Package: openssh / 1:6.7p1-5+deb8u4

Metadata

Package Version Patches format
openssh 1:6.7p1-5+deb8u4 3.0 (quilt)

Patch series

view the series file
Patch File delta Description
gssapi.patch | (download)

ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 113 + 0 - 0 !
Makefile.in | 3 2 + 1 - 0 !
auth-krb5.c | 17 15 + 2 - 0 !
auth2-gss.c | 48 45 + 3 - 0 !
auth2.c | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
clientloop.c | 13 13 + 0 - 0 !
config.h.in | 6 6 + 0 - 0 !
configure | 57 57 + 0 - 0 !
configure.ac | 24 24 + 0 - 0 !
gss-genr.c | 275 271 + 4 - 0 !
gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 78 + 7 - 0 !
gss-serv.c | 221 193 + 28 - 0 !
kex.c | 16 16 + 0 - 0 !
kex.h | 14 14 + 0 - 0 !
kexgssc.c | 332 332 + 0 - 0 !
kexgsss.c | 290 290 + 0 - 0 !
monitor.c | 108 107 + 1 - 0 !
monitor.h | 3 3 + 0 - 0 !
monitor_wrap.c | 47 46 + 1 - 0 !
monitor_wrap.h | 4 3 + 1 - 0 !
readconf.c | 42 42 + 0 - 0 !
readconf.h | 5 5 + 0 - 0 !
servconf.c | 38 37 + 1 - 0 !
servconf.h | 3 3 + 0 - 0 !
ssh-gss.h | 41 37 + 4 - 0 !
ssh_config | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
ssh_config.5 | 34 33 + 1 - 0 !
sshconnect2.c | 124 120 + 4 - 0 !
sshd.c | 110 110 + 0 - 0 !
sshd_config | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
sshd_config.5 | 28 28 + 0 - 0 !
sshkey.c | 3 2 + 1 - 0 !
sshkey.h | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
33 files changed, 2052 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)

 gssapi key exchange support

This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
years.  This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface.  This one is
particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
system resources."

However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
-krb5 packages (as we used to have).  It seems to have a generally good
security history.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
Last-Updated: 2014-10-07

Patch-Name: gssapi.patch

restore tcp wrappers.patch | (download)

configure.ac | 57 57 + 0 - 0 !
sshd.8 | 7 7 + 0 - 0 !
sshd.c | 25 25 + 0 - 0 !
3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)

 restore tcp wrappers support

Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7.  See this message
and thread:

  https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html

It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the
other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.

It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
before a freeze.

selinux role.patch | (download)

auth.h | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
auth1.c | 8 7 + 1 - 0 !
auth2.c | 10 8 + 2 - 0 !
monitor.c | 32 29 + 3 - 0 !
monitor.h | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
monitor_wrap.c | 22 20 + 2 - 0 !
monitor_wrap.h | 3 2 + 1 - 0 !
openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 27 20 + 7 - 0 !
openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 4 2 + 2 - 0 !
platform.c | 4 2 + 2 - 0 !
platform.h | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
session.c | 10 5 + 5 - 0 !
session.h | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
sshd.c | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
sshpty.c | 4 2 + 2 - 0 !
sshpty.h | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
16 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

 handle selinux authorisation roles

Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
will need an SSH protocol change.  In the meantime, this came from Debian's
SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
ssh vulnkey compat.patch | (download)

readconf.c | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
servconf.c | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

 accept obsolete ssh-vulnkey configuration options

These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
configuration options are still present.

ssh1 keepalive.patch | (download)

clientloop.c | 25 15 + 10 - 0 !
ssh_config.5 | 5 4 + 1 - 0 !
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

 partial server keep-alive implementation for ssh1

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1712
keepalive extensions.patch | (download)

readconf.c | 14 12 + 2 - 0 !
ssh_config.5 | 21 19 + 2 - 0 !
sshd_config.5 | 3 3 + 0 - 0 !
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

 various keepalive extensions

Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported
in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by
ServerAliveInterval.  (We're probably stuck with this bit for
compatibility.)

In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes.

Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of
keepalives.

syslog level silent.patch | (download)

log.c | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
ssh.c | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

 "loglevel silent" compatibility

"LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) was introduced in Debian openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1 to
match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal
errors.  However, this was unintentionally broken in 1:4.6p1-2 and nobody
complained, so we've dropped most of it.  The parts that remain are basic
configuration file compatibility, and an adjustment to "Pseudo-terminal will
not be allocated ..." which should be split out into a separate patch.

quieter signals.patch | (download)

clientloop.c | 6 4 + 2 - 0 !
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

 reduce severity of "killed by signal %d"

This produces irritating messages when using ProxyCommand or other programs
that use ssh under the covers (e.g. Subversion).  These messages are more
normally printed by the calling program, such as the shell.

According to the upstream bug, the right way to avoid this is to use the -q
option, so we may drop this patch after further investigation into whether
any software in Debian is still relying on it.

helpful wait terminate.patch | (download)

serverloop.c | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

 mention ~& when waiting for forwarded connections to terminate

Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/50308
consolekit.patch | (download)

Makefile.in | 3 2 + 1 - 0 !
configure | 132 132 + 0 - 0 !
configure.ac | 25 25 + 0 - 0 !
consolekit.c | 241 241 + 0 - 0 !
consolekit.h | 24 24 + 0 - 0 !
monitor.c | 42 42 + 0 - 0 !
monitor.h | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
monitor_wrap.c | 30 30 + 0 - 0 !
monitor_wrap.h | 4 4 + 0 - 0 !
session.c | 13 13 + 0 - 0 !
session.h | 6 6 + 0 - 0 !
11 files changed, 521 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

 add support for registering consolekit sessions on login

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1450
Last-Updated: 2014-10-07

Patch-Name: consolekit.patch

user group modes.patch | (download)

auth-rhosts.c | 6 2 + 4 - 0 !
auth.c | 9 3 + 6 - 0 !
misc.c | 69 68 + 1 - 0 !
misc.h | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
platform.c | 16 0 + 16 - 0 !
readconf.c | 5 3 + 2 - 0 !
ssh.1 | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
ssh_config.5 | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
8 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

 allow harmless group-writability

Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be
group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's
owner.  Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding
about the contents of gr->gr_mem).  Given that per-user groups and umask 002
are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in
setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by
default.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347
scp quoting.patch | (download)

scp.c | 12 10 + 2 - 0 !
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

 adjust scp quoting in verbose mode

Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
confusing with spaces.

This should be revised to mimic real shell quoting.

Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/89945
shell path.patch | (download)

sshconnect.c | 4 2 + 2 - 0 !
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

 look for $shell on the path for proxycommand/localcommand

There's some debate on the upstream bug about whether POSIX requires this.
I (Colin Watson) agree with Vincent and think it does.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1494
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/492728
dnssec sshfp.patch | (download)

dns.c | 14 13 + 1 - 0 !
openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 10 5 + 5 - 0 !
openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h | 3 3 + 0 - 0 !
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

 force use of dnssec even if "options edns0" isn't in resolv.conf

This allows SSHFP DNS records to be verified if glibc 2.11 is installed.

auth log verbosity.patch | (download)

auth-options.c | 35 26 + 9 - 0 !
auth-options.h | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
auth-rsa.c | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
auth2-pubkey.c | 3 3 + 0 - 0 !
4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

 quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used

Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630606
mention ssh keygen on keychange.patch | (download)

sshconnect.c | 7 6 + 1 - 0 !
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

 mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
package versioning.patch | (download)

sshconnect.c | 4 2 + 2 - 0 !
sshd.c | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
version.h | 7 6 + 1 - 0 !
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

 include the debian version in our identification

This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
vulnerabilities.  It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
vulnerable-looking version strings.  (However, see debian-banner.patch.)

debian banner.patch | (download)

servconf.c | 9 9 + 0 - 0 !
servconf.h | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
sshd.c | 3 2 + 1 - 0 !
sshd_config.5 | 5 5 + 0 - 0 !
4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

 add debianbanner server configuration option

Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.

Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
authorized keys man symlink.patch | (download)

Makefile.in | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

 install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
lintian symlink pickiness.patch | (download)

Makefile.in | 4 2 + 2 - 0 !
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

 fix picky lintian errors about slogin symlinks

Apparently this breaks some SVR4 packaging systems, so upstream can't win
either way and opted to keep the status quo.  We need this patch anyway.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1728
openbsd docs.patch | (download)

moduli.5 | 4 2 + 2 - 0 !
ssh-keygen.1 | 12 4 + 8 - 0 !
ssh.1 | 4 4 + 0 - 0 !
sshd.8 | 5 2 + 3 - 0 !
sshd_config.5 | 3 1 + 2 - 0 !
5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

 adjust various openbsd-specific references in manual pages

No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
 http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
 http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
 http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
 https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))

ssh argv0.patch | (download)

ssh.1 | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

 ssh(1): refer to ssh-argv0(1)

Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to.  Debian ships an
ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
page from ssh(1).

Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
doc hash tab completion.patch | (download)

ssh_config.5 | 3 3 + 0 - 0 !
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

 document that hashknownhosts may break tab-completion

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
doc upstart.patch | (download)

sshd.8 | 5 4 + 1 - 0 !
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

 refer to ssh's upstart job as well as its init script

ssh agent setgid.patch | (download)

ssh-agent.1 | 15 15 + 0 - 0 !
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

 document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)

Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
no openssl version status.patch | (download)

openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c | 6 3 + 3 - 0 !
openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

 don't check the status field of the openssl version

There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian).  If it's
not compatible the soname will change.  OpenSSH seems to want to do a
check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
status of the release the same.  Remove that check on the status since
it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.

gnome ssh askpass2 icon.patch | (download)

contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 2 + 0 - 0 !
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

 give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon

Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
sigstop.patch | (download)

sshd.c | 10 10 + 0 - 0 !
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

 support synchronisation with service supervisor using sigstop

debian config.patch | (download)

readconf.c | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
ssh_config | 7 6 + 1 - 0 !
ssh_config.5 | 19 18 + 1 - 0 !
sshd_config | 1 1 + 0 - 0 !
sshd_config.5 | 25 25 + 0 - 0 !
5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

 various debian-specific configuration changes

ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).

ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).

ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
worms.

ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication and disable GSSAPIDelegateCredentials by
default.

sshd: Refer to /usr/share/doc/openssh-server/README.Debian.gz alongside
PermitRootLogin default.

Document all of this, along with several sshd defaults set in
debian/openssh-server.postinst.

disable roaming.patch | (download)

readconf.c | 5 2 + 3 - 0 !
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

 disable roaming in ssh client

SSH roaming implementation in openssh client is vulnerable to an
information leak (CVE-2016-0777) and heap-based buffer overflow
(CVE-2016-0778). The information leak is somehow attacker-controller,
and it is for example possible to extract the ssh client private keys.

Patch-Name: disable-roaming.patch

CVE 2015 8325.patch | (download)

session.c | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

 ignore pam environment vars when uselogin=yes

If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables
and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may
attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables
set via PAM.

CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh, via Colin Watson

Patch-Name: CVE-2015-8325.patch

CVE 2016 6210 1.patch | (download)

auth-passwd.c | 12 8 + 4 - 0 !
openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c | 34 34 + 0 - 0 !
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

 determine appropriate salt for invalid users.

When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses
the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the
password supplied by the client.  That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on
systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid
CVE 2016 6210 2.patch | (download)

auth-pam.c | 35 31 + 4 - 0 !
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

 mitigate timing of disallowed users pam logins.

When sshd decides to not allow a login (eg PermitRootLogin=no) and
it's using PAM, it sends a fake password to PAM so that the timing for
CVE 2016 6210 3.patch | (download)

openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c | 24 15 + 9 - 0 !
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

 search users for one with a valid salt.

If the root account is locked (eg password "!!" or "*LK*") keep looking
until we find a user with a valid salt to use for crypting passwords of
invalid users.  ok djm@

Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-3.patch

dash dash before hostname.patch | (download)

ssh.c | 9 6 + 3 - 0 !
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

 make "--" before hostname end option processing

make "--" before the hostname terminate command-line
option processing completely; previous behaviour would not prevent further
options appearing after the hostname (ssh has a supported options after the
hostname for >20 years, so that's too late to change).

ok deraadt@

Upstream-ID: ef5ee50571b98ad94dcdf8282204e877ec88ad89