GIT update of https://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git/release/2.42/master from glibc-2.42 to c5476b7907d01207ede6bf57b26cef151b601f35 diff --git a/ADVISORIES b/ADVISORIES new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d4e33f2df3 --- /dev/null +++ b/ADVISORIES @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +For the GNU C Library Security Advisories, see the git master branch: +https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=tree;f=advisories;hb=HEAD diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS index f0b0e924a4..1d04bdfef8 100644 --- a/NEWS +++ b/NEWS @@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ See the end for copying conditions. Please send GNU C library bug reports via using `glibc' in the "product" field. +Version 2.42.1 + +The following bugs were resolved with this release: + + [31943] _dl_find_object can fail if ld.so contains gaps between load segments + [32994] stdlib: resolve a double lock init issue after fork + [33245] nptl: nptl: error in internal cancellation syscall handling + Version 2.42 Major new features: diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0001 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0001 deleted file mode 100644 index 3d19c91b6a..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0001 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -printf: incorrect output for integers with thousands separator and width field - -When the printf family of functions is called with a format specifier -that uses an (enable grouping) and a minimum width -specifier, the resulting output could be larger than reasonably expected -by a caller that computed a tight bound on the buffer size. The -resulting larger than expected output could result in a buffer overflow -in the printf family of functions. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2023-25139 -Public-Date: 2023-02-02 -Vulnerable-Commit: e88b9f0e5cc50cab57a299dc7efe1a4eb385161d (2.37) -Fix-Commit: c980549cc6a1c03c23cc2fe3e7b0fe626a0364b0 (2.38) -Fix-Commit: 07b9521fc6369d000216b96562ff7c0ed32a16c4 (2.37-4) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0002 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0002 deleted file mode 100644 index 5122669a64..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0002 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -getaddrinfo: Stack read overflow in no-aaaa mode - -If the system is configured in no-aaaa mode via /etc/resolv.conf, -getaddrinfo is called for the AF_UNSPEC address family, and a DNS -response is received over TCP that is larger than 2048 bytes, -getaddrinfo may potentially disclose stack contents via the returned -address data, or crash. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2023-4527 -Public-Date: 2023-09-12 -Vulnerable-Commit: f282cdbe7f436c75864e5640a409a10485e9abb2 (2.36) -Fix-Commit: bd77dd7e73e3530203be1c52c8a29d08270cb25d (2.39) -Fix-Commit: 4ea972b7edd7e36610e8cde18bf7a8149d7bac4f (2.36-113) -Fix-Commit: b7529346025a130fee483d42178b5c118da971bb (2.37-38) -Fix-Commit: b25508dd774b617f99419bdc3cf2ace4560cd2d6 (2.38-19) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0003 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0003 deleted file mode 100644 index d3aef80348..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0003 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -getaddrinfo: Potential use-after-free - -When an NSS plugin only implements the _gethostbyname2_r and -_getcanonname_r callbacks, getaddrinfo could use memory that was freed -during buffer resizing, potentially causing a crash or read or write to -arbitrary memory. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2023-4806 -Public-Date: 2023-09-12 -Fix-Commit: 973fe93a5675c42798b2161c6f29c01b0e243994 (2.39) -Fix-Commit: e09ee267c03e3150c2c9ba28625ab130705a485e (2.34-420) -Fix-Commit: e3ccb230a961b4797510e6a1f5f21fd9021853e7 (2.35-270) -Fix-Commit: a9728f798ec7f05454c95637ee6581afaa9b487d (2.36-115) -Fix-Commit: 6529a7466c935f36e9006b854d6f4e1d4876f942 (2.37-39) -Fix-Commit: 00ae4f10b504bc4564e9f22f00907093f1ab9338 (2.38-20) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0004 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0004 deleted file mode 100644 index 5286a7aa54..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0004 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -tunables: local privilege escalation through buffer overflow - -If a tunable of the form NAME=NAME=VAL is passed in the environment of a -setuid program and NAME is valid, it may result in a buffer overflow, -which could be exploited to achieve escalated privileges. This flaw was -introduced in glibc 2.34. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2023-4911 -Public-Date: 2023-10-03 -Vulnerable-Commit: 2ed18c5b534d9e92fc006202a5af0df6b72e7aca (2.34) -Fix-Commit: 1056e5b4c3f2d90ed2b4a55f96add28da2f4c8fa (2.39) -Fix-Commit: dcc367f148bc92e7f3778a125f7a416b093964d9 (2.34-423) -Fix-Commit: c84018a05aec80f5ee6f682db0da1130b0196aef (2.35-274) -Fix-Commit: 22955ad85186ee05834e47e665056148ca07699c (2.36-118) -Fix-Commit: b4e23c75aea756b4bddc4abcf27a1c6dca8b6bd3 (2.37-45) -Fix-Commit: 750a45a783906a19591fb8ff6b7841470f1f5701 (2.38-27) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0005 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0005 deleted file mode 100644 index cc4eb90b82..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0005 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -getaddrinfo: DoS due to memory leak - -The fix for CVE-2023-4806 introduced a memory leak when an application -calls getaddrinfo for AF_INET6 with AI_CANONNAME, AI_ALL and AI_V4MAPPED -flags set. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2023-5156 -Public-Date: 2023-09-25 -Vulnerable-Commit: e09ee267c03e3150c2c9ba28625ab130705a485e (2.34-420) -Vulnerable-Commit: e3ccb230a961b4797510e6a1f5f21fd9021853e7 (2.35-270) -Vulnerable-Commit: a9728f798ec7f05454c95637ee6581afaa9b487d (2.36-115) -Vulnerable-Commit: 6529a7466c935f36e9006b854d6f4e1d4876f942 (2.37-39) -Vulnerable-Commit: 00ae4f10b504bc4564e9f22f00907093f1ab9338 (2.38-20) -Fix-Commit: 8006457ab7e1cd556b919f477348a96fe88f2e49 (2.34-421) -Fix-Commit: 17092c0311f954e6f3c010f73ce3a78c24ac279a (2.35-272) -Fix-Commit: 856bac55f98dc840e7c27cfa82262b933385de90 (2.36-116) -Fix-Commit: 4473d1b87d04b25cdd0e0354814eeaa421328268 (2.37-42) -Fix-Commit: 5ee59ca371b99984232d7584fe2b1a758b4421d3 (2.38-24) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0001 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0001 deleted file mode 100644 index 28931c75ae..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0001 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -syslog: Heap buffer overflow in __vsyslog_internal - -__vsyslog_internal did not handle a case where printing a SYSLOG_HEADER -containing a long program name failed to update the required buffer -size, leading to the allocation and overflow of a too-small buffer on -the heap. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2023-6246 -Public-Date: 2024-01-30 -Vulnerable-Commit: 52a5be0df411ef3ff45c10c7c308cb92993d15b1 (2.37) -Fix-Commit: 6bd0e4efcc78f3c0115e5ea9739a1642807450da (2.39) -Fix-Commit: 23514c72b780f3da097ecf33a793b7ba9c2070d2 (2.38-42) -Fix-Commit: 97a4292aa4a2642e251472b878d0ec4c46a0e59a (2.37-57) -Vulnerable-Commit: b0e7888d1fa2dbd2d9e1645ec8c796abf78880b9 (2.36-16) -Fix-Commit: d1a83b6767f68b3cb5b4b4ea2617254acd040c82 (2.36-126) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0002 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0002 deleted file mode 100644 index 940bfcf2fc..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0002 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -syslog: Heap buffer overflow in __vsyslog_internal - -__vsyslog_internal used the return value of snprintf/vsnprintf to -calculate buffer sizes for memory allocation. If these functions (for -any reason) failed and returned -1, the resulting buffer would be too -small to hold output. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2023-6779 -Public-Date: 2024-01-30 -Vulnerable-Commit: 52a5be0df411ef3ff45c10c7c308cb92993d15b1 (2.37) -Fix-Commit: 7e5a0c286da33159d47d0122007aac016f3e02cd (2.39) -Fix-Commit: d0338312aace5bbfef85e03055e1212dd0e49578 (2.38-43) -Fix-Commit: 67062eccd9a65d7fda9976a56aeaaf6c25a80214 (2.37-58) -Vulnerable-Commit: b0e7888d1fa2dbd2d9e1645ec8c796abf78880b9 (2.36-16) -Fix-Commit: 2bc9d7c002bdac38b5c2a3f11b78e309d7765b83 (2.36-127) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0003 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0003 deleted file mode 100644 index b43a5150ab..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0003 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -syslog: Integer overflow in __vsyslog_internal - -__vsyslog_internal calculated a buffer size by adding two integers, but -did not first check if the addition would overflow. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2023-6780 -Public-Date: 2024-01-30 -Vulnerable-Commit: 52a5be0df411ef3ff45c10c7c308cb92993d15b1 (2.37) -Fix-Commit: ddf542da94caf97ff43cc2875c88749880b7259b (2.39) -Fix-Commit: d37c2b20a4787463d192b32041c3406c2bd91de0 (2.38-44) -Fix-Commit: 2b58cba076e912961ceaa5fa58588e4b10f791c0 (2.37-59) -Vulnerable-Commit: b0e7888d1fa2dbd2d9e1645ec8c796abf78880b9 (2.36-16) -Fix-Commit: b9b7d6a27aa0632f334352fa400771115b3c69b7 (2.36-128) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0004 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0004 deleted file mode 100644 index 08df2b3118..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0004 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28 +0,0 @@ -ISO-2022-CN-EXT: fix out-of-bound writes when writing escape sequence - -The iconv() function in the GNU C Library versions 2.39 and older may -overflow the output buffer passed to it by up to 4 bytes when converting -strings to the ISO-2022-CN-EXT character set, which may be used to -crash an application or overwrite a neighbouring variable. - -ISO-2022-CN-EXT uses escape sequences to indicate character set changes -(as specified by RFC 1922). While the SOdesignation has the expected -bounds checks, neither SS2designation nor SS3designation have its; -allowing a write overflow of 1, 2, or 3 bytes with fixed values: -'$+I', '$+J', '$+K', '$+L', '$+M', or '$*H'. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2024-2961 -Public-Date: 2024-04-17 -Vulnerable-Commit: 755104edc75c53f4a0e7440334e944ad3c6b32fc (2.1.93-169) -Fix-Commit: f9dc609e06b1136bb0408be9605ce7973a767ada (2.40) -Fix-Commit: 31da30f23cddd36db29d5b6a1c7619361b271fb4 (2.39-31) -Fix-Commit: e1135387deded5d73924f6ca20c72a35dc8e1bda (2.38-66) -Fix-Commit: 89ce64b269a897a7780e4c73a7412016381c6ecf (2.37-89) -Fix-Commit: 4ed98540a7fd19f458287e783ae59c41e64df7b5 (2.36-164) -Fix-Commit: 36280d1ce5e245aabefb877fe4d3c6cff95dabfa (2.35-315) -Fix-Commit: a8b0561db4b9847ebfbfec20075697d5492a363c (2.34-459) -Fix-Commit: ed4f16ff6bed3037266f1fa682ebd32a18fce29c (2.33-263) -Fix-Commit: 682ad4c8623e611a971839990ceef00346289cc9 (2.32-140) -Fix-Commit: 3703c32a8d304c1ee12126134ce69be965f38000 (2.31-154) - -Reported-By: Charles Fol diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0005 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0005 deleted file mode 100644 index a59596610a..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0005 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -nscd: Stack-based buffer overflow in netgroup cache - -If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) fixed size cache is exhausted -by client requests then a subsequent client request for netgroup data -may result in a stack-based buffer overflow. This flaw was introduced -in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd. - -This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33599 -Public-Date: 2024-04-23 -Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15) -Fix-Commit: 69c58d5ef9f584ea198bd00f7964d364d0e6b921 (2.31-155) -Fix-Commit: a77064893bfe8a701770e2f53a4d33805bc47a5a (2.32-141) -Fix-Commit: 5c75001a96abcd50cbdb74df24c3f013188d076e (2.33-264) -Fix-Commit: 52f73e5c4e29b14e79167272297977f360ae1e97 (2.34-460) -Fix-Commit: 7a95873543ce225376faf13bb71c43dea6d24f86 (2.35-316) -Fix-Commit: caa3151ca460bdd9330adeedd68c3112d97bffe4 (2.36-165) -Fix-Commit: f75c298e747b2b8b41b1c2f551c011a52c41bfd1 (2.37-91) -Fix-Commit: 5968aebb86164034b8f8421b4abab2f837a5bdaf (2.38-72) -Fix-Commit: 1263d583d2e28afb8be53f8d6922f0842036f35d (2.39-35) -Fix-Commit: 87801a8fd06db1d654eea3e4f7626ff476a9bdaa (2.40) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0006 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0006 deleted file mode 100644 index d44148d3d9..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0006 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -nscd: Null pointer crash after notfound response - -If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) cache fails to add a not-found -netgroup response to the cache, the client request can result in a null -pointer dereference. This flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the -cache was added to nscd. - -This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33600 -Public-Date: 2024-04-24 -Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15) -Fix-Commit: b048a482f088e53144d26a61c390bed0210f49f2 (2.40) -Fix-Commit: 7835b00dbce53c3c87bbbb1754a95fb5e58187aa (2.40) -Fix-Commit: c99f886de54446cd4447db6b44be93dabbdc2f8b (2.39-37) -Fix-Commit: 5a508e0b508c8ad53bd0d2fb48fd71b242626341 (2.39-36) -Fix-Commit: 2ae9446c1b7a3064743b4a51c0bbae668ee43e4c (2.38-74) -Fix-Commit: 541ea5172aa658c4bd5c6c6d6fd13903c3d5bb0a (2.38-73) -Fix-Commit: a8070b31043c7585c36ba68a74298c4f7af075c3 (2.37-93) -Fix-Commit: 5eea50c4402e39588de98aa1d4469a79774703d4 (2.37-92) -Fix-Commit: f205b3af56740e3b014915b1bd3b162afe3407ef (2.36-167) -Fix-Commit: c34f470a615b136170abd16142da5dd0c024f7d1 (2.36-166) -Fix-Commit: bafadc589fbe21ae330e8c2af74db9da44a17660 (2.35-318) -Fix-Commit: 4370bef52b0f3f3652c6aa13d7a9bb3ac079746d (2.35-317) -Fix-Commit: 1f94122289a9bf7dba573f5d60327aaa2b85cf2e (2.34-462) -Fix-Commit: 966d6ac9e40222b84bb21674cc4f83c8d72a5a26 (2.34-461) -Fix-Commit: e3eef1b8fbdd3a7917af466ca9c4b7477251ca79 (2.33-266) -Fix-Commit: f20a8d696b13c6261b52a6434899121f8b19d5a7 (2.33-265) -Fix-Commit: be602180146de37582a3da3a0caa4b719645de9c (2.32-143) -Fix-Commit: 394eae338199078b7961b051c191539870742d7b (2.32-142) -Fix-Commit: 8d7949183760170c61e55def723c1d8050187874 (2.31-157) -Fix-Commit: 304ce5fe466c4762b21b36c26926a4657b59b53e (2.31-156) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0007 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0007 deleted file mode 100644 index b6928fa27a..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0007 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28 +0,0 @@ -nscd: netgroup cache may terminate daemon on memory allocation failure - -The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache uses xmalloc or -xrealloc and these functions may terminate the process due to a memory -allocation failure resulting in a denial of service to the clients. The -flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd. - -This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary. - -Subsequent refactoring of the netgroup cache only added more uses of -xmalloc and xrealloc. Uses of xmalloc and xrealloc in other parts of -nscd only occur during startup of the daemon and so are not affected by -client requests that could trigger an out of memory followed by -termination. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33601 -Public-Date: 2024-04-24 -Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15) -Fix-Commit: c04a21e050d64a1193a6daab872bca2528bda44b (2.40) -Fix-Commit: a9a8d3eebb145779a18d90e3966009a1daa63cd8 (2.39-38) -Fix-Commit: 71af8ca864345d39b746d5cee84b94b430fad5db (2.38-75) -Fix-Commit: 6e106dc214d6a033a4e945d1c6cf58061f1c5f1f (2.37-94) -Fix-Commit: b6742463694b1dfdd5120b91ee21cf05d15ec2e2 (2.36-168) -Fix-Commit: 7a5864cac60e06000394128a5a2817b03542f5a3 (2.35-319) -Fix-Commit: 86f1d5f4129c373ac6fb6df5bcf38273838843cb (2.34-463) -Fix-Commit: 4d27d4b9a188786fc6a56745506cec2acfc51f83 (2.33-267) -Fix-Commit: 3ed195a8ec89da281e3c4bf887a13d281b72d8f4 (2.32-144) -Fix-Commit: bbf5a58ccb55679217f94de706164d15372fbbc0 (2.31-158) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0008 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0008 deleted file mode 100644 index d93e2a6f0b..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0008 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -nscd: netgroup cache assumes NSS callback uses in-buffer strings - -The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache can corrupt memory -when the NSS callback does not store all strings in the provided buffer. -The flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd. - -This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary. - -There is no guarantee from the NSS callback API that the returned -strings are all within the buffer. However, the netgroup cache code -assumes that the NSS callback uses in-buffer strings and if it doesn't -the buffer resizing logic could lead to potential memory corruption. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33602 -Public-Date: 2024-04-24 -Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15) -Fix-Commit: c04a21e050d64a1193a6daab872bca2528bda44b (2.40) -Fix-Commit: a9a8d3eebb145779a18d90e3966009a1daa63cd8 (2.39-38) -Fix-Commit: 71af8ca864345d39b746d5cee84b94b430fad5db (2.38-75) -Fix-Commit: 6e106dc214d6a033a4e945d1c6cf58061f1c5f1f (2.37-94) -Fix-Commit: b6742463694b1dfdd5120b91ee21cf05d15ec2e2 (2.36-168) -Fix-Commit: 7a5864cac60e06000394128a5a2817b03542f5a3 (2.35-319) -Fix-Commit: 86f1d5f4129c373ac6fb6df5bcf38273838843cb (2.34-463) -Fix-Commit: 4d27d4b9a188786fc6a56745506cec2acfc51f83 (2.33-267) -Fix-Commit: 3ed195a8ec89da281e3c4bf887a13d281b72d8f4 (2.32-144) -Fix-Commit: bbf5a58ccb55679217f94de706164d15372fbbc0 (2.31-158) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0001 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0001 deleted file mode 100644 index b053d32e91..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0001 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -assert: Buffer overflow when printing assertion failure message - -When the assert() function fails, it does not allocate enough space for the -assertion failure message string and size information, which may lead to a -buffer overflow if the message string size aligns to page size. - -This bug can be triggered when an assertion in a program fails. The assertion -failure message is allocated to allow developers to see this failure in core -dumps and it typically includes, in addition to the invariant assertion -string and function name, the name of the program. If the name of the failing -program is user controlled, for example on a local system, this could allow an -attacker to control the assertion failure to trigger this buffer overflow. - -The only viable vector for exploitation of this bug is local, if a setuid -program exists that has an existing bug that results in an assertion failure. -No such program has been discovered at the time of publishing this advisory, -but the presence of custom setuid programs, although strongly discouraged as a -security practice, cannot be discounted. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2025-0395 -Public-Date: 2025-01-22 -Vulnerable-Commit: f8a3b5bf8fa1d0c43d2458e03cc109a04fdef194 (2.13-175) -Fix-Commit: 68ee0f704cb81e9ad0a78c644a83e1e9cd2ee578 (2.41) -Fix-Commit: cdb9ba84191ce72e86346fb8b1d906e7cd930ea2 (2.42) -Fix-Commit: 69fda28279b497bd405fdd442a6d8e4d3d5f681b (2.41-7) -Fix-Commit: 7d4b6bcae91f29d7b4daf15bab06b66cf1d2217c (2.40-66) -Fix-Commit: d6c156c326999f144cb5b73d29982108d549ad8a (2.40-71) -Fix-Commit: 808a84a8b81468b517a4d721fdc62069cb8c211f (2.39-146) -Fix-Commit: f6d48470aef9264d2d56f4c4533eb76db7f9c2e4 (2.39-150) -Fix-Commit: c32fd59314c343db88c3ea4a203870481d33c3d2 (2.38-122) -Fix-Commit: f984e2d7e8299726891a1a497a3c36cd5542a0bf (2.38-124) -Fix-Commit: a3d7865b098a3a67c44f7812208d9ce4718873ba (2.37-143) -Fix-Commit: b989519fe1683c204ac24ec92830e3fe3bfaccad (2.37-146) -Fix-Commit: 7971add7ee4171fdd8dfd17e7c04c4ed77a18845 (2.36-216) -Fix-Commit: 0487893d5c5bc6710d83d7c3152d888a0339559e (2.36-219) -Fix-Commit: 8b5d4be762419c4f6176261c6fea40ac559b88dc (2.35-370) -Fix-Commit: 8b3d09dc0d350191985f9d291cc30ce96f034b49 (2.35-373) -Fix-Commit: df4e1f4a5096b385c9bcc94424cf2eaa227b3761 (2.34-500) -Fix-Commit: 31eb872cb21449832ab47ad5db83281d240e1d03 (2.34-503) -Reported-By: Qualys Security Advisory diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0002 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0002 deleted file mode 100644 index 161da13dd4..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0002 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -elf: static setuid binary dlopen may incorrectly search LD_LIBRARY_PATH - -A statically linked setuid binary that calls dlopen (including internal -dlopen calls after setlocale or calls to NSS functions such as getaddrinfo) -may incorrectly search LD_LIBRARY_PATH to determine which library to load, -leading to the execution of library code that is attacker controlled. - -The only viable vector for exploitation of this bug is local, if a static -setuid program exists, and that program calls dlopen, then it may search -LD_LIBRARY_PATH to locate the SONAME to load. No such program has been -discovered at the time of publishing this advisory, but the presence of -custom setuid programs, although strongly discouraged as a security -practice, cannot be discounted. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2025-4802 -Public-Date: 2025-05-16 -Vulnerable-Commit: 10e93d968716ab82931d593bada121c17c0a4b93 (2.27) -Fix-Commit: 5451fa962cd0a90a0e2ec1d8910a559ace02bba0 (2.39) -Fix-Commit: 3be3728df2f1912c80abd3288bc6e3a25ad679e4 (2.38-132) -Fix-Commit: 7403ede2d7752e59e0c47d5d33d73c2bf850e7be (2.37-154) -Fix-Commit: 2ef7850279b2931caf6d6d6743ebaa91839e1cf7 (2.36-227) -Fix-Commit: 621c65ccf12ddd415ceeb2234423bd1acd0fabb3 (2.35-387) -Fix-Commit: 35018c0fd20eac9ceaf60060fed2745b3177359d (2.34-517) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0003 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0003 deleted file mode 100644 index 2adeb3ce00..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0003 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -power10: strcmp fails to save and restore nonvolatile vector registers - -The Power 10 implementation of strcmp in -sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/le/power10/strcmp.S failed to save/restore -nonvolatile vector registers in the 32-byte aligned loop path. This -results in callers reading content from those registers in a different -context, potentially altering program logic. - -There could be a program context where a user controlled string could -leak through strcmp into program code, thus altering its logic. There -is also a potential for sensitive strings passed into strcmp leaking -through the clobbered registers into parts of the calling program that -should otherwise not have had access to those strings. - -The impact of this flaw is limited to applications running on Power 10 -hardware that use the nonvolatile vector registers, i.e. v20 to v31 -assuming that they have been treated in accordance with the OpenPower -psABI. It is possible to work around the issue for those specific -applications by setting the glibc.cpu.hwcaps tunable to "-arch_3_1" like -so: - - export GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.cpu.hwcaps=-arch_3_1 - -CVE-Id: CVE-2025-5702 -Public-Date: 2025-06-04 -Vulnerable-Commit: 3367d8e180848030d1646f088759f02b8dfe0d6f (2.39) -Fix-Commit: 15808c77b35319e67ee0dc8f984a9a1a434701bc (2.42) -Fix-Commit: 0c76c951620f9e12df2a89b2c684878b55bb6795 (2.41-60) -Fix-Commit: 7e12550b8e3a11764a4a9090ce6bd3fc23fc8a8e (2.40-139) -Fix-Commit: 06a70769fd0b2e1f2a3085ad50ab620282bd77b3 (2.39-209) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0004 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0004 deleted file mode 100644 index 9409ca27c4..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0004 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -power10: strncmp fails to save and restore nonvolatile vector registers - -The Power 10 implementation of strncmp in -sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/le/power10/strncmp.S failed to save/restore -nonvolatile vector registers in the 32-byte aligned loop path. This -results in callers reading content from those registers in a different -context, potentially altering program logic. - -There could be a program context where a user controlled string could -leak through strncmp into program code, thus altering its logic. There -is also a potential for sensitive strings passed into strncmp leaking -through the clobbered registers into parts of the calling program that -should otherwise not have had access to those strings. - -The impact of this flaw is limited to applications running on Power 10 -hardware that use the nonvolatile vector registers, i.e. v20 to v31 -assuming that they have been treated in accordance with the OpenPower -psABI. It is possible to work around the issue for those specific -applications by setting the glibc.cpu.hwcaps tunable to "-arch_3_1" like -so: - - export GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.cpu.hwcaps=-arch_3_1 - -CVE-Id: CVE-2025-5745 -Public-Date: 2025-06-05 -Vulnerable-Commit: 23f0d81608d0ca6379894ef81670cf30af7fd081 (2.40) -Fix-Commit: 63c60101ce7c5eac42be90f698ba02099b41b965 (2.42) -Fix-Commit: 84bdbf8a6f2fdafd3661489dbb7f79835a52da82 (2.41-57) -Fix-Commit: 42a5a940c974d02540c8da26d6374c744d148cb9 (2.40-136) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0005 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0005 deleted file mode 100644 index 8bcccc59a5..0000000000 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2025-0005 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -posix: Fix double-free after allocation failure in regcomp - -The regcomp function in the GNU C library version from 2.4 to 2.41 is -subject to a double free if some previous allocation fails. It can be -accomplished either by a malloc failure or by using an interposed -malloc that injects random malloc failures. The double free can allow -buffer manipulation depending of how the regex is constructed. -This issue affects all architectures and ABIs supported by the GNU C -library. - -CVE-Id: CVE-2025-8058 -Public-Date: 2025-07-22 -Vulnerable-Commit: 963d8d782fc98fb6dc3a66f0068795f9920c269d (2.3.3-1596) -Fix-Commit: 7ea06e994093fa0bcca0d0ee2c1db271d8d7885d (2.42) diff --git a/advisories/README b/advisories/README deleted file mode 100644 index b8f8a829ca..0000000000 --- a/advisories/README +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -GNU C Library Security Advisory Format -====================================== - -Security advisories in this directory follow a simple git commit log -format, with a heading and free-format description augmented with tags -to allow parsing key information. References to code changes are -specific to the glibc repository and follow a specific format: - - Tag-name: (release-version) - -The indicates a specific commit in the repository. The -release-version indicates the publicly consumable release in which this -commit is known to exist. The release-version is derived from the -git-describe format, (i.e. stripped out from glibc-2.34.NNN-gxxxx) and -is of the form 2.34-NNN. If the -NNN suffix is absent, it means that -the change is in that release tarball, otherwise the change is on the -release/2.YY/master branch and not in any released tarball. - -The following tags are currently being used: - -CVE-Id: -This is the CVE-Id assigned under the CVE Program -(https://www.cve.org/). - -Public-Date: -The date this issue became publicly known. - -Vulnerable-Commit: -The commit that introduced this vulnerability. There could be multiple -entries, one for each release branch in the glibc repository; the -release-version portion of this tag should tell you which branch this is -on. - -Fix-Commit: -The commit that fixed this vulnerability. There could be multiple -entries for each release branch in the glibc repository, indicating that -all of those commits contributed to fixing that issue in each of those -branches. - -Reported-By: -The entity that reported this issue. There could be multiple entries, one for -each reporter. - -Adding an Advisory ------------------- - -An advisory for a CVE needs to be added on the master branch in two steps: - -1. Add the text of the advisory without any Fix-Commit tags along with - the fix for the CVE. Add the Vulnerable-Commit tag, if applicable. - The advisories directory does not exist in release branches, so keep - the advisory text commit distinct from the code changes, to ease - backports. Ask for the GLIBC-SA advisory number from the security - team. - -2. Finish all backports on release branches and then back on the msater - branch, add all commit refs to the advisory using the Fix-Commit - tags. Don't bother adding the release-version subscript since the - next step will overwrite it. - -3. Run the process-advisories.sh script in the scripts directory on the - advisory: - - scripts/process-advisories.sh update GLIBC-SA-YYYY-NNNN - - (replace YYYY-NNNN with the actual advisory number). - -4. Verify the updated advisory and push the result. - -Getting a NEWS snippet from advisories --------------------------------------- - -Run: - - scripts/process-advisories.sh news - -and copy the content into the NEWS file. diff --git a/elf/Makefile b/elf/Makefile index 48aa0b57e5..3a5596e2bb 100644 --- a/elf/Makefile +++ b/elf/Makefile @@ -543,6 +543,8 @@ tests-internal += \ tst-dl_find_object-threads \ tst-dlmopen2 \ tst-hash-collision3 \ + tst-link-map-contiguous-ldso \ + tst-link-map-contiguous-libc \ tst-ptrguard1 \ tst-stackguard1 \ tst-tls-surplus \ @@ -554,6 +556,10 @@ tests-internal += \ unload2 \ # tests-internal +ifeq ($(build-hardcoded-path-in-tests),yes) +tests-internal += tst-link-map-contiguous-main +endif + tests-container += \ tst-dlopen-self-container \ tst-dlopen-tlsmodid-container \ diff --git a/elf/dl-find_object.c b/elf/dl-find_object.c index 1e76373292..c9f4c1c8d1 100644 --- a/elf/dl-find_object.c +++ b/elf/dl-find_object.c @@ -465,6 +465,37 @@ _dl_find_object (void *pc1, struct dl_find_object *result) } rtld_hidden_def (_dl_find_object) +/* Subroutine of _dlfo_process_initial to split out noncontigous link + maps. NODELETE is the number of used _dlfo_nodelete_mappings + elements. It is incremented as needed, and the new NODELETE value + is returned. */ +static size_t +_dlfo_process_initial_noncontiguous_map (struct link_map *map, + size_t nodelete) +{ + struct dl_find_object_internal dlfo; + _dl_find_object_from_map (map, &dlfo); + + /* PT_LOAD segments for a non-contiguous link map are added to the + non-closeable mappings. */ + const ElfW(Phdr) *ph = map->l_phdr; + const ElfW(Phdr) *ph_end = map->l_phdr + map->l_phnum; + for (; ph < ph_end; ++ph) + if (ph->p_type == PT_LOAD) + { + if (_dlfo_nodelete_mappings != NULL) + { + /* Second pass only. */ + _dlfo_nodelete_mappings[nodelete] = dlfo; + ElfW(Addr) start = ph->p_vaddr + map->l_addr; + _dlfo_nodelete_mappings[nodelete].map_start = start; + _dlfo_nodelete_mappings[nodelete].map_end = start + ph->p_memsz; + } + ++nodelete; + } + return nodelete; +} + /* _dlfo_process_initial is called twice. First to compute the array sizes from the initial loaded mappings. Second to fill in the bases and infos arrays with the (still unsorted) data. Returns the @@ -476,29 +507,8 @@ _dlfo_process_initial (void) size_t nodelete = 0; if (!main_map->l_contiguous) - { - struct dl_find_object_internal dlfo; - _dl_find_object_from_map (main_map, &dlfo); - - /* PT_LOAD segments for a non-contiguous are added to the - non-closeable mappings. */ - for (const ElfW(Phdr) *ph = main_map->l_phdr, - *ph_end = main_map->l_phdr + main_map->l_phnum; - ph < ph_end; ++ph) - if (ph->p_type == PT_LOAD) - { - if (_dlfo_nodelete_mappings != NULL) - { - /* Second pass only. */ - _dlfo_nodelete_mappings[nodelete] = dlfo; - _dlfo_nodelete_mappings[nodelete].map_start - = ph->p_vaddr + main_map->l_addr; - _dlfo_nodelete_mappings[nodelete].map_end - = _dlfo_nodelete_mappings[nodelete].map_start + ph->p_memsz; - } - ++nodelete; - } - } + /* Contiguous case already handled in _dl_find_object_init. */ + nodelete = _dlfo_process_initial_noncontiguous_map (main_map, nodelete); size_t loaded = 0; for (Lmid_t ns = 0; ns < GL(dl_nns); ++ns) @@ -510,11 +520,18 @@ _dlfo_process_initial (void) /* lt_library link maps are implicitly NODELETE. */ if (l->l_type == lt_library || l->l_nodelete_active) { - if (_dlfo_nodelete_mappings != NULL) - /* Second pass only. */ - _dl_find_object_from_map - (l, _dlfo_nodelete_mappings + nodelete); - ++nodelete; + /* The kernel may have loaded ld.so with gaps. */ + if (!l->l_contiguous && is_rtld_link_map (l)) + nodelete + = _dlfo_process_initial_noncontiguous_map (l, nodelete); + else + { + if (_dlfo_nodelete_mappings != NULL) + /* Second pass only. */ + _dl_find_object_from_map + (l, _dlfo_nodelete_mappings + nodelete); + ++nodelete; + } } else if (l->l_type == lt_loaded) { @@ -764,7 +781,6 @@ _dl_find_object_update_1 (struct link_map **loaded, size_t count) /* Prefer newly loaded link map. */ assert (loaded_index1 > 0); _dl_find_object_from_map (loaded[loaded_index1 - 1], dlfo); - loaded[loaded_index1 - 1]->l_find_object_processed = 1; --loaded_index1; } diff --git a/elf/dl-find_object.h b/elf/dl-find_object.h index 9aa2439eaa..d9d75c4ad9 100644 --- a/elf/dl-find_object.h +++ b/elf/dl-find_object.h @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ _dl_find_object_to_external (struct dl_find_object_internal *internal, } /* Extract the object location data from a link map and writes it to - *RESULT using relaxed MO stores. */ + *RESULT using relaxed MO stores. Set L->l_find_object_processed. */ static void __attribute__ ((unused)) _dl_find_object_from_map (struct link_map *l, struct dl_find_object_internal *result) @@ -141,8 +141,11 @@ _dl_find_object_from_map (struct link_map *l, break; } if (read_seg == 3) - return; + goto done; } + + done: + l->l_find_object_processed = 1; } /* Called by the dynamic linker to set up the data structures for the diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c index 493f9696ea..ef4d96c053 100644 --- a/elf/rtld.c +++ b/elf/rtld.c @@ -1239,6 +1239,60 @@ rtld_setup_main_map (struct link_map *main_map) return has_interp; } +/* Set up the program header information for the dynamic linker + itself. It can be accessed via _r_debug and dl_iterate_phdr + callbacks, and it is used by _dl_find_object. */ +static void +rtld_setup_phdr (void) +{ + /* Starting from binutils-2.23, the linker will define the magic + symbol __ehdr_start to point to our own ELF header if it is + visible in a segment that also includes the phdrs. */ + + const ElfW(Ehdr) *rtld_ehdr = &__ehdr_start; + assert (rtld_ehdr->e_ehsize == sizeof *rtld_ehdr); + assert (rtld_ehdr->e_phentsize == sizeof (ElfW(Phdr))); + + const ElfW(Phdr) *rtld_phdr = (const void *) rtld_ehdr + rtld_ehdr->e_phoff; + + _dl_rtld_map.l_phdr = rtld_phdr; + _dl_rtld_map.l_phnum = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum; + + + _dl_rtld_map.l_contiguous = 1; + /* The linker may not have produced a contiguous object. The kernel + will load the object with actual gaps (unlike the glibc loader + for shared objects, which always produces a contiguous mapping). + See similar logic in rtld_setup_main_map above. */ + { + ElfW(Addr) expected_load_address = 0; + for (const ElfW(Phdr) *ph = rtld_phdr; ph < &rtld_phdr[rtld_ehdr->e_phnum]; + ++ph) + if (ph->p_type == PT_LOAD) + { + ElfW(Addr) mapstart = ph->p_vaddr & ~(GLRO(dl_pagesize) - 1); + if (_dl_rtld_map.l_contiguous && expected_load_address != 0 + && expected_load_address != mapstart) + _dl_rtld_map.l_contiguous = 0; + ElfW(Addr) allocend = ph->p_vaddr + ph->p_memsz; + /* The next expected address is the page following this load + segment. */ + expected_load_address = ((allocend + GLRO(dl_pagesize) - 1) + & ~(GLRO(dl_pagesize) - 1)); + } + } + + /* PT_GNU_RELRO is usually the last phdr. */ + size_t cnt = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum; + while (cnt-- > 0) + if (rtld_phdr[cnt].p_type == PT_GNU_RELRO) + { + _dl_rtld_map.l_relro_addr = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_vaddr; + _dl_rtld_map.l_relro_size = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_memsz; + break; + } +} + /* Adjusts the contents of the stack and related globals for the user entry point. The ld.so processed skip_args arguments and bumped _dl_argv and _dl_argc accordingly. Those arguments are removed from @@ -1705,33 +1759,7 @@ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr, ++GL(dl_ns)[LM_ID_BASE]._ns_nloaded; ++GL(dl_load_adds); - /* Starting from binutils-2.23, the linker will define the magic symbol - __ehdr_start to point to our own ELF header if it is visible in a - segment that also includes the phdrs. If that's not available, we use - the old method that assumes the beginning of the file is part of the - lowest-addressed PT_LOAD segment. */ - - /* Set up the program header information for the dynamic linker - itself. It is needed in the dl_iterate_phdr callbacks. */ - const ElfW(Ehdr) *rtld_ehdr = &__ehdr_start; - assert (rtld_ehdr->e_ehsize == sizeof *rtld_ehdr); - assert (rtld_ehdr->e_phentsize == sizeof (ElfW(Phdr))); - - const ElfW(Phdr) *rtld_phdr = (const void *) rtld_ehdr + rtld_ehdr->e_phoff; - - _dl_rtld_map.l_phdr = rtld_phdr; - _dl_rtld_map.l_phnum = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum; - - - /* PT_GNU_RELRO is usually the last phdr. */ - size_t cnt = rtld_ehdr->e_phnum; - while (cnt-- > 0) - if (rtld_phdr[cnt].p_type == PT_GNU_RELRO) - { - _dl_rtld_map.l_relro_addr = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_vaddr; - _dl_rtld_map.l_relro_size = rtld_phdr[cnt].p_memsz; - break; - } + rtld_setup_phdr (); /* Add the dynamic linker to the TLS list if it also uses TLS. */ if (_dl_rtld_map.l_tls_blocksize != 0) diff --git a/elf/tst-env-setuid.c b/elf/tst-env-setuid.c index 7209acd616..ff3eda7f91 100644 --- a/elf/tst-env-setuid.c +++ b/elf/tst-env-setuid.c @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ static char SETGID_CHILD[] = "setgid-child"; # define PROFILE_LIB "tst-sonamemove-runmod2.so" #endif +#define LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT "/tmp/some-file" + struct envvar_t { const char *env; @@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ static const struct envvar_t filtered_envvars[] = { "MALLOC_TRIM_THRESHOLD_", FILTERED_VALUE }, { "RES_OPTIONS", FILTERED_VALUE }, { "LD_DEBUG", "all" }, - { "LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT", "/tmp/some-file" }, + { "LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT", LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT }, { "LD_WARN", FILTERED_VALUE }, { "LD_VERBOSE", FILTERED_VALUE }, { "LD_BIND_NOW", "0" }, @@ -74,6 +76,14 @@ static const struct envvar_t unfiltered_envvars[] = { "LD_ASSUME_KERNEL", UNFILTERED_VALUE }, }; +static void +unlink_ld_debug_output (pid_t pid) +{ + char *output = xasprintf ("%s.%d", LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT, pid); + unlink (output); + free (output); +} + static int test_child (void) { @@ -138,13 +148,21 @@ do_test (int argc, char **argv) /* Setgid child process. */ if (argc == 2 && strcmp (argv[1], SETGID_CHILD) == 0) { + pid_t ppid = getppid (); + if (getgid () == getegid ()) - /* This can happen if the file system is mounted nosuid. */ - FAIL_UNSUPPORTED ("SGID failed: GID and EGID match (%jd)\n", - (intmax_t) getgid ()); + { + /* This can happen if the file system is mounted nosuid. */ + unlink_ld_debug_output (ppid); + + FAIL_UNSUPPORTED ("SGID failed: GID and EGID match (%jd)\n", + (intmax_t) getgid ()); + } int ret = test_child (); + unlink_ld_debug_output (ppid); + if (ret != 0) exit (1); return 0; diff --git a/elf/tst-link-map-contiguous-ldso.c b/elf/tst-link-map-contiguous-ldso.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04de808bb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/elf/tst-link-map-contiguous-ldso.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* Check that _dl_find_object behavior matches up with gaps. + Copyright (C) 2025 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + This file is part of the GNU C Library. + + The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + + The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see + . */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int +do_test (void) +{ + struct link_map *l = xdlopen (LD_SO, RTLD_NOW); + if (!l->l_contiguous) + { + puts ("info: ld.so link map is not contiguous"); + + /* Try to find holes by probing with mmap. */ + int pagesize = getpagesize (); + bool gap_found = false; + ElfW(Addr) addr = l->l_map_start; + TEST_COMPARE (addr % pagesize, 0); + while (addr < l->l_map_end) + { + void *expected = (void *) addr; + void *ptr = xmmap (expected, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1); + struct dl_find_object dlfo; + int dlfo_ret = _dl_find_object (expected, &dlfo); + if (ptr == expected) + { + if (dlfo_ret < 0) + { + TEST_COMPARE (dlfo_ret, -1); + printf ("info: hole without mapping data found at %p\n", ptr); + } + else + FAIL ("object \"%s\" found in gap at %p", + dlfo.dlfo_link_map->l_name, ptr); + gap_found = true; + } + else if (dlfo_ret == 0) + { + if ((void *) dlfo.dlfo_link_map != (void *) l) + { + printf ("info: object \"%s\" found at %p\n", + dlfo.dlfo_link_map->l_name, ptr); + gap_found = true; + } + } + else + TEST_COMPARE (dlfo_ret, -1); + xmunmap (ptr, 1); + addr += pagesize; + } + if (!gap_found) + FAIL ("no ld.so gap found"); + } + else + { + puts ("info: ld.so link map is contiguous"); + + /* Assert that ld.so is truly contiguous in memory. */ + volatile long int *p = (volatile long int *) l->l_map_start; + volatile long int *end = (volatile long int *) l->l_map_end; + while (p < end) + { + *p; + ++p; + } + } + + xdlclose (l); + + return 0; +} + +#include diff --git a/elf/tst-link-map-contiguous-libc.c b/elf/tst-link-map-contiguous-libc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eb5728c765 --- /dev/null +++ b/elf/tst-link-map-contiguous-libc.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* Check that the entire libc.so program image is readable if contiguous. + Copyright (C) 2025 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + This file is part of the GNU C Library. + + The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + + The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see + . */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int +do_test (void) +{ + struct link_map *l = xdlopen (LIBC_SO, RTLD_NOW); + + /* The dynamic loader fills holes with PROT_NONE mappings. */ + if (!l->l_contiguous) + FAIL_EXIT1 ("libc.so link map is not contiguous"); + + /* Direct probing does not work because not everything is readable + due to PROT_NONE mappings. */ + int pagesize = getpagesize (); + ElfW(Addr) addr = l->l_map_start; + TEST_COMPARE (addr % pagesize, 0); + while (addr < l->l_map_end) + { + void *expected = (void *) addr; + void *ptr = xmmap (expected, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1); + if (ptr == expected) + FAIL ("hole in libc.so memory image after %lu bytes", + (unsigned long int) (addr - l->l_map_start)); + xmunmap (ptr, 1); + addr += pagesize; + } + + xdlclose (l); + + return 0; +} +#include diff --git a/elf/tst-link-map-contiguous-main.c b/elf/tst-link-map-contiguous-main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d1a054f0f --- /dev/null +++ b/elf/tst-link-map-contiguous-main.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* Check that the entire main program image is readable if contiguous. + Copyright (C) 2025 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + This file is part of the GNU C Library. + + The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + + The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see + . */ + +#include +#include +#include + +static int +do_test (void) +{ + struct link_map *l = xdlopen ("", RTLD_NOW); + if (!l->l_contiguous) + FAIL_UNSUPPORTED ("main link map is not contiguous"); + + /* This check only works if the kernel loaded the main program. The + dynamic loader replaces gaps with PROT_NONE mappings, resulting + in faults. */ + volatile long int *p = (volatile long int *) l->l_map_start; + volatile long int *end = (volatile long int *) l->l_map_end; + while (p < end) + { + *p; + ++p; + } + + xdlclose (l); + + return 0; +} +#include diff --git a/inet/bits/inet-fortified.h b/inet/bits/inet-fortified.h index 6738221a54..cc476ebcfd 100644 --- a/inet/bits/inet-fortified.h +++ b/inet/bits/inet-fortified.h @@ -45,15 +45,15 @@ __NTH (inet_pton (int __af, __fortify_clang_warning_only_if_bos0_lt (4, __dst, "inet_pton called with destination buffer size less than 4") { - size_t sz = 0; + size_t __sz = 0; if (__af == AF_INET) - sz = sizeof (struct in_addr); + __sz = sizeof (struct in_addr); else if (__af == AF_INET6) - sz = sizeof (struct in6_addr); + __sz = sizeof (struct in6_addr); else return __inet_pton_alias (__af, __src, __dst); - return __glibc_fortify (inet_pton, sz, sizeof (char), + return __glibc_fortify (inet_pton, __sz, sizeof (char), __glibc_objsize (__dst), __af, __src, __dst); }; diff --git a/nptl/cancellation.c b/nptl/cancellation.c index 156e63dcf0..bed0383a23 100644 --- a/nptl/cancellation.c +++ b/nptl/cancellation.c @@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ __syscall_cancel (__syscall_arg_t a1, __syscall_arg_t a2, __syscall_arg_t a5, __syscall_arg_t a6, __SYSCALL_CANCEL7_ARG_DEF __syscall_arg_t nr) { - int r = __internal_syscall_cancel (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, - __SYSCALL_CANCEL7_ARG nr); + long int r = __internal_syscall_cancel (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, + __SYSCALL_CANCEL7_ARG nr); return __glibc_unlikely (INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P (r)) ? SYSCALL_ERROR_LABEL (INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO (r)) : r; diff --git a/stdlib/abort.c b/stdlib/abort.c index caa9e6dc04..904244a2fb 100644 --- a/stdlib/abort.c +++ b/stdlib/abort.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* Try to get a machine dependent instruction which will make the @@ -42,7 +43,10 @@ __libc_rwlock_define_initialized (static, lock); void __abort_fork_reset_child (void) { - __libc_rwlock_init (lock); + /* Reinitialize lock without calling pthread_rwlock_init, to + avoid a valgrind DRD false positive. */ + __libc_rwlock_define_initialized (, reset_lock); + memcpy (&lock, &reset_lock, sizeof (lock)); } void diff --git a/support/support_capture_subprocess.c b/support/support_capture_subprocess.c index b4e4bf9502..c89e65b534 100644 --- a/support/support_capture_subprocess.c +++ b/support/support_capture_subprocess.c @@ -133,6 +133,27 @@ copy_and_spawn_sgid (const char *child_id, gid_t gid) if (chmod (execname, 02750) != 0) FAIL_UNSUPPORTED ("cannot make \"%s\" SGID: %m ", execname); + /* Now we can drop the privilege of that group. */ + const int count = 64; + gid_t groups[count]; + int ngroups = getgroups(count, groups); + + if (ngroups < 0) + FAIL_UNSUPPORTED ("Could not get group list again for user %jd\n", + (intmax_t) getuid ()); + + int n = 0; + for (int i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) + { + if (groups[i] != gid) + { + if (n != i) + groups[n] = groups[i]; + n++; + } + } + setgroups (n, groups); + /* We have the binary, now spawn the subprocess. Avoid using support_subprogram because we only want the program exit status, not the contents. */ diff --git a/support/support_subprocess.c b/support/support_subprocess.c index be00dde3a7..8bf9a33ea2 100644 --- a/support/support_subprocess.c +++ b/support/support_subprocess.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static struct support_subprocess support_subprocess_init (void) @@ -60,6 +61,8 @@ support_subprocess (void (*callback) (void *), void *closure) xclose (result.stdout_pipe[1]); xclose (result.stderr_pipe[1]); callback (closure); + /* Make sure that temporary files are deleted. */ + support_delete_temp_files (); _exit (0); } xclose (result.stdout_pipe[1]); diff --git a/sysdeps/pthread/tst-fopen-threaded.c b/sysdeps/pthread/tst-fopen-threaded.c index ade58ad19e..c17f1eaa13 100644 --- a/sysdeps/pthread/tst-fopen-threaded.c +++ b/sysdeps/pthread/tst-fopen-threaded.c @@ -34,11 +34,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include +#include #define NUM_THREADS 100 #define ITERS 10 @@ -111,7 +113,8 @@ threadOpenCloseRoutine (void *argv) /* Wait for all threads to be ready to call fopen and fclose. */ xpthread_barrier_wait (&barrier); - FILE *fd = xfopen ("/tmp/openclosetest", "w+"); + char *file = (char *) argv; + FILE *fd = xfopen (file, "w+"); xfclose (fd); return NULL; } @@ -235,6 +238,10 @@ do_test (void) xfclose (fd_file); } + char *tempdir = support_create_temp_directory ("openclosetest-"); + char *file = xasprintf ("%s/file", tempdir); + add_temp_file (file); + /* Test 3: Concurrent open/close. */ for (int reps = 1; reps <= ITERS; reps++) { @@ -243,7 +250,7 @@ do_test (void) { threads[i] = xpthread_create (support_small_stack_thread_attribute (), - threadOpenCloseRoutine, NULL); + threadOpenCloseRoutine, file); } for (int i = 0; i < NUM_THREADS; i++) { @@ -252,6 +259,9 @@ do_test (void) xpthread_barrier_destroy (&barrier); } + free (file); + free (tempdir); + return 0; }