import functools import json import time try: # Python 2 from urlparse import urljoin except: # Python 3 from urllib.parse import urljoin import logging import sys import warnings import uuid import requests from .oauth2cli import Client, JwtAssertionCreator from .authority import Authority from .mex import send_request as mex_send_request from .wstrust_request import send_request as wst_send_request from .wstrust_response import * from .token_cache import TokenCache # The __init__.py will import this. Not the other way around. __version__ = "1.9.0" logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) def decorate_scope( scopes, client_id, reserved_scope=frozenset(['openid', 'profile', 'offline_access'])): if not isinstance(scopes, (list, set, tuple)): raise ValueError("The input scopes should be a list, tuple, or set") scope_set = set(scopes) # Input scopes is typically a list. Copy it to a set. if scope_set & reserved_scope: # These scopes are reserved for the API to provide good experience. # We could make the developer pass these and then if they do they will # come back asking why they don't see refresh token or user information. raise ValueError( "API does not accept {} value as user-provided scopes".format( reserved_scope)) if client_id in scope_set: if len(scope_set) > 1: # We make developers pass their client id, so that they can express # the intent that they want the token for themselves (their own # app). # If we do not restrict them to passing only client id then they # could write code where they expect an id token but end up getting # access_token. raise ValueError("Client Id can only be provided as a single scope") decorated = set(reserved_scope) # Make a writable copy else: decorated = scope_set | reserved_scope return list(decorated) CLIENT_REQUEST_ID = 'client-request-id' CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY = 'x-client-current-telemetry' def _get_new_correlation_id(): correlation_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) logger.debug("Generates correlation_id: %s", correlation_id) return correlation_id def _build_current_telemetry_request_header(public_api_id, force_refresh=False): return "1|{},{}|".format(public_api_id, "1" if force_refresh else "0") def extract_certs(public_cert_content): # Parses raw public certificate file contents and returns a list of strings # Usage: headers = {"x5c": extract_certs(open("my_cert.pem").read())} public_certificates = re.findall( r'-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----(?P[^-]+)-----END CERTIFICATE-----', public_cert_content, re.I) if public_certificates: return [cert.strip() for cert in public_certificates] # The public cert tags are not found in the input, # let's make best effort to exclude a private key pem file. if "PRIVATE KEY" in public_cert_content: raise ValueError( "We expect your public key but detect a private key instead") return [public_cert_content.strip()] def _merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities(capabilities, claims_challenge): # Represent capabilities as {"access_token": {"xms_cc": {"values": capabilities}}} # and then merge/add it into incoming claims if not capabilities: return claims_challenge claims_dict = json.loads(claims_challenge) if claims_challenge else {} for key in ["access_token"]: # We could add "id_token" if we'd decide to claims_dict.setdefault(key, {}).update(xms_cc={"values": capabilities}) return json.dumps(claims_dict) def _str2bytes(raw): # A conversion based on duck-typing rather than six.text_type try: return raw.encode(encoding="utf-8") except: return raw class ClientApplication(object): ACQUIRE_TOKEN_SILENT_ID = "84" ACQUIRE_TOKEN_BY_REFRESH_TOKEN = "85" ACQUIRE_TOKEN_BY_USERNAME_PASSWORD_ID = "301" ACQUIRE_TOKEN_ON_BEHALF_OF_ID = "523" ACQUIRE_TOKEN_BY_DEVICE_FLOW_ID = "622" ACQUIRE_TOKEN_FOR_CLIENT_ID = "730" ACQUIRE_TOKEN_BY_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_ID = "832" ACQUIRE_TOKEN_INTERACTIVE = "169" GET_ACCOUNTS_ID = "902" REMOVE_ACCOUNT_ID = "903" def __init__( self, client_id, client_credential=None, authority=None, validate_authority=True, token_cache=None, http_client=None, verify=True, proxies=None, timeout=None, client_claims=None, app_name=None, app_version=None, client_capabilities=None): """Create an instance of application. :param str client_id: Your app has a client_id after you register it on AAD. :param str client_credential: For :class:`PublicClientApplication`, you simply use `None` here. For :class:`ConfidentialClientApplication`, it can be a string containing client secret, or an X509 certificate container in this form:: { "private_key": "...-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----...", "thumbprint": "A1B2C3D4E5F6...", "public_certificate": "...-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----... (Optional. See below.)", "passphrase": "Passphrase if the private_key is encrypted (Optional. Added in version 1.6.0)", } *Added in version 0.5.0*: public_certificate (optional) is public key certificate which will be sent through 'x5c' JWT header only for subject name and issuer authentication to support cert auto rolls. Per `specs `_, "the certificate containing the public key corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS MUST be the first certificate. This MAY be followed by additional certificates, with each subsequent certificate being the one used to certify the previous one." However, your certificate's issuer may use a different order. So, if your attempt ends up with an error AADSTS700027 - "The provided signature value did not match the expected signature value", you may try use only the leaf cert (in PEM/str format) instead. :param dict client_claims: *Added in version 0.5.0*: It is a dictionary of extra claims that would be signed by by this :class:`ConfidentialClientApplication` 's private key. For example, you can use {"client_ip": "x.x.x.x"}. You may also override any of the following default claims:: { "aud": the_token_endpoint, "iss": self.client_id, "sub": same_as_issuer, "exp": now + 10_min, "iat": now, "jti": a_random_uuid } :param str authority: A URL that identifies a token authority. It should be of the format https://login.microsoftonline.com/your_tenant By default, we will use https://login.microsoftonline.com/common :param bool validate_authority: (optional) Turns authority validation on or off. This parameter default to true. :param TokenCache cache: Sets the token cache used by this ClientApplication instance. By default, an in-memory cache will be created and used. :param http_client: (optional) Your implementation of abstract class HttpClient Defaults to a requests session instance :param verify: (optional) It will be passed to the `verify parameter in the underlying requests library `_ This does not apply if you have chosen to pass your own Http client :param proxies: (optional) It will be passed to the `proxies parameter in the underlying requests library `_ This does not apply if you have chosen to pass your own Http client :param timeout: (optional) It will be passed to the `timeout parameter in the underlying requests library `_ This does not apply if you have chosen to pass your own Http client :param app_name: (optional) You can provide your application name for Microsoft telemetry purposes. Default value is None, means it will not be passed to Microsoft. :param app_version: (optional) You can provide your application version for Microsoft telemetry purposes. Default value is None, means it will not be passed to Microsoft. :param list[str] client_capabilities: (optional) Allows configuration of one or more client capabilities, e.g. ["CP1"]. Client capability is meant to inform the Microsoft identity platform (STS) what this client is capable for, so STS can decide to turn on certain features. For example, if client is capable to handle *claims challenge*, STS can then issue CAE access tokens to resources knowing when the resource emits *claims challenge* the client will be capable to handle. Implementation details: Client capability is implemented using "claims" parameter on the wire, for now. MSAL will combine them into `claims parameter 2 ** 32 else "x86", } if self.app_name: default_headers['x-app-name'] = self.app_name if self.app_version: default_headers['x-app-ver'] = self.app_version default_body = {"client_info": 1} if isinstance(client_credential, dict): assert ("private_key" in client_credential and "thumbprint" in client_credential) headers = {} if 'public_certificate' in client_credential: headers["x5c"] = extract_certs(client_credential['public_certificate']) if not client_credential.get("passphrase"): unencrypted_private_key = client_credential['private_key'] else: from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend unencrypted_private_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key( _str2bytes(client_credential["private_key"]), _str2bytes(client_credential["passphrase"]), backend=default_backend(), # It was a required param until 2020 ) assertion = JwtAssertionCreator( unencrypted_private_key, algorithm="RS256", sha1_thumbprint=client_credential.get("thumbprint"), headers=headers) client_assertion = assertion.create_regenerative_assertion( audience=authority.token_endpoint, issuer=self.client_id, additional_claims=self.client_claims or {}) client_assertion_type = Client.CLIENT_ASSERTION_TYPE_JWT else: default_body['client_secret'] = client_credential server_configuration = { "authorization_endpoint": authority.authorization_endpoint, "token_endpoint": authority.token_endpoint, "device_authorization_endpoint": authority.device_authorization_endpoint or urljoin(authority.token_endpoint, "devicecode"), } return Client( server_configuration, self.client_id, http_client=self.http_client, default_headers=default_headers, default_body=default_body, client_assertion=client_assertion, client_assertion_type=client_assertion_type, on_obtaining_tokens=lambda event: self.token_cache.add(dict( event, environment=authority.instance)), on_removing_rt=self.token_cache.remove_rt, on_updating_rt=self.token_cache.update_rt) def initiate_auth_code_flow( self, scopes, # type: list[str] redirect_uri=None, state=None, # Recommended by OAuth2 for CSRF protection prompt=None, login_hint=None, # type: Optional[str] domain_hint=None, # type: Optional[str] claims_challenge=None, ): """Initiate an auth code flow. Later when the response reaches your redirect_uri, you can use :func:`~acquire_token_by_auth_code_flow()` to complete the authentication/authorization. :param list scope: It is a list of case-sensitive strings. :param str redirect_uri: Optional. If not specified, server will use the pre-registered one. :param str state: An opaque value used by the client to maintain state between the request and callback. If absent, this library will automatically generate one internally. :param str prompt: By default, no prompt value will be sent, not even "none". You will have to specify a value explicitly. Its valid values are defined in Open ID Connect specs https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#AuthRequest :param str login_hint: Optional. Identifier of the user. Generally a User Principal Name (UPN). :param domain_hint: Can be one of "consumers" or "organizations" or your tenant domain "contoso.com". If included, it will skip the email-based discovery process that user goes through on the sign-in page, leading to a slightly more streamlined user experience. More information on possible values `here `_ and `here `_. :return: The auth code flow. It is a dict in this form:: { "auth_uri": "https://...", // Guide user to visit this "state": "...", // You may choose to verify it by yourself, // or just let acquire_token_by_auth_code_flow() // do that for you. "...": "...", // Everything else are reserved and internal } The caller is expected to:: 1. somehow store this content, typically inside the current session, 2. guide the end user (i.e. resource owner) to visit that auth_uri, 3. and then relay this dict and subsequent auth response to :func:`~acquire_token_by_auth_code_flow()`. """ client = Client( {"authorization_endpoint": self.authority.authorization_endpoint}, self.client_id, http_client=self.http_client) flow = client.initiate_auth_code_flow( redirect_uri=redirect_uri, state=state, login_hint=login_hint, prompt=prompt, scope=decorate_scope(scopes, self.client_id), domain_hint=domain_hint, claims=_merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, claims_challenge), ) flow["claims_challenge"] = claims_challenge return flow def get_authorization_request_url( self, scopes, # type: list[str] login_hint=None, # type: Optional[str] state=None, # Recommended by OAuth2 for CSRF protection redirect_uri=None, response_type="code", # Could be "token" if you use Implicit Grant prompt=None, nonce=None, domain_hint=None, # type: Optional[str] claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): """Constructs a URL for you to start a Authorization Code Grant. :param list[str] scopes: (Required) Scopes requested to access a protected API (a resource). :param str state: Recommended by OAuth2 for CSRF protection. :param str login_hint: Identifier of the user. Generally a User Principal Name (UPN). :param str redirect_uri: Address to return to upon receiving a response from the authority. :param str response_type: Default value is "code" for an OAuth2 Authorization Code grant. You could use other content such as "id_token" or "token", which would trigger an Implicit Grant, but that is `not recommended `_. :param str prompt: By default, no prompt value will be sent, not even "none". You will have to specify a value explicitly. Its valid values are defined in Open ID Connect specs https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#AuthRequest :param nonce: A cryptographically random value used to mitigate replay attacks. See also `OIDC specs `_. :param domain_hint: Can be one of "consumers" or "organizations" or your tenant domain "contoso.com". If included, it will skip the email-based discovery process that user goes through on the sign-in page, leading to a slightly more streamlined user experience. More information on possible values `here `_ and `here `_. :param claims_challenge: The claims_challenge parameter requests specific claims requested by the resource provider in the form of a claims_challenge directive in the www-authenticate header to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token and/or Access Token. It is a string of a JSON object which contains lists of claims being requested from these locations. :return: The authorization url as a string. """ authority = kwargs.pop("authority", None) # Historically we support this if authority: warnings.warn( "We haven't decided if this method will accept authority parameter") # The previous implementation is, it will use self.authority by default. # Multi-tenant app can use new authority on demand the_authority = Authority( authority, self.http_client ) if authority else self.authority client = Client( {"authorization_endpoint": the_authority.authorization_endpoint}, self.client_id, http_client=self.http_client) warnings.warn( "Change your get_authorization_request_url() " "to initiate_auth_code_flow()", DeprecationWarning) with warnings.catch_warnings(record=True): return client.build_auth_request_uri( response_type=response_type, redirect_uri=redirect_uri, state=state, login_hint=login_hint, prompt=prompt, scope=decorate_scope(scopes, self.client_id), nonce=nonce, domain_hint=domain_hint, claims=_merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, claims_challenge), ) def acquire_token_by_auth_code_flow( self, auth_code_flow, auth_response, scopes=None, **kwargs): """Validate the auth response being redirected back, and obtain tokens. It automatically provides nonce protection. :param dict auth_code_flow: The same dict returned by :func:`~initiate_auth_code_flow()`. :param dict auth_response: A dict of the query string received from auth server. :param list[str] scopes: Scopes requested to access a protected API (a resource). Most of the time, you can leave it empty. If you requested user consent for multiple resources, here you will need to provide a subset of what you required in :func:`~initiate_auth_code_flow()`. OAuth2 was designed mostly for singleton services, where tokens are always meant for the same resource and the only changes are in the scopes. In AAD, tokens can be issued for multiple 3rd party resources. You can ask authorization code for multiple resources, but when you redeem it, the token is for only one intended recipient, called audience. So the developer need to specify a scope so that we can restrict the token to be issued for the corresponding audience. :return: * A dict containing "access_token" and/or "id_token", among others, depends on what scope was used. (See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.1) * A dict containing "error", optionally "error_description", "error_uri". (It is either `this `_ or `that `_) * Most client-side data error would result in ValueError exception. So the usage pattern could be without any protocol details:: def authorize(): # A controller in a web app try: result = msal_app.acquire_token_by_auth_code_flow( session.get("flow", {}), request.args) if "error" in result: return render_template("error.html", result) use(result) # Token(s) are available in result and cache except ValueError: # Usually caused by CSRF pass # Simply ignore them return redirect(url_for("index")) """ self._validate_ssh_cert_input_data(kwargs.get("data", {})) return self.client.obtain_token_by_auth_code_flow( auth_code_flow, auth_response, scope=decorate_scope(scopes, self.client_id) if scopes else None, headers={ CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: _get_new_correlation_id(), CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY: _build_current_telemetry_request_header( self.ACQUIRE_TOKEN_BY_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_ID), }, data=dict( kwargs.pop("data", {}), claims=_merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, auth_code_flow.pop("claims_challenge", None))), **kwargs) def acquire_token_by_authorization_code( self, code, scopes, # Syntactically required. STS accepts empty value though. redirect_uri=None, # REQUIRED, if the "redirect_uri" parameter was included in the # authorization request as described in Section 4.1.1, and their # values MUST be identical. nonce=None, claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): """The second half of the Authorization Code Grant. :param code: The authorization code returned from Authorization Server. :param list[str] scopes: (Required) Scopes requested to access a protected API (a resource). If you requested user consent for multiple resources, here you will typically want to provide a subset of what you required in AuthCode. OAuth2 was designed mostly for singleton services, where tokens are always meant for the same resource and the only changes are in the scopes. In AAD, tokens can be issued for multiple 3rd party resources. You can ask authorization code for multiple resources, but when you redeem it, the token is for only one intended recipient, called audience. So the developer need to specify a scope so that we can restrict the token to be issued for the corresponding audience. :param nonce: If you provided a nonce when calling :func:`get_authorization_request_url`, same nonce should also be provided here, so that we'll validate it. An exception will be raised if the nonce in id token mismatches. :param claims_challenge: The claims_challenge parameter requests specific claims requested by the resource provider in the form of a claims_challenge directive in the www-authenticate header to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token and/or Access Token. It is a string of a JSON object which contains lists of claims being requested from these locations. :return: A dict representing the json response from AAD: - A successful response would contain "access_token" key, - an error response would contain "error" and usually "error_description". """ # If scope is absent on the wire, STS will give you a token associated # to the FIRST scope sent during the authorization request. # So in theory, you can omit scope here when you were working with only # one scope. But, MSAL decorates your scope anyway, so they are never # really empty. assert isinstance(scopes, list), "Invalid parameter type" self._validate_ssh_cert_input_data(kwargs.get("data", {})) warnings.warn( "Change your acquire_token_by_authorization_code() " "to acquire_token_by_auth_code_flow()", DeprecationWarning) with warnings.catch_warnings(record=True): return self.client.obtain_token_by_authorization_code( code, redirect_uri=redirect_uri, scope=decorate_scope(scopes, self.client_id), headers={ CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: _get_new_correlation_id(), CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY: _build_current_telemetry_request_header( self.ACQUIRE_TOKEN_BY_AUTHORIZATION_CODE_ID), }, data=dict( kwargs.pop("data", {}), claims=_merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, claims_challenge)), nonce=nonce, **kwargs) def get_accounts(self, username=None): """Get a list of accounts which previously signed in, i.e. exists in cache. An account can later be used in :func:`~acquire_token_silent` to find its tokens. :param username: Filter accounts with this username only. Case insensitive. :return: A list of account objects. Each account is a dict. For now, we only document its "username" field. Your app can choose to display those information to end user, and allow user to choose one of his/her accounts to proceed. """ accounts = self._find_msal_accounts(environment=self.authority.instance) if not accounts: # Now try other aliases of this authority instance for alias in self._get_authority_aliases(self.authority.instance): accounts = self._find_msal_accounts(environment=alias) if accounts: break if username: # Federated account["username"] from AAD could contain mixed case lowercase_username = username.lower() accounts = [a for a in accounts if a["username"].lower() == lowercase_username] # Does not further filter by existing RTs here. It probably won't matter. # Because in most cases Accounts and RTs co-exist. # Even in the rare case when an RT is revoked and then removed, # acquire_token_silent() would then yield no result, # apps would fall back to other acquire methods. This is the standard pattern. return accounts def _find_msal_accounts(self, environment): return [a for a in self.token_cache.find( TokenCache.CredentialType.ACCOUNT, query={"environment": environment}) if a["authority_type"] in ( TokenCache.AuthorityType.ADFS, TokenCache.AuthorityType.MSSTS)] def _get_authority_aliases(self, instance): if not self.authority_groups: resp = self.http_client.get( "https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/discovery/instance?api-version=1.1&authorization_endpoint=https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/authorize", headers={'Accept': 'application/json'}) resp.raise_for_status() self.authority_groups = [ set(group['aliases']) for group in json.loads(resp.text)['metadata']] for group in self.authority_groups: if instance in group: return [alias for alias in group if alias != instance] return [] def remove_account(self, account): """Sign me out and forget me from token cache""" self._forget_me(account) def _sign_out(self, home_account): # Remove all relevant RTs and ATs from token cache owned_by_home_account = { "environment": home_account["environment"], "home_account_id": home_account["home_account_id"],} # realm-independent app_metadata = self._get_app_metadata(home_account["environment"]) # Remove RTs/FRTs, and they are realm-independent for rt in [rt for rt in self.token_cache.find( TokenCache.CredentialType.REFRESH_TOKEN, query=owned_by_home_account) # Do RT's app ownership check as a precaution, in case family apps # and 3rd-party apps share same token cache, although they should not. if rt["client_id"] == self.client_id or ( app_metadata.get("family_id") # Now let's settle family business and rt.get("family_id") == app_metadata["family_id"]) ]: self.token_cache.remove_rt(rt) for at in self.token_cache.find( # Remove ATs # Regardless of realm, b/c we've removed realm-independent RTs anyway TokenCache.CredentialType.ACCESS_TOKEN, query=owned_by_home_account): # To avoid the complexity of locating sibling family app's AT, # we skip AT's app ownership check. # It means ATs for other apps will also be removed, it is OK because: # * non-family apps are not supposed to share token cache to begin with; # * Even if it happens, we keep other app's RT already, so SSO still works self.token_cache.remove_at(at) def _forget_me(self, home_account): # It implies signout, and then also remove all relevant accounts and IDTs self._sign_out(home_account) owned_by_home_account = { "environment": home_account["environment"], "home_account_id": home_account["home_account_id"],} # realm-independent for idt in self.token_cache.find( # Remove IDTs, regardless of realm TokenCache.CredentialType.ID_TOKEN, query=owned_by_home_account): self.token_cache.remove_idt(idt) for a in self.token_cache.find( # Remove Accounts, regardless of realm TokenCache.CredentialType.ACCOUNT, query=owned_by_home_account): self.token_cache.remove_account(a) def acquire_token_silent( self, scopes, # type: List[str] account, # type: Optional[Account] authority=None, # See get_authorization_request_url() force_refresh=False, # type: Optional[boolean] claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): """Acquire an access token for given account, without user interaction. It is done either by finding a valid access token from cache, or by finding a valid refresh token from cache and then automatically use it to redeem a new access token. This method will combine the cache empty and refresh error into one return value, `None`. If your app does not care about the exact token refresh error during token cache look-up, then this method is easier and recommended. Internally, this method calls :func:`~acquire_token_silent_with_error`. :param claims_challenge: The claims_challenge parameter requests specific claims requested by the resource provider in the form of a claims_challenge directive in the www-authenticate header to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token and/or Access Token. It is a string of a JSON object which contains lists of claims being requested from these locations. :return: - A dict containing no "error" key, and typically contains an "access_token" key, if cache lookup succeeded. - None when cache lookup does not yield a token. """ result = self.acquire_token_silent_with_error( scopes, account, authority, force_refresh, claims_challenge=claims_challenge, **kwargs) return result if result and "error" not in result else None def acquire_token_silent_with_error( self, scopes, # type: List[str] account, # type: Optional[Account] authority=None, # See get_authorization_request_url() force_refresh=False, # type: Optional[boolean] claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): """Acquire an access token for given account, without user interaction. It is done either by finding a valid access token from cache, or by finding a valid refresh token from cache and then automatically use it to redeem a new access token. This method will differentiate cache empty from token refresh error. If your app cares the exact token refresh error during token cache look-up, then this method is suitable. Otherwise, the other method :func:`~acquire_token_silent` is recommended. :param list[str] scopes: (Required) Scopes requested to access a protected API (a resource). :param account: one of the account object returned by :func:`~get_accounts`, or use None when you want to find an access token for this client. :param force_refresh: If True, it will skip Access Token look-up, and try to find a Refresh Token to obtain a new Access Token. :param claims_challenge: The claims_challenge parameter requests specific claims requested by the resource provider in the form of a claims_challenge directive in the www-authenticate header to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token and/or Access Token. It is a string of a JSON object which contains lists of claims being requested from these locations. :return: - A dict containing no "error" key, and typically contains an "access_token" key, if cache lookup succeeded. - None when there is simply no token in the cache. - A dict containing an "error" key, when token refresh failed. """ assert isinstance(scopes, list), "Invalid parameter type" self._validate_ssh_cert_input_data(kwargs.get("data", {})) correlation_id = _get_new_correlation_id() if authority: warnings.warn("We haven't decided how/if this method will accept authority parameter") # the_authority = Authority( # authority, # self.http_client, # ) if authority else self.authority result = self._acquire_token_silent_from_cache_and_possibly_refresh_it( scopes, account, self.authority, force_refresh=force_refresh, claims_challenge=claims_challenge, correlation_id=correlation_id, **kwargs) if result and "error" not in result: return result final_result = result for alias in self._get_authority_aliases(self.authority.instance): if not self.token_cache.find( self.token_cache.CredentialType.REFRESH_TOKEN, # target=scopes, # MUST NOT filter by scopes, because: # 1. AAD RTs are scope-independent; # 2. therefore target is optional per schema; query={"environment": alias}): # Skip heavy weight logic when RT for this alias doesn't exist continue the_authority = Authority( "https://" + alias + "/" + self.authority.tenant, self.http_client, validate_authority=False) result = self._acquire_token_silent_from_cache_and_possibly_refresh_it( scopes, account, the_authority, force_refresh=force_refresh, claims_challenge=claims_challenge, correlation_id=correlation_id, **kwargs) if result: if "error" not in result: return result final_result = result if final_result and final_result.get("suberror"): final_result["classification"] = { # Suppress these suberrors, per #57 "bad_token": "", "token_expired": "", "protection_policy_required": "", "client_mismatch": "", "device_authentication_failed": "", }.get(final_result["suberror"], final_result["suberror"]) return final_result def _acquire_token_silent_from_cache_and_possibly_refresh_it( self, scopes, # type: List[str] account, # type: Optional[Account] authority, # This can be different than self.authority force_refresh=False, # type: Optional[boolean] claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): if not (force_refresh or claims_challenge): # Bypass AT when desired or using claims query={ "client_id": self.client_id, "environment": authority.instance, "realm": authority.tenant, "home_account_id": (account or {}).get("home_account_id"), } key_id = kwargs.get("data", {}).get("key_id") if key_id: # Some token types (SSH-certs, POP) are bound to a key query["key_id"] = key_id matches = self.token_cache.find( self.token_cache.CredentialType.ACCESS_TOKEN, target=scopes, query=query) now = time.time() for entry in matches: expires_in = int(entry["expires_on"]) - now if expires_in < 5*60: continue # Removal is not necessary, it will be overwritten logger.debug("Cache hit an AT") return { # Mimic a real response "access_token": entry["secret"], "token_type": entry.get("token_type", "Bearer"), "expires_in": int(expires_in), # OAuth2 specs defines it as int } return self._acquire_token_silent_by_finding_rt_belongs_to_me_or_my_family( authority, decorate_scope(scopes, self.client_id), account, force_refresh=force_refresh, claims_challenge=claims_challenge, **kwargs) def _acquire_token_silent_by_finding_rt_belongs_to_me_or_my_family( self, authority, scopes, account, **kwargs): query = { "environment": authority.instance, "home_account_id": (account or {}).get("home_account_id"), # "realm": authority.tenant, # AAD RTs are tenant-independent } app_metadata = self._get_app_metadata(authority.instance) if not app_metadata: # Meaning this app is now used for the first time. # When/if we have a way to directly detect current app's family, # we'll rewrite this block, to support multiple families. # For now, we try existing RTs (*). If it works, we are in that family. # (*) RTs of a different app/family are not supposed to be # shared with or accessible by us in the first place. at = self._acquire_token_silent_by_finding_specific_refresh_token( authority, scopes, dict(query, family_id="1"), # A hack, we have only 1 family for now rt_remover=lambda rt_item: None, # NO-OP b/c RTs are likely not mine break_condition=lambda response: # Break loop when app not in family # Based on an AAD-only behavior mentioned in internal doc here # https://msazure.visualstudio.com/One/_git/ESTS-Docs/pullrequest/1138595 "client_mismatch" in response.get("error_additional_info", []), **kwargs) if at and "error" not in at: return at last_resp = None if app_metadata.get("family_id"): # Meaning this app belongs to this family last_resp = at = self._acquire_token_silent_by_finding_specific_refresh_token( authority, scopes, dict(query, family_id=app_metadata["family_id"]), **kwargs) if at and "error" not in at: return at # Either this app is an orphan, so we will naturally use its own RT; # or all attempts above have failed, so we fall back to non-foci behavior. return self._acquire_token_silent_by_finding_specific_refresh_token( authority, scopes, dict(query, client_id=self.client_id), **kwargs) or last_resp def _get_app_metadata(self, environment): apps = self.token_cache.find( # Use find(), rather than token_cache.get(...) TokenCache.CredentialType.APP_METADATA, query={ "environment": environment, "client_id": self.client_id}) return apps[0] if apps else {} def _acquire_token_silent_by_finding_specific_refresh_token( self, authority, scopes, query, rt_remover=None, break_condition=lambda response: False, force_refresh=False, correlation_id=None, claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): matches = self.token_cache.find( self.token_cache.CredentialType.REFRESH_TOKEN, # target=scopes, # AAD RTs are scope-independent query=query) logger.debug("Found %d RTs matching %s", len(matches), query) client = self._build_client(self.client_credential, authority) response = None # A distinguishable value to mean cache is empty for entry in matches: logger.debug("Cache attempts an RT") response = client.obtain_token_by_refresh_token( entry, rt_getter=lambda token_item: token_item["secret"], on_removing_rt=rt_remover or self.token_cache.remove_rt, on_obtaining_tokens=lambda event: self.token_cache.add(dict( event, environment=authority.instance, skip_account_creation=True, # To honor a concurrent remove_account() )), scope=scopes, headers={ CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: correlation_id or _get_new_correlation_id(), CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY: _build_current_telemetry_request_header( self.ACQUIRE_TOKEN_SILENT_ID, force_refresh=force_refresh), }, data=dict( kwargs.pop("data", {}), claims=_merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, claims_challenge)), **kwargs) if "error" not in response: return response logger.debug("Refresh failed. {error}: {error_description}".format( error=response.get("error"), error_description=response.get("error_description"), )) if break_condition(response): break return response # Returns the latest error (if any), or just None def _validate_ssh_cert_input_data(self, data): if data.get("token_type") == "ssh-cert": if not data.get("req_cnf"): raise ValueError( "When requesting an SSH certificate, " "you must include a string parameter named 'req_cnf' " "containing the public key in JWK format " "(https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517).") if not data.get("key_id"): raise ValueError( "When requesting an SSH certificate, " "you must include a string parameter named 'key_id' " "which identifies the key in the 'req_cnf' argument.") def acquire_token_by_refresh_token(self, refresh_token, scopes, **kwargs): """Acquire token(s) based on a refresh token (RT) obtained from elsewhere. You use this method only when you have old RTs from elsewhere, and now you want to migrate them into MSAL. Calling this method results in new tokens automatically storing into MSAL. You do NOT need to use this method if you are already using MSAL. MSAL maintains RT automatically inside its token cache, and an access token can be retrieved when you call :func:`~acquire_token_silent`. :param str refresh_token: The old refresh token, as a string. :param list scopes: The scopes associate with this old RT. Each scope needs to be in the Microsoft identity platform (v2) format. See `Scopes not resources `_. :return: * A dict contains "error" and some other keys, when error happened. * A dict contains no "error" key means migration was successful. """ self._validate_ssh_cert_input_data(kwargs.get("data", {})) return self.client.obtain_token_by_refresh_token( refresh_token, scope=decorate_scope(scopes, self.client_id), headers={ CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: _get_new_correlation_id(), CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY: _build_current_telemetry_request_header( self.ACQUIRE_TOKEN_BY_REFRESH_TOKEN), }, rt_getter=lambda rt: rt, on_updating_rt=False, on_removing_rt=lambda rt_item: None, # No OP **kwargs) class PublicClientApplication(ClientApplication): # browser app or mobile app DEVICE_FLOW_CORRELATION_ID = "_correlation_id" def __init__(self, client_id, client_credential=None, **kwargs): if client_credential is not None: raise ValueError("Public Client should not possess credentials") super(PublicClientApplication, self).__init__( client_id, client_credential=None, **kwargs) def acquire_token_interactive( self, scopes, # type: list[str] prompt=None, login_hint=None, # type: Optional[str] domain_hint=None, # type: Optional[str] claims_challenge=None, timeout=None, port=None, extra_scopes_to_consent=None, **kwargs): """Acquire token interactively i.e. via a local browser. :param list scope: It is a list of case-sensitive strings. :param str prompt: By default, no prompt value will be sent, not even "none". You will have to specify a value explicitly. Its valid values are defined in Open ID Connect specs https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#AuthRequest :param str login_hint: Optional. Identifier of the user. Generally a User Principal Name (UPN). :param domain_hint: Can be one of "consumers" or "organizations" or your tenant domain "contoso.com". If included, it will skip the email-based discovery process that user goes through on the sign-in page, leading to a slightly more streamlined user experience. More information on possible values `here `_ and `here `_. :param claims_challenge: The claims_challenge parameter requests specific claims requested by the resource provider in the form of a claims_challenge directive in the www-authenticate header to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token and/or Access Token. It is a string of a JSON object which contains lists of claims being requested from these locations. :param int timeout: This method will block the current thread. This parameter specifies the timeout value in seconds. Default value ``None`` means wait indefinitely. :param int port: The port to be used to listen to an incoming auth response. By default we will use a system-allocated port. (The rest of the redirect_uri is hard coded as ``http://localhost``.) :param list extra_scopes_to_consent: "Extra scopes to consent" is a concept only available in AAD. It refers to other resources you might want to prompt to consent for, in the same interaction, but for which you won't get back a token for in this particular operation. :return: - A dict containing no "error" key, and typically contains an "access_token" key, if cache lookup succeeded. - A dict containing an "error" key, when token refresh failed. """ self._validate_ssh_cert_input_data(kwargs.get("data", {})) claims = _merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, claims_challenge) return self.client.obtain_token_by_browser( scope=decorate_scope(scopes, self.client_id) if scopes else None, extra_scope_to_consent=extra_scopes_to_consent, redirect_uri="http://localhost:{port}".format( # Hardcode the host, for now. AAD portal rejects 127.0.0.1 anyway port=port or 0), prompt=prompt, login_hint=login_hint, timeout=timeout, auth_params={ "claims": claims, "domain_hint": domain_hint, }, data=dict(kwargs.pop("data", {}), claims=claims), headers={ CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: _get_new_correlation_id(), CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY: _build_current_telemetry_request_header( self.ACQUIRE_TOKEN_INTERACTIVE), }, **kwargs) def initiate_device_flow(self, scopes=None, **kwargs): """Initiate a Device Flow instance, which will be used in :func:`~acquire_token_by_device_flow`. :param list[str] scopes: Scopes requested to access a protected API (a resource). :return: A dict representing a newly created Device Flow object. - A successful response would contain "user_code" key, among others - an error response would contain some other readable key/value pairs. """ correlation_id = _get_new_correlation_id() flow = self.client.initiate_device_flow( scope=decorate_scope(scopes or [], self.client_id), headers={ CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: correlation_id, # CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY is not currently required }, **kwargs) flow[self.DEVICE_FLOW_CORRELATION_ID] = correlation_id return flow def acquire_token_by_device_flow(self, flow, claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): """Obtain token by a device flow object, with customizable polling effect. :param dict flow: A dict previously generated by :func:`~initiate_device_flow`. By default, this method's polling effect will block current thread. You can abort the polling loop at any time, by changing the value of the flow's "expires_at" key to 0. :param claims_challenge: The claims_challenge parameter requests specific claims requested by the resource provider in the form of a claims_challenge directive in the www-authenticate header to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token and/or Access Token. It is a string of a JSON object which contains lists of claims being requested from these locations. :return: A dict representing the json response from AAD: - A successful response would contain "access_token" key, - an error response would contain "error" and usually "error_description". """ return self.client.obtain_token_by_device_flow( flow, data=dict( kwargs.pop("data", {}), code=flow["device_code"], # 2018-10-4 Hack: # during transition period, # service seemingly need both device_code and code parameter. claims=_merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, claims_challenge), ), headers={ CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: flow.get(self.DEVICE_FLOW_CORRELATION_ID) or _get_new_correlation_id(), CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY: _build_current_telemetry_request_header( self.ACQUIRE_TOKEN_BY_DEVICE_FLOW_ID), }, **kwargs) def acquire_token_by_username_password( self, username, password, scopes, claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): """Gets a token for a given resource via user credentials. See this page for constraints of Username Password Flow. https://github.com/AzureAD/microsoft-authentication-library-for-python/wiki/Username-Password-Authentication :param str username: Typically a UPN in the form of an email address. :param str password: The password. :param list[str] scopes: Scopes requested to access a protected API (a resource). :param claims_challenge: The claims_challenge parameter requests specific claims requested by the resource provider in the form of a claims_challenge directive in the www-authenticate header to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token and/or Access Token. It is a string of a JSON object which contains lists of claims being requested from these locations. :return: A dict representing the json response from AAD: - A successful response would contain "access_token" key, - an error response would contain "error" and usually "error_description". """ scopes = decorate_scope(scopes, self.client_id) headers = { CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: _get_new_correlation_id(), CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY: _build_current_telemetry_request_header( self.ACQUIRE_TOKEN_BY_USERNAME_PASSWORD_ID), } data = dict( kwargs.pop("data", {}), claims=_merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, claims_challenge)) if not self.authority.is_adfs: user_realm_result = self.authority.user_realm_discovery( username, correlation_id=headers[CLIENT_REQUEST_ID]) if user_realm_result.get("account_type") == "Federated": return self._acquire_token_by_username_password_federated( user_realm_result, username, password, scopes=scopes, data=data, headers=headers, **kwargs) return self.client.obtain_token_by_username_password( username, password, scope=scopes, headers=headers, data=data, **kwargs) def _acquire_token_by_username_password_federated( self, user_realm_result, username, password, scopes=None, **kwargs): wstrust_endpoint = {} if user_realm_result.get("federation_metadata_url"): wstrust_endpoint = mex_send_request( user_realm_result["federation_metadata_url"], self.http_client) if wstrust_endpoint is None: raise ValueError("Unable to find wstrust endpoint from MEX. " "This typically happens when attempting MSA accounts. " "More details available here. " "https://github.com/AzureAD/microsoft-authentication-library-for-python/wiki/Username-Password-Authentication") logger.debug("wstrust_endpoint = %s", wstrust_endpoint) wstrust_result = wst_send_request( username, password, user_realm_result.get("cloud_audience_urn", "urn:federation:MicrosoftOnline"), wstrust_endpoint.get("address", # Fallback to an AAD supplied endpoint user_realm_result.get("federation_active_auth_url")), wstrust_endpoint.get("action"), self.http_client) if not ("token" in wstrust_result and "type" in wstrust_result): raise RuntimeError("Unsuccessful RSTR. %s" % wstrust_result) GRANT_TYPE_SAML1_1 = 'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml1_1-bearer' grant_type = { SAML_TOKEN_TYPE_V1: GRANT_TYPE_SAML1_1, SAML_TOKEN_TYPE_V2: self.client.GRANT_TYPE_SAML2, WSS_SAML_TOKEN_PROFILE_V1_1: GRANT_TYPE_SAML1_1, WSS_SAML_TOKEN_PROFILE_V2: self.client.GRANT_TYPE_SAML2 }.get(wstrust_result.get("type")) if not grant_type: raise RuntimeError( "RSTR returned unknown token type: %s", wstrust_result.get("type")) self.client.grant_assertion_encoders.setdefault( # Register a non-standard type grant_type, self.client.encode_saml_assertion) return self.client.obtain_token_by_assertion( wstrust_result["token"], grant_type, scope=scopes, **kwargs) class ConfidentialClientApplication(ClientApplication): # server-side web app def acquire_token_for_client(self, scopes, claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): """Acquires token for the current confidential client, not for an end user. :param list[str] scopes: (Required) Scopes requested to access a protected API (a resource). :param claims_challenge: The claims_challenge parameter requests specific claims requested by the resource provider in the form of a claims_challenge directive in the www-authenticate header to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token and/or Access Token. It is a string of a JSON object which contains lists of claims being requested from these locations. :return: A dict representing the json response from AAD: - A successful response would contain "access_token" key, - an error response would contain "error" and usually "error_description". """ # TBD: force_refresh behavior self._validate_ssh_cert_input_data(kwargs.get("data", {})) return self.client.obtain_token_for_client( scope=scopes, # This grant flow requires no scope decoration headers={ CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: _get_new_correlation_id(), CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY: _build_current_telemetry_request_header( self.ACQUIRE_TOKEN_FOR_CLIENT_ID), }, data=dict( kwargs.pop("data", {}), claims=_merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, claims_challenge)), **kwargs) def acquire_token_on_behalf_of(self, user_assertion, scopes, claims_challenge=None, **kwargs): """Acquires token using on-behalf-of (OBO) flow. The current app is a middle-tier service which was called with a token representing an end user. The current app can use such token (a.k.a. a user assertion) to request another token to access downstream web API, on behalf of that user. See `detail docs here `_ . The current middle-tier app has no user interaction to obtain consent. See how to gain consent upfront for your middle-tier app from this article. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-on-behalf-of-flow#gaining-consent-for-the-middle-tier-application :param str user_assertion: The incoming token already received by this app :param list[str] scopes: Scopes required by downstream API (a resource). :param claims_challenge: The claims_challenge parameter requests specific claims requested by the resource provider in the form of a claims_challenge directive in the www-authenticate header to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token and/or Access Token. It is a string of a JSON object which contains lists of claims being requested from these locations. :return: A dict representing the json response from AAD: - A successful response would contain "access_token" key, - an error response would contain "error" and usually "error_description". """ # The implementation is NOT based on Token Exchange # https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange-16 return self.client.obtain_token_by_assertion( # bases on assertion RFC 7521 user_assertion, self.client.GRANT_TYPE_JWT, # IDTs and AAD ATs are all JWTs scope=decorate_scope(scopes, self.client_id), # Decoration is used for: # 1. Explicitly requesting an RT, without relying on AAD default # behavior, even though it currently still issues an RT. # 2. Requesting an IDT (which would otherwise be unavailable) # so that the calling app could use id_token_claims to implement # their own cache mapping, which is likely needed in web apps. data=dict( kwargs.pop("data", {}), requested_token_use="on_behalf_of", claims=_merge_claims_challenge_and_capabilities( self._client_capabilities, claims_challenge)), headers={ CLIENT_REQUEST_ID: _get_new_correlation_id(), CLIENT_CURRENT_TELEMETRY: _build_current_telemetry_request_header( self.ACQUIRE_TOKEN_ON_BEHALF_OF_ID), }, **kwargs)