#!/usr/bin/python """SPF (Sender Policy Framework) implementation. Copyright (c) 2003, Terence Way Portions Copyright (c) 2004,2005,2006,2007,2008 Stuart Gathman Portions Copyright (c) 2005,2006,2007,2008,2011,2012 Scott Kitterman This module is free software, and you may redistribute it and/or modify it under the same terms as Python itself, so long as this copyright message and disclaimer are retained in their original form. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE TO ANY PARTY FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF THIS CODE, EVEN IF THE AUTHOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. THE AUTHOR SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE CODE PROVIDED HEREUNDER IS ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, AND THERE IS NO OBLIGATION WHATSOEVER TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, UPDATES, ENHANCEMENTS, OR MODIFICATIONS. For more information about SPF, a tool against email forgery, see http://www.openspf.net/ For news, bugfixes, etc. visit the home page for this implementation at http://cheeseshop.python.org/pypi/pyspf/ http://sourceforge.net/projects/pymilter/ http://www.wayforward.net/spf/ """ # CVS Commits since last release (2.0.6): # $Log: spf.py,v $ # Revision 1.108.2.75 2012/02/03 01:44:58 customdesigned # Fix CNAME duplicating DNS records. # Fix handling non-ascii chars in TXT/SPF records. # # Revision 1.108.2.74 2012/01/19 06:40:24 kitterma # * Accounts for new py3dns error classes coming in py3dns 3.0.2 (but fully # backward compatible with earlier versions) # # Revision 1.108.2.73 2012/01/19 06:22:35 kitterma # * Accept TXT and SPF type records back from py(3)dns and deal with them regardless of type (string or bytes. # * Update README # # Revision 1.108.2.72 2012/01/16 15:37:47 kitterma # Do away with default querytime, make it fully optional and by default completely backwards compatible. # # Revision 1.108.2.71 2012/01/16 06:19:31 kitterma # * Refactor timeout changes to improve backward comaptibility (see CHANGELOG). # # Revision 1.108.2.70 2012/01/13 04:21:19 kitterma # * Change timeouts to be global for all DNS lookups instead of per DNS lookup # to match processing limits recommendation in RFC 4408 10.1 # - Default is 20 seconds for the global timer instead of 30 seconds per DNS # lookup # - This can be adjusted by changing spf.MAX_GLOBAL_TIME # # Revision 1.108.2.69 2012/01/10 06:13:18 kitterma # * Finish Python3 port - works with python2.6/2.7/3.2 and 2to3 is no longer # required. # # Revision 1.108.2.68 2012/01/10 05:56:16 kitterma # Update copyright years and fix date. # # Revision 1.108.2.67 2012/01/10 04:42:03 kitterma # * Rework query.parse_header: # - Make query.parse_header automatically select Received-DPF or # Authentication Results header types and use them to collect SPF # results from trusted relays # - Add query.parse_header_spf and query.parse_header_ar functions for # header type specific processing # * Add 'Programming Language :: Python3' to setup.py # * Bump release dates # # Revision 1.108.2.66 2012/01/10 00:17:09 kitterma # Fix authentication results support to provide similar comments as Received-SPF. # # Revision 1.108.2.65 2011/11/08 07:38:37 kitterma # Extend query.get_header to return either Received-SPF (still default) or # Authentication Results headers # # Revision 1.108.2.64 2011/11/08 05:11:56 kitterma # Add tests for query.get_header. # # Revision 1.108.2.63 2011/11/08 04:36:33 kitterma # Update CHANGELOG, setup.py, spf.py, and move old commit messages to # pyspf_changelog.txt to start on new version (2.0.7). # # Revision 1.108.2.62 2011/11/05 19:07:53 customdesigned # New website openspf.org -> openspf.net # # See pyspf_changelog.txt for earlier CVS commits. __author__ = "Terence Way" __email__ = "terry@wayforward.net" __version__ = "2.0.7: Jan 19, 2012" MODULE = 'spf' USAGE = """To check an incoming mail request: % python spf.py [-v] {ip} {sender} {helo} % python spf.py 69.55.226.139 tway@optsw.com mx1.wayforward.net To test an SPF record: % python spf.py [-v] "v=spf1..." {ip} {sender} {helo} % python spf.py "v=spf1 +mx +ip4:10.0.0.1 -all" 10.0.0.1 tway@foo.com a To fetch an SPF record: % python spf.py {domain} % python spf.py wayforward.net To test this script (and to output this usage message): % python spf.py """ import re import socket # for inet_ntoa() and inet_aton() import struct # for pack() and unpack() import time # for time() try: import urllib.parse as urllibparse # for quote() except: import urllib as urllibparse import sys # for version_info() from functools import reduce try: from email.message import Message except ImportError: from email.Message import Message import DNS # http://pydns.sourceforge.net if not hasattr(DNS.Type, 'SPF'): # patch in type99 support DNS.Type.SPF = 99 DNS.Type.typemap[99] = 'SPF' DNS.Lib.RRunpacker.getSPFdata = DNS.Lib.RRunpacker.getTXTdata def DNSLookup(name, qtype, strict=True, timeout=30): try: req = DNS.DnsRequest(name, qtype=qtype, timeout=timeout) resp = req.req() #resp.show() # key k: ('wayforward.net', 'A'), value v # FIXME: pydns returns AAAA RR as 16 byte binary string, but # A RR as dotted quad. For consistency, this driver should # return both as binary string. # if resp.header['tc'] == True: if strict > 1: raise AmbiguityWarning('DNS: Truncated UDP Reply, SPF records should fit in a UDP packet, retrying TCP') try: req = DNS.DnsRequest(name, qtype=qtype, protocol='tcp', timeout=(timeout)) resp = req.req() except DNS.DNSError as x: raise TempError('DNS: TCP Fallback error: ' + str(x)) if resp.header['rcode'] != 0 and resp.header['rcode'] != 3: raise IOError('Error: ' + resp.header['status'] + ' RCODE: ' + str(resp.header['rcode'])) return [((a['name'], a['typename']), a['data']) for a in resp.answers] \ + [((a['name'], a['typename']), a['data']) for a in resp.additional] except IOError as x: raise TempError('DNS ' + str(x)) except DNS.DNSError as x: raise TempError('DNS ' + str(x)) RE_SPF = re.compile(r'^v=spf1$|^v=spf1 ',re.IGNORECASE) # Regular expression to look for modifiers RE_MODIFIER = re.compile(r'^([a-z][a-z0-9_\-\.]*)=', re.IGNORECASE) # Regular expression to find macro expansions PAT_CHAR = r'%(%|_|-|(\{[^\}]*\}))' RE_CHAR = re.compile(PAT_CHAR) # Regular expression to break up a macro expansion RE_ARGS = re.compile(r'([0-9]*)(r?)([^0-9a-zA-Z]*)') RE_DUAL_CIDR = re.compile(r'//(0|[1-9]\d*)$') RE_CIDR = re.compile(r'/(0|[1-9]\d*)$') PAT_IP4 = r'\.'.join([r'(?:\d|[1-9]\d|1\d\d|2[0-4]\d|25[0-5])']*4) RE_IP4 = re.compile(PAT_IP4+'$') RE_TOPLAB = re.compile( r'\.(?:[0-9a-z]*[a-z][0-9a-z]*|[0-9a-z]+-[0-9a-z-]*[0-9a-z])\.?$|%s' % PAT_CHAR, re.IGNORECASE) RE_DOT_ATOM = re.compile(r'%(atext)s+([.]%(atext)s+)*$' % { 'atext': r"[0-9a-z!#$%&'*+/=?^_`{}|~-]" }, re.IGNORECASE) # Derived from RFC 3986 appendix A RE_IP6 = re.compile( '(?:%(hex4)s:){6}%(ls32)s$' '|::(?:%(hex4)s:){5}%(ls32)s$' '|(?:%(hex4)s)?::(?:%(hex4)s:){4}%(ls32)s$' '|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,1}%(hex4)s)?::(?:%(hex4)s:){3}%(ls32)s$' '|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,2}%(hex4)s)?::(?:%(hex4)s:){2}%(ls32)s$' '|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,3}%(hex4)s)?::%(hex4)s:%(ls32)s$' '|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,4}%(hex4)s)?::%(ls32)s$' '|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,5}%(hex4)s)?::%(hex4)s$' '|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,6}%(hex4)s)?::$' % { 'ls32': r'(?:[0-9a-f]{1,4}:[0-9a-f]{1,4}|%s)'%PAT_IP4, 'hex4': r'[0-9a-f]{1,4}' }, re.IGNORECASE) # Local parts and senders have their delimiters replaced with '.' during # macro expansion # JOINERS = {'l': '.', 's': '.'} RESULTS = {'+': 'pass', '-': 'fail', '?': 'neutral', '~': 'softfail', 'pass': 'pass', 'fail': 'fail', 'permerror': 'permerror', 'error': 'temperror', 'neutral': 'neutral', 'softfail': 'softfail', 'none': 'none', 'local': 'local', 'trusted': 'trusted', 'ambiguous': 'ambiguous', 'unknown': 'permerror' } EXPLANATIONS = {'pass': 'sender SPF authorized', 'fail': 'SPF fail - not authorized', 'permerror': 'permanent error in processing', 'temperror': 'temporary DNS error in processing', 'softfail': 'domain owner discourages use of this host', 'neutral': 'access neither permitted nor denied', 'none': '', #Note: The following are not formally SPF results 'local': 'No SPF result due to local policy', 'trusted': 'No SPF check - trusted-forwarder.org', #Ambiguous only used in harsh mode for SPF validation 'ambiguous': 'No error, but results may vary' } DELEGATE = None # standard default SPF record for best_guess DEFAULT_SPF = 'v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr' #Whitelisted forwarders here. Additional locally trusted forwarders can be #added to this record. TRUSTED_FORWARDERS = 'v=spf1 ?include:spf.trusted-forwarder.org -all' # maximum DNS lookups allowed MAX_LOOKUP = 10 #RFC 4408 Para 10.1 MAX_MX = 10 #RFC 4408 Para 10.1 MAX_PTR = 10 #RFC 4408 Para 10.1 MAX_CNAME = 10 # analogous interpretation to MAX_PTR MAX_RECURSION = 20 MAX_PER_LOOKUP_TIME = 30 # Long standing pyspf default ALL_MECHANISMS = ('a', 'mx', 'ptr', 'exists', 'include', 'ip4', 'ip6', 'all') COMMON_MISTAKES = { 'prt': 'ptr', 'ip': 'ip4', 'ipv4': 'ip4', 'ipv6': 'ip6', 'all.': 'all' } #If harsh processing, for the validator, is invoked, warn if results #likely deviate from the publishers intention. class AmbiguityWarning(Exception): "SPF Warning - ambiguous results" def __init__(self, msg, mech=None, ext=None): Exception.__init__(self, msg, mech) self.msg = msg self.mech = mech self.ext = ext def __str__(self): if self.mech: return '%s: %s' %(self.msg, self.mech) return self.msg class TempError(Exception): "Temporary SPF error" def __init__(self, msg, mech=None, ext=None): Exception.__init__(self, msg, mech) self.msg = msg self.mech = mech self.ext = ext def __str__(self): if self.mech: return '%s: %s '%(self.msg, self.mech) return self.msg class PermError(Exception): "Permanent SPF error" def __init__(self, msg, mech=None, ext=None): Exception.__init__(self, msg, mech) self.msg = msg self.mech = mech self.ext = ext def __str__(self): if self.mech: return '%s: %s'%(self.msg, self.mech) return self.msg def check2(i, s, h, local=None, receiver=None, timeout=MAX_PER_LOOKUP_TIME, verbose=False, querytime=0): """Test an incoming MAIL FROM:, from a client with ip address i. h is the HELO/EHLO domain name. This is the RFC4408 compliant pySPF2.0 interface. The interface returns an SPF result and explanation only. SMTP response codes are not returned since RFC 4408 does not specify receiver policy. Applications updated for RFC 4408 should use this interface. The maximum time, in seconds, this function is allowed to run before a TempError is returned is controlled by querytime. When set to 0 (default) the timeout parameter (default 30 seconds) controls the time allowed for each DNS lookup. Returns (result, explanation) where result in ['pass', 'permerror', 'fail', 'temperror', 'softfail', 'none', 'neutral' ]. Example: #>>> check2(i='61.51.192.42', s='liukebing@bcc.com', h='bmsi.com') """ res,_,exp = query(i=i, s=s, h=h, local=local, receiver=receiver,timeout=timeout,verbose=verbose,querytime=querytime).check() return res,exp def check(i, s, h, local=None, receiver=None, verbose=False): """Test an incoming MAIL FROM:, from a client with ip address i. h is the HELO/EHLO domain name. This is the pre-RFC SPF Classic interface. Applications written for pySPF 1.6/1.7 can use this interface to allow pySPF2 to be a drop in replacement for older versions. With the exception of result codes, performance in RFC 4408 compliant. Returns (result, code, explanation) where result in ['pass', 'unknown', 'fail', 'error', 'softfail', 'none', 'neutral' ]. Example: #>>> check(i='61.51.192.42', s='liukebing@bcc.com', h='bmsi.com') """ res,code,exp = query(i=i, s=s, h=h, local=local, receiver=receiver, verbose=verbose).check() if res == 'permerror': res = 'unknown' elif res == 'tempfail': res =='error' return res, code, exp class query(object): """A query object keeps the relevant information about a single SPF query: i: ip address of SMTP client in dotted notation s: sender declared in MAIL FROM:<> l: local part of sender s d: current domain, initially domain part of sender s h: EHLO/HELO domain v: 'in-addr' for IPv4 clients and 'ip6' for IPv6 clients t: current timestamp p: SMTP client domain name o: domain part of sender s r: receiver c: pretty ip address (different from i for IPv6) This is also, by design, the same variables used in SPF macro expansion. Also keeps cache: DNS cache. """ def __init__(self, i, s, h, local=None, receiver=None, strict=True, timeout=MAX_PER_LOOKUP_TIME,verbose=False,querytime=0): self.s, self.h = s, h if not s and h: self.s = 'postmaster@' + h self.ident = 'helo' else: self.ident = 'mailfrom' self.l, self.o = split_email(s, h) self.t = str(int(time.time())) self.d = self.o self.p = None # lazy evaluation if receiver: self.r = receiver else: self.r = 'unknown' # Since the cache does not track Time To Live, it is created # fresh for each query. It is important for efficiently using # multiple results provided in DNS answers. self.cache = {} self.defexps = dict(EXPLANATIONS) self.exps = dict(EXPLANATIONS) self.libspf_local = local # local policy self.lookups = 0 # strict can be False, True, or 2 (numeric) for harsh self.strict = strict self.timeout = timeout self.querytime = querytime # Default to not using a global check # timelimit since this is an RFC 4408 MAY if querytime > 0: self.timeout = querytime self.timer = 0 if i: self.set_ip(i) self.default_modifier = True self.verbose = verbose self.authserv = None # Only used in A-R header generation tests def log(self,mech,d,spf): print('%s: %s "%s"'%(mech,d,spf)) def set_ip(self, i): "Set connect ip, and ip6 or ip4 mode." if RE_IP4.match(i): self.ip = addr2bin(i) ip6 = False else: self.ip = bin2long6(inet_pton(i)) if (self.ip >> 32) == 0xFFFF: # IP4 mapped address self.ip = self.ip & 0xFFFFFFFF ip6 = False else: ip6 = True # NOTE: self.A is not lowercase, so isn't a macro. See query.expand() if ip6: self.c = inet_ntop( struct.pack("!QQ", self.ip>>64, self.ip&0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF)) self.i = '.'.join(list('%032X'%self.ip)) self.A = 'AAAA' self.v = 'ip6' self.cidrmax = 128 else: self.c = socket.inet_ntoa(struct.pack("!L", self.ip)) self.i = self.c self.A = 'A' self.v = 'in-addr' self.cidrmax = 32 def set_default_explanation(self, exp): exps = self.exps defexps = self.defexps for i in 'softfail', 'fail', 'permerror': exps[i] = exp defexps[i] = exp def set_explanation(self, exp): exps = self.exps for i in 'softfail', 'fail', 'permerror': exps[i] = exp # Compute p macro only if needed def getp(self): if not self.p: p = self.validated_ptrs() if not p: self.p = "unknown" elif self.d in p: self.p = self.d else: sfx = '.' + self.d for d in p: if d.endswith(sfx): self.p = d break else: self.p = p[0] return self.p def best_guess(self, spf=DEFAULT_SPF): """Return a best guess based on a default SPF record. >>> q = query('1.2.3.4','','SUPERVISION1',receiver='example.com') >>> q.best_guess()[0] 'none' """ if RE_TOPLAB.split(self.d)[-1]: return ('none', 250, '') return self.check(spf) def check(self, spf=None): """ Returns (result, mta-status-code, explanation) where result in ['fail', 'softfail', 'neutral' 'permerror', 'pass', 'temperror', 'none'] Examples: >>> q = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com', ... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ?all') ('neutral', 250, 'access neither permitted nor denied') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 redirect=controlledmail.com exp=_exp.controlledmail.com') ('fail', 550, 'SPF fail - not authorized') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 ?all moo') ('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown mechanism found: moo') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 =a ?all moo') ('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown qualifier, RFC 4408 para 4.6.1, found in: =a') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 ~all') ('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 -all moo=') ('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 -all match.sub-domains_9=yes') ('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized') >>> q.strict = False >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 -all moo') ('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown mechanism found: moo') >>> q.perm_error.ext ('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized') >>> q.strict = True >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.1.0.0/16 moo -all') ('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown mechanism found: moo') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.1.0.0/16 ~all') ('softfail', 250, 'domain owner discourages use of this host') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 -ip4:192.1.0.0/6 ~all') ('fail', 550, 'SPF fail - not authorized') # Assumes DNS available >>> q.check() ('none', 250, '') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 -a:example.net -all') ('fail', 550, 'SPF fail - not authorized') >>> q.libspf_local='ip4:192.0.2.3 a:example.org' >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 -a:example.net -all') ('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 -all exp=_exp.controlledmail.com') ('fail', 550, 'Controlledmail.com does not send mail from itself.') >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 ?all exp=_exp.controlledmail.com') ('neutral', 250, 'access neither permitted nor denied') """ self.mech = [] # unknown mechanisms # If not strict, certain PermErrors (mispelled # mechanisms, strict processing limits exceeded) # will continue processing. However, the exception # that strict processing would raise is saved here self.perm_error = None self.mechanism = None self.options = {} try: self.lookups = 0 self.timer = 0 if not spf: spf = self.dns_spf(self.d) if self.verbose: self.log("top",self.d,spf) if self.libspf_local and spf: spf = insert_libspf_local_policy( spf, self.libspf_local) rc = self.check1(spf, self.d, 0) if self.perm_error: # lax processing encountered a permerror, but continued self.perm_error.ext = rc raise self.perm_error return rc except TempError as x: self.prob = x.msg if x.mech: self.mech.append(x.mech) return ('temperror', 451, 'SPF Temporary Error: ' + str(x)) except PermError as x: if not self.perm_error: self.perm_error = x self.prob = x.msg if x.mech: self.mech.append(x.mech) # Pre-Lentczner draft treats this as an unknown result # and equivalent to no SPF record. return ('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: ' + str(x)) def check1(self, spf, domain, recursion): # spf rfc: 3.7 Processing Limits # if recursion > MAX_RECURSION: # This should never happen in strict mode # because of the other limits we check, # so if it does, there is something wrong with # our code. It is not a PermError because there is not # necessarily anything wrong with the SPF record. if self.strict: raise AssertionError('Too many levels of recursion') # As an extended result, however, it should be # a PermError. raise PermError('Too many levels of recursion') try: try: tmp, self.d = self.d, domain return self.check0(spf, recursion) finally: self.d = tmp except AmbiguityWarning as x: self.prob = x.msg if x.mech: self.mech.append(x.mech) return ('ambiguous', 000, 'SPF Ambiguity Warning: %s' % x) def note_error(self, *msg): if self.strict: raise PermError(*msg) # if lax mode, note error and continue if not self.perm_error: try: raise PermError(*msg) except PermError as x: # FIXME: keep a list of errors for even friendlier diagnostics. self.perm_error = x return self.perm_error def expand_domain(self,arg): "validate and expand domain-spec" # any trailing dot was removed by expand() if RE_TOPLAB.split(arg)[-1]: raise PermError('Invalid domain found (use FQDN)', arg) return self.expand(arg) def validate_mechanism(self, mech): """Parse and validate a mechanism. Returns mech,m,arg,cidrlength,result Examples: >>> q = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com.', ... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3') >>> q.validate_mechanism('A') ('A', 'a', 'email.example.com', 32, 'pass') >>> q = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com', ... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3') >>> q.validate_mechanism('A') ('A', 'a', 'email.example.com', 32, 'pass') >>> q.validate_mechanism('?mx:%{d}/27') ('?mx:%{d}/27', 'mx', 'email.example.com', 27, 'neutral') >>> try: q.validate_mechanism('ip4:1.2.3.4/247') ... except PermError as x: print(x) Invalid IP4 CIDR length: ip4:1.2.3.4/247 >>> try: q.validate_mechanism('ip4:1.2.3.4/33') ... except PermError as x: print(x) Invalid IP4 CIDR length: ip4:1.2.3.4/33 >>> try: q.validate_mechanism('a:example.com:8080') ... except PermError as x: print(x) Invalid domain found (use FQDN): example.com:8080 >>> try: q.validate_mechanism('ip4:1.2.3.444/24') ... except PermError as x: print(x) Invalid IP4 address: ip4:1.2.3.444/24 >>> try: q.validate_mechanism('ip4:1.2.03.4/24') ... except PermError as x: print(x) Invalid IP4 address: ip4:1.2.03.4/24 >>> try: q.validate_mechanism('-all:3030') ... except PermError as x: print(x) Invalid all mechanism format - only qualifier allowed with all: -all:3030 >>> q.validate_mechanism('-mx:%%%_/.Clara.de/27') ('-mx:%%%_/.Clara.de/27', 'mx', '% /.Clara.de', 27, 'fail') >>> q.validate_mechanism('~exists:%{i}.%{s1}.100/86400.rate.%{d}') ('~exists:%{i}.%{s1}.100/86400.rate.%{d}', 'exists', '192.0.2.3.com.100/86400.rate.email.example.com', 32, 'softfail') >>> q.validate_mechanism('a:mail.example.com.') ('a:mail.example.com.', 'a', 'mail.example.com', 32, 'pass') >>> try: q.validate_mechanism('a:mail.example.com,') ... except PermError as x: print(x) Do not separate mechnisms with commas: a:mail.example.com, """ if mech.endswith( "," ): self.note_error('Do not separate mechnisms with commas', mech) mech = mech[:-1] # a mechanism m, arg, cidrlength, cidr6length = parse_mechanism(mech, self.d) # map '?' '+' or '-' to 'neutral' 'pass' or 'fail' if m: result = RESULTS.get(m[0]) if result: # eat '?' '+' or '-' m = m[1:] else: # default pass result = 'pass' if m in COMMON_MISTAKES: self.note_error('Unknown mechanism found', mech) m = COMMON_MISTAKES[m] if m == 'a' and RE_IP4.match(arg): x = self.note_error( 'Use the ip4 mechanism for ip4 addresses', mech) m = 'ip4' # validate cidr and dual-cidr if m in ('a', 'mx'): if cidrlength is None: cidrlength = 32; elif cidrlength > 32: raise PermError('Invalid IP4 CIDR length', mech) if cidr6length is None: cidr6length = 128 elif cidr6length > 128: raise PermError('Invalid IP6 CIDR length', mech) if self.v == 'ip6': cidrlength = cidr6length elif m == 'ip4' or RE_IP4.match(m): if m != 'ip4': self.note_error( 'Missing IP4' , mech) m,arg = 'ip4',m if cidr6length is not None: raise PermError('Dual CIDR not allowed', mech) if cidrlength is None: cidrlength = 32; elif cidrlength > 32: raise PermError('Invalid IP4 CIDR length', mech) if not RE_IP4.match(arg): raise PermError('Invalid IP4 address', mech) elif m == 'ip6': if cidr6length is not None: raise PermError('Dual CIDR not allowed', mech) if cidrlength is None: cidrlength = 128 elif cidrlength > 128: raise PermError('Invalid IP6 CIDR length', mech) if not RE_IP6.match(arg): raise PermError('Invalid IP6 address', mech) else: if cidrlength is not None or cidr6length is not None: if m in ALL_MECHANISMS: raise PermError('CIDR not allowed', mech) cidrlength = self.cidrmax if m in ('a', 'mx', 'ptr', 'exists', 'include'): if m == 'exists' and not arg: raise PermError('implicit exists not allowed', mech) arg = self.expand_domain(arg) if not arg: raise PermError('empty domain:',mech) if m == 'include': if arg == self.d: if mech != 'include': raise PermError('include has trivial recursion', mech) raise PermError('include mechanism missing domain', mech) return mech, m, arg, cidrlength, result # validate 'all' mechanism per RFC 4408 ABNF if m == 'all' and mech.count(':'): # print '|'+ arg + '|', mech, self.d, self.note_error( 'Invalid all mechanism format - only qualifier allowed with all' , mech) if m in ALL_MECHANISMS: return mech, m, arg, cidrlength, result if m[1:] in ALL_MECHANISMS: x = self.note_error( 'Unknown qualifier, RFC 4408 para 4.6.1, found in', mech) else: x = self.note_error('Unknown mechanism found', mech) return mech, m, arg, cidrlength, x def check0(self, spf, recursion): """Test this query information against SPF text. Returns (result, mta-status-code, explanation) where result in ['fail', 'unknown', 'pass', 'none'] """ if not spf: return ('none', 250, EXPLANATIONS['none']) # split string by whitespace, drop the 'v=spf1' spf = spf.split() # Catch case where SPF record has no spaces. # Can never happen with conforming dns_spf(), however # in the future we might want to give warnings # for common mistakes like IN TXT "v=spf1" "mx" "-all" # in relaxed mode. if spf[0].lower() != 'v=spf1': if self.strict > 1: raise AmbiguityWarning('Invalid SPF record in', self.d) return ('none', 250, EXPLANATIONS['none']) spf = spf[1:] # copy of explanations to be modified by exp= exps = self.exps redirect = None # no mechanisms at all cause unknown result, unless # overridden with 'default=' modifier # default = 'neutral' mechs = [] modifiers = [] # Look for modifiers # for mech in spf: m = RE_MODIFIER.split(mech)[1:] if len(m) != 2: mechs.append(self.validate_mechanism(mech)) continue mod,arg = m if mod in modifiers: if mod == 'redirect': raise PermError('redirect= MUST appear at most once',mech) self.note_error('%s= MUST appear at most once'%mod,mech) # just use last one in lax mode modifiers.append(mod) if mod == 'exp': # always fetch explanation to check permerrors if not arg: raise PermError('exp has empty domain-spec:',arg) arg = self.expand_domain(arg) if arg: try: exp = self.get_explanation(arg) if exp and not recursion: # only set explanation in base recursion level self.set_explanation(exp) except: pass elif mod == 'redirect': self.check_lookups() redirect = self.expand_domain(arg) if not redirect: raise PermError('redirect has empty domain:',arg) elif mod == 'default': # default modifier is obsolete if self.strict > 1: raise AmbiguityWarning('The default= modifier is obsolete.') if not self.strict and self.default_modifier: # might be an old policy, so do it anyway arg = self.expand(arg) # default=- is the same as default=fail default = RESULTS.get(arg, default) elif mod == 'op': if not recursion: for v in arg.split('.'): if v: self.options[v] = True else: # spf rfc: 3.6 Unrecognized Mechanisms and Modifiers self.expand(m[1]) # syntax error on invalid macro # Evaluate mechanisms # for mech, m, arg, cidrlength, result in mechs: if m == 'include': self.check_lookups() d = self.dns_spf(arg) if self.verbose: self.log("include",arg,d) res, code, txt = self.check1(d,arg, recursion + 1) if res == 'pass': break if res == 'none': self.note_error( 'No valid SPF record for included domain: %s' %arg, mech) res = 'neutral' continue elif m == 'all': break elif m == 'exists': self.check_lookups() try: if len(self.dns_a(arg,'A')) > 0: break except AmbiguityWarning: # Exists wants no response sometimes so don't raise # the warning. pass elif m == 'a': self.check_lookups() if self.cidrmatch(self.dns_a(arg,self.A), cidrlength): break elif m == 'mx': self.check_lookups() if self.cidrmatch(self.dns_mx(arg), cidrlength): break elif m == 'ip4': if self.v == 'in-addr': # match own connection type only try: if self.cidrmatch([arg], cidrlength): break except socket.error: raise PermError('syntax error', mech) elif m == 'ip6': if self.v == 'ip6': # match own connection type only try: arg = inet_pton(arg) if self.cidrmatch([arg], cidrlength): break except socket.error: raise PermError('syntax error', mech) elif m == 'ptr': self.check_lookups() if domainmatch(self.validated_ptrs(), arg): break else: # no matches if redirect: #Catch redirect to a non-existant SPF record. redirect_record = self.dns_spf(redirect) if not redirect_record: raise PermError('redirect domain has no SPF record', redirect) if self.verbose: self.log("redirect",redirect,redirect_record) # forget modifiers on redirect if not recursion: self.exps = dict(self.defexps) self.options = {} return self.check1(redirect_record, redirect, recursion) result = default mech = None if not recursion: # record matching mechanism at base level self.mechanism = mech if result == 'fail': return (result, 550, exps[result]) else: return (result, 250, exps[result]) def check_lookups(self): self.lookups = self.lookups + 1 if self.lookups > MAX_LOOKUP*4: raise PermError('More than %d DNS lookups'%(MAX_LOOKUP*4)) if self.lookups > MAX_LOOKUP: self.note_error('Too many DNS lookups') def get_explanation(self, spec): """Expand an explanation.""" if spec: try: a = self.dns_txt(spec) if len(a) == 1: return str(self.expand(a[0], stripdot=False)) except PermError: # RFC4408 6.2/4 syntax errors cause exp= to be ignored pass elif self.strict > 1: raise PermError('Empty domain-spec on exp=') # RFC4408 6.2/4 empty domain spec is ignored # (unless you give precedence to the grammar). return None def expand(self, str, stripdot=True): # macros='slodipvh' """Do SPF RFC macro expansion. Examples: >>> q = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com', ... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3') >>> q.p = 'mx.example.org' >>> q.r = 'example.net' >>> q.expand('%{d}') 'email.example.com' >>> q.expand('%{d4}') 'email.example.com' >>> q.expand('%{d3}') 'email.example.com' >>> q.expand('%{d2}') 'example.com' >>> q.expand('%{d1}') 'com' >>> q.expand('%{p}') 'mx.example.org' >>> q.expand('%{p2}') 'example.org' >>> q.expand('%{dr}') 'com.example.email' >>> q.expand('%{d2r}') 'example.email' >>> q.expand('%{l}') 'strong-bad' >>> q.expand('%{l-}') 'strong.bad' >>> q.expand('%{lr}') 'strong-bad' >>> q.expand('%{lr-}') 'bad.strong' >>> q.expand('%{l1r-}') 'strong' >>> q.expand('%{c}',stripdot=False) '192.0.2.3' >>> q.expand('%{r}',stripdot=False) 'example.net' >>> q.expand('%{ir}.%{v}._spf.%{d2}') '3.2.0.192.in-addr._spf.example.com' >>> q.expand('%{lr-}.lp._spf.%{d2}') 'bad.strong.lp._spf.example.com' >>> q.expand('%{lr-}.lp.%{ir}.%{v}._spf.%{d2}') 'bad.strong.lp.3.2.0.192.in-addr._spf.example.com' >>> q.expand('%{ir}.%{v}.%{l1r-}.lp._spf.%{d2}') '3.2.0.192.in-addr.strong.lp._spf.example.com' >>> try: q.expand('%(ir).%{v}.%{l1r-}.lp._spf.%{d2}') ... except PermError as x: print(x) invalid-macro-char : %(ir) >>> q.expand('%{p2}.trusted-domains.example.net') 'example.org.trusted-domains.example.net' >>> q.expand('%{p2}.trusted-domains.example.net.') 'example.org.trusted-domains.example.net' >>> q = query(s='@email.example.com', ... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3') >>> q.p = 'mx.example.org' >>> q.expand('%{l}') 'postmaster' """ macro_delimiters = ['{', '%', '-', '_'] end = 0 result = '' macro_count = str.count('%') if macro_count != 0: labels = str.split('.') for label in labels: is_macro = False if len(label) > 1: if label[0] == '%': for delimit in macro_delimiters: if label[1] == delimit: is_macro = True if not is_macro: raise PermError ('invalid-macro-char ', label) break for i in RE_CHAR.finditer(str): result += str[end:i.start()] macro = str[i.start():i.end()] if macro == '%%': result += '%' elif macro == '%_': result += ' ' elif macro == '%-': result += '%20' else: letter = macro[2].lower() # print letter if letter == 'p': self.getp() elif letter in 'crt' and stripdot: raise PermError( 'c,r,t macros allowed in exp= text only', macro) expansion = getattr(self, letter, self) if expansion: if expansion == self: raise PermError('Unknown Macro Encountered', macro) e = expand_one(expansion, macro[3:-1], JOINERS.get(letter)) if letter != macro[2]: e = urllibparse.quote(e) result += e end = i.end() result += str[end:] if stripdot and result.endswith('.'): result = result[:-1] if result.count('.') != 0: if len(result) > 253: result = result[(result.index('.')+1):] return result def dns_spf(self, domain): """Get the SPF record recorded in DNS for a specific domain name. Returns None if not found, or if more than one record is found. """ # Per RFC 4.3/1, check for malformed domain. This produces # no results as a special case. for label in domain.split('.'): if not label or len(label) > 63: return None # for performance, check for most common case of TXT first a = [t for t in self.dns_txt(domain) if RE_SPF.match(t)] if len(a) > 1: raise PermError('Two or more type TXT spf records found.') if len(a) == 1 and self.strict < 2: return to_ascii(a[0]) # check official SPF type first when it becomes more popular if self.strict > 1: #Only check for Type SPF in harsh mode until it is more popular. try: b = [t for t in self.dns_99(domain) if RE_SPF.match(t)] except TempError as x: # some braindead DNS servers hang on type 99 query if self.strict > 1: raise TempError(x) b = [] if len(b) > 1: raise PermError('Two or more type SPF spf records found.') if len(b) == 1: if self.strict > 1 and len(a) == 1 and a[0] != b[0]: #Changed from permerror to warning based on RFC 4408 Auth 48 change raise AmbiguityWarning( 'v=spf1 records of both type TXT and SPF (type 99) present, but not identical') return to_ascii(b[0]) if len(a) == 1: return to_ascii(a[0]) # return TXT if SPF wasn't found if DELEGATE: # use local record if neither found a = [t for t in self.dns_txt(domain+'._spf.'+DELEGATE) if RE_SPF.match(t) ] if len(a) == 1: return to_ascii(a[0]) return None def dns_txt(self, domainname): "Get a list of TXT records for a domain name." if domainname: try: return [''.join(s.decode("ascii") for s in a) for a in self.dns(domainname, 'TXT')] except UnicodeEncodeError: raise PermError('Non-ascii character in SPF TXT record.') return [] def dns_99(self, domainname): "Get a list of type SPF=99 records for a domain name." if domainname: try: return [''.join(s.decode("ascii") for s in a) for a in self.dns(domainname, 'SPF')] except UnicodeEncodeError: raise PermError('Non-ascii character in SPF record.') return [] def dns_mx(self, domainname): """Get a list of IP addresses for all MX exchanges for a domain name. """ # RFC 4408 section 5.4 "mx" # To prevent DoS attacks, more than 10 MX names MUST NOT be looked up mxnames = self.dns(domainname, 'MX') if self.strict: max = MAX_MX if self.strict > 1: if len(mxnames) > MAX_MX: raise AmbiguityWarning( 'More than %d MX records returned'%MAX_MX) if len(mxnames) == 0: raise AmbiguityWarning( 'No MX records found for mx mechanism', domainname) else: max = MAX_MX * 4 return [a for mx in mxnames[:max] for a in self.dns_a(mx[1],self.A)] def dns_a(self, domainname, A='A'): """Get a list of IP addresses for a domainname. """ if not domainname: return [] if self.strict > 1: alist = self.dns(domainname, A) if len(alist) == 0: raise AmbiguityWarning( 'No %s records found for'%A, domainname) else: return alist return self.dns(domainname, A) def validated_ptrs(self): """Figure out the validated PTR domain names for the connect IP.""" # To prevent DoS attacks, more than 10 PTR names MUST NOT be looked up if self.strict: max = MAX_PTR if self.strict > 1: #Break out the number of PTR records returned for testing try: ptrnames = self.dns_ptr(self.i) if len(ptrnames) > max: warning = 'More than %d PTR records returned' % max raise AmbiguityWarning(warning, self.i) else: if len(ptrnames) == 0: raise AmbiguityWarning( 'No PTR records found for ptr mechanism', self.c) except: raise AmbiguityWarning( 'No PTR records found for ptr mechanism', self.i) else: max = MAX_PTR * 4 cidrlength = self.cidrmax return [p for p in self.dns_ptr(self.i)[:max] if self.cidrmatch(self.dns_a(p,self.A),cidrlength)] def dns_ptr(self, i): """Get a list of domain names for an IP address.""" return self.dns('%s.%s.arpa'%(reverse_dots(i),self.v), 'PTR') # We have to be careful which additional DNS RRs we cache. For # instance, PTR records are controlled by the connecting IP, and they # could poison our local cache with bogus A and MX records. SAFE2CACHE = { ('MX','A'): None, ('MX','MX'): None, ('CNAME','A'): None, ('A','A'): None, ('AAAA','AAAA'): None, ('PTR','PTR'): None, ('TXT','TXT'): None, ('SPF','SPF'): None } def dns(self, name, qtype, cnames=None): """DNS query. If the result is in cache, return that. Otherwise pull the result from DNS, and cache ALL answers, so additional info is available for further queries later. CNAMEs are followed. If there is no data, [] is returned. pre: qtype in ['A', 'AAAA', 'MX', 'PTR', 'TXT', 'SPF'] post: isinstance(__return__, types.ListType) """ if name.endswith('.'): name = name[:-1] if not reduce(lambda x,y:x and 0 < len(y) < 64, name.split('.'),True): return [] # invalid DNS name (too long or empty) result = self.cache.get( (name, qtype) ) if result: return result cnamek = (name,'CNAME') cname = self.cache.get( cnamek ) if cname: cname = cname[0] else: safe2cache = query.SAFE2CACHE if self.querytime < 0: raise TempError('DNS Error: exceeded max query lookup time') if self.querytime < self.timeout and self.querytime > 0: timeout = self.querytime else: timeout = self.timeout timethen = time.time() for k, v in DNSLookup(name, qtype, self.strict, timeout): if k == cnamek: cname = v if k[1] == 'CNAME' or (qtype,k[1]) in safe2cache: self.cache.setdefault(k, []).append(v) #if ans and qtype == k[1]: # self.cache.setdefault((name,qtype), []).append(v) result = self.cache.get( (name, qtype), []) if self.querytime > 0: self.querytime = self.querytime - (time.time()-timethen) if not result and cname: if not cnames: cnames = {} elif len(cnames) >= MAX_CNAME: #return result # if too many == NX_DOMAIN raise PermError('Length of CNAME chain exceeds %d' % MAX_CNAME) cnames[name] = cname if cname in cnames: raise PermError('CNAME loop') result = self.dns(cname, qtype, cnames=cnames) if result: self.cache[(name,qtype)] = result return result def cidrmatch(self, ipaddrs, n): """Match connect IP against a list of other IP addresses.""" try: if self.v == 'ip6': MASK = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF bin = bin2long6 else: MASK = 0xFFFFFFFF bin = addr2bin c = ~(MASK >> n) & MASK & self.ip for ip in [bin(ip) for ip in ipaddrs]: if c == ~(MASK >> n) & MASK & ip: return True except socket.error: pass return False def parse_header_ar(self, val): """Set SPF values from RFC 5451 Authentication Results header. Useful when SPF has already been run on a trusted gateway machine. Expects the entire header as an input. Examples: >>> q = query('192.0.2.3','strong-bad@email.example.com','mx.example.org') >>> q.mechanism = 'unknown' >>> p = q.parse_header_ar('''Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=neutral \\n (abuse@kitterman.com: 192.0.2.3 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of email.example.com) \\n smtp.mailfrom=email.example.com \\n (sender=strong-bad@email.example.com; helo=mx.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.3; receiver=abuse@kitterman.com; mechanism=?all)''') >>> q.get_header(q.result, header_type='authres', aid='bmsi.com') 'Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=neutral (unknown: 192.0.2.3 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of email.example.com) smtp.mailfrom=email.example.com (sender=email.example.com; helo=mx.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.3; receiver=unknown; mechanism=unknown)' >>> p = q.parse_header_ar('''Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=None (mail.bmsi.com: test; client-ip=163.247.46.150) smtp.mailfrom=admin@squiebras.cl (helo=mail.squiebras.cl; receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=mx/24)''') >>> q.get_header(q.result, header_type='authres', aid='bmsi.com') 'Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=none (unknown: 192.0.2.3 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of email.example.com) smtp.mailfrom=admin@squiebras.cl (sender=admin@squiebras.cl; helo=mx.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.3; receiver=unknown; mechanism=unknown)' """ import authres # Authres expects unwrapped headers unwrap = '' valsplit = val.split('\n') for element in valsplit: unwrap += '{0} '.format(element.strip()) arobj = authres.AuthenticationResultsHeader.parse(val) # TODO extract and parse comments (not supported by authres) for resobj in arobj.results: if resobj.method == 'spf': self.authserv = arobj.authserv_id self.result = resobj.result if resobj.properties[0].name == 'mailfrom': self.d = resobj.properties[0].value self.s = resobj.properties[0].value if resobj.properties[0].name == 'helo': self.h = resobj.properties[0].value return def parse_header_spf(self, val): """Set SPF values from Received-SPF header. Useful when SPF has already been run on a trusted gateway machine. Examples: >>> q = query('0.0.0.0','','') >>> p = q.parse_header_spf('''Pass (test) client-ip=70.98.79.77; ... envelope-from="evelyn@subjectsthum.com"; helo=mail.subjectsthum.com; ... receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=a; identity=mailfrom''') >>> q.get_header(q.result) 'Pass (test) client-ip=70.98.79.77; envelope-from="evelyn@subjectsthum.com"; helo=mail.subjectsthum.com; receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=a; identity=mailfrom' >>> p = q.parse_header_spf('''None (mail.bmsi.com: test) ... client-ip=163.247.46.150; envelope-from="admin@squiebras.cl"; ... helo=mail.squiebras.cl; receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=mx/24; ... x-bestguess=pass; x-helo-spf=neutral; identity=mailfrom''') >>> q.get_header(q.result,**p) 'None (mail.bmsi.com: test) client-ip=163.247.46.150; envelope-from="admin@squiebras.cl"; helo=mail.squiebras.cl; receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=mx/24; x-bestguess=pass; x-helo-spf=neutral; identity=mailfrom' >>> p['bestguess'] 'pass' """ a = val.split(None,1) self.result = a[0].lower() self.mechanism = None if len(a) < 2: return 'none' val = a[1] if val.startswith('('): pos = val.find(')') if pos < 0: return self.result self.comment = val[1:pos] val = val[pos+1:] msg = Message() msg.add_header('Received-SPF','; '+val) p = {} for k,v in msg.get_params(header='Received-SPF'): if k == 'client-ip': self.set_ip(v) elif k == 'envelope-from': self.s = v elif k == 'helo': self.h = v elif k == 'receiver': self.r = v elif k == 'problem': self.mech = v elif k == 'mechanism': self.mechanism = v elif k == 'identity': self.ident = v elif k.startswith('x-'): p[k[2:]] = v self.l, self.o = split_email(self.s, self.h) return p def parse_header(self, val): """Set SPF values from Received-SPF or RFC 5451 Authentication Results header. Useful when SPF has already been run on a trusted gateway machine. Auto detects the header type and parses it. Use parse_header_spf or parse_header_ar for each type if required. Examples: >>> q = query('0.0.0.0','','') >>> p = q.parse_header('''Pass (test) client-ip=70.98.79.77; ... envelope-from="evelyn@subjectsthum.com"; helo=mail.subjectsthum.com; ... receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=a; identity=mailfrom''') >>> q.get_header(q.result) 'Pass (test) client-ip=70.98.79.77; envelope-from="evelyn@subjectsthum.com"; helo=mail.subjectsthum.com; receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=a; identity=mailfrom' >>> p = q.parse_header('''None (mail.bmsi.com: test) ... client-ip=163.247.46.150; envelope-from="admin@squiebras.cl"; ... helo=mail.squiebras.cl; receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=mx/24; ... x-bestguess=pass; x-helo-spf=neutral; identity=mailfrom''') >>> q.get_header(q.result,**p) 'None (mail.bmsi.com: test) client-ip=163.247.46.150; envelope-from="admin@squiebras.cl"; helo=mail.squiebras.cl; receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=mx/24; x-bestguess=pass; x-helo-spf=neutral; identity=mailfrom' >>> p['bestguess'] 'pass' >>> q = query('192.0.2.3','strong-bad@email.example.com','mx.example.org') >>> q.mechanism = 'unknown' >>> p = q.parse_header_ar('''Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=neutral \\n (abuse@kitterman.com: 192.0.2.3 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of email.example.com) \\n smtp.mailfrom=email.example.com \\n (sender=strong-bad@email.example.com; helo=mx.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.3; receiver=abuse@kitterman.com; mechanism=?all)''') >>> q.get_header(q.result, header_type='authres', aid='bmsi.com') 'Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=neutral (unknown: 192.0.2.3 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of email.example.com) smtp.mailfrom=email.example.com (sender=email.example.com; helo=mx.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.3; receiver=unknown; mechanism=unknown)' >>> p = q.parse_header_ar('''Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=None (mail.bmsi.com: test; client-ip=163.247.46.150) smtp.mailfrom=admin@squiebras.cl (helo=mail.squiebras.cl; receiver=mail.bmsi.com; mechanism=mx/24)''') >>> q.get_header(q.result, header_type='authres', aid='bmsi.com') 'Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=none (unknown: 192.0.2.3 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of email.example.com) smtp.mailfrom=admin@squiebras.cl (sender=admin@squiebras.cl; helo=mx.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.3; receiver=unknown; mechanism=unknown)' """ if val.startswith('Authentication-Results:'): return(self.parse_header_ar(val)) else: return(self.parse_header_spf(val)) def get_header(self, res, receiver=None, header_type='spf', aid=None, **kv): """ Generate Received-SPF or Authentication Results header based on the last lookup. >>> q = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com', h='mx.example.org', ... i='192.0.2.3') >>> q.r='abuse@kitterman.com' >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ?all') ('neutral', 250, 'access neither permitted nor denied') >>> q.get_header('neutral') 'Neutral (abuse@kitterman.com: 192.0.2.3 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of email.example.com) client-ip=192.0.2.3; envelope-from="strong-bad@email.example.com"; helo=mx.example.org; receiver=abuse@kitterman.com; mechanism=?all; identity=mailfrom' >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 redirect=controlledmail.com exp=_exp.controlledmail.com') ('fail', 550, 'SPF fail - not authorized') >>> q.get_header('fail') 'Fail (abuse@kitterman.com: domain of email.example.com does not designate 192.0.2.3 as permitted sender) client-ip=192.0.2.3; envelope-from="strong-bad@email.example.com"; helo=mx.example.org; receiver=abuse@kitterman.com; mechanism=-all; identity=mailfrom' >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 ?all moo') ('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown mechanism found: moo') >>> q.get_header('permerror') 'PermError (abuse@kitterman.com: permanent error in processing domain of email.example.com: Unknown mechanism found) client-ip=192.0.2.3; envelope-from="strong-bad@email.example.com"; helo=mx.example.org; receiver=abuse@kitterman.com; problem=moo; identity=mailfrom' >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 ~all') ('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized') >>> q.get_header('pass') 'Pass (abuse@kitterman.com: domain of email.example.com designates 192.0.2.3 as permitted sender) client-ip=192.0.2.3; envelope-from="strong-bad@email.example.com"; helo=mx.example.org; receiver=abuse@kitterman.com; mechanism="ip4:192.0.0.0/8"; identity=mailfrom' >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ?all') ('neutral', 250, 'access neither permitted nor denied') >>> q.get_header('neutral', header_type = 'authres', aid='bmsi.com') 'Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=neutral (abuse@kitterman.com: 192.0.2.3 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of email.example.com) smtp.mailfrom=email.example.com (sender=strong-bad@email.example.com; helo=mx.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.3; receiver=abuse@kitterman.com; mechanism=?all)' >>> p = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com', h='mx.example.org', ... i='192.0.2.3') >>> p.r='abuse@kitterman.com' >>> p.check(spf='v=spf1 redirect=controlledmail.com exp=_exp.controlledmail.com') ('fail', 550, 'SPF fail - not authorized') >>> p.ident = 'helo' >>> p.get_header('fail', header_type = 'authres', aid='bmsi.com') 'Authentication-Results: bmsi.com; spf=fail (abuse@kitterman.com: domain of email.example.com does not designate 192.0.2.3 as permitted sender) smtp.helo=mx.example.org (sender=strong-bad@email.example.com; client-ip=192.0.2.3; receiver=abuse@kitterman.com; mechanism=-all)' >>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ?all') ('neutral', 250, 'access neither permitted nor denied') >>> try: q.get_header('neutral', header_type = 'dkim') ... except SyntaxError as x: print(x) Unknown results header type: dkim """ # If type is Authentication Results header (spf/authres) if header_type == 'authres': if not aid: raise SyntaxError('authserv-id missing for Authentication Results header type, see RFC5451 2.3') import authres if not receiver: receiver = self.r client_ip = self.c helo = quote_value(self.h) resmap = { 'pass': 'Pass', 'neutral': 'Neutral', 'fail': 'Fail', 'softfail': 'SoftFail', 'none': 'None', 'temperror': 'TempError', 'permerror': 'PermError' } identity = self.ident if identity == 'helo': envelope_from = None else: envelope_from = quote_value(self.s) tag = resmap[res] if res == 'permerror' and self.mech: problem = quote_value(' '.join(self.mech)) else: problem = None mechanism = quote_value(self.mechanism) if hasattr(self,'comment'): comment = self.comment else: comment = '%s: %s' % (receiver,self.get_header_comment(res)) res = ['%s (%s)' % (tag,comment)] if header_type == 'spf': for k in ('client_ip','envelope_from','helo','receiver', 'problem','mechanism'): v = locals()[k] if v: res.append('%s=%s;'%(k.replace('_','-'),v)) for k,v in list(kv.items()): if v: res.append('x-%s=%s;'%(k.replace('_','-'),quote_value(v))) # do identity last so we can easily drop the trailing ';' res.append('%s=%s'%('identity',identity)) return ' '.join(res) elif header_type == 'authres': if envelope_from: return str(authres.AuthenticationResultsHeader(authserv_id = aid, \ results = [authres.SPFAuthenticationResult(result = tag, \ result_comment = comment, smtp_mailfrom = self.d, \ smtp_mailfrom_comment = \ 'sender={0}; helo={1}; client-ip={2}; receiver={3}; mechanism={4}'.format(self.s, \ self.h, self.i, self.r, mechanism))])) else: return str(authres.AuthenticationResultsHeader(authserv_id = aid, \ results = [authres.SPFAuthenticationResult(result = tag, \ result_comment = comment, smtp_helo = self.h, \ smtp_helo_comment = \ 'sender={0}; client-ip={1}; receiver={2}; mechanism={3}'.format(self.s, \ self.i, self.r, mechanism))])) else: raise SyntaxError('Unknown results header type: {0}'.format(header_type)) def get_header_comment(self, res): """Return comment for Received-SPF header. """ sender = self.o if res == 'pass': return \ "domain of %s designates %s as permitted sender" \ % (sender, self.c) elif res == 'softfail': return \ "transitioning domain of %s does not designate %s as permitted sender" \ % (sender, self.c) elif res == 'neutral': return \ "%s is neither permitted nor denied by domain of %s" \ % (self.c, sender) elif res == 'none': return \ "%s is neither permitted nor denied by domain of %s" \ % (self.c, sender) #"%s does not designate permitted sender hosts" % sender elif res == 'permerror': return \ "permanent error in processing domain of %s: %s" \ % (sender, self.prob) elif res == 'temperror': return \ "temporary error in processing during lookup of %s" % sender elif res == 'fail': return \ "domain of %s does not designate %s as permitted sender" \ % (sender, self.c) raise ValueError("invalid SPF result for header comment: "+res) def split_email(s, h): """Given a sender email s and a HELO domain h, create a valid tuple (l, d) local-part and domain-part. Examples: >>> split_email('', 'wayforward.net') ('postmaster', 'wayforward.net') >>> split_email('foo.com', 'wayforward.net') ('postmaster', 'foo.com') >>> split_email('terry@wayforward.net', 'optsw.com') ('terry', 'wayforward.net') """ if not s: return 'postmaster', h else: parts = s.split('@', 1) if parts[0] == '': parts[0] = 'postmaster' if len(parts) == 2: return tuple(parts) else: return 'postmaster', s def quote_value(s): """Quote the value for a key-value pair in Received-SPF header field if needed. No quoting needed for a dot-atom value. Examples: >>> quote_value('foo@bar.com') '"foo@bar.com"' >>> quote_value('mail.example.com') 'mail.example.com' >>> quote_value('A:1.2.3.4') '"A:1.2.3.4"' >>> quote_value('abc"def') '"abc\\\\"def"' >>> quote_value(r'abc\def') '"abc\\\\\\\\def"' >>> quote_value('abc..def') '"abc..def"' >>> quote_value('') '""' >>> quote_value(None) """ if s is None or RE_DOT_ATOM.match(s): return s return '"' + s.replace('\\',r'\\').replace('"',r'\"' ).replace('\x00',r'\x00') + '"' def parse_mechanism(str, d): """Breaks A, MX, IP4, and PTR mechanisms into a (name, domain, cidr,cidr6) tuple. The domain portion defaults to d if not present, the cidr defaults to 32 if not present. Examples: >>> parse_mechanism('a', 'foo.com') ('a', 'foo.com', None, None) >>> parse_mechanism('exists','foo.com') ('exists', None, None, None) >>> parse_mechanism('a:bar.com', 'foo.com') ('a', 'bar.com', None, None) >>> parse_mechanism('a/24', 'foo.com') ('a', 'foo.com', 24, None) >>> parse_mechanism('A:foo:bar.com/16//48', 'foo.com') ('a', 'foo:bar.com', 16, 48) >>> parse_mechanism('-exists:%{i}.%{s1}.100/86400.rate.%{d}','foo.com') ('-exists', '%{i}.%{s1}.100/86400.rate.%{d}', None, None) >>> parse_mechanism('mx:%%%_/.Claranet.de/27','foo.com') ('mx', '%%%_/.Claranet.de', 27, None) >>> parse_mechanism('mx:%{d}//97','foo.com') ('mx', '%{d}', None, 97) >>> parse_mechanism('iP4:192.0.0.0/8','foo.com') ('ip4', '192.0.0.0', 8, None) """ a = RE_DUAL_CIDR.split(str) if len(a) == 3: str, cidr6 = a[0], int(a[1]) else: cidr6 = None a = RE_CIDR.split(str) if len(a) == 3: str, cidr = a[0], int(a[1]) else: cidr = None a = str.split(':', 1) if len(a) < 2: str = str.lower() if str == 'exists': d = None return str, d, cidr, cidr6 return a[0].lower(), a[1], cidr, cidr6 def reverse_dots(name): """Reverse dotted IP addresses or domain names. Example: >>> reverse_dots('192.168.0.145') '145.0.168.192' >>> reverse_dots('email.example.com') 'com.example.email' """ a = name.split('.') a.reverse() return '.'.join(a) def domainmatch(ptrs, domainsuffix): """grep for a given domain suffix against a list of validated PTR domain names. Examples: >>> domainmatch(['FOO.COM'], 'foo.com') 1 >>> domainmatch(['moo.foo.com'], 'FOO.COM') 1 >>> domainmatch(['moo.bar.com'], 'foo.com') 0 """ domainsuffix = domainsuffix.lower() for ptr in ptrs: ptr = ptr.lower() if ptr == domainsuffix or ptr.endswith('.' + domainsuffix): return True return False def addr2bin(str): """Convert a string IPv4 address into an unsigned integer. Examples:: >>> import sys >>> if sys.version_info[0] == 2: ... print(long(addr2bin('127.0.0.1'))) ... else: ... print(addr2bin('127.0.0.1')) 2130706433 >>> addr2bin('127.0.0.1') == socket.INADDR_LOOPBACK 1 >>> print(addr2bin('255.255.255.254')) 4294967294 >>> print(addr2bin('192.168.0.1')) 3232235521 Unlike DNS.addr2bin, the n, n.n, and n.n.n forms for IP addresses are handled as well:: >>> import sys >>> if sys.version_info[0] == 2: ... print(long(addr2bin('10.65536'))) ... else: ... print(addr2bin('10.65536')) 167837696 >>> import sys >>> if sys.version_info[0] == 2: ... print(long(addr2bin('10.93.512'))) ... else: ... print(addr2bin('10.93.512')) 173867520 """ return struct.unpack("!L", socket.inet_aton(str))[0] def bin2long6(str): h, l = struct.unpack("!QQ", str) return h << 64 | l if hasattr(socket,'has_ipv6') and socket.has_ipv6: def inet_ntop(s): return socket.inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET6,s) def inet_pton(s): return socket.inet_pton(socket.AF_INET6,s) else: def inet_ntop(s): """Convert ip6 address to standard hex notation. Examples: >>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0,0,0,0,0,0xFFFF,0x0102,0x0304)) '::FFFF:1.2.3.4' >>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0x1234,0x5678,0,0,0,0,0x0102,0x0304)) '1234:5678::102:304' >>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0,0,0,0x1234,0x5678,0,0x0102,0x0304)) '::1234:5678:0:102:304' >>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0x1234,0x5678,0,0x0102,0x0304,0,0,0)) '1234:5678:0:102:304::' >>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)) '::' """ # convert to 8 words a = struct.unpack("!HHHHHHHH",s) n = (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) # null ip6 if a == n: return '::' # check for ip4 mapped if a[:5] == (0,0,0,0,0) and a[5] in (0,0xFFFF): ip4 = '.'.join([str(i) for i in struct.unpack("!HHHHHHBBBB",s)[6:]]) if a[5]: return "::FFFF:" + ip4 return "::" + ip4 # find index of longest sequence of 0 for l in (7,6,5,4,3,2,1): e = n[:l] for i in range(9-l): if a[i:i+l] == e: if i == 0: return ':'+':%x'*(8-l) % a[l:] if i == 8 - l: return '%x:'*(8-l) % a[:-l] + ':' return '%x:'*i % a[:i] + ':%x'*(8-l-i) % a[i+l:] return "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x" % a def inet_pton(p): """Convert ip6 standard hex notation to ip6 address. Examples: >>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('::')) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) >>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('::1234')) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4660) >>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('1234::')) (4660, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) >>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('1234::5678')) (4660, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 22136) >>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('::FFFF:1.2.3.4')) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 65535, 258, 772) >>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('1.2.3.4')) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 65535, 258, 772) >>> try: inet_pton('::1.2.3.4.5') ... except ValueError,x: print x ::1.2.3.4.5 """ if p == '::': return '\0'*16 s = p m = RE_IP4.search(s) try: if m: pos = m.start() ip4 = [int(i) for i in s[pos:].split('.')] if not pos: return struct.pack('!QLBBBB',0,65535,*ip4) s = s[:pos]+'%x%02x:%x%02x'%tuple(ip4) a = s.split('::') if len(a) == 2: l,r = a if not l: r = r.split(':') return struct.pack('!HHHHHHHH', *[0]*(8-len(r)) + [int(s,16) for s in r]) if not r: l = l.split(':') return struct.pack('!HHHHHHHH', *[int(s,16) for s in l] + [0]*(8-len(l))) l = l.split(':') r = r.split(':') return struct.pack('!HHHHHHHH', *[int(s,16) for s in l] + [0]*(8-len(l)-len(r)) + [int(s,16) for s in r]) if len(a) == 1: return struct.pack('!HHHHHHHH', *[int(s,16) for s in a[0].split(':')]) except ValueError: pass raise ValueError(p) def expand_one(expansion, str, joiner): if not str: return expansion ln, reverse, delimiters = RE_ARGS.split(str)[1:4] if not delimiters: delimiters = '.' expansion = split(expansion, delimiters, joiner) if reverse: expansion.reverse() if ln: expansion = expansion[-int(ln)*2+1:] return ''.join(expansion) def split(str, delimiters, joiner=None): """Split a string into pieces by a set of delimiter characters. The resulting list is delimited by joiner, or the original delimiter if joiner is not specified. Examples: >>> split('192.168.0.45', '.') ['192', '.', '168', '.', '0', '.', '45'] >>> split('terry@wayforward.net', '@.') ['terry', '@', 'wayforward', '.', 'net'] >>> split('terry@wayforward.net', '@.', '.') ['terry', '.', 'wayforward', '.', 'net'] """ result, element = [], '' for c in str: if c in delimiters: result.append(element) element = '' if joiner: result.append(joiner) else: result.append(c) else: element += c result.append(element) return result def insert_libspf_local_policy(spftxt, local=None): """Returns spftxt with local inserted just before last non-fail mechanism. This is how the libspf{2} libraries handle "local-policy". Examples: >>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 -all') 'v=spf1 -all' >>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 -all','mx') 'v=spf1 -all' >>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1','a mx ptr') 'v=spf1 a mx ptr' >>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 mx -all','a ptr') 'v=spf1 mx a ptr -all' >>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 mx -include:foo.co +all','a ptr') 'v=spf1 mx a ptr -include:foo.co +all' # FIXME: is this right? If so, "last non-fail" is a bogus description. >>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 mx ?include:foo.co +all','a ptr') 'v=spf1 mx a ptr ?include:foo.co +all' >>> spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 -a:example.net -all' >>> local='ip4:192.0.2.3 a:example.org' >>> insert_libspf_local_policy(spf,local) 'v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 ip4:192.0.2.3 a:example.org -a:example.net -all' """ # look to find the all (if any) and then put local # just after last non-fail mechanism. This is how # libspf2 handles "local policy", and some people # apparently find it useful (don't ask me why). if not local: return spftxt spf = spftxt.split()[1:] if spf: # local policy is SPF mechanisms/modifiers with no # 'v=spf1' at the start spf.reverse() #find the last non-fail mechanism for mech in spf: # map '?' '+' or '-' to 'neutral' 'pass' # or 'fail' if not RESULTS.get(mech[0]): # actually finds last mech with default result where = spf.index(mech) spf[where:where] = [local] spf.reverse() local = ' '.join(spf) break else: return spftxt # No local policy adds for v=spf1 -all # Processing limits not applied to local policy. Suggest # inserting 'local' mechanism to handle this properly #MAX_LOOKUP = 100 return 'v=spf1 '+local if sys.version_info[0] == 2: def to_ascii(s): "Raise PermError is arg is not 7-bit ascii." try: return s.encode('ascii') except UnicodeEncodeError: raise PermError('Non-ascii domain found',repr(s)) else: def to_ascii(s): "Raise PermError is arg is not 7-bit ascii." try: return bytes(s,'ascii').decode('ascii') except UnicodeEncodeError: raise PermError('Non-ascii domain found',repr(s)) def _test(): import doctest, spf return doctest.testmod(spf) DNS.DiscoverNameServers() # Fails on Mac OS X? Add domain to /etc/resolv.conf if __name__ == '__main__': import getopt try: opts,argv = getopt.getopt(sys.argv[1:],"hv",["help","verbose"]) except getopt.GetoptError as err: print(str(err)) print(USAGE) sys.exit(2) verbose = False for o,a in opts: if o in ('-v','--verbose'): verbose = True elif o in ('-h','--help'): print(USAGE) if len(argv) == 0: print(USAGE) _test() elif len(argv) == 1: try: q = query(i='127.0.0.1', s='localhost', h='unknown', receiver=socket.gethostname()) print(q.dns_spf(argv[0])) except TempError as x: print("Temporary DNS error: ", x) except PermError as x: print("PermError: ", x) elif len(argv) == 3: q = query(i=argv[0], s=argv[1], h=argv[2], receiver=socket.gethostname(), verbose=verbose) print q.check(),q.mechanism if q.perm_error and q.perm_error.ext: print q.perm_error.ext elif len(argv) == 4: i, s, h = argv[1:] q = query(i=i, s=s, h=h, receiver=socket.gethostname(), strict=False, verbose=verbose) print(q.check(argv[0]),q.mechanism) if q.perm_error and q.perm_error.ext: print(q.perm_error.ext) else: print(USAGE)