Package: 389-ds-base / 1.4.0.21-1

CVE-2017-15135.patch Patch series | download
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From 872c98cd1b5059a4b76e3707d92f1445663db83d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: William Brown <firstyear@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 11:27:58 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] Ticket bz1525628 - invalid password migration causes unauth
 bind

Bug Description:  Slapi_ct_memcmp expects both inputs to be
at LEAST size n. If they are not, we only compared UP to n.

Invalid migrations of passwords (IE {CRYPT}XX) would create
a pw which is just salt and no hash. ct_memcmp would then
only verify the salt bits and would allow the authentication.

This relies on an administrative mistake both of allowing
password migration (nsslapd-allow-hashed-passwords) and then
subsequently migrating an INVALID password to the server.

Fix Description:  slapi_ct_memcmp now access n1, n2 size
and will FAIL if they are not the same, but will still compare
n bytes, where n is the "longest" memory, to the first byte
of the other to prevent length disclosure of the shorter
value (generally the mis-migrated password)

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525628

Author: wibrown

Review by: ???
---
 .../bz1525628_ct_memcmp_invalid_hash_test.py       | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/clear_pwd.c        |  4 +-
 ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c        |  4 +-
 ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/md5_pwd.c          |  4 +-
 ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/sha_pwd.c          |  4 +-
 ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/smd5_pwd.c         |  2 +-
 ldap/servers/slapd/ch_malloc.c                     | 36 ++++++++++++--
 ldap/servers/slapd/slapi-plugin.h                  |  2 +-
 8 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/bz1525628_ct_memcmp_invalid_hash_test.py

--- /dev/null
+++ b/dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/bz1525628_ct_memcmp_invalid_hash_test.py
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# --- BEGIN COPYRIGHT BLOCK ---
+# Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# License: GPL (version 3 or any later version).
+# See LICENSE for details.
+# --- END COPYRIGHT BLOCK ---
+#
+
+import ldap
+import pytest
+import logging
+from lib389.topologies import topology_st
+from lib389._constants import PASSWORD, DEFAULT_SUFFIX
+
+from lib389.idm.user import UserAccounts, TEST_USER_PROPERTIES
+
+logging.getLogger(__name__).setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
+log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+def test_invalid_hash_fails(topology_st):
+    """When given a malformed hash from userpassword migration
+    slapi_ct_memcmp would check only to the length of the shorter
+    field. This affects some values where it would ONLY verify
+    the salt is valid, and thus would allow any password to bind.
+
+    :id: 8131c029-7147-47db-8d03-ec5db2a01cfb
+    :setup: Standalone Instance
+    :steps:
+        1. Create a user
+        2. Add an invalid password hash (truncated)
+        3. Attempt to bind
+    :expectedresults:
+        1. User is added
+        2. Invalid pw hash is added
+        3. Bind fails
+    """
+    log.info("Running invalid hash test")
+
+    # Allow setting raw password hashes for migration.
+    topology_st.standalone.config.set('nsslapd-allow-hashed-passwords', 'on')
+
+    users = UserAccounts(topology_st.standalone, DEFAULT_SUFFIX)
+    user = users.create(properties=TEST_USER_PROPERTIES)
+    user.set('userPassword', '{CRYPT}XX')
+
+    # Attempt to bind. This should fail.
+    with pytest.raises(ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS):
+        user.bind(PASSWORD)
+    with pytest.raises(ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS):
+        user.bind('XX')
+    with pytest.raises(ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS):
+        user.bind('{CRYPT}XX')
+
+    log.info("PASSED")
+
--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/clear_pwd.c
+++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/clear_pwd.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ clear_pw_cmp(const char *userpwd, const
          * However, even if the first part of userpw matches dbpwd, but len !=, we
          * have already failed anyawy. This prevents substring matching.
          */
-        if (slapi_ct_memcmp(userpwd, dbpwd, len_dbp) != 0) {
+        if (slapi_ct_memcmp(userpwd, dbpwd, len_user, len_dbp) != 0) {
             result = 1;
         }
     } else {
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ clear_pw_cmp(const char *userpwd, const
          * dbpwd to itself. We have already got result == 1 if we are here, so we are
          * just trying to take up time!
          */
-        if (slapi_ct_memcmp(dbpwd, dbpwd, len_dbp)) {
+        if (slapi_ct_memcmp(dbpwd, dbpwd, len_dbp, len_dbp)) {
             /* Do nothing, we have the if to fix a coverity check. */
         }
     }
--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c
+++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static unsigned char itoa64[] = /* 0 ...
 int
 crypt_pw_cmp(const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd)
 {
-    int rc;
+    int32_t rc;
     char *cp;
     struct crypt_data data;
     data.initialized = 0;
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ crypt_pw_cmp(const char *userpwd, const
     /* we use salt (first 2 chars) of encoded password in call to crypt_r() */
     cp = crypt_r(userpwd, dbpwd, &data);
     if (cp) {
-        rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(dbpwd, cp, strlen(dbpwd));
+        rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(dbpwd, cp, strlen(dbpwd), strlen(cp));
     } else {
         rc = -1;
     }
--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/md5_pwd.c
+++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/md5_pwd.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 int
 md5_pw_cmp(const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd)
 {
-    int rc = -1;
+    int32_t rc = -1;
     char *bver;
     PK11Context *ctx = NULL;
     unsigned int outLen;
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ md5_pw_cmp(const char *userpwd, const ch
     bver = NSSBase64_EncodeItem(NULL, (char *)b2a_out, sizeof b2a_out, &binary_item);
     /* bver points to b2a_out upon success */
     if (bver) {
-        rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(bver, dbpwd, strlen(dbpwd));
+        rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(bver, dbpwd, strlen(dbpwd), strlen(bver));
     } else {
         slapi_log_err(SLAPI_LOG_PLUGIN, MD5_SUBSYSTEM_NAME,
                       "Could not base64 encode hashed value for password compare");
--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/sha_pwd.c
+++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/sha_pwd.c
@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ sha_pw_cmp(const char *userpwd, const ch
 
     /* the proof is in the comparison... */
     if (hash_len >= shaLen) {
-        result = slapi_ct_memcmp(userhash, dbhash, shaLen);
+        result = slapi_ct_memcmp(userhash, dbhash, shaLen, shaLen);
     } else {
-        result = slapi_ct_memcmp(userhash, dbhash + OLD_SALT_LENGTH, hash_len - OLD_SALT_LENGTH);
+        result = slapi_ct_memcmp(userhash, dbhash + OLD_SALT_LENGTH, hash_len - OLD_SALT_LENGTH, hash_len - OLD_SALT_LENGTH);
     }
 
 loser:
--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/smd5_pwd.c
+++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/smd5_pwd.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ smd5_pw_cmp(const char *userpwd, const c
     PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, 1);
 
     /* Compare everything up to the salt. */
-    rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(userhash, dbhash, MD5_LENGTH);
+    rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(userhash, dbhash, MD5_LENGTH, MD5_LENGTH);
 
 loser:
     if (dbhash && dbhash != quick_dbhash)
--- a/ldap/servers/slapd/ch_malloc.c
+++ b/ldap/servers/slapd/ch_malloc.c
@@ -336,8 +336,8 @@ slapi_ch_smprintf(const char *fmt, ...)
 
 /* Constant time memcmp. Does not shortcircuit on failure! */
 /* This relies on p1 and p2 both being size at least n! */
-int
-slapi_ct_memcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n)
+int32_t
+slapi_ct_memcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n1, size_t n2)
 {
     int result = 0;
     const unsigned char *_p1 = (const unsigned char *)p1;
@@ -347,9 +347,35 @@ slapi_ct_memcmp(const void *p1, const vo
         return 2;
     }
 
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-        if (_p1[i] ^ _p2[i]) {
-            result = 1;
+    if (n1 == n2) {
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < n1; i++) {
+            if (_p1[i] ^ _p2[i]) {
+                result = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        const unsigned char *_pa;
+        const unsigned char *_pb;
+        size_t nl;
+        if (n2 > n1) {
+            _pa = _p2;
+            _pb = _p2;
+            nl = n2;
+        } else {
+            _pa = _p1;
+            _pb = _p1;
+            nl = n1;
+        }
+        /* We already fail as n1 != n2 */
+        result = 3;
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < nl; i++) {
+            if (_pa[i] ^ _pb[i]) {
+                /*
+                 * If we don't mutate result here, dead code elimination
+                 * we remove for loop.
+                 */
+                result = 4;
+            }
         }
     }
     return result;
--- a/ldap/servers/slapd/slapi-plugin.h
+++ b/ldap/servers/slapd/slapi-plugin.h
@@ -5864,7 +5864,7 @@ char *slapi_ch_smprintf(const char *fmt,
  * \param n length in bytes of the content of p1 AND p2.
  * \return 0 on match. 1 on non-match. 2 on presence of NULL pointer in p1 or p2.
  */
-int slapi_ct_memcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n);
+int32_t slapi_ct_memcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n1, size_t n2);
 
 /*
  * syntax plugin routines