Package: atril / 1.8.1+dfsg1-4+deb8u1

Metadata

Package Version Patches format
atril 1.8.1+dfsg1-4+deb8u1 3.0 (quilt)

Patch series

view the series file
Patch File delta Description
0001_open multiple files.patch | (download)

shell/ev-application.c | 12 9 + 3 - 0 !
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

 [patch] uses g_app_info_launch_uris instead of g_app_info_launch to
 spawn other sessions

Closes https://github.com/mate-desktop/atril/issues/86

Solution comes from evince code

0002_forgotten mutex unlock.patch | (download)

libview/ev-jobs.c | 6 4 + 2 - 0 !
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

 [patch] ev-jobs: don't forget to unlock the trylock'ed mutex


2001_omit gfdl licensed help files.patch | (download)

Makefile.am | 3 1 + 2 - 0 !
configure.ac | 8 0 + 8 - 0 !
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)

 don't build non-dfsg (gfdl 1.1 licensed) help files
0003 CVE 2017 1000083 evince comics remove tar commands support 3 10 3.patch | (download)

backend/comics/comics-document.c | 15 1 + 14 - 0 !
configure.ac | 2 1 + 1 - 0 !
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

 [patch] comics: remove support for tar and tar-like commands

When handling tar files, or using a command with tar-compatible syntax,
to open comic-book archives, both the archive name (the name of the
comics file) and the filename (the name of a page within the archive)
are quoted to not be interpreted by the shell.

But the filename is completely with the attacker's control and can start
with "--" which leads to tar interpreting it as a command line flag.

This can be exploited by creating a CBT file (a tar archive with the
.cbt suffix) with an embedded file named something like this:
"--checkpoint-action=exec=bash -c 'touch ~/hacked;'.jpg"

CBT files are infinitely rare (CBZ is usually used for DRM-free
commercial releases, CBR for those from more dubious provenance), so
removing support is the easiest way to avoid the bug triggering. All
this code was rewritten in the development release for GNOME 3.26 to not
shell out to any command, closing off this particular attack vector.

This also removes the ability to use libarchive's bsdtar-compatible
binary for CBZ (ZIP), CB7 (7zip), and CBR (RAR) formats. The first two
are already supported by unzip and 7zip respectively. libarchive's RAR
support is limited, so unrar is a requirement anyway.

Discovered by Felix Wilhelm from the Google Security Team.

https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=784630