Package: gdk-pixbuf / 2.31.1-2+deb8u7
Metadata
Package | Version | Patches format |
---|---|---|
gdk-pixbuf | 2.31.1-2+deb8u7 | 3.0 (quilt) |
Patch series
view the series filePatch | File delta | Description |
---|---|---|
CVE 2015 4491.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/pixops/pixops.c |
22 17 + 5 - 0 ! |
pixops: be more careful about integer overflow Our loader code is supposed to handle out-of-memory and overflow situations gracefully, reporting errors instead of aborting. But if you load an image at a specific size, we also execute our scaling code, which was not careful enough about overflow in some places. This commit makes the scaling code silently return if it fails to allocate filter tables. This is the best we can do, since gdk_pixbuf_scale() is not taking a GError. https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=752297 |
CVE 2015 4491 2.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/pixops/pixops.c |
6 5 + 1 - 0 ! |
[patch] pixops: fix oversight for cve-2015-4491 The n_x variable could be made large enough to overflow, too. Also included are various testcases for this vulnerability: - The original exploit (adapted for the testsuite) - Causing overflow by making both X and Y variables large - Causing overflow using only the X variable - Causing overflow using only the Y variable https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=752297 |
CVE 2015 7673/0001 pixops Fail make_weights functions on OOM.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/pixops/pixops.c |
75 55 + 20 - 0 ! |
[patch] pixops: fail make_weights functions on oom The weights could grow very large under certain circumstances, in particular in security-relevant conditions, including the testsuite. By allowing the weight allocation to fail, this can be worked around. https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=754387 |
CVE 2015 7673/0002 tga Wrap TGAColormap struct in its own API.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/io-tga.c |
124 82 + 42 - 0 ! |
[patch] tga: wrap tgacolormap struct in its own api Instead of poking into it directly. |
CVE 2015 7673/0003 io tga Colormaps are always present so always parse .patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/io-tga.c |
14 3 + 11 - 0 ! |
[patch] io-tga: colormaps are always present, so always parse them. We might end up with a colormap with 0 entries, but whatever, it's a colormap. |
CVE 2015 7674/0001 pixops Don t overflow variables when shifting them.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/pixops/pixops.c |
10 5 + 5 - 0 ! |
[patch] pixops: don't overflow variables when shifting them If we shift by 16 bits we need to be sure those 16 bits actually exist. They do now. |
CVE 2015 8875/0001 pixops use gint64 in more places to avoid overflow w.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/pixops/pixops.c |
34 17 + 17 - 0 ! |
[patch] pixops: use gint64 in more places to avoid overflow when shifting |
CVE 2015 7552/0001 Avoid integer overflow in gdk_pixbuf_rotate_simple.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/gdk-pixbuf-scale.c |
2 1 + 1 - 0 ! |
[patch] avoid integer overflow in gdk_pixbuf_rotate_simple Same as before: don't do ptr = base + y * rowstride if y and rowstride are integers. |
0001 ico Protect against overflow.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/io-ico.c |
32 17 + 15 - 0 ! |
[patch] ico: protect against overflow |
0001 bmp Reject bogus depth.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/io-bmp.c |
9 9 + 0 - 0 ! |
[patch] bmp: reject bogus depth Erroring out early if we find a bogus image depth is the right thing to do, and avoids possible memory overruns later on. https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=747605 |
0001 bmp Reject impossible palette size.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/io-bmp.c |
11 11 + 0 - 0 ! |
[patch] bmp: reject impossible palette size bmp headers contain separate fields for the number of colors, and the bit depth. Catch the impossible n_colors > 1 << depth and error early, before it causes a out-of-bounds memory access when decoding the colormap. https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=758991 |
CVE 2017 2862.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/io-jpeg.c |
26 22 + 4 - 0 ! |
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CVE 2017 1000422.patch | (download) |
gdk-pixbuf/io-gif.c |
59 52 + 7 - 0 ! |
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