Package: openvpn / 2.1.3-2+squeeze3
Metadata
Package | Version | Patches format |
---|---|---|
openvpn | 2.1.3-2+squeeze3 | 3.0 (quilt) |
Patch series
view the series filePatch | File delta | Description |
---|---|---|
auth pam_libpam_so_filename.patch | (download) |
plugin/auth-pam/auth-pam.c |
2 1 + 1 - 0 ! |
--- |
close_socket_before_scripts.patch | (download) |
socket.c |
8 4 + 4 - 0 ! |
--- |
manpage_dash_escaping.patch | (download) |
openvpn.8 |
1578 789 + 789 - 0 ! |
--- |
debian_nogroup_for_sample_files.patch | (download) |
sample-config-files/client.conf |
2 1 + 1 - 0 ! |
--- |
debian_openssl_vulnkeys.patch | (download) |
init.c |
77 77 + 0 - 0 ! |
--- |
attemping_typo | (download) |
socket.c |
2 1 + 1 - 0 ! |
--- |
openvpn pkcs11warn.patch | (download) |
options.c |
14 14 + 0 - 0 ! |
--- |
jjo ipv6 support.patch | (download) |
README.ipv6 |
79 79 + 0 - 0 ! |
--- |
eurephia.patch | (download) |
README.eurephia |
24 24 + 0 - 0 ! |
--- |
counter_type_for_bytes.patch | (download) |
ssl.c |
3 2 + 1 - 0 ! |
--- |
route_default_nil.patch | (download) |
openvpn.8 |
2 1 + 1 - 0 ! |
--- |
client_hang_when_server_dont_push.patch | (download) |
push.c |
17 17 + 0 - 0 ! |
when the client sends push_requests, it waits until the server sends PUSH_REPLY. If the server do not have anything to push to the client nothing happens. The client will then regularly send new PUSH_REQUESTS until it gets an answer, which results in not completing the connection negotiation. This patch makes the server send an empty PUSH_REPLY when it has nothing more to push to the client. |
clean_netlist.patch | (download) |
route.c |
2 2 + 0 - 0 ! |
--- |
cve 2013 2061.patch | (download) |
buffer.h |
8 8 + 0 - 0 ! |
--- |
0001 Drop too short control channel packets instead of as.patch | (download) |
ssl.c |
6 5 + 1 - 0 ! |
[patch] drop too-short control channel packets instead of asserting out. This fixes a denial-of-service vulnerability where an authenticated client could stop the server by triggering a server-side ASSERT(). OpenVPN would previously ASSERT() that control channel packets have a payload of at least 4 bytes. An authenticated client could trigger this assert by sending a too-short control channel packet to the server. Thanks to Dragana Damjanovic for reporting the issue. This bug has been assigned CVE-2014-8104. Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com> |
update_sample_certs.patch | (download) |
sample-keys/ca.crt |
48 32 + 16 - 0 ! |
--- |