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Description: ix new variant of the vulnerability in CVE-2023-35936
Guilhem Moulin noticed that the fix to CVE-2023-35936 was incomplete.
An attacker could get around it
by double-encoding the malicious extension
to create or override arbitrary files.
.
$ echo '' >b.md
$ .cabal/bin/pandoc b.md --extract-media=bar
<p><img
src="bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fb%2elua" /></p>
$ cat b.lua
print "hello"
$ find bar
bar/
bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+
.
This commit adds a test case for this more complex attack
and fixes the vulnerability.
(The fix is quite simple:
if the URL-unescaped filename or extension contains a '%',
we just use the sha1 hash of the contents as the canonical name,
just as we do if the filename contains '..'.)
Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/eddedbf
Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu>
Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g
Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-38745
Forwarded: yes
Last-Update: 2023-07-25
---
This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/
--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
+++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@
-> m ()
writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do
-- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform
+ -- we unescape URI encoding, but given how insertMedia
+ -- is written, we shouldn't have any % in a canonical media name...
let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp
liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath)
logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs
--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs
+++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs
@@ -87,16 +87,17 @@
newpath = if isRelative fp''
&& isNothing uri
&& not (".." `isInfixOf` fp'')
+ && '%' `notElem` fp''
then fp''
- else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext
+ else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> ext
fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of
".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp''
_ -> getMimeTypeDef fp''
mt = fromMaybe fallback mbMime
path = maybe fp'' (unEscapeString . uriPath) uri
ext = case takeExtension path of
- '.':e -> e
- _ -> maybe "" T.unpack $ extensionFromMimeType mt
+ '.':e | '%' `notElem` e -> '.':e
+ _ -> maybe "" (\x -> '.':T.unpack x) $ extensionFromMimeType mt
-- | Lookup a media item in a 'MediaBag', returning mime type and contents.
lookupMedia :: FilePath
--- a/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs
+++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
let d = B.doc $
B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <>
B.para (B.image "moon.jpg" "" mempty) <>
- B.para (B.image "data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <>
+ B.para (B.image ";.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <>
B.para (B.image "" "" mempty)
runIOorExplode $ do
fillMediaBag d
@@ -34,4 +34,14 @@
(exists3 && not exists4)
exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif")
assertBool "data uri with gif is not properly decoded" exists5
+ -- double-encoded version:
+ let e = B.doc $
+ B.para (B.image ";.lua+%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fb%252elua" "" mempty)
+ runIOorExplode $ do
+ fillMediaBag e
+ extractMedia "bar" e
+ exists6 <- doesFileExist ("bar" </> "772ceca21a2751863ec46cb23db0e7fc35b9cff8.png")
+ exists7 <- doesFileExist "b.lua"
+ assertBool "data uri with double-encoded malicious payload gets written outside of destination dir"
+ (exists6 && not exists7)
]
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