Package: strongswan / 5.9.8-5+deb12u1
Metadata
| Package | Version | Patches format |
|---|---|---|
| strongswan | 5.9.8-5+deb12u1 | 3.0 (quilt) |
Patch series
view the series file| Patch | File delta | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 02_disable bypass lan.patch | (download) |
conf/plugins/bypass-lan.conf |
2 1 + 1 - 0 ! |
don't load bypass-lan plugin by default |
| 03_systemd service.patch | (download) |
init/systemd-starter/strongswan-starter.service.in |
3 2 + 1 - 0 ! |
tune the ipsec systemd service file - add a reload argument - don't wait on syslog |
| 04_disable libtls tests.patch | (download) |
src/libtls/Makefile.am |
2 1 + 1 - 0 ! |
disable libtls tests They're too intensive for the buildd network and cause FTBFS |
| dont load kernel libipsec plugin by default.patch | (download) |
conf/plugins/kernel-libipsec.conf |
2 1 + 1 - 0 ! |
dont-load-kernel-libipsec-plugin-by-default |
| 0005 libtls Fix authentication bypass and expired pointer.patch | (download) |
src/libtls/tls_server.c |
8 4 + 4 - 0 ! |
libtls: fix authentication bypass and expired pointer dereference
`public` is returned, but previously only if a trusted key was found.
We obviously don't want to return untrusted keys. However, since the
reference is released after determining the key type, the returned
object also doesn't have the correct refcount.
So when the returned reference is released after verifying the TLS
signature, the public key object is actually destroyed. The certificate
object then points to an expired pointer, which is dereferenced once it
itself is destroyed after the authentication is complete. Depending on
whether the pointer is valid (i.e. points to memory allocated to the
process) and what was allocated there after the public key was freed,
this could result in a segmentation fault or even code execution.
Fixes: 63fd718915b5 ("libtls: call create_public_enumerator() with key_type")
Fixes: CVE-2023-26463
|
| 0006 charon tkm Validate DH public key to fix potential b.patch | (download) |
src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c |
7 6 + 1 - 0 ! |
charon-tkm: validate dh public key to fix potential buffer overflow Seems this was forgotten in the referenced commit and actually could lead to a buffer overflow. Since charon-tkm is untrusted this isn't that much of an issue but could at least be easily exploited for a DoS attack as DH public values are set when handling IKE_SA_INIT requests. |
