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<title>1 Are "anarcho"-capitalists really anarchists?
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<h1>1 Are "anarcho"-capitalists really anarchists?</h1>

In a word, no. While "anarcho"-capitalists obviously try to associate
themselves with the anarchist tradition by using the word "anarcho"
or by calling themselves "anarchists", their ideas are distinctly at 
odds with those associated with anarchism. As a result, any claims that 
their ideas are anarchist or that they are part of the anarchist 
tradition or movement are false. 
<p>
"Anarcho"-capitalists claim to be anarchists because they say that they 
oppose government. As such, as noted in the <a href="append13int.html">last section</a>, they use 
a dictionary definition of anarchism. However, this fails to appreciate
that anarchism is a <b>political theory</b>, not a dictionary definition. 
As dictionaries are rarely politically sophisticated things, this means 
that they fail to recognise that anarchism is more than just opposition to
government, it is also marked a opposition to capitalism (i.e. exploitation
and private property). Thus, opposition to government is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for being an anarchist -- you also need 
to be opposed to exploitation and capitalist private property. As 
"anarcho"-capitalists do not consider interest, rent and profits (i.e.
capitalism) to be exploitative nor oppose capitalist property rights,
they are not anarchists.
<p>
Moreover, "anarcho"-capitalism is inherently self-refuting. This can be
seen from leading "anarcho"-capitalist Murray Rothbard. he thundered 
against the evil of the state, arguing that it <i>"arrogates to itself a 
monopoly of force, of ultimate decision-making power, over a given area 
territorial area."</i> In and of itself, this definition is unremarkable. 
That a few people (an elite of rulers) claim the right to rule others 
must be part of any sensible definition of the state or government.
However, the problems begin for Rothbard when he notes that 
<i>"[o]bviously, in a free society, Smith has the ultimate decision-making 
power over his own just property, Jones over his, etc."</i> [<b>The Ethics of 
Liberty</b>, p. 170 and p. 173] The logical contradiction in this position
should be obvious, but not to Rothbard. It shows the power of ideology,
the ability of means words (the expression <i>"private property"</i>) to turn 
the bad (<i>"ultimate decision-making power over a given area"</i>) into the 
good (<i>"ultimate decision-making power over a given area"</i>). 
<p>
Now, this contradiction can be solved in only <b>one</b> way -- the owners
of the <i>"given area"</i> are also its users. In other words, a system of
possession (or "occupancy and use") as favoured by anarchists. However,
Rothbard is a capitalist and supports private property. In other
words, wage labour and landlords. This means that he supports a 
divergence between ownership and use and this means that this 
<i>"ultimate decision-making power"</i> extends to those who <b>use,</b> but do 
not own, such property (i.e. tenants and workers). The statist nature 
of private property is clearly indicated by Rothbard's words -- the
property owner in an "anarcho"-capitalist society possesses the 
<i>"ultimate decision-making power"</i> over a given area, which is also what 
the state has currently. Rothbard has, ironically, proved by his own
definition that "anarcho"-capitalism is not anarchist.
<p>
Rothbard does try to solve this obvious contradiction, but utterly fails. 
He simply ignores the crux of the matter, that capitalism is based on 
hierarchy and, therefore, cannot be anarchist. He does this by arguing
that the hierarchy associated with capitalism is fine as long as the
private property that produced it was acquired in a "just" manner. In
so doing he yet again draws attention to the identical authority 
structures and social relationships of the state and property. As
he puts it:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"<b>If</b> the State may be said too properly <b>own</b> its territory, then 
it is proper for it to make rules for everyone who presumes to 
live in that area. It can legitimately seize or control private 
property because there <b>is</b> no private property in its area, 
because it really owns the entire land surface. <b>So long</b> as 
the State permits its subjects to leave its territory, then, it 
can be said to act as does any other owner who sets down rules 
for people living on his property."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 170] 
</blockquote><p>
Obviously Rothbard argues that the state does not "justly" own its
territory -- but given that the current distribution of property
is just as much the result of violence and coercion as the state,
his argument is seriously flawed. It amounts, as we note in 
<a href="append134.html">section 4</a>, to little more than an <i><b>"immaculate conception of property"</b></i> 
unrelated to reality. Even assuming that private property was 
produced by the means Rothbard assumes, it does not justify the 
hierarchy associated with it as the current and future generations 
of humanity have, effectively, been excommunicated from liberty by 
previous ones. If, as Rothbard argues, property is a natural right 
and the basis of liberty then why should the many be excluded from 
their birthright by a minority? In other words, Rothbard denies that 
liberty should be universal. He chooses property over liberty while 
anarchists choose liberty over property.
<p>
Even worse, the possibility that private property can result in <b>worse</b> 
violations of individual freedom (at least of workers) than the state 
of its citizens was implicitly acknowledged by Rothbard. He uses as a 
hypothetical example a country whose King is threatened by a rising 
"libertarian" movement. The King responses by <i>"employ[ing] a cunning 
stratagem,"</i> namely he <i>"proclaims his government to be dissolved, but 
just before doing so he arbitrarily parcels out the entire land area 
of his kingdom to the 'ownership' of himself and his relatives."</i> Rather 
than taxes, his subjects now pay rent and he can <i>"regulate to regulate 
the lives of all the people who presume to live on"</i> his property as he 
sees fit. Rothbard then asks:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Now what should be the reply of the libertarian rebels to this pert 
challenge? If they are consistent utilitarians, they must bow to this 
subterfuge, and resign themselves to living under a regime no less 
despotic than the one they had been battling for so long. Perhaps, 
indeed, <b>more</b> despotic, for now the king and his relatives can claim 
for themselves the libertarians' very principle of the absolute right 
of private property, an absoluteness which they might not have dared 
to claim before."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 54-5]
</blockquote><p>
So not only does the property owner have the same monopoly of power 
over a given area as the state, it is <b>more</b> despotic as it is based 
on the <i>"absolute right of private property"</i>! And remember, Rothbard
is arguing <b>in favour</b> of "anarcho"-capitalismAnd remember, Rothbard
is arguing <b>in favour</b> of "anarcho"-capitalism (<i>"if you have unbridled
capitalism, you will have all kinds of authority: you will have <b>extreme</b> 
authority."</i> [Chomksy, <b>Understanding Power</b>, p. 200]). So in practice, 
private property is a major source of oppression and authoritarianism within 
society -- there is little or no freedom within capitalist production 
(as Bakunin noted, <i>"the worker sells his person and his liberty for 
a given time"</i>). So, in stark contrast to anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists 
have no problem with factory fascism (i.e. wage labour), a position which 
seems highly illogical for a theory calling itself libertarian. If it 
were truly libertarian, it would oppose all forms of domination, not 
just statism. This position flows from the "anarcho"-capitalist 
definition of freedom as the absence of coercion and will be discussed 
in <a href="append132.html">section 2</a> in more detail.
<p>
Of course, Rothbard has yet another means to escape the obvious, namely
that the market will limit the abuses of the property owners. If workers
do not like their ruler then they can seek another. However, this reply
completely ignores the reality of economic and social power. Thus the
"consent" argument fails because it ignores the social circumstances of 
capitalism which limit the choice of the many. Anarchists have long argued 
that, as a class, workers have little choice but to "consent" to capitalist 
hierarchy. The alternative is either dire poverty or starvation. 
<p>
"Anarcho"-capitalists dismiss such claims by denying that there is such a 
thing as economic power. Rather, it is simply freedom of contract. Anarchists 
consider such claims as a joke. To show why, we need only quote (yet again)
Rothbard on the abolition of slavery and serfdom in the 19th century. He 
argued, correctly, that the <i>"<b>bodies</b> of the oppressed were freed, but the 
property which they had worked and eminently deserved to own, remained in 
the hands of their former oppressors. With economic power thus remaining 
in their hands, the former lords soon found themselves virtual masters 
once more of what were now free tenants or farm labourers. The serfs and 
slaves had tasted freedom, but had been cruelly derived of its fruits."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 74]
<p>
To say the least, anarchists fail to see the logic in this position. Contrast 
this with the standard "anarcho"-capitalist claim that if market forces 
("voluntary exchanges") result in the creation of <i>"free tenants or farm 
labourers"</i> then they are free. Yet labourers dispossessed by market forces 
are in exactly the same social and economic situation as the ex-serfs and 
ex-slaves. If the latter do not have the fruits of freedom, neither do 
the former. Rothbard sees the obvious <i>"economic power"</i> in the latter case, 
but denies it in the former. It is only Rothbard's ideology that stops 
him from drawing the obvious conclusion -- identical economic conditions 
produce identical social relationships and so capitalism is marked by 
<i>"economic power"</i> and <i>"virtual masters."</i> The only solution is for 
"anarcho"-capitalists to simply say the ex-serfs and ex-slaves were 
actually free to choose and, consequently, Rothbard was wrong. It might 
be inhuman, but at least it would be consistent!
<p>
Rothbard's perspective is alien to anarchism. For example, as 
individualist anarchist William Bailie noted, under capitalism 
there is a class system marked by <i>"a dependent industrial class of 
wage-workers"</i> and <i>"a privileged class of wealth-monopolisers, each
becoming more and more distinct from the other as capitalism advances."</i>
This has turned property into <i>"a social power, an economic force 
destructive of rights, a fertile source of injustice, a means of
enslaving the dispossessed."</i> He concludes: <i>"Under this system equal
liberty cannot obtain."</i> Bailie notes that the modern <i>"industrial
world under capitalistic conditions"</i> have <i>"arisen under the <b>regime</b>
of status"</i> (and so <i>"law-made privileges"</i>) however, it seems unlikely
that he would have concluded that such a class system would be fine 
if it had developed naturally or the current state was abolished 
while leaving the class structure intact (as we note in 
<a href="secG4.html">section G.4</a>, 
Tucker recognised that even the <i>"freest competition"</i> was powerless 
against the <i>"enormous concentration of wealth"</i> associated with modern 
capitalism). [<b>The Individualist Anarchists</b>, p. 121] 
<p>
Therefore anarchists recognise that "free exchange" or "consent" in 
unequal circumstances will reduce freedom as well as increasing inequality 
between individuals and classes. In other words, as we discuss in 
<a href="append133.html">section 3</a>, inequality will produce social relationships which are based on 
hierarchy and domination, <b>not</b> freedom. As Noam Chomsky put it:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Anarcho-capitalism, in my opinion, is a doctrinal system which, if ever
implemented, would lead to forms of tyranny and oppression that have few
counterparts in human history. There isn't the slightest possibility that
its (in my view, horrendous) ideas would be implemented, because they would
quickly destroy any society that made this colossal error. The idea of 'free
contract' between the potentate and his starving subject is a sick joke,
perhaps worth some moments in an academic seminar exploring the consequences
of (in my view, absurd) ideas, but nowhere else."</i> [<b>Noam Chomsky on 
Anarchism</b>, interview with Tom Lane, December 23, 1996]
</blockquote><p>
Clearly, then, by its own arguments "anarcho"-capitalism is not anarchist.
This should come as no surprise to anarchists. Anarchism, as a political 
theory, was born when Proudhon wrote <b>What is Property?</b> specifically to 
refute the notion that workers are free when capitalist property forces 
them to seek employment by landlords and capitalists. He was well aware 
that in such circumstances property <i>"violates equality by the rights of 
exclusion and increase, and freedom by despotism . . . [and has] perfect 
identity with robbery."</i> He, unsurprisingly, talks of the <i>"proprietor, to 
whom [the worker] has sold and surrendered his liberty."</i> For Proudhon,
anarchy was <i>"the absence of a master, of a sovereign"</i> while <i>"proprietor"</i>
was <i>"synonymous"</i> with <i>"sovereign"</i> for he <i>"imposes his will as law, and 
suffers neither contradiction nor control."</i> This meant that <i>"property 
engenders despotism,"</i> as <i>"each proprietor is sovereign lord within the 
sphere of his property."</i> [<b>What is Property</b>, p. 251, p. 130, p. 264
and pp. 266-7] It must also be stressed that Proudhon's classic work is 
a lengthy critique of the kind of apologetics for private property 
Rothbard espouses to salvage his ideology from its obvious contradictions. 
<p>
Ironically, Rothbard repeats the same analysis as Proudhon but draws
the <b>opposite</b> conclusions and expects to be considered an anarchist! 
Moreover, it seems equally ironic that "anarcho"-capitalism calls itself 
"anarchist" while basing itself on the arguments that anarchism was 
created in opposition to. As shown, "anarcho"-capitalism makes as much 
sense as "anarcho-statism" -- an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. The 
idea that "anarcho"-capitalism warrants the name "anarchist" is simply 
false. Only someone ignorant of anarchism could maintain such a thing.
While you expect anarchist theory to show this to be the case, the 
wonderful thing is that "anarcho"-capitalism itself does the same. 
<p>
Little wonder Bob Black argues that <i>"[t]o demonise state authoritarianism 
while ignoring identical albeit contract-consecrated subservient arrangements 
in the large-scale corporations which control the world economy is fetishism 
at its worst."</i> [<b>Libertarian as Conservative</b>] The similarities between 
capitalism and statism are clear -- and so why "anarcho"-capitalism cannot 
be anarchist. To reject the authority (the <i>"ultimate decision-making power"</i>) 
of the state and embrace that of the property owner indicates not only a 
highly illogical stance but one at odds with the basic principles of anarchism.
This whole-hearted support for wage labour and capitalist property rights 
indicates that "anarcho"-capitalists are not anarchists because they do 
not reject all forms of <b>archy.</b> They obviously support the hierarchy 
between boss and worker (wage labour) and landlord and tenant. Anarchism, 
by definition, is against all forms of archy, including the hierarchy 
generated by capitalist property. To ignore the obvious archy associated 
with capitalist property is highly illogical.
<p>
In addition, we must note that such inequalities in power and wealth 
will need  "defending" from those subject to them ("anarcho"-capitalists 
recognise the need for private police and courts to defend property 
from theft -- and, anarchists add, to defend the theft and despotism 
associated with property!). Due to its support of private property (and 
thus authority), "anarcho"-capitalism ends up retaining a state in its 
"anarchy"; namely a <b>private</b> state whose existence its proponents 
attempt to deny simply by refusing to call it a state, like an ostrich 
hiding its head in the sand (see <a href="append136.html">section 6</a> for more on this and why 
"anarcho"-capitalism is better described as "private state" capitalism). 
As Albert Meltzer put it:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Common-sense shows that any capitalist society might dispense with
a 'State' . . . but it could not dispense with organised government,
or a privatised form of it, if there were people amassing money and 
others working to amass it for them. The philosophy of 'anarcho-capitalism'
dreamed up by the 'libertarian' New Right, has nothing to do with 
Anarchism as known by the Anarchist movement proper. It is a lie
. . . Patently unbridled capitalism . . . needs some force at its
disposal to maintain class privileges, either form the State itself
or from private armies. What they believe in is in fact a limited
State -- that us, one in which the State has one function, to protect
the ruling class, does not interfere with exploitation, and comes as
cheap as possible for the ruling class. The idea also serves another 
purpose . . . a moral justification for bourgeois consciences in 
avoiding taxes without feeling guilty about it."</i> [<b>Anarchism: 
Arguments For and Against</b>, p. 50]
</blockquote><p>
For anarchists, this need of capitalism for some kind of state is 
unsurprising. For <i>"Anarchy without socialism seems equally as impossible 
to us [as socialism without anarchy], for in such a case it could not be 
other than the domination of the strongest, and would therefore set in 
motion right away the organisation and consolidation of this domination; 
that is to the constitution of government."</i> [Errico Malatesta, <b>Life and 
Ideas</b>, p. 148] Because of this, the "anarcho"-capitalist rejection of 
anarchist ideas on capitalist property economics and the need for 
equality, they cannot be considered anarchists or part of the anarchist 
tradition.
<p>
Thus anarchism is far more than the common dictionary definition
of "no government" -- it also entails being against all forms of
<b>archy</b>, including those generated by capitalist property. This 
is clear from the roots of the word "anarchy." As we noted 
in <a href="secA1.html">section A.1</a>, the word anarchy means "no rulers" or "contrary 
to authority." As Rothbard himself acknowledges, the property 
owner is the ruler of their property and, therefore, those who 
use it. For this reason "anarcho"-capitalism cannot be considered as
a form of anarchism -- a real anarchist must logically oppose 
the authority of the property owner along with that of the state.
As "anarcho"-capitalism does not explicitly (or implicitly, for 
that matter) call for economic arrangements that will end wage 
labour and usury it cannot be considered anarchist or part of the 
anarchist tradition.
<p>
Political theories should be identified by their actual features and 
history rather than labels. Once we recognise that, we soon find out that 
"anarcho"-capitalism is an oxymoron. Anarchists and "anarcho"-capitalists 
are not part of the same movement or tradition. Their ideas and aims 
are in direct opposition to those of all kinds of anarchists. 
<p>
While anarchists have always opposed capitalism, "anarcho"-capitalists 
have embraced it. And due to this embrace their "anarchy" will be marked 
by extensive differences in wealth and power, differences that will show 
themselves up in relationships based upon subordination and hierarchy 
(such as wage labour), <b>not</b> freedom (little wonder that Proudhon 
argued that <i>"property is despotism"</i> -- it creates authoritarian and
hierarchical relationships between people in a similar way to statism).
<p>
Their support for "free market" capitalism ignores the impact of wealth 
and power on the nature and outcome of individual decisions within the 
market (see sections <a href="append132.html">2</a> and 
<a href="append133.html">3</a> for further discussion). For example, 
as we indicate in sections <a href="secJ5.html#secj510">J.5.10</a>, 
<a href="secJ5.html#secj511">J.5.11</a> and <a href="secJ5.html#secj512">J.5.12</a>, wage labour is less 
efficient than self-management in production but due to the structure and 
dynamics of the capitalist market, "market forces" will actively discourage 
self-management due to its empowering nature for workers. In other words,
a developed capitalist market will promote hierarchy and unfreedom in 
production in spite of its effects on individual workers and their 
wants (see also <a href="append1310.html#secf102">section 10.2</a>). Thus "free market" capitalism tends 
to re-enforce inequalities of wealth and power, <b>not</b> eliminate them.
<p>
Furthermore, any such system of (economic and social) power will require 
extensive force to maintain it and the "anarcho"-capitalist system of 
competing "defence firms" will simply be a new state, enforcing 
capitalist power, property rights and law.
<p>
Overall, the lack of concern for meaningful freedom within production and 
the effects of vast differences in power and wealth within society as a 
whole makes "anarcho"-capitalism little better than "anarchism for the rich." 
Emma Goldman recognised this when she argued that <i>"'Rugged individualism' 
has meant all the 'individualism' for the masters . . . in whose name
political tyranny and social oppression are defended and held up as 
virtues while every aspiration and attempt of man to gain freedom . . . 
is denounced as . . . evil in the name of that same individualism."</i> 
[<b>Red Emma Speaks</b>, p. 112] And, as such, is no anarchism at all.
<p>
So, unlike anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists do not seek the <i>"abolition
of the proletariat"</i> (to use Proudhon's expression) via changing capitalist 
property rights and institutions. Thus the "anarcho"-capitalist and the 
anarchist have different starting positions and opposite ends in mind 
and so they cannot be considered part of the same (anarchist) tradition.
As we discuss further in later sections, the "anarcho"-capitalist
claims to being anarchists are bogus simply because they reject so much
of the anarchist tradition as to make what they do accept non-anarchist
in theory and practice. Little wonder Peter Marshall said that <i>"few
anarchists would accept the 'anarcho-capitalists' into the anarchist
camp since they do not share a concern for economic equality and
social justice."</i> [<b>Demanding the Impossible</b>, p. 565]

<a name="secf11"><h2>1.1 Why is the failure to renounce hierarchy the Achilles Heel of right-wing libertarianism</h2> 

Any capitalist system will produce vast differences in economic (and social)
wealth and power. As we argue in <a href="append133.html#secf31">section 3.1</a>, such differences will
reflect themselves in the market and any "free" contracts agreed there 
will create hierarchical relationships. Thus capitalism is marked by
hierarchy (see <a href="secB1.html#secb12">section B.1.2</a>) and, unsurprisingly, right-libertarians
and "anarcho"-capitalists fail to oppose such "free market" generated
hierarchy.
<p>
Both groups approve of it in the capitalist workplace or rented accommodation 
and the right-Libertarians also approve of it in a 'minimal' state to protect 
private property ("anarcho"-capitalists, in contrast, approve of the use
of private defence firms to protect property). But the failure of these 
two movements to renounce hierarchy is their weakest point. For 
anti-authoritarianism has sunk deep roots into the modern psyche, 
as a legacy of the sixties.
<p>
Many people who do not even know what anarchism is have been profoundly
affected by the personal liberation and counterculture movements of the
past thirty years, epitomised by the popular bumper sticker, <i>"Question
Authority."</i> As a result, society now tolerates much more choice than ever
before in matters of religion, sexuality, art, music, clothing, and other
components of lifestyle. We need only recall the conservatism that reigned
in such areas during the fifties to see that the idea of liberty has made
tremendous advances in just a few decades.
<p>
Although this liberatory impulse has so far been confined almost entirely
to the personal and cultural realms, it may yet be capable of spilling
over and affecting economic and political institutions, provided it
continues to grow. The Right is well aware of this, as seen in its ongoing
campaigns for "family values," school prayer, suppression of women's
rights, fundamentalist Christianity, sexual abstinence before marriage,
and other attempts to revive the Ozzie-and-Harriet mindset of the Good Old
Days. This is where the efforts of "cultural anarchists" -- artists,
musicians, poets, and others -- are important in keeping alive the ideal
of personal freedom and resistance to authority as a necessary foundation
for economic and political restructuring.
<p>
Indeed, the libertarian right (as a whole) support restrictions on freedom
<b>as long as its not the state that is doing it</b>! Their support for
capitalism means that they have no problem with bosses dictating what
workers do during working hours (nor outside working hours, if the job
requires employees to take drug tests or not be gay in order to keep it).
If a private landlord or company decrees a mandatory rule or mode of 
living, workers/tenets must "love it or leave it!" Of course, that the
same argument also applies to state laws is one hotly denied by 
right-Libertarians -- a definite case of not seeing the wood for the
trees (see <a href="append132.html#secf23">section 2.3</a>).
<p>
Of course, the "anarcho"-capitalist will argue, workers and tenants can
find a more liberal boss or landlord. This, however, ignores two key facts.
Firstly, being able to move to a more liberal state hardly makes state
laws less offensive (as they themselves will be the first to point out).
Secondly, looking for a new job or home is not that easy. Just a moving
to a new state can involve drastic upheavals, so change changing jobs
and homes. Moreover, the job market is usually a buyers market (it has
to be in capitalism, otherwise profits are squeezed -- see sections 
<a href="secC7.html">C.7</a>
and <a href="append1310.html#secf102">10.2</a>) and this means that workers are not usually in a position 
(unless they organise) to demand increased liberties at work. 
<p>
It seems somewhat ironic, to say the least, that right-libertarians 
place rights of property over the rights of self-ownership, even though 
(according to their ideology) self-ownership is the foundational right 
from which property rights are derived. Thus in right-libertarianism the 
rights of property owners to discriminate and govern the property-less 
are more important than the freedom from discrimination (i.e. to be 
yourself) or the freedom to govern oneself at all times.
<p>
So, when it boils down to it, right-libertarians are not really bothered 
about restrictions on liberty and, indeed, they will defend private 
restrictions on liberty with all their might. This may seem a strange 
position for self-proclaimed "libertarians" to take, but it flows 
naturally from their definition of freedom (see 
<a href="append132.html">section 2</a> for a 
full discussion of this). but by not attacking hierarchy beyond certain 
forms of statism, the 'libertarian' right fundamentally undermines its 
claim to be libertarian. Freedom cannot be compartmentalised, but is 
holistic. The denial of liberty in, say, the workplace, quickly results 
in its being denied elsewhere in society (due to the impact of the
inequalities it would produce) , just as the degrading effects of wage 
labour and the hierarchies with which is it bound up are felt by the worker 
outside work. 
<p>
Neither the Libertarian Party nor so-called "anarcho"-capitalism is
<b>genuinely</b> anti-authoritarian, as those who are truly dedicated to 
liberty must be. 

<a name="secf12"><h2>1.2 How libertarian is right-Libertarian theory?</h2>

The short answer is, not very. Liberty not only implies but also requires 
independent, critical thought (indeed, anarchists would argue that critical 
thought requires free development and evolution and that it is precisely
<b>this</b> which capitalist hierarchy crushes). For anarchists a libertarian 
theory, if it is to be worthy of the name, must be based upon critical 
thought and reflect the key aspect that characterises life - change and the 
ability to evolve. To hold up dogma and base "theory" upon assumptions (as 
opposed to facts) is the opposite of a libertarian frame of mind. A 
libertarian theory must be based upon reality and recognise the need 
for change and the existence of change. Unfortunately, right-Libertarianism 
is marked more by ideology than critical analysis.
<p>
Right-Libertarianism is characterised by a strong tendency of creating
theories based upon assumptions and deductions from these axioms (for a
discussion on the pre-scientific nature of this methodology and of its
dangers, see the <a href="append131.html#secf13">next section</a>). Robert Nozick, for example, in <b>Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia</b> makes no attempt to provide a justification of the 
property rights his whole theory is based upon. His main assumption is 
that <i>"[i]ndividuals have rights, and there are certain things no person 
or group may do to them (without violating their rights)."</i> [<b>Anarchy, 
State and Utopia</b>, p. ix] While this does have its intuitive appeal, 
it is not much to base a political ideology upon. After all, what rights 
people consider as valid can be pretty subjective and have constantly 
evolved during history. To say that "individuals have rights" is to open up 
the question "what rights?" Indeed, as we argue in greater length in 
<a href="append132.html">section 2</a>, such a rights based system as Nozick desires can and does lead to 
situations developing in which people "consent" to be exploited and 
oppressed and that, intuitively, many people consider supporting the 
"violation" of these "certain rights" (by creating other ones) simply 
because of their evil consequences. 
<p>
In other words, starting from the assumption "people have [certain] rights" 
Nozick constructs a theory which, when faced with the reality of unfreedom 
and domination it would create for the many, justifies this unfreedom 
as an expression of liberty. In other words, regardless of the outcome,
the initial assumptions are what matter. Nozick's intuitive rights system 
can lead to some very non-intuitive outcomes.
<p>
And does Nozick prove the theory of property rights he assumes? He states 
that <i>"we shall not formulate [it] here."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 150] Moreover, it 
is not formulated anywhere else in his book. And if it is not formulated,
what is there to defend? Surely this means that his Libertarianism is 
without foundations? As Jonathan Wolff notes, Nozick's <i>"Libertarian property 
rights remain substantially undefended."</i> [<b>Robert Nozick: Property, Justice 
and the Minimal State</b>, p. 117] Given that the right to acquire property 
is critical to his whole theory you would think it important enough to go 
into in some detail (or at least document). After all, unless he provides us 
with a firm basis for property rights then his entitlement theory is nonsense 
as no one has the right to (private) property.
<p>
It could be argued that Nozick <b>does</b> present enough information to allow 
us to piece together a possible argument in favour of property rights 
based on his modification of the <i>"Lockean Proviso"</i> (although he does
not point us to these arguments). However, assuming this is the case, 
such a defence actually fails (see <a href="secB3.html#secb34">
section B.3.4</a> for more on this). If individuals <b>do</b> have rights, these rights do not include property rights 
in the form Nozick assumes (but does not prove). Nozick appears initially 
convincing because what he assumes with regards to property is a normal 
feature of the society we are in (we would be forgiven when we note here 
that feeble arguments pass for convincing when they are on the same side 
as the prevailing sentiment). 
<p>
Similarly, both Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand (who is infamous for repeating 
<i>"A is A"</i> ad infinitum) do the same - base their ideologies on assumptions 
(see <a href="append1311.html">section 11</a> for more on this). 
<p>
Therefore, we see that most of the leading right-Libertarian ideologues 
base themselves on assumptions about what "Man" is or the rights they 
should have (usually in the form that people have (certain) rights because 
they are people). From these theorems and assumptions they build their 
respective ideologies, using logic to deduce the conclusions that their 
assumptions imply. Such a methodology is unscientific and, indeed, a relic 
of religious (pre-scientific) society (see <a href="append131.html#secf13">next section</a>) but, more 
importantly, can have negative effects on maximising liberty. This is
because this "methodology" has distinct problems. Murray Bookchin 
argues:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Conventional reason rests on identity, not change; its fundamental 
principle is that <b>A equals A,</b> the famous 'principle of identity,' which 
means that any given phenomenon can be only itself and cannot be other than
what we immediately perceive it to be at a given moment in time. It does not
address the problem of change. A human being is an infant at one time, a
child at another, an adolescent at still another, and finally a youth and
an adult. When we analyse an infant by means of conventional reason, we
are not exploring what it is <b>becoming</b> in the process of developing into
a child."</i> [<i>"A Philosophical Naturalism"</i>, <b>Society and Nature</b> No.2, p. 64]
</blockquote><p>
In other words, right-Libertarian theory is based upon ignoring the
fundamental aspect of life - namely <b>change</b> and <b>evolution.</b> Perhaps
it will be argued that identity also accounts for change by including
potentiality -- which means, that we have the strange situation that 
A can <b>potentially</b> be A! If A is not actually A, but only has the 
potential to be A, then A is not A. Thus to include change is to 
acknowledge that A does not equal A -- that individuals and humanity 
evolves and so what constitutes A also changes. To maintain identity
and then to deny it seems strange.
<p>
That change is far from the "A is A" mentality can be seen from Murray 
Rothbard who goes so far as to state that <i>"one of the notable attributes 
of natural law"</i> is <i>"its applicability to all men [sic!], regardless of 
time or place. Thus ethical law takes its place alongside physical or 
'scientific' natural laws."</i> [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 42] Apparently 
the "nature of man" is the only living thing in nature that does not evolve 
or change! Of course, it could be argued that by "natural law" Rothbard is 
only referring to his method of deducing his (and, we stress, they are
just his -- not natural) "ethical laws" -- but his methodology starts
by assuming certain things about "man." Whether these assumptions seem
far or not is besides the point, by using the term "natural law" Rothbard
is arguing that any actions that violate <b>his</b> ethical laws are somehow
"against nature" (but if they were against nature, they could not occur 
-- see <a href="append137.html">section 11</a> for more on this). Deductions from assumptions is a
Procrustean bed for humanity (as Rothbard's ideology shows).
<p>
So, as can be seen, many leading right-Libertarians place great store
by the axiom "A is A" or that "man" has certain rights simply because 
"he" is a "man". And as Bookchin points out, such conventional reason 
<i>"doubtless plays an indispensable role in mathematical thinking and 
mathematical sciences . . . and in the nuts-and-bolts of dealing with 
everyday life"</i> and so is essential to <i>"understand or design mechanical 
entities."</i> [<b>Ibid.</b>, p.67] But the question arises, is such reason 
useful when considering people and other forms of life?
<p>
Mechanical entities are but one (small) aspect of human life. Unfortunately 
for right-Libertarians (and fortunately for the rest of humanity), human 
beings are <b>not</b> mechanical entities but instead are living, breathing, 
feeling, hoping, dreaming, <b>changing</b> living organisms. They are not
mechanical entities and any theory that uses reason based on such 
(non-living) entities will flounder when faced with living ones. In 
other words, right-Libertarian theory treats people as the capitalist 
system tries to -- namely as commodities, as things. Instead of human 
beings, whose ideas, ideals and ethics change, develop and grow, capitalism 
and capitalist ideologues try to reduce human life to the level of corn or 
iron (by emphasising the unchanging "nature" of man and their starting
assumptions/rights). 
<p>
This can be seen from their support for wage labour, the reduction of
human activity to a commodity on the market. While paying lip service 
to liberty and life, right-libertarianism justifies the commodification 
of labour and life, which within a system of capitalist property rights
can result in the treating of people as means to an end as opposed 
to an end in themselves (see sections <a href="append132.html">2</a> and <a href="append133.html#secf31">3.1</a>). 
<p>
And as Bookchin points out, <i>"in an age of sharply conflicting values and
emotionally charges ideals, such a way of reasoning is often repellent. 
Dogmatism, authoritarianism, and fear seem all-pervasive."</i> [<b>Ibid.</b>, p. 68]
Right-Libertarianism provides more than enough evidence for Bookchin's 
summary with its support for authoritarian social relationships, hierarchy
and even slavery (see <a href="append132.html">section 2</a>).
<p>
This mechanical viewpoint is also reflected in their lack of appreciation 
that social institutions and relationships evolve over time and, sometimes,
fundamentally change. This can best be seen from property. Right-libertarians
fail to see that over time (in the words of Proudhon) property <i>"changed
its nature."</i> Originally, <i>"the word <b>property</b> was synonymous with . . .
<b>individual possession</b>"</i> but it became more <i>"complex"</i> and turned into 
<b>private property</b> -- <i>"the right to use it by his neighbour's labour."</i> 
The changing of use-rights to (capitalist) property rights created relations
of domination and exploitation between people absent before. For the
right-Libertarian, both the tools of the self-employed artisan and the 
capital of a transnational corporation are both forms of "property" and 
(so) basically identical. In practice, of course, the social relations 
they create and the impact they have on society are totally different. 
Thus the mechanical mind-set of right-Libertarianism fails to understand
how institutions, like property, evolve and come to replace whatever 
freedom enhancing features they had with oppression (indeed, von Mises
argued that <i>"[t]here may possibly be a difference of opinion about
whether a particular institution is socially beneficial or harmful. But
once it has been judged [by whom, we ask] beneficial, one can no longer
contend that, for some inexplicable reason, it must be condemned as 
immoral"</i> [<b>Liberalism</b>, p. 34] So much for evolution and change!).
<p>
Anarchism, in contrast, is based upon the importance of critical thought 
informed by an awareness that life is in a constant process of change. This 
means that our ideas on human society must be informed by the facts, not by 
what we wish was true. For Bookchin, an evaluation of conventional wisdom 
(as expressed in <i>"the law of identity"</i>) is essential and its conclusions 
have <i>"enormous importance for how we behave as ethical beings, the nature 
of nature, and our place in the natural world. Moreover. . . these issues 
directly affect the kind of society, sensibility, and lifeways we wish to 
foster."</i> [Bookchin, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 69-70]
<p>
Bookchin is correct. While anarchists oppose hierarchy in the name of 
liberty, right-libertarians support authority and hierarchy, all of which 
deny freedom and restrict individual development. This is unsurprising 
because the right-libertarian ideology rejects change and critical thought 
based upon the scientific method and so is fundamentally <b>anti-life</b> in 
its assumptions and <b>anti-human</b> in its method. Far from being a libertarian 
set of ideas, right-Libertarianism is a mechanical set of dogmas that deny 
the fundamental nature of life (namely change) and of individuality (namely 
critical thought and freedom). Moreover, in practice their system of 
(capitalist) rights would soon result in extensive restrictions on liberty 
and authoritarian social relationships (see sections <a href="append132.html">2</a> and <a href="append133.html">3</a>) -- a 
strange result of a theory proclaiming itself "libertarian" but one 
consistent with its methodology.
<p>
From a wider viewpoint, such a rejection of liberty by right-libertarians 
is unsurprising. They do, after all, support capitalism. Capitalism 
produces an inverted set of ethics, one in which capital (dead labour) is
more important that people (living labour). After all, workers are usually 
easier to replace than investments in capital and the person who owns
capital commands the person who "only" owns his life and productive 
abilities. And as Oscar Wilde once noted, crimes against property <i>"are 
the crimes that the English law, valuing what a man has more than what 
a man is, punishes with the harshest and most horrible severity."</i> [<b>The 
Soul of Man Under Socialism</b>] 
<p>
This mentality is reflected in right-libertarianism when it claims that 
stealing food is a crime while starving to death (due to the action of 
market forces/power and property rights) is no infringement of your rights 
(see <a href="append134.html#secf42">section 4.2</a> for a similar argument with regards to water). It can 
also be seen when right-libertarian's claim that the taxation <i>"of earnings 
from labour"</i> (e.g. of one dollar from a millionaire) is <i>"<b>on a par with</b> 
forced labour"</i> [Nozick, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 169] while working in a sweatshop 
for 14 hours a day (enriching said millionaire) does not affect your 
liberty as you "consent" to it due to market forces (although, of course, 
many rich people have earned their money <b>without</b> labouring themselves -- 
their earnings derive from the wage labour of others so would taxing
those, non-labour, earnings be "forced labour"?) Interestingly, the
Individualist Anarchist Ben Tucker argued that an income tax was <i>"a 
recognition of the fact that industrial freedom and equality of
opportunity no longer exist here [in the USA in the 1890s] even in
the imperfect state in which they once did exist"</i> [quoted by James
Martin, <b>Men Against the State</b>, p. 263] which suggests a somewhat
different viewpoint on this matter than Nozick or Rothbard.
<p>
That capitalism produces an inverted set of ethics can be seen when the
Ford produced the Pinto. The Pinto had a flaw in it which meant that if
it was hit in a certain way in a crash the fuel tank exploded. The Ford
company decided it was more "economically viable" to produce that car and
pay damages to those who were injured or the relatives of those who died 
than pay to change the invested capital. The needs for the owners of 
capital to make a profit came before the needs of the living. Similarly, 
bosses often hire people to perform unsafe work in dangerous conditions
and fire them if they protest. Right-libertarian ideology is the 
philosophical equivalent. Its dogma is "capital" and it comes before 
life (i.e. "labour").
<p>
As Bakunin once put it, <i>"you will always find the idealists in the very
act of practical materialism, while you will see the materialists pursuing
and realising the most grandly ideal aspirations and thoughts."</i> [<b>God
and the State</b>, p. 49] Hence we see right "libertarians" supporting
sweat shops and opposing taxation -- for, in the end, money (and the
power that goes with it) counts far more in that ideology than ideals 
such as liberty, individual dignity, empowering, creative and productive 
work and so forth for all. The central flaw of right-libertarianism is
that it does not recognise that the workings of the capitalist market can 
easily ensure that the majority end up becoming a resource for others in 
ways far worse than that associated with taxation. The legal rights 
of self-ownership supported by right-libertarians does not mean that 
people have the ability to avoid what is in effect enslavement to 
another (see sections <a href="append132.html">2</a> and <a href="append133.html">3</a>).
<p>
Right-Libertarian theory is not based upon a libertarian methodology or
perspective and so it is hardly surprising it results in support for
authoritarian social relationships and, indeed, slavery (see 
<a href="append132.html#secf26">section 2.6</a>).

<a name="secf13"><h2>1.3 Is right-Libertarian theory scientific in nature?</h2>

Usually, no. The scientific approach is <b>inductive,</b> much of the 
right-libertarian approach is <b>deductive.</b> The first draws generalisations 
from the data, the second applies preconceived generalisations to the data. 
A completely deductive approach is pre-scientific, however, which is why 
many right-Libertarians cannot legitimately claim to use a scientific 
method. Deduction does occur in science, but the generalisations are 
primarily based on other data, not <i>a priori</i> assumptions, and are checked 
against data to see if they are accurate. Anarchists tend to fall into the 
inductive camp, as Kropotkin put it:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Precisely this natural-scientific method applied to economic facts,
enables us to prove that the so-called 'laws' of middle-class sociology,
including also their political economy, are not laws at all, but 
simply guesses, or mere assertions which have never been verified
at all."</i> [<b>Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets</b>, p. 153]
</blockquote><p>
The idea that natural-scientific methods can be applied to economic and
social life is one that many right-libertarians reject. Instead they 
favour the deductive (pre-scientific) approach (this we must note is
not limited purely to Austrian economists, many more mainstream 
capitalist economists also embrace deduction over induction).
<p>
The tendency for right-Libertarianism to fall into dogmatism (or <i>a priori</i> 
theorems, as they call it) and its implications can best be seen from the 
work of Ludwig von Mises and other economists from the right-Libertarian
"Austrian school." Of course, not all right-libertarians necessarily 
subscribe to this approach (Murray Rothbard for one did) but its use by
so many leading lights of both schools of thought is significant and 
worthy of comment. And as we are concentrating on <b>methodology</b> it is
not essential to discuss the starting assumptions. The assumptions (such 
as, to use Rothbard's words, the Austrian's <i>"fundamental axiom that 
individual human beings act"</i>) may be correct, incorrect or incomplete -- 
but the method of using them advocated by von Mises ensures that such 
considerations are irrelevant.
<p>
Von Mises (a leading member of the Austrian school of economics) begins by 
noting that social and economic theory <i>"is not derived from experience; it 
is prior to experience..."</i> Which is back to front. It is obvious that 
experience of capitalism is necessary in order to develop a viable theory 
about how it works. Without the experience, any theory is just a flight of 
fantasy. The actual specific theory we develop is therefore derived from 
experience, informed by it and will have to get checked against reality 
to see if it is viable. This is the scientific method - any theory must 
be checked against the facts. However, von Mises goes on to argue at length that <i>"no kind of experience 
can ever force us to discard or modify <b>a priori</b> theorems; they are 
logically prior to it and cannot be either proved by corroborative 
experience or disproved by experience to the contrary . . ."</i>
<p>
And if this does not do justice to a full exposition of the phantasmagoria 
of von Mises' <i>a priorism</i>, the reader may take some joy (or horror) from 
the following statement:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"If a contradiction appears between a theory and experience, <b>we must 
always assume</b> that a condition pre-supposed by the theory was not 
present, or else there is some error in our observation. The disagreement 
between the theory and the facts of experience frequently forces us to think
through the problems of the theory again. <b>But so long as a rethinking of 
the theory uncovers no errors in our thinking, we are not entitled to doubt 
its truth</b>"</i> [emphasis added -- the quotes presented here are cited 
in <b>Ideology and Method in Economics</b> by Homa Katouzian, pp. 39-40]
<p></blockquote>
In other words, if reality is in conflict with your ideas, do not adjust 
your views because reality must be at fault! The scientific method would 
be to revise the theory in light of the facts. It is not scientific to
reject the facts in light of the theory! This anti-scientific perspective
is at the heart of his economics as experience <i>"can never . . . prove or 
disprove any particular theorem"</i>: 
<p><blockquote><i>
"What assigns economics to its peculiar and unique position in the
orbit of pure knowledge and of the practical utilisation of knowledge
is the fact that its particular theorems are not open to any verification
or falsification on the grounds of experience . . .. . . The ultimate 
yardstick of an economic theorem's correctness or incorrectness is solely 
reason unaided by experience."</i> [<b>Human Action</b>, p. 858]
<p></blockquote>
Von Mises rejects the scientific approach as do all Austrian Economists.
Murray Rothbard states approvingly that <i>"Mises indeed held not only that 
economic theory does not need to be 'tested' by historical fact but also 
that it <b>cannot</b> be so tested."</i> [<i>"Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian 
Economics"</i> in <b>The Foundation of Modern Austrian Economics</b>, p. 32]
Similarly, von Hayek wrote that economic theories can <i>"never be verified 
or falsified by reference to facts. All that we can and must verify is the 
presence of our assumptions in the particular case."</i> [<b>Individualism and 
Economic Order</b>, p. 73]
<p>
This may seen somewhat strange to non-Austrians. How can we ignore reality
when deciding whether a theory is a good one or not? If we cannot evaluate
our ideas, how can we consider them anything bar dogma? The Austrian's
maintain that we cannot use historical evidence because every historical
situation is unique. Thus we cannot use <i>"complex heterogeneous historical
facts as if they were repeatable homogeneous facts"</i> like those in a
scientist's experiment [Rothbard, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 33]. While such a position
<b>does</b> have an element of truth about it, the extreme <i>a priorism</i> that
is drawn from this element is radically false (just as extreme empiricism 
is also false, but for different reasons).
<p>
Those who hold such a position ensure that their ideas cannot be evaluated 
beyond logical analysis. As Rothbard makes clear, <i>"since praxeology begins 
with a true axiom, A, all that can be deduced from this axiom must also 
be true. For if A implies be, and A is true, then B must also be true."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 19-20] But such an approach makes the search for truth a
game without rules. The Austrian economists (and other right-libertarians) 
who use this method are free to theorise anything they want, without such 
irritating constrictions as facts, statistics, data, history or experimental 
confirmation. Their only guide is logic. But this is no different from what 
religions do when they assert the logical existence of God. Theories 
ungrounded in facts and data are easily spun into any belief a person 
wants. Starting assumptions and trains of logic may contain inaccuracies 
so small as to be undetectable, yet will yield entirely false conclusions.
<p>
In addition, trains of logic may miss things which are only brought 
to light by actual experiences (after all, the human mind is not all 
knowing or all seeing). To ignore actual experience is to loose that
input when evaluating a theory. Hence our comments on the irrelevance of
the assumptions used -- the methodology is such that incomplete or 
incorrect assumptions or steps cannot be identified in light of experience. 
This is because one way of discovering if a given chain of logic requires 
checking is to test its conclusions against available evidence (although 
von Mises did argue that the <i>"ultimate yardstick"</i> was <i>"solely reason unaided 
by experience"</i>). If we <b>do</b> take experience into account and rethink a 
given theory in the light of contradictory evidence, the problem 
remains that a given logical chain may be correct, but incomplete 
or concentrate on or stress inappropriate factors. In other words, our 
logical deductions may be correct but our starting place or steps wrong 
and as the facts are to be rejected in the light of the deductive method, 
we cannot revise our ideas.
<p>
Indeed, this approach could result in discarding (certain forms of) human 
behaviour as irrelevant (which the Austrian system claims using empirical 
evidence does). For there are too many variables that can have an influence 
upon individual acts to yield conclusive results explaining human behaviour. 
Indeed, the deductive approach may ignore as irrelevant certain human 
motivations which have a decisive impact on an outcome. There could be 
a strong tendency to project "right-libertarian person" onto the rest of 
society and history, for example, and draw inappropriate insights into the
way human society works or has worked. This can be seen, for example, 
in attempts to claim pre-capitalist societies as examples of
"anarcho"-capitalism in action.
<p>
Moreover, deductive reasoning cannot indicate the relative significance 
of assumptions or theoretical factors. That requires empirical study. It 
could be that a factor considered important in the theory actually turns 
out to have little effect in practice and so the derived axioms are so 
weak as to be seriously misleading.
<p>
In such a purely ideal realm, observation and experience are distrusted
(when not ignored) and instead theory is the lodestone. Given the bias
of most theorists in this tradition, it is unsurprising that this style
of economics can always be trusted to produce results proving free markets
to be the finest principle of social organisation. And, as an added
bonus, reality can be ignored as it is <b>never</b> "pure" enough according
to the assumptions required by the theory. It could be argued, because
of this, that many right-libertarians insulate their theories from 
criticism by refusing to test them or acknowledge the results of such
testing (indeed, it could also be argued that much of right-libertarianism 
is more a religion than a political theory as it is set-up in such a 
way that it is either true or false, with this being determined not 
by evaluating facts but by whether you accept the assumptions and 
logical chains presented with them).
<p>
Strangely enough, while dismissing the "testability" of theories many
right-Libertarians (including Murray Rothbard) <b>do</b> investigate historical 
situations and claim them as examples of how well their ideas work in 
practice. But why does historical fact suddenly become useful when it 
can be used to bolster the right-Libertarian argument? Any such example 
is just as "complex" as any other and the good results indicated may 
not be accountable to the assumptions and steps of the theory but to other
factors totally ignored by it. If economic (or other) theory is untestable 
then <b>no</b> conclusions can be drawn from history, including claims for the
superiority of laissez-faire capitalism. You cannot have it both ways 
-- although we doubt that right-libertarians will stop using history
as evidence that their ideas work.
<p>
Perhaps the Austrian desire to investigate history is not so strange 
after all. Clashes with reality make a-priori deductive systems implode 
as the falsifications run back up the deductive changes to shatter the 
structure built upon the original axioms. Thus the desire to find <b>some</b>
example which proves their ideology must be tremendous. However, the 
deductive a-priori methodology makes them unwilling to admit to being 
mistaken -- hence their attempts to downplay examples which refute their 
dogmas. Thus we have the desire for historical examples while at the same 
time they have extensive ideological justifications that ensure reality 
only enters their world-view when it agrees with them. In practice,
the latter wins as real-life refuses to be boxed into their dogmas
and deductions.
<p>
Of course it is sometimes argued that it is <b>complex</b> data that is
the problem. Let use assume that this is the case. It is argued that
when dealing with complex information it is impossible to use aggregate 
data without first having more simple assumptions (i.e. that "humans
act"). Due to the complexity of the situation, it is argued, it is 
impossible to aggregate data because this hides the individual activities 
that creates it. Thus "complex" data cannot be used to invalidate 
assumptions or theories. Hence, according to Austrians, the axioms 
derived from the "simple fact" that "humans act" are the only basis 
for thinking about the economy.
<p>
Such a position is false in two ways.
<p>
Firstly, the aggregation of data <b>does</b> allow us to understand complex 
systems. If we look at a chair, we cannot find out whether it is 
comfortable, its colour, whether it is soft or hard by looking at 
the atoms that make it up. To suggest that you can is to imply the 
existence of green, soft, comfortable atoms. Similarly with gases. 
They are composed to countless individual atoms but scientists do 
not study them by looking at those atoms and their actions. Within
limits, this is also valid for human action. For example, it would
be crazy to maintain from historical data that interest rates will
be a certain percentage a week but it is valid to maintain that 
interest rates are known to be related to certain variables in certain
ways. Or that certain experiences will tend to result in certain forms
of psychological damage. General tendencies and "rules of thumb" can
be evolved from such study and these can be used to <b>guide</b> current 
practice and theory. By aggregating data you can produce valid 
information, rules of thumb, theories and evidence which would be 
lost if you concentrated on "simple data"  (such as "humans act").
Therefore, empirical study produces facts which vary across time 
and place, and yet underlying and important patterns can be
generated (patterns which can be evaluated against <b>new</b> data
and improved upon).
<p>
Secondly, the simple actions themselves influence and are influenced 
in turn by overall (complex) facts. People act in different ways in 
different circumstances (something we can agree with Austrians about, 
although  we refuse to take it to their extreme position of rejecting 
empirical evidence as such). To use simple acts to understand
complex systems means to miss the fact that these acts are not 
independent of their circumstances. For example, to claim that the
capitalist market is "just" the resultant of bilateral exchanges
ignores the fact that the market activity shapes the nature and
form of these bilateral exchanges. The "simple" data is dependent
on the "complex" system -- and so the complex system <b>cannot</b> be
understood by looking at the simple actions in isolation. To do so
would be to draw incomplete and misleading conclusions (and it is
due to these interrelations that we argue that aggregate data should
be used critically). This is particularly important when looking at
capitalism, where the "simple" acts of exchange in the labour market
are dependent upon and shaped by circumstances outside these acts.
<p>
So to claim that (complex) data cannot be used to evaluate a theory 
is false. Data can be useful when seeing whether a theory is confirmed by 
reality. This is the nature of the scientific method -- you compare the 
results expected by your theory to the facts and if they do not match you 
check your facts <b>and</b> check your theory. This may involve revising the
assumptions, methodology and theories you use if the evidence is such as 
to bring them into question. For example, if you claim that capitalism is 
based on freedom but that the net result of capitalism is to produce 
relations of domination between people then it would be valid to revise, 
for example, your definition of freedom rather than deny that domination 
restricts freedom (see <a href="append132.html">section 2</a> on this). But if actual experience is 
to be distrusted when evaluating theory, we effectively place ideology 
above people -- after all, how the ideology affects people in <b>practice</b> 
is irrelevant as experiences cannot be used to evaluate the (logically
sound but actually deeply flawed) theory.
<p>
Moreover, there is a slight arrogance in the "Austrian" dismissal of 
empirical evidence. If, as they argue, the economy is just too complex 
to allow us to generalise from experience then how can one person 
comprehend it sufficiently to create an economic ideology as the 
Austrian's suggest? Surely no one mind (or series of minds) can 
produce a model which accurately reflects such a complex system? To 
suggest that one can deduce a theory for an exceedingly complex social 
system from the theoretical work based on an analysis technique which 
deliberately ignores that reality as being unreliable seems to require 
a deliberate suspension of one's reasoning faculties. Of course, it 
may be argued that such a task is possible, given a small enough subset 
of economic activity. However, such a process is sure to lead its 
practitioners astray as the subset is not independent of the whole 
and, consequently, can be influenced in ways the ideologist does not 
(indeed, cannot) take into account. Simply put, even the greatest mind
cannot comprehend the complexities of real life and so empirical 
evidence needs to inform any theory seeking to describe and explain 
it. To reject it is simply to retreat into dogmatism and ideology,
which is precisely what right-wing libertarians generally do.
<p>
Ultimately, this dismissal of empirical evidence seems little more 
than self-serving. It's utility to the ideologist is obvious. It 
allows them to speculate to their hearts content, building models of 
the economy with no bearing to reality. Their models and the conclusions 
it generates need never be bothered with reality -- nor the effects of 
their dogma. Which shows its utility to the powerful. It allows them 
to spout comments like "the free market benefits all" while the rich
get richer and allows them to brush aside any one who points out such
troublesome facts. 
<p>
That this position is self-serving can be seen from the fact that most 
right libertarians are very selective about applying von Mises' argument. 
As a rule of thumb, it is only applied when the empirical evidence goes 
against capitalism. In such circumstances the fact that the current 
system is not a free market will also be mentioned. However, if the 
evidence seems to bolster the case for propertarianism then empirical 
evidence becomes all the rage. Needless to say, the fact that we do not 
have a free market will be conveniently forgotten. Depending on the 
needs of the moment, fundamental facts are dropped and retrieved to
bolster the ideology.
<p>
As we indicated above (in <a href="append131.html#secf12">section 1.2</a>) and will discuss in more depth
later (in <a href="append1311.html">section 11</a>) most of the leading right-Libertarian theorists
base themselves on such deductive methodologies, starting from assumptions
and "logically" drawing conclusions from them. The religious undertones
of such methodology can best be seen from the roots of right-Libertarian
"Natural law" theory.
<p>
Carole Pateman, in her analysis of Liberal contract theory, indicates
the religious nature of the "Natural Law" argument so loved by the
theorists of the "Radical Right." She notes that for Locke (the main source
of the Libertarian Right's Natural Law cult) <i>"natural law"</i> was equivalent
of <i>"God's Law"</i> and that <i>"God's law exists externally to and independently
of individuals."</i> [<b>The Problem of Political Obligation</b>, p. 154] No role
for critical thought there, only obedience. Most modern day "Natural Law"
supporters forget to mention this religious undercurrent and instead
talk of about "Nature" (or "the market") as the deity that creates Law, 
not God, in order to appear "rational." So much for science.
<p>
Such a basis in dogma and religion can hardly be a firm foundation for
liberty and indeed "Natural Law" is marked by a deep authoritarianism:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Locke's traditional view of natural law provided individual's with an 
external standard which they could recognise, but which they did not 
voluntarily choose to order their political life."</i> [Pateman, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 79]
<p></blockquote>
In <a href="append1311.html">section 11</a> we discuss the authoritarian nature of "Natural Law" and
will not do so here. However, here we must point out the political 
conclusions Locke draws from his ideas. In Pateman's words, Locke believed that <i>"obedience lasts only as long as protection. His 
individuals are able to take action themselves to remedy their political
lot. . . but this does not mean, as is often assumed, that Locke's theory
gives direct support to present-day arguments for a right of civil
disobedience. . . His theory allows for two alternatives only: either
people go peacefully about their daily affairs under the protection of
a liberal, constitutional government, or they are in revolt against a
government which has ceased to be 'liberal' and has become arbitrary and
tyrannical, so forfeiting its right to obedience."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 77]
<p>
Locke's "rebellion" exists purely to reform a <b>new</b> 'liberal' government, not
to change the existing socio-economic structure which the 'liberal' government
exists to protect. His theory, therefore, indicates the results of a priorism, 
namely a denial of any form of social dissent which may change the "natural 
law" as defined by Locke. This perspective can be found in
Rothbard who lambasted the individualist anarchists for arguing that
juries should judge the law as well as the facts. For Rothbard, the law
would be drawn up by jurists and lawyers, not ordinary people (see 
<a href="append131.html#secf14">section 1.4</a> for details). The idea that those subject to laws should
have a say in forming them is rejected in favour of elite rule. As 
von Mises put it:
<p><blockquote><i>
"The flowering of human society depends on two factors: the 
intellectual power of outstanding men to conceive sound social 
and economic theories, and the ability of these or other men 
to make these ideologies palatable to the majority."</i> [<b>Human 
Action</b>, p. 864]
<p></blockquote>
Yet such a task would require massive propaganda work and would only, 
ultimately, succeed by removing the majority from any say in the 
running of society. Once that is done then we have to believe that 
the ruling elite will be altruistic in the extreme and not abuse 
their position to create laws and processes which defended what
<b>they</b> thought was "legitimate" property, property rights and what 
constitutes "aggression." Which, ironically, contradicts the key 
capitalist notion that people are driven by self-gain. The obvious 
conclusion from such argument is that any right-libertarian regime 
would have to exclude change. If people can change the regime they 
are under they may change it in ways that right libertarian's do 
not support. The provision for ending amendments to the regime or 
the law would effectively ban most opposition groups or parties 
as, by definition, they could do nothing once in office (for 
minimal state "libertarians") or in the market for "defence" 
agencies (for "anarcho"-capitalists). How this differs from a 
dictatorship is hard to say -- after all, most dictatorships have 
parliamentary bodies which have no power but which can talk a lot.
Perhaps the knowledge that it is <b>private</b> police enforcing <b>private</b>
power will make those subject to the regime maximise their utility
by keeping quiet and not protesting. Given this, von Mises' praise
for fascism in the 1920s may be less contradictory than it first 
appears (see <a href="append136.html#secf65">section 6.5</a>) as it successfully "deterred democracy"
by crushing the labour, socialist and anarchist movements across
the world.
<p>
So, von Mises, von Hayek and most right-libertarians reject the scientific 
method in favour of ideological correctness -- if the facts contradict your
theory then they can be dismissed as too "complex" or "unique". Facts, 
however, should inform theory and any theory's methodology should take 
this into account. To dismiss facts out of hand is to promote dogma.
This is not to suggest that a theory should be modified very time new
data comes along -- that would be crazy as unique situations <b>do</b> exist,
data can be wrong and so forth -- but it does suggest that if your theory
<b>continually</b> comes into conflict with reality, its time to rethink the
theory and not assume that facts cannot invalidate it. A true libertarian 
would approach a contradiction between reality and theory by evaluating
the facts available and changing the theory is this is required, not by 
ignoring reality or dismissing it as "complex". 
<p>
Thus, much of right-Libertarian theory is neither libertarian nor scientific.
Much of right-libertarian thought is highly axiomatic, being logically
deduced from such starting axioms as <i>"self-ownership"</i> or <i>"no one should
initiate force against another"</i>. Hence the importance of our discussion
of von Mises as this indicates the dangers of this approach, namely the
tendency to ignore/dismiss the consequences of these logical chains and, 
indeed, to justify them in terms of these axioms rather than from the
facts. In addition, the methodology used is such as that it would be 
fair to argue that right-libertarians get to critique reality but reality 
can never be used to critique right-libertarianism -- for any empirical 
data presented as evidence as be dismissed as "too complex" or "unique" 
and so irrelevant (unless it can be used to support their claims, of 
course). 
<p>
Hence W. Duncan Reekie's argument (quoting leading Austrian economist 
Israel Kirzner) that <i>"empirical  work 'has the function of establishing 
the <b>applicability</b> of particular theorems, and thus <b>illustrating</b> their 
operation' . . . Confirmation of theory is not possible because there is no 
constants in human action, nor is it necessary because theorems themselves 
describe relationships logically developed from hypothesised conditions. 
Failure of a logically derived axiom to fit the facts does not render 
it invalid, rather it 'might merely indicate inapplicability' to the 
circumstances of the case.'"</i> [<b>Markets, Entrepreneurs and Liberty</b>, p. 31]
<p>
So, if facts confirm your theory, your theory is right. If facts do not 
confirm your theory, it is still right but just not applicable in this case! 
Which has the handy side effect of ensuring that facts can <b>only</b> be used to 
support the ideology, <b>never</b> to refute it (which is, according to this
perspective, impossible anyway). As Karl Popper argued, a <i>"theory 
which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific."</i>
[<b>Conjectures and Refutations</b>, p. 36] In other words 
(as we noted above), if
reality contradicts your theory, ignore reality!
<p>
Kropotkin hoped <i>"that those who believe in [current economic doctrines]
will themselves become convinced of their error as soon as they come to
see the necessity of verifying their quantitative deductions by 
quantitative investigation."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 178] However, the Austrian
approach builds so many barriers to this that it is doubtful that
this will occur. Indeed, right-libertarianism, with its focus on exchange
rather than its consequences, seems to be based upon justifying domination
in terms of their deductions than analysing what freedom actually means 
in terms of human existence (see <a href="append132.html">section 2</a> for a fuller discussion).
<p>
The real question is why are such theories taken seriously and arouse such 
interest. Why are they not simply dismissed out of hand, given their
methodology and the authoritarian conclusions they produce? The answer is, 
in part, that feeble arguments can easily pass for convincing when they
are on the same side as the prevailing sentiment and social system. And, of
course, there is the utility of such theories for ruling elites - <i>"[a]n 
ideological defence of privileges, exploitation, and private power will be 
welcomed, regardless of its merits."</i> [Noam Chomsky, <b>The Chomsky Reader</b>,
p. 188]

<a name="secf14"><h2> 1.4 Is "anarcho"-capitalism a new form of individualist anarchism?</h2>

Some "anarcho"-capitalists shy away from the term, preferring such
expressions as "market anarchist" or "individualist anarchist." This
suggests that there is some link between their ideology and that of
Tucker. However, the founder of "anarcho"-capitalism, Murray Rothbard,
refused that label for, while <i>"strongly tempted,"</i> he could not do so
because <i>"Spooner and Tucker have in a sense pre-empted that name for
their doctrine and that from that doctrine I have certain differences."</i>
Somewhat incredibly Rothbard argued that on the whole politically
<i>"these differences are minor,"</i> economically <i>"the differences are 
substantial, and this means that my view of the consequences of 
putting our more of less common system into practice is very far from 
theirs."</i> [<i>"The Spooner-Tucker Doctrine: An Economist's View"</i>, <b>Journal 
of Libertarian Studies</b>, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 7] 
<p>
What an understatement! Individualist anarchists advocated an economic 
system in which there would have been very little inequality of wealth 
and so of power (and the accumulation of capital would have been minimal 
without profit, interest and rent). Removing this social and economic 
basis would result in <b>substantially</b> different political regimes. This 
can be seen from the fate of Viking Iceland, where a substantially 
communal and anarchistic system was destroyed from within by increasing 
inequality and the rise of tenant farming (see <a href="append139.html">section 9</a> for details). 
In other words, politics is not isolated from economics. As David
Wieck put it, Rothbard <i>"writes of society as though some part of it 
(government) can be extracted and replaced by another arrangement while 
other things go on before, and he constructs a system of police and 
judicial power without any consideration of the influence of historical 
and economic context."</i> [<i>"Anarchist Justice,"</i> in <b>Nomos XIX</b>, Pennock 
and Chapman, eds., p. 227]
<p>
Unsurprisingly, the political differences he highlights <b>are</b> significant,
namely <i>"the role of law and the jury system"</i> and <i>"the land question."</i>
The former difference relates to the fact that the individualist anarchists 
<i>"allow[ed] each individual free-market court, and more specifically, each 
free-market jury, totally free rein over judicial decision."</i> This horrified 
Rothbard. The reason is obvious, as it allows real people to judge the law 
as well as the facts, modifying the former as society changes and evolves. 
For Rothbard, the idea that ordinary people should have a say in the law is 
dismissed. Rather, <i>"it would not be a very difficult task for Libertarian 
lawyers and jurists to arrive at a rational and objective code of libertarian 
legal principles and procedures."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 7-8] Of course, the fact that 
<i>"lawyers"</i> and <i>"jurists"</i> may have a radically different idea of what is just 
than those subject to their laws is not raised by Rothbard, never mind 
answered. While Rothbard notes that juries may defend the people against 
the state, the notion that they may defend the people against the authority
and power of the rich is not even raised. That is why the rich have tended to 
oppose juries as well as popular assemblies.
<p>
Unsurprisingly, the few individualist anarchists that remained pointed this
out. Laurance Labadie, the son of Tucker associate Joseph Labadie, argued
in response to Rothbard as follows:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Mere common sense would suggest that any court would be influenced 
by experience; and any free-market court or judge would in the very 
nature of things have some precedents guiding them in their instructions 
to a jury. But since no case is exactly the same, a jury would have 
considerable say about the heinousness of the offence in each case, 
realising that circumstances alter cases, and prescribing penalty 
accordingly. This appeared to Spooner and Tucker to be a more flexible 
and equitable administration of justice possible or feasible, human 
beings being what they are.. . .
<p>
"But when Mr. Rothbard quibbles about the jurisprudential ideas of 
Spooner and Tucker, and at the same time upholds <b>presumably in his 
courts</b> the very economic evils which are at bottom the very reason 
for human contention and conflict, he would seem to be a man who 
chokes at a gnat while swallowing a camel."</i> [quoted by Mildred J. 
Loomis and Mark A. Sullivan, <i>"Laurance Labadie: Keeper Of The Flame"</i>,
pp. 116-30, <b>Benjamin R. Tucker and the Champions of Liberty</b>, 
Coughlin, Hamilton and Sullivan (eds.), p. 124]
</blockquote><p>
In other words, to exclude the general population from any say in the
law and how it changes is hardly a <i>"minor"</i> difference! Particularly
if you are proposing an economic system which is based on inequalities
of wealth, power and influence and the means of accumulating more.
It is like a supporter of the state saying that it is a <i>"minor"</i>
difference if you favour a dictatorship rather than a democratically 
elected government. As Tucker argued, <i>"it is precisely in the 
tempering of the rigidity of enforcement that one of the chief
excellences of Anarchism consists . . . under Anarchism all rules
and laws will be little more than suggestions for the guidance of
juries, and that all disputes . . . will be submitted to juries 
which will judge not only the facts but the law, the justice of
the law, its applicability to the given circumstances, and the
penalty or damage to be inflicted because of its infraction . . .
under Anarchism the law . . . will be regarded as <b>just</b> in 
proportion to its flexibility, instead of now in proportion to 
its rigidity."</i> [<b>The Individualist Anarchists</b>, pp. 160-1] In 
others, the law will evolve to take into account changing social
circumstances and, as a consequence, public opinion on specific 
events and rights. Tucker's position is fundamentally <b>democratic</b> 
and evolutionary while Rothbard's is autocratic and fossilised.
<p>
On the land question, Rothbard opposed the individualist position of
"occupancy and use" as it <i>"would automatically abolish all rent
payments for land."</i>  Which was <b>precisely</b> why the individualist 
anarchists advocated it! In a predominantly rural economy, this 
would result in a significant levelling of income and social 
power as well as bolstering the bargaining position of non-land 
workers by reducing unemployment. He bemoans that landlords
cannot charge rent on their <i>"justly-acquired private property"</i>
without noticing that is begging the question as anarchists deny
that this is <i>"justly-acquired"</i> land. Unsurprising, Rothbard
considers <i>"the property theory"</i> of land ownership as John Locke's,
ignoring the fact that the first self-proclaimed anarchist book
was written to refute that kind of theory. His argument simply shows 
how far from anarchism his ideology is. For Rothbard, it goes
without saying that the landlord's <i>"freedom of contract"</i> tops the 
worker's freedom to control their own work and live and, of course, 
their right to life. [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 8 and p. 9] However, for 
anarchists, <i>"the land is indispensable to our existence, 
consequently a common thing, consequently insusceptible of
appropriation."</i> [Proudhon, <b>What is Property?</b>, p. 107]
<p>
The reason question is why Rothbard considers this a <b>political</b>
difference rather than an economic one. Unfortunately, he does not
explain. Perhaps because of the underlying <b>socialist</b> perspective 
behind the anarchist position? Or perhaps the fact that feudalism
and monarchism was based on the owner of the land being its ruler
suggests a political aspect to the ideology best left unexplored?
Given that the idea of grounding rulership on land ownership receded 
during the Middle Ages, it may be unwise to note that under 
"anarcho"-capitalism the landlord and capitalist would, likewise, 
be sovereign over the land <b>and</b> those who used it? As we noted
in <a href="append131.html">section 1</a>, this is the conclusion that Rothbard does draw.
As such, there <b>is</b> a political aspect to this difference. 
<p>
Moreover. <i>"the expropriation of the mass of the people from the 
soil forms the basis of the capitalist mode of production."</i> [Marx, 
<b>Capital</b>, vol. 1, p. 934] For there are <i>"two ways of oppressing 
men: either directly by brute force, by physical violence; or 
indirectly by denying them the means of life and this reducing them 
to a state of surrender."</i> In the second case, government is <i>"an 
organised instrument to ensure that dominion and privilege will be 
in the hands of those who . . . have cornered all the means of life,
first and foremost the land, which they make use of to keep the
people in bondage and to make them work for their benefit."</i>
[Malatesta, <b>Anarchy</b>, p. 21] Privatising the coercive functions
of said government hardly makes much difference.
<p>
Of course, Rothbard is simply skimming the surface. There are two
main ways "anarcho"-capitalists differ from individualist anarchists.
The first one is the fact that the individualist anarchists are 
socialists. The second is on whether equality is essential or not 
to anarchism. Each will be discussed in turn.
<p>
Unlike both Individualist (and social) anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists 
support capitalism (a "pure" free market type, which has never existed 
although it has been approximated occasionally). This means that they 
reject totally the ideas of anarchists with regards to property and 
economic analysis. For example, like all supporters of capitalists 
they consider rent, profit and interest as valid incomes. In contrast, 
all Anarchists consider these as exploitation and agree with the 
Individualist Anarchist Benjamin Tucker when he argued that 
<i>"<b>[w]hoever</b> contributes to production is alone entitled. <b>What</b> 
has no rights that <b>who</b> is bound to respect. <b>What</b> is a thing. <b>Who</b> 
is a person. Things have no claims; they exist only to be claimed. The 
possession of a right cannot be predicted of dead material, but only a 
living person."</i>[quoted by Wm. Gary Kline, <b>The Individualist Anarchists</b>, 
p. 73] 
<p>
This, we must note, is the fundamental critique of the capitalist theory 
that capital is productive. In and of themselves, fixed costs do not 
create value. Rather value is creation depends on how investments are 
developed and used once in place. Because of this the Individualist 
Anarchists, like other anarchists, considered non-labour derived income 
as usury, unlike "anarcho"-capitalists. Similarly, anarchists reject 
the notion of capitalist property rights in favour of possession 
(including the full fruits of one's labour). For example, anarchists 
reject private ownership of land in favour of a "occupancy and use" 
regime. In this we follow Proudhon's <b>What is Property?</b> and argue that 
<i>"property is theft"</i>. Rothbard, as noted, rejected this perspective.
<p>
As these ideas are an <b>essential</b> part of anarchist politics, they cannot
be removed without seriously damaging the rest of the theory. This can
be seen from Tucker's comments that <i>"<b>Liberty</b> insists. . . [on] the abolition 
of the State and the abolition of usury; on no more government of man by 
man, and no more exploitation of man by man."</i> [cited by Eunice Schuster in 
<b>Native American Anarchism</b>, p. 140]. He indicates that anarchism has 
specific economic <b>and</b> political ideas, that it opposes capitalism along
with the state. Therefore anarchism was never purely a "political" concept, 
but always combined an opposition to oppression with an opposition to 
exploitation. The social anarchists made exactly the same point.  Which 
means that when Tucker argued that <i>"<b>Liberty</b> insists on Socialism. . . - 
true Socialism, Anarchistic Socialism: the prevalence on earth of Liberty, 
Equality, and Solidarity"</i> he knew exactly what he was saying and meant it 
wholeheartedly. [<b>Instead of a Book</b>, p. 363] 
<p>
So because "anarcho"-capitalists embrace capitalism and reject socialism, 
they cannot be considered anarchists or part of the anarchist tradition.
<p>
Which brings us nicely to the second point, namely a lack of concern for
equality. In stark contrast to anarchists of all schools, inequality
is not seen to be a problem with "anarcho"-capitalists (see <a href="append133.html">section 3</a>). 
However, it is a truism that not all "traders" are equally subject to the 
market (i.e. have the same market power). In many cases, a few have 
sufficient control of resources to influence or determine price and in 
such cases, all others must submit to those terms or not buy the commodity. 
When the commodity is labour power, even this option is lacking -- workers 
have to accept a job in order to live. As we argue in <a href="append1310.html#secf102">section 10.2</a>, 
workers are usually at a disadvantage on the labour market when compared 
to capitalists, and this forces them to sell their liberty in return for 
making profits for others. These profits increase inequality in society
as the property owners receive the surplus value their workers produce. 
This increases inequality further, consolidating market power and so weakens
the bargaining position of workers further, ensuring that even the freest
competition possible could not eliminate class power and society (something 
B. Tucker recognised as occurring with the development of trusts within 
capitalism -- see <a href="secG4.html">section G.4</a>). 
<p>
By removing the underlying commitment to abolish non-labour income, any
"anarchist" capitalist society would have vast differences in wealth
and so power. Instead of a government imposed monopolies in land, money
and so on, the economic power flowing from private property and capital 
would ensure that the majority remained in (to use Spooner's words) <i>"the 
condition of servants"</i> (see sections <a href="append132.html">2</a> and 
<a href="append133.html#secf31">3.1</a> for more on this). 
The Individualist Anarchists were aware of this danger and so supported
economic ideas that opposed usury (i.e. rent, profit and interest) and
ensured the worker the full value of her labour. While not all of them
called these ideas "socialist" it is clear that these ideas <b>are</b> socialist
in nature and in aim (similarly, not all the Individualist Anarchists
called themselves anarchists but their ideas are clearly anarchist in
nature and in aim).
<p>
This combination of the political and economic is essential as they mutually
reinforce each other. Without the economic ideas, the political ideas 
would be meaningless as inequality would make a mockery of them. As Kline
notes, the Individualist Anarchists' <i>"proposals were designed to establish
true equality of opportunity . . . and they expected this would result in
a society without great wealth or poverty. In the absence of monopolistic
factors which would distort competition, they expected a society largely
of self-employed workmen with no significant disparity of wealth between
any of them since all would be required to live at their own expense and 
not at the expense of exploited fellow human beings."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 103-4]
<p>
Because of the evil effects of inequality on freedom, both social 
and individualist anarchists desired to create an environment in which 
circumstances would not drive people to sell their liberty to others 
at a disadvantage. In other words, they desired an equalisation of 
market power by opposing interest, rent and profit and capitalist 
definitions of private property. Kline summarises this by saying <i>"the 
American [individualist] anarchists exposed the tension existing in 
liberal thought between private property and the ideal of equal access. 
The Individual Anarchists were, at least, aware that existing conditions 
were far from ideal, that the system itself working against the majority 
of individuals in their efforts to attain its promises. Lack of capital, 
the means to creation and accumulation of wealth, usually doomed a 
labourer to a life of exploitation. This the anarchists knew and they 
abhorred such a system."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 102]
<p>
And this desire for bargaining equality is reflected in their economic 
ideas and by removing these underlying economic ideas of the individualist
anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalism makes a mockery of any ideas they 
do appropriate. Essentially, the Individualist Anarchists agreed with
Rousseau that in order to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes you 
deprive people of the means to accumulate in the first place and 
<b>not</b> take away wealth from the rich. An important point which 
"anarcho"-capitalism fails to understand or appreciate.
<p>
There are, of course, overlaps between individualist anarchism and
"anarcho"-capitalism, just as there are overlaps between it and Marxism
(and social anarchism, of course). However, just as a similar analysis
of capitalism does not make individualist anarchists Marxists, so 
apparent similarities between individualist anarchism does not make
it a forerunner of "anarcho"-capitalism. For example, both schools
support the idea of "free markets." Yet the question of markets is 
fundamentally second to the issue of property rights for what is
exchanged on the market is dependent on what is considered legitimate
property. In this, as Rothbard notes, individualist anarchists and
"anarcho"-capitalists differ and different property rights produce 
different market structures and dynamics. This means that capitalism 
is not the only economy with markets and so support for markets cannot 
be equated with support for capitalism. Equally, opposition to markets 
is <b>not</b> the defining characteristic of socialism (as we note in 
<a href="secG2.html#secg21">section G.2.1</a>). As such, it <b>is</b> possible to be a market socialist 
(and many socialist are). This is because "markets" and "property" do
not equate to capitalism:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Political economy confuses, on principle, two very different kinds of 
private property, one of which rests on the labour of the producers 
himself, and the other on the exploitation of the labour of others. It 
forgets that the latter is not only the direct antithesis of the former, 
but grows on the former's tomb and nowhere else. 
<p>
"In Western Europe, the homeland of political economy, the process of 
primitive accumulation is more of less accomplished. . . . 
<p>
"It is otherwise in the colonies. There the capitalist regime constantly
comes up against the obstacle presented by the producer, who, as owner 
of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour to enrich himself 
instead of the capitalist. The contradiction of these two diametrically 
opposed economic systems has its practical manifestation here in the 
struggle between them."</i> [Karl Marx, <b>Capital</b>, vol. 1, p. 931]
</blockquote><p>
Individualist anarchism is obviously an aspect of this struggle 
between the system of peasant and artisan production of early America 
and the state encouraged system of private property and wage labour.
"Anarcho"-capitalists, in contrast, assume that generalised wage labour 
would remain under their system (while paying lip-service to the possibilities 
of co-operatives -- and if an "anarcho"-capitalist thinks that co-operative
will become the dominant form of workplace organisation, then they are
some kind of market socialist, <b>not</b> a capitalist). It is clear that their 
end point (a pure capitalism, i.e. generalised wage labour) is directly 
the opposite of that desired by anarchists. This was the case of the 
Individualist Anarchists who embraced the ideal of (non-capitalist) 
laissez faire competition -- they did so, as noted, to <b>end</b> exploitation, 
<b>not</b> to maintain it. Indeed, their analysis of the change in American 
society from one of mainly independent producers into one based mainly 
upon wage labour has many parallels with, of all people, Karl Marx's 
presented in chapter 33 of <b>Capital</b>. Marx, correctly, argues that <i>"the 
capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist 
private property, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation 
of that private property which rests on the labour of the individual
himself; in other words, the expropriation of the worker."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 940] He notes that to achieve this, the state is used:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"How then can the anti-capitalistic cancer of the colonies be healed? 
. . . Let the Government set an artificial price on the virgin soil,
a price independent of the law of supply and demand, a price that compels 
the immigrant to work a long time for wages before he can earn enough 
money to buy land, and turn himself into an independent farmer."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 938]
</blockquote><p>
Moreover, tariffs are introduced with <i>"the objective of manufacturing
capitalists artificially"</i> for the <i>"system of protection was an artificial
means of manufacturing manufacturers, or expropriating independent
workers, of capitalising the national means of production and 
subsistence, and of forcibly cutting short the transition . . . to
the modern mode of production,"</i> to capitalism [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 932 and 
pp. 921-2]
<p>
It is this process which Individualist Anarchism protested against, the use
of the state to favour the rising capitalist class. However, unlike social
anarchists, many individualist anarchists were not consistently against
wage labour. This is the other significant overlap between "anarcho"-capitalism 
and individualist anarchism. However, they were opposed to exploitation and
argued (unlike "anarcho"-capitalism) that in their system workers bargaining
powers would be raised to such a level that their wages would equal the full
product of their labour. However, as we discuss in 
<a href="secG1.html#secg11">section G.1.1</a> the social
context the individualist anarchists lived in must be remembered. America
at the times was a predominantly rural society and industry was not as 
developed as it is now wage labour would have been minimised (Spooner,
for example, explicitly envisioned a society made up mostly entirely of 
self-employed workers). As Kline argues:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Committed as they were to equality in the pursuit of property, the 
objective for the anarchist became the construction of a society 
providing equal access to those things necessary for creating wealth. 
The goal of the anarchists who extolled mutualism and the abolition of 
all monopolies was, then, a society where everyone willing to work would 
have the tools and raw materials necessary for production in a 
non-exploitative system . . . the dominant vision of the future society 
. . . [was] underpinned by individual, self-employed workers."</i></i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 95]
</blockquote><p>
As such, a limited amount of wage labour within a predominantly 
self-employed economy does not make a given society capitalist any 
more than a small amount of governmental communities within an
predominantly anarchist world would make it statist. As Marx argued.
when <i>"the separation of the worker from the conditions of labour
and from the soil . . . does not yet exist, or only sporadically,
or on too limited a scale . . . Where, amongst such curious 
characters, is the 'field of abstinence' for the capitalists?
. . . Today's wage-labourer is tomorrow's independent peasant
or artisan, working for himself. He vanishes from the labour-market
-- but not into the workhouse."</i> There is a <i>"constant transformation 
of wage-labourers into independent producers, who work for themselves
instead of for capital"</i> and so <i>"the degree of exploitation of the
wage-labourer remain[s] indecently low."</i> In addition, the 
<i>"wage-labourer also loses, along with the relation of dependence,
the feeling of dependence on the abstemious capitalist."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>,
pp. 935-6]
<p>
Saying that, as we discuss in <a href="secG4.html">section G.4</a>, individualist anarchist support 
for wage labour is at odds with the ideas of Proudhon and, far more 
importantly, in contradiction to many of the stated principles of the 
individualist anarchists themselves. In particular, wage labour violates 
"occupancy and use" as well as having more than a passing similarity to 
the state. However, these problems can be solved by consistently applying 
the principles of individualist anarchism, unlike "anarcho"-capitalism,
and that is why it is a real school of anarchism. In other words, a 
system of <b>generalised</b> wage labour would not be anarchist nor would 
it be non-exploitative. Moreover, the social context these ideas were 
developed in and would have been applied ensure that these contradictions 
would have been minimised. If they had been applied, a genuine anarchist 
society of self-employed workers would, in all likelihood, have been 
created (at least at first, whether the market would increase inequalities 
is a moot point -- see <a href="secG4.html">section G.4</a>). 
<p>
We must stress that the social situation is important as it shows how 
apparently superficially similar arguments can have radically different 
aims and results depending on who suggests them and in what circumstances. 
As noted, during the rise of capitalism the bourgeoisie were not shy in 
urging state intervention against the masses. Unsurprisingly, working class 
people generally took an anti-state position during this period. The 
individualist anarchists were part of that tradition, opposing what Marx 
termed <i>"primitive accumulation"</i> in favour of the pre-capitalist forms of
property and society it was destroying.
<p>
However, when capitalism found its feet and could do without such obvious 
intervention, the possibility of an "anti-state" capitalism could arise.
Such a possibility became a definite once the state started to intervene
in ways which, while benefiting the system as a whole, came into conflict
with the property and power of individual members of the capitalist and
landlord class. Thus social legislation which attempted to restrict the
negative effects of unbridled exploitation and oppression on workers and
the environment were having on the economy were the source of much outrage
in certain bourgeois circles:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Quite independently of these tendencies [of individualist anarchism] 
. . . the anti-state bourgeoisie (which is also anti-statist, being 
hostile to any social intervention on the part of the State to protect 
the victims of exploitation -- in the matter of working hours, hygienic 
working conditions and so on), and the greed of unlimited exploitation, 
had stirred up in England a certain agitation in favour of
pseudo-individualism, an unrestrained exploitation. To this end, they 
enlisted the services of a mercenary pseudo-literature . . . which 
played with doctrinaire and fanatical ideas in order to project a species 
of 'individualism' that was absolutely sterile, and a species of 
'non-interventionism' that would let a man die of hunger rather than 
offend his dignity."</i> [Max Nettlau, <b>A Short History of Anarchism</b>, p. 39]
</blockquote><p>
This perspective can be seen when Tucker denounced Herbert Spencer as
a champion of the capitalistic class for his vocal attacks on social
legislation which claimed to benefit working class people but stays
strangely silent on the laws passed to benefit (usually indirectly)
capital and the rich. "Anarcho"-capitalism is part of that tradition, 
the tradition associated with a capitalism which no longer needs obvious 
state intervention as enough wealth as been accumulated to keep workers 
under control by means of market power. 
<p>
As with the original nineteenth century British "anti-state" 
capitalists like Spencer and Herbert, Rothbard <i>"completely overlooks 
the role of the state in building and maintaining a capitalist economy 
in the West. Privileged to live in the twentieth century, long after 
the battles to establish capitalism have been fought and won, Rothbard 
sees the state solely as a burden on the market and a vehicle for 
imposing the still greater burden of socialism. He manifests a kind 
of historical nearsightedness that allows him to collapse many centuries 
of human experience into one long night of tyranny that ended only with 
the invention of the free market and its 'spontaneous' triumph over the
past. It is pointless to argue, as Rothbard seems ready to do, that
capitalism would have succeeded without the bourgeois state; the fact
is that all capitalist nations have relied on the machinery of government
to create and preserve the political and legal environments required
by their economic system."</i> That, of course, has not stopped him <i>"critis[ing]
others for being unhistorical."</i> [Stephen L Newman, <b>Liberalism at Wit's 
End</b>, pp. 77-8 and p. 79]
<p>
In other words, there is substantial differences between the victims of a 
thief trying to stop being robbed and be left alone to enjoy their property 
and the successful thief doing the same! Individualist Anarchist's were
aware of this. For example, Victor Yarros stressed this key difference 
between individualist anarchism and the proto-"libertarian" capitalists 
of "voluntaryism":
<p><blockquote>
<i>"[Auberon Herbert] believes in allowing people to retain all their 
possessions, no matter how unjustly and basely acquired, while getting 
them, so to speak, to swear off stealing and usurping and to promise to 
behave well in the future. We, on the other hand, while insisting on the 
principle of private property, in wealth honestly obtained under the reign 
of liberty, do not think it either unjust or unwise to dispossess the 
landlords who have monopolised natural wealth by force and fraud. We hold 
that the poor and disinherited toilers would be justified in expropriating, 
not alone the landlords, who notoriously have no equitable titles to their 
lands, but <b>all</b> the financial lords and rulers, all the millionaires and 
very wealthy individuals. . . . Almost all possessors of great wealth 
enjoy neither what they nor their ancestors rightfully acquired (and if 
Mr. Herbert wishes to challenge the correctness of this statement, we are 
ready to go with him into a full discussion of the subject). . . . 
<p>
"If he holds that the landlords are justly entitled to their lands, let 
him make a defence of the landlords or an attack on our unjust proposal."</i>
[quoted by Carl Watner, <i>"The English Individualists As They Appear In 
Liberty,"</i> pp. 191-211, <b>Benjamin R. Tucker and the Champions of Liberty</b>, 
Coughlin, Hamilton and Sullivan (eds.), pp. 199-200]
</blockquote><p>
Significantly, Tucker and other individualist anarchists saw state intervention
has a result of capital manipulating legislation to gain an advantage on the 
so-called free market which allowed them to exploit labour and, as such, it
benefited the <b>whole</b> capitalist class. Rothbard, at best, acknowledges
that <b>some</b> sections of big business benefit from the current system and so
fails to have the comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of capitalism
as a <b>system</b> (rather as an ideology). This lack of understanding of capitalism
as a historic and dynamic system rooted in class rule and economic power is 
important in evaluating "anarcho"-capitalist claims to anarchism. Marxists 
are not considered anarchists as they support the state as a means of 
transition to an anarchist society. Much the same logic can be applied to 
right-wing libertarians (even if they do call themselves "anarcho"-capitalists). 
This is because they do not seek to correct the inequalities produced by 
previous state action before ending it nor do they seek to change the 
definitions of "private property" imposed by the state. In effect, they 
argue that the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" should "wither away" and 
be limited to defending the property accumulated in a few hands. Needless 
to say, starting from the current (coercively produced) distribution of 
property and then eliminating "force" simply means defending the power and 
privilege of ruling minorities:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"The modern Individualism initiated by Herbert Spencer is, like the critical 
theory of Proudhon, a powerful indictment against the dangers and wrongs of 
government, but its practical solution of the social problem is miserable -- 
so miserable as to lead us to inquire if the talk of 'No force' be merely an 
excuse for supporting landlord and capitalist domination."</i> [<b>Act For 
Yourselves</b>, p. 98]
</blockquote>

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