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<title>B.2 Why are anarchists against the state?</title>

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<h1>B.2 Why are anarchists against the state?</h1>

As previously noted (see <a href="secB1.html">section B.1</a>), 
anarchists oppose all forms of 
hierarchical authority. Historically, however, they have spent most 
of their time and energy opposing two main forms in particular. One is 
capitalism, the other, the state. These two forms of authority have a 
symbiotic relationship and cannot be easily separated:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"[T]he State . . . and Capitalism are facts and conceptions which we
cannot separate from each other. In the course of history these 
institutions have developed, supporting and reinforcing each other.
<p>
"They are connected with each other -- not as mere accidental 
co-incidences. They are linked together by the links of cause and
effect."</i> [Kropotkin, <b>Evolution and Environment</b>, p. 94]
</blockquote><p>
In this section, in consequence, as well as explaining why anarchists 
oppose the state, we will necessarily have to analyse the relationship 
between it and capitalism. 
<p>
So what is the state? As Malatesta put it, anarchists <i>"have used the word 
State, and still do, to mean the sum total of the political, legislative, 
judiciary, military and financial institutions through which the management 
of their own affairs, the control over their personal behaviour, the 
responsibility for their personal safety, are taken away from the people 
and entrusted to others who, by usurpation or delegation, are vested with 
the power to make laws for everything and everybody, and to oblige the 
people to observe them, if need be, by the use of collective force."</i> 
[<b>Anarchy</b>, p. 17]
<p>
He continues:
<p><blockquote><i>
"For us, government [or the state] is made up of all the governors; and
the governors . . . are those who have the power to make <b>laws</b> regulating 
inter-human relations and to see that they are carried out . . . [and] 
who have the power, to a greater or lesser degree, to make use of the 
social power, that is of the physical, intellectual and economic power 
of the whole community, in order to oblige everybody to carry out their 
wishes. And this power, in our opinion, constitutes the principle of
government, of authority."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 19]
</blockquote><p>
Kropotkin presented a similar analysis, arguing that the state <i>"not only
includes the existence of a power situated above society, but also of a
<b>territorial concentration</b> as well as the concentration <b>in the hands 
of a few of many functions in the life of societies</b> . . . A whole 
mechanism of legislation and of policing has to be developed in order to
subject some classes to the domination of others."</i> [<b>The State: Its 
Historic Role</b>, p. 10] For Bakunin, all states <i>"are in essence only
machines governing the masses from above, through . . . a privileged
minority, allegedly knowing the genuine interests of the people better
than the people themselves."</i> [<b>The Political Philosophy of Bakunin</b>, 
p. 211] On this subject Murray Bookchin writes:
<p><blockquote><i>
"Minimally, the State is a professional system of social coercion -- 
not merely a system of social administration as it is still naively
regarded by the public and by many political theorists. The word
'professional' should be emphasised as much as the word 'coercion.'
. . . It is only when coercion is institutionalised into a professional,
systematic and organised form of social control -- that is, when 
people are plucked out of their everyday lives in a community and
expected not only to 'administer' it but to do so with the backing 
of a monopoly of violence -- that we can properly speak of a State."</i> 
[<b>Remaking Society</b>, p. 66]
</blockquote><p>
As Bookchin indicates, anarchists reject the idea that the state is
the same as society or that <b>any</b> grouping of human beings living 
and organised together is a state. This confusion, as Kropotkin notes,
explains why <i>"anarchists are generally upbraided for wanting to 
'destroy society' and of advocating a return to 'the permanent war
of each against all.'"</i> Such a position <i>"overlook[s] the fact that
Man lived in Societies for thousands of years before the State had
been heard of"</i> and that, consequently, the State <i>"is only one of the
forms assumed by society in the course of history."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 10]
<p>
The state, therefore, is not just federations of individuals or 
peoples and so, as Malatesta stressed, cannot be used to describe 
a <i>"human collectively gathered together in a particular territory 
and making up what is called a social unit irrespective of the 
way the way said collectivity are grouped or the state of
relations between them."</i> It cannot be <i>"used simply as a synonym
for society."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 17] The state is a particular form of 
social organisation based on certain key attributes and so, we
argue, <i>"the word 'State' . . . should be reserved for those societies 
with the hierarchical system and centralisation."</i> [Peter Kropotkin, 
<b>Ethics</b>, p. 317f] As such, the state <i>"is a historic, transitory
institution, a temporary form of society"</i> and one whose <i>"utter 
extinction"</i> is possible as the <i>"State is not society."</i> [Bakunin,
<b>Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings</b>, p. 151]
<p>
In summary, the state is a specific way in which human affairs
are organised in a given area, a way marked by certain institutions
which, in turn, have certain characteristics. This does not imply,
however, that the state is a monolithic entity that has been the 
same from its birth to the present day. States vary in many ways, 
especially in their degree of authoritarianism, in the size and 
power of their bureaucracy and how they organise themselves. Thus
we have monarchies, oligarchies, theocracies, party dictatorships 
and (more or less) democratic states. We have ancient states, with
minimal bureaucracy, and modern ones, with enormous bureaucracy.
<p>
Moreover, anarchists argue that <i>"the <b>political</b> regime . . . is 
always an expression of the <b>economic</b> regime which exists at the 
heart of society."</i> This means that regardless of how the state 
changes, it <i>"continues to be shaped by the economic system, of
which it is always the expression and, at the same time, the 
consecration and the sustaining force."</i> Needless to say, there
is not always an exact match and sometimes <i>"the political regime
of a country finds itself lagging behind the economic changes 
that are taking place, and in that case it will abruptly be set
aside and remodelled in a way appropriate to the economic regime
that has been established."</i> [Kropotkin, <b>Words of a Rebel</b>, p. 118]
<p>
At other times, the state can change its form to protect the 
economic system it is an expression of. Thus we see democracies 
turn to dictatorships in the face of popular revolts and movements. 
The most obvious examples of Pinochet's Chile, Franco's Spain, 
Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany are all striking confirmations
of Bakunin's comment that while <i>"[n]o government could serve the
economic interests of the bourgeoisie better than a republic,"</i>
that class would <i>"prefer . . . military dictatorship"</i> if needed
to crush <i>"the revolts of the proletariat."</i> [<b>Bakunin on Anarchism</b>, 
p. 417]
<p>
However, as much as the state may change its form it still has 
certain characteristics which identify a social institution as a
state. As such, we can say that, for anarchists, the state is 
marked by three things:
<p><ol>
	1) A <i><b>"monopoly of violence"</b></i> in a given territorial area;<br>
	2) This violence having a <i>"professional,"</i> institutional 
	   nature; and<br>
	3) A hierarchical nature, centralisation of power and 
	   initiative into the hands of a few.<br>
</ol><p>
Of these three aspects, the last one (its centralised, hierarchical
nature) is the most important simply because the concentration of
power into the hands of the few ensures a division of society into
government and governed (which necessitates the creation of a 
professional body to enforce that division). Hence we find Bakunin
arguing that <i>"[w]ith the State there must go also . . . all 
organisation of social life from the top downward, via legislation 
and government."</i> [<b>The Political Philosophy of Bakunin</b>, p. 242] 
In other words, <i>"the people was not governing itself."</i> [Kropotkin, 
<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 120]
<p>
This aspect implies the rest. In a state, all the people residing 
in an area are subject to the state, submitting themselves to the 
individuals who make up the institution of authority ruling that 
territory. To enforce the will of this few, they must have a 
monopoly of force within the territory. As the members of the 
state collectively monopolise political decision making power, 
they are a privileged body separated by its position and status 
from the rest of the population as a whole which means they cannot 
rely on them to enforce its will. This necessities a professional 
body of some kind to enforce their decisions, a separate police 
force or army rather than the people armed.
<p>
Given this, the division of society into rulers and ruled is the
key to what constitutes a state. Without such a division, we would 
not need a monopoly of violence and so would simply have an 
association of equals, unmarked by power and hierarchy (such as 
exists in many stateless "primitive" tribes and will exist in a 
future anarchist society). And, it must be stressed, such a division
exists even in democratic states as <i>"with the state there is always
a hierarchical and status difference between rulers and ruled. Even
if it is a democracy, where we suppose those who rule today are 
not rulers tomorrow, there are still differences in status. In a
democratic system, only a tiny minority will ever have the opportunity
to rule and these are invariably drawn from the elite."</i> [Harold
Barclay, <b>The State</b>, pp. 23-4] 
<p>
Thus, the <i>"essence of government"</i> is that <i>"it is a thing apart, 
developing its own interests"</i> and so is <i>"an institution existing for
its own sake, preying upon the people, and teaching them whatever
will tend to keep it secure in its seat."</i> [Voltairine de Cleyre,
<b>The Voltairine de Cleyre Reader</b>, p. 27 and p. 26] And so <i>"despotism
resides not so much in the <b>form</b> of the State or power as in the 
very <b>principle</b> of the State and political power."</i> [Bakunin, 
<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 211]
<p>
As the state is the delegation of power into the hands of the few, 
it is obviously based on hierarchy. This delegation of power results 
in the elected people becoming isolated from the mass of people who 
elected them and outside of their control (see 
<a href="secB2.html#secb24">section B.2.4</a>). In 
addition, as those elected are given power over a host of different 
issues and told to decide upon them, a bureaucracy soon develops 
around them to aid in their decision-making and enforce those 
decisions once they have been reached. However, this bureaucracy, 
due to its control of information and its permanency, soon has more 
power than the elected officials. Therefore <i>"a highly complex state 
machine . . . leads to the formation of a class especially concerned 
with state management, which, using its acquired experience, begins to
deceive the rest for its personal advantage."</i> [Kropotkin, <b>Selected
Writings on Anarchism and Revolution</b>, p. 61] This means that those 
who serve the people's (so-called) servant have more power than those 
they serve, just as the politician has more power than those who 
elected him. All forms of state-like (i.e. hierarchical) organisations 
inevitably spawn a bureaucracy about them. This bureaucracy soon becomes 
the de facto focal point of power in the structure, regardless of the 
official rules. 
<p>
This marginalisation and disempowerment of ordinary people (and so 
the empowerment of a bureaucracy) is the key reason for anarchist 
opposition to the state. Such an arrangement ensures that the 
individual is disempowered, subject to bureaucratic, authoritarian 
rule which reduces the person to an object or a number, <b>not</b> a 
unique individual with hopes, dreams, thoughts and feelings. As 
Proudhon forcefully argued:
<p><blockquote><i>
"To be GOVERNED is to be kept in sight, inspected, spied upon, directed,
law-driven, numbered, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled,
estimated, valued, censured, commanded, by creatures who have neither the
right, nor the wisdom, nor the virtue to do so . . . To be GOVERNED is to
be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled,
taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorised, 
admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under the 
pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be 
placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolised, 
extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, 
the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, 
tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, 
shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to crown it all, mocked, 
ridiculed, outraged, dishonoured. That is government; that is its justice;
that is its morality."</i> [<b>General Idea of the Revolution</b>, p. 294]
</blockquote><p>
Such is the nature of the state that <b>any</b> act, no matter how
evil, becomes good if it helps forward the interests of the state
and the minorities it protects. As Bakunin put it:
<p><blockquote><i>
"<b>The State . . . is the most flagrant, the most cynical, and the 
most complete negation of humanity.</b> It shatters the universal 
solidarity of all men [and women] on the earth, and brings some 
of them into association only for the purpose of destroying, 
conquering, and enslaving all the rest . . . 
<p>
"This flagrant negation of humanity which constitutes the very 
essence of the State is, from the standpoint of the State, its 
supreme duty and its greatest virtue . . . Thus, to offend, to 
oppress, to despoil, to plunder, to assassinate or enslave one's 
fellowman [or woman] is ordinarily regarded as a crime. In public 
life, on the other hand, from the standpoint of patriotism, when 
these things are done for the greater glory of the State, for 
the preservation or the extension of its power, it is all 
transformed into duty and virtue. And this virtue, this duty,
are obligatory for each patriotic citizen; everyone if supposed
to exercise them not against foreigners only but against one's
own fellow citizens . . . whenever the welfare of the State
demands it.
<p>
"This explains why, since the birth of the State, the world of
politics has always been and continues to be the stage for 
unlimited rascality and brigandage . . . This explains why the 
entire history of ancient and modern states is merely a series 
of revolting crimes; why kings and ministers, past and present, 
of all times and all countries -- statesmen, diplomats, bureaucrats, 
and warriors -- if judged from the standpoint of simply morality 
and human justice, have a hundred, a thousand times over earned 
their sentence to hard labour or to the gallows. There is no 
horror, no cruelty, sacrilege, or perjury, no imposture, no 
infamous transaction, no cynical robbery, no bold plunder or 
shabby betrayal that has not been or is not daily being 
perpetrated by the representatives of the states, under no other 
pretext than those elastic words, so convenient and yet so 
terrible: '<b>for reasons of state.</b>'"</i> [<b>Bakunin on Anarchism</b>, 
pp. 133-4] 
</blockquote><p>
Governments habitually lie to the people they claim to represent 
in order to justify wars, reductions (if not the destruction) of 
civil liberties and human rights, policies which benefit the few 
over the many, and other crimes. And if its subjects protest, 
the state will happily use whatever force deemed necessary to 
bring the rebels back in line (labelling such repression "law 
and order"). Such repression includes the use of death squads,
the institutionalisation of torture, collective punishments,
indefinite imprisonment, and other horrors at the worse extremes.
<p>
Little wonder the state usually spends so much time ensuring the 
(mis)education of its population -- only by obscuring (when not 
hiding) its actual practises can it ensure the allegiance of 
those subject to it. The history of the state could be viewed
as nothing more than the attempts of its subjects to control it
and bind it to the standards people apply to themselves.
<p>
Such behaviour is not surprising, given that Anarchists see the 
state, with its vast scope and control of deadly force, as the 
"ultimate" hierarchical structure, suffering from all the negative 
characteristics associated with authority described in the 
<a href="secB1.html">last 
section</a>. <i>"Any loical and straightforward theory of the State,"</i> 
argued Bakunin, <i>"is essentially founded upon the principle of 
<b>authority</b>, that is the eminently theological, metaphysical, 
and political idea that the masses, <b>always</b> incapable of 
governing themselves, must at all times submit to the beneficent 
yoke of a wisdom and a justice imposed upon them, in some way or 
other, from above."</i> [<b>Bakunin on Anarchism</b>, p. 142] Such a 
system of authority cannot help being centralised, hierarchical
and bureaucratic in nature. And because of its centralised, 
hierarchical, and bureaucratic nature, the state becomes a 
great weight over society, restricting its growth and 
development and making popular control impossible. As 
Bakunin put it:
<p><blockquote><i>
"the so-called general interests of society supposedly represented by the
State . . . [are] in reality . . . the general and permanent negation of 
the positive interests of the regions, communes, and associations, and a 
vast number of individuals subordinated to the State . . . [in which] 
all the best aspirations, all the living forces of a country, are 
sanctimoniously immolated and interred."</i> [<b>The Political Philosophy 
of Bakunin</b>, p. 207]
</blockquote><p>
That is by no means the end of it. As well as its obvious hierarchical
form, anarchists object to the state for another, equally important,
reason. This is its role as a defender of the economically dominant 
class in society against the rest of it (i.e. from the working class). 
This means, under the current system, the capitalists <i>"need the state
to legalise their methods of robbery, to protect the capitalist 
system."</i> [Berkman, <b>What is Anarchism?</b>, p. 16] The state, as we
discuss in <a href="secB2.html#secb21">section B.2.1</a>, is the defender of private property (see 
<a href="secB3.html">section B.3</a> for a discussion of what anarchists mean by that term 
and how it differs from individual possessions). 
<p>
This means that in capitalist states the mechanisms of state domination 
are controlled by and for a corporate elite (and hence the large 
corporations are often considered to belong to a wider <i>"state-complex"</i>). 
Indeed, as we discuss in more depth in <a href="secF8.html">section F.8</a>, the <i>"State has been, 
and still is, the main pillar and the creator, direct and indirect, of 
Capitalism and its powers over the masses."</i> [Kropotkin, <b>Evolution and 
Environment</b>, p. 97] <a href="secB2.html#secb23">Section B.2.3</a> indicates how this is domination is
achieved in a representative democracy.
<p>
However this does not mean anarchists think that the state is purely 
an instrument of economic class rule. As Malatesta argued, while <i>"a 
special class (government) which, provided with the necessary means 
of repression, exists to legalise and protect the owning class from 
the demands of the workers . . . it uses the powers at its disposal 
to create privileges for itself and to subject, if it can, the 
owning class itself as well."</i> [<b>Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas</b>, 
p. 183] Thus the state has interests of its own, distinct from and 
sometimes in opposition to the economic ruling elite. This means 
that both state <b>and</b> capitalism needs to be abolished, for the 
former is as much a distinct (and oppressive and exploitative) 
class as the former. This aspects of the state is discussed in 
<a href="secB2.html#secb26">section B.2.6</a>.
<p>
As part of its role as defender of capitalism, the state is involved 
in not only in political domination but also in economic domination.
This domination can take different forms, varying from simply 
maintaining capitalist property rights to actually owning workplaces
and exploiting labour directly. Thus every state intervenes in the 
economy in some manner. While this is usually to favour the economically 
dominant, it can also occur try and mitigate the anti-social nature
of the capitalist market and regulate its worse abuses. We discuss 
this aspect of the state in <a href="secB2.html#secb22">section B.2.2</a>. 
<p>
Needless to say, the characteristics which mark a state did not 
develop by chance. As we discuss in 
<a href="secH3.html#sech37">section H.3.7</a>, anarchists 
have an evolutionary perspective on the state. This means that 
it has a hierarchical nature in order to facilitate the execution 
of its role, its function. As sections <a href="secB2.html#secb24">B.2.4</a> 
and <a href="secB2.html#secb25">B.2.5</a> indicate, 
the centralisation that marks a state is required to secure elite 
rule and was deliberately and actively created to do so. This 
means that states, by their very nature, are top-down 
institutions which centralise power into a few hands and, as a
consequence, a state <i>"with its traditions, its hierarchy, and its
narrow nationalism"</i> can <i>"not be utilised as an instrument of
emancipation."</i> [Kropotkon, <b>Evolution and Environment</b>, p. 78]
It is for this reason that anarchists aim to create a new form
of social organisation and life, a decentralised one based on
decision making from the bottom-up and the elimination of 
hierarchy.
<p>
Finally, we must point out that anarchists, while stressing what
states have in common, do recognise that some forms of the state
are better than others. Democracies, for example, tend to be less
oppressive than dictatorships or monarchies. As such it would be
false to conclude that anarchists, <i>"in criticising the democratic
government we thereby show our preference for the monarchy. We 
are firmly convinced that the most imperfect republic is a 
thousand times better than the most enlightened monarchy."</i> 
[Bakunin, <b>Bakunin on Anarchism</b>, p. 144] However, this does not
change the nature or role of the state. Indeed, what liberties we 
have are <b>not</b> dependent on the goodwill of the state but rather 
the result of people standing against it and exercising their 
autonomy. Left to itself, the state would soon turn the liberties 
and rights it says it defends into dead-laws -- things that look 
good in print but not practised in real life.
<p>
So in the rest of this section we will discuss the state, its 
role, its impact on a society's freedom and who benefits from its 
existence. Kropotkin's classic essay, <b>The State: It's Historic 
Role</b> is recommended for further reading on this subject. Harold
Barclay's <b>The State</b> is a good overview of the origins of the
state, how it has changed over the millenniums and the nature of
the modern state.

<a name="secb21"><h2>B.2.1 What is main function of the state?</h2>

The main function of the state is to guarantee the existing social
relationships and their sources within a given society through
centralised power and a monopoly of violence. To use Malatesta's 
words, the state is basically <i>"the property owners' <b>gendarme.</b>"</i> 
This is because there are <i>"two ways of oppressing men [and women]:
either directly by brute force, by physical violence; or indirectly by
denying them the means of life and thus reducing them to a state of 
surrender."</i> The owning class, <i>"gradually concentrating in their hands 
the means of production, the real sources of life, agriculture, industry,
barter, etc., end up establishing their own power which, by reason of
the superiority of its means . . . always ends by more or less openly
subjecting the political power, which is the government, and making it
into its own <b>gendarme.</b>"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 23, p. 21 and p. 22]
<p>
The state, therefore, is <i>"the political expression of the economic 
structure"</i> of society and, therefore, <i>"the representative of the 
people who own or control the wealth of the community and the 
oppressor of the people who do the work which creates the wealth."</i> 
[Nicholas Walter, <b>About Anarchism</b>, p. 37] It is therefore no 
exaggeration to say that the state is the extractive apparatus of 
society's parasites. 
<p>
The state ensures the exploitative privileges of its ruling elite by
protecting certain economic monopolies from which its members derive 
their wealth. The nature of these economic privileges varies over time. 
Under the current system, this means defending capitalist property 
rights (see <a href="secB3.html#secb32">section B.3.2</a>). 
This service is referred to as "protecting 
private property" and is said to be one of the two main functions of 
the state, the other being to ensure that individuals are "secure in 
their persons." However, although this second aim is professed, in 
reality most state laws and institutions are concerned with the 
protection of property (for the anarchist definition of "property"  
see <a href="secB3.html#secb31">section B.3.1</a>). 
<p>
From this we may infer that references to the "security of persons,"
"crime prevention," etc., are mostly rationalisations of the state's
existence and smokescreens for its perpetuation of elite power and
privileges. This does not mean that the state does not address these
issues. Of course it does, but, to quote Kropotkin, any <i>"laws developed
from the nucleus of customs useful to human communities . . . have
been turned to account by rulers to sanctify their own domination."
of the people, and maintained only by the fear of punishment."</i> 
[<b>Anarchism</b>, p. 215]
<p>
Simply put, if the state <i>"presented nothing but a collection of 
prescriptions serviceable to rulers, it would find some difficulty in
insuring acceptance and obedience"</i> and so the law reflects customs
"essential to the very being of society"</i> but these are <i>"cleverly 
intermingled with usages imposed by the ruling caste and both claim
equal respect from the crowd."</i> Thus the state's laws have a <i>"two-fold 
character."</i> While its <i>"origin is the desire of the ruling class to
give permanence to customs imposed by themselves for their own 
advantage"</i> it also passes into law <i>"customs useful to society, 
customs which have no need of law to insure respect"</i> -- unlike 
those <i>"other customs useful only to rulers, injurious to the mass 
of the people, and maintained only by the fear of punishment."</i> 
[Kropotkin, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 205-6] To use an obvious example, we 
find the state using the defence of an individual's possessions 
as the rationale for imposing capitalist private property rights 
upon the general public and, consequently, defending the elite 
and the source of its wealth and power against those subject to
it.
<p>
Moreover, even though the state does take a secondary interest
in protecting the security of persons (particularly elite persons), 
the vast majority of crimes against persons are motivated by poverty 
and alienation due to state-supported exploitation and also by the
desensitisation to violence created by the state's own violent methods 
of protecting private property. In other words, the state rationalises 
its existence by pointing to the social evils it itself helps to create 
(either directly or indirectly). Hence, anarchists maintain that without 
the state and the crime-engendering conditions to which it gives rise, 
it would be possible for decentralised, voluntary community associations 
to deal compassionately (not punitively) with the few incorrigibly 
violent people who might remain (see <a href="secI5.html#seci58">section I.5.8</a>). 
<p>
Anarchists think it is pretty clear what the real role of the modern
state is. It represents the essential coercive mechanisms by which 
capitalism and the authority relations associated with private 
property are sustained. The protection of property is fundamentally the 
means of assuring the social domination of owners over non-owners, both 
in society as a whole and in the particular case of a specific boss 
over a specific group of workers. Class domination is the authority 
of property owners over those who use that property and it is the 
primary function of the state to uphold that domination (and the 
social relationships that generate it). In Kropotkin's words, <i>"the 
rich perfectly well know that if the machinery of the State ceased 
to protect them, their power over the labouring classes would be gone
immediately."</i> [<b>Evolution and Environment</b>, p. 98] Protecting private 
property and upholding class domination are the same thing.
<p>
The historian Charles Beard makes a similar point: 
<p><blockquote><i>
"Inasmuch as the primary object of a government, beyond mere repression 
of physical violence, is the making of the rules which determine the 
property relations of members of society, the dominant classes whose 
rights are thus to be protected must perforce obtain from the government 
such rules as are consonant with the larger interests necessary to the 
continuance of their economic processes, or they must themselves control 
the organs of government."</i> ["An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution,"</i> 
quoted by Howard Zinn, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 89]
</blockquote><p>
This role of the state -- to protect capitalism and the property, 
power and authority of the property owner -- was also noticed by 
Adam Smith: 
<p><blockquote>
<i>"[T]he inequality of fortune . . . introduces among men a degree 
of authority and subordination which could not possibly exist 
before. It thereby introduces some degree of that civil government 
which is indispensably necessary for its own preservation . . . 
[and] to maintain and secure that authority and subordination. The 
rich, in particular, are necessarily interested to support that order 
of things which can alone secure them in the possession of their own 
advantages. Men of inferior wealth combine to defend those of superior 
wealth in the possession of their property, in order that men of 
superior wealth may combine to defend them in the possession of 
theirs . . .  [T]he maintenance of their lesser authority depends 
upon that of his greater authority, and that upon their subordination 
to him depends his power of keeping their inferiors in subordination 
to them. They constitute a sort of little nobility, who feel themselves 
interested to defend the property and to support the authority of 
their own little sovereign in order that he may be able to defend 
their property and to support their authority. Civil government, so 
far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality 
instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those 
who have some property against those who have none at all."</i> [<b>The 
Wealth of Nations</b>, book 5, pp. 412-3]
</blockquote><p>
This is reflected in both the theory and history of the modern state.
Theorists of the liberal state like John Locke had no qualms about
developing a theory of the state which placed the defence of private
property at its heart. This perspective was reflected in the American
Revolution. For example, there is the words of John Jay (the first
chief justice of the Supreme Court), namely that <i>"the people who 
own the country ought to govern it."</i> [quoted by Noam Chomksy, 
<b>Understanding Power</b>, p. 315] This was the maxim of the Founding 
Fathers of American <i>"democracy"</i> and it has continued ever since. 
<p>
So, in a nutshell, the state is the means by which the ruling class 
rules. Hence Bakunin:
<p><blockquote><i>
"The State is authority, domination, and force, organised by the 
property-owning and so-called enlightened classes against the masses
. . . the State's domination . . . [ensures] that of the privileged 
classes who it solely represents."</i> [<b>The Basic Bakunin</b>, p. 140]
</blockquote><p>
Under the current system, this means that the state <i>"constitutes the
chief bulwark of capital"</i> because of its <i>"centralisation, law (always 
written by a minority in the interest of that minority), and courts of 
justice (established mainly for the defence of authority and capital)."</i>
Thus it is <i>"the mission of all governments . . . is to protect and 
maintain by force the . . . privileges of the possessing classes."</i> 
Consequently, while <i>"[i]n the struggle between the individual and the 
State, anarchism . . . takes the side of the individual as against the 
State, of society against the authority which oppresses it,"</i> anarchists 
are well aware that the state does not exist above society, independent
of the classes which make it up. [Kropotkin, <b>Anarchism</b>, pp. 149-50,
p. 214 and pp. 192-3]
<p>
Consequently anarchists reject the idea that the role of the state
is simply to represent the interests of the people or "the nation."
For <i>"democracy is an empty pretence to the extent that production,
finance and commerce -- and along with them, the political processes
of the society as well -- are under control of 'concentrations of
private power.' The 'national interest' as articulated by those who
dominate the . . . societies will be their special interests. Under
these circumstances, talk of 'national interest' can only contribute
to mystification and oppression."</i> [Noam Chomsky, <b>Radical Priorities</b>, 
p. 52] As we discuss in <a href="secD6.html">section D.6</a>, nationalism always reflects the
interests of the elite, not those who make up a nation and, 
consequently, anarchists reject the notion as nothing more than a 
con (i.e. the use of affection of where you live to further ruling 
class aims and power). 
<p>
Indeed, part of the state's role as defender of the ruling elite is 
to do so internationally, defending "national" (i.e. elite) interests 
against the elites of other nations. Thus we find that at the IMF and
World Bank, nations are represented by ministers who are <i>"closely 
aligned with particular constituents <b>within</b> their countries. The
trade ministers reflect the concerns of the business community"</i>
while the <i>"finance ministers and central bank governors are closely
tied to financial community; they come from financial firms, and
after their period in service, that is where they return . . . These
individuals see the world through the eyes of the financial community."</i>
Unsurprisingly, the <i>"decisions of any institution naturally reflect
the perspectives and interests of those who make the decisions"</i> and
so the <i>"policies of the international economic institutions are all
too often closely aligned with the commercial and financial interests
of those in the advanced industrial countries."</i> [Joseph Stiglitz, 
<b>Globalisation and its Discontents</b>, pp. 19-20]
<p>
This, it must be stressed, does not change in the so-called 
democratic state. Here, however, the primary function of the state 
is disguised by the "democratic" facade of the representative electoral
system, through which it is made to appear that the people rule
themselves. Thus Bakunin writes that the modern state <i>"unites in itself
the two conditions necessary for the prosperity of the capitalistic
economy: State centralisation and the actual subjection of . . . the
people . . . to the minority allegedly representing it but actually
governing it."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 210] How this is achieved is discussed 
in <a href="secB2.html#secb23">section B.2.3</a>.

<a name="secb22"><h2>B.2.2 Does the state have subsidiary functions?</h2>

Yes, it does. While, as discussed in the <a href="secB2.html#secb21">last section</a>, 
the state is an instrument to maintain class rule this does 
not mean that it is limited to just defending the social 
relationships in a society and the economic and political 
sources of those relationships. No state has ever left its 
activities at that bare minimum. As well as defending the rich, 
their property and the specific forms of property rights they 
favoured, the state has numerous other subsidiary functions. 
<p>
What these are has varied considerably over time and space and, 
consequently, it would be impossible to list them all. However, 
<b>why</b> it does is more straight forward. We can generalise two 
main forms of subsidiary functions of the state. The first one 
is to boost the interests of the ruling elite either nationally 
or internationally beyond just defending their property. The 
second is to protect society against the negative effects of 
the capitalist market. We will discuss each in turn and, for 
simplicity and relevance, we will concentrate on capitalism
(see also <a href="secD1.html">section D.1</a>).
<p>
The first main subsidiary function of the state is when it 
intervenes in society to help the capitalist class in some way.
This can take obvious forms of intervention, such as subsidies, 
tax breaks, non-bid government contracts, protective tariffs to old,
inefficient, industries, giving actual monopolies to certain firms 
or individuals, bailouts of corporations judged by state bureaucrats 
as too important to let fail, and so on. However, the state 
intervenes far more than that and in more subtle ways. Usually 
it does so to solve problems that arise in the course of capitalist 
development and which cannot, in general, be left to the market (at
least initially). These are designed to benefit the capitalist class as 
a whole rather than just specific individuals, companies or sectors.
<p>
These interventions have taken different forms in different times 
and include state funding for industry (e.g. military spending); the 
creation of social infrastructure too expensive for private capital 
to provide (railways, motorways); the funding of research that
companies cannot afford to undertake; protective tariffs to 
protect developing industries from more efficient international 
competition (the key to successful industrialisation as it allows 
capitalists to rip-off consumers, making them rich and increasing 
funds available for investment); giving capitalists preferential 
access to land and other natural resources; providing education to 
the general public that ensures they have the skills and attitude 
required by capitalists and the state (it is no accident that a 
key thing learned in school is how to survive boredom, being in 
a hierarchy and to do what it orders); imperialist ventures to 
create colonies or client states (or protect citizen's capital 
invested abroad) in order to create markets or get access to raw 
materials and cheap labour; government spending to stimulate 
consumer demand in the face of recession and stagnation; maintaining 
a "natural" level of unemployment that can be used to discipline 
the working class, so ensuring they produce more, for less; 
manipulating the interest rate in order to try and reduce the 
effects of the business cycle and undermine workers' gains in 
the class struggle. 
<p>
These actions, and others like it, ensures that a key role of the 
state within capitalism <i>"is essentially to socialise risk and cost, 
and to privatise power and profit."</i> Unsurprisingly, <i>"with all the 
talk about minimising the state, in the OECD countries the state 
continues to grow relative to GNP."</i> [Noam Chomsky, <b>Rogue States</b>, 
p. 189] Hence David Deleon:
<p><blockquote><i>
"Above all, the state remains an institution for the 
continuance of dominant socioeconomic relations, whether 
through such agencies as the military, the courts, politics 
or the police . . . Contemporary states have acquired . . . 
less primitive means to reinforce their property systems [than 
state violence -- which is always the means of last, often first, 
resort]. States can regulate, moderate or resolve tensions in 
the economy by preventing the bankruptcies of key corporations, 
manipulating the economy through interest rates, supporting 
hierarchical ideology through tax benefits for churches and 
schools, and other tactics. In essence, it is not a neutral 
institution; it is powerfully for the status quo. The capitalist
state, for example, is virtually a gyroscope centred in capital, 
balancing the system. If one sector of the economy earns a level 
of profit, let us say, that harms the rest of the system -- such 
as oil producers' causing public resentment and increased 
manufacturing costs -- the state may redistribute some of that 
profit through taxation, or offer encouragement to competitors."</i> 
[<i>"Anarchism on the origins and functions of the state: some
basic notes"</i>, <b>Reinventing Anarchy</b>, pp. 71-72] 
</blockquote><p>
In other words, the state acts to protect the long-term interests 
of the capitalist class as a whole (and ensure its own survival) 
by protecting the system. This role can and does clash with the 
interests of particular capitalists or even whole sections of the 
ruling class (see <a href="secB2.html#secb26">section B.2.6</a>). But this conflict does not change 
the role of the state as the property owners' policeman. Indeed, 
the state can be considered as a means for settling (in a peaceful 
and apparently independent manner) upper-class disputes over what 
to do to keep the system going.
<p>
This subsidiary role, it must be stressed, is no accident, It is 
part and parcel capitalism. Indeed, <i>"successful industrial societies 
have consistently relied on departures from market orthodoxies, while 
condemning their victims [at home and abroad] to market discipline."</i>
[Noam Chomsky, <b>World Orders, Old and New</b>, p. 113] While such state 
intervention grew greatly after the Second World War, the role of the 
state as active promoter of the capitalist class rather than just its 
passive defender as implied in capitalist ideology (i.e. as defender 
of property) has always been a feature of the system. As Kropotkin 
put it:
<p><blockquote><i>
"every State reduces the peasants and the industrial workers to a 
life of misery, by means of taxes, and through the monopolies it 
creates in favour of the landlords, the cotton lords, the railway 
magnates, the publicans, and the like . . . we need only to look 
round, to see how everywhere in Europe and America the States are 
constituting monopolies in favour of capitalists at home, and still 
more in conquered lands [which are part of their empires]."</i> 
[<b>Evolution and Environment</b>, p. 97] 
</blockquote><p>
By <i>"monopolies,"</i> it should be noted, Kropotkin meant general 
privileges and benefits rather than giving a certain firm total 
control over a market. This continues to this day by such means as,
for example, privatising industries but providing them with state 
subsidies or by (mis-labelled) "free trade" agreements which impose
protectionist measures such as intellectual property rights on the
world market. 
<p>
All this means that capitalism has rarely relied on purely economic 
power to keep the capitalists in their social position of dominance 
(either nationally, vis--vis the working class, or internationally, 
vis--vis competing foreign elites). While a "free market" capitalist 
regime in which the state reduces its intervention to simply protecting
capitalist property rights has been approximated on a few occasions, 
this is not the standard state of the system -- direct force, i.e. 
state action, almost always supplements it. 
<p>
This is most obviously the case during the birth of capitalist 
production. Then the bourgeoisie wants and uses the power of the 
state to "regulate" wages (i.e. to keep them down to such levels 
as to maximise profits and force people attend work regularly), to 
lengthen the working day and to keep the labourer dependent on wage 
labour as their own means of income (by such means as enclosing land, 
enforcing property rights on unoccupied land, and so forth). As 
capitalism is not and has never been a "natural" development in 
society, it is not surprising that more and more state intervention 
is required to keep it going (and if even this was not the case,
if force was essential to creating the system in the first place, 
the fact that it latter can survive without further direct 
intervention does not make the system any less statist). As such,
"regulation" and other forms of state intervention continue to 
be used in order to skew the market in favour of the rich and 
so force working people to sell their labour on the bosses terms. 
<p>
This form of state intervention is designed to prevent those 
greater evils which might threaten the efficiency of a capitalist
economy or the social and economic position of the bosses. It is
designed not to provide positive benefits for those subject to the
elite (although this may be a side-effect). Which brings us to the 
other kind of state intervention, the attempts by society, by means 
of the state, to protect itself against the eroding effects of the 
capitalist market system. 
<p>
Capitalism is an inherently anti-social system. By trying to treat 
labour (people) and land (the environment) as commodities, it has 
to break down communities and weaken eco-systems. This cannot but
harm those subject to it and, as a consequence, this leads to pressure 
on government to intervene to mitigate the most damaging effects of 
unrestrained capitalism. Therefore, on one side there is the historical 
movement of the market, a movement that has not inherent limit and that 
therefore threatens society's very existence. On the other there is 
society's natural propensity to defend itself, and therefore to create 
institutions for its protection. Combine this with a desire for justice
on behalf of the oppressed along with opposition to the worse inequalities 
and abuses of power and wealth and we have the potential for the state to
act to combat the worse excesses of the system in order to keep the
system as a whole going. After all, the government <i>"cannot want society 
to break up, for it would mean that it and the dominant class would be 
deprived of the sources of exploitation."</i> [Malatesta, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 25]
<p>
Needless to say, the thrust for any system of social protection 
usually comes from below, from the people most directly affected by 
the negative effects of capitalism. In the face of mass protests the 
state may be used to grant concessions to the working class in cases 
where not doing so would threaten the integrity of the system as a whole.
Thus, social struggle is the dynamic for understanding many, if not
all, of the subsidiary functions acquired by the state over the years
(this applies to pro-capitalist functions as these are usually driven
by the need to bolster the profits and power of capitalists at the 
expense of the working class).
<p>
State legislation to set the length of the working day is an obvious
example this. In the early period of capitalist development, the 
economic position of the capitalists was secure and, consequently,
the state happily ignored the lengthening working day, thus allowing 
capitalists to appropriate more surplus value from workers and increase 
the rate of profit without interference. Whatever protests erupted 
were handled by troops. Later, however, after workers began to organise
on a wider and wider scale, reducing the length of the working day became 
a key demand around which revolutionary socialist fervour was developing. 
In order to defuse this threat (and socialist revolution is the 
worst-case scenario for the capitalist), the state passed legislation 
to reduce the length of the working day. 
<p>
Initially, the state was functioning purely as the protector of the 
capitalist class, using its powers simply to defend the property of
the few against the many who used it (i.e. repressing the labour 
movement to allow the capitalists to do as they liked). In the second
period, the state was granting concessions to the working class 
to eliminate a threat to the integrity of the system as a whole.
Needless to say, once workers' struggle calmed down and their 
bargaining position reduced by the normal workings of market (see
<a href="secB4.html#secb43">section B.4.3</a>), the legislation restricting the working day was
happily ignored and became "dead laws."
<p>
This suggests that there is a continuing tension and conflict between 
the efforts to establish, maintain, and spread the "free market" and 
the efforts to protect people and society from the consequences of its 
workings. Who wins this conflict depends on the relative strength of 
those involved (as does the actual reforms agreed to). Ultimately, 
what the state concedes, it can also take back. Thus the rise and fall 
of the welfare state -- granted to stop more revolutionary change (see 
<a href="secD1.html#secd13">section D.1.3</a>), it did not fundamentally challenge the existence of wage 
labour and was useful as a means of regulating capitalism but was 
"reformed" (i.e. made worse, rather than better) when it conflicted 
with the needs of the capitalist economy and the ruling elite felt 
strong enough to do so.
<p>
Of course, this form of state intervention does not change the nature nor
role of the state as an instrument of minority power. Indeed, that nature
cannot help but shape how the state tries to implement social protection
and so if the state assumes functions it does so as much in the immediate 
interest of the capitalist class as in the interest of society in general. 
Even where it takes action under pressure from the general population or 
to try and mend the harm done by the capitalist market, its class and 
hierarchical character twists the results in ways useful primarily to 
the capitalist class or itself. This can be seen from how labour legislation 
is applied, for example. Thus even the "good" functions of the state are 
penetrated with and dominated by the state's hierarchical nature. As 
Malatesta forcefully put it: 
<p><blockquote><i>
"The basic function of government . . . is always that of oppressing 
and exploiting the masses, of defending the oppressors and the exploiters 
. . . It is true that to these basic functions . . . other functions have 
been added in the course of history . . . hardly ever has a government 
existed . . . which did not combine with its oppressive and plundering 
activities others which were useful . . . to social life. But this does 
not detract from the fact that government is by nature oppressive . . . 
and that it is in origin and by its attitude, inevitably inclined to 
defend and strengthen the dominant class; indeed it confirms and 
aggravates the position . . . [I]t is enough to understand how and why 
it carries out these functions to find the practical evidence that 
whatever governments do is always motivated by the desire to dominate, 
and is always geared to defending, extending and perpetuating its 
privileges and those of the class of which it is both the representative 
and defender."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 23-4]
</blockquote><p>
This does not mean that these reforms should be abolished (the alternative 
is often worse, as neo-liberalism shows), it simply recognises that the 
state is not a neutral body and cannot be expected to act as if it were.
Which, ironically, indicates another aspect of social protection reforms
within capitalism: they make for good PR. By appearing to care for the 
interests of those harmed by capitalism, the state can obscure it real 
nature:
<p><blockquote><i>
"A government cannot maintain itself for long without hiding its true 
nature behind a pretence of general usefulness; it cannot impose respect 
for the lives of the privileged if it does not appear to demand respect 
for all human life; it cannot impose acceptance of the privileges of the 
few if it does not pretend to be the guardian of the rights of all."</i> 
[Malatesta, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 24]
</blockquote><p>
Obviously, being an instrument of the ruling elite, the state can hardly 
be relied upon to control the system which that elite run. As we discuss 
in the <a href="secB2.html#secb23">next section</a>, even in a democracy the state is run and controlled 
by the wealthy making it unlikely that pro-people legislation will be 
introduced or enforced without substantial popular pressure. That is why
anarchists favour direct action and extra-parliamentary organising (see 
sections <a href="secJ2.html">J.2</a> and <a href="secJ5.html">J.5</a> for details). Ultimately, even basic civil liberties
and rights are the product of direct action, of <i>"mass movements among the
people"</i> to <i>"wrest these rights from the ruling classes, who would never
have consented to them voluntarily."</i> [Rocker, <b>Anarcho-Syndicalism</b>, p. 75]
<p>
Equally obviously, the ruling elite and its defenders hate any legislation 
it does not favour -- while, of course, remaining silent on its own use of
the state. As Benjamin Tucker pointed out about the "free market" capitalist 
Herbert Spencer, <i>"amid his multitudinous illustrations . . . of the evils 
of legislation, he in every instance cites some law passed ostensibly at 
least to protect labour, alleviating suffering, or promote the people's 
welfare. . . But never once does he call attention to the far more deadly 
and deep-seated evils growing out of the innumerable laws creating privilege 
and sustaining monopoly."</i> [<b>The Individualist Anarchists</b>, p. 45] 
Such hypocrisy is staggering, but all too common in the 
ranks of supporters of "free market" capitalism. 
<p>
Finally, it must be stressed that none of these subsidiary functions implies 
that capitalism can be changed through a series of piecemeal reforms into 
a benevolent system that primarily serves working class interests. To the 
contrary, these functions grow out of, and supplement, the basic role of 
the state as the protector of capitalist property and the social relations 
they generate -- i.e. the foundation of the capitalist's ability to exploit. 
Therefore reforms may modify the functioning of capitalism but they can 
never threaten its basis. 
<p>
In summary, while the level and nature of statist intervention on behalf 
of the employing classes may vary, it is always there. No matter what 
activity it conducts beyond its primary function of protecting private 
property, what subsidiary functions it takes on, the state always operates 
as an instrument of the ruling class. This applies even to those subsidiary 
functions which have been imposed on the state by the general public --
even the most popular reform will be twisted to benefit the state or
capital, if at all possible. This is not to dismiss all attempts at reform
as irrelevant, it simply means recognising that we, the oppressed, need to
rely on our own strength and organisations to improve our circumstances.

<a name="secb23"><h2>B.2.3 How does the ruling class maintain control of the state?</h2>

In some systems, it is obvious how economic dominant minorities control
the state. In feudalism, for example, the land was owned by the feudal
lords who exploited the peasantry directly. Economic and political power
were merged into the same set of hands, the landlords. Absolutism saw 
the monarch bring the feudal lords under his power and the relative
decentralised nature of feudalism was replaced by a centralised state.
<p>
It was this centralised state system which the raising bourgeoisie took 
as the model for their state. The King was replaced by a Parliament, which
was initially elected on a limited suffrage. In this initial form of 
capitalist state, it is (again) obvious how the elite maintain control 
of the state machine. As the vote was based on having a minimum amount
of property, the poor were effectively barred from having any (official) 
say in what the government did. This exclusion was theorised by 
philosophers like John Locke -- the working masses were considered to 
be an object of state policy rather than part of the body of people 
(property owners) who nominated the government. In this perspective 
the state was like a joint-stock company. The owning class were the 
share-holders who nominated the broad of directors and the mass of 
the population were the workers who had no say in determining the
management personnel and were expected to follow orders.
<p>
As would be expected, this system was mightily disliked by the 
majority who were subjected to it. Such a "classical liberal" regime 
was rule by an alien, despotic power, lacking popular legitimacy, and 
utterly unaccountable to the general population. It is quite evident 
that a government elected on a limited franchise could not be trusted 
to treat those who owned no real property with equal consideration. 
It was predictable that the ruling elite would use the state they 
controlled to further their own interests and to weaken potential 
resistance to their social, economic and political power. Which is 
precisely what they did do, while masking their power under the guise 
of "good governance" and "liberty." Moreover, limited suffrage, like 
absolutism, was considered an affront to liberty and individual dignity
by many of those subject to it.
<p>
Hence the call for universal suffrage and opposition to property 
qualifications for the franchise. For many radicals (including Marx 
and Engels) such a system would mean that the working classes would
hold <i>"political power"</i> and, consequently, be in a position to end the 
class system once and for all. Anarchists were not convinced, arguing 
that <i>"universal suffrage, considered in itself and applied in a society
based on economic and social inequality, will be nothing but a swindle
and snare for the people"</i> and <i>"the surest way to consolidate under the
mantle of liberalism and justice the permanent domination of the people
by the owning classes, to the detriment of popular liberty."</i> Consequently,
anarchists denied that it <i>"could be used by the people for the conquest 
of economic and social equality. It must always and necessarily be an
instrument hostile to the people, one which supports the <b>de facto</b>
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."</i> [Bakunin, <b>Bakunin on Anarchism</b>, 
p. 224]
<p>
Due to popular mass movements form below, the vote was won by the 
male working classes and, at a later stage, women. While the elite
fought long and hard to retain their privileged position they were
defeated. Sadly, the history of universal suffrage proven the 
anarchists right. Even allegedly <i>"democratic"</i> capitalist states are 
in effect dictatorships of the propertariat. The political history 
of modern times can be summarised by the rise of capitalist power, 
the rise, due to popular movements, of (representative) democracy 
and the continued success of the former to undermine and control 
the latter. 
<p>
This is achieved by three main processes which combine to effectively 
deter democracy. These are the wealth barrier, the bureaucracy barrier 
and, lastly, the capital barrier. Each will be discussed in turn and 
all ensure that <i>"representative democracy"</i> remains an <i>"organ of 
capitalist domination."</i> [Kropotkin, <b>Words of a Rebel</b>, p. 127]
<p>
The wealth barrier is the most obvious. It takes money to run for office.
In 1976, the total spent on the US Presidential election was $66.9 million. 
In 1984, it was $103.6 million and in 1996 it was $239.9 million. At the 
dawn of the 21st century, these figures had increased yet again. 2000 
saw $343.1 spent and 2004, $717.9 million. Most of this money was spent 
by the two main candidates. In 2000, Republican George Bush spent a 
massive $185,921,855 while his Democratic rival Al Gore spent only 
$120,031,205. Four years later, Bush spent $345,259,155 while John 
Kerry managed a mere $310,033,347. 
<p>
Other election campaigns are also enormously expensive. In 2000, the
average winning candidate for a seat in the US House of Representatives
spent $816,000 while the average willing senator spent $7 million. Even
local races require significant amounts of fundraising. One candidate
for the Illinois House raised over $650,000 while another candidate for
the Illinois Supreme Court raised $737,000. In the UK, similarly 
prohibitive amounts were spent. In the 2001 general election the 
Labour Party spent a total of 10,945,119, the Tories 12,751,813 
and the Liberal Democrats (who came a distant third) just 1,361,377.
<p>
To get this sort of money, wealthy contributors need to be found
and wooed, in other words promised that that their interests will 
be actively looked after. While, in theory, it is possible to raise 
large sums from small contributions in practice this is difficult.
To raise $1 million you need to either convince 50 millionaires to
give you $20,000 or 20,000 people to fork out $50. Given that for 
the elite $20,000 is pocket money, it is hardly surprising that 
politicians aim for winning over the few, not the many. Similarly 
with corporations and big business. It is far easier and more 
efficient in time and energy to concentrate on the wealthy few 
(whether individuals or companies). 
<p>
It is obvious: whoever pays the piper calls the tune. And in 
capitalism, this means the wealthy and business. In the US corporate 
campaign donations and policy paybacks have reached unprecedented 
proportions. The vast majority of large campaign donations are, not 
surprisingly, from corporations. Most of the wealthy individuals who 
give large donations to the candidates are CEOs and corporate board 
members. And, just to be sure, many companies give to more than one 
party. 
<p>
Unsurprisingly, corporations and the rich expect their investments 
to get a return. This can be seen from George W. Bush's administration. 
His election campaigns were beholden to the energy industry (which has 
backed him since the beginning of his career as Governor of Texas). The 
disgraced corporation Enron (and its CEO Kenneth Lay) were among Bush's 
largest contributors in 2000. Once in power, Bush backed numerous policies 
favourable to that industry (such as rolling back environmental regulation 
on a national level as he had done in Texas). His supporters in Wall Street 
were not surprised that Bush tried to privatise Social Security. Nor were 
the credit card companies when the Republicans tighten the noose on bankrupt 
people in 2005. By funding Bush, these corporations ensured that the 
government furthered their interests rather than the people who voted
in the election.
<p>
This means that as a <i>"consequence of the distribution of resources 
and decision-making power in the society at large . . . the political 
class and the cultural managers typically associate themselves with 
the sectors that dominate the private economy; they are either drawn 
directly from those sectors or expect to join them."</i> [Chomsky, <b>Necessary
Illusions</b>, p. 23] This can be seen from George W. Bush's quip at an 
elite fund-raising gala during the 2000 Presidential election: <i>"This 
is an impressive crowd -- the haves and the have-mores. Some people 
call you the elites; I call you my base."</i> Unsurprisingly: 
<p><blockquote><i>
"In the real world, state policy is largely determined by those
groups that command resources, ultimately by virtue of their ownership
and management of the private economy or their status as wealthy 
professionals. The major decision-making positions in the Executive
branch of the government are typically filled by representatives of
major corporations, banks and investment firms, a few law firms that
cater primarily to corporate interests and thus represent the broad
interests of owners and managers rather than some parochial interest
. . . The Legislative branch is more varied, but overwhelmingly, it
is drawn from the business and professional classes."</i> [Chomsky, <b>On
Power and Ideology</b>, pp. 116-7]
</blockquote><p>
That is not the only tie between politics and business. Many politicians also 
have directorships in companies, interests in companies, shares, land and 
other forms of property income and so forth. Thus they are less like the 
majority of constituents they claim to represent and more like the wealthy 
few. Combine these outside earnings with a high salary (in the UK, MP's are 
paid more than twice the national average) and politicians can be among the 
richest 1% of the population. Thus not only do we have a sharing of common 
interests the elite, the politicians are part of it. As such, they can hardly 
be said to be representative of the general public and are in a position of 
having a vested interest in legislation on property being voted on.
<p>
Some defend these second jobs and outside investments by saying that it keeps 
them in touch with the outside world and, consequently, makes them better 
politicians. That such an argument is spurious can be seen from the fact that 
such outside interests never involve working in McDonald's flipping burgers 
or working on an assembly line. For some reason, no politician seeks to get 
a feeling for what life is like for the average person. Yet, in a sense, this 
argument <b>does</b> have a point. Such jobs and income do keep politicians in 
touch with the world of the elite rather than that of the masses and, as the 
task of the state is to protect elite interests, it cannot be denied that 
this sharing of interests and income with the elite can only aid that task!
<p>
Then there is the sad process by which politicians, once they leave politics, 
get jobs in the corporate hierarchy (particularly with the very companies they 
had previously claimed to regulate on behalf of the public). This was termed 
"the revolving door."</i> Incredibly, this has changed for the worse. Now the 
highest of government officials arrive directly from the executive offices 
of powerful corporations. Lobbyists are appointed to the jobs whose occupants 
they once vied to influence. Those who regulate and those supposed to be 
regulated have become almost indistinguishable.
<p>
Thus politicians and capitalists go hand in hand. Wealth selects them, 
funds them and gives them jobs and income when in office. Finally, once 
they finally leave politics, they are often given directorships and other 
jobs in the business world. Little wonder, then, that the capitalist class 
maintains control of the state.
<p>
That is not all. The wealth barrier operates indirectly to. This takes 
many forms. The most obvious is in the ability of  corporations and the 
elite to lobby politicians. In the US, there is the pervasive power of 
Washington's army of 24,000 registered lobbyists -- and the influence of 
the corporate interests they represent. These lobbyists, whose job it
is to convince politicians to vote in certain ways to further the 
interests of their corporate clients help shape the political agenda
even further toward business interests than it already is. This Lobby
industry is immense -- and exclusively for big business and the elite.
Wealth ensures that the equal opportunity to garner resources to
share a perspective and influence the political progress is monopolised
by the few: <i>"where are the desperately needed countervailing lobbies
to represent the interests of average citizens? Where are the millions
of dollars acting in <b>their</b> interests? Alas, they are notably absent."</i>
[Joel Bakan, <b>The Corporation</b>, p. 107]
<p>
However, it cannot be denied that it is up to the general population 
to vote for politicians. This is when the indirect impact of wealth 
kicks in, namely the role of the media and the Public Relations (PR) 
industry. As we discuss in <a href="secD3.html">section D.3</a>, the modern media is dominated
by big business and, unsurprisingly, reflects their interests. This 
means that the media has an important impact on how voters see parties 
and specific politicians and candidates. A radical party will, at best, 
be ignored by the capitalist press or, at worse, subject to smears and
attacks. This will have a corresponding negative impact on their election
prospects and will involve the affected party having to invest substantially 
more time, energy and resources in countering the negative media coverage.
The PR industry has a similar effect, although that has the advantage of
not having to bother with appearing to look factual or unbiased. Add to
this the impact of elite and corporation funded <i>"think tanks"</i> and the 
political system is fatally skewed in favour of the capitalist class
(also see <a href="secD2.html">section D.2</a>).
<p>
In a nutshell: 
<p><blockquote><i>
"The business class dominates government through its ability to fund 
political campaigns, purchase high priced lobbyists and reward former 
officials with lucrative jobs . . . [Politicians] have become wholly 
dependent upon the same corporate dollars to pay for a new professional 
class of PR consultants, marketeers and social scientists who manage 
and promote causes and candidates in essentially the same manner that 
advertising campaigns sell cars, fashions, drugs and other wares."</i> 
[John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, <b>Toxic Sludge is Good for You</b>, 
p. 78]
</blockquote><p>
That is the first barrier, the direct and indirect impact of wealth.
This, in itself, is a powerful barrier to deter democracy and, as a
consequence, it is usually sufficient in itself. Yet sometimes people 
see through the media distortions and vote for reformist, even radical, 
candidates. As we discuss in <a href="secJ2.html#secj26">section J.2.6</a>, anarchists argue that the 
net effect of running for office is a general <b>de</b>-radicalising of the 
party involved. Revolutionary parties become reformist, reformist 
parties end up maintaining capitalism and introducing polities the 
opposite of which they had promised. So while it is unlikely that a 
radical party could get elected and remain radical in the process, 
it is possible. If such a party did get into office, the remaining 
two barriers kicks in: the bureaucracy barrier and the capital barrier.
<p>
The existence of a state bureaucracy is a key feature in ensuring that 
the state remains the ruling class's <i>"policeman"</i> and will be discussed 
in greater detail in section J.2.2 (<a href="secJ2.html#secj22">Why do anarchists reject voting as 
a means for change?</a>). Suffice to say, the politicians who are elected
to office are at a disadvantage as regards the state bureaucracy. The
latter is a permanent concentration of power while the former come and
go. Consequently, they are in a position to tame any rebel government 
by means of bureaucratic inertia, distorting and hiding necessary 
information and pushing its own agenda onto the politicians who are
in theory their bosses but in reality dependent on the bureaucracy.
And, needless to say, if all else fails the state bureaucracy can play 
its final hand: the military coup.
<p>
This threat has been applied in many countries, most obviously in the 
developing world (with the aid of Western, usually US, imperialism). 
The coups in Iran (1953) and Chile (1973) are just two examples of 
this process. Yet the so-called developed world is not immune to it. 
The rise of fascism in Italy, Germany, Portugal and Spain can be 
considered as variations of a military coup (particularly the last 
one where fascism was imposed by the military). Wealthy business men 
funded para-military forces to break the back of the labour movement, 
forces formed by ex-military people. Even the New Deal in America
was threatened by such a coup. [Joel Bakan, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 86-95]
While such regimes do protect the interests of capital and are, 
consequently, backed by it, they do hold problems for capitalism. 
This is because, as with the Absolutism which fostered capitalism 
in the first place, this kind of government can get ideas above its 
station This means that a military coup will only be used when the 
last barrier, the capital barrier, is used and fails. 
<p>
The capital barrier is obviously related to the wealth barrier insofar
as it relates to the power that great wealth produces. However, it is
different in how it is applied. The wealth barrier restricts who gets 
into office, the capital barrier controls whoever does so. The capital
barrier, in other words, are the economic forces that can be brought
to bear on any government which is acting in ways disliked of by the
capitalist class. 
<p>
We see their power implied when the news report that changes in 
government, policies and law have been <i>"welcomed by the markets."</i> 
As the richest 1% of households in America (about 2 million adults) 
owned 35% of the stock owned by individuals in 1992 -- with the top 
10% owning over 81% -- we can see that the <i>"opinion"</i> of the markets 
actually means the power of the richest 1-5% of a countries population 
(and their finance experts), power derived from their control over 
investment and production. Given that the bottom 90% of the US 
population has a smaller share (23%) of all kinds of investable 
capital that the richest 1/2% (who own 29%), with stock ownership 
being even more concentrated (the top 5% holding 95% of all shares), 
its obvious why Doug Henwood argues that stock markets are <i>"a way 
for the very rich as a class to own an economy's productive capital 
stock as a whole,"</i> are a source of <i>"political power"</i> and a way to 
have influence over government policy. [<b>Wall Street: Class Racket</b>]
<p>
The mechanism is simple enough. The ability of capital to disinvest 
(capital flight) and otherwise adversely impact the economy is a 
powerful weapon to keep the state as its servant. The companies and
the elite can invest at home or abroad, speculate in currency markets
and so forth. If a significant number of investors or corporations
lose confidence in a government they will simply stop investing at 
home and move their funds abroad. At home, the general population
feel the results as demand drops, layoffs increase and recession 
kicks in. As Noam Chomsky notes:
<p><blockquote><i>
"In capitalist democracy, the interests that must be satisfied are 
those of capitalists; otherwise, there is no investment, no production, 
no work, no resources to be devoted, however marginally, to the needs 
of the general population."</i> [<b>Turning the Tide</b>, p. 233] 
</blockquote><p>
This ensures the elite control of government as government policies which
private power finds unwelcome will quickly be reversed. The power which
"business confidence" has over the political system ensures that democracy
is subservient to big business. As summarised by Malatesta: 
<p><blockquote><i>
"Even with universal suffrage -- we could well say even more so with 
universal suffrage -- the government remained the bourgeoisie's servant 
and <b>gendarme.</b> For were it to be otherwise with the government hinting 
that it might take up a hostile attitude, or that democracy could ever be
anything but a pretence to deceive the people, the bourgeoisie, feeling 
its interests threatened, would by quick to react, and would use all the 
influence and force at its disposal, by reason of its wealth, to recall 
the government to its proper place as the bourgeoisie's <b>gendarme.</b>"</i> 
[<b>Anarchy</b>, p. 23]
</blockquote><p>
It is due to these barriers that the state remains an instrument of the
capitalist class while being, in theory, a democracy. Thus the state 
machine remains a tool by which the few can enrich themselves at the
expense of the many. This does not mean, of course, that the state is
immune to popular pressure. Far from it. As indicated in the 
<a href="secB2.html#secb22">last section</a>,
direct action by the oppressed can and has forced the state to implement
significant reforms. Similarly, the need to defend society against the
negative effects of unregulated capitalism can also force through 
populist measures (particularly when the alternative may be worse than
the allowing the reforms, i.e. revolution). The key is that such changes
are <b>not</b> the natural function of the state.
<p>
So due to their economic assets, the elites whose incomes are derived 
from them -- namely, finance capitalists, industrial capitalists, and 
landlords -- are able to accumulate vast wealth from those whom they 
exploit. This stratifies society into a hierarchy of economic classes, 
with a huge disparity of wealth between the small property-owning elite 
at the top and the non-property-owning majority at the bottom. Then, 
because it takes enormous wealth to win elections and lobby or bribe
legislators, the propertied elite are able to control the political
process -- and hence the state -- through the <i>"power of the purse."</i> 
In summary:
<p><blockquote><i>
"No democracy has freed itself from the rule by the well-to-do anymore
than it has freed itself from the division between the ruler and the
ruled . . . at the very least, no democracy has jeopardised the role
of business enterprise. Only the wealthy and well off can afford to
launch viable campaigns for public office and to assume such positions.
Change in government in a democracy is a circulation from one elite
group to another."</i> [Harold Barclay, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 47]
</blockquote><p>
In other words, elite control of politics through huge wealth disparities
insures the continuation of such disparities and thus the continuation of
elite control. In this way the crucial political decisions of those at
the top are insulated from significant influence by those at the bottom. 
Finally, it should be noted that these barriers do not arise accidentally.
They flow from the way the state is structured. By effectively disempowering 
the masses and centralising power into the hands of the few which make up 
the government, the very nature of the state ensures that it remains under
elite control. This is why, from the start, the capitalist class has 
favoured centralisation. We discuss this in the next two sections.
<p>
(For more on the ruling elite and its relation to the state, see C. 
Wright Mills, <b>The Power Elite</b> [Oxford, 1956]; cf. Ralph Miliband, 
<b>The State in Capitalist Society</b> [Basic Books, 1969] and <b>Divided 
Societies</b> [Oxford, 1989]; G. William Domhoff, <b>Who Rules America?</b> 
[Prentice Hall, 1967]; and <b>Who Rules America Now? A View for the 
'80s</b> [Touchstone, 1983]).

<a name="secb24"><h2>B.2.4 How does state centralisation affect freedom?</h2>

It is a common idea that voting every four or so years to elect the 
public face of a highly centralised and bureaucratic machine means 
that ordinary people control the state and, as a consequence, free. 
In reality, this is a false idea. In any system of centralised 
power the general population have little say in what affects them
and, as a result, their freedom is extremely limited.
<p>
Obviously, to say that this idea is false does not imply that there 
is no difference between a liberal republic and a fascistic or 
monarchical state. Far from it. The vote is an important victory 
wrested from the powers that be. That, of course, is not to suggest that 
anarchists think that libertarian socialism is only possible after 
universal suffrage has been won or that it is achievable via it. 
Far from it. It is simply to point out that being able to pick your 
ruler is a step forward from having one imposed upon you. Moreover, 
those considered able to pick their ruler is, logically, also able 
to do without one.
<p>
However, while the people are proclaimed to be sovereign in a 
democratic state, in reality they alienate their power and hand 
over control of their affairs to a small minority. Liberty, in other words,
is reduced to merely the possibility <i>"to pick rulers"</i> every four or
five years and whose mandate (sic!) is <i>"to legislate on any subject, 
and his decision will become law."</i> [Kropotkin, <b>Words of a Rebel</b>, 
p. 122 and p. 123] 
<p>
In other words, representative democracy is not "liberty" nor 
"self-government." It is about alienating power to a few people 
who then (mis)rule in your name. To imply it is anything else is 
nonsense. So while we get to pick a politician to govern in our 
name it does not follow that they represent those who voted for 
them in any meaningful sense. As shown time and time again, 
"representative" governments can happily ignore the opinions of 
the majority while, at the same time, verbally praising the 
"democracy" it is abusing (New Labour in the UK during the run 
up to the invasion of Iraq was a classic example of this). Given 
that politicians can do what they like for four or five years once
elected, it is clear that popular control via the ballot box
is hardly effective or even meaningful. 
<p>
Indeed, such "democracy" almost always means electing politicians 
who say one thing in opposition and do the opposite once in 
office. Politicians who, at best, ignore their election 
manifesto when it suits them or, at worse, introduce the
exact opposite. It is the kind of "democracy" in which people 
can protest in their hundreds of thousands against a policy only 
to see their "representative" government simply ignore them
(while, at the same time, seeing their representatives bend 
over backward ensuring corporate profits and power while 
speaking platitudes to the electorate and their need to tighten 
their belts). At best it can be said that democratic governments 
tend to be less oppressive than others but it does not follow that 
this equates to liberty.
<p>
State centralisation is the means to ensure 
this situation and the debasement of freedom it implies.
<p>
All forms of hierarchy, even those in which the top officers are 
elected are marked by authoritarianism and centralism. Power is 
concentrated in the centre (or at the top), which means that society 
becomes <i>"a heap 
of dust animated from without by a subordinating, centralist idea."</i> 
[P. J. Proudhon, quoted by Martin Buber, <b>Paths in Utopia</b>, p. 29] For, 
once elected, top officers can do as they please, and, as in all 
bureaucracies, many important decisions are made by non-elected staff. 
This means that the democratic state is a contradiction in terms:
<p><blockquote><i>
"In the democratic state the election of rulers by alleged majority 
vote is a subterfuge which helps individuals to believe that they 
control the situation. They are selecting persons to do a task for
them and they have no guarantee that it will be carried out as they
desired. They are abdicating to these persons, granting them the right
to impose their own wills by the threat of force. Electing individuals
to public office is like being given a limited choice of your 
oppressors . . . Parliamentary democracies are essentially oligarchies
in which the populace is led to believe that it delegates all its
authority to members of parliament to do as they think best."</i> 
[Harold Barclay, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 46-7]
</blockquote><p>
The nature of centralisation places power into the hands of the few.
Representative democracy is based on this delegation of power, with
voters electing others to govern them. This cannot help but create
a situation in which freedom is endangered -- universal suffrage 
<i>"does not prevent the formation of a body of politicians, privileged 
in fact though not in law, who, devoting themselves exclusively to 
the administration of the nation's public affairs, end by becoming 
a sort of political aristocracy or oligarchy."</i> [Bakunin, <b>The 
Political Philosophy of Bakunin</b>, p. 240]
<p>
This should not come as a surprise, for to <i>"create a state is to 
institutionalise power in a form of machine that exists <b>apart</b>
from the people. It is to professionalise rule and policy making,
to create a distinct interest (be it of bureaucrats, deputies,
commissars, legislators, the military, the police, ad nauseam)
that, however weak or however well-intentioned it may be at first,
eventually takes on a corruptive power of its own."</i> [Murray 
Bookchin, <i>"The Ecological Crisis, Socialism, and the need to
remake society,"</i> pp. 1-10, <b>Society and Nature</b>, vol. 2,
no. 3, p. 7]
<p>
Centralism makes democracy meaningless, as political decision-making is
given over to professional politicians in remote capitals. Lacking local
autonomy, people are isolated from each other (atomised) by having no
political forum where they can come together to discuss, debate, and
decide among themselves the issues they consider important. Elections
are not based on natural, decentralised groupings and thus cease to be
relevant. The individual is just another "voter" in the mass, a political
"constituent" and nothing more. The amorphous basis of modern, statist
elections <i>"aims at nothing less than to abolish political life in towns,
communes and departments, and through this destruction of all municipal
and regional autonomy to arrest the development of universal suffrage."</i>
[Proudhon, quoted by Martin Buber, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 29] 
<p>
Thus people are disempowered by the very structures that claim to allow 
them to express themselves. To quote Proudhon again, in the centralised 
state <i>"the citizen divests himself of sovereignty, the town and the 
Department and province above it, absorbed by central authority, are 
no longer anything but agencies under direct ministerial control."</i> He 
continues:
<p><blockquote><i>
"The Consequences soon make themselves felt: the citizen and the
town are deprived of all dignity, the state's depredations multiply,
and the burden on the taxpayer increases in proportion. It is no
longer the government that is made for the people; it is the people
who are made for the government. Power invades everything, dominates
everything, absorbs everything."</i> [<b>The Principle of Federation</b>, p. 59]
</blockquote><p>
As intended, as isolated people are no threat to the powers that be. 
This process of marginalisation can be seen from American history, 
for example, when town meetings were replaced by elected bodies, 
with the citizens being placed in passive, spectator roles as mere 
"voters" (see <a href="secB2.html#secb25">next section</a>). Being an atomised voter is hardly an 
ideal notion of "freedom," despite the rhetoric of politicians about 
the virtues of a "free society" and "The Free World" -- as if voting 
once every four or five years could ever be classed as "liberty" or 
even "democracy." 
<p>
Marginalisation of the people is the key control mechanism in the 
state and authoritarian organisations in general. Considering the 
European Community (EC), for example, we find that the <i>"mechanism 
for decision-making between EC states leaves power in the hands of 
officials (from Interior ministries, police, immigration, customs 
and security services) through a myriad of working groups. Senior 
officials . . . play a critical role in ensuring agreements between 
the different state officials. The EC Summit meetings, comprising the 
12 Prime Ministers, simply rubber-stamp the conclusions agreed by the
Interior and Justice Ministers. It is only then, in this intergovernmental 
process, that parliaments and people are informed (and them only with the 
barest details)."</i> [Tony Bunyon, <b>Statewatching the New Europe</b>, p. 39]
<p>
As well as economic pressures from elites, governments also face pressures 
within the state itself due to the bureaucracy that comes with centralism. 
There is a difference between the state and government. The state is the 
permanent collection of institutions that have entrenched power structures 
and interests. The government is made up of various politicians. It's the 
institutions that have power in the state due to their permanence, not the 
representatives who come and go. As Clive Ponting (an ex-civil servant 
himself) indicates, <i>"the function of a political system in any country . . . 
is to regulate, but not to alter radically, the existing economic structure 
and its linked power relationships. The great illusion of politics is that 
politicians have the ability to make whatever changes they like."</i>
[quoted in <b>Alternatives</b>, no.5, p. 19]
<p> 
Therefore, as well as marginalising the people, the state also ends up
marginalising "our" representatives. As power rests not in the elected
bodies, but in a bureaucracy, popular control becomes increasingly
meaningless. As Bakunin pointed out, <i>"liberty can be valid only
when . . . [popular] control [of the state] is valid. On the contrary, 
where such control is fictitious, this freedom of the people likewise 
becomes a mere fiction."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 212] State centralisation ensures
that popular control is meaningless.
<p>
This means that state centralism can become a serious source of danger
to the liberty and well-being of most of the people under it. <i>"The
bourgeois republicans,"</i> argued Bakunin, <i>"do not yet grasp this simple
truth, demonstrated by the experience of all times and in all lands,
that every organised power standing above and over the people necessarily
excludes the freedom of peoples. The political state has no other purpose
than to protect and perpetuate the exploitation of the labour of the 
proletariat by the economically dominant classes, and in so doing the
state places itself against the freedom of the people."</i> [<b>Bakunin on
Anarchism</b>, p. 416] 
<p>
Unsurprisingly, therefore, <i>"whatever progress that has been made 
. . . on various issues, whatever things have been done for people,
whatever human rights have been gained, have not been gained through
the calm deliberations of Congress or the wisdom of presidents or
the ingenious decisions of the Supreme Court. Whatever progress has
been made . . . has come because of the actions of ordinary people,
of citizens, of social movements. Not from the Constitution."</i> That
document has been happily ignored by the official of the state when
it suits them. An obvious example is the 14th Amendment of the US
Constitution, which <i>"didn't have any meaning until black people 
rose up in the 1950s and 1960s in the South in mass movements . . .
They made whatever words there were in the Constitution and the 14th
Amendment have some meaning for the first time."</i> [Howard Zinn,
<b>Failure to Quit</b>, p. 69 and p. 73]
<p>
This is because the <i>"fact that you have got a constitutional right
doesn't mean you're going to get that right. Who has the power on
the spot? The policeman on the street. The principal in the school.
The employer on job. The Constitution does not cover private 
employment. In other words, the Constitution does not cover most
of reality."</i> Thus our liberty is not determined by the laws of 
the state. Rather <i>"the source and solution of our civil liberties
problems are in the situations of every day . . . Our actual 
freedom is determined not by the Constitution or the Court,
but by the power the policeman has over us on the street or that
of the local judge behind him; by the authority of our employers;
. . . by the welfare bureaucrats if we are poor; . . . by landlords
if we are tenants."</i> Thus freedom and justice <i>"are determined by 
power and money"</i> rather than laws. This points to the importance
of popular participation, of social movements, for what those do
are <i>"to create a countervailing power to the policeman with a club 
and a gun. That's essentially what movements do: They create 
countervailing powers to counter the power which is much more 
important than what is written down in the Constitution or the 
laws."</i> [Zinn, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 84-5, pp. 54-5 and p. 79]
<p>
It is precisely this kind of mass participation that centralisation
kills. Under centralism, social concern and power are taken away from 
ordinary citizens and centralised in the hands of the few. This results
in any formally guaranteed liberties being effectively ignored when 
people want to use them, if the powers at be so decide. Ultimately,
isolated individuals facing the might of a centralised state machine
are in a weak position. Which is way the state does what it can to
undermine such popular movements and organisations (going so far as
to violate its own laws to do so).
<p>
As should be obvious, by centralisation anarchists do not mean simply a
territorial centralisation of power in a specific central location (such
as in a nation state where power rests in a central government located in 
a specific place). We also mean the centralisation of <b>power</b> into a few 
hands. Thus we can have a system like feudalism which is territorially 
decentralised (i.e. made up on numerous feudal lords without a strong 
central state) while having power centralised in a few hands locally 
(i.e. power rests in the hands of the feudal lords, not in the general 
population). Or, to use another example, we can have a laissez-faire 
capitalist system which has a weak central authority but is made up of a 
multitude of autocratic workplaces. As such, getting rid of the central 
power (say the central state in capitalism or the monarch in absolutism) 
while retaining the local authoritarian institutions (say capitalist 
firms and feudal landlords) would not ensure freedom. Equally, the
abolition of local authorities may simply result in the strengthening
of central power and a corresponding weakening of freedom. 

<a name="secb25"><h2>B.2.5 Who benefits from centralisation?</h2>

No social system would exist unless it benefited someone or some group.
Centralisation, be it in the state or the company, is no different. In
all cases, centralisation directly benefits those at the top, because it
shelters them from those who are below, allowing the latter to be
controlled and governed more effectively. Therefore, it is in the direct
interests of bureaucrats and politicians to support centralism. 
<p>
Under capitalism, however, various sections of the business class also
support state centralism. This is the symbiotic relationship between
capital and the state. As will be discussed later (in 
<a href="secF8.html">section F.8</a>), the 
state played an important role in "nationalising" the market, i.e. forcing 
the "free market" onto society. By centralising power in the hands of
representatives and so creating a state bureaucracy, ordinary people were
disempowered and thus became less likely to interfere with the interests
of the wealthy. <i>"In a republic,"</i> writes Bakunin, <i>"the so-called people,
the legal people, allegedly represented by the State, stifle and will keep
on stifling the actual and living people"</i> by <i>"the bureaucratic world"</i> for
<i>"the greater benefit of the privileged propertied classes as well as for
its own benefit."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 211]
<p> 
Examples of increased political centralisation being promoted by
wealthy business interests by can be seen throughout the history of
capitalism. <i>"In revolutionary America, 'the nature of city government
came in for heated discussion,' observes Merril Jensen . . . Town 
meetings . . . 'had been a focal point of revolutionary activity'. 
The anti-democratic reaction that set in after the American revolution 
was marked by efforts to do away with town meeting government . . . 
Attempts by conservative elements were made to establish a 'corporate 
form (of municipal government) whereby the towns would be governed by 
mayors and councils' elected from urban wards . . . [T]he merchants 
'backed incorporation consistently in their efforts to escape town 
meetings.'"</i> [Murray Bookchin, <b>Towards an Ecological Society</b>, 
p. 182]
<p>
Here we see local policy making being taken out of the hands of the many 
and centralised in the hands of the few (who are always the wealthy). 
France provides another example: 
<p><blockquote><i>
"The Government found. . .the folkmotes [of all households] 'too noisy', 
too disobedient, and in 1787, elected councils, composed of a mayor and 
three to six syndics, chosen among the wealthier peasants, were
introduced instead."</i> [Peter Kropotkin, <b>Mutual Aid</b>, pp. 185-186]
</blockquote><p>
This was part of a general movement to disempower the working class
by centralising decision making power into the hands of the few (as
in the American revolution). Kropotkin indicates the process at work:
<p><blockquote><i>
"[T]he middle classes, who had until then had sought the support of
the people, in order to obtain constitutional laws and to dominate
the higher nobility, were going, now that they had seen and felt
the strength of the people, to do all they could to dominate the
people, to disarm them and to drive them back into subjection.
<p>
[. . .]
<p>
"[T]hey made haste to legislate in such a way that the political
power which was slipping out of the hand of the Court should
not fall into the hands of the people. Thus . . . [it was]
proposed . . . to divide the French into two classes, of which
one only, the <b>active</b> citizens, should take part in the
government, whilst the other, comprising the great mass of the
people under the name of <b>passive</b> citizens, should be deprived
of all political rights . . . [T]he [National] Assembly divided 
France into departments . . . always maintaining the principle of 
excluding the poorer classes from the Government . . . [T]hey 
excluded from the primary assemblies the mass of the people . . . 
who could no longer take part in the primary assemblies, and
accordingly had no right to nominate the electors [who chose 
representatives to the National Assembly], or the municipality,
or any of the local authorities . . .
<p>
"And finally, the <b>permanence</b> of the electoral assemblies was
interdicted. Once the middle-class governors were appointed,
these assemblies were not to meet again. Once the middle-class
governors were appointed, they must not be controlled too
strictly. Soon the right even of petitioning and of passing
resolutions was taken away -- 'Vote and hold your tongue!'
<p>
"As to the villages . . . the general assembly of the 
inhabitants . . . [to which] belonged the administration
of the affairs of the commune . . . were forbidden by the
. . . law. Henceforth only the well-to-do peasants, the
<b>active</b> citizens, had the right to meet, <b>once a year</b>,
to nominate the mayor and the municipality, composed of
three or four middle-class men of the village.
<p>
"A similar municipal organisation was given to the towns. . .
<p>
"[Thus] the middle classes surrounded themselves with every 
precaution in order to keep the municipal power in the hands 
of the well-to-do members of the community."</i> [<b>The Great French
Revolution</b>, vol. 1, pp. 179-186]
</blockquote><p>
Thus centralisation aimed to take power away from the mass of
the people and give it to the wealthy. The power of the people
rested in popular assemblies, such as the <i>"Sections"</i> and <i>"Districts"</i>
of Paris (expressing, in Kropotkin's words, <i>"the principles of
anarchism"</i> and <i>"practising . . . Direct Self-Government"</i> [<b>Op. 
Cit.</b>, p. 204 and p. 203]) and village assemblies. However,
the National Assembly <i>"tried all it could to lessen the power
of the districts . . . [and] put an end to those hotbeds of
Revolution . . . [by allowing] <b>active</b> citizens only . . . 
to take part in the electoral and administrative assemblies."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 211] Thus the <i>"central government was steadily 
endeavouring to subject the sections to its authority"</i> with 
the state <i>"seeking to centralise everything in its own hands 
. . . [I]ts depriving the popular organisations . . . all 
. . . administrative functions . . . and its subjecting
them to its bureaucracy in police matters, meant the death
of the sections."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, vol. 2, p. 549 and p. 552]
<p>
As can be seen, both the French and American revolutions saw
a similar process by which the wealthy centralised power into
their own hands (volume one of Murray Bookchin's <b>The Third 
Revolution</b> discusses the French and American revolutions in 
some detail). This ensured that working class people (i.e.
the majority) were excluded from the decision making process
and subject to the laws and power of a few. Which, of course,
benefits the minority class whose representatives have that
power. This was the rationale for the centralisation of power 
in every revolution. Whether it was the American, French or
Russian, the centralisation of power was the means to exclude
the many from participating in the decisions that affected
them and their communities. 
<p>
For example, the founding fathers of the American State were 
quite explicit on the need for centralisation for precisely 
this reason. For James Madison the key worry was when the 
<i>"majority"</i> gained control of <i>"popular government"</i> and was 
in a position to <i>"sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest 
both the public good and the rights of other citizens."</i> Thus 
the <i>"public good"</i> escaped the <i>"majority"</i> nor was it, as you 
would think, what the public thought of as good (for some 
reason left unexplained, Madison considered the majority able
to pick those who <b>could</b> identify the public good). To safeguard 
against this, he advocated a republic rather than a democracy 
in which the citizens <i>"assemble and administer the government 
in person . . . have ever been found incompatible with personal 
security or the rights of property."</i> He, of course, took it for 
granted that <i>"[t]hose who hold and those who are without property 
have ever formed distinct interests in society."</i> His schema was
to ensure that private property was defended and, as a consequence,
the interests of those who held protected. Hence the need for 
<i>"the delegation of the government . . . to a small number of 
citizens elected by the rest."</i> This centralisation of power 
into a few hands locally was matched by a territorial centralisation
for the same reason. Madison favoured <i>"a large over a small 
republic"</i> as a <i>"rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts,
for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or
wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of
the Union than a particular member of it."</i> [contained in <b>Voices
of a People's History of the United States</b>, Howard Zinn and 
Anthony Arnove (eds.), pp. 109-113] This desire to have a formal
democracy, where the masses are mere spectators of events rather
than participants, is a recurring theme in capitalism (see the 
chapter <i>"Force and Opinion"</i> in Noam Chomsky's <b>Deterring Democracy</b> 
for a good overview).
<p>
On the federal and state levels in the US after the Revolution,
centralisation of power was encouraged, since <i>"most of the makers 
of the Constitution had some direct economic interest in establishing 
a strong federal government."</i> Needless to say, while the rich elite
were well represented in formulating the principles of the new order,
four groups were not: <i>"slaves, indentured servants, women, men without
property."</i> Needless to say, the new state and its constitution did not 
reflect their interests. Given that these were the vast majority, 
<i>"there was not only a positive need for strong central government 
to protect the large economic interests, but also immediate fear
of rebellion by discontented farmers."</i> [Howard Zinn, <b>A People's 
History of the United States</b>, p. 90] The chief event was Shay's
Rebellion in western Massachusetts. There the new Constitution had
raised property qualifications for voting and, therefore, no one 
could hold state office without being wealthy. The new state was
formed to combat such rebellions, to protect the wealthy few against
the many.
<p>
Moreover, state centralisation, the exclusion of popular participation, 
was essential to mould US society into one dominated by capitalism:
<p><blockquote><i>
"In the thirty years leading up to the Civil War, the law was 
increasingly interpreted in the courts to suit capitalist development.
Studying this, Morton Horwitz (<b>The Transformation of American Law</b>)
points out that the English common-law was no longer holy when it 
stood in the way of business growth . . . Judgements for damages 
against businessmen were taken out of the hands of juries, which 
were unpredictable, and given to judges . . . The ancient idea of 
a fair price for goods gave way in the courts to the idea of caveat 
emptor (let the buyer beware) . . . contract law was intended to 
discriminate against working people and for business . . . The 
pretence of the law was that a worker and a railroad made a contract
with equal bargaining power . . . 'The circle was completed; the law 
had come simply to ratify those forms of inequality that the market 
system had produced.'"</i> [Zinn, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 234]
</blockquote><p>
The US state was created on elitist liberal doctrine and actively aimed
to reduce democratic tendencies (in the name of "individual liberty"). 
What happened in practice (unsurprisingly enough) was that the wealthy 
elite used the state to undermine popular culture and common right in 
favour of protecting and extending their own interests and power. In 
the process, US society was reformed in their own image:
<p><blockquote><i>
"By the middle of the nineteenth century the legal system had been 
reshaped to the advantage of men of commerce and industry at the 
expense of farmers, workers, consumers, and other less powerful groups 
in society. . . it actively promoted a legal distribution of wealth 
against the weakest groups in society."</i> [Morton Horwitz, quoted by 
Zinn, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 235]
</blockquote><p>
In more modern times, state centralisation and expansion has gone hand in
glove with rapid industrialisation and the growth of business. As Edward
Herman points out, <i>"[t]o a great extent, it was the growth in business
size and power that elicited the countervailing emergence of unions and 
the growth of government. Bigness <b>beyond</b> business was to a large extent
a response to bigness <b>in</b> business."</i> [<b>Corporate Control, Corporate 
Power</b>, p. 188 -- see also, Stephen Skowronek, <b>Building A New American 
State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920</b>]
State centralisation was required to produce bigger, well-defined markets 
and was supported by business when it acted in their interests (i.e. as
markets expanded, so did the state in order to standardise and enforce
property laws and so on). On the other hand, this development towards
"big government" created an environment in which big business could grow 
(often encouraged by the state by subsidies and protectionism - as would be 
expected when the state is run by the wealthy) as well as further removing
state power from influence by the masses and placing it more firmly in
the hands of the wealthy. It is little wonder we see such developments, 
for <i>"[s]tructures of governance tend to coalesce around domestic power, 
in the last few centuries, economic power."</i> [Noam Chomsky, <b>World Orders, 
Old and New</b>, p. 178]
<p>
State centralisation makes it easier for business to control government,
ensuring that it remains their puppet and to influence the political
process. For example, the European Round Table (ERT) <i>"an elite lobby group
of . . . chairmen or chief executives of large multi-nationals based mainly
in the EU . . . [with] 11 of the 20 largest European companies [with]
combined sales [in 1991] . . . exceeding $500 billion, . . . approximately
60 per cent of EU industrial production,"</i> makes much use of the EU. As
two researchers who have studied this body note, the ERT <i>"is adept at
lobbying . . . so that many ERT proposals and 'visions' are mysteriously
regurgitated in Commission summit documents."</i> The ERT <i>"claims that 
the labour market should be more 'flexible,' arguing for more
flexible hours, seasonal contracts, job sharing and part time work. In
December 1993, seven years after the ERT made its suggestions [and 
after most states had agreed to the Maastricht Treaty and its "social
chapter"], the European Commission published a white paper . . .
[proposing] making labour markets in Europe more flexible."</i> [Doherty 
and Hoedeman, <i>"Knights of the Road,"</i> <b>New Statesman</b>, 4/11/94, p. 27]
<p>
The current talk of globalisation, NAFTA, and the Single European Market
indicates an underlying transformation in which state growth follows the
path cut by economic growth. Simply put, with the growth of transnational
corporations and global finance markets, the bounds of the nation-state
have been made economically redundant. As companies have expanded into
multi-nationals, so the pressure has mounted for states to follow suit and
rationalise their markets across <i>"nations"</i> by creating multi-state
agreements and unions.
<p>
As Noam Chomsky notes, G7, the IMF, the World Bank and so forth are a <i>"de
facto world government,"</i> and <i>"the institutions of the transnational state
largely serve other masters [than the people], as state power typically
does; in this case the rising transnational corporations in the domains of
finance and other services, manufacturing, media and communications."</i> [<b>Op.
Cit.</b>, p. 179] 
<p>
As multi-nationals grow and develop, breaking through national boundaries, 
a corresponding growth in statism is required. Moreover, a <i>"particularly 
valuable feature of the rising de facto governing institutions is their 
immunity from popular influence, even awareness. They operate in secret, 
creating a world subordinated to the needs of investors, with the public 
'put in its place', the threat of democracy reduced"</i> [Chomsky, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 178].
<p>
This does not mean that capitalists desire state centralisation for
everything. Often, particularly for social issues, relative
decentralisation is often preferred (i.e. power is given to local
bureaucrats) in order to increase business control over them. By 
devolving control to local areas, the power which large corporations, 
investment firms and the like have over the local government increases 
proportionally. In addition, even middle-sized enterprise can join in 
and influence, constrain or directly control local policies and set 
one workforce against another. Private power can ensure that <i>"freedom"</i> 
is safe, <b>their</b> freedom.
<p>
No matter which set of bureaucrats are selected, the need to centralise
social power, thus marginalising the population, is of prime importance 
to the business class. It is also important to remember that capitalist 
opposition to <i>"big government"</i> is often financial, as the state feeds 
off the available social surplus, so reducing the amount left for the 
market to distribute to the various capitals in competition. 
<p>
In reality, what capitalists object to about "big government" is its 
spending on social programs designed to benefit the poor and working 
class, an "illegitimate" function which "wastes" part of the surplus 
that might go to capital (and also makes people less desperate and 
so less willing to work cheaply). Hence the constant push to reduce 
the state to its "classical" role as protector of private property 
and the system, and little else. Other than their specious quarrel 
with the welfare state, capitalists are the staunchest supports of 
government (and the "correct" form of state intervention, such as 
defence spending), as evidenced by the fact that funds can always 
be found to build more prisons and send troops abroad to advance 
ruling-class interests, even as politicians are crying that there 
is "no money" in the treasury for scholarships, national health care, 
or welfare for the poor. 
<p>
State centralisation ensures that <i>"as much as the equalitarian principles 
have been embodied in its political constitutions, it is the bourgeoisie 
that governs, and it is the people, the workers, peasants included, 
who obey the laws made by the bourgeoisie"</i> who <i>"has in fact if not 
by right the exclusive privilege of governing."</i> This means that 
<i>"political equality . . . is only a puerile fiction, an utter lie."</i> 
It takes a great deal of faith to assume that the rich, <i>"being so far
removed from the people by the conditions of its economic and social
existence"</i> can <i>"give expression in the government and in the laws, to
the feelings, the ideas, and the will of the people."</i> Unsurprisingly,
we find that <i>"in legislation as well as in carrying on the government,
the bourgeoisie is guided by its own interests and its own instincts
without concerning itself much with the interests of the people."</i> So
while <i>"on election days even the proudest bourgeois who have any 
political ambitions are forced to court . . . The Sovereign People."</i>
But on the <i>"day after the elections every one goes back to their 
daily business"</i> and the politicians are given carte blanche to rule
in the name of the people they claim to represent."</i> [Bakunin, 
<b>The Political Philosophy of Bakunin</b>, p. 218 and p. 219]

<a name="secb26"><h2>B.2.6 Can the state be an independent power within society?</h2>

Yes it can. Given the power of the state machine, it would be hard 
to believe that it could always be simply a tool for the economically 
dominant minority in a society. Given its structure and powers, it 
can use them to further its own interests. Indeed, in some circumstances 
it can be the ruling class itself.
<p>
However, in normal times the state is, as we discussed in 
<a href="secB2.html#secb21">section B.2.1</a>,
a tool of the capitalist class. This, it must be stressed, does not mean 
that they always see <i>"eye to eye."</i> Top politicians, for example, are part 
of the ruling elite, but they are in competition with other parts of it. 
In addition, different sectors of the capitalist class are competing 
against each other for profits, political influence, privileges, etc. 
The bourgeoisie, argued Malatesta, <i>"are always at war among themselves 
. . . Thus the games of the swings, the manoeuvres, the concessions 
and withdrawals, the attempts to find allies among the people against 
the conservatives, and among the conservatives against the people."</i> 
[<b>Anarchy</b>, p. 25] This means that different sections of the ruling class
will cluster around different parties, depending on their interests, and
these parties will seek to gain power to further those interests. This
may bring them into conflict with other sections of the capitalist class.
The state is the means by which these conflicts can be resolved.
<p>
Given that the role of the state is to ensure the best conditions for 
capital <b>as a whole,</b> this means that, when necessary, it can and does 
work against the interests of certain parts of the capitalist class. 
To carry out this function the state needs to be above individual
capitalists or companies. This is what can give the state the 
appearance of being a neutral social institution and can fool 
people into thinking that it represents the interests of society 
as a whole. Yet this sometime neutrality with regards to individual
capitalist companies exists only as an expression of its role as an 
instrument of capital in general. Moreover, without the tax money 
from successful businesses the state would be weakened and so the 
state is in competition with capitalists for the surplus value 
produced by the working class. Hence the anti-state rhetoric of big
business which can fool those unaware of the hand-in-glove nature of
modern capitalism to the state. 
<p>
As Chomsky notes:
<p><blockquote><i>
"There has always been a kind of love-hate relationship between 
business interests and the capitalist state. On the one hand, 
business wants a powerful state to regulate disorderly markets,
provide services and subsidies to business, enhance and protect
access to foreign markets and resources, and so on. On the other
hand, business does not want a powerful competitor, in particular,
one that might respond to different interests, popular interests,
and conduct policies with a redistributive effect, with regard to
income or power."</i> [<b>Turning the Tide</b>, p. 211]
</blockquote><p>
As such, the state is often in conflict with sections of the capitalist 
class, just as sections of that class use the state to advance their own 
interests within the general framework of protecting the capitalist system 
(i.e. the interests of the ruling class <b>as a class</b>). The state's role
is to resolve such disputes within that class peacefully. Under modern 
capitalism, this is usually done via the <i>"democratic"</i> process (within
which we get the chance of picking the representatives of the elite who
will oppress us least).
<p>
Such conflicts sometimes give the impression of the state being a 
"neutral" body, but this is an illusion -- it exists to defend class 
power and privilege -- but exactly which class it defends can change.
While recognising that the state protects the power and position 
of the economically dominant class within a society anarchists 
also argue that the state has, due to its hierarchical nature, 
interests of its own. Thus it cannot be considered as simply 
the tool of the economically dominant class in society. States have
their own dynamics, due to their structure, which generate their 
own classes and class interests and privileges (and which allows 
them to escape from the control of the economic ruling class and 
pursue their own interests, to a greater or lesser degree). As
Malatesta put it <i>"the government, though springing from the 
bourgeoisie and its servant and protector, tends, as with every 
servant and every protector, to achieve its own emancipation
and to dominate whoever it protects."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 25] 
<p>
Thus, even in a class system like capitalism, the state can act 
independently of the ruling elite and, potentially, act against 
their interests. As part of its role is to mediate between individual
capitalists/corporations, it needs sufficient power to tame them
and this requires the state to have some independence from the 
class whose interests it, in general, defends. And such independence 
can be used to further its own interests, even to the detriment of 
the capitalist class, if the circumstances allow. If the capitalist
class is weak or divided then the state can be in a position to 
exercise its autonomy vis--vis the economically dominant elite,
using against the capitalists as a whole the tools it usually
applies to them individually to further its own interests and 
powers.
<p>
This means that the state it not just <i>"the guardian of capital"</i> for 
it <i>"has a vitality of its own and constitutes . . . a veritable 
social class apart from other classes . . . ; and this class has 
its own particular parasitical and usurious interests, in conflict 
with those of the rest of the collectivity which the State itself 
claims to represent . . . The State, being the depository of 
society's greatest physical and material force, has too much power 
in its hands to resign itself to being no more than the capitalists' 
guard dog."</i> [Luigi Fabbri, quoted by David Berry, <b>A History of the 
French Anarchist Movement, 1917-1945</b>, p. 39]
<p>
Therefore the state machine (and structure), while its modern 
form is intrinsically linked to capitalism, cannot be seen as
being a tool usable by the majority. This is because the <i>"State,
any State -- even when it dresses-up in the most liberal and
democratic form -- is essentially based on domination, and
upon violence, that is upon despotism -- a concealed but no
less dangerous despotism."</i> The State <i>"denotes power, authority, 
domination; it presupposes inequality in fact."</i> [<b>The Political 
Philosophy of Michael Bakunin</b>, p. 211 and p. 240] The state,
therefore, has its own specific logic, its own priorities and
its own momentum. It constitutes its own locus of power which
is not merely a derivative of economic class power. Consequently, 
the state can be beyond the control of the economically dominant 
class and it need not reflect economic relations. 
<p>
This is due to its hierarchical and centralised nature, which
empowers the few who control the state machine -- <i>"[e]very
state power, every government, by its nature places itself
outside and over the people and inevitably subordinates
them to an organisation and to aims which are foreign to
and opposed to the real needs and aspirations of the people."</i> 
If <i>"the whole proletariat . . . [are] members of the government 
. . . there will be no government, no state, but, if there is 
to be a state there will be those who are ruled and those who 
are slaves."</i> [<b>Bakunin on Anarchism</b>, p. 328 and p. 330] 
<p>
In other words, the state bureaucracy is itself directly an 
oppressor and can exist independently of an economically
dominant class. In Bakunin's prophetic words:
<p><blockquote><i>
"What have we seen throughout history? The State has always
been the patrimony of some privileged class: the sacerdotal
class, the nobility, the bourgeoisie -- and finally, when
all other classes have exhausted themselves, the class of
the bureaucracy enters the stage and then the State falls,
or rises, if you please, to the position of a machine."</i>
[<b>The Political Philosophy of Michael Bakunin</b>, p. 208]
</blockquote><p>
This is unsurprising. For anarchists, <i>"the State organisation 
. . . [is] the force to which minorities resorted for establishing and 
organising their power over the masses."</i> It does not imply that these
minorities need to be the economically dominant class in a society.
The state is <i>"a superstructure built to the advantage of Landlordism, 
Capitalism, and Officialism."</i> [<b>Evolution and Environment</b>, p. 82 and
p. 105] Consequently, we cannot assume that abolishing one or even two 
of this unholy trinity will result in freedom nor that all three share
exactly the same interests or power in relation to the others. Thus,
in some situations, the landlord class can promote its interests over
those of the capitalist class (and vice versa) while the state 
bureaucracy can grow at the expense of both.
<p>
As such, it is important to stress that the minority whose interests 
the state defends need not be an economically dominant one (although 
it usually is). Under some circumstances a priesthood can be a ruling 
class, as can a military group or a bureaucracy. This means that the 
state can also effectively <b>replace</b> the economically dominant elite
as the exploiting class. This is because anarchists view the state as 
having (class) interests of its own. 
<p>
As we discuss in more detail in <a href="secH3.html#sech39">section H.3.9</a>, 
the state cannot be 
considered as merely an instrument of (economic) class rule. History 
has shown numerous societies were the state <b>itself</b> was the ruling 
class and where no other dominant economic class existed. The 
experience of Soviet Russia indicates the validity of this analysis. 
The reality of the Russian Revolution contrasted starkly with the 
Marxist claim that a state was simply an instrument of class rule 
and, consequently, the working class needed to build its own state 
within which to rule society. Rather than being an instrument by 
which working class people could run and transform society in their 
own interests, the new state created by the Russian Revolution soon 
became a power over the class it claimed to represent (see sections 
<a href="secH3.html#sech315">H.3.15</a> and 
<a href="secH3.html#sech316">H.3.16</a> for more on this). The working class was exploited 
and dominated by the new state and its bureaucracy rather than by 
the capitalist class as previously. This did not happen by chance. 
As we discuss in <a href="secH3.html#sech37">section H.3.7</a>, 
the state has evolved certain 
characteristics (such as centralisation, delegated power and so on) 
which ensure its task as enforcer of minority rule is achieved. 
Keeping those characteristics will inevitably mean keeping the 
task they were created to serve.
<p>
Thus, to summarise, the state's role is to repress the individual 
and the working class as a whole in the interests of economically 
dominant minorities/classes and in its own interests. It is <i>"a 
society for mutual insurance between the landlord, the military 
commander, the judge, the priest, and later on the capitalist, in 
order to support such other's authority over the people, and for 
exploiting the poverty of the masses and getting rich themselves."</i> 
Such was the <i>"origin of the State; such was its history; and such 
is its present essence."</i> [Kropotkin, <b>Evolution and Environment</b>, 
p. 94] 
<p>
So while the state is an instrument of class rule it does <b>not</b> 
automatically mean that it does not clash with sections of the class 
it represents nor that it has to be the tool of an economically 
dominant class. One thing is sure, however. The state is not a
suitable tool for securing the emancipation of the oppressed. 

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