File: secF2.html

package info (click to toggle)
anarchism 11.7-1
links: PTS
area: main
in suites: etch, etch-m68k, lenny
size: 19,196 kB
ctags: 601
sloc: makefile: 38
file content (767 lines) | stat: -rw-r--r-- 49,970 bytes
<html>
<head>
<title>F.2 What do "anarcho"-capitalists mean by "freedom"?
</title>
</head>

<h1>F.2 What do "anarcho"-capitalists mean by "freedom"?</h1>

For "anarcho"-capitalists, the concept of freedom is limited to the idea
of <i>"freedom from."</i>  For them, freedom means simply freedom from the
<i>"initiation of force,"</i> or the <i>"non-aggression against anyone's person and
property."</i> [Murray Rothbard, <b>For a New Liberty</b>, p. 23] The notion that
real freedom must combine both freedom <i>"to"</i> <b>and</b> freedom <i>"from"</i> is
missing in their ideology, as is the social context of the so-called
freedom they defend.
<p>
Before starting, it is useful to quote Alan Haworth when he notes that
<i>"[i]n fact, it is surprising how <b>little</b> close attention the concept 
of freedom receives from libertarian writers. Once again <b>Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia</b> is a case in point. The word 'freedom' doesn't 
even appear in the index. The word 'liberty' appears, but only to 
refer the reader to the 'Wilt Chamberlain' passage. In a supposedly 
'libertarian' work, this is more than surprising. It is truly 
remarkable."</i> [<b>Anti-Libertarianism</b>, p. 95] 
<p>
Why this is the case can be seen from how the "anarcho"-capitalist 
defines freedom.
<p>
In a right-libertarian or "anarcho"-capitalist society, freedom is
considered to be a product of property. As Murray Rothbard puts it, <i>"the
libertarian defines the concept of 'freedom' or 'liberty'. . .[as a]
condition in which a person's ownership rights in his body and his
legitimate material property rights are not invaded, are not aggressed
against. . . . Freedom and unrestricted property rights go hand in hand."</i>
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p.41]
<p>
This definition has some problems, however. In such a society, one cannot
(legitimately) do anything with or on another's property if the owner
prohibits it.  This means that an individual's only <b>guaranteed</b> freedom
is determined by the amount of property that he or she owns. This has the
consequence that someone with no property has no guaranteed freedom at
all (beyond, of course, the freedom not to be murdered or otherwise 
harmed by the deliberate acts of others). In other words, a distribution 
of property is a distribution of freedom, as the right-libertarians 
themselves define it. It strikes anarchists as strange that an ideology 
that claims to be committed to promoting freedom entails the conclusion 
that some people should be more free than others. However, this is the 
logical implication of their view, which raises a serious doubt as to 
whether "anarcho"-capitalists are actually interested in freedom. 
<p>
Looking at Rothbard's definition of "liberty" quoted above, we can 
see that freedom is actually no longer considered to be a fundamental,
independent concept.  Instead, freedom is a derivative of something 
more fundamental, namely the <i>"legitimate rights"</i> of an individual, 
which are identified as property rights.  In other words, given that 
"anarcho"-capitalists and right libertarians in general consider the 
right to property as "absolute," it follows that freedom and property 
become one and the same.  This suggests an alternative name for the right
Libertarian, namely <b><i>"Propertarian."</i></b> And, needless to say, if we do not 
accept the right-libertarians' view of what constitutes "legitimate" 
"rights," then their claim to be defenders of liberty is weak.
<p>
Another important implication of this "liberty as property" concept is
that it produces a strangely alienated concept of freedom. Liberty, as 
we noted, is no longer considered absolute, but a derivative of property 
-- which has the important consequence that you can "sell" your liberty 
and still be considered free by the ideology. This concept of liberty
(namely "liberty as property") is usually termed "self-ownership." But, 
to state the obvious, I do not "own" myself, as if were an object somehow 
separable from my subjectivity -- I <b>am</b> myself. However, the concept of 
"self-ownership" is handy for justifying various forms of domination and 
oppression -- for by agreeing (usually under the force of circumstances, 
we must note) to certain contracts, an individual can "sell" (or rent out) 
themselves to others (for example, when workers sell their labour power to 
capitalists on the "free market"). In effect, "self-ownership" becomes the 
means of justifying treating people as objects -- ironically, the very thing 
the concept was created to stop! As L. Susan Brown notes, <i>"[a]t the moment 
an individual 'sells' labour power to another, he/she loses self-determination
and instead is treated as a subjectless instrument for the fulfilment of 
another's will."</i> [<b>The Politics of Individualism</b>, p. 4]
<p>
Given that workers are paid to obey, you really have to wonder which planet
Murray Rothbard is on when he argues that a person's <i>"labour service is
alienable, but his <b>will</b> is not"</i> and that he [sic!] <i>"cannot alienate his 
<b>will</b>, more particularly his control over his own mind and body."</i> He contrasts private property and
self-ownership by arguing that <i>"[a]ll physical property owned by a person 
is alienable . . . I can give away or sell to another person my shoes, my 
house, my car, my money, etc. But there are certain vital things which, in 
natural fact and in the nature of man, are <b>in</b>alienable . . . [his] will 
and control over his own person are inalienable."</i> [<b>The 
Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 40, p. 135 and pp. 134-5] 
<p>
But <i>"labour services"</i> are unlike the private possessions Rothbard lists
as being alienable. As we argued in section B.1 (<a href="secB1.html">"Why do anarchists oppose 
hierarchy"</a>) a person's <i>"labour services"</i> and <i>"will"</i> cannot be divided -- if 
you sell your labour services, you also have to give control of your body 
and mind to another person! If a worker does not obey the commands of her 
employer, she is fired. That Rothbard denies this indicates a total lack 
of common-sense. Perhaps Rothbard will argue that as the worker can quit at 
any time she does not alienate their will (this seems to be his case against 
slave contracts -- see <a href="secF2.html#secf22">section F.2.2</a>). But this ignores the fact that between 
the signing and breaking of the contract and during work hours (and perhaps 
outside work hours, if the boss has mandatory drug testing or will fire 
workers who attend union or anarchist meetings or those who have an 
"unnatural" sexuality and so on) the worker <b>does</b> alienate his will 
and body. In the words of Rudolf Rocker, <i>"under the realities of the 
capitalist economic form . . . there can be no talk of a 'right over one's
own person,' for that ends when one is compelled to submit to the economic
dictation of another if he does not want to starve."</i> [<b>Anarcho-Syndicalism</b>,
p. 17]
<p>
Ironically, the rights of property (which are said to flow from 
an individual's self-ownership of themselves) becomes the means, under
capitalism, by which self-ownership of non-property owners is denied. The 
foundational right (self-ownership) becomes denied by the derivative right 
(ownership of things). <i>"To treat others and oneself as property,"</i> argues anarchist L. Susan 
Brown, <i>"objectifies the human individual, 
denies the unity of subject and object and is a negation of individual 
will . . . [and] destroys the very freedom one sought in the first place. 
The liberal belief in property, both real and in the person, leads not to
freedom but to relationships of domination and subordination."</i> [<b>The Politics of Individualism</b>, p. 3] Under capitalism, a lack of property can be just as oppressive as a lack 
of legal rights because of the relationships of domination and subjection 
this situation creates. That people "consent" to this hierarchy misses the
point. As Alexander Berkman put it:
<p><blockquote><i>
"The law says your employer does not sell anything from you, because it
is done with your consent. You have agreed to work for your boss for 
certain pay, he to have all that you produce . . .
<p>
"But did you really consent?
<p>
"When the highway man holds his gun to your head, you turn your valuables
over to him. You 'consent' all right, but you do so because you cannot
help yourself, because you are <b>compelled</b> by his gun.
<p>
"Are you not <b>compelled</b> to work for an employer? Your need compels you
just as the highwayman's gun. You must live. . . You can't work for
yourself . . .The factories, machinery, and tools belong to the 
employing class, so you <b>must</b> hire yourself out to that class in order
to work and live. Whatever you work at, whoever your employer may be, it
is always comes to the same: you must work <b>for him</b>. You can't help
yourself. You are <b>compelled</b>."</i> [<b>What is Communist Anarchism?</b>, p. 9]
</blockquote><p>
Due to this class monopoly over the means of life, workers (usually) are 
at a disadvantage in terms of bargaining power -- there are more workers
than jobs As was indicated in <a href="secB4.html">section B.4</a>, within capitalism there is no 
equality between owners and the dispossessed, and so property is a source 
of <b>power.</b> To claim that this power should be "left alone" or is "fair" 
is <i>"to the anarchists. . . preposterous. Once a State has been established, 
and most of the country's capital privatised, the threat of physical force 
is no longer necessary to coerce workers into accepting jobs, even with 
low pay and poor conditions. To use Ayn Rand's term, 'initial force' has 
<b>already taken place,</b> by those who now have capital against those who 
do not. . . . In other words, if a thief died and willed his 'ill-gotten 
gain' to his children, would the children have a right to the stolen 
property? Not legally. So if 'property is theft,' to borrow Proudhon's 
quip, and the fruit of exploited labour is simply legal theft, then 
the only factor giving the children of a deceased capitalist a right 
to inherit the 'booty' is the law, the State. As Bakunin wrote, 
'Ghosts should not rule and oppress this world, which belongs only to 
the living.'"</i> [Jeff Draughn, <b>Between Anarchism and Libertarianism</b>] 
<p>
Or, in other words, right-Libertarianism fails to <i>"meet the charge that 
normal operations of the market systematically places an entire class of 
persons (wage earners) in circumstances that compel them to accept the 
terms and conditions of labour dictated by those who offer work. While 
it is true that individuals are formally free to seek better jobs or 
withhold their labour in the hope of receiving higher wages, in the end 
their position in the market works against them; they cannot live if they 
do not find employment. When circumstances regularly bestow a relative 
disadvantage on one class of persons in their dealings with another class, 
members of the advantaged class have little need of coercive measures to 
get what they want."</i> [Stephen L. Newman, <b>Liberalism at Wit's End</b>, 
p. 130]
<p>
So Rothbard's argument (as well as being contradictory) misses the point 
(and the reality of capitalism). Yes, <b>if</b> we define freedom as <i>"the absence 
of coercion"</i> then the idea that wage labour does not restrict liberty is 
unavoidable, but such a definition is useless. This is because it hides 
structures of power and relations of domination and subordination. As Carole 
Pateman argues, <i>"the contract in which the worker allegedly sells his labour 
power is a contract in which, since he cannot be separated from his 
capacities, he sells command over the use of his body and himself. . . 
To sell command over the use of oneself for a specified period . . . 
is to be an unfree labourer."</i> [<b>The Sexual Contract</b>, p. 151]
<p>
In other words, contracts about property in the person inevitably create
subordination. "Anarcho"-capitalism defines this source of unfreedom away,
but it still exists and has a major impact on people's liberty. Therefore 
freedom is better described as "self-government" or "self-management" -- 
to be able to govern ones own actions (if alone) or to participate in the 
determination of join activity (if part of a group). Freedom, to put it
another way, is not an abstract legal concept, but the vital concrete 
possibility for every human being to bring to full development all their 
powers, capacities, and talents which nature has endowed them. A key
aspect of this is to govern one own actions when within associations
(self-management). If we look at freedom this way, we see that coercion 
is condemned but so is hierarchy (and so is capitalism for during working 
hours, people are not free to make their own plans and have a say in what 
affects them. They are order takers, <b>not</b> free individuals). 
<p>
It is because anarchists have recognised the authoritarian nature of 
capitalist firms that they have opposed wage labour and capitalist
property rights along with the state. They have desired to replace 
institutions structured by subordination with institutions constituted 
by free relationships (based, in other words, on self-management) in
<b>all</b> areas of life, including economic organisations. Hence Proudhon's 
argument that the <i>"workmen's associations . . . are full of hope both as a
protest against the wage system, and as an affirmation of <b>reciprocity</b>"</i>
and that their importance lies <i>"in their denial of the rule of capitalists,
money lenders and governments."</i> [<b>The General Idea of the Revolution</b>, 
pp. 98-99]
<p>
Unlike anarchists, the "anarcho"-capitalist account of freedom allows an 
individual's freedom to be rented out to another while maintaining that the 
person is still free. It may seem strange that an ideology proclaiming its 
support for liberty sees nothing wrong with the alienation and denial of 
liberty but, in actual fact, it is unsurprising. After all, contract theory 
is a <i>"theoretical strategy that justifies subjection by presenting it as
freedom"</i> and nothing more. Little wonder, then, that contract <i>"creates
a relation of subordination"</i> and not of freedom [Carole Pateman, <b>Op. Cit.</b>,
p. 39, p. 59] 
<p>
Any attempt to build an ethical framework starting from the abstract 
individual (as Rothbard does with his <i>"legitimate rights"</i> method) will 
result in domination and oppression between people, <b>not</b> freedom. 
Indeed, Rothbard provides an example of the dangers of idealist 
philosophy that Bakunin warned about when he argued that while
<i>"[m]aterialism denies free will and ends in the establishment of 
liberty; idealism, in the name of human dignity, proclaims free 
will, and on the ruins of every liberty founds authority."</i> [<b>God 
and the State</b>, p. 48] This is the case with "anarcho"-capitalism 
can be seen from Rothbard's wholehearted support for wage labour 
and the rules imposed by property owners on those who use, but do 
not own, their property. Rothbard, basing himself on abstract
individualism, cannot help but justify authority over liberty.
<p>
Overall, we can see that the logic of the right-libertarian definition of 
"freedom" ends up negating itself, because it results in the creation 
and encouragement of <b>authority,</b> which is an <b>opposite</b> of freedom. For
example, as Ayn Rand points out, <i>"man has to sustain his life by his own
effort, the man who has no right to the product of his effort has no means
to sustain his life. The man who produces while others dispose of his
product, is a slave."</i> [<b>The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism from A to Z</b>, 
pp. 388-9] But, as was shown in <a href="secCcon.html">section C</a>, capitalism is based on, as 
Proudhon put it, workers working <i>"for an entrepreneur who pays them and 
keeps their products,"</i> and so is a form of <b>theft.</b> Thus, by "libertarian"
capitalism's <b>own</b> logic, capitalism is based not on freedom, but on
(wage) slavery; for interest, profit and rent are derived from a worker's
<b>unpaid</b> labour, i.e. <i>"others dispose of his [sic] product."</i>
<p>
And if a society <b>is</b> run on the wage- and profit-based system suggested
by the "anarcho" and "libertarian" capitalists, freedom becomes a
commodity. The more money you have, the more freedom you get. Then, since
money is only available to those who earn it, Libertarianism is based on
that classic saying <i>"work makes one free!"</i> (<b><i>Arbeit macht frei!</i></b>), which
the Nazis placed on the gates of their concentration camps. Of course,
since it is capitalism, this motto is somewhat different for those at the
top. In this case it is <i>"other people's work makes one free!"</i> -- a truism
in any society based on private property and the authority that stems from
it.
<p>
Thus it is debatable that a libertarian or "anarcho" capitalist society 
would have less unfreedom or coercion in it than "actually existing 
capitalism." In contrast to anarchism, "anarcho"-capitalism, with its 
narrow definitions, restricts freedom to only a few aspects of social life 
and ignores domination and authority beyond those aspects. As Peter Marshall 
points out, the right-libertarian's <i>"definition of freedom is entirely 
negative.  It calls for the absence of coercion but cannot guarantee the 
positive freedom of individual autonomy and independence."</i> [<b>Demanding 
the Impossible</b>, p. 564] By confining freedom to such a narrow range of 
human action, "anarcho"-capitalism is clearly <b>not</b> a form of anarchism. 
Real anarchists support freedom in every aspect of an individual's life.

<a name="secf21"><h2>F.2.1 How does private property affect freedom?</h2>

The right-libertarian does not address or even acknowledge that the 
(absolute) right of private property may lead to extensive control by 
property owners over those who use, but do not own, property (such as
workers and tenants). Thus a free-market capitalist system leads to a 
very selective and class-based protection of "rights" and "freedoms." 
For example, under capitalism, the "freedom" of employers inevitably 
conflicts with the "freedom" of employees. When stockholders or their 
managers exercise their "freedom of enterprise" to decide how their 
company will operate, they violate their employee's right to decide 
how their labouring capacities will be utilised. In other words, under 
capitalism, the "property rights" of employers will conflict with and 
restrict the "human right" of employees to manage themselves. Capitalism 
allows the right of self-management only to the few, not to all. Or, 
alternatively, capitalism does not recognise certain human rights as 
<b>universal</b> which anarchism does.
<p>
This can be seen from Austrian Economist W. Duncan Reekie's defence of
wage labour. While referring to <i>"intra-firm labour markets"</i> as <i>"hierarchies"</i>,
Reekie (in his best <i>ex cathedra</i> tone) states that <i>"[t]here is nothing 
authoritarian, dictatorial or exploitative in the relationship. Employees 
order employers to pay them amounts specified in the hiring contract just 
as much as employers order employees to abide by the terms of the contract."</i> 
[<b>Markets, Entrepreneurs and Liberty</b>, p. 136, p. 137]. Given that <i>"the 
terms of contract"</i> involve the worker agreeing to obey the employers orders 
and that they will be fired if they do not, its pretty clear that the 
ordering that goes on in the <i>"intra-firm labour market"</i> is decidedly <b>one 
way</b>. Bosses have the power, workers are paid to obey. And this begs the 
question, <b>if</b> the employment contract creates a free worker, why must 
she abandon her liberty during work hours?
<p>
Reekie actually recognises this lack of freedom in a "round about" way 
when he notes that <i>"employees in a firm at any level in the hierarchy can 
exercise an entrepreneurial role. The area within which that role can be 
carried out increases the more authority the employee has."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 142] Which means workers <b>are</b> subject to control from above which 
restricts the activities they are allowed to do and so they are <b>not</b> 
free to act, make decisions, participate in the plans of the organisation, 
to create the future and so forth within working hours. And it is strange 
that while recognising the firm as a hierarchy, Reekie tries to deny that 
it is authoritarian or dictatorial -- as if you could have a 
hierarchy without authoritarian structures or an unelected person in 
authority who is not a dictator. His confusion is shared by Austrian guru 
Ludwig
von Mises, who asserts that the <i>"entrepreneur and capitalist are not
irresponsible autocrats"</i> because they are <i>"unconditionally subject to
the sovereignty of the consumer"</i> while, <b>on the next page</b>, 
admitting
there is a <i>"managerial hierarchy"</i> which contains <i>"the average subordinate
employee."</i> [<b>Human Action</b>, p. 809 and p. 810] It does not 
enter his
mind that the capitalist may be subject to some consumer control while
being an autocrat to their subordinated employees. Again, we find the
right-"libertarian" acknowledging that the capitalist managerial 
structure is a hierarchy and workers are subordinated while denying 
it is autocratic to the workers! Thus we have "free" workers within a
relationship distinctly <b>lacking</b> freedom (in the sense of 
self-government)
-- a strange paradox. Indeed, if your personal life were as closely 
monitored and regulated as the work life of millions of people across
the world, you would rightly consider it the worse form of oppression and tyranny.
<p>
Ironically, right-wing, "free market" economist Milton Friedman 
contrasts <i>"central planning involving the use of coercion - the 
technique of the army or the modern totalitarian state"</i> with 
<i>"voluntary co-operation between individuals - the technique of the 
marketplace"</i> as two distinct ways of co-ordinating the economic 
activity of large groups (<i>"millions"</i>) of people. [<b>Capitalism and 
Freedom</b>, p. 13] However, this misses the key issue of the internal
nature of the company. As right-libertarians themselves note, the 
internal structure of a capitalist company is hierarchical.
<p>
Indeed, the capitalist company <b>is</b> a form of central planning and 
shares the same "technique" as the army. As the pro-capitalist writer
Peter Drucker noted in his history of General Motors, <i>"[t]here is a
remarkably close parallel between General Motors' scheme of organisation
and those of the two institutions most renowned for administrative
efficiency: that of the Catholic Church and that of the modern army . . ."</i> 
[quoted by David Enger, <b>Apostles of Greed</b>, p. 66] Thus capitalism
is marked by a series of totalitarian organisations. Dictatorship does 
not change much -- nor does it become less fascistic -- when discussing 
economic structures rather than political ones. To state the obvious, 
<i>"the employment contract (like the marriage contract) is not an exchange; 
both contracts create social relations that endure over time - social 
relations of subordination."</i> [Carole Pateman, <b>The Sexual Contract</b>, 
p. 148] 
<p>
Perhaps Reekie (like most right-libertarians) will maintain that workers
voluntarily agree ("consent") to be subject to the bosses dictatorship (he 
writes that <i>"each will only enter into the contractual agreement known as 
a firm if each believes he will be better off thereby. The firm is simply 
another example of mutually beneficial exchange"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 137]). 
However, this does not stop the relationship being authoritarian or 
dictatorial (and so exploitative as it is <b>highly</b> unlikely that those 
at the top will not abuse their power). And as we argue further in the 
<a href="secF2.html#secf23">next section</a> (and also see sections <a href="secB4.html">B.4</a> and <a href="secF3.html#secf31">F.3.1</a>), in a capitalist 
society workers have the option of finding a job or facing abject poverty 
and/or starvation.
<p> 
Little wonder, then, that people "voluntarily" sell their labour and
"consent" to authoritarian structures! They have little option to do 
otherwise. So, <b>within</b> the labour market, workers <b>can</b> and <b>do</b> seek 
out the best working conditions possible, but that does not mean that 
the final contract agreed is "freely" accepted and not due to the 
force of circumstances, that both parties have equal bargaining power 
when drawing up the contract or that the freedom of both parties is 
ensured. Which means to argue (as many right-libertarians do) that 
freedom cannot be restricted by wage labour because people enter 
into relationships they consider will lead to improvements over their 
initial situation totally misses the points. As the initial situation 
is not considered relevant, their argument fails. After all, agreeing
to work in a sweatshop 14 hours a day <b>is</b> an improvement over starving
to death -- but it does not mean that those who so agree are free 
when working there or actually <b>want</b> to be there. They are not and
it is the circumstances, created and enforced by the law, that have 
ensured that they "consent" to such a regime (given the chance, they 
would desire to <b>change</b> that regime but cannot as this would violate 
their bosses property rights and they would be repressed for trying).
<p>
So the right-wing "libertarian" right is interested only in a narrow 
concept of freedom (rather than in "freedom" or "liberty" as such).
This can be seen in the argument of Ayn Rand (a leading ideologue of
"libertarian" capitalism) that <i>"<b>Freedom</b>, in a political context, means
freedom from government coercion. It does <b>not</b> mean freedom from the
landlord, or freedom from the employer, or freedom from the laws of nature
which do not provide men with automatic prosperity. It means freedom from
the coercive power of the state -- and nothing else!"</i> [<b>Capitalism: The
Unknown Ideal</b>, p. 192] By arguing in this way, right libertarians ignore
the vast number of authoritarian social relationships that exist in
capitalist society and, as Rand does here, imply that these social
relationships are like "the laws of nature." However, if one looks at the
world without prejudice but with an eye to maximising freedom, the major
coercive institution is seen to be not the state  but capitalist social
relationships (as indicated in <a href="secB4.html">section B.4</a>). 
<p>
The right "libertarian," then, far from being a defender of freedom, is 
in fact a keen defender of certain forms of authority and domination. As
Peter Kropotkin noted: 
<p><blockquote><i>"The modern Individualism initiated by Herbert
Spencer is, like the critical theory of Proudhon, a powerful indictment
against the dangers and wrongs of government, but its practical solution
of the social problem is miserable -- so miserable as to lead us to
inquire if the talk of 'No force' be merely an excuse for supporting
landlord and capitalist domination."</i> [<b>Act For Yourselves</b>, p. 98]
</blockquote><p>
To defend the "freedom" of property owners is to defend authority and 
privilege -- in other words, statism. So, in considering the concept of 
liberty as "freedom from," it is clear that by defending private property 
(as opposed to possession) the "anarcho"-capitalist is defending the power 
and authority of property owners to govern those who use "their" property. 
And also, we must note, defending all the petty tyrannies that make the 
work lives of so many people frustrating, stressful and unrewarding.
<p>
However, anarchism, by definition, is in favour of organisations and social 
relationships which are non-hierarchical and non-authoritarian. Otherwise, 
some people are more free than others. Failing to attack hierarchy leads 
to massive contradiction. For example, since the British Army is a volunteer 
one, it is an "anarchist" organisation! (see <a href="secF2.html#secf23">next section</a> for a 
discussion on why the "anarcho"-capitalism concept of freedom also allows 
the state to appear "libertarian"). 
<p>
In other words, "full capitalist property rights" do not protect freedom,
in fact they actively deny it. But this lack of freedom is only inevitable
if we accept capitalist private property rights. If we reject them, we
can try and create a world based on freedom in all aspects of life, 
rather than just in a few.

<a name="secf22"><h2>F.2.2 Do Libertarian-capitalists support slavery?</h2> 

Yes. It may come as a surprise to many people, but right-Libertarianism is 
one of the few political theories that justifies slavery. For example, Robert 
Nozick asks whether <i>"a free system would allow [the individual] to sell 
himself into slavery"</i> and he answers <i>"I believe that it would."</i> [<b>Anarchy,
State and Utopia</b>, p. 371] While some right-Libertarians do not agree with 
Nozick, there is no logical basis in their ideology for such disagreement.
<p>
The logic is simple, you cannot really own something unless you can sell 
it. Self-ownership is one of the cornerstones of laissez-faire capitalist 
ideology. Therefore, since you own yourself you can sell yourself. 
<p>
(For Murray Rothbard's claims of the <i>"unenforceability, in libertarian 
theory, of voluntary slave contracts"</i> see <b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, pp. 
134-135 -- of course, <b>other</b> libertarian theorists claim the exact 
opposite so <i>"libertarian theory"</i> makes no such claims, but nevermind! 
Essentially, his point revolves around the assertion that a person 
<i>"cannot, in nature, sell himself into slavery and have this sale enforced 
- for this would mean that his future will over his own body was being 
surrendered in advance"</i> and that if a <i>"labourer remains totally subservient 
to his master's will voluntarily, he is not yet a slave since his submission 
is voluntary."</i> [p. 40] However, as we noted in <a href="secF2.html">
section F.2</a>, Rothbard 
emphasis on quitting fails to recognise that actual denial of will and 
control over ones own body that is explicit in wage labour. It is this 
failure that pro-slave contract "libertarians" stress -- as we will 
see, they consider the slave contract as an extended wage contract. 
Moreover, a modern slave contract would likely take the form of a
<i>"performance bond"</i> [p. 136] in which the slave agrees to 
perform X years labour or pay their master substantial damages. The
threat of damages that enforces the contract and such a "contract" 
Rothbard does agree is enforceable -- along with <i>"conditional exchange"</i>
[p. 141] which could be another way of creating slave contracts.)
<p>
Nozick's defence of slavery should not come as a surprise to any one 
familiar with classical liberalism. An elitist ideology, its main rationale
is to defend the liberty and power of property owners and justify unfree 
social relationships (such as government and wage labour) in terms of 
"consent." Nozick just takes it to its logical conclusion, a conclusion
which Rothbard, while balking at the label used, does not actually 
disagree with. 
<p>
This is because Nozick's argument is not new but, as with so many 
others, can be found in John Locke's work. The key difference is
that Locke refused the term <i>"slavery"</i> and favoured <i>"drudgery"</i> as, 
for him, slavery mean a relationship <i>"between a lawful conqueror 
and a captive"</i> where the former has the power of life and death over
the latter. Once a <i>"compact"</i> is agreed between them, <i>"an agreement 
for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other . . .
slavery ceases."</i> As long as the master could not kill the slave, then
it was <i>"drudgery."</i> Like Nozick, he acknowledges that <i>"men did sell 
themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: 
for, it is evident, the person sold  was not under an absolute, arbitrary, 
despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at 
any time, whom, at a  certain time, he was obliged to let go free out 
of his service."</i> [Locke, <b>Second Treatise of Government</b>, Section 24]
In other words, like Rothbard, voluntary slavery was fine but just call 
it something else.
<p>
Not that Locke was bothered by involuntary slavery. He was heavily 
involved in the slave trade. He owned shares in the "Royal Africa 
Company" which carried on the slave trade for England, making a 
profit when he sold them. He also held a significant share in another 
slave company, the "Bahama Adventurers." In the <i>"Second Treatise"</i>, 
Locke justified slavery in terms of <i>"Captives taken in a just war."</i> [Section 85] In other words, a war waged against aggressors. That, of 
course, had nothing to do with the <b>actual</b> slavery Locke profited from 
(slave raids were common, for example). Nor did his "liberal" principles 
stop him suggesting a constitution that would ensure that <i>"every freeman 
of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves."</i> 
The constitution itself was typically autocratic and hierarchical, designed 
explicitly to <i>"avoid erecting a numerous democracy."</i> [<b>The Works of John Locke</b>, vol. X, p. 196]
<p>
So the notion of contractual slavery has a long history within right-wing
liberalism, although most refuse to call it by that name. It is of course
simply embarrassment that stops Rothbard calling a spade a spade. He 
incorrectly assumes that slavery has to be involuntary. In fact, historically,
voluntary slave contracts have been common (David Ellerman's  <b>Property and Contract in Economics</b> has an excellent overview). Any new form of voluntary
slavery would be a "civilised" form of slavery and could occur when an 
individual would "agree" to sell themselves to themselves to another (as 
when a starving worker would "agree" to become a slave in return for food).
In addition, the contract would be able to be broken under certain conditions
(perhaps in return for breaking the contract, the former slave would have
pay damages to his or her master for the labour their master would lose - 
a sizeable amount no doubt and such a payment could result in debt slavery,
which is the most common form of "civilised" slavery. Such damages
may be agreed in the contract as a "performance bond" or "conditional
exchange"). 
<p>
In summary, right-Libertarians are talking about "civilised" slavery (or, 
in other words, civil slavery) and not forced slavery. While some may have
reservations about calling it slavery, they agree with the basic concept
that since people own themselves they can sell themselves as well as 
selling their labour for a lifetime.
<p>
We must stress that this is no academic debate. "Voluntary" slavery has 
been a problem in many societies and still exists in many countries today
(particularly third world ones where bonded labour -- i.e. where debt is
used to enslave people -- is the most common form). With the rise of sweat 
shops and child labour in many "developed" countries such as the USA, 
"voluntary" slavery (perhaps via debt and bonded labour) may become 
common in all parts of the world -- an ironic (if not surprising) result
of "freeing" the market and being indifferent to the actual freedom of 
those within it. 
<p>
And it is interesting to note that even Murray Rothbard is not against
the selling of humans. He argued that children are the property of their 
parents. They can (bar actually murdering them by violence) do whatever 
they please with them, even sell them on a <i>"flourishing free child market."</i> 
[<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 102] Combined with a whole hearted support 
for child labour (after all, the child can leave its parents if it objects 
to working for them) such a "free child market" could easily become a 
"child slave market" -- with entrepreneurs making a healthy profit selling 
infants to other entrepreneurs who could make profits from the toil of 
"their" children (and such a process did occur in 19th century Britain). 
Unsurprisingly, Rothbard ignores the possible nasty aspects of such a 
market in human flesh (such as children being sold to work in factories, 
homes and brothels). And, of course, such a market could see women 
"specialising" in producing children for it (the use of child labour 
during the Industrial Revolution actually made it economically sensible 
for families to have more children) and, perhaps, gluts and scarcities 
of babies due to changing market conditions. But this is besides the 
point.
<p>
Of course, this theoretical justification for slavery at the heart of an 
ideology calling itself "libertarianism" is hard for many right-Libertarians
to accept. Some of the "anarcho"-capitalist type argue that such contracts 
would be very hard to enforce in their system of capitalism. This attempt 
to get out of the contradiction fails simply because it ignores the nature
of the capitalist market. If there is a demand for slave contracts to be 
enforced, then companies will develop to provide that "service" (and it would 
be interesting to see how two "protection" firms, one defending slave contracts 
and another not, could compromise and reach a peaceful agreement over whether 
slave contracts were valid). Thus we could see a so-called "anarchist" or 
"free" society producing companies whose specific purpose was to hunt down 
escaped slaves (i.e. individuals in slave contracts who have not paid 
damages to their owners for freedom). Of course, perhaps Rothbard would
claim that such slave contracts would be "outlawed" under his "general
libertarian law code" but this is a denial of market "freedom". If slave 
contracts <b>are</b> "banned" then surely this is paternalism, stopping 
individuals from contracting out their "labour services" to whom and 
however long they "desire". You cannot have it both ways.
<p>
So, ironically, an ideology proclaiming itself to support "liberty" ends 
up justifying and defending slavery. Indeed, for the right-libertarian the
slave contract is an exemplification, not the denial, of the individual's 
liberty! How is this possible? How can slavery be supported as an expression 
of liberty? Simple, right-Libertarian support for slavery is a symptom of
a <b>deeper</b> authoritarianism, namely their uncritical acceptance of contract
theory. The central claim of contract theory is that contract is the means 
to secure and enhance individual freedom. Slavery is the antithesis to freedom
and so, in theory, contract and slavery must be mutually exclusive. However,
as indicated above, some contract theorists (past and present) have included 
slave contracts among legitimate contracts. This suggests that contract 
theory cannot provide the theoretical support needed to secure and enhance 
individual freedom. Why is this?
<p>
As Carole Pateman argues, <i>"contract theory is primarily about a way of 
creating social relations constituted by subordination, not about exchange."</i> 
Rather than undermining subordination, contract theorists justify modern subjection -- <i>"contract doctrine has proclaimed that
subjection to a master -- a boss, a husband -- is freedom."</i> 
[<b>The Sexual Contract</b>, p. 40 and p. 146] 
The question central to contract theory (and so right-Libertarianism) is
not "are people free" (as one would expect) but "are people free to 
subordinate themselves in any manner they please." A radically different 
question and one only fitting to someone who does not know what liberty
means.
<p>
Anarchists argue that not all contracts are legitimate and no free individual 
can make a contract that denies his or her own freedom. If an individual 
is able to express themselves by making free agreements then those free 
agreements must also be based upon freedom internally as well. Any agreement 
that creates domination or hierarchy negates the assumptions underlying the 
agreement and makes itself null and void. In other words, voluntary 
government is still government and the defining chararacteristic of 
an anarchy must be, surely, "no government" and "no rulers."
<p>
This is most easily seen in the extreme case of the slave contract. John 
Stuart Mill stated that such a contract would be "null and void." He argued
that an individual may voluntarily choose to enter such a contract but
in so doing <i>"he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it
beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the
very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of
himself. . .The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be
free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his
freedom."</i> He adds that <i>"these reasons, the force of which is so 
conspicuous in this particular case, are evidently of far wider 
application."</i> [quoted by Pateman, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 171-2]
<p>
And it is such an application that defenders of capitalism fear (Mill did
in fact apply these reasons wider and unsurprisingly became a supporter of 
a market syndicalist form of socialism). If we reject slave contracts as 
illegitimate then, logically, we must also reject <b>all</b> contracts that 
express qualities similar to slavery (i.e. deny freedom) including wage 
slavery. Given that, as David Ellerman points out, <i>"the voluntary slave . . . and the employee 
cannot in fact take their will out of their intentional actions so that 
they could be 'employed' by the master or employer"</i> we are left with <i>"the 
rather implausible assertion that a person can vacate his or her will for
eight or so hours a day for weeks, months, or years on end but cannot do so
for a working lifetime."</i> [<b>Property and 
Contract in Economics</b>, p. 58]
<p>
The implications of supporting voluntary slavery is quite devastating 
for all forms of right-wing "libertarianism." This was proven by Ellerman
when he wrote an extremely robust defence of it under the  pseudonym 
"J. Philmore" called <b>The Libertarian Case for Slavery</b> (first published
in <b>The Philosophical Forum</b>, xiv, 1982). This classic rebuttal takes the 
form of "proof by contradiction" (or <b>reductio ad absurdum</b>) whereby he 
takes the arguments of right-libertarianism to their logical end and shows how 
they reach the memorably conclusion that the <i>"time has come for liberal 
economic and political thinkers to stop dodging this issue and to 
critically re-examine their shared prejudices about certain voluntary 
social institutions . . . this critical process will inexorably drive 
liberalism to its only logical conclusion: libertarianism that finally 
lays the true moral foundation for economic and political slavery."</i>
<p>
Ellerman shows how, from a right-"libertarian" perspective there is a 
<i>"fundamental contradiction"</i> in a modern liberal society for the state 
to prohibit slave contracts. He notes that there <i>"seems to be a basic 
shared prejudice of liberalism that slavery is inherently involuntary, 
so the issue of genuinely voluntary slavery has received little scrutiny. 
The perfectly valid liberal argument that involuntary slavery is inherently 
unjust is thus taken to include voluntary slavery (in which case, the 
argument, by definition, does not apply).  This has resulted in an 
abridgment of the freedom of contract in modern liberal society."</i> Thus it 
is possible to argue for a <i>"civilised form of contractual slavery."</i> 
["J. Philmore,", <b>Op. Cit.</b>] 
<p>
So accurate and logical was Ellerman's article that many of its readers
were convinced it <b>was</b> written by a right-libertarian (including, we have
to say, us!). One such writer was Carole Pateman, who correctly noted
that <i>"[t]here is a nice historical irony here. In the American South, 
slaves were emancipated and turned into wage labourers, and now 
American contractarians argue that all workers should have the
opportunity to turn themselves into civil slaves."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 63]).
<p>
The aim of Ellerman's article was to show the problems that employment (wage 
labour) presents for the concept of self-government and how contract need
not result in social relationships based on freedom. As "Philmore" put it, 
<i>"[a]ny thorough and decisive critique of voluntary slavery or constitutional 
nondemocratic government would carry over to the employment contract -- 
which is the voluntary contractual basis for the free-market 
free-enterprise system.  Such a critique would thus be a <b>reductio ad 
absurdum</b>."</i> As <i>"contractual slavery"</i> is an <i>"extension of the employer-employee 
contract,"</i> he shows that the difference between wage labour and slavery is 
the time scale rather than the principle or social relationships involved.
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>] This explains, firstly, the early workers' movement called 
capitalism <i><b>"wage slavery"</b></i> (anarchists still do) and, secondly, why 
capitalists like Rothbard support the concept but balk at the name. It 
exposes the unfree nature of the system they support! While it is possible
to present wage labour as "freedom" due to its "consensual" nature, it
becomes much harder to do so when talking about slavery or dictatorship.
Then the contradictions are exposed for all to see and be horrified by.
<p>
All this does not mean that we must reject free agreement. Far from it! Free
agreement is <b>essential</b> for a society based upon individual dignity and
liberty. There are a variety of forms of free agreement and anarchists
support those based upon co-operation and self-management (i.e. individuals
working together as equals). Anarchists desire to create relationships
which reflect (and so express) the liberty that is the basis of free 
agreement. Capitalism creates relationships that deny liberty. The opposition 
between autonomy and subjection can only be maintained by modifying or
rejecting contract theory, something that capitalism cannot do and so the 
right-wing Libertarian rejects autonomy in favour of subjection (and so 
rejects socialism in favour of capitalism).
<p> 
The real contrast between anarchism and right-Libertarianism is best 
expressed in their respective opinions on slavery. Anarchism is based 
upon the individual whose individuality depends upon the maintenance of 
free relationships with other individuals. If individuals deny their
capacities for self-government from themselves through a contract 
the individuals bring about a qualitative change in their relationship 
to others - freedom is turned into mastery and subordination. For the 
anarchist, slavery is thus the paradigm of what freedom is <b>not</b>, instead
of an exemplification of what it is (as right-Libertarians state). As 
Proudhon argued: 
<p><blockquote>
<i>"If I were asked to answer the following question: What 
is slavery? and I should answer in one word, It is murder, my meaning would 
be understood at once. No extended argument would be required to show that 
the power to take from a man his thought, his will, his personality, is a 
power of life and death; and that to enslave a man is to kill him."</i> [<b>What
is Property?</b>, p. 37]
<p></blockquote>
In contrast, the right-Libertarian effectively argues that "I support slavery 
because I believe in liberty." It is a sad reflection of the ethical and 
intellectual bankruptcy of our society that such an "argument" is actually 
taken seriously by (some) people. The concept of "slavery as freedom" is
far too Orwellian to warrant a critique - we will leave it up to right
Libertarians to corrupt our language and ethical standards with an attempt
to prove it.
<p>
From the basic insight that slavery is the opposite of freedom, the anarchist 
rejection of authoritarian social relations quickly follows (the right-wing Libertarians fear):
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Liberty is inviolable. I can neither sell nor alienate my liberty; every
contract, every condition of a contract, which has in view the alienation or
suspension of liberty, is null: the slave, when he plants his foot upon the
soil of liberty, at that moment becomes a free man. . . Liberty is the original 
condition of man; to renounce liberty is to renounce the nature of man: after 
that, how could we perform the acts of man?"</i> [P.J. Proudhon, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 67]
<p></blockquote>
The employment contract (i.e. wage slavery) abrogates liberty. It is based
upon inequality of power and <i>"exploitation is a consequence of the fact 
that the sale of labour power entails the worker's subordination."</i> [Carole
Pateman, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, P. 149] Hence Proudhon's (and Mill's) support of 
self-management and opposition to capitalism - any relationship that 
resembles slavery is illegitimate and no contract that creates a 
relationship of subordination is valid. Thus in a truly anarchistic 
society, slave contracts would be unenforceable -- people in a truly 
free (i.e. non-capitalist) society would <b>never</b> tolerate such a 
horrible institution or consider it a valid agreement. If someone was
silly enough to sign such a contract, they would simply have to 
say they now rejected it in order to be free -- such contracts are
made to be broken and without the force of a law system (and private
defence firms) to back it up, such contracts will stay broken.
<p>
The right-Libertarian support for slave contracts (and wage slavery) 
indicates that their ideology has little to do with liberty and far more 
to do with justifying property and the oppression and exploitation it 
produces. Their support and theoretical support for slavery indicates 
a deeper authoritarianism which negates their claims to be libertarians.

</body>
</html>