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<title>F.2 What do "anarcho"-capitalists mean by freedom?</title>

</head>

<h1>F.2 What do "anarcho"-capitalists mean by freedom?</h1>

<p>
For "anarcho"-capitalists, the concept of freedom is limited to the idea
of <i>"freedom from."</i>  For them, freedom means simply freedom from the
<i>"initiation of force,"</i> or the <i>"non-aggression against anyone's person and
property."</i> [Murray Rothbard, <b>For a New Liberty</b>, p. 23] The notion that
real freedom must combine both freedom <i>"to"</i> <b>and</b> freedom <i>"from"</i> is
missing in their ideology, as is the social context of the so-called
freedom they defend.
</p><p>
Before continuing, it is useful to quote Alan Haworth when he notes that
<i>"[i]n fact, it is surprising how <b>little</b> close attention the concept 
of freedom receives from libertarian writers. Once again <b>Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia</b> is a case in point. The word 'freedom' doesn't 
even appear in the index. The word 'liberty' appears, but only to 
refer the reader to the 'Wilt Chamberlain' passage. In a supposedly 
'libertarian' work, this is more than surprising. It is truly 
remarkable."</i> [<b>Anti-Libertarianism</b>, p. 95] Why this is the case can 
be seen from how the right-"libertarian" defines freedom.
</p><p>
In right-"libertarian" and "anarcho"-capitalist ideology, freedom is
considered to be a product of property. As Murray Rothbard puts it, <i>"the
libertarian defines the concept of 'freedom' or 'liberty'. . .[as a]
condition in which a person's ownership rights in his body and his
legitimate material property rights are not invaded, are not aggressed
against. . . . Freedom and unrestricted property rights go hand in hand."</i>
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p.41]
</p><p>
This definition has some problems, however. In such a society, one cannot
(legitimately) do anything with or on another's property if the owner
prohibits it.  This means that an individual's only <b>guaranteed</b> freedom
is determined by the amount of property that he or she owns. This has the
consequence that someone with no property has no guaranteed freedom at
all (beyond, of course, the freedom not to be murdered or otherwise 
harmed by the deliberate acts of others). In other words, a distribution 
of property is a distribution of freedom, as the right-"libertarians"
themselves define it. It strikes anarchists as strange that an ideology 
that claims to be committed to promoting freedom entails the conclusion 
that some people should be more free than others. Yet this is the 
logical implication of their view, which raises a serious doubt as to 
whether "anarcho"-capitalists are actually interested in freedom at all. 
</p><p>
Looking at Rothbard's definition of "liberty" quoted above, we can 
see that freedom is actually no longer considered to be a fundamental,
independent concept.  Instead, freedom is a derivative of something 
more fundamental, namely the <i>"legitimate rights"</i> of an individual, 
which are identified as property rights.  In other words, given that 
"anarcho"-capitalists and right-"libertarians" in general consider the 
right to property as "absolute," it follows that freedom and property 
become one and the same.  This suggests an alternative name for the right
Libertarian, namely <b><i>"Propertarian."</i></b> And, needless to say, 
if we do not accept the right-libertarians' view of what constitutes 
"legitimate rights," then their claim to be defenders of liberty is weak.
</p><p>
Another important implication of this "liberty as property" concept is
that it produces a strangely alienated concept of freedom. Liberty, as 
we noted, is no longer considered absolute, but a derivative of property 
-- which has the important consequence that you can "sell" your liberty 
and still be considered free by the ideology. This concept of liberty is 
usually termed "self-ownership." But, to state the obvious, I do not "own" 
myself, as if were an object somehow separable from my subjectivity -- I 
<b>am</b> myself (see <a href="secB4.html#secb42">section B.4.2</a>). However, 
the concept of "self-ownership" is handy for justifying various forms of domination 
and oppression -- for by agreeing (usually under the force of circumstances, 
we must note) to certain contracts, an individual can "sell" (or rent out) 
themselves to others (for example, when workers sell their labour power to 
capitalists on the "free market"). In effect, "self-ownership" becomes the 
means of justifying treating people as objects -- ironically, the very thing 
the concept was created to stop! As anarchist L. Susan Brown notes, <i>"[a]t the moment 
an individual 'sells' labour power to another, he/she loses self-determination
and instead is treated as a subjectless instrument for the fulfilment of 
another's will."</i> [<b>The Politics of Individualism</b>, p. 4]
</p><p>
Given that workers are paid to obey, you really have to wonder which planet
Murray Rothbard was on when he argued that a person's <i>"labour service is
alienable, but his <b>will</b> is not"</i> and that he <i>"cannot alienate his 
<b>will</b>, more particularly his control over his own mind and body."</i> He 
contrasts private property and self-ownership by arguing that <i>"[a]ll physical 
property owned by a person is alienable . . . I can give away or sell to another 
person my shoes, my house, my car, my money, etc. But there are certain vital 
things which, in natural fact and in the nature of man, are <b>in</b>alienable 
. . . [his] will and control over his own person are inalienable."</i> [<b>The 
Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 40, p. 135 and pp. 134-5] Yet <i>"labour services"</i> 
are unlike the private possessions Rothbard lists as being alienable. As we 
argued in  <a href="secB1.html">section B.1</a> a person's <i>"labour services"</i> 
and <i>"will"</i> cannot be divided -- if you sell your labour services, you 
also have to give control of your body and mind to another person. If a worker 
does not obey the commands of her employer, she is fired. That Rothbard denied 
this indicates a total lack of common-sense. Perhaps Rothbard would have argued 
that as the worker can quit at any time she does not really alienate their will 
(this seems to be his case against slave contracts -- see 
<a href="secF2.html#secf22">section F.2.2</a>). But this ignores the fact that 
between the signing and breaking of the contract and during work hours (and 
perhaps outside work hours, if the boss has mandatory drug testing or will 
fire workers who attend union or anarchist meetings or those who have an 
"unnatural" sexuality and so on) the worker <b>does</b> alienate his will 
and body. In the words of Rudolf Rocker, <i>"under the realities of the 
capitalist economic form . . . there can . . . be no talk of a 'right over one's
own person,' for that ends when one is compelled to submit to the economic
dictation of another if he does not want to starve."</i> [<b>Anarcho-Syndicalism</b>,
p. 10]
</p><p>
Ironically, the rights of property (which are said to flow from 
an individual's self-ownership of themselves) becomes the means, under
capitalism, by which self-ownership of non-property owners is denied. The 
foundational right (self-ownership) becomes denied by the derivative right 
(ownership of things). <i>"To treat others and oneself as property,"</i> argues 
L. Susan Brown, <i>"objectifies the human individual, 
denies the unity of subject and object and is a negation of individual 
will . . . [and] destroys the very freedom one sought in the first place. 
The liberal belief in property, both real and in the person, leads not to
freedom but to relationships of domination and subordination."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 3] Under capitalism, a lack of property 
can be just as oppressive as a lack 
of legal rights because of the relationships of domination and subjection 
this situation creates. That people "consent" to this hierarchy misses the
point. As Alexander Berkman put it:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The law says your employer does not steal anything from you, because it
is done with your consent. You have agreed to work for your boss for 
certain pay, he to have all that you produce . . .
</p><p>
"But did you really consent?
</p><p>
"When the highway man holds his gun to your head, you turn your valuables
over to him. You 'consent' all right, but you do so because you cannot
help yourself, because you are <b>compelled</b> by his gun.
</p><p>
"Are you not <b>compelled</b> to work for an employer? Your need compels you
just as the highwayman's gun. You must live . . . You can't work for
yourself . . . The factories, machinery, and tools belong to the 
employing class, so you <b>must</b> hire yourself out to that class in order
to work and live. Whatever you work at, whoever your employer may be, it
always comes to the same: you must work <b>for him</b>. You can't help
yourself. You are <b>compelled</b>."</i> [<b>What is Anarchism?</b>, p. 11]
</blockquote></p><p>
Due to this class monopoly over the means of life, workers (usually) are at 
a disadvantage in terms of bargaining power -- there are more workers than 
jobs (see <a href="secC9.html"> section C.9</a>). Within capitalism there is 
no equality between owners and the dispossessed, and so property is a source 
of <b>power.</b> To claim that this power should be "left alone" or is "fair" 
is <i>"to the anarchists. . . preposterous. Once a State has been established, 
and most of the country's capital privatised, the threat of physical force 
is no longer necessary to coerce workers into accepting jobs, even with 
low pay and poor conditions. To use [right-"libertarian"] Ayn Rand's term, 
'initial force' has 
<b>already taken place,</b> by those who now have capital against those who 
do not. . . . In other words, if a thief died and willed his 'ill-gotten 
gain' to his children, would the children have a right to the stolen 
property? Not legally. So if 'property is theft,' to borrow Proudhon's 
quip, and the fruit of exploited labour is simply legal theft, then 
the only factor giving the children of a deceased capitalist a right 
to inherit the 'booty' is the law, the State. As Bakunin wrote, 
'Ghosts should not rule and oppress this world, which belongs only to 
the living.'"</i> [Jeff Draughn, <b>Between Anarchism and Libertarianism</b>] 
</p><p>
Or, in other words, right-Libertarianism fails to <i>"meet the charge that 
normal operations of the market systematically places an entire class of 
persons (wage earners) in circumstances that compel them to accept the 
terms and conditions of labour dictated by those who offer work. While 
it is true that individuals are formally free to seek better jobs or 
withhold their labour in the hope of receiving higher wages, in the end 
their position in the market works against them; they cannot live if they 
do not find employment. When circumstances regularly bestow a relative 
disadvantage on one class of persons in their dealings with another class, 
members of the advantaged class have little need of coercive measures to 
get what they want."</i> [Stephen L. Newman, <b>Liberalism at Wit's End</b>, 
p. 130] Eliminating taxation does not end oppression, in other words. As 
Tolstoy put it:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"in Russia serfdom was only abolished when all the land had been appropriated. 
When land was granted to the peasants, it was burdened with payments which took 
the place of the land slavery. In Europe, taxes that kept the people in bondage 
began to be abolished only when the people had lost their land, were unaccustomed 
to agricultural work, and . . . quite dependent on the capitalists . . . [They] 
abolish the taxes that fall on the workers . . . only because the majority of 
the people are already in the hands of the capitalists. One form of slavery
is not abolished until another has already replaced it."</i> [<b>The Slavery 
of Our Times</b>, p. 32]
</blockquote></p><p>
So Rothbard's argument (as well as being contradictory) misses the point 
(and the reality of capitalism). Yes, <b>if</b> we define freedom as <i>"the absence 
of coercion"</i> then the idea that wage labour does not restrict liberty is 
unavoidable, but such a definition is useless. This is because it hides 
structures of power and relations of domination and subordination. As Carole 
Pateman argues, <i>"the contract in which the worker allegedly sells his labour 
power is a contract in which, since he cannot be separated from his 
capacities, he sells command over the use of his body and himself . . . 
To sell command over the use of oneself for a specified period . . . 
is to be an unfree labourer. The characteristics of this condition are 
captured in the term <b>wage slave</b>."</i> [<b>The Sexual Contract</b>, p. 151]
</p><p>
In other words, contracts about property in the person inevitably create
subordination. "Anarcho"-capitalism defines this source of unfreedom away,
but it still exists and has a major impact on people's liberty. For anarchists
freedom is better described as "self-government" or "self-management" -- 
to be able to govern ones own actions (if alone) or to participate in the 
determination of join activity (if part of a group). Freedom, to put it
another way, is not an abstract legal concept, but the vital concrete 
possibility for every human being to bring to full development all their 
powers, capacities, and talents which nature has endowed them. A key
aspect of this is to govern one own actions when within associations
(self-management). If we look at freedom this way, we see that coercion 
is condemned but so is hierarchy (and so is capitalism for during working 
hours people are not free to make their own plans and have a say in what 
affects them. They are order takers, <b>not</b> free individuals). 
</p><p>
It is because anarchists have recognised the authoritarian nature of 
capitalist firms that they have opposed wage labour and capitalist
property rights along with the state. They have desired to replace 
institutions structured by subordination with institutions constituted 
by free relationships (based, in other words, on self-management) in
<b>all</b> areas of life, including economic organisations. Hence Proudhon's 
argument that the <i>"workmen's associations . . . are full of hope both as a
protest against the wage system, and as an affirmation of <b>reciprocity</b>"</i>
and that their importance lies <i>"in their denial of the rule of capitalists,
money lenders and governments."</i> [<b>The General Idea of the Revolution</b>, 
pp. 98-99]
</p><p>
Unlike anarchists, the "anarcho"-capitalist account of freedom allows an 
individual's freedom to be rented out to another while maintaining that the 
person is still free. It may seem strange that an ideology proclaiming its 
support for liberty sees nothing wrong with the alienation and denial of 
liberty but, in actual fact, it is unsurprising. After all, contract theory 
is a <i>"theoretical strategy that justifies subjection by presenting it as
freedom"</i> and has <i>"turned a subversive proposition [that we are born
free and equal] into a defence of civil subjection."</i> Little wonder, then, 
that contract <i>"creates a relation of subordination"</i> and not of freedom 
[Carole Pateman, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 39 and p. 59] Little wonder, then, that 
Colin Ward argued that, as an anarchist, he is <i>"by definition, a socialist"</i> 
and that <i>"[w]orkers' control of industrial production"</i> is <i>"the only 
approach compatible with anarchism."</i> [<b>Talking Anarchy</b>, p. 25 and p. 26]
</p><p>
Ultimately, any attempt to build an ethical framework starting from the abstract 
individual (as Rothbard does with his <i>"legitimate rights"</i> method) will 
result in domination and oppression between people, <b>not</b> freedom. Indeed, 
Rothbard provides an example of the dangers of idealist philosophy that Bakunin 
warned about when he argued that while <i>"[m]aterialism denies free will and 
ends in the establishment of liberty; idealism, in the name of human dignity, 
proclaims free will, and on the ruins of every liberty founds authority."</i> 
[<b>God and the State</b>, p. 48] That this is the case with "anarcho"-capitalism 
can be seen from Rothbard's wholehearted support for wage labour, landlordism 
and the rules imposed by property owners on those who use, but do not own, their 
property. Rothbard, basing himself on abstract individualism, cannot help but 
justify authority over liberty. This, undoubtedly, flows from the right-liberal
and conservative roots of his ideology. Individualist anarchist Shawn Wilbar 
once defined Wikipedia as <i>"the most successful modern experiment in promoting 
obedience to authority as freedom."</i> However, Wikipedia pales into insignificance 
compared to the success of liberalism (in its many forms) in doing precisely that. 
Whether politically or economically, liberalism has always rushed to justify and 
rationalise the individual subjecting themselves to some form of hierarchy. That 
"anarcho"-capitalism does this under the name "anarchism" is deeply insulting to 
anarchists.
</p><p>
Overall, we can see that the logic of the right-"libertarian" definition of 
"freedom" ends up negating itself because it results in the creation and 
encouragement of <b>authority,</b> which is an <b>opposite</b> of freedom. For
example, as Ayn Rand pointed out, <i>"man has to sustain his life by his own
effort, the man who has no right to the product of his effort has no means
to sustain his life. The man who produces while others dispose of his
product, is a slave."</i> [<b>The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism from A to Z</b>, 
pp. 388-9] But, as was shown in <a href="secC2.html">section C.2</a>, capitalism is based on, as 
Proudhon put it, workers working <i>"for an entrepreneur who pays them and 
keeps their products,"</i> and so is a form of <b>theft.</b> Thus, by "libertarian"
capitalism's <b>own</b> logic, capitalism is based not on freedom, but on
(wage) slavery; for interest, profit and rent are derived from a worker's
<b>unpaid</b> labour, i.e. <i>"others dispose of his [sic] product."</i>
</p><p>
Thus it is debatable that a right-"libertarian" or "anarcho" capitalist society 
would have less unfreedom or authoritarianism in it than "actually existing" capitalism. 
In contrast to anarchism, "anarcho"-capitalism, with its narrow definitions, 
restricts freedom to only a few areas of social life and ignores domination 
and authority beyond those aspects. As Peter Marshall points out, their 
<i>"definition of freedom is entirely negative. It calls for the absence of 
coercion but cannot guarantee the positive freedom of individual autonomy and 
independence."</i> [<b>Demanding the Impossible</b>, p. 564] By confining freedom 
to such a narrow range of human action, "anarcho"-capitalism is clearly <b>not</b> 
a form of anarchism. Real anarchists support freedom in every aspect of an 
individual's life.
</p><p>
In short, as French anarchist Elisee Reclus put it there is <i>"an abyss 
between two kinds of society,"</i> one of which is <i>"constituted freely by 
men of good will, based on a consideration of their common interests"</i> and 
another which <i>"accepts the existence of either temporary or permanent masters 
to whom [its members] owe obedience."</i> [quoted by Clark and Martin, 
<b>Anarchy, Geography, Modernity</b>, p. 62] In other words, when choosing 
between anarchism and capitalism, "anarcho"-capitalists pick the latter and 
call it the former.</p> 

<a name="secf21"><h2>F.2.1 How does private property affect freedom?</h2></a>

<p>
The right-"libertarian" either does not acknowledge or dismisses as irrelevant
the fact that the (absolute) right of private property may lead to extensive 
control by property owners over those who use, but do not own, property (such 
as workers and tenants). Thus a free-market capitalist system leads to a 
very selective and class-based protection of "rights" and "freedoms." 
For example, under capitalism, the "freedom" of employers inevitably 
conflicts with the "freedom" of employees. When stockholders or their 
managers exercise their "freedom of enterprise" to decide how their 
company will operate, they violate their employee's right to decide 
how their labouring capacities will be utilised and so under capitalism 
the "property rights" of employers will conflict with and restrict the 
"human right" of employees to manage themselves. Capitalism allows the 
right of self-management only to the few, not to all. Or, alternatively, 
capitalism does not recognise certain human rights as <b>universal</b> 
which anarchism does.
</p><p>
This can be seen from Austrian Economist W. Duncan Reekie's defence of
wage labour. While referring to <i>"intra-firm labour markets"</i> as <i>"hierarchies"</i>,
Reekie (in his best <i><b>ex cathedra</b></i> tone) states that <i>"[t]here is nothing 
authoritarian, dictatorial or exploitative in the relationship. Employees 
order employers to pay them amounts specified in the hiring contract just 
as much as employers order employees to abide by the terms of the contract."</i> 
[<b>Markets, Entrepreneurs and Liberty</b>, p. 136 and p. 137]. Given that <i>"the 
terms of contract"</i> involve the worker agreeing to obey the employers orders 
and that they will be fired if they do not, its pretty clear that the 
ordering that goes on in the <i>"intra-firm labour market"</i> is decidedly <b>one 
way</b>. Bosses have the power, workers are paid to obey. And this begs the 
question: <b>if</b> the employment contract creates a free worker, why must 
she abandon her liberty during work hours?
</p><p>
Reekie actually recognises this lack of freedom in a "round about" way 
when he notes that <i>"employees in a firm at any level in the hierarchy can 
exercise an entrepreneurial role. The area within which that role can be 
carried out increases the more authority the employee has."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 142] Which means workers <b>are</b> subject to control from above which 
restricts the activities they are allowed to do and so they are <b>not</b> 
free to act, make decisions, participate in the plans of the organisation, 
to create the future and so forth within working hours. And it is strange 
that while recognising the firm as a hierarchy, Reekie tries to deny that 
it is authoritarian or dictatorial -- as if you could have a 
hierarchy without authoritarian structures or an unelected person in 
authority who is not a dictator. His confusion is shared by Austrian guru 
Ludwig von Mises, who asserted that the <i>"entrepreneur and capitalist are not
irresponsible autocrats"</i> because they are <i>"unconditionally subject to
the sovereignty of the consumer"</i> while, <b>on the next page</b>, admitting
there was a <i>"managerial hierarchy"</i> which contains <i>"the average 
subordinate employee."</i> [<b>Human Action</b>, p. 809 and p. 810] It does not 
enter his mind that the capitalist may be subject to some consumer control 
while being an autocrat to their subordinated employees. Again, we find the
right-"libertarian" acknowledging that the capitalist managerial structure is 
a hierarchy and workers are subordinated while denying it is autocratic to the 
workers! Thus we have "free" workers within a relationship distinctly 
<b>lacking</b> freedom -- a strange paradox. Indeed, if your personal life 
were as closely monitored and regulated as the work life of millions of people across
the world, you would rightly consider it the worse form of oppression and tyranny.
</p><p>
Somewhat ironically, right-wing liberal and "free market" economist Milton 
Friedman contrasted <i>"central planning involving the use of coercion -- the 
technique of the army or the modern totalitarian state"</i> with <i>"voluntary 
co-operation between individuals -- the technique of the marketplace"</i> as 
two distinct ways of co-ordinating the economic activity of large groups 
(<i>"millions"</i>) of people. [<b>Capitalism and Freedom</b>, p. 13] However, 
this misses the key issue of the internal nature of the company. As 
right-"libertarians" themselves note, the internal structure of a capitalist 
company is hierarchical. Indeed, the capitalist company <b>is</b> a form of 
central planning and so shares the same "technique" as the army. As Peter 
Drucker noted in his history of General Motors, <i>"[t]here is a remarkably 
close parallel between General Motors' scheme of organisation and those of the 
two institutions most renowned for administrative efficiency: that of the 
Catholic Church and that of the modern army."</i> [quoted by David Engler, 
<b>Apostles of Greed</b>, p. 66] Thus capitalism is marked by a series of 
totalitarian organisations. Dictatorship does not change much -- nor does it 
become less fascistic -- when discussing economic structures rather than 
political ones. To state the obvious, <i>"the employment contract (like the 
marriage contract) is not an exchange; both contracts create social relations 
that endure over time - social relations of subordination."</i> [Carole Pateman, 
<b>The Sexual Contract</b>, p. 148] 
</p><p>
Perhaps Reekie (like most right-"libertarians") will maintain that workers
voluntarily agree ("consent") to be subject to the bosses dictatorship (he 
writes that <i>"each will only enter into the contractual agreement known as 
a firm if each believes he will be better off thereby. The firm is simply 
another example of mutually beneficial exchange."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 137]). 
However, this does not stop the relationship being authoritarian or 
dictatorial (and so exploitative as it is <b>highly</b> unlikely that those 
at the top will not abuse their power). Representing employment relations as 
voluntary agreement simply mystifies the existence and exercise of power 
within the organisation so created.
</p><p>
As we argue further in the <a href="secF3.html">section F.3</a>, in a capitalist 
society workers have the option of finding a job or facing abject poverty and/or 
starvation. Little wonder, then, that people "voluntarily" sell their labour and 
"consent" to authoritarian structures! They have little option to do otherwise. 
So, <b>within</b> the labour market workers <b>can</b> and <b>do</b> seek 
out the best working conditions possible, but that does not mean that 
the final contract agreed is "freely" accepted and not due to the 
force of circumstances, that both parties have equal bargaining power 
when drawing up the contract or that the freedom of both parties is 
ensured. 
</p><p>
Which means to argue (as right-"libertarians" do) that freedom cannot be 
restricted by wage labour because people enter into relationships they 
consider will lead to improvements over their initial situation totally 
misses the point. As the initial situation is not considered relevant, 
their argument fails. After all, agreeing to work in a sweatshop 14 hours 
a day <b>is</b> an improvement over starving to death -- but it does not 
mean that those who so agree are free when working there or actually 
<b>want</b> to be there. They are not and it is the circumstances, created 
and enforced by the law (i.e., the state), that have ensured that they "consent" 
to such a regime (given the chance, they would desire to <b>change</b> that regime 
but cannot as this would violate their bosses property rights and they would 
be repressed for trying).
</p><p>
So the right-wing "libertarian" right is interested only in a narrow concept 
of freedom (rather than in freedom or liberty as such). This can be seen 
in the argument of Ayn Rand that <i>"<b>Freedom</b>, in a political context, 
means freedom from government coercion. It does <b>not</b> mean freedom from 
the landlord, or freedom from the employer, or freedom from the laws of nature
which do not provide men with automatic prosperity. It means freedom from
the coercive power of the state -- and nothing else!"</i> [<b>Capitalism: The
Unknown Ideal</b>, p. 192] By arguing in this way, right-"libertarians" ignore
the vast number of authoritarian social relationships that exist in capitalist 
society and, as Rand does here, imply that these social relationships are like 
<i>"the laws of nature."</i> However, if one looks at the world without 
prejudice but with an eye to maximising freedom, the major coercive institutions 
are the state <b>and</b> capitalist social relationships (and the latter relies
on the former). It should also be noted that, unlike gravity, the power of the 
landlord and boss depends on the use of force -- gravity does not need policemen 
to make things fall! 
</p><p>
The right "libertarian," then, far from being a defender of freedom, is 
in fact a keen defender of certain forms of authority. As Kropotkin argued 
against a forerunner of right-"libertarianism": 
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"The modern Individualism initiated by Herbert
Spencer is, like the critical theory of Proudhon, a powerful indictment
against the dangers and wrongs of government, but its practical solution
of the social problem is miserable -- so miserable as to lead us to
inquire if the talk of 'No force' be merely an excuse for supporting
landlord and capitalist domination."</i> [<b>Act For Yourselves</b>, p. 98]
</blockquote></p><p>
To defend the "freedom" of property owners is to defend authority and 
privilege -- in other words, statism. So, in considering the concept of 
liberty as "freedom from," it is clear that by defending private property 
(as opposed to possession) the "anarcho"-capitalist is defending the power 
and authority of property owners to govern those who use "their" property. 
And also, we must note, defending all the petty tyrannies that make the 
work lives of so many people frustrating, stressful and unrewarding.
</p><p>
Anarchism, by definition, is in favour of organisations and social 
relationships which are non-hierarchical and non-authoritarian. Otherwise, 
some people are more free than others. Failing to attack hierarchy leads 
to massive contradiction. For example, since the British Army is a volunteer 
one, it is an "anarchist" organisation! Ironically, it can also allow 
a state to appear "libertarian" as that, too, can be considered voluntary
arrangement as long as it allows its subjects to emigrate freely. So 
equating freedom with (capitalist) property rights does not protect 
freedom, in fact it actively denies it. This lack of freedom is only 
inevitable as long as we accept capitalist private property rights. If 
we reject them, we can try and create a world based on freedom in all 
aspects of life, rather than just in a few.
</p>

<a name="secf22"><h2>F.2.2 Do "libertarian"-capitalists support slavery?</h2></a> 

<p>
Yes. It may come as a surprise to many people, but right-"Libertarianism" is 
one of the few political theories that justifies slavery. For example, Robert 
Nozick asks whether <i>"a free system would allow [the individual] to sell 
himself into slavery"</i> and he answers <i>"I believe that it would."</i> 
[<b>Anarchy, State and Utopia</b>, p. 371] While some right-"libertarians" do 
not agree with Nozick, there is no logical basis in their ideology for such 
disagreement.
</p><p>
This can be seen from "anarcho"-capitalist Walter Block, who, like Nozick, 
supports voluntary slavery. As he puts it, <i>"if I own something, I can sell 
it (and should be allowed by law to do so). If I can't sell, then, and to 
that extent, I really don't own it."</i> Thus agreeing to sell yourself for 
a lifetime <i>"is a bona fide contract"</i> which, if <i>"abrogated, theft 
occurs."</i> He critiques those other right-wing "libertarians" (like Murray 
Rothbard) who oppose voluntary slavery as being inconsistent to their principles. 
Block, in his words, seeks to make <i>"a tiny adjustment"</i> which <i>"strengthens 
libertarianism by making it more internally consistent."</i> He argues
that his position shows <i>"that contract, predicated on private property [can] 
reach to the furthest realms of human interaction, even to voluntary
slave contracts."</i> [<i>"Towards a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability: A 
Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Smith, Kinsella, Gordon, and Epstein,"</i> 
pp. 39-85, <b>Journal of Libertarian Studies</b>, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 44, 
p. 48, p. 82 and p. 46] 
</p><p>
So the logic is simple, you cannot really own something unless you can sell 
it. Self-ownership is one of the cornerstones of laissez-faire capitalist 
ideology. Therefore, since you own yourself you can sell yourself. 
</p><p>
This defence of slavery should not come as a surprise to any one 
familiar with classical liberalism. An elitist ideology, its main rationale
is to defend the liberty and power of property owners and justify unfree 
social relationships (such as government and wage labour) in terms of "consent." 
Nozick and Block just takes it to its logical conclusion. This is because 
his position is not new but, as with so many other right-"libertarian" ones, 
can be found in John Locke's work. The key difference is that Locke refused 
the term <i>"slavery"</i> and favoured <i>"drudgery"</i> as, for him, 
slavery mean a relationship <i>"between a lawful conqueror and a captive"</i> 
where the former has the power of life and death over the latter. Once 
a <i>"compact"</i> is agreed between them, <i>"an agreement for a 
limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other . . .
slavery ceases."</i> As long as the master could not kill the slave, then
it was <i>"drudgery."</i> Like Nozick, he acknowledges that <i>"men did sell 
themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: 
for, it is evident, the person sold  was not under an absolute, arbitrary, 
despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at 
any time, whom, at a  certain time, he was obliged to let go free out 
of his service."</i> [Locke, <b>Second Treatise of Government</b>, Section 24]
In other words, voluntary slavery was fine but just call it something else.
</p><p>
Not that Locke was bothered by <b>involuntary</b> slavery. He was heavily 
involved in the slave trade. He owned shares in the <b>"Royal Africa 
Company"</b> which carried on the slave trade for England, making a 
profit when he sold them. He also held a significant share in another 
slave company, the <b>"Bahama Adventurers."</b> In the <i>"Second Treatise"</i>, 
Locke justified slavery in terms of <i>"Captives taken in a just war,"</i> 
a war waged against aggressors. [Section 85] That, of course, had nothing 
to do with the <b>actual</b> slavery Locke profited from (slave raids 
were common, for example). Nor did his "liberal" principles stop him 
suggesting a constitution that would ensure that <i>"every freeman of 
Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves."</i> 
The constitution itself was typically autocratic and hierarchical, designed 
explicitly to <i>"avoid erecting a numerous democracy."</i> [<b>The Works of 
John Locke</b>, vol. X, p. 196]
</p><p>
So the notion of contractual slavery has a long history within right-wing
liberalism, although most refuse to call it by that name. It is of course
simply embarrassment that stops many right-"libertarians" calling a spade 
a spade. They incorrectly assume that slavery has to be involuntary. In fact, 
historically, voluntary slave contracts have been common (David Ellerman's  
<b>Property and Contract in Economics</b> has an excellent overview). Any 
new form of voluntary slavery would be a "civilised" form of slavery and 
could occur when an individual would "agree" to sell their lifetime's 
labour to another (as when a starving worker would "agree" to become a 
slave in return for food). In addition, the contract would be able to be 
broken under certain conditions (perhaps in return for breaking the contract, 
the former slave would have pay damages to his or her master for the labour 
their master would lose -- a sizeable amount no doubt and such a payment 
could result in debt slavery, which is the most common form of "civilised" 
slavery. Such damages may be agreed in the contract as a "performance bond" 
or "conditional exchange." 
</p><p>
In summary, right-"libertarians" are talking about "civilised" slavery (or, 
in other words, civil slavery) and not forced slavery. While some may have
reservations about calling it slavery, they agree with the basic concept
that since people own themselves they can sell themselves, that is sell 
their labour for a lifetime rather than piecemeal.
</p><p>
We must stress that this is no academic debate. "Voluntary" slavery has 
been a problem in many societies and still exists in many countries today
(particularly third world ones where bonded labour -- i.e. where debt is
used to enslave people -- is the most common form). With the rise of sweat 
shops and child labour in many "developed" countries such as the USA, 
"voluntary" slavery (perhaps via debt and bonded labour) may become 
common in all parts of the world -- an ironic (if not surprising) result
of "freeing" the market and being indifferent to the actual freedom of 
those within it. 
</p><p>
Some right-"libertarians" are obviously uneasy with the logical conclusion
of their definition of freedom. Murray Rothbard, for example, stressed the 
<i>"unenforceability, in libertarian theory, of voluntary slave contracts."</i> 
Of course, <b>other</b> "libertarian" theorists claim the exact opposite, 
so <i>"libertarian theory"</i> makes no such claim, but never mind! Essentially, 
his objection revolves around the assertion that a person <i>"cannot, in nature, 
sell himself into slavery and have this sale enforced -- for this would mean 
that his future will over his own body was being surrendered in advance"</i> 
and that if a <i>"labourer remains totally subservient to his master's will 
voluntarily, he is not yet a slave since his submission is voluntary."</i> 
However, as we noted in <a href="secF2.html">section F.2</a>, Rothbard emphasis 
on quitting fails to recognise the actual denial of will and control over ones 
own body that is explicit in wage labour. It is this failure that pro-slave 
contract "libertarians" stress -- they consider the slave contract as an 
extended wage contract. Moreover, a modern slave contract would likely take 
the form of a <i>"performance bond,"</i> on which Rothbard laments about its 
<i>"unfortunate suppression"</i> by the state. In such a system, the slave 
could agree to perform X years labour or pay their master substantial damages 
if they fail to do so. It is the threat of damages that enforces the contract 
and such a "contract" Rothbard does agree is enforceable. Another means of 
creating slave contracts would be <i>"conditional exchange"</i> which 
Rothbard also supports. As for debt bondage, that too, seems acceptable. He 
surreally notes that paying damages and debts in such contracts is fine as 
<i>"money, of course, <b>is</b> alienable"</i> and so forgets that it needs 
to be earned by labour which, he asserts, is <b>not</b> alienable! [<b>The 
Ethics of Liberty,</b> pp. 134-135, p. 40, pp. 136-9, p. 141 and p. 138] 
</p><p>
It should be noted that the slavery contract cannot be null and void because it 
is unenforceable, as Rothbard suggests. This is because the doctrine of specific 
performance applies to all contracts, not just to labour contracts. This is because 
<b>all</b> contracts specify some future performance. In the case of the lifetime 
labour contract, then it can be broken as long as the slave pays any appropriate 
damages. As Rothbard puts it elsewhere, <i>"if A has agreed to work for life for B 
in exchange for 10,000 grams of gold, he will have to return the proportionate 
amount of property if he terminates the arrangement and ceases to work."</i> [<b>Man, 
Economy, and State</b>, vol. I , p. 441] This is understandable, as the law 
generally allows material damages for breached contracts, as does Rothbard in his
support for the <i>"performance bond"</i> and <i>"conditional exchange."</i> Needless 
to say, having to pay such damages (either as a lump sum or over a period of time) 
could turn the worker into the most common type of modern slave, the debt-slave.
</p><p>
And it is interesting to note that even Murray Rothbard is not against
the selling of humans. He argued that children are the property of their 
parents who can (bar actually murdering them by violence) do whatever 
they please with them, even sell them on a <i>"flourishing free child market."</i> 
[<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 102] Combined with a whole hearted support 
for child labour (after all, the child can leave its parents if it objects 
to working for them) such a "free child market" could easily become a 
"child slave market" -- with entrepreneurs making a healthy profit selling 
infants and children or their labour to capitalists (as did occur in 19th 
century Britain). Unsurprisingly, Rothbard ignores the possible nasty aspects 
of such a market in human flesh (such as children being sold to work in 
factories, homes and brothels). But this is besides the point.
</p><p>
Of course, this theoretical justification for slavery at the heart of an 
ideology calling itself "libertarianism" is hard for many right-"libertarians"
to accept and so they argue that such contracts would be very hard to enforce. 
This attempt to get out of the contradiction fails simply because it ignores 
the nature of the capitalist market. If there is a demand for slave contracts 
to be enforced, then companies will develop to provide that "service" (and it 
would be interesting to see how two "protection" firms, one defending slave 
contracts and another not, could compromise and reach a peaceful agreement 
over whether slave contracts were valid). Thus we could see a so-called 
"free" society producing companies whose specific purpose was to hunt down 
escaped slaves (i.e. individuals in slave contracts who have not paid 
damages to their owners for freedom). Of course, perhaps Rothbard would
claim that such slave contracts would be "outlawed" under his <i>"general
libertarian law code"</i> but this is a denial of market "freedom". If slave 
contracts <b>are</b> "banned" then surely this is paternalism, stopping 
individuals from contracting out their "labour services" to whom and 
however long they "desire". You cannot have it both ways.
</p><p>
So, ironically, an ideology proclaiming itself to support "liberty" ends 
up justifying and defending slavery. Indeed, for the right-"libertarian" the
slave contract is an exemplification, not the denial, of the individual's 
liberty! How is this possible? How can slavery be supported as an expression 
of liberty? Simple, right-"libertarian" support for slavery is a symptom of
a <b>deeper</b> authoritarianism, namely their uncritical acceptance of contract
theory. The central claim of contract theory is that contract is the means 
to secure and enhance individual freedom. Slavery is the antithesis to freedom
and so, in theory, contract and slavery must be mutually exclusive. However,
as indicated above, some contract theorists (past and present) have included 
slave contracts among legitimate contracts. This suggests that contract 
theory cannot provide the theoretical support needed to secure and enhance 
individual freedom. 
</p><p>
As Carole Pateman argues, <i>"contract theory is primarily about a way of 
creating social relations constituted by subordination, not about exchange."</i> 
Rather than undermining subordination, contract theorists justify modern 
subjection -- <i>"contract doctrine has proclaimed that subjection to a 
master -- a boss, a husband -- is freedom."</i> [<b>The Sexual Contract</b>, p. 40 
and p. 146] The question central to contract theory (and so right-Libertarianism) is
not "are people free" (as one would expect) but "are people free to 
subordinate themselves in any manner they please." A radically different 
question and one only fitting to someone who does not know what liberty means.
</p><p>
Anarchists argue that not all contracts are legitimate and no free individual 
can make a contract that denies his or her own freedom. If an individual 
is able to express themselves by making free agreements then those free 
agreements must also be based upon freedom internally as well. Any agreement 
that creates domination or hierarchy negates the assumptions underlying the 
agreement and makes itself null and void. In other words, voluntary government 
is still government and a defining characteristic of an anarchy must be, 
surely, "no government" and "no rulers."
</p><p>
This is most easily seen in the extreme case of the slave contract. John 
Stuart Mill stated that such a contract would be "null and void." He argued
that an individual may voluntarily choose to enter such a contract but
in so doing <i>"he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it
beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the
very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of
himself. . .The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be
free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his
freedom."</i> He adds that <i>"these reasons, the force of which is so 
conspicuous in this particular case, are evidently of far wider 
application."</i> [quoted by Pateman, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 171-2]
</p><p>
And it is such an application that defenders of capitalism fear (Mill did
in fact apply these reasons wider and unsurprisingly became a supporter of 
a market syndicalist form of socialism). If we reject slave contracts as 
illegitimate then, logically, we must also reject <b>all</b> contracts that 
express qualities similar to slavery (i.e. deny freedom) including wage 
slavery. Given that, as David Ellerman points out, <i>"the voluntary slave . . . 
and the employee cannot in fact take their will out of their intentional actions 
so that they could be 'employed' by the master or employer"</i> we are left 
with <i>"the rather implausible assertion that a person can vacate his or her 
will for eight or so hours a day for weeks, months, or years on end but cannot 
do so for a working lifetime."</i> [<b>Property and Contract in Economics</b>, 
p. 58] This is Rothbard's position.
</p><p>
The implications of supporting voluntary slavery is quite devastating 
for all forms of right-wing "libertarianism." This was proven by Ellerman
when he wrote an extremely robust defence of it under the pseudonym 
"J. Philmore" called <b>The Libertarian Case for Slavery</b> (first published
in <b>The Philosophical Forum</b>, xiv, 1982). This classic rebuttal takes the 
form of "proof by contradiction" (or <b>reductio ad absurdum</b>) whereby he 
takes the arguments of right-libertarianism to their logical end and shows how 
they reach the memorably conclusion that the <i>"time has come for liberal 
economic and political thinkers to stop dodging this issue and to 
critically re-examine their shared prejudices about certain voluntary 
social institutions . . . this critical process will inexorably drive 
liberalism to its only logical conclusion: libertarianism that finally 
lays the true moral foundation for economic and political slavery."</i>
Ellerman shows how, from a right-"libertarian" perspective there is a 
<i>"fundamental contradiction"</i> in a modern liberal society for the state 
to prohibit slave contracts. He notes that there <i>"seems to be a basic 
shared prejudice of liberalism that slavery is inherently involuntary, 
so the issue of genuinely voluntary slavery has received little scrutiny. 
The perfectly valid liberal argument that involuntary slavery is inherently 
unjust is thus taken to include voluntary slavery (in which case, the 
argument, by definition, does not apply).  This has resulted in an 
abridgement of the freedom of contract in modern liberal society."</i> Thus it 
is possible to argue for a <i>"civilised form of contractual slavery."</i> 
["J. Philmore,", <b>Op. Cit.</b>] 
</p><p>
So accurate and logical was Ellerman's article that many of its readers
were convinced it <b>was</b> written by a right-"libertarian" (including, we 
have to say, us!). One such writer was Carole Pateman, who correctly noted
that <i>"[t]here is a nice historical irony here. In the American South, 
slaves were emancipated and turned into wage labourers, and now American 
contractarians argue that all workers should have the opportunity to turn 
themselves into civil slaves."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 63]).
</p><p>
The aim of Ellerman's article was to show the problems that employment (wage 
labour) presents for the concept of self-government and how contract need
not result in social relationships based on freedom. As "Philmore" put it, 
<i>"[a]ny thorough and decisive critique of voluntary slavery or constitutional 
non-democratic government would carry over to the employment contract -- 
which is the voluntary contractual basis for the free-market 
free-enterprise system.  Such a critique would thus be a <b>reductio ad 
absurdum</b>."</i> As <i>"contractual slavery"</i> is an <i>"extension of the employer-employee 
contract,"</i> he shows that the difference between wage labour and slavery is 
the time scale rather than the principle or social relationships involved.
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>] This explains why the early workers' movement called 
capitalism <i><b>"wage slavery"</b></i> and why anarchists still do. It 
exposes the unfree nature of capitalism and the poverty of its vision of
freedom. While it is possible to present wage labour as "freedom" due to 
its "consensual" nature, it becomes much harder to do so when talking about 
slavery or dictatorship (and let us not forget that Nozick also had no problem
with autocracy -- see <a href="secB4.html">section B.4</a>). Then the 
contradictions are exposed for all to see and be horrified by.
</p><p>
All this does not mean that we must reject free agreement. Far from it! Free
agreement is <b>essential</b> for a society based upon individual dignity and
liberty. There are a variety of forms of free agreement and anarchists
support those based upon co-operation and self-management (i.e. individuals
working together as equals). Anarchists desire to create relationships
which reflect (and so express) the liberty that is the basis of free 
agreement. Capitalism creates relationships that deny liberty. The opposition 
between autonomy and subjection can only be maintained by modifying or
rejecting contract theory, something that capitalism cannot do and so the 
right-wing "libertarian" rejects autonomy in favour of subjection (and so 
rejects socialism in favour of capitalism).
</p><p> 
So the real contrast between genuine libertarians and right-"libertarians" is 
best expressed in their respective opinions on slavery. Anarchism is based 
upon the individual whose individuality depends upon the maintenance of 
free relationships with other individuals. If individuals deny their
capacities for self-government through a contract the individuals bring 
about a qualitative change in their relationship to others -- freedom is 
turned into mastery and subordination. For the anarchist, slavery is thus 
the paradigm of what freedom is <b>not</b>, instead of an exemplification of 
what it is (as right-"libertarians" state). As Proudhon argued: 
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"If I were asked to answer the following question: What is slavery? and 
I should answer in one word, It is murder, my meaning would be understood 
at once. No extended argument would be required to show that the power to 
take from a man his thought, his will, his personality, is a power of life 
and death; and that to enslave a man is to kill him."</i> [<b>What is Property?</b>, 
p. 37]
</p><p></blockquote>
In contrast, the right-"libertarian" effectively argues that "I support slavery 
because I believe in liberty." It is a sad reflection of the ethical and 
intellectual bankruptcy of our society that such an "argument" is actually 
proposed by some people under the name of liberty. The concept of "slavery as 
freedom" is far too Orwellian to warrant a critique -- we will leave it up to 
right-"libertarians" to corrupt our language and ethical standards with an attempt
to prove it.
</p><p>
From the basic insight that slavery is the opposite of freedom, the anarchist 
rejection of authoritarian social relations quickly follows:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"Liberty is inviolable. I can neither sell nor alienate my liberty; every
contract, every condition of a contract, which has in view the alienation or
suspension of liberty, is null: the slave, when he plants his foot upon the
soil of liberty, at that moment becomes a free man . . . Liberty is the original 
condition of man; to renounce liberty is to renounce the nature of man: after 
that, how could we perform the acts of man?"</i> [P.J. Proudhon, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 67]
</p><p></blockquote>
The employment contract (i.e. wage slavery) abrogates liberty. It is based
upon inequality of power and <i>"exploitation is a consequence of the fact 
that the sale of labour power entails the worker's subordination."</i> [Carole
Pateman, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 149] Hence Proudhon's support for self-management 
and opposition to capitalism -- any relationship that resembles slavery is 
illegitimate and no contract that creates a relationship of subordination is 
valid. Thus in a truly anarchistic society, slave contracts would be unenforceable 
-- people in a truly free (i.e. non-capitalist) society would <b>never</b> 
tolerate such a horrible institution or consider it a valid agreement. If 
someone was silly enough to sign such a contract, they would simply have to 
say they now rejected it in order to be free -- such contracts are
made to be broken and without the force of a law system (and private
defence firms) to back it up, such contracts will stay broken.
</p><p>
The right-"libertarian" support for slave contracts (and wage slavery) 
indicates that their ideology has little to do with liberty and far more 
to do with justifying property and the oppression and exploitation it 
produces. Their theoretical support for permanent and temporary voluntary 
slavery and autocracy indicates a deeper authoritarianism which negates 
their claims to be libertarians.
</p>

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