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<title>I.6 What about the "Tragedy of the Commons"?</title>
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<h1>I.6 What about the <i>"Tragedy of the Commons"</i>?</h1>

<p>
The term <i>"Tragedy of the Commons"</i> is a phrase which is used to
describe why, according to some, commonly owned resources will be 
destructively overused. The term was first coined by Garret Hardin 
in December 1968. [<i>"The Tragedy of the Commons"</i>, <b>Science</b>, 
Vol. 162, No. 3859, pp. 1243-1248] It quickly became popular with 
those arguing against any form of collective ownership or socialism 
and would be the basis for many arguments for privatisation.
</p><p>
Unsurprisingly, given its popularity with defenders of capitalism and
neo-classical economists, Hardin's argument was a pure thought experiment
with absolutely no empirical evidence to support it. He suggested a
scenario in which commonly owned pasture was open to all local herdsmen
to feed their cattle on. Completing this assumption with the standard 
ones of neo-classical economics, with Hardin arguing that each herdsman 
would try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons to maximise 
their income. This would result in overgrazing and environmental destruction
as the cost of each feeding addition animals is shouldered by all who 
use the commons while the benefits accrue to the individual herdsman.
However, what is individually rational becomes collectively irrational 
when each herdsman, acting in isolation, does the same thing. The net
result of the individual's actions is the ending of the livelihood of 
<b>every</b> herdsman as the land becomes overused. 
</p><p>
His article was used to justify both nationalisation and privatisation
of communal resources (the former often a precursor for the latter).
As state ownership fell out of favour, the lesson of this experiment 
in logic was as uniform as it was simple: only privatisation of 
common resources could ensure their efficient use and stop them being 
overused and destroyed. Coming as it before the rise of neo-liberalism
in the 1970s, Hardin's essay was much referenced by those
seeking to privatise nationalised industries and eliminate communal
institutions in tribal societies in the Third World. That these resulted
in wealth being concentrated in a few hands should come as no surprise.
</p><p>
Needless to say, there are numerous problems with Hardin's analysis. Most
fundamentally, it was a pure thought experiment and, as such, was not 
informed by historical or current practice. In other words, it did not 
reflect the reality of the commons as a social institution. The so-called 
<i>"Tragedy of the Commons"</i> was no such thing. It is actually an 
imposition of the <i>"tragedy of the free-for-all"</i> to communally 
owned resources (in this case, land). In reality, commons were <b>never</b> 
<i>"free for all"</i> resources and while the latter may be see overuse 
and destruction the former managed to survive thousands of years. So, 
unfortunately for the supporters of private property who so regularly 
invoke the <i>"Tragedy of the Commons"</i>, they simply show their 
ignorance of what true commons are. As socialist Allan Engler points 
out: 
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"Supporters of capitalism cite what they call the tragedy of 
the commons to explain the wanton plundering of forests, fish and 
waterways, but common property is not the problem. When property 
was held in common by tribes, clans and villages, people took no
more than their share and respected the rights of others. They cared for
common property and when necessary acted together to protect it against
those who would damage it. Under capitalism, there is no common property.
(Public property is a form of private property, property owned by the 
government as a corporate person.) Capitalism recognises only private
property and free-for-all property. Nobody is responsible for free-for-all
property until someone claims it as his own. He then has a right to do as
he pleases with it, a right that is uniquely capitalist. Unlike common or
personal property, capitalist property is not valued for itself or for its
utility. It is valued for the revenue it produces for its owner. If the
capitalist owner can maximise his revenue by liquidating it, he has the
right to do that."</i> [<b>Apostles of Greed</b>, pp. 58-59]
</blockquote></p><p>
Therefore, as Colin Ward argues, <i>"[l]ocal, popular, control is the
surest way of avoiding the tragedy of the commons."</i> [<b>Reflected in
Water</b>, p. 20] Given that a social anarchist society is a communal,
decentralised one, it will have little to fear from irrational overuse 
or abuse of communally owned and used resources.
</p><p>
So, the <b>real</b> problem is that a lot of economists and sociologists
conflate Hardin's scenario, in which <b>unmanaged</b> resources are free for 
all, with the situation that prevailed in the use of commons which were
communally <b>managed</b> resources in village and tribal communities. 
Historian E.P. Thompson, for example, noted that Hardin was <i>"historically 
uninformed"</i> when he assumed that commons were pastures open to all. The 
commons, in reality, <b>were</b> managed by common agreements between those 
who used them. In an extensive investigation on this subject, Thompson 
showed that the <i>"argument [is] that since resources held in common are 
not owned and protected by anyone, there is an inexorable economic logic 
that dooms them to over-exploitation . . . Despite its common sense air, 
what it overlooks is that commoners themselves were not without common 
sense. Over time and over space the users of commons have developed a 
rich variety of institutions and community sanctions which have effected 
restraints and stints upon use . . . As the old . . . institutions lapsed, 
so they fed into a vacuum in which political influence, market forces, and 
popular assertion contested with each other without common rules."</i> 
[<b>Customs in Common</b>, p. 108fn and p. 107] Colin Ward points to a 
more recent example, that of Spain after the victory of Franco:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"The water history of Spain demonstrates that the tragedy of the commons
is not the one identified by Garrett Hardin. Communal control developed
an elaborate and sophisticated system of fair shares for all. The private 
property recommended by Hardin resulted in the selfish individualism that 
he thought was inevitable with common access, or in the lofty indifference 
of the big landowners."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 27]
</blockquote></p><p>
So, for a while, Hardin's essay <i>"was taken to provide an argument
for the privatisation of the commons. It is now a well-developed point 
that Hardin's argument is not a tragedy of common ownership at all . . . 
Hardin's argument is a problem not of common ownership, but of open 
access in a context of private ownership of particular assets."</i>
[John O'Neill, <B>Markets, Deliberation and Environment</b>, p. 54]
Significantly, Hardin later admitted his mistake and noted that <i>"it 
is clear to me that the title of my original contribution should have been
<b>The Tragedy of the</b> Unmanaged <b>Commons</b> . . . I can understand
how I might have misled others."</i> [quoted by O'Neill, <b>Op. Cit.</b>,
p. 199] But, of course, by then the damage had been done.
</p><p>
There is something quite arrogant about Hardin's assertions, as he basically 
assumed that peasant farmers are unable to recognise certain disaster and 
change their behaviour accordingly. This, apparently, is where enlightened 
elites (governmental and economic) step in. However, in the real world, small 
farmers (and others) have created their own institutions and rules for 
preserving resources and ensuring that their community has the resources
it needed to survive. Hardin, in other words, ignored what actually happens 
in a real commons, namely communal control and self-regulation by the 
communities involved who develop the appropriate communal institutions 
to do so.
</p><p>
Surely, the very obvious fact that humans have lived in societies with
commons for centuries and did not overuse them disproves Hardin's most 
fundamental assumptions. <i>"If we misunderstand the true nature of 
the commons,"</i> argues scientist Susan Jane Buck Cox <i>"we also 
misunderstand the implications of the demise of the traditional, 
commons system. Perhaps what existed in fact was not a 'tragedy of 
the commons' but rather a triumph: that for hundreds of years -- and 
perhaps thousands, although written records do not exist to prove the 
longer era -- land was managed successfully by communities."</i> This
suggests that it is a case of <i>"the myth of the tragedy of the commons"</i>, 
rooted in an argument which is <i>"historically false"</i> as the
<i>"commons were carefully and painstakingly regulated."</i> She
points to a wider issue, namely whether <i>"our perceptions of the nature 
of humankind are awry"</i> for <i>"it seems quite likely if 'economic man' 
had been managing the commons that tragedy really would have occurred,"</i> 
so <i>"perhaps someone else was running the common."</i> [<i>"No Tragedy on 
the Commons"</i>, pp. 49-61, <b>Environmental Ethics</b>, vol. 7, p. 60,
p. 53, p. 56 and p. 61]
</p><p>
One economist has noted that the "tragedy of the commons" only makes sense
once the assumption of neo-classical economics are taken for granted. If
we assume atomised individuals accessing unmanaged lands then Hardin's
conclusions automatically flow. However, <i>"if the property were <b>really</b> 
common, this would imply the necessary existence of institutional agreements 
. . . between the co-owners to establish the rules for decisions governing 
the management of the resource. To put it more clearly, for common property 
to be truly common property implies its existence as an institution."</i>
It is precisely these kinds of human institutions which neo-classical
economics ignores and so <i>"the so-called 'tragedy of the commons' is 
more accurately considered 'the tragedy of a methodological individualism'"</i>.
As many critics note, there are numerous <i>"conceptual errors"</i> contained
in the article and these <i>"have been repeated systematically by economists."</i>
In summary, <i>"the so-called tragedy of the commons has nothing to do with 
common property, but with unrestricted and unregulated access."</i>
[F. Aguilera-Klink, <i>"Some Notes on the Misuse of Classic Writings in
Economics on the Subject of Common Property"</i>, pp. 221-8, <b>Ecological 
Economics</b>, No. 9, p. 223, p. 221, p. 224 and p. 226]
</p><p>
Much the same can be said against those who argue that the experience of the
Stalinism in the Eastern Block and elsewhere shows that public property leads 
to pollution and destruction of natural resources. Such arguments also show a 
lack of awareness of what common property actually is (it is no co-incidence 
that the propertarian-right use such an argument). This is because the resources 
in question, as we discussed in <a href="secB3.html#secb35">section B.3.5</a>, 
were <b>not</b> owned or managed in common -- the fact that these countries 
were dictatorships excluded popular control of resources. Thus Stalinism 
does not, in fact, show the dangers of having commons or public ownership.
Rather it shows the danger of not subjecting those who manage a resource to 
public control (and it is no co-incidence that the USA is far more polluted 
than Western Europe -- in the USA, like in the USSR, the controllers of 
resources are not subject to popular control and so pass pollution on to 
the public). Stalinism shows the danger of state owned resource use 
(nationalisation) rather than commonly owned resource use (socialisation),
particularly when the state in question is not under even the limited
control of its subjects implied in representative democracy.
</p><p>
This confusion of public and state owned resources has, of course, been 
used to justify the stealing of communal property by the rich and the 
state. The continued acceptance of this "confusion" in political debate,
like the continued use of Hardin's original and flawed <i>"Tragedy of
the Commons"</i>, is due to the utility of the theory for the rich and 
powerful, who have a vested interest in undermining pre-capitalist social 
forms and stealing communal resources. Most examples used to justify the 
<i>"tragedy of the commons"</i> are <b>false</b> examples, based on 
situations in which the underlying social context is assumed to be 
radically different from that involved in using true commons.
</p><p>
In reality, the <i>"tragedy of the commons"</i> comes about only after 
wealth and private property, backed by the state, starts to eat into 
and destroy communal life. This is well indicated by the fact that 
commons existed for thousands of years and only disappeared after 
the rise of capitalism -- and the powerful central state it requires 
-- had eroded communal values and traditions. Without the influence of 
wealth concentrations and the state, people get together and come to 
agreements over how to use communal resources and have been doing so 
for millennia. That was how the commons were successfully managed before
the wealthy sought to increase their holdings and deny the poor access
to land in order to make them fully dependent on the power and whims of
the owning class.
</p><p>
Thus, as Kropotkin stressed, the state <i>"systematically weeded out all
institutions in which the mutual-aid tendency had formerly found its 
expression. The village communities were bereft of their folkmotes, 
their courts and independent administration; their lands were confiscated."</i>
[<b>Mutual Aid</b>, p. 182] The possibilities of free discussion and agreement 
were destroyed in the name of "absolute" property rights and the power and 
authority which goes with them. Both political influence and market forces 
were, and are, dominated by wealth: <i>"There were two occasions that 
dictated absolute precision: a trial at law and a process of enclosure. 
And both occasions favoured those with power and purses against the 
little users."</i> Popular assertion meant little when the state 
enforces property rights in the interests of the wealthy. Ultimately, 
<i>"Parliament and law imposed capitalist definitions to exclusive 
property in land."</i> [Thompson, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 134 and p. 163] 
As Cox suggested, many tenants were <i>"denied [their] remedy at law for 
the illegal abuses of the more powerful landowners"</i> and <i>"[s]ponsored 
by wealthy landowners, the land reform was frequently no more than a 
sophisticated land-grab."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 58 and p. 59] Gerrard 
Winstanley, the Digger (and proto-anarchist), was only expressing a 
widespread popular sentiment when he complained that <i>"in Parishes where 
Commons lie the rich Norman Freeholders, or the new (more covetous) Gentry 
overstock the Commons with sheep and cattle, so that the inferior Tenants 
and poor labourers can hardly keep a cow but half starve her."</i> [quoted 
by Maurice Dobb, <b>Studies in the Development of Capitalism</b>, p. 173] 
The working class is only "left alone" to starve. 
</p><p>
As discussed in <a href="secF8.html">section F.8</a>, the enclosures were
part of a wider state-imposition of capitalism onto society. Of course, 
enclosure was often justified by supporters of capitalism by the 
increased productivity which, they claim, resulted from it (in 
effect, repeating Locke's earlier, and flawed, argument -- see
<a href="secB3.html#secb34">section B.3.4</a>). There are three objections 
to this. First, it cannot be assumed that increased productivity could not
be achieved by keeping the commons and by the commoners applying the 
improved techniques and technologies that contributed to any post-enclosure 
increased productivity. Second, it ignores the key issue of liberty and 
replaces it with property (increases in wealth being considered more 
important than reducing the freedom of the working class). Third, and more 
importantly, this paternalistic rationale for coercion and state action 
does not fit well with such apologist's opposition to (certain forms of) 
state intervention today (such as taxation or popular land reform). If 
the "ends justify the means" (which is what their arguments boil down to) 
when applied to the rural working class, then they have little basis for 
opposing taxation of the wealthy elite or pro-worker land-reform in a 
democracy or a popular social revolution.
</p><p>
To conclude. The "tragedy of the commons" argument is conceptually flawed 
and empirically wrong (unsurprising, given that no actual empirical 
evidence was presented to support the argument). Sadly, this has not 
stopped Hardin, or those inspired by his arguments, from suggesting 
policies based on a somewhat dubious understanding of history and humanity. 
Perhaps this is not that surprising, given that Hardin's assumptions 
(which drive his conclusions) are based not on actual people nor 
historical evidence but rather by fundamental components of 
capitalist economic theory. While under capitalism, and the 
short-termism imposed by market forces, you could easily imagine 
that a desire for profit would outweigh a person's interest in the 
long-term survival of their community, such a perspective is relatively 
recent in human history.
</p><p>
In fact, communal ownership produces a strong incentive to protect such
resources for people are aware that their offspring will need
them and so be inclined to look after them. By having more resources
available, they would be able to resist the pressures of short-termism
and so resist maximising current production without regard for the future.
Capitalist owners have the opposite incentive for, as argued in 
<a href="secE3.html">section E.3</a>,
unless they maximise short-term profits then they will not be around in
the long-term (so if wood means more profits than centuries-old forests
then the trees will be chopped down). By combining common ownership with
decentralised and federated communal self-management, anarchism will be
more than able to manage resources effectively, avoiding the pitfalls of
both privatisation and nationalisation.
</p>

<a name="seci61"><h2>I.6.1 How can property <i>"owned by everyone in the 
world"</i> be used?</h2></a>

<p>
First, we need to point out the fallacy normally lying behind this
objection. It is assumed that because everyone owns something, then
everyone has to be consulted in what it is used for. This, however,
applies the logic of private property to non-capitalist social forms.
While it is true that everyone owns collective "property" in an anarchist
society, it does not mean that everyone <b>uses</b> it. Carlo Cafiero, one
of the founders of communist-anarchism, stated the obvious:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"The common wealth being scattered right across the planet, while
belonging by right to the whole of humanity, those who happen to
be within reach of that wealth and in a position to make use of it
will utilise it in common. The folk from a given country will use
the land, the machines, the workshops, the houses, etc., of that
country and they will all make common use of them. As part of
humanity, they will exercise here, in fact and directly, their
rights over a portion of mankind's wealth. But should an inhabitant
of Peking visit this country, he [or she] would enjoy the same
rights as the rest: in common with the others, he would enjoy
all the wealth of the country, just as he [or she] would have
in Peking."</i> [<b>No Gods, No Masters</b>, vol. 1, p. 250]
</blockquote></p><p>
Anarchists, therefore, think that those who <b>use</b> a part of society's 
wealth have the most say in what happens to it (e.g., workers control 
the means of production they use and the work they do when using it). 
This does not mean that those using it can do what they like to it. 
Users would be subject to recall by local communities if they are 
abusing their position (for example, if a workplace were polluting the 
environment, then the local community could act to stop or, if need
be, close down the workplace). Thus use rights (or usufruct) replace 
property rights in a free society, combined with a strong dose of 
<i>"think globally, act locally."</i> 
</p><p>
It is no coincidence that societies that are stateless are also without 
private property. As Murray Bookchin pointed out <i>"an individual 
appropriation of goods, a personal claim to tools, land, and other 
resources . . . is fairly common in organic [i.e. aboriginal] societies 
. . . By the same token, co-operative work and the sharing of resources 
on a scale that could be called communistic is also fairly common . . . 
But primary to both of these seemingly contrasting relationships is the 
practice of <b>usufruct.</b>"</i> Such stateless societies are based 
upon <i>"the principle of <b>usufruct</b>, the freedom of individuals 
in a community to appropriate resources merely by the virtue of the 
fact they are using them . . . Such resources belong to the user as 
long as they are being used. Function, in effect, replaces our hallowed 
concept of possession."</i> [<b>The Ecology of Freedom</b>, p. 116] 
The future stateless society anarchists hope for would also be based upon 
such a principle.
</p><p> 
In effect, critics of social anarchism confuse property 
with possession and think that abolishing property automatically abolishes 
possession and use rights. However, as argued in 
<a href="secB3.html">section B.3</a>, 
property and possession are distinctly different. In the words of Charlotte 
Wilson:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"<b>Property</b> is the <b>domination</b> of an individual, or a 
coalition of individuals, over things; it is not the claim of any 
person or persons to the use of things -- this is, usufruct, a very 
different matter. Property means the monopoly of wealth, the right 
to prevent others using it, whether the owner needs it or not. Usufruct 
implies the claim to the use of such wealth as supplies the users needs. 
If any individual shuts of a portion of it (which he is not using, and 
does not need for his own use) from his fellows, he is defrauding the 
whole community."</i> [<b>Anarchist Essays</b>, p. 40]
</blockquote></p><p>
Thus an anarchist society has a simple and effective means of deciding
how communally owned resources are used, one based on possession and
usufruct. The key thing to remember, as discussed in 
<a href="secI3.html#seci33">section I.3.3</a>, 
is that socialisation means that <b>access</b> is free:
users of a resource are not subjected to hierarchical social relationships 
in order to use it. Socialisation does not mean that people can, say, 
wander into someone's workplace and simply take away a machine or computer. 
Rather, it means that when someone joins a workplace they are sharing in
the use of a common resource and do so as a free and equal associate rather 
than as an obedient wage-slave. If a resource is not being used, then they
have free access to use it. If it is being used then it will be managed by
those who use it, with access granted in agreed ways which ensure egalitarian,
and so free, relationships and outcomes.
</p><p>
As for deciding what a given area of commons is used for, that falls 
to the local communities who live next to them. If, for example, a
local self-managed factory wants to expand and eat into the commons, 
then the local community who uses (and so controls) the local commons 
would discuss it and come to an agreement concerning it. If a minority 
<b>really</b> objects, they can use direct action to put their point across. 
But anarchists argue that rational debate among equals will not result 
in too much of that. Or suppose an individual wanted to set up an allotment
in a given area, which had not been allocated as a park. Then he or she
would notify the community assembly by appropriate means (e.g. on a notice
board or newspaper), and if no one objected at the next assembly or in a
set time-span, the allotment would go ahead, as no one else desired to use
the resource in question.
</p><p>
Other communities would be confederated with this one, and joint activity
would also be discussed by debate, with a community (like an individual)
being free <b>not</b> to associate if they so desire. Other communities could
and would object to ecologically and individually destructive practices.
The interrelationships of both ecosystems and freedom is well known, and
its doubtful that free individuals would sit back and let some amongst
them destroy <b>their</b> planet.
</p><p>
Therefore, those who use something control it. This means that "users
groups" would be created to manage resources used by more than one person.
For workplaces this would (essentially) be those who worked there (with,
possibly, the input of consumer groups and co-operatives). Housing
associations made up of tenants would manage housing  and repairs. 
Resources that are used by associations within society, such as communally
owned schools, workshops, computer networks, and so forth, would be
managed on a day-to-day basis by those who use them. User groups would
decide access rules (for example, time-tables and booking rules) and how
they are used, making repairs and improvements. Such groups would be
accountable to their local community. Hence, if that community thought
that any activities by a group within it was  destroying communal
resources or restricting access to them, the matter would be discussed 
at the relevant assembly. In this way, interested parties manage their 
own activities and the resources they use (and so would be very likely 
to have an interest in ensuring their proper and effective use), but
without private property and its resulting hierarchies and restrictions 
on freedom.
</p><p>
Lastly, let us examine clashes of use rights, i.e. cases where two or 
more people, communes or syndicates desire to use the same resource. 
In general, such problems can be resolved by discussion and decision
making by those involved. This process would be roughly as follows: if
the contesting parties are reasonable, they would probably mutually agree
to allow their dispute to be settled by some mutual friend whose judgement
they could trust, or they would place it in the hands of a jury, randomly
selected from the community or communities in question. This would take
place only if they could not come to an agreement between themselves to share
the resource in question. 
</p><p>
On thing is certain, however, such disputes are much better settled without
the interference of authority or the re-creation of private property. If
those involved do not take the sane course described above and instead
decide to set up an authority, disaster will be the inevitable result. 
In the first place, this authority will have to be given power to enforce 
its judgement in such matters. If this happens, the new authority will 
undoubtedly keep for itself the best of what is disputed (as payment for
services rendered, of course!). If private property were re-introduced, 
such authoritarian bodies would develop sooner, rather than later, with two 
new classes of oppressors being created -- the property owners and the
enforcers of "justice." Ultimately, it is strange to think that two 
parties who meet on terms of equality and disagree could not be 
reasonable or just, and that a third party with power backed up by violence 
will be the incarnation of justice itself. Common sense should warn us 
against such an illusion and, if common sense is lacking, then history 
shows that using authority or property to solve disputes is not wise!
</p><p>
And, we should note, it is equally as fallacious, as Leninists suggest,
that only centralisation can ensure common access and common use. 
Centralisation, by removing control from the users into a body 
claiming to represent "society", replaces the dangers of abuse by a 
small group of workers with the dangers of abuse by a bureaucracy invested 
with power and authority over <b>all</b>. If members of a 
commune or syndicate can abuse their position and restrict access for 
their own benefit, so can the individuals who make up the bureaucracy
gathered round a centralised body (whether that body is, in theory, 
accountable by election or not). Indeed, it is far more likely to occur
as the experience of Leninism shows beyond doubt. Thus <b>decentralisation</b> 
is the key to common ownership and access, <b>not</b> centralisation.
</p><p>
Communal ownership needs communal structures in order to function. Use
rights, and discussion among equals, replace property rights in a free
society. Freedom cannot survive if it is caged behind laws enforced by
public or private states. 
</p>

<a name="seci62"><h2>I.6.2 Doesn't communal ownership involve restricting 
individual liberty?</h2></a>

<p>
This point is expressed in many different forms. John Henry MacKay (an
individualist anarchist) put the point as follows:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"'Would you [the social anarchist], in the system of society which you 
call 'free Communism' prevent individuals from exchanging their labour  
among themselves by means of their own medium of exchange? And further: 
Would you prevent them from occupying land for the purpose of personal 
use?' . . . [The] question was not to be escaped. If he answered 'Yes!' 
he admitted that society had the right of control over the individual and 
threw overboard the autonomy of the individual which he had always zealously
defended; if on the other hand he answered 'No!' he admitted  the right 
of private property which he had just denied so emphatically."</i> 
[<b>Patterns of Anarchy</b>, p. 31]
</blockquote></p><p>
However, anarchist theory has a simple and clear answer to this question. 
To see what this answer is, it simply a case of remembering that use 
rights replace property rights in an anarchist society. In other words, 
individuals can exchange their labour as they see fit and occupy land 
for their own use. This in no way contradicts the abolition of private
property, because occupancy and use is directly opposed to private
property (see <a href="secB3.html">section B.3</a>). Socialisation is
rooted in this concept of <i>"occupancy and use"</i> and this means that
in a free communist society individuals can occupy and use whatever land 
and such tools and equipment as they need -- they do not have to join 
the free communist society (see <a href="secI5.html#seci57">section I.5.7</a>).
If they do not, however, they cannot place claims on the benefits 
others receive from co-operation and communal life. 
</p><p>
This can be seen from Charlotte Wilson's discussions on anarchism
written a few years before MacKay published his <i>"inescapable"</i> 
question. She asks the question: <i>"Does Anarchism . . . then . . . 
acknowledge . . . no personal property?"</i> She answers by 
noting that <i>"every man [or woman] is free to take what he 
[or she] requires"</i> and so <i>"it is hardly conceivable that
personal necessaries and conveniences will not be appropriated"</i>
by individual's for their personal consumption and use. For 
<i>"[w]hen property is protected by no legal enactments, backed 
by armed force, and is unable to buy personal service, its 
resuscitation on such a scale as to be dangerous to society is 
little to be dreaded. The amount appropriated by each individual 
. . . must be left to his [or her] own conscience, and the pressure 
exercised upon him [or her] by the moral sense and distinct interests 
of his [or her] neighbours."</i> This system of <i>"usufruct"</i>
would also apply to the <i>"instruments of production -- land 
included"</i>, being <i>"free to all workers, or groups of workers"</i> 
for <i>"as long as long and capital are unappropriated, the workers 
are free, and that, when these have a master, the workers also are 
slaves."</i> [<b>Anarchist Essays</b>, p. 24 and p. 21] This is 
because, as with all forms of anarchism, communist-anarchism
bases itself on the distinction between property and possession.
</p><p>
In other words, <b>possession</b> replaces private property in a 
free society. This applies to those who decide to join a free 
communist society and those who desire to remain outside. This 
is clear from the works of many leading theorists of free communism 
(as indicated in <a href="secG2.html#secg21">section G.2.1</a>), none 
of whom thought the occupying of land for personal use (or a house or 
the means of production) entailed the <i>"right of private property."</i> 
For example, looking at land we find both Kropotkin and Proudhon arguing 
along the same lines. For the former: <i>"Who, then, can appropriate for 
himself the tiniest plot of ground . . . without committing a flagrant 
injustice?"</i> [<b>Conquest of Bread</b>, p. 90] For the latter: <i>"The 
land cannot be appropriated"</i>. Neither denied that individuals could 
<b>use</b> the land or other resources, simply that it could not be 
turned into private property. Thus Proudhon: <i>"Every occupant is, 
then, necessarily a possessor or usufructuary, -- a function that 
excludes proprietorship."</i> [<b>What is Property?</b>, p. 103 
and p. 98] Obviously John Henry MacKay, unlike Kropotkin, had not 
read his Proudhon! As Wilson argued:
</p><p><blockquote><i>
"Proudhon's famous dictum, 'Property is theft', is the key to
the equally famous enigma . . . 'From each according to his
capacities, to each according to his needs'. When the workers
clearly understand that in taking possession of railways and
ships, mines and fields, farm buildings and factories, raw
material and machinery, and all else they need for their labour, 
they are claiming the right to use freely for the benefit of 
society, what social labour has created, or utilised in the 
past, and that, in return for their work, they have a just 
right to take from the finished product whatever they 
personally require."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 20-1]
</blockquote>
</p><p>
This can be seen from libertarian communist William Morris and 
his account of Proudhon. Morris classed the French anarchist as 
<i>"the most noteworthy figure"</i> of a group of <i>"Socialist 
thinkers who serve as a kind of link between the Utopians and the 
school of . . . scientific Socialists."</i> As far as his critique 
of property went, Morris argued that in <b>What is Property?</b> 
Proudhon's <i>"position is that of a Communist pure and simple."</i>
[<b>Political Writings</b>, p. 569 and p. 570] 
</p><p>
Unsurprisingly, then, we find Kropotkin arguing that <i>"[a]ll 
things belong to all, and provided that men and women contribute 
their share of labour for the production of necessary objects, 
they are entitled to their share of all that is produced by the 
community at large."</i>  He went on to state that <i>"free Communism 
. . . places the products reaped or manufactured in common at the 
disposal of all, leaving to each the liberty to consume them 
as he [or she] pleases in his [or her] own home."</i> [<b>The 
Place of Anarchism in Socialistic Evolution,</b>, p. 6 and p. 7] 
This obviously implies a situation of <i>"occupancy and use"</i> 
(with those who are actually using a resource controlling it). 
</p><p>
This support for possession does not, of course, imply any contradiction 
with communism as MacKay suggested. The aim of communism is to place the 
fruits of society at the disposal of society, to be used and consumed as 
the members of that society desire. As such, individuals are <b>not</b> 
stopped from taking and using the goods produced and, obviously, this 
automatically means "excluding" others from using and consuming them. 
This in no way implies the recreation of private property in any 
meaningful sense. Significantly, this perspective has been pretty 
commonplace in human society and numerous authors have pointed out 
<i>"how many languages lack any verb for unilateral ownership."</i>
[David Graeber, <b>Possibilities</b>, p. 23] 
</p><p>
For example, a group of friends go on a picnic and share the food stuffs 
they bring. If someone takes an apple from the common bounty and eats it, 
then obviously it is no longer available for others to eat. However, this 
does not change the common ownership of foodstuffs the picnic is based on. 
Similarly, in a communist society people would still have their own homes 
and, of course, would have the right to restrict entry to just those whom 
they have invited. People would not come in from the street and take up 
residence in the main bedroom on the dubious rationale that it is not 
being used as the inhabitant is watching TV in the lounge, is on holiday 
or visiting friends. 
</p><p>
Thus communism is based on the obvious fact that individuals will 
"appropriate" (use) the products of society to satisfy their own 
needs (assuming they can find someone who needs to produce it). What 
it does, though, is to deprive individuals of the ability to turn 
possession into private property and, as a result, subjugate others 
to their will by means of wage labour or landlordism. 
</p><p>
In other words, possession (personal "property") is not transformed 
into social property. Hence the communist support for individuals 
<b>not</b> joining the commune, working their land or tools and 
living by their own hands. Being based on <b>possession</b>, this 
is utterly compatible with communist principles and the abolition 
of private property. This is because people are <b>using</b> the 
resources in question and for that simple reason are exercising the 
same rights as the rest of communist society. Thus the case of the 
non-member of free communism is clear -- they would also have access
to what they possessed and used such as the land, housing and means 
of production. The difference is that the non-communists would have 
to barter with the rest of society for goods rather than take what 
they need from the communal stores.
</p><p>
To re-iterate, the resources non-communists use do <b>not</b> become private 
property because they are being used and they revert back into common ownership 
once they are no longer occupied and used. In other words, <b>possession</b> 
replaces <b>property.</b> Thus communist-anarchists agree with Individualist 
Anarchist John Beverley Robinson when he wrote:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"There are two kinds of land ownership, proprietorship or property, by
which the owner is absolute lord of the land to use it or hold it out
of use, as it may please him; and possession, by which he is secure in
the tenure of land which he uses and occupies, but has no claim on it
at all if he ceases to use it. For the secure possession of his crops
or buildings or other products, he needs nothing but the possession
of the land he uses."</i> [<b>Patterns of Anarchy</b>, p. 273]
</blockquote></p><p>
This system, we must note, was used in the rural collectives during the
Spanish Revolution, with people free to remain outside the collective
working only as much land and equipment as they could <i>"occupy and use"</i> 
by their own labour. Similarly, the individuals within the collective
worked in common and took what they needed from the communal stores (see 
<a href="secI8.html">section I.8</a>). 
</p><p>
MacKay's comments raise another interesting point. Given that Individualist
Anarchists oppose the current system of private property in land, <b>their</b>
system entails that <i>"society ha[s] the right of control over the individual."</i> 
If we look at the <i>"occupancy and use"</i> land system favoured by the likes
of Tucker, we discover that it is based on restricting property in land (and so 
the owners of land). As discussed in <a href="secG1.html#secg12">section G.1.2</a>,
the likes of Tucker looked forward to a time when public opinion (i.e., society) 
would limit the amount of land which individuals could acquire and so, from 
MacKay's perspective, controlling their actions and violating their autonomy. 
Which, we must say, is not surprising as individualism requires the supremacy
of the rest of society over the individual in terms of rules relating to the 
ownership and use of possessions (or "property") -- as the Individualist 
Anarchists themselves implicitly acknowledge.
</p><p>
MacKay goes on to state that <i>"every serious man must declare
himself: for Socialism, and thereby for force and against liberty, or for
Anarchism, and thereby for liberty and against force."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 32] Which, we must note, is a strange statement for, as indicated in
<a href="secG1.html">section G.1</a>, individualist anarchists like Benjamin 
Tucker considered themselves socialists and opposed capitalist private property 
(while, confusingly, many of them calling their system of possession "property").
</p><p>
However, MacKay's statement begs the question: does private property 
support liberty?  He does not address or even acknowledge the fact that 
private property will inevitably lead to the owners of such property 
gaining control over the individuals who use, but do not own, it and 
so denying them liberty (see <a href="secB4.html">section B.4</a>). 
As Proudhon argued:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"The purchaser draws boundaries, fences himself in, and says, 'This
is mine; each one by himself, each one for himself.' Here, then, is
a piece of land upon which, henceforth, no one has right to step,
save the proprietor and his friends; which can benefit nobody, save
the proprietor and his servants. Let these multiply, and soon the
people . . . will have nowhere to rest, no place of shelter, no
ground to till. They will die of hunger at the proprietor's door,
on the edge of that property which was their birth-right; and the
proprietor, watching them die, will exclaim, 'So perish idlers
and vagrants.'"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 118]
</blockquote></p><p>
Of course, as Proudhon suggested, the non-owner can gain access to the 
property by becoming a servant, by selling their liberty to the owner
and agreeing to submit to the owner's authority. Little wonder that he 
argued that the <i>"second effect of property is despotism."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 259] As discussed in 
<a href="secG4.html#secg41">section G.4.1</a>, this points to a 
massive contradiction in any form of individualist anarchism which 
defends private property which goes beyond possession and generates 
wage-labour. This is because both the state and the property owner 
<b>both</b> assume sole authority over a given area and all within 
it. Little wonder Emile Pouget, echoing Proudhon, argued that:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"Property and authority are merely differing manifestations and
expressions of one and the same 'principle' which boils down to
the enforcement and enshrinement of the servitude of man. 
Consequently, the only difference between them is one of vantage
point: viewed from one angle, slavery appears as a <b>property
crime</b>, whereas, viewed from a different angle, it constitutes
an <b>authority crime.</b>"</i> [<b>No Gods, No Masters</b>, vol. 2, 
p. 66]
</blockquote></p><p>
So the issue changes if someone claims more resources than they can 
use as individuals or as a co-operative group. If they are attempting 
to restrict access to others of resources they are not using then the 
others are entitled to simply ignore the pretensions of the would-be 
monopoliser. Without a state to enforce capitalist property rights, 
attempts to recreate private property will flounder in the laughter 
of their neighbours as these free people defend their liberty by 
ignoring the would-be capitalist's attempts to subjugate the labour 
of others for their own benefit by monopolising the means of life.
Unsurprisingly, MacKay does not address the fact that private property 
requires extensive force (i.e. a state) to protect it against those 
who use it or could use it but do not own it.
</p><p>
So MacKay ignores two important aspects of private property. Firstly, 
that private property is based upon force, which must be used to 
ensure the owner's right to exclude others (the main reason for the
existence of the state). And secondly, he ignores the anti-libertarian
nature of "property" when it creates wage labour -- the other side of 
"private property" -- in which the liberty of employees is obviously 
restricted by the owners whose property they are hired to use. Unlike
in a free communist society, in which members of a commune have equal
rights, power and say within a self-managed association, under "private 
property" the owner of the property governs those who use it. When the 
owner and the user is identical, this is not a problem (i.e. when 
possession replaces property) but once possession becomes property 
then despotism, as Proudhon noted, is created. As Charlotte Wilson put 
it:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"Property -- not the claim to use, but to a right to prevent others
from using -- enables individuals who have appropriated the means
of production, to hold in subjection all those who possess nothing
. . . and who must work that they may live. No work is possible
without land, materials, and tools or machinery; thus the masters
of those things are the masters also of the destitute workers, and
can live in idleness upon their labour. . .  We look for th[e] 
socialisation of wealth, not to restraints imposed by authority 
upon property, but to the removal, by direct personal action of the 
people themselves, of the restraints which secure property against 
the claims of popular justice. For authority and property are both 
manifestations of the egoistical spirit of domination".</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 57-8]
</blockquote></p><p>
Therefore, it seems that in the name of "liberty" John Henry MacKay 
and a host of other "individualists" end up supporting authority and 
(effectively) some kind of state. This is hardly surprising as private 
property is the opposite of personal possession, not its base. In summary, 
then, far from communal property restricting individual liberty (or even 
personal use of resources) it is in fact its only defence. That is
why all anarchists would agree with Emma Goldman that <i>"it is our 
endeavour to abolish private property, State . . . we aim to free men 
from tyrants and government."</i> [<b>A Documentary History of the 
American Years</b>, vol. 1, p. 181]
</p>

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