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<html>
<head>
<title>F.6 Is "anarcho"-capitalism against the state?
</title>
</head>
<h1>F.6 Is "anarcho"-capitalism against the state?</h1>
<p>
No. Due to its basis in private property, "anarcho"-capitalism implies a
class division of society into bosses and workers. Any such division
will require a state to maintain it. However, it need not be the same
state as exists now. Regarding this point, "anarcho"-capitalism plainly
advocates "defence associations" to protect property. For the
"anarcho"-capitalist these private companies are not states. For
anarchists, they most definitely. As Bakunin put it, the
state <i>"is authority, domination, and force, organised by the
property-owning and so-called enlightened classes against the masses."</i>
[<b>The Basic Bakunin</b>, p. 140] It goes without saying that
"anarcho"-capitalism has a state in the anarchist sense.
</p><p>
According to Murray Rothbard [<b>Society Without A State</b>, p. 192],
a state must have one or both of the following characteristics:
</p><p><ol>
1) The ability to tax those who live within it.<br>
2) It asserts and usually obtains a coerced monopoly of the
provision of defence over a given area.<br>
</ol></p><p>
He makes the same point elsewhere. [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 171]
Significantly, he stresses that <i>"our definition of anarchism"</i> is a system
which <i>"provides no legal sanction"</i> for aggression against person and property
rather than, say, being against government or authority. [<b>Society without
a State</b>, p. 206]
</p><p>
Instead of this, the "anarcho"-capitalist thinks that people should be
able to select their own "defence companies" (which would provide the
needed police) and courts from a free market in "defence" which would
spring up after the state monopoly has been eliminated. These companies
<i>"all . . . would have to abide by the basic law code,"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>,
p. 206] Thus a <i>"general libertarian law code"</i> would govern the
actions of these companies. This "law code" would prohibit coercive
aggression at the very least, although to do so it would have to specify
what counted as legitimate property, how said can be owned and what
actually constitutes aggression. Thus the law code would be quite
extensive.
</p><p>
How is this law code to be actually specified? Would these laws be
democratically decided? Would they reflect common usage (i.e. custom)?
"Supply and demand"? "Natural law"? Given the strong dislike of
democracy shown by "anarcho"-capitalists, we think we can safely say
that some combination of the last two options would be used. Murray
Rothbard argued for "Natural Law" and so the judges in his system would
<i>"not [be] making the law but finding it on the basis of agreed-upon
principles derived either from custom or reason."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>,
p. 206] David Friedman, on the other hand, argues that different defence
firms would sell their own laws. [<b>The Machinery of Freedom</b>, p. 116]
It is sometimes acknowledged that non-"libertarian" laws may be demanded
(and supplied) in such a market although the obvious fact that the rich
can afford to pay for more laws (either in quantity or in terms of being
more expensive to enforce) is downplayed.
</p><p>
Around this system of "defence companies" is a free market in "arbitrators"
and "appeal judges" to administer justice and the <i>"basic law code."</i> Rothbard
believes that such a system would see <i>"arbitrators with the best reputation
for efficiency and probity"</i> being <i>"chosen by the various parties in the
market"</i> and <i>"will come to be given an increasing amount of business."</i>
Judges <i>"will prosper on the market in proportion to their reputation for
efficiency and impartiality."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 199 and p. 204] Therefore,
like any other company, arbitrators would strive for profits with the most
successful ones would <i>"prosper"</i>, i.e. become wealthy. Such wealth would,
of course, have no impact on the decisions of the judges, and if it did, the
population (in theory) are free to select any other judge. Of course, the
competing judges would <b>also</b> be striving for profits and wealth --
which means the choice of character may be somewhat limited! -- and the laws
which they were using to guide their judgements would be enforcing capitalist
rights.
</p><p>
Whether or not this system would work as desired is discussed in the
following sections. We think that it will not. Moreover, we will argue that
"anarcho"-capitalist "defence companies" meet not only the criteria of
statehood we outlined in <a href="secB2.html">section B.2</a>, but also
Rothbard's own criteria for the state. As regards the anarchist criterion,
it is clear that "defence companies" exist to defend private property; that
they are hierarchical (in that they are capitalist companies which defend
the power of those who employ them); that they are professional coercive
bodies; and that they exercise a monopoly of force over a given area (the
area, initially, being the property of the person or company who is
employing the company). Not only that, as we discuss in
<a href="secF6.html#secf64">section F.6.4</a> these "defence companies"
also matches the right-libertarian and "anarcho"-capitalist definition of
the state. For this (and other reasons), we should call the
"anarcho"-capitalist defence firms "private states" -- that is what they
are -- and "anarcho"-capitalism "private state" capitalism.
</p>
<a name="secf61"><h2>F.6.1 What's wrong with this "free market" justice?</h2></a>
<p>
It does not take much imagination to figure out whose interests prosperous
arbitrators, judges and defence companies would defend: their own as well
as those who pay their wages -- which is to say, other members of the rich
elite. As the law exists to defend property, then it (by definition) exists
to defend the power of capitalists against their workers. Rothbard argued
that the <i>"judges"</i> would <i>"not [be] making the law but finding
it on the basis of agreed-upon principles derived either from custom
or reason."</i> [<b>Society without a State</b>, p. 206] However, this begs the
question: <b>whose</b> reason? <b>whose</b> customs? Do individuals in different
classes share the same customs? The same ideas of right and wrong? Would rich
and poor desire the same from a <i>"basic law code"</i>? Obviously not. The
rich would only support a code which defended their power over the poor.
</p><p>
Rothbard does not address this issue. He stated that "anarcho"-capitalism would
involve <i>"taking the largely libertarian common law, and correcting it by the
use of man's reason, before enshrining it as a permanently fixed libertarian
law code."</i> [<i>"On Freedom and the Law"</i>, <b>New Individualist Review</b>, Winter 1962,
p. 40] Needless to say, <i>"man"</i> does not exist -- it is an abstraction
(and a distinctly collectivist one, we should note). There are only individual
men and women and so individuals and <b>their</b> reason. By <i>"man's reason"</i>
Rothbard meant, at best, the prejudices of those individuals with whom he agreed
with or, at worse, his own value judgements. Needless to say, what is considered
acceptable will vary from individual to individual and reflect their social position.
Similarly, as Kropotkin stressed, "common law" does not develop in isolation of class
struggles and so is a mishmash of customs genuinely required by social life and
influences imposed by elites by means of state action. [<b>Anarchism</b>, pp. 204-6]
This implies what should be <i>"corrected"</i> from the "common law" will also differ
based on their class position and their general concepts of what is right and wrong.
History is full of examples of lawyers, jurists and judges (not to mention states)
<i>"correcting"</i> common law and social custom in favour of a propertarian
perspective which, by strange co-incidence, favoured the capitalists and landlords,
i.e. those of the same class as the politicians, lawyers, jurists and judges (see
<a href="secF8.html">section F.8</a> for more details). We can imagine the results
of similar "correcting" of common law by those deemed worthy by Rothbard and his
followers of representing both "man" and "natural law."
</p><p>
Given these obvious points, it should come as no surprise that Rothbard solves
this problem by explicitly excluding the general population from deciding which
laws they will be subject to. As he put it, <i>"it would not be a very difficult
task for Libertarian lawyers and jurists to arrive at a rational and objective
code of libertarian legal principles and procedures . . . This code would then
be followed and applied to specific cases by privately-competitive and free-market
courts and judges, all of whom would be pledged to abide by the code."</i>
[<i>"The Spooner-Tucker Doctrine: An Economist's View"</i>, pp. 5-15, <b>Journal of
Libertarian Studies</b>, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 7] By jurist Rothbard means a professional
or an expert who studies, develops, applies or otherwise deals with the law, i.e. a
lawyer or a judge. That is, law-making by privately-competitive judges and lawyers.
And not only would the law be designed by experts, so would its interpretation:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"If legislation is replaced by such judge-made law fixity and certainty
. . . will replace the capriciously changing edicts of statutory legislation.
The body of judge-made law changes very slowly . . . decisions properly apply
only to the particular case, judge-made law -- in contrast to legislation --
permits a vast body of voluntary, freely-adapted rules, bargains, and arbitrations
to proliferate as needed in society. The twin of the free market economy, then,
is . . . a proliferation of voluntary rules interpreted and applied by experts
in the law."</i> [<i>"On Freedom and the Law"</i>, <b>Op. Cit.</b> p. 38]
</blockquote></p><p>
In other words, as well as privatising the commons in land he also seeks to
privatise "common law." This will be expropriated from the general population
and turned over to wealthy judges and libertarian scholars to "correct" as they
see fit. Within this mandatory legal regime, there would be "voluntary"
interpretations yet it hardly taxes the imagination to see how economic
inequality would shape any "bargains" made on it. So we have a legal system
created and run by judges and jurists within which specific interpretations
would be reached by "bargains" conducted between the rich and the poor. A
fine liberation indeed!
</p><p>
So although only <i>"finding"</i> the law, the arbitrators and judges still exert
an influence in the "justice" process, an influence not impartial or neutral.
As the arbitrators themselves would be part of a profession, with specific
companies developing within the market, it does not take a genius to realise
that when <i>"interpreting"</i> the <i>"basic law code,"</i> such companies
would hardly act against their own interests as companies. As we noted in
<a href="secF3.html#secf32">section F.3.2</a>, the basic class interest of keeping the
current property rights system going will still remain -- a situation which
wealthy judges would be, to say the least, happy to see continue. In addition,
if the "justice" system was based on "one dollar, one vote," the "law" would
best defend those with the most "votes" (the question of market forces will
be discussed in <a href="secF6.html#secf63">section F.6.3</a>). Moreover,
even if "market forces" would ensure that "impartial" judges were dominant,
all judges would be enforcing a <b>very</b> partial law code (namely one that
defended <b>capitalist</b> property rights). Impartiality when enforcing partial
laws hardly makes judgements less unfair.
</p><p>
Thus, due to these three pressures -- the interests of arbitrators/judges,
the influence of money and the nature of the law -- the terms of "free
agreements" under such a law system would be tilted in favour of lenders
over debtors, landlords over tenants, employers over employees, and in
general, the rich over the poor just as we have today. This is what one
would expect in a system based on "unrestricted" property rights and a
(capitalist) free market.
</p><p>
Some "anarcho"-capitalists, however, claim that just as cheaper cars were
developed to meet demand, so cheaper defence associations and "people's
arbitrators" would develop on the market for the working class. In this
way impartiality will be ensured. This argument overlooks a few key points.
</p><p>
Firstly, the general "libertarian" law code would be applicable to <b>all</b>
associations, so they would have to operate within a system determined
by the power of money and of capital. The law code would reflect,
therefore, property <b>not</b> labour and so "socialistic" law codes would
be classed as "outlaw" ones. The options then facing working people
is to select a firm which best enforced the <b>capitalist</b> law in their
favour. And as noted above, the impartial enforcement of a biased law
code will hardly ensure freedom or justice for all. This means that saying
the possibility of competition from another judge would keep them honest
becomes meaningless when they are all implementing the <b>same</b> capitalist
law!
</p><p>
Secondly, in a race between a Jaguar and a Volkswagen Beetle, who is more
likely to win? The rich would have "the best justice money can buy," even
more than they do now. Members of the capitalist class would be able to select
the firms with the best lawyers, best private cops and most resources. Those
without the financial clout to purchase quality "justice" would simply be
out of luck -- such is the "magic" of the marketplace.
</p><p>
Thirdly, because of the tendency toward concentration, centralisation,
and oligopoly under capitalism (due to increasing capital costs for new
firms entering the market, as discussed in <a href="secC4.html">section C.4</a>),
a few companies would soon dominate the market -- with obvious implications for
"justice." Different firms will have different resources and in a
conflict between a small firm and a larger one, the smaller one is at a
disadvantage. They may not be in a position to fight the larger company
if it rejects arbitration and so may give in simply because, as the
"anarcho"-capitalists so rightly point out, conflict and violence
will push up a company's costs and so they would have to be avoided
by smaller ones (it is ironic that the "anarcho"-capitalist implicitly
assumes that every "defence company" is approximately of the same size, with
the same resources behind it and in real life this would clearly <b>not</b> the
case). Moreover, it seems likely that a Legal-Industrial complex would develop,
with other companies buying shares in "defence" firms as well as companies
which provide lawyers and judges (and vice versa). We would also expect
mergers to develop as well as cross-ownership between companies, not to
mention individual judges and security company owners and managers having
shares in other capitalist firms. Even if the possibility that the companies
providing security and "justice" have links with other capitalism firms is
discounted then the fact remains that these firms would hardly be sympathetic
to organisations and individuals seeking to change the system which makes
them rich or, as property owners and bosses, seeking to challenge the powers
associated with both particularly if the law is designed from a propertarian perspective.
</p><p>
Fourthly, it is <b>very</b> likely that many companies would make subscription to
a specific "defence" firm or court a requirement of employment and residence. Just
as today many (most?) workers have to sign no-union contracts (and face being
fired if they change their minds), it does not take much imagination to see that
the same could apply to "defence" firms and courts. This was/is the case
in company towns (indeed, you can consider unions as a form of "defence"
firm and these companies refused to recognise them). As the labour market
is almost always a buyer's market, it is not enough to argue that workers
can find a new job without this condition. They may not and so have to put
up with this situation. And if (as seems likely) the laws and rules of the
property-owner will take precedence in any conflict, then workers and tenants
will be at a disadvantage no matter how "impartial" the judges.
</p><p>
Ironically, some "anarcho"-capitalists (like David Friedman) have pointed to
company/union negotiations as an example of how different defence firms would
work out their differences peacefully. Sadly for this argument, union rights
under "actually existing capitalism" were hard fought for, often resulting
in strikes which quickly became mini-wars as the capitalists used the full
might associated with their wealth to stop them getting a foothold or to
destroy them if they had. In America the bosses usually had recourse to private
defence firms like the Pinkertons to break unions and strikes. Since 1935 in
America, union rights have been protected by the state in direct opposition to
capitalist "freedom of contract." Before the law was changed (under pressure
from below, in the face of business opposition and violence), unions were usually
crushed by force -- the companies were better armed, had more resources and had
the law on their side (Rothbard showed his grasp of American labour history by
asserting that union <i>"restrictions and strikes"</i> were the <i>"result of
government privilege, notably in the Wagner Act of 1935."</i> [<b>The Logic of
Action II</b>, p. 194]). Since the 1980s and the advent of the free(r) market,
we can see what happens to "peaceful negotiation" and "co-operation" between
unions and companies when it is no longer required and when the resources of
both sides are unequal. The market power of companies far exceeds those of the
unions and the law, by definition, favours the companies. As an example
of how competing "protection agencies" will work in an "anarcho"-capitalist
society, it is far more insightful than originally intended!
</p><p>
Now let us consider Rothbard's <i>"basic law code"</i> itself. For Rothbard,
the laws in the <i>"general libertarian law code"</i> would be unchangeable,
selected by those considered as "the voice of nature" (with obvious
authoritarian implications). David Friedman, in contrast, argues that as well
as a market in defence companies, there will also be a market in laws and
rights. However, there will be extensive market pressure to unify these
differing law codes into one standard one (imagine what would happen if ever
CD manufacturer created a unique CD player, or every computer manufacturer
different sized floppy-disk drivers -- little wonder, then, that over time
companies standardise their products). Friedman himself acknowledges that this
process is likely (and uses the example of standard paper sizes to illustrate
it). Which suggests that competition would be meaningless as <b>all</b> firms
would be enforcing the same (capitalist) law.
</p><p>
In any event, the laws would not be decided on the basis of "one person, one
vote"; hence, as market forces worked their magic, the "general" law code
would reflect vested interests and so be very hard to change. As rights and
laws would be a commodity like everything else in capitalism, they would soon
reflect the interests of the rich -- particularly if those interpreting the
law are wealthy professionals and companies with vested interests of their
own. Little wonder that the individualist anarchists proposed "trial by jury"
as the only basis for real justice in a free society. For, unlike professional
"arbitrators," juries are ad hoc, made up of ordinary people and do not
reflect power, authority, or the influence of wealth. And by being able
to judge the law as well as a conflict, they can ensure a populist revision
of laws as society progresses.
</p><p>
Rothbard, unsurprisingly, is at pains to dismiss the individualist anarchist
idea of juries judging the law as well as the facts, stating it would give each
free-market jury <i>"totally free rein over judicial decisions"</i> and this
<i>"could not be expected to arrive at just or even libertarian decisions."</i>
[<i>"The Spooner-Tucker Doctrine: An Economist's View"</i>, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p.7]
However, the opposite is the case as juries made up of ordinary people will be
more likely to reach just decisions which place genuinely libertarian positions
above a law dedicated to maintaining capitalist property and power. History is
full of examples of juries acquitting people for so-called crimes against property
which are the result of dire need or simply reflect class injustice. For example,
during the Great Depression unemployed miners in Pennsylvania <i>"dug small mines
on company property, mined coal, trucked it to cities and sold it below the
commercial rate. By 1934, 5 million tons of this 'bootleg' coal were produced
by twenty thousand men using four thousand vehicles. When attempts were made to
prosecute, local juries would not convict, local jailers would not imprison."</i>
[Howard Zinn, <b>A People's History of the United States</b>, pp. 385-6] It is
precisely this outcome which causes Rothbard to reject that system.
</p><p>
Thus Rothbard postulated a <b>judge</b> directed system of laws in stark contrast
to individualist anarchism's <b>jury</b> directed system. It is understandable
that Rothbard would seek to replace juries with judges, it is the only way he
can exclude the general population from having a say in the laws they are
subjected to. Juries allow the general public to judge the law as well as any
crime and so this would allow those aspects "corrected" by right-"libertarians"
to seep back into the "common law" and so make private property and power
accountable to the general public rather than vice versa. Moreover, concepts
of right and wrong evolve over time and in line with changes in socio-economic
conditions. To have a "common law" which is unchanging means that social evolution
is considered to have stopped when Murray Rothbard decided to call his ideology
"anarcho"-capitalism.
</p><p>
In a genuinely libertarian system, social customs (common law) would evolve
based on what the general population thought was right and wrong based on
changing social institutions and relationships between individuals. That is
why ruling classes have always sought to replace it with state determined
and enforced laws. Changing social norms and institutions can be seen from
property. As Proudhon noted, property <i>"changed its nature"</i> over time.
Originally, <i>"the word <b>property</b> was synonymous with . . .
<b>individual possession</b>"</i> but it became more <i>"complex"</i> and
turned into <b>private property</b> -- <i>"the right to use it by his
neighbour's labour."</i> [<b>What is Property?</b>, p. 395] The changing
nature of property created relations of domination and exploitation between
people absent before. For the capitalist, however, both the tools of the
self-employed artisan and the capital of a transnational corporation are
both forms of "property" and so basically identical. Changing social
relations impact on society and the individuals who make it up. This
would be reflected in any genuinely libertarian society, something
right-"libertarians" are aware of. They, therefore, seek to freeze the
rights framework and legal system to protect institutions, like property,
no matter how they evolve and come to replace whatever freedom enhancing
features they had with oppression. Hence we find Rothbard's mentor, Ludwig
von Mises asserting that <i>"[t]here may possibly be a difference of opinion
about whether a particular institution is socially beneficial or harmful.
But once it has been judged [by whom?] beneficial, one can no longer
contend that, for some inexplicable reason, it must be condemned as
immoral."</i> [<b>Liberalism</b>, p. 34] Rothbard's system is designed to
ensure that the general population cannot judge whether a particular
institution has changed is social impact. Thus a system of "defence" on
the capitalist market will continue to reflect the influence and power of
property owners and wealth and not be subject to popular control beyond
choosing between companies to enforce the capitalist laws.
</p><p>
Ultimately, such an "anarcho"-capitalist system would be based on simple
absolute principles decided in advance by a small group of ideological
leaders. We are then expected to live with the consequences as best we
can. If people end up in a worse condition than before then that is
irrelevant as that we have enforced the eternal principles they have
proclaimed as being in our best interests.
</p>
<a name="secf62"><h2>F.6.2 What are the social consequences of such a system?</h2></a>
<p>
The "anarcho" capitalist imagines that there will be police agencies,
"defence associations," courts, and appeals courts all organised on a
free-market basis and available for hire. As David Wieck points out,
however, the major problem with such a system would not be the corruption
of "private" courts and police forces (although, as suggested above, this
could indeed be a problem):
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"There is something more serious than the 'Mafia danger', and this other
problem concerns the role of such 'defence' institutions in a given social
and economic context.
</p><p>
"[The] context . . . is one of a free-market economy with no restraints
upon accumulation of property. Now, we had an American experience,
roughly from the end of the Civil War to the 1930's, in what were in
effect private courts, private police, indeed private governments. We
had the experience of the (private) Pinkerton police which, by its spies,
by its <b>agents provocateurs,</b> and by methods that included violence and
kidnapping, was one of the most powerful tools of large corporations
and an instrument of oppression of working people. We had the experience
as well of the police forces established to the same end, within
corporations, by numerous companies . . . (The automobile companies
drew upon additional covert instruments of a private nature, usually
termed vigilante, such as the Black Legion). These were, in effect,
private armies, and were sometimes described as such. The territories
owned by coal companies, which frequently included entire towns and their
environs, the stores the miners were obliged by economic coercion to
patronise, the houses they lived in, were commonly policed by the private
police of the United States Steel Corporation or whatever company owned
the properties. The chief practical function of these police was, of
course, to prevent labour organisation and preserve a certain balance of
'bargaining.' . . . These complexes were a law unto themselves, powerful
enough to ignore, when they did not purchase, the governments of various
jurisdictions of the American federal system. This industrial system was,
at the time, often characterised as feudalism."</i> [<b>Anarchist Justice</b>,
pp. 223-224]
</blockquote></p><p>
For a description of the weaponry and activities of these private armies,
the Marxist economic historian Maurice Dobb presents an excellent summary in
<b>Studies in Capitalist Development</b>. [pp. 353-357] According to a report on
<i>"Private Police Systems"</i> quoted by Dobb, in a town dominated by Republican
Steel the <i>"civil liberties and the rights of labour were suppressed by
company police. Union organisers were driven out of town."</i> Company towns
had their own (company-run) money, stores, houses and jails and many
corporations had machine-guns and tear-gas along with the usual shot-guns,
rifles and revolvers. The <i>"usurpation of police powers by privately paid
'guards and 'deputies', often hired from detective agencies, many with
criminal records"</i> was <i>"a general practice in many parts of the country."</i>
</p><p>
The local (state-run) law enforcement agencies turned a blind-eye to what
was going on (after all, the workers <b>had</b> broken their contracts and
so were "criminal aggressors" against the companies) even when union
members and strikers were beaten and killed. The workers own defence
organisations (unions) were the only ones willing to help them, and if the
workers seemed to be winning then troops were called in to "restore the peace"
(as happened in the Ludlow strike, when strikers originally cheered
the troops as they thought they would defend them; needless to say, they
were wrong).
</p><p>
Here we have a society which is claimed by many "anarcho"-capitalists
as one of the closest examples to their "ideal," with limited state
intervention, free reign for property owners, etc. What happened? The
rich reduced the working class to a serf-like existence, capitalist
production undermined independent producers (much to the annoyance of
individualist anarchists at the time), and the result was the emergence
of the corporate America that "anarcho"-capitalists (sometimes) say they
oppose.
</p><p>
Are we to expect that "anarcho"-capitalism will be different? That, unlike
before, "defence" firms will intervene on behalf of strikers? Given that
the <i>"general libertarian law code"</i> will be enforcing capitalist property
rights, workers will be in exactly the same situation as they were then.
Support of strikers violating property rights would be a violation of
the law and be costly for profit making firms to do (if not dangerous as
they could be "outlawed" by the rest). This suggests that "anarcho"-capitalism
will extend extensive rights and powers to bosses, but few if any rights to
rebellious workers. And this difference in power is enshrined within the
fundamental institutions of the system. This can easily be seen from Rothbard's
numerous anti-union tirades and his obvious hatred of them, strikes and pickets
(which he habitually labelled as violent). As such it is not surprising to
discover that Rothbard complained in the 1960s that, because of the Wagner Act,
the American police <i>"commonly remain 'neutral' when strike-breakers are
molested or else blame the strike-breakers for 'provoking' the attacks on them
. . . When unions are permitted to resort to violence, the state or other
enforcing agency has implicitly delegated this power to the unions. The
unions, then, have become 'private states.'"</i> [<b>The Logic of Action II</b>,
p. 41] The role of the police was to back the property owner against
their rebel workers, in other words, and the state was failing to provide the
appropriate service (of course, that bosses exercising power over workers provoked
the strike is irrelevant, while private police attacking picket lines is purely a
form of "defensive" violence and is, likewise, of no concern).
</p><p>
In evaluating "anarcho"-capitalism's claim to be a form of anarchism,
Peter Marshall notes that <i>"private protection agencies would merely serve
the interests of their paymasters."</i> [<b>Demanding the Impossible</b>, p. 653]
With the increase of private "defence associations" under "really existing
capitalism" today (associations that many "anarcho"-capitalists point to
as examples of their ideas), we see a vindication of Marshall's claim.
There have been many documented experiences of protesters being badly
beaten by private security guards. As far as market theory goes, the
companies are only supplying what the buyer is demanding. The rights of
others are <b>not a factor</b> (yet more "externalities," obviously). Even
if the victims successfully sue the company, the message is clear --
social activism can seriously damage your health. With a reversion
to <i>"a general libertarian law code"</i> enforced by private companies,
this form of "defence" of "absolute" property rights can only increase,
perhaps to the levels previously attained in the heyday of US capitalism,
as described above by Wieck.
</p>
<a name="secf63"><h2>F.6.3 But surely market forces will stop abuses by the rich?</h2></a>
<p>
Unlikely. The rise of corporations within America indicates exactly how a
<i>"general libertarian law code"</i> would reflect the interests of the rich and
powerful. The laws recognising corporations as "legal persons" were <b>not</b>
primarily a product of "the state" but of private lawyers hired by the
rich. As Howard Zinn notes:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"the American Bar Association, organised by lawyers accustomed to
serving the wealthy, began a national campaign of education to reverse
the [Supreme] Court decision [that companies could not be considered as
a person]. . . . By 1886, they succeeded . . . the Supreme Court had
accepted the argument that corporations were 'persons' and their money
was property protected by the process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
. . . The justices of the Supreme Court were not simply interpreters of
the Constitution. They were men of certain backgrounds, of certain [class]
interests."</i> [<b>A People's History of the United States</b>, p. 255]
</p><p></blockquote>
Of course it will be argued that the Supreme Court is chosen by the government
and is a state enforced monopoly and so our analysis is flawed. Yet this is not
the case. As Rothbard made clear, the <i>"general libertarian law code"</i>
would be created by lawyers and jurists and everyone would be expected to
obey it. Why expect <b>these</b> lawyers and jurists to be any less class conscious
then those in the 19th century? If the Supreme Court <i>"was doing its bit
for the ruling elite"</i> then why would those creating the law system be
any different? <i>"How could it be neutral between rich and poor,"</i> argues
Zinn, <i>"when its members were often former wealthy lawyers, and almost
always came from the upper class?"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 254] Moreover,
the corporate laws came about because there was a demand for them. That
demand would still have existed in "anarcho"-capitalism. Now, while
there may nor be a Supreme Court, Rothbard does maintain that <i>"the basic
Law Code . . . would have to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies"</i>
but he maintains that this <i>"would imply no unified legal system"</i>! Even
though <i>"[a]ny agencies that transgressed the basic libertarian law
code would be open outlaws"</i> and soon crushed this is <b>not</b>, apparently,
a monopoly. [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 234] So, you either agree to
the law code or you go out of business. And that is <b>not</b> a monopoly!
Therefore, we think, our comments on the Supreme Court are valid (see also
<a href="secF7.html#secf72">section F.7.2</a>).
</p><p>
If all the available defence firms enforce the same laws, then it can
hardly be called "competitive"! And if this is the case (and it is)
<i>"when private wealth is uncontrolled, then a police-judicial complex
enjoying a clientele of wealthy corporations whose motto is self-interest
is hardly an innocuous social force controllable by the possibility of
forming or affiliating with competing 'companies.'"</i> [Wieck, <b>Op. Cit.</b>,
p. 225] This is particularly true if these companies are themselves Big Business
and so have a large impact on the laws they are enforcing. If the law
code recognises and protects capitalist power, property and wealth as
fundamental <b>any</b> attempt to change this is "initiation of force" and
so the power of the rich is written into the system from the start!
</p><p>
(And, we must add, if there is a general libertarian law code to which
all must subscribe, where does that put customer demand? If people demand
a non-libertarian law code, will defence firms refuse to supply it? If so,
will not new firms, looking for profit, spring up that will supply what
is being demanded? And will that not put them in direct conflict with the
existing, pro-general law code ones? And will a market in law codes not
just reflect economic power and wealth? David Friedman, who is for a market
in law codes, argues that <i>"[i]f almost everyone believes strongly that
heroin addiction is so horrible that it should not be permitted anywhere
under any circumstances anarcho-capitalist institutions will produce laws
against heroin. Laws are being produced on the market, and that is what the
market wants."</i> And he adds that <i>"market demands are in dollars, not votes.
The legality of heroin will be determined, not by how many are for or against
but how high a cost each side is willing to bear in order to get its way."</i>
[<b>The Machinery of Freedom</b>, p. 127] And, as the market is less than equal
in terms of income and wealth, such a position will mean that the capitalist
class will have a higher effective demand than the working class and more
resources to pay for any conflicts that arise. Thus any law codes that
develop will tend to reflect the interests of the wealthy.)
</p><p>
Which brings us nicely on to the next problem regarding market forces.
</p><p>
As well as the obvious influence of economic interests and differences
in wealth, another problem faces the "free market" justice of
"anarcho"-capitalism. This is the <i>"general libertarian law code"</i> itself.
Even if we assume that the system actually works like it should in theory,
the simple fact remains that these "defence companies" are enforcing laws
which explicitly defend capitalist property (and so social relations).
Capitalists own the means of production upon which they hire wage-labourers
to work and this is an inequality established <b>prior</b> to any specific
transaction in the labour market. This inequality reflects itself in
terms of differences in power within (and outside) the company and
in the "law code" of "anarcho"-capitalism which protects that power
against the dispossessed.
</p><p>
In other words, the law code within which the defence companies work
assumes that capitalist property is legitimate and that force can
legitimately be used to defend it. This means that, in effect,
"anarcho"-capitalism is based on a monopoly of law, a monopoly which
explicitly exists to defend the power and capital of the wealthy.
The major difference is that the agencies used to protect that
wealth will be in a weaker position to act independently of their
pay-masters. Unlike the state, the "defence" firm is not remotely
accountable to the general population and cannot be used to equalise
even slightly the power relationships between worker and capitalist (as
the state has, on occasion done, due to public pressure and to preserve
the system as a whole). And, needless to say, it is very likely that the
private police forces <b>will</b> give preferential treatment to
their wealthier customers (which business does not?) and that the law
code will reflect the interests of the wealthier sectors of society
(particularly if prosperous judges administer that code) in reality,
even if not in theory. Since, in capitalist practice, "the customer
is always right," the best-paying customers will get their way in
"anarcho"-capitalist society.
</p><p>
For example, in chapter 29 of <b>The Machinery of Freedom</b>, David Friedman
presents an example of how a clash of different law codes could be resolved
by a bargaining process (the law in question is the death penalty). This
process would involve one defence firm giving a sum of money to the other
for them accepting the appropriate (anti/pro capital punishment) court.
Friedman claims that <i>"[a]s in any good trade, everyone gains"</i> but this
is obviously not true. Assuming the anti-capital punishment defence firm
pays the pro one to accept an anti-capital punishment court, then, yes,
both defence firms have made money and so are happy, so are the anti-capital
punishment consumers but the pro-death penalty customers have only (perhaps)
received a cut in their bills. Their desire to see criminals hanged (for
whatever reason) has been ignored (if they were not in favour of the
death penalty, they would not have subscribed to that company). Friedman
claims that the deal, by allowing the anti-death penalty firm to cut its
costs, will ensure that it <i>"keep its customers and even get more"</i> but
this is just an assumption. It is just as likely to loose customers to a
defence firm that refuses to compromise (and has the resources to back it
up). Friedman's assumption that lower costs will automatically win over
people's passions is unfounded as is the assumption that both firms have
equal resources and bargaining power. If the pro-capital punishment firm
demands more than the anti can provide and has larger weaponry and troops,
then the anti defence firm may have to agree to let the pro one have its
way. So, all in all, it is <b>not</b> clear that <i>"everyone gains"</i> --
there may be a sizeable percentage of those involved who do not "gain" as
their desire for capital punishment is traded away by those who claimed
they would enforce it. This may, in turn, produce a demand for defence
firms which do <b>not</b> compromise with obvious implications for public
peace.
</p><p>
In other words, a system of competing law codes and privatised rights
does not ensure that <b>all</b> individual interests are meet. Given unequal
resources within society, it is clear that the "effective demand"
of the parties involved to see their law codes enforced is drastically
different. The wealthy head of a transnational corporation will have far
more resources available to him to pay for <b>his</b> laws to be enforced than
one of his employees on the assembly line. Moreover, as we noted in
<a href="secF3.html#secf31">section F.3.1</a>, the labour market is usually skewed in favour of capitalists.
This means that workers have to compromise to get work and such compromises
may involve agreeing to join a specific "defence" firm or not join one
at all (just as workers are often forced to sign non-union contracts
today in order to get work). In other words, a privatised law system
is very likely to skew the enforcement of laws in line with the skewing
of income and wealth in society. At the very least, unlike every other
market, the customer is <b>not</b> guaranteed to get exactly what they demand
simply because the product they "consume" is dependent on others within
the same market to ensure its supply. The unique workings of the
law/defence market are such as to deny customer choice (we will
discuss other aspects of this unique market shortly). Wieck summed by
pointing out the obvious:
</p><p><blockquote>
<i>"any judicial system is going to exist in the
context of economic institutions. If there are gross inequalities of
power in the economic and social domains, one has to imagine society as
strangely compartmentalised in order to believe that those inequalities
will fail to reflect themselves in the judicial and legal domain, and that
the economically powerful will be unable to manipulate the legal and
judicial system to their advantage. To abstract from such influences of
context, and then consider the merits of an abstract judicial system. . .
is to follow a method that is not likely to take us far. This, by the
way, is a criticism that applies. . .to any theory that relies on a rule
of law to override the tendencies inherent in a given social and economic
system"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 225]
</blockquote></p><p>
There is another reason why "market forces" will not stop abuse by the rich,
or indeed stop the system from turning from private to public statism. This
is due to the nature of the "defence" market (for a similar analysis of
the "defence" market see right-"libertarian" economist Tyler Cowen's <i>"Law
as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy"</i> [<b>Economics and Philosophy</b>,
no. 8 (1992), pp. 249-267] and <i>"Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of
Anarchy"</i> [<b>Economics and Philosophy</b>, no. 10 (1994), pp. 329-332]). In
"anarcho"-capitalist theory it is assumed that the competing "defence companies"
have a vested interest in peacefully settling differences between themselves by
means of arbitration. In order to be competitive on the market, companies will
have to co-operate via contractual relations otherwise the higher price associated
with conflict will make the company uncompetitive and it will go under. Those
companies that ignore decisions made in arbitration would be outlawed by others,
ostracised and their rulings ignored. By this process, it is argued, a system of
competing "defence" companies will be stable and not turn into a civil war
between agencies with each enforcing the interests of their clients against
others by force.
</p><p>
However, there is a catch. Unlike every other market, the businesses in
competition in the "defence" industry <b>must</b> co-operate with its fellows
in order to provide its services for its customers. They need to be able
to agree to courts and judges, agree to abide by decisions and law codes
and so forth. In economics there are other, more accurate, terms to
describe co-operative activity between companies: collusion and cartels.
These are when companies in a specific market agree to work together
(co-operate) to restrict competition and reap the benefits of monopoly
power by working to achieve the same ends in partnership with each other.
By stressing the co-operative nature of the "defence" market, "anarcho"-capitalists
are implicitly acknowledging that collusion is built into the system.
The necessary contractual relations between agencies in the "protection"
market require that firms co-operate and, by so doing, to behave (effectively)
as one large firm (and so resemble a normal state even more than they
already do). Quoting Adam Smith seems appropriate here: <i>"People
of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."</i> [<b>The Wealth of
Nations</b>, p. 117] Having a market based on people of the same trade
co-operating seems, therefore, an unwise move.
</p><p>
For example, when buying food it does not matter whether the supermarkets
visited have good relations with each other. The goods bought are independent
of the relationships that exist between competing companies. However, in the
case of private states this is <b>not</b> the case. If a specific "defence"
company has bad relationships with other companies in the market then it is
against a customer's self-interest to subscribe to it. Why subscribe to a
private state if its judgements are ignored by the others and it has to resort
to violence to be heard? This, as well as being potentially dangerous, will
also push up the prices that have to be paid. Arbitration is one of the most
important services a defence firm can offer its customers and its market share
is based upon being able to settle interagency disputes without risk of war or
uncertainty that the final outcome will not be accepted by all parties. Lose
that and a company will lose market share.
</p><p>
Therefore, the market set-up within the "anarcho"-capitalist "defence" market
is such that private states <b>have to co-operate</b> with the others (or go out
of business fast) and this means collusion can take place. In other words,
a system of private states will have to agree to work together in order to
provide the service of "law enforcement" to their customers and the result
of such co-operation is to create a cartel. However, unlike cartels in other
industries, the "defence" cartel will be a stable body simply because its
members <b>have</b> to work with their competitors in order to survive.
</p><p>
Let us look at what would happen after such a cartel is formed in a specific
area and a new "defence company" desired to enter the market. This new
company will have to work with the members of the cartel in order to provide
its services to its customers (note that "anarcho"-capitalists already
assume that they <i>"will have to"</i> subscribe to the same law code). If the
new defence firm tries to under-cut the cartel's monopoly prices, the other
companies would refuse to work with it. Having to face constant conflict or
the possibility of conflict, seeing its decisions being ignored by other
agencies and being uncertain what the results of a dispute would be, few
would patronise the new "defence company." The new company's prices would
go up and it would soon face either folding or joining the cartel. Unlike
every other market, if a "defence company" does not have friendly, co-operative
relations with other firms in the same industry then it will go out of business.
</p><p>
This means that the firms that are co-operating have simply to agree not to
deal with new firms which are attempting to undermine the cartel in order
for them to fail. A "cartel busting" firm goes out of business in the same
way an outlaw one does -- the higher costs associated with having to solve
all its conflicts by force, not arbitration, increases its production
costs much higher than the competitors and the firm faces insurmountable
difficulties selling its products at a profit (ignoring any drop of
demand due to fears of conflict by actual and potential customers).
Even if we assume that many people will happily join the new firm in spite
of the dangers to protect themselves against the cartel and its taxation
(i.e. monopoly profits), enough will remain members of the cartel so that
co-operation will still be needed and conflict unprofitable and dangerous
(and as the cartel will have more resources than the new firm, it could
usually hold out longer than the new firm could). In effect, breaking the
cartel may take the form of an armed revolution -- as it would with any state.
</p><p>
The forces that break up cartels and monopolies in other industries (such as
free entry -- although, of course the "defence" market will be subject to
oligopolistic tendencies as any other and this will create barriers to entry)
do not work here and so new firms have to co-operate or loose market share
and/or profits. This means that "defence companies" will reap monopoly
profits and, more importantly, have a monopoly of force over a given area.
</p><p>
It is also likely that a multitude of cartels would develop, with a given
cartel operating in a given locality. This is because law enforcement
would be localised in given areas as most crime occurs where the criminal
lives (few criminals would live in Glasgow and commit crimes in Paris).
However, as defence companies have to co-operate to provide their services,
so would the cartels. Few people live all their lives in one area and so
firms from different cartels would come into contact, so forming a
cartel of cartels. This cartel of cartels may (perhaps) be less powerful
than a local cartel, but it would still be required and for exactly the same
reasons a local one is. Therefore "anarcho"-capitalism would, like "actually
existing capitalism," be marked by a series of public states covering given
areas, co-ordinated by larger states at higher levels. Such a set up would
parallel the United States in many ways except it would be run directly by
wealthy shareholders without the sham of "democratic" elections. Moreover,
as in the USA and other states there will still be a monopoly of rules and
laws (the <i>"general libertarian law code"</i>).
</p><p>
Hence a monopoly of private states will develop in addition to the existing
monopoly of law and this is a de facto monopoly of force over a given
area (i.e. some kind of public state run by share holders). New companies
attempting to enter the "defence" industry will have to work with the
existing cartel in order to provide the services it offers to its customers.
The cartel is in a dominant position and new entries into the market either
become part of it or fail. This is exactly the position with the state,
with "private agencies" free to operate as long as they work to the state's
guidelines. As with the monopolist <i>"general libertarian law code"</i>, if
you do not toe the line, you go out of business fast.
</p><p>
"Anarcho"-capitalists claim that this will not occur, but that the
co-operation needed to provide the service of law enforcement will somehow
<b>not</b> turn into collusion between companies. However, they are quick to
argue that renegade "agencies" (for example, the so-called "Mafia
problem" or those who reject judgements) will go out of business because
of the higher costs associated with conflict and not arbitration. Yet
these higher costs are ensured because the firms in question do not
co-operate with others. If other agencies boycott a firm but co-operate with
all the others, then the boycotted firm will be at the same disadvantage
-- regardless of whether it is a cartel buster or a renegade. So the
"anarcho"-capitalist is trying to have it both ways. If the punishment
of non-conforming firms cannot occur, then "anarcho"-capitalism will turn
into a war of all against all or, at the very least, the service of social
peace and law enforcement cannot be provided. If firms cannot deter others
from disrupting the social peace (one service the firm provides) then
"anarcho"-capitalism is not stable and will not remain orderly as agencies
develop which favour the interests of their own customers and enforce their
own law codes at the expense of others. If collusion cannot occur (or is
too costly) then neither can the punishment of non-conforming firms and
"anarcho"-capitalism will prove to be unstable.
</p><p>
So, to sum up, the "defence" market of private states has powerful forces
within it to turn it into a monopoly of force over a given area. From a
privately chosen monopoly of force over a specific (privately owned) area,
the market of private states will turn into a monopoly of force over a
general area. This is due to the need for peaceful relations between
companies, relations which are required for a firm to secure market
share. The unique market forces that exist within this market ensure
collusion and the system of private states will become a cartel and so a
public state - unaccountable to all but its shareholders, a state of the
wealthy, by the wealthy, for the wealthy.
</p>
<a name="secf64"><h2>F.6.4 Why are these "defence associations" states?</h2></a>
<p>
It is clear that "anarcho"-capitalist defence associations meet the criteria of
statehood outlined in section B.2 (<a href="secB2.html">"Why are anarchists
against the state"</a>). They defend property and preserve authority
relationships, they practice coercion, and are hierarchical institutions
which govern those under them on behalf of a "ruling elite," i.e. those who
employ both the governing forces and those they govern. Thus, from an anarchist
perspective, these "defence associations" are most definitely states.
</p><p>
What is interesting, however, is that by their own definitions a very
good case can be made that these "defence associations" are states
in the "anarcho"-capitalist sense too. Capitalist apologists usually
define a "government" (or state) as something which has a monopoly of force
and coercion within a given area. Relative to the rest of the society,
these defence associations would have a monopoly of force and coercion
of a given piece of property: thus, by the "anarcho"-capitalists'
<b>own definition</b> of statehood, these associations would qualify!
</p><p>
If we look at Rothbard's definition of statehood, which requires (a) the
power to tax and/or (b) a <i>"coerced monopoly of the provision of defence
over a given area"</i>, "anarcho"-capitalism runs into trouble.
</p><p>
In the first place, the costs of hiring defence associations will be
deducted from the wealth created by those who use, but do not own, the
property of capitalists and landlords. Let us not forget that a capitalist
will only employ a worker or rent out land and housing if they make a
profit from so doing. Without the labour of the worker, there would be
nothing to sell and no wages to pay for rent and so a company's or
landlord's "defence" firm will be paid from the revenue gathered from
the capitalists power to extract a tribute from those who use, but do
not own, a property. In other words, workers would pay for the agencies
that enforce their employers' authority over them via the wage system
and rent -- taxation in a more insidious form.
</p><p>
In the second, under capitalism most people spend a large part of their
day on other people's property -- that is, they work for capitalists
and/or live in rented accommodation. Hence if property owners select a
"defence association" to protect their factories, farms, rental housing,
etc., their employees and tenants will view it as a <i>"coerced monopoly of
the provision of defence over a given area."</i> For certainly the employees
and tenants will not be able to hire their own defence companies to
expropriate the capitalists and landlords. So, from the standpoint of
the employees and tenants, the owners do have a monopoly of "defence"
over the areas in question. Of course, the "anarcho"-capitalist will
argue that the tenants and workers "consent" to <b>all</b> the rules and
conditions of a contract when they sign it and so the property owner's
monopoly is not "coerced." However, the "consent" argument is so weak
in conditions of inequality as to be useless (see
<a href="secF3.html#secf31">section F.3.1</a>, for example) and, moreover, it can and has been used to justify
the state. In other words, "consent" in and of itself does not ensure
that a given regime is not statist. So an argument along these lines is deeply flawed and can be used to
justify regimes which are little better than "industrial feudalism"
(such as, as indicated in <a href="secB4.html">section B.4</a>,
company towns, for example -- an institution which right-"libertarians"
have no problem with). Even the <i>"general libertarian law code,"</i> could be
considered a "monopoly of government over a particular area," particularly
if ordinary people have no real means of affecting the law code, either
because it is market-driven and so is money-determined, or because it
will be "natural" law and so unchangeable by mere mortals.
</p><p>
In other words, <b>if</b> the state <i>"arrogates to itself a monopoly of force,
of ultimate decision-making power, over a given area territorial area"</i>
then its pretty clear that the property owner shares this power. As we
indicated in <a href="secF1.html">section F.1</a>, Rothbard agrees that
the owner is, after all, the <i>"ultimate decision-making power"</i> in
their workplace or on their land. If the boss takes a dislike to you (for
example, you do not follow their orders) then you get fired. If you cannot
get a job or rent the land without agreeing to certain conditions (such as
not joining a union or subscribing to the "defence firm" approved by your
employer) then you either sign the contract or look for something else.
Rothbard fails to draw the obvious conclusion and instead refers to the state
<i>"prohibiting the voluntary purchase and sale of defence and judicial
services."</i> [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 170 and p. 171] But just
as surely as the law of contract allows the banning of unions from a
property, it can just as surely ban the sale and purchase of defence
and judicial services (it could be argued that market forces will stop this
happening, but this is unlikely as bosses usually have the advantage on the
labour market and workers have to compromise to get a job). After all, in
the company towns, only company money was legal tender and company police
the only law enforcers.
</p><p>
Therefore, it is obvious that the "anarcho"-capitalist system meets
the Weberian criteria of a monopoly to enforce certain rules in a
given area of land. The <i>"general libertarian law code"</i> is a monopoly
and property owners determine the rules that apply on their property.
Moreover, if the rules that property owners enforce are subject to
rules contained in the monopolistic <i>"general libertarian law code"</i> (for
example, that they cannot ban the sale and purchase of certain products
-- such as defence -- on their own territory) then "anarcho"-capitalism
<b>definitely</b> meets the Weberian definition of the state (as described by
Ayn Rand as an institution <i>"that holds the exclusive power to <b>enforce</b>
certain rules of conduct in a given geographical area"</i> [<b>Capitalism: The
Unknown Ideal</b>, p. 239]) as its "law code" overrides the desires of
property owners to do what they like on their own property.
</p><p>
Therefore, no matter how you look at it, "anarcho"-capitalism and its
"defence" market promotes a <i>"monopoly of ultimate decision making power"</i>
over a <i>"given territorial area"</i>. It is obvious that for anarchists, the
"anarcho"-capitalist system is a state system. And, as we note, a reasonable
case can be made for it also being a state in the "anarcho"-capitalist sense
as well. So, in effect, "anarcho"-capitalism has a <b>different</b> sort of
state, one in which bosses hire and fire the policeman. As anarchist Peter
Sabatini notes:
</p><p><blockquote><i>"Within [right] Libertarianism, Rothbard
represents a minority perspective that actually argues for the total
elimination of the state. However Rothbard's claim as an anarchist is
quickly voided when it is shown that he only wants an end to the public
state. In its place he allows countless private states, with each person
supplying their own police force, army, and law, or else purchasing these
services from capitalist vendors . . . Rothbard sees nothing at all wrong
with the amassing of wealth, therefore those with more capital will
inevitably have greater coercive force at their disposal, just as
they do now."</i> [<b>Libertarianism: Bogus Anarchy</b>]
</blockquote></p><p>
Far from wanting to abolish the state, then, "anarcho"-capitalists only
desire to privatise it - to make it solely accountable to capitalist wealth.
Their "companies" perform the same services as the state, for the same
people, in the same manner. However, there is one slight difference.
Property owners would be able to select between competing companies
for their "services." Because such "companies" are employed by the boss,
they would be used to reinforce the totalitarian nature of capitalist firms
by ensuring that the police and the law they enforce are not even slightly
accountable to ordinary people. Looking beyond the "defence association"
to the defence market itself (as we argued in the
<a href="secF6.html#secf63">last section</a>), this will become a cartel and so become
some kind of public state. The very nature of the private state, its need
to co-operate with others in the same industry, push it towards a
monopoly network of firms and so a monopoly of force over a given
area. Given the assumptions used to defend "anarcho"-capitalism, its
system of private statism will develop into public statism -- a state
run by managers accountable only to the share-holding elite.
</p><p>
To quote Peter Marshall again, the "anarcho"-capitalists <i>"claim that
all would benefit from a free exchange on the market, it is by no means
certain; any unfettered market system would most likely sponsor a
reversion to an unequal society with defence associations perpetuating
exploitation and privilege."</i> [<b>Demanding the Impossible</b>, p. 565]
History, and current practice, prove this point.
</p><p>
In short, "anarcho"-capitalists are not anarchists at all, they are just
capitalists who desire to see private states develop -- states which are
strictly accountable to their paymasters without even the sham of
democracy we have today. Hence a far better name for "anarcho"-capitalism
would be "private-state" capitalism. At least that way we get a fairer
idea of what they are trying to sell us. Bob Black put it well: <i>"To my
mind a right-wing anarchist is just a
minarchist who'd abolish the state to his own satisfaction by calling it
something else . . . They don't denounce what the state does, they just
object to who's doing it."</i> [<i>"The Libertarian As Conservative"</i>,
<b>The Abolition of Work and Other Essays</b>, p. 144]
</p>
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