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<title>F.1 Are "anarcho"-capitalists really anarchists?
</title>
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<p>
<h1>F.1 Are "anarcho"-capitalists really anarchists?</h1>
<p>
In a word, no. While "anarcho"-capitalists obviously try to associate
themselves with the anarchist tradition by using the word "anarcho",
their ideas are distinctly at odds with those associated with anarchism.
Because of this any claims that their ideas are anarchist or that they
are part of the anarchist tradition or movement are false.
<p>
"Anarcho"-capitalists claim to be anarchists because they say that they 
oppose government. As such, as noted in the <a href="secFint.html">last section</a>, they use 
a dictionary definition of anarchism. However, this fails to appreciate
that anarchism is a <b>political theory</b>, not a dictionary definition. 
As dictionaries are rarely politically sophisticated things, this means 
that they fail to recognise that anarchism is more than just opposition to
government, it is also marked a opposition to capitalism (i.e. exploitation
and private property). Thus, opposition to government is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for being an anarchist -- you also need 
to be opposed to exploitation and capitalist private property. As 
"anarcho"-capitalists do not consider interest, rent and profits (i.e.
capitalism) to be exploitative nor oppose capitalist property rights,
they are not anarchists.
<p>
So in what ways do "anarcho"-capitalists differ from anarchists? There 
are three main ones:
<p>
Firstly, unlike both Individualist and Social anarchists,
"anarcho"-capitalists support capitalism (a "pure" free market type 
of capitalism). This means that they reject totally the ideas of anarchists 
with regards to property and economic analysis. For example, like all
supporters of capitalists they consider rent, profit and interest as
valid incomes. In contrast, all Anarchists consider these as exploitation
and agree with the Individualist Anarchist Tucker when argued that
<i>"<b>[w]hoever</b> contributes to production is alone entitled. <b>What</b> has no
rights that <b>who</b> is bound to respect. <b>What</b> is a thing. <b>Who</b> is a person.
Things have no claims; they exist only to be claimed. The possession of
a right cannot be predicted of dead material, but only a living person."</i>
[quoted by Wm. Gary Kline, <b>The Individualist Anarchists</b>, p. 73] (And this,
we must note, is the fundamental critique of the capitalist theory that 
capital is productive. In and of themselves, fixed costs do not create
value. Rather value is creation depends on how investments are developed
and used once in place. Because of this the Individualist Anarchists 
considered non-labour derived income as usury, unlike "anarcho"-capitalists).
<p>
Similarly, anarchists reject the notion of capitalist property rights in
favour of possession (including the full fruits of one's labour). For 
example, anarchists reject private ownership of land in favour of a 
<i>"occupancy and use"</i> regime. In this we follow Proudhon's <b>What is 
Property?</b> and argue that <i>"property is theft"</i>.
<p>
As these ideas are an <b>essential</b> part of anarchist politics, they cannot
be removed without seriously damaging the rest of the theory. This can
be seen from Tucker's comments that <i>"<b>Liberty</b> insists. . . [on] the abolition 
of the State and the abolition of usury; on no more government of man by 
man, and no more exploitation of man by man."</i> [cited by Eunice Schuster in 
<b>Native American Anarchism</b>, p. 140]. He indicates that anarchism has 
specific economic <b>and</b> political ideas, that it opposes capitalism along
with the state. Therefore anarchism was never purely a "political" concept, 
but always combined an opposition to oppression with an opposition to 
exploitation. The social anarchists made exactly the same point.  Which 
means that when Tucker argued that <i>"<b>Liberty</b> insists on Socialism. . . - 
true Socialism, Anarchistic Socialism: the prevalence on earth of Liberty, 
Equality, and Solidarity"</i> [<b>Instead of a Book</b>, p. 363] he knew exactly 
what he was saying and meant it whole heartedly.
<p>
This combination of the political and economic is essential as they mutually
reinforce each other. Without the economic ideas, the political ideas 
would be meaningless as inequality would make a mockery of them. As Kline
notes, the Individualist Anarchists' <i>"proposals were designed to establish
true equality of opportunity . . . and they expected this would result in
a society without great wealth or poverty. In the absence of monopolistic
factors which would distort competition, they expected a society largely
of self-employed workmen with no significant disparity of wealth between
any of them since all would be required to live at their own expense and 
not at the expense of exploited fellow human beings."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 103-4]
<p>
By removing the underlying commitment to abolish non-labour income, any
"anarchist" capitalist society would have vast differences in wealth
and so power. Instead of a government imposed monopolies in land, money
and so on, the economic power flowing from private property and capital 
would ensure that the majority remained in (to use Spooner's words) <i>"the 
condition of servants"</i> (see sections <a href="secF2.html">F.2</a> and 
<a href="secF3.html#secf31">F.3.1</a> for more on this). 
The Individualist Anarchists were aware of this danger and so supported
economic ideas that opposed usury (i.e. rent, profit and interest) and
ensured the worker the full value of her labour. While not all of them
called these ideas "socialist" it is clear that these ideas <b>are</b> socialist
in nature and in aim (similarly, not all the Individualist Anarchists
called themselves anarchists but their ideas are clearly anarchist in
nature and in aim).
<p>
Because "anarcho"-capitalists embrace capitalism and reject socialism, 
they cannot be considered anarchists or part of the anarchist tradition.
<p>
Which brings us nicely to the second point, namely a lack of concern for
equality. In stark contrast to anarchists of all schools, inequality
is not seen to be a problem with "anarcho"-capitalists (see 
<a href="secF3.html">section F.3</a>). 
However, it is a truism that not all "traders" are equally subject to the 
market (i.e. have the same market power). In many cases, a few have 
sufficient control of resources to influence or determine price and in 
such cases, all others must submit to those terms or not buy the commodity. 
When the commodity is labour power, even this option is lacking -- workers 
have to accept a job in order to live. As we argue in <a href="secF10.html#secf102">section F.10.2</a>, 
workers are usually at a disadvantage on the labour market when compared 
to capitalists, and this forces them to sell their liberty in return for 
making profits for others. These profits increase inequality in society
as the property owners receive the surplus value their workers produce. 
This increases inequality further, consolidating market power and so weakens
the bargaining position of workers further, ensuring that even the freest
competition possible could not eliminate class power and society (something 
B. Tucker recognised as occurring with the development of trusts within 
capitalism -- see <a href="secG4.html">section G.4</a>). Little wonder Proudhon argued that the
law of supply and demand was a <i>"deceitful law . . . suitable only for
assuring the victory of the strong over the weak, of those who own 
property over those who own nothing."</i> [quoted by Alan Ritter, <b>The 
Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon</b>, p. 121]
<p>
Wage labour is a key way of creating, maintaining and increasing 
inequality (as well as being a source of domination and subordination, 
i.e. unfreedom). Needless to say, inequalities of power and wealth do 
not restrict themselves solely to workplaces nor is the damage of hierarchy 
upon individuals and their liberty limited to working hours. Both have a 
deep impact on the rest of society, expanding into <b>all</b> areas of life 
and restricting liberty everywhere (see <a href="secF.3">section F.3</a> for a further 
discussion on this). You cannot isolate one aspect of life (i.e. work)
and believe that it will somehow not affect all others. However, the 
"anarcho"-capitalist seems to believe you can. 
<p>
Therefore anarchists recognise that "free exchange" in unequal circumstances 
will increase inequality between individuals and classes, <b>not</b> reduce it 
(and that inequality will produce social relationships which are based on 
hierarchy and domination, <b>not</b> freedom). As Noam Chomsky put it:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Anarcho-capitalism, in my opinion, is a doctrinal system which, if ever
implemented, would lead to forms of tyranny and oppression that have few
counterparts in human history. There isn't the slightest possibility that
its (in my view, horrendous) ideas would be implemented, because they would
quickly destroy any society that made this colossal error. The idea of 'free
contract' between the potentate and his starving subject is a sick joke,
perhaps worth some moments in an academic seminar exploring the consequences
of (in my view, absurd) ideas, but nowhere else."</i> [<b>Noam Chomsky on 
Anarchism</b>, interview with Tom Lane, December 23, 1996]
<p></blockquote>
Because of the evil effects of inequality on freedom, both the social 
and individualist anarchists desired to create an environment in which 
circumstances would not drive people to sell their liberty to others 
in return for wages. In other words, they desired an equalisation of 
market power by opposing interest, rent and profit and capitalist 
definitions of private property. Kline summarises this by saying <i>"the 
American [individualist] anarchists exposed the tension existing in 
liberal thought between private property and the ideal of equal access. 
The Individual Anarchists were, at least, aware that existing conditions 
were far from ideal, that the system itself working against the majority 
of individuals in their efforts to attain its promises. Lack of capital, 
the means to creation and accumulation of wealth, usually doomed a 
labourer to a life of exploitation. This the anarchists knew and they 
abhorred such a system."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 102]
<p>
And this desire for bargaining equality is reflected in their economic 
ideas and by removing these underlying economic ideas of the individualist
anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalism makes a mockery of any ideas they 
do appropriate. Essentially, the Individualist Anarchists agreed with
Rousseau that in order to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes you 
deprive people of the means to accumulate in the first place and 
<b>not</b> take away wealth from the rich. An important point which 
"anarcho"-capitalism fails to understand or appreciate.
<p>
In addition, we must note that such inequalities in power and wealth 
will need  "defending" from those subject to them ("anarcho"-capitalists 
recognise the need for private police and courts to defend property 
from theft -- and, anarchists add, to defend the theft and despotism 
associated with property!). Due to its support of private property (and 
thus authority), "anarcho"-capitalism ends up retaining a state in its 
"anarchy"; namely a <b>private</b> state whose existence its proponents 
attempt to deny simply by refusing to call it a state, like an 
ostrich hiding its head in the sand (see <a href="secF6.html">
section F.6</a> for more 
on this and why "anarcho"-capitalism is better described as 
"private state" capitalism). 
<p>
For anarchists, this need of capitalism for some kind of state is 
unsurprising because:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Anarchy without socialism seems equally as impossible to us [as socialism 
without anarchy], for in such a case it could not be other than the 
domination of the strongest, and would therefore set in motion right 
away the organisation and consolidation of this domination; that is 
to the constitution of government."</i> [Errico Malatesta, <b>Life and Ideas</b>, 
p. 148]
</blockquote><p>
Because of this, the "anarcho"-capitalist rejection of anarchist ideas on 
capitalist property economics and the need for equality, they cannot be 
considered anarchists or part of the anarchist tradition.
<p>
Thirdly, unlike anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists consider a society 
of generalised wage labour as a free and non-exploitative one -- but 
such a society is opposed by anarchists. Like all socialists, anarchists 
desire to see workers reunited with the means of production they use and 
so end the exploitation of workers by capitalists and landlords. In other 
words, when the Individual anarchists called themselves "socialists" they 
meant it (see <a href="secGcon.html">section G</a> for more details on this)! 
<p>
If we look at the work of Individualist Anarchist Lysander Spooner, we 
find that he considered capitalism to result in labourers becoming <i>"mere 
tools and machines in the hands of their employers"</i> and labour <i>"only 
for the benefit of their employers."</i> [<b>A Letter to Grover Cleveland</b>, 
p. 50] He considered the Money Monopoly (a combination of specie commodity
money and a 10% tax on non-registered banks) as <i>"the one great obstacle
to the liberation of the labouring classes all over the world"</i>, a monopoly
created by <i>"the employers of wage labour"</i> to ensure necessity <i>"compel[led]
them [the great body of wealth producers] . . . - by the alternative of
starvation - to sell their labour to the money monopolists."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, 
p. 49, p. 48, p. 20]
<p>
Such an analysis is essentially socialist in nature, recognising that 
apparently "free" markets create conditions which drive working class
people to sell their liberty on the market. Similarly, his vision of a
free society is also socialist, with wage labour no more. With the end 
of the money (and land) monopolies, he considered that <i>"with few or no 
exceptions"</i> working people would stop being wage slaves and become 
self-employed workers. In stark contrast to wage labour, he considered 
that free labour involved the worker <i>"appl[ying] both his . . . head and 
his hands"</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 48, p. 50]. Thus Spooner recognised that under 
wage labour, there is a division of labour, with a few using their heads
(giving orders) and the many using their hands (following orders). 
<p>
<i>"Committed as they were to equality in the pursuit of property,"</i> argues
Kline, <i>"the objective for the anarchist became the construction of a
society providing equal access to those things necessary for creating
wealth. The goal of the anarchists who extolled mutualism and the
abolition of all monopolies was, then, a society where everyone willing
to work would have the tools and raw materials necessary for production
in a non-exploitative system . . .the dominant vision of the future 
society . . . [was] underpinned by individual, self-employed workers."</i>
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 95]
<p>
"Anarcho"-capitalists assume that generalised wage labour would remain
under their system (while paying lip-service to the possibilities of 
co-operatives -- and if an "anarcho"-capitalist thinks that co-operative
will become the dominant form of workplace organisation, then they are
some kind of market socialist, <b>not</b> a capitalist). It is clear that their 
end point (a pure capitalism, i.e. generalised wage labour) is directly 
the opposite of that desired by anarchists. This was the case of the 
Individualist Anarchists who embraced the ideal of (non-capitalist) 
laissez faire competition -- they did so, as noted, to <b>end</b> wage 
labour and usury, <b>not</b> to maintain them (indeed, their analysis of the 
change in American society from one of mainly independent producers into 
one based mainly upon wage labour has many parallels with, of all people, 
Karl Marx's presented in chapter 33 of <b>Capital</b>).
<p>
"Anarcho"-capitalists, in contrast, believe that it is likely that 
workplaces will remain hierarchical (i.e. capitalistic) even if the 
public state has been dissolved and that this is of no concern. This 
belief reveals the priority of their values: "efficiency" (the bottom 
line) is considered more important than eliminating the domination, 
coercion, and exploitation of workers. Similarly, they consider that
profits, interest and rent as valid sources of income while anarchists
oppose these as usury and exploitative.
<p>
Moreover, in practice, wage labour is a major source of oppression 
and authoritarianism within society -- there is little or no freedom 
within capitalist production (as Bakunin noted, <i>"the worker sells his
person and his liberty for a given time"</i>). So, in stark contrast to 
anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists have no problem with factory fascism 
(i.e. wage labour), a position which seems highly illogical for a theory
calling itself libertarian. If it were truly libertarian, it would 
oppose all forms of domination, not just statism. This position flows 
from the "anarcho"-capitalist definition of freedom as the absence of 
coercion and will be discussed in <a href="secF2.html">section F.2</a> in more detail.
<p>
This whole-hearted support for wage labour and capitalist
property rights indicates that "anarcho"-capitalists are 
not anarchists because they do not reject all forms of 
<b><i>archy.</i></b> They obviously support the hierarchy between 
boss and worker (wage labour) and landlord and tenant. 
Anarchism, by definition, is against all forms of 
<b><i>archy</b></i>, 
including the hierarchy generated by capitalist property. 
To ignore the obvious <b><i>archy</i></b> associated with capitalist 
property is highly illogical.
<p>
The anti-anarchist nature of "anarcho"-capitalism can best
be seen by quoting a leading "anarcho"-capitalist, Murray
Rothbard. He argues, that the state <i>"arrogates to itself a 
monopoly of force, of ultimate decision-making power, over a 
given area territorial area."</i> [Rothbard, <b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, 
p. 170] In and of itself, this definition is unremarkable. 
Unfortunately for him (and "anarcho"-capitalist claims of
being anarchist), he also notes that capitalist property owners 
have similar powers. As he states, <i>"[o]bviously, in a free 
society, Smith has the ultimate decision-making power over 
his own just property, Jones over his, etc."</i> [<b>Op. 
Cit.</b>, p. 173] 
and, equally obviously, this ultimate-decision making power 
extends to those who <b>use,</b> but do not own, such property
(i.e. tenants and workers). The statist nature of property
property is clearly indicated by Rothbard's words -- the
property owner in an "anarcho"-capitalist society possesses
the <i>"ultimate decision-making power"</i> over a given area, which
is also what the state has currently. 
<p>
As we argue in more depth in <a href="secF2.html">
section F.2</a>, "anarcho"-capitalism
cannot be considered as anarchist simply because they replace
the authority of the state with that of the property owner. Both
has <i>"ultimate decision-making power"</i> over a given area and so over 
those who live in (or use) that area. The similarities between 
capitalism and statism are clear -- and so why "anarcho"-capitalism
cannot be anarchist. To reject the authority (the <i>"ultimate 
decision-making power"</i>) of the state and embrace that of the 
property owner indicates not
only a highly illogical stance but one at odds with the basic
principles of anarchism. 
<p>
Thus anarchism is far more than the common dictionary definition
of <i>"no government"</i> -- it also entails being against all forms of
<b><i>archy</i></b>, including those generated by capitalist property. This 
is clear from the roots of the word "anarchy." As we noted 
in <a href="secA1.html">section A.1</a>, the word anarchy means 
<i>"no rulers"</i> or <i>"contrary 
to authority"</i>. As Rothbard himself acknowledges, the 
property owner is the ruler of their property and, therefore, 
those who use it (hence Bakunin's above quoted comment that <i>"the 
worker sells his person and his liberty for a given time"</i>).
For this reason "anarcho"-capitalism cannot be considered as
a form of anarchism -- a real anarchist must logically oppose 
the authority of the property owner along with that of the state.
<p>
Because "anarcho"-capitalism does not explicitly (or implicitly, for 
that matter) call for economic arrangements that will end wage labour 
and usury they cannot be considered anarchists or part of the anarchist 
tradition.
<p>
To conclude. 
<p>
Political theories should be identified by their actual features and 
history rather than labels. Once we recognise that, we soon find out that 
"anarcho"-capitalism is an oxymoron. Anarchists and "anarcho"-capitalists 
are not part of the same movement or tradition. Their ideas and aims 
are in direct opposition to those of all kinds of anarchists. 
<p>
While anarchists have always opposed capitalism, "anarcho"-capitalists 
have embraced it. And due to this embrace their "anarchy" will be marked 
by extensive differences in wealth and power, differences that will show 
themselves up in relationships based upon subordination and hierarchy 
(such as wage labour), <b>not</b> freedom (little wonder that Proudhon 
argued that <i>"property is despotism"</i> -- it creates authoritarian and
hierarchical relationships between people in a similar way to statism).
<p>
Their support for "free market" capitalism ignores the impact of wealth 
and power on the nature and outcome of individual decisions within the 
market (see sections <a href="secF2.html">F.2</a> and <a href="secF3.html">F.3</a> for further discussion). For example, 
as we indicate in sections <a href="secJ5.html#secj510">J.5.10</a>, <a href="secJ5.html#secj511">J.5.11</a> and <a href="secJ5.html#secj512">J.5.12</a>  wage labour is less 
efficient than self-management in production but due to the structure and 
dynamics of the capitalist market, "market forces" will actively discourage 
self-management due to its empowering nature for workers. In other words,
a developed capitalist market will promote hierarchy and unfreedom in 
production in spite of its effects on individual workers and their 
wants (see also <a href="secF10.html#secf102">section F.10.2</a>). Thus "free market" capitalism tends 
to re-enforce inequalities of wealth and power, <b>not</b> eliminate them.
<p>
Furthermore, any such system of (economic and social) power will require 
extensive force to maintain it and the "anarcho"-capitalist system of 
competing "defence firms" will simply be a new state, enforcing 
capitalist power, property rights and law.
<p>
Overall, the lack of concern for meaningful freedom within production and 
the effects of vast differences in power and wealth within society as a 
whole makes "anarcho"-capitalism little better than "anarchism for the rich." 
Emma Goldman recognised this when she argued that <i>"'Rugged individualism' 
has meant all the 'individualism' for the masters . . . in whose name
political tyranny and social oppression are defended and held up as 
virtues while every aspiration and attempt of man to gain freedom . . . 
is denounced as . . . evil in the name of that same individualism."</i> 
[ <b>Red Emma Speaks</b>, p. 112] And, as such, is no anarchism at all.
<p>
So, unlike anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists do not seek the <i>"abolition
of the proletariat"</i> (to use Proudhon's expression) via changing capitalist 
property rights and institutions. Thus the "anarcho"-capitalist and the 
anarchist have different starting positions and opposite ends in mind 
and so they cannot be considered part of the same (anarchist) tradition.
<p>
As we discuss further in later sections, the "anarcho"-capitalist
claims to being anarchists are bogus simply because they reject so much
of the anarchist tradition as to make what they do accept non-anarchist
in theory and practice. Little wonder Peter Marshall said that <i>"few
anarchists would accept the 'anarcho-capitalists' into the anarchist
camp since they do not share a concern for economic equality and
social justice."</i> [<b>Demanding the Impossible</b>, p. 565]
<p>
<a name="secf11"><h2>F.1.1 Why is the failure to renounce hierarchy the Achilles Heel of right-wing libertarianism and "anarcho"-capitalism?</h2> 
<p>
Any capitalist system will produce vast differences in economic (and social)
wealth and power. As we argue in <a href="secF3.html#secf31">section F.3.1</a>, such differences will
reflect themselves in the market and any "free" contracts agreed there 
will create hierarchical relationships. Thus capitalism is marked by
hierarchy (see <a href="secB1.html#secb12">section B.1.2</a>) and, unsurprisingly, right-libertarians
and "anarcho"-capitalists fail to oppose such "free market" generated
hierarchy.
<p>
Both groups approve of it in the capitalist workplace or rented accommodation 
and the right-Libertarians also approve of it in a 'minimal' state to protect 
private property ("anarcho"-capitalists, in contrast, approve of the use
of private defence firms to protect property). But the failure of these 
two movements to renounce hierarchy is their weakest point. For 
anti-authoritarianism has sunk deep roots into the modern psyche, 
as a legacy of the sixties.
<p>
Many people who do not even know what anarchism is have been profoundly
affected by the personal liberation and counterculture movements of the
past thirty years, epitomised by the popular bumper sticker, <i>"Question
Authority."</i> As a result, society now tolerates much more choice than ever
before in matters of religion, sexuality, art, music, clothing, and other
components of lifestyle. We need only recall the conservatism that reigned
in such areas during the fifties to see that the idea of liberty has made
tremendous advances in just a few decades.
<p>
Although this liberatory impulse has so far been confined almost entirely
to the personal and cultural realms, it may yet be capable of spilling
over and affecting economic and political institutions, provided it
continues to grow. The Right is well aware of this, as seen in its ongoing
campaigns for "family values," school prayer, suppression of women's
rights, fundamentalist Christianity, sexual abstinence before marriage,
and other attempts to revive the Ozzie-and-Harriet mindset of the Good Old
Days. This is where the efforts of "cultural anarchists" -- artists,
musicians, poets, and others -- are important in keeping alive the ideal
of personal freedom and resistance to authority as a necessary foundation
for economic and political restructuring.
<p>
Indeed, the libertarian right (as a whole) support restrictions on freedom
<b>as long as its not the state that is doing it</b>! Their support for
capitalism means that they have no problem with bosses dictating what
workers do during working hours (nor outside working hours, if the job
requires employees to take drug tests or not be gay in order to keep it).
If a private landlord or company decrees a mandatory rule or mode of 
living, workers/tenets must "love it or leave it!" Of course, that the
same argument also applies to state laws is one hotly denied by 
right-Libertarians -- a definite case of not seeing the wood for the
trees (see <a href="secF2.html#secf23">section F.2.3</a>).
<p>
Of course, the "anarcho"-capitalist will argue, workers and tenants can
find a more liberal boss or landlord. This, however, ignores two key facts.
Firstly, being able to move to a more liberal state hardly makes state
laws less offensive (as they themselves will be the first to point out).
Secondly, looking for a new job or home is not that easy. Just a moving
to a new state can involve drastic upheavals, so change changing jobs
and homes. Moreover, the job market is usually a buyers market (it has
to be in capitalism, otherwise profits are squeezed -- see sections 
<a href="secC7.html">C.7</a>
and <a href="secF10.html#secf102">F.10.2</a>) and this means that workers are not usually in a position 
(unless they organise) to demand increased liberties at work. 
<p>
It seems somewhat ironic, to say the least, that right-libertarians 
place rights of property over the rights of self-ownership, even though 
(according to their ideology) self-ownership is the foundational right 
from which property rights are derived. Thus in right-libertarianism the 
rights of property owners to discriminate and govern the property-less 
are more important than the freedom from discrimination (i.e. to be 
yourself) or the freedom to govern oneself at all times.
<p>
So, when it boils down to it, right-libertarians are not really bothered 
about restrictions on liberty and, indeed, they will defend private 
restrictions on liberty with all their might. This may seem a strange 
position for self-proclaimed "libertarians" to take, but it flows 
naturally from their definition of freedom (see 
<a href="secF2.html">section F.2</a> for a 
full discussion of this). but by not attacking hierarchy beyond certain 
forms of statism, the 'libertarian' right fundamentally undermines its 
claim to be libertarian. Freedom cannot be compartmentalised, but is 
holistic. The denial of liberty in, say, the workplace, quickly results 
in its being denied elsewhere in society (due to the impact of the
inequalities it would produce) , just as the degrading effects of wage 
labour and the hierarchies with which is it bound up are felt by the worker 
outside work. 
<p>
Neither the Libertarian Party nor so-called "anarcho"-capitalism is
<b>genuinely</b> anti-authoritarian, as those who are truly dedicated to 
liberty must be. 
<p>
<a name="secf12"><h2>F.1.2 How libertarian is right-Libertarian theory?</h2>
<p>
The short answer is, not very. Liberty not only implies but also requires 
independent, critical thought (indeed, anarchists would argue that critical 
thought requires free development and evolution and that it is precisely
<b>this</b> which capitalist hierarchy crushes). For anarchists a libertarian 
theory, if it is to be worthy of the name, must be based upon critical 
thought and reflect the key aspect that characterises life - change and the 
ability to evolve. To hold up dogma and base "theory" upon assumptions (as 
opposed to facts) is the opposite of a libertarian frame of mind. A 
libertarian theory must be based upon reality and recognise the need 
for change and the existence of change. Unfortunately, right-Libertarianism 
is marked more by ideology than critical analysis.
<p>
Right-Libertarianism is characterised by a strong tendency of creating
theories based upon assumptions and deductions from these axioms (for a
discussion on the pre-scientific nature of this methodology and of its
dangers, see the <a href="secF1.html#secf13">next section</a>). Robert Nozick, for example, in <b>Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia</b> makes no attempt to provide a justification of the 
property rights his whole theory is based upon. His main assumption is 
that <i>"[i]ndividuals have rights, and there are certain things no person 
or group may do to them (without violating their rights)."</i> [<b>Anarchy, 
State and Utopia</b>, p. ix] While this does have its intuitive appeal, 
it is not much to base a political ideology upon. After all, what rights 
people consider as valid can be pretty subjective and have constantly 
evolved during history. To say that "individuals have rights" is to open up 
the question "what rights?" Indeed, as we argue in greater length in 
<a href="secF2.html">section F.2</a>, such a rights based system as Nozick desires can and does lead to 
situations developing in which people "consent" to be exploited and 
oppressed and that, intuitively, many people consider supporting the 
"violation" of these "certain rights" (by creating other ones) simply 
because of their evil consequences. 
<p>
In other words, starting from the assumption "people have [certain] rights" 
Nozick constructs a theory which, when faced with the reality of unfreedom 
and domination it would create for the many, justifies this unfreedom 
as an expression of liberty. In other words, regardless of the outcome,
the initial assumptions are what matter. Nozick's intuitive rights system 
can lead to some very non-intuitive outcomes.
<p>
And does Nozick prove the theory of property rights he assumes? He states 
that <i>"we shall not formulate [it] here."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 150] Moreover, it 
is not formulated anywhere else in his book. And if it is not formulated,
what is there to defend? Surely this means that his Libertarianism is 
without foundations? As Jonathan Wolff notes, Nozick's <i>"Libertarian property 
rights remain substantially undefended."</i> [<b>Robert Nozick: Property, Justice 
and the Minimal State</b>, p. 117] Given that the right to acquire property 
is critical to his whole theory you would think it important enough to go 
into in some detail (or at least document). After all, unless he provides us 
with a firm basis for property rights then his entitlement theory is nonsense 
as no one has the right to (private) property.
<p>
It could be argued that Nozick <b>does</b> present enough information to allow 
us to piece together a possible argument in favour of property rights 
based on his modification of the <i>"Lockean Proviso"</i> (although he does
not point us to these arguments). However, assuming this is the case, 
such a defence actually fails (see <a href="secB3.html#secb34">
section B.3.4</a> for more on this). If individuals <b>do</b> have rights, these rights do not include property rights 
in the form Nozick assumes (but does not prove). Nozick appears initially 
convincing because what he assumes with regards to property is a normal 
feature of the society we are in (we would be forgiven when we note here 
that feeble arguments pass for convincing when they are on the same side 
as the prevailing sentiment). 
<p>
Similarly, both Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand (who is infamous for repeating 
<i>"A is A"</i> ad infinitum) do the same - base their ideologies on assumptions 
(see <a href="secF7.html">section F.7</a> for more on this). 
<p>
Therefore, we see that most of the leading right-Libertarian ideologues 
base themselves on assumptions about what "Man" is or the rights they 
should have (usually in the form that people have (certain) rights because 
they are people). From these theorems and assumptions they build their 
respective ideologies, using logic to deduce the conclusions that their 
assumptions imply. Such a methodology is unscientific and, indeed, a relic 
of religious (pre-scientific) society (see <a href="secF1.html#secf13">next section</a>) but, more 
importantly, can have negative effects on maximising liberty. This is
because this "methodology" has distinct problems. Murray Bookchin 
argues:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Conventional reason rests on identity, not change; its fundamental 
principle is that <b>A equals A,</b> the famous 'principle of identity,' which 
means that any given phenomenon can be only itself and cannot be other than
what we immediately perceive it to be at a given moment in time. It does not
address the problem of change. A human being is an infant at one time, a
child at another, an adolescent at still another, and finally a youth and
an adult. When we analyse an infant by means of conventional reason, we
are not exploring what it is <b>becoming</b> in the process of developing into
a child."</i> [<i>"A Philosophical Naturalism"</i>, <b>Society and Nature</b> No.2, p. 64]
</blockquote><p>
In other words, right-Libertarian theory is based upon ignoring the
fundamental aspect of life - namely <b>change</b> and <b>evolution.</b> Perhaps
it will be argued that identity also accounts for change by including
potentiality -- which means, that we have the strange situation that 
A can <b>potentially</b> be A! If A is not actually A, but only has the 
potential to be A, then A is not A. Thus to include change is to 
acknowledge that A does not equal A -- that individuals and humanity 
evolves and so what constitutes A also changes. To maintain identity
and then to deny it seems strange.
<p>
That change is far from the "A is A" mentality can be seen from Murray 
Rothbard who goes so far as to state that <i>"one of the notable attributes 
of natural law"</i> is <i>"its applicability to all men [sic!], regardless of 
time or place. Thus ethical law takes its place alongside physical or 
'scientific' natural laws."</i> [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 42] Apparently 
the "nature of man" is the only living thing in nature that does not evolve 
or change! Of course, it could be argued that by "natural law" Rothbard is 
only referring to his method of deducing his (and, we stress, they are
just his -- not natural) "ethical laws" -- but his methodology starts
by assuming certain things about "man." Whether these assumptions seem
far or not is besides the point, by using the term "natural law" Rothbard
is arguing that any actions that violate <b>his</b> ethical laws are somehow
"against nature" (but if they were against nature, they could not occur 
-- see <a href="secF7.html">section F.7</a> for more on this). Deductions from assumptions is a
Procrustean bed for humanity (as Rothbard's ideology shows).
<p>
So, as can be seen, many leading right-Libertarians place great store
by the axiom "A is A" or that "man" has certain rights simply because 
"he" is a "man". And as Bookchin points out, such conventional reason 
<i>"doubtless plays an indispensable role in mathematical thinking and 
mathematical sciences . . . and in the nuts-and-bolts of dealing with 
everyday life"</i> and so is essential to <i>"understand or design mechanical 
entities."</i> [<b>Ibid.</b>, p.67] But the question arises, is such reason 
useful when considering people and other forms of life?
<p>
Mechanical entities are but one (small) aspect of human life. Unfortunately 
for right-Libertarians (and fortunately for the rest of humanity), human 
beings are <b>not</b> mechanical entities but instead are living, breathing, 
feeling, hoping, dreaming, <b>changing</b> living organisms. They are not
mechanical entities and any theory that uses reason based on such 
(non-living) entities will flounder when faced with living ones. In 
other words, right-Libertarian theory treats people as the capitalist 
system tries to -- namely as commodities, as things. Instead of human 
beings, whose ideas, ideals and ethics change, develop and grow, capitalism 
and capitalist ideologues try to reduce human life to the level of corn or 
iron (by emphasising the unchanging "nature" of man and their starting
assumptions/rights). 
<p>
This can be seen from their support for wage labour, the reduction of
human activity to a commodity on the market. While paying lip service 
to liberty and life, right-libertarianism justifies the commodification 
of labour and life, which within a system of capitalist property rights
can result in the treating of people as means to an end as opposed 
to an end in themselves (see sections <a href="secF2.html">F.2</a> and <a href="secF3.html#secf31">F.3.1</a>). 
<p>
And as Bookchin points out, <i>"in an age of sharply conflicting values and
emotionally charges ideals, such a way of reasoning is often repellent. 
Dogmatism, authoritarianism, and fear seem all-pervasive."</i> [<b>Ibid.</b>, p. 68]
Right-Libertarianism provides more than enough evidence for Bookchin's 
summary with its support for authoritarian social relationships, hierarchy
and even slavery (see <a href="secF2.html">section F.2</a>).
<p>
This mechanical viewpoint is also reflected in their lack of appreciation 
that social institutions and relationships evolve over time and, sometimes,
fundamentally change. This can best be seen from property. Right-libertarians
fail to see that over time (in the words of Proudhon) property <i>"changed
its nature."</i> Originally, <i>"the word <b>property</b> was synonymous with . . .
<b>individual possession</b>"</i> but it became more <i>"complex"</i> and turned into 
<b>private property</b> -- <i>"the right to use it by his neighbour's labour."</i> 
The changing of use-rights to (capitalist) property rights created relations
of domination and exploitation between people absent before. For the
right-Libertarian, both the tools of the self-employed artisan and the 
capital of a transnational corporation are both forms of "property" and 
(so) basically identical. In practice, of course, the social relations 
they create and the impact they have on society are totally different. 
Thus the mechanical mind-set of right-Libertarianism fails to understand
how institutions, like property, evolve and come to replace whatever 
freedom enhancing features they had with oppression (indeed, von Mises
argued that <i>"[t]here may possibly be a difference of opinion about
whether a particular institution is socially beneficial or harmful. But
once it has been judged [by whom, we ask] beneficial, one can no longer
contend that, for some inexplicable reason, it must be condemned as 
immoral"</i> [<b>Liberalism</b>, p. 34] So much for evolution and change!).
<p>
Anarchism, in contrast, is based upon the importance of critical thought 
informed by an awareness that life is in a constant process of change. This 
means that our ideas on human society must be informed by the facts, not by 
what we wish was true. For Bookchin, an evaluation of conventional wisdom 
(as expressed in <i>"the law of identity"</i>) is essential and its conclusions 
have <i>"enormous importance for how we behave as ethical beings, the nature 
of nature, and our place in the natural world. Moreover. . . these issues 
directly affect the kind of society, sensibility, and lifeways we wish to 
foster."</i> [Bookchin, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 69-70]
<p>
Bookchin is correct. While anarchists oppose hierarchy in the name of 
liberty, right-libertarians support authority and hierarchy, all of which 
deny freedom and restrict individual development. This is unsurprising 
because the right-libertarian ideology rejects change and critical thought 
based upon the scientific method and so is fundamentally <b>anti-life</b> in 
its assumptions and <b>anti-human</b> in its method. Far from being a libertarian 
set of ideas, right-Libertarianism is a mechanical set of dogmas that deny 
the fundamental nature of life (namely change) and of individuality (namely 
critical thought and freedom). Moreover, in practice their system of 
(capitalist) rights would soon result in extensive restrictions on liberty 
and authoritarian social relationships (see sections <a href="secF2.html">F.2</a> and <a href="secF3.html">F.3</a>) -- a 
strange result of a theory proclaiming itself "libertarian" but one 
consistent with its methodology.
<p>
From a wider viewpoint, such a rejection of liberty by right-libertarians 
is unsurprising. They do, after all, support capitalism. Capitalism 
produces an inverted set of ethics, one in which capital (dead labour) is
more important that people (living labour). After all, workers are usually 
easier to replace than investments in capital and the person who owns
capital commands the person who "only" owns his life and productive 
abilities. And as Oscar Wilde once noted, crimes against property <i>"are 
the crimes that the English law, valuing what a man has more than what 
a man is, punishes with the harshest and most horrible severity."</i> [<b>The 
Soul of Man Under Socialism</b>] 
<p>
This mentality is reflected in right-libertarianism when it claims that 
stealing food is a crime while starving to death (due to the action of 
market forces/power and property rights) is no infringement of your rights 
(see <a href="secF4.html#secf42">section F.4.2</a> for a similar argument with regards to water). It can 
also be seen when right-libertarian's claim that the taxation <i>"of earnings 
from labour"</i> (e.g. of one dollar from a millionaire) is <i>"<b>on a par with</b> 
forced labour"</i> [Nozick, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 169] while working in a sweatshop 
for 14 hours a day (enriching said millionaire) does not affect your 
liberty as you "consent" to it due to market forces (although, of course, 
many rich people have earned their money <b>without</b> labouring themselves -- 
their earnings derive from the wage labour of others so would taxing
those, non-labour, earnings be "forced labour"?) Interestingly, the
Individualist Anarchist Ben Tucker argued that an income tax was <i>"a 
recognition of the fact that industrial freedom and equality of
opportunity no longer exist here [in the USA in the 1890s] even in
the imperfect state in which they once did exist"</i> [quoted by James
Martin, <b>Men Against the State</b>, p. 263] which suggests a somewhat
different viewpoint on this matter than Nozick or Rothbard.
<p>
That capitalism produces an inverted set of ethics can be seen when the
Ford produced the Pinto. The Pinto had a flaw in it which meant that if
it was hit in a certain way in a crash the fuel tank exploded. The Ford
company decided it was more "economically viable" to produce that car and
pay damages to those who were injured or the relatives of those who died 
than pay to change the invested capital. The needs for the owners of 
capital to make a profit came before the needs of the living. Similarly, 
bosses often hire people to perform unsafe work in dangerous conditions
and fire them if they protest. Right-libertarian ideology is the 
philosophical equivalent. Its dogma is "capital" and it comes before 
life (i.e. "labour").
<p>
As Bakunin once put it, <i>"you will always find the idealists in the very
act of practical materialism, while you will see the materialists pursuing
and realising the most grandly ideal aspirations and thoughts."</i> [<b>God
and the State</b>, p. 49] Hence we see right "libertarians" supporting
sweat shops and opposing taxation -- for, in the end, money (and the
power that goes with it) counts far more in that ideology than ideals 
such as liberty, individual dignity, empowering, creative and productive 
work and so forth for all. The central flaw of right-libertarianism is
that it does not recognise that the workings of the capitalist market can 
easily ensure that the majority end up becoming a resource for others in 
ways far worse than that associated with taxation. The legal rights 
of self-ownership supported by right-libertarians does not mean that 
people have the ability to avoid what is in effect enslavement to 
another (see sections <a href="secF2.html">F.2</a> and <a href="secF3.html">F.3</a>).
<p>
Right-Libertarian theory is not based upon a libertarian methodology or
perspective and so it is hardly surprising it results in support for
authoritarian social relationships and, indeed, slavery (see 
<a href="secF2.html#secf26">section F.2.6</a>).
<p>
<a name="secf13"><h2>F.1.3 Is right-Libertarian theory scientific in nature?</h2>
<p>
Usually, no. The scientific approach is <b>inductive,</b> much of the 
right-libertarian approach is <b>deductive.</b> The first draws generalisations 
from the data, the second applies preconceived generalisations to the data. 
A completely deductive approach is pre-scientific, however, which is why 
many right-Libertarians cannot legitimately claim to use a scientific 
method. Deduction does occur in science, but the generalisations are 
primarily based on other data, not <i>a priori</i> assumptions, and are checked 
against data to see if they are accurate. Anarchists tend to fall into the 
inductive camp, as Kropotkin put it:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Precisely this natural-scientific method applied to economic facts,
enables us to prove that the so-called 'laws' of middle-class sociology,
including also their political economy, are not laws at all, but 
simply guesses, or mere assertions which have never been verified
at all."</i> [<b>Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets</b>, p. 153]
</blockquote><p>
The idea that natural-scientific methods can be applied to economic and
social life is one that many right-libertarians reject. Instead they 
favour the deductive (pre-scientific) approach (this we must note is
not limited purely to Austrian economists, many more mainstream 
capitalist economists also embrace deduction over induction).
<p>
The tendency for right-Libertarianism to fall into dogmatism (or <i>a priori</i> 
theorems, as they call it) and its implications can best be seen from the 
work of Ludwig von Mises and other economists from the right-Libertarian
"Austrian school." Of course, not all right-libertarians necessarily 
subscribe to this approach (Murray Rothbard for one did) but its use by
so many leading lights of both schools of thought is significant and 
worthy of comment. And as we are concentrating on <b>methodology</b> it is
not essential to discuss the starting assumptions. The assumptions (such 
as, to use Rothbard's words, the Austrian's <i>"fundamental axiom that 
individual human beings act"</i>) may be correct, incorrect or incomplete -- 
but the method of using them advocated by von Mises ensures that such 
considerations are irrelevant.
<p>
Von Mises (a leading member of the Austrian school of economics) begins by 
noting that social and economic theory <i>"is not derived from experience; it 
is prior to experience..."</i> Which is back to front. It is obvious that 
experience of capitalism is necessary in order to develop a viable theory 
about how it works. Without the experience, any theory is just a flight of 
fantasy. The actual specific theory we develop is therefore derived from 
experience, informed by it and will have to get checked against reality 
to see if it is viable. This is the scientific method - any theory must 
be checked against the facts.
<p>
However, von Mises goes on to argue at length that <i>"no kind of experience 
can ever force us to discard or modify <b>a priori</b> theorems; they are 
logically prior to it and cannot be either proved by corroborative 
experience or disproved by experience to the contrary . . ."</i>
<p>
Von Mises makes a similar claim in his work <b>Human Action</b>, namely 
that experience <i>"can never . . . prove or disprove any particular 
theorem . . . The ultimate yardstick of an economic theorem's 
correctness or incorrectness is solely reason unaided by experience."</i> 
[p. 858]
<p>
And if this does not do justice to a full exposition of the phantasmagoria 
of von Mises' <i>a priorism</i>, the reader may take some joy (or horror) from 
the following statement:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"If a contradiction appears between a theory and experience, <b>we must 
always assume</b> that a condition pre-supposed by the theory was not 
present, or else there is some error in our observation. The disagreement 
between the theory and the facts of experience frequently forces us to think
through the problems of the theory again. <b>But so long as a rethinking of 
the theory uncovers no errors in our thinking, we are not entitled to doubt 
its truth</b>"</i> [emphasis added -- the quotes presented here are cited 
in <b>Ideology and Method in Economics</b> by Homa Katouzian, pp. 39-40]
<p></blockquote>
In other words, if reality is in conflict with your ideas, do not adjust 
your views because reality must be at fault! The scientific method would 
be to revise the theory in light of the facts. It is not scientific to
reject the facts in light of the theory! 
<p>
Von Mises rejects the scientific approach as do all Austrian Economists.
Murray Rothbard states approvingly that <i>"Mises indeed held not only that 
economic theory does not need to be 'tested' by historical fact but also 
that it <b>cannot</b> be so tested."</i> [<i>"Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian 
Economics"</i> in <b>The Foundation of Modern Austrian Economics</b>, p. 32]
Similarly, von Hayek wrote that economic theories can <i>"never be verified 
or falsified by reference to facts. All that we can and must verify is the 
presence of our assumptions in the particular case."</i> [<b>Individualism and 
Economic Order</b>, p. 73]
<p>
This may seen somewhat strange to non-Austrians. How can we ignore reality
when deciding whether a theory is a good one or not? If we cannot evaluate
our ideas, how can we consider them anything bar dogma? The Austrian's
maintain that we cannot use historical evidence because every historical
situation is unique. Thus we cannot use <i>"complex heterogeneous historical
facts as if they were repeatable homogeneous facts"</i> like those in a
scientist's experiment [Rothbard, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 33]. While such a position
<b>does</b> have an element of truth about it, the extreme <i>a priorism</i> that
is drawn from this element is radically false (just as extreme empiricism 
is also false, but for different reasons).
<p>
Those who hold such a position ensure that their ideas cannot be evaluated 
beyond logical analysis. As Rothbard makes clear, <i>"since praxeology begins 
with a true axiom, A, all that can be deduced from this axiom must also 
be true. For if A implies be, and A is true, then B must also be true."</i> 
[<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 19-20] But such an approach makes the search for truth a
game without rules. The Austrian economists (and other right-libertarians) 
who use this method are free to theorise anything they want, without such 
irritating constrictions as facts, statistics, data, history or experimental 
confirmation. Their only guide is logic. But this is no different from what 
religions do when they assert the logical existence of God. Theories 
ungrounded in facts and data are easily spun into any belief a person 
wants. Starting assumptions and trains of logic may contain inaccuracies 
so small as to be undetectable, yet will yield entirely false conclusions.
<p>
In addition, trains of logic may miss things which are only brought 
to light by actual experiences (after all, the human mind is not all 
knowing or all seeing). To ignore actual experience is to loose that
input when evaluating a theory. Hence our comments on the irrelevance of
the assumptions used -- the methodology is such that incomplete or 
incorrect assumptions or steps cannot be identified in light of experience. 
This is because one way of discovering if a given chain of logic requires 
checking is to test its conclusions against available evidence (although 
von Mises did argue that the <i>"ultimate yardstick"</i> was <i>"solely reason unaided 
by experience"</i>). If we <b>do</b> take experience into account and rethink a 
given theory in the light of contradictory evidence, the problem 
remains that a given logical chain may be correct, but incomplete 
or concentrate on or stress inappropriate factors. In other words, our 
logical deductions may be correct but our starting place or steps wrong 
and as the facts are to be rejected in the light of the deductive method, 
we cannot revise our ideas.
<p>
Indeed, this approach could result in discarding (certain forms of) human 
behaviour as irrelevant (which the Austrian system claims using empirical 
evidence does). For there are too many variables that can have an influence 
upon individual acts to yield conclusive results explaining human behaviour. 
Indeed, the deductive approach may ignore as irrelevant certain human 
motivations which have a decisive impact on an outcome. There could be 
a strong tendency to project "right-libertarian person" onto the rest of 
society and history, for example, and draw inappropriate insights into the
way human society works or has worked. This can be seen, for example, 
in attempts to claim pre-capitalist societies as examples of
"anarcho"-capitalism in action.
<p>
Moreover, deductive reasoning cannot indicate the relative significance 
of assumptions or theoretical factors. That requires empirical study. It 
could be that a factor considered important in the theory actually turns 
out to have little effect in practice and so the derived axioms are so 
weak as to be seriously misleading.
<p>
In such a purely ideal realm, observation and experience are distrusted
(when not ignored) and instead theory is the lodestone. Given the bias
of most theorists in this tradition, it is unsurprising that this style
of economics can always be trusted to produce results proving free markets
to be the finest principle of social organisation. And, as an added
bonus, reality can be ignored as it is <b>never</b> "pure" enough according
to the assumptions required by the theory. It could be argued, because
of this, that many right-libertarians insulate their theories from 
criticism by refusing to test them or acknowledge the results of such
testing (indeed, it could also be argued that much of right-libertarianism 
is more a religion than a political theory as it is set-up in such a 
way that it is either true or false, with this being determined not 
by evaluating facts but by whether you accept the assumptions and 
logical chains presented with them).
<p>
Strangely enough, while dismissing the "testability" of theories many
right-Libertarians (including Murray Rothbard) <b>do</b> investigate historical 
situations and claim them as examples of how well their ideas work in 
practice. But why does historical fact suddenly become useful when it 
can be used to bolster the right-Libertarian argument? Any such example 
is just as "complex" as any other and the good results indicated may 
not be accountable to the assumptions and steps of the theory but to other
factors totally ignored by it. If economic (or other) theory is untestable 
then <b>no</b> conclusions can be drawn from history, including claims for the
superiority of laissez-faire capitalism. You cannot have it both ways 
-- although we doubt that right-libertarians will stop using history
as evidence that their ideas work.
<p>
Perhaps the Austrian desire to investigate history is not so strange 
after all. Clashes with reality make a-priori deductive systems implode 
as the falsifications run back up the deductive changes to shatter the 
structure built upon the original axioms. Thus the desire to find <b>some</b>
example which proves their ideology must be tremendous. However, the 
deductive a-priori methodology makes them unwilling to admit to being 
mistaken -- hence their attempts to downplay examples which refute their 
dogmas. Thus we have the desire for historical examples while at the same 
time they have extensive ideological justifications that ensure reality 
only enters their world-view when it agrees with them. In practice,
the latter wins as real-life refuses to be boxed into their dogmas
and deductions.
<p>
Of course it is sometimes argued that it is <b>complex</b> data that is
the problem. Let use assume that this is the case. It is argued that
when dealing with complex information it is impossible to use aggregate 
data without first having more simple assumptions (i.e. that "humans
act"). Due to the complexity of the situation, it is argued, it is 
impossible to aggregate data because this hides the individual activities 
that creates it. Thus "complex" data cannot be used to invalidate 
assumptions or theories. Hence, according to Austrians, the axioms 
derived from the "simple fact" that "humans act" are the only basis 
for thinking about the economy.
<p>
Such a position is false in two ways.
<p>
Firstly, the aggregation of data <b>does</b> allow us to understand complex 
systems. If we look at a chair, we cannot find out whether it is 
comfortable, its colour, whether it is soft or hard by looking at 
the atoms that make it up. To suggest that you can is to imply the 
existence of green, soft, comfortable atoms. Similarly with gases. 
They are composed to countless individual atoms but scientists do 
not study them by looking at those atoms and their actions. Within
limits, this is also valid for human action. For example, it would
be crazy to maintain from historical data that interest rates will
be a certain percentage a week but it is valid to maintain that 
interest rates are known to be related to certain variables in certain
ways. Or that certain experiences will tend to result in certain forms
of psychological damage. General tendencies and "rules of thumb" can
be evolved from such study and these can be used to <b>guide</b> current 
practice and theory. By aggregating data you can produce valid 
information, rules of thumb, theories and evidence which would be 
lost if you concentrated on "simple data"  (such as "humans act").
Therefore, empirical study produces facts which vary across time 
and place, and yet underlying and important patterns can be
generated (patterns which can be evaluated against <b>new</b> data
and improved upon).
<p>
Secondly, the simple actions themselves influence and are influenced 
in turn by overall (complex) facts. People act in different ways in 
different circumstances (something we can agree with Austrians about, 
although  we refuse to take it to their extreme position of rejecting 
empirical evidence as such). To use simple acts to understand
complex systems means to miss the fact that these acts are not 
independent of their circumstances. For example, to claim that the
capitalist market is "just" the resultant of bilateral exchanges
ignores the fact that the market activity shapes the nature and
form of these bilateral exchanges. The "simple" data is dependent
on the "complex" system -- and so the complex system <b>cannot</b> be
understood by looking at the simple actions in isolation. To do so
would be to draw incomplete and misleading conclusions (and it is
due to these interrelations that we argue that aggregate data should
be used critically). This is particularly important when looking at
capitalism, where the "simple" acts of exchange in the labour market
are dependent upon and shaped by circumstances outside these acts.
<p>
So to claim that (complex) data cannot be used to evaluate a theory 
is false. Data can be useful when seeing whether a theory is confirmed by 
reality. This is the nature of the scientific method -- you compare the 
results expected by your theory to the facts and if they do not match you 
check your facts <b>and</b> check your theory. This may involve revising the
assumptions, methodology and theories you use if the evidence is such as 
to bring them into question. For example, if you claim that capitalism is 
based on freedom but that the net result of capitalism is to produce 
relations of domination between people then it would be valid to revise, 
for example, your definition of freedom rather than deny that domination 
restricts freedom (see <a href="secF2.html">section F.2</a> on this). But if actual experience is 
to be distrusted when evaluating theory, we effectively place ideology 
above people -- after all, how the ideology affects people in <b>practice</b> 
is irrelevant as experiences cannot be used to evaluate the (logically
sound but actually deeply flawed) theory.
<p>
As we indicated above (in <a href="secF1.html#secf12">section F.1.2</a>) and will discuss in more depth
later (in <a href="secF7.html">section F.7</a>) most of the leading right-Libertarian theorists
base themselves on such deductive methodologies, starting from assumptions
and "logically" drawing conclusions from them. The religious undertones
of such methodology can best be seen from the roots of right-Libertarian
"Natural law" theory.
<p>
Carole Pateman, in her analysis of Liberal contract theory, indicates
the religious nature of the "Natural Law" argument so loved by the
theorists of the "Radical Right." She notes that for Locke (the main source
of the Libertarian Right's Natural Law cult) <i>"natural law"</i> was equivalent
of <i>"God's Law"</i> and that <i>"God's law exists externally to and independently
of individuals."</i> [<b>The Problem of Political Obligation</b>, p. 154] No role
for critical thought there, only obedience. Most modern day "Natural Law"
supporters forget to mention this religious undercurrent and instead
talk of about "Nature" (or "the market") as the deity that creates Law, 
not God, in order to appear "rational." So much for science.
<p>
Such a basis in dogma and religion can hardly be a firm foundation for
liberty and indeed "Natural Law" is marked by a deep authoritarianism:
<p><blockquote>
<i>"Locke's traditional view of natural law provided individual's with an 
external standard which they could recognise, but which they did not 
voluntarily choose to order their political life."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 79]
<p></blockquote>
In <a href="secF7.html">section F.7</a> we discuss the authoritarian nature of "Natural Law" and
will not do so here. However, here we must point out the political 
conclusions Locke draws from his ideas. Pateman summary is worth 
repeating at length:
<p>
Locke believed that <i>"obedience lasts only as long as protection. His 
individuals are able to take action themselves to remedy their political
lot. . . but this does not mean, as is often assumed, that Locke's theory
gives direct support to present-day arguments for a right of civil
disobedience. . . His theory allows for two alternatives only: either
people go peacefully about their daily affairs under the protection of
a liberal, constitutional government, or they are in revolt against a
government which has ceased to be 'liberal' and has become arbitrary and
tyrannical, so forfeiting its right to obedience."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 77]
<p>
Locke's "rebellion" exists purely to reform a <b>new</b> 'liberal' government, not
to change the existing socio-economic structure which the 'liberal' government
exists to protect. His theory, therefore, indicates the results of a priorism, 
namely a denial of any form of social dissent which may change the "natural 
law" as defined by Locke. 
<p>
So, von Mises, von Hayek and most right-libertarians reject the scientific 
method in favour of ideological correctness -- if the facts contradict your
theory then they can be dismissed as too "complex" or "unique". Facts, 
however, should inform theory and any theory's methodology should take 
this into account. To dismiss facts out of hand is to promote dogma.
This is not to suggest that a theory should be modified very time new
data comes along -- that would be crazy as unique situations <b>do</b> exist,
data can be wrong and so forth -- but it does suggest that if your theory
<b>continually</b> comes into conflict with reality, its time to rethink the
theory and not assume that facts cannot invalidate it. A true libertarian 
would approach a contradiction between reality and theory by evaluating
the facts available and changing the theory is this is required, not by 
ignoring reality or dismissing it as "complex". 
<p>
Thus, much of right-Libertarian theory is neither libertarian nor scientific.
Much of right-libertarian thought is highly axiomatic, being logically
deduced from such starting axioms as <i>"self-ownership"</i> or <i>"no one should
initiate force against another"</i>. Hence the importance of our discussion
of von Mises as this indicates the dangers of this approach, namely the
tendency to ignore/dismiss the consequences of these logical chains and, 
indeed, to justify them in terms of these axioms rather than from the
facts. In addition, the methodology used is such as that it would be 
fair to argue that right-libertarians get to critique reality but reality 
can never be used to critique right-libertarianism -- for any empirical 
data presented as evidence as be dismissed as "too complex" or "unique" 
and so irrelevant (unless it can be used to support their claims, of 
course). 
<p>
Hence W. Duncan Reekie's argument (quoting leading Austrian economist 
Israel Kirzner) that <i>"empirical  work 'has the function of establishing 
the <b>applicability</b> of particular theorems, and thus <b>illustrating</b> their 
operation' . . . Confirmation of theory is not possible because there is no 
constants in human action, nor is it necessary because theorems themselves 
describe relationships logically developed from hypothesised conditions. 
Failure of a logically derived axiom to fit the facts does not render 
it invalid, rather it 'might merely indicate inapplicability' to the 
circumstances of the case.'"</i> [<b>Markets, Entrepreneurs and Liberty</b>, p. 31]
<p>
So, if facts confirm your theory, your theory is right. If facts do not 
confirm your theory, it is still right but just not applicable in this case! 
Which has the handy side effect of ensuring that facts can <b>only</b> be used to 
support the ideology, <b>never</b> to refute it (which is, according to this
perspective, impossible anyway). As Karl Popper argued, a <i>"theory 
which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific."</i>
[<b>Conjectures and Refutations</b>, p. 36] In other words 
(as we noted above), if
reality contradicts your theory, ignore reality!
<p>
Kropotkin hoped <i>"that those who believe in [current economic doctrines]
will themselves become convinced of their error as soon as they come to
see the necessity of verifying their quantitative deductions by 
quantitative investigation."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 178] However, the Austrian
approach builds so many barriers to this that it is doubtful that
this will occur. Indeed, right-libertarianism, with its focus on exchange
rather than its consequences, seems to be based upon justifying domination
in terms of their deductions than analysing what freedom actually means 
in terms of human existence (see <a href="secF2.html">section F.2</a> for a fuller discussion).
<p>
The real question is why are such theories taken seriously and arouse such 
interest. Why are they not simply dismissed out of hand, given their
methodology and the authoritarian conclusions they produce? The answer is, 
in part, that feeble arguments can easily pass for convincing when they
are on the same side as the prevailing sentiment and social system. And, of
course, there is the utility of such theories for ruling elites - <i>"[a]n 
ideological defence of privileges, exploitation, and private power will be 
welcomed, regardless of its merits."</i> [Noam Chomsky, <b>The Chomsky Reader</b>,
p. 188]
<p>
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