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/*
* Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
package android.os.strictmode;
import android.annotation.NonNull;
import android.annotation.Nullable;
import android.app.PendingIntent;
import android.content.Intent;
import android.net.Uri;
import java.util.Objects;
/**
* Violation raised when your app launches an {@link Intent} which originated
* from outside your app.
* <p>
* Violations may indicate security vulnerabilities in the design of your app,
* where a malicious app could trick you into granting {@link Uri} permissions
* or launching unexported components. Here are some typical design patterns
* that can be used to safely resolve these violations:
* <ul>
* <li>The ideal approach is to migrate to using a {@link PendingIntent}, which
* ensures that your launch is performed using the identity of the original
* creator, completely avoiding the security issues described above.
* <li>If using a {@link PendingIntent} isn't feasible, an alternative approach
* is to create a brand new {@link Intent} and carefully copy only specific
* values from the original {@link Intent} after careful validation.
* </ul>
* <p>
* Note that this <em>may</em> detect false-positives if your app sends itself
* an {@link Intent} which is first routed through the OS, such as using
* {@link Intent#createChooser}. In these cases, careful inspection is required
* to determine if the return point into your app is appropriately protected
* with a signature permission or marked as unexported. If the return point is
* not protected, your app is likely vulnerable to malicious apps.
*/
public final class UnsafeIntentLaunchViolation extends Violation {
private transient Intent mIntent;
public UnsafeIntentLaunchViolation(@NonNull Intent intent) {
super("Launch of unsafe intent: " + intent);
mIntent = Objects.requireNonNull(intent);
}
/**
* Return the {@link Intent} which caused this violation to be raised. Note
* that this value is not available if this violation has been serialized
* since intents cannot be serialized.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("IntentBuilderName")
public @Nullable Intent getIntent() {
return mIntent;
}
}
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