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/*
* Copyright Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License").
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* A copy of the License is located at
*
* http://aws.amazon.com/apache2.0
*
* or in the "license" file accompanying this file. This file is distributed
* on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either
* express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing
* permissions and limitations under the License.
*/
#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif
#include "crypto/s2n_certificate.h"
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include "api/s2n.h"
#include "crypto/s2n_openssl_x509.h"
#include "tls/extensions/s2n_extension_list.h"
#include "tls/s2n_connection.h"
#include "utils/s2n_array.h"
#include "utils/s2n_mem.h"
#include "utils/s2n_safety.h"
int s2n_cert_set_cert_type(struct s2n_cert *cert, s2n_pkey_type pkey_type)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert);
cert->pkey_type = pkey_type;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_pkey_setup_for_type(&cert->public_key, pkey_type));
return 0;
}
int s2n_create_cert_chain_from_stuffer(struct s2n_cert_chain *cert_chain_out, struct s2n_stuffer *chain_in_stuffer)
{
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_stuffer cert_out_stuffer = { 0 }, s2n_stuffer_free);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_growable_alloc(&cert_out_stuffer, 2048));
struct s2n_cert **insert = &cert_chain_out->head;
uint32_t chain_size = 0;
do {
struct s2n_cert *new_node = NULL;
if (s2n_stuffer_certificate_from_pem(chain_in_stuffer, &cert_out_stuffer) < 0) {
if (chain_size == 0) {
POSIX_BAIL(S2N_ERR_NO_CERTIFICATE_IN_PEM);
}
break;
}
struct s2n_blob mem = { 0 };
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_alloc(&mem, sizeof(struct s2n_cert)));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&mem));
new_node = (struct s2n_cert *) (void *) mem.data;
if (s2n_alloc(&new_node->raw, s2n_stuffer_data_available(&cert_out_stuffer)) != S2N_SUCCESS) {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(&mem));
S2N_ERROR_PRESERVE_ERRNO();
}
if (s2n_stuffer_read(&cert_out_stuffer, &new_node->raw) != S2N_SUCCESS) {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(&mem));
S2N_ERROR_PRESERVE_ERRNO();
}
/* Additional 3 bytes for the length field in the protocol */
chain_size += new_node->raw.size + 3;
new_node->next = NULL;
*insert = new_node;
insert = &new_node->next;
} while (s2n_stuffer_data_available(chain_in_stuffer));
/* Leftover data at this point means one of two things:
* A bug in s2n's PEM parsing OR a malformed PEM in the user's chain.
* Be conservative and fail instead of using a partial chain.
*/
S2N_ERROR_IF(s2n_stuffer_data_available(chain_in_stuffer) > 0, S2N_ERR_INVALID_PEM);
cert_chain_out->chain_size = chain_size;
return 0;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_cert_chain_from_stuffer(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert_and_key, struct s2n_stuffer *chain_in_stuffer)
{
return s2n_create_cert_chain_from_stuffer(cert_and_key->cert_chain, chain_in_stuffer);
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_cert_chain_bytes(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert_and_key, uint8_t *cert_chain_pem, uint32_t cert_chain_len)
{
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_stuffer chain_in_stuffer = { 0 }, s2n_stuffer_free);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init_ro_from_string(&chain_in_stuffer, cert_chain_pem, cert_chain_len));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_cert_chain_from_stuffer(cert_and_key, &chain_in_stuffer));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_cert_chain(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert_and_key, const char *cert_chain_pem)
{
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_stuffer chain_in_stuffer = { 0 }, s2n_stuffer_free);
/* Turn the chain into a stuffer */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_alloc_ro_from_string(&chain_in_stuffer, cert_chain_pem));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_cert_chain_from_stuffer(cert_and_key, &chain_in_stuffer));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_private_key_from_stuffer(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert_and_key,
struct s2n_stuffer *key_in_stuffer, struct s2n_stuffer *key_out_stuffer)
{
struct s2n_blob key_blob = { 0 };
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_pkey_zero_init(cert_and_key->private_key));
/* Convert pem to asn1 and asn1 to the private key. Handles both PKCS#1 and PKCS#8 formats */
int type = 0;
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_private_key_from_pem(key_in_stuffer, key_out_stuffer, &type));
key_blob.size = s2n_stuffer_data_available(key_out_stuffer);
key_blob.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(key_out_stuffer, key_blob.size);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(key_blob.data);
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_asn1der_to_private_key(cert_and_key->private_key, &key_blob, type));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_private_key_bytes(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert_and_key, uint8_t *private_key_pem, uint32_t private_key_len)
{
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_stuffer key_in_stuffer = { 0 }, s2n_stuffer_free);
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_stuffer key_out_stuffer = { 0 }, s2n_stuffer_free);
/* Put the private key pem in a stuffer */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init_ro_from_string(&key_in_stuffer, private_key_pem, private_key_len));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_growable_alloc(&key_out_stuffer, private_key_len));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_private_key_from_stuffer(cert_and_key, &key_in_stuffer, &key_out_stuffer));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_private_key(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert_and_key, const char *private_key_pem)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(private_key_pem);
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_stuffer key_in_stuffer = { 0 }, s2n_stuffer_free);
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_stuffer key_out_stuffer = { 0 }, s2n_stuffer_free);
/* Put the private key pem in a stuffer */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_alloc_ro_from_string(&key_in_stuffer, private_key_pem));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_growable_alloc(&key_out_stuffer, strlen(private_key_pem)));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_private_key_from_stuffer(cert_and_key, &key_in_stuffer, &key_out_stuffer));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_ocsp_data(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(&chain_and_key->ocsp_status));
if (data && length) {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_alloc(&chain_and_key->ocsp_status, length));
POSIX_CHECKED_MEMCPY(chain_and_key->ocsp_status.data, data, length);
}
return 0;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_sct_list(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(&chain_and_key->sct_list));
if (data && length) {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_alloc(&chain_and_key->sct_list, length));
POSIX_CHECKED_MEMCPY(chain_and_key->sct_list.data, data, length);
}
return 0;
}
struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *s2n_cert_chain_and_key_new(void)
{
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_blob chain_and_key_mem = { 0 }, s2n_free);
PTR_GUARD_POSIX(s2n_alloc(&chain_and_key_mem, sizeof(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key)));
PTR_GUARD_POSIX(s2n_blob_zero(&chain_and_key_mem));
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_blob cert_chain_mem = { 0 }, s2n_free);
PTR_GUARD_POSIX(s2n_alloc(&cert_chain_mem, sizeof(struct s2n_cert_chain)));
PTR_GUARD_POSIX(s2n_blob_zero(&cert_chain_mem));
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_blob pkey_mem = { 0 }, s2n_free);
PTR_GUARD_POSIX(s2n_alloc(&pkey_mem, sizeof(s2n_cert_private_key)));
PTR_GUARD_POSIX(s2n_blob_zero(&pkey_mem));
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_array *cn_names = NULL, s2n_array_free_p);
cn_names = s2n_array_new(sizeof(struct s2n_blob));
PTR_ENSURE_REF(cn_names);
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_array *san_names = NULL, s2n_array_free_p);
san_names = s2n_array_new(sizeof(struct s2n_blob));
PTR_ENSURE_REF(san_names);
struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key = (struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *) (void *) chain_and_key_mem.data;
chain_and_key->cert_chain = (struct s2n_cert_chain *) (void *) cert_chain_mem.data;
chain_and_key->private_key = (s2n_cert_private_key *) (void *) pkey_mem.data;
chain_and_key->cn_names = cn_names;
chain_and_key->san_names = san_names;
ZERO_TO_DISABLE_DEFER_CLEANUP(chain_and_key_mem);
ZERO_TO_DISABLE_DEFER_CLEANUP(cert_chain_mem);
ZERO_TO_DISABLE_DEFER_CLEANUP(pkey_mem);
ZERO_TO_DISABLE_DEFER_CLEANUP(cn_names);
ZERO_TO_DISABLE_DEFER_CLEANUP(san_names);
return chain_and_key;
}
DEFINE_POINTER_CLEANUP_FUNC(GENERAL_NAMES *, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load_sans(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, X509 *x509_cert)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key->san_names);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(x509_cert);
DEFER_CLEANUP(GENERAL_NAMES *san_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL), GENERAL_NAMES_free_pointer);
if (san_names == NULL) {
/* No SAN extension */
return 0;
}
const int num_san_names = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(san_names);
for (int i = 0; i < num_san_names; i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *san_name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(san_names, i);
if (!san_name) {
continue;
}
if (san_name->type == GEN_DNS) {
/* Decoding isn't necessary here since a DNS SAN name is ASCII(type V_ASN1_IA5STRING) */
unsigned char *san_str = san_name->d.dNSName->data;
const size_t san_str_len = san_name->d.dNSName->length;
struct s2n_blob *san_blob = NULL;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_pushback(chain_and_key->san_names, (void **) &san_blob));
if (!san_blob) {
POSIX_BAIL(S2N_ERR_NULL_SANS);
}
if (s2n_alloc(san_blob, san_str_len)) {
S2N_ERROR_PRESERVE_ERRNO();
}
POSIX_CHECKED_MEMCPY(san_blob->data, san_str, san_str_len);
san_blob->size = san_str_len;
/* normalize san_blob to lowercase */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_blob_char_to_lower(san_blob));
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Parse CN names from the Subject of the leaf certificate. Technically there can by multiple CNs
* in the Subject but practically very few certificates in the wild will have more than one CN.
* Since the data for this certificate is coming from the application and not from an untrusted
* source, we will try our best to parse all of the CNs.
*
* A recent CAB thread proposed removing support for multiple CNs:
* https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-April/007242.html
*/
DEFINE_POINTER_CLEANUP_FUNC(unsigned char *, OPENSSL_free);
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load_cns(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, X509 *x509_cert)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key->cn_names);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(x509_cert);
X509_NAME *subject = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
if (!subject) {
return 0;
}
int lastpos = -1;
while ((lastpos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subject, NID_commonName, lastpos)) >= 0) {
X509_NAME_ENTRY *name_entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(subject, lastpos);
if (!name_entry) {
continue;
}
ASN1_STRING *asn1_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(name_entry);
if (!asn1_str) {
continue;
}
/* We need to try and decode the CN since it may be encoded as unicode with a
* direct ASCII equivalent. Any non ASCII bytes in the string will fail later when we
* actually compare hostnames.
*
* `ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8` allocates in both the success case and in the zero return case, but
* not in the failure case (negative return value). Therefore, we use `ZERO_TO_DISABLE_DEFER_CLEANUP`
* in the failure case to prevent double-freeing `utf8_str`. For the zero and success cases, `utf8_str`
* will be freed by the `DEFER_CLEANUP`.
*/
DEFER_CLEANUP(unsigned char *utf8_str, OPENSSL_free_pointer);
const int utf8_out_len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_str, asn1_str);
if (utf8_out_len < 0) {
/* On failure, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 does not allocate any memory */
ZERO_TO_DISABLE_DEFER_CLEANUP(utf8_str);
continue;
} else if (utf8_out_len == 0) {
/* We still need to free memory for this case, so let the DEFER_CLEANUP free it
* see https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7521 and
* https://security.archlinux.org/CVE-2017-7521
*/
} else {
struct s2n_blob *cn_name = NULL;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_pushback(chain_and_key->cn_names, (void **) &cn_name));
if (cn_name == NULL) {
POSIX_BAIL(S2N_ERR_NULL_CN_NAME);
}
if (s2n_alloc(cn_name, utf8_out_len) < 0) {
S2N_ERROR_PRESERVE_ERRNO();
}
POSIX_CHECKED_MEMCPY(cn_name->data, utf8_str, utf8_out_len);
cn_name->size = utf8_out_len;
/* normalize cn_name to lowercase */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_blob_char_to_lower(cn_name));
}
}
return 0;
}
static int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_names(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, X509 *cert)
{
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load_sans(chain_and_key, cert));
/* For current use cases, we *could* avoid populating the common names if any sans were loaded in
* s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load_sans. Let's unconditionally populate this field to avoid surprises
* in the future.
*/
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load_cns(chain_and_key, cert));
return 0;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key->cert_chain);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key->cert_chain->head);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key->private_key);
struct s2n_cert *head = chain_and_key->cert_chain->head;
DEFER_CLEANUP(X509 *leaf_cert = NULL, X509_free_pointer);
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_openssl_x509_parse(&head->raw, &leaf_cert));
/* Parse the leaf cert for the public key and certificate type */
DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_pkey public_key = { 0 }, s2n_pkey_free);
s2n_pkey_type pkey_type = S2N_PKEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_pkey_from_x509(leaf_cert, &public_key, &pkey_type));
POSIX_ENSURE(pkey_type != S2N_PKEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN, S2N_ERR_CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_set_cert_type(head, pkey_type));
/* Validate the leaf cert's public key matches the provided private key */
if (s2n_pkey_check_key_exists(chain_and_key->private_key) == S2N_SUCCESS) {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_pkey_match(&public_key, chain_and_key->private_key));
}
/* Populate name information from the SAN/CN for the leaf certificate */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_names(chain_and_key, leaf_cert));
/* Populate ec curve libcrypto nid */
if (pkey_type == S2N_PKEY_TYPE_ECDSA) {
int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(public_key.key.ecdsa_key.ec_key));
POSIX_ENSURE(nid > 0, S2N_ERR_CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
POSIX_ENSURE(nid < UINT16_MAX, S2N_ERR_CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
head->ec_curve_nid = nid;
}
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load_pem(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, const char *chain_pem, const char *private_key_pem)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_cert_chain(chain_and_key, chain_pem));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_private_key(chain_and_key, private_key_pem));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load(chain_and_key));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load_public_pem_bytes(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, uint8_t *chain_pem, uint32_t chain_pem_len)
{
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_cert_chain_bytes(chain_and_key, chain_pem, chain_pem_len));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load(chain_and_key));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load_pem_bytes(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, uint8_t *chain_pem,
uint32_t chain_pem_len, uint8_t *private_key_pem, uint32_t private_key_pem_len)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_cert_chain_bytes(chain_and_key, chain_pem, chain_pem_len));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_private_key_bytes(chain_and_key, private_key_pem, private_key_pem_len));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_load(chain_and_key));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
S2N_CLEANUP_RESULT s2n_cert_chain_and_key_ptr_free(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key **cert_and_key)
{
RESULT_ENSURE_REF(cert_and_key);
RESULT_GUARD_POSIX(s2n_cert_chain_and_key_free(*cert_and_key));
*cert_and_key = NULL;
return S2N_RESULT_OK;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_free(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert_and_key)
{
if (cert_and_key == NULL) {
return 0;
}
/* Walk the chain and free the certs */
if (cert_and_key->cert_chain) {
struct s2n_cert *node = cert_and_key->cert_chain->head;
while (node) {
/* Free the cert */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(&node->raw));
/* update head so it won't point to freed memory */
cert_and_key->cert_chain->head = node->next;
/* Free the node */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free_object((uint8_t **) &node, sizeof(struct s2n_cert)));
node = cert_and_key->cert_chain->head;
}
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free_object((uint8_t **) &cert_and_key->cert_chain, sizeof(struct s2n_cert_chain)));
}
if (cert_and_key->private_key) {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_pkey_free(cert_and_key->private_key));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free_object((uint8_t **) &cert_and_key->private_key, sizeof(s2n_cert_private_key)));
}
uint32_t len = 0;
if (cert_and_key->san_names) {
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_num_elements(cert_and_key->san_names, &len));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
struct s2n_blob *san_name = NULL;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_get(cert_and_key->san_names, i, (void **) &san_name));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(san_name));
}
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_free(cert_and_key->san_names));
cert_and_key->san_names = NULL;
}
if (cert_and_key->cn_names) {
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_num_elements(cert_and_key->cn_names, &len));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
struct s2n_blob *cn_name = NULL;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_get(cert_and_key->cn_names, i, (void **) &cn_name));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(cn_name));
}
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_free(cert_and_key->cn_names));
cert_and_key->cn_names = NULL;
}
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(&cert_and_key->ocsp_status));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(&cert_and_key->sct_list));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free_object((uint8_t **) &cert_and_key, sizeof(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key)));
return 0;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_free(struct s2n_cert_chain *cert_chain)
{
/* Walk the chain and free the certs/nodes allocated prior to failure */
if (cert_chain) {
struct s2n_cert *node = cert_chain->head;
while (node) {
/* Free the cert */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free(&node->raw));
/* update head so it won't point to freed memory */
cert_chain->head = node->next;
/* Free the node */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_free_object((uint8_t **) &node, sizeof(struct s2n_cert)));
node = cert_chain->head;
}
}
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_send_cert_chain(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_stuffer *out, struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(out);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
struct s2n_cert_chain *chain = chain_and_key->cert_chain;
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain);
struct s2n_cert *cur_cert = chain->head;
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cur_cert);
struct s2n_stuffer_reservation cert_chain_size = { 0 };
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_reserve_uint24(out, &cert_chain_size));
/* Send certs and extensions (in TLS 1.3) */
bool first_entry = true;
while (cur_cert) {
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cur_cert);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint24(out, cur_cert->raw.size));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_bytes(out, cur_cert->raw.data, cur_cert->raw.size));
/* According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.2,
* If an extension applies to the entire chain, it SHOULD be included in
* the first CertificateEntry.
* While the spec allow extensions to be included in other certificate
* entries, only the first matter to use here */
if (conn->actual_protocol_version >= S2N_TLS13) {
if (first_entry) {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_extension_list_send(S2N_EXTENSION_LIST_CERTIFICATE, conn, out));
first_entry = false;
} else {
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_extension_list_send(S2N_EXTENSION_LIST_EMPTY, conn, out));
}
}
cur_cert = cur_cert->next;
}
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_vector_size(&cert_chain_size));
return 0;
}
int s2n_send_empty_cert_chain(struct s2n_stuffer *out)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(out);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint24(out, 0));
return 0;
}
static int s2n_does_cert_san_match_hostname(const struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, const struct s2n_blob *dns_name)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(dns_name);
struct s2n_array *san_names = chain_and_key->san_names;
uint32_t len = 0;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_num_elements(san_names, &len));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
struct s2n_blob *san_name = NULL;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_get(san_names, i, (void **) &san_name));
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(san_name);
if ((dns_name->size == san_name->size) && (strncasecmp((const char *) dns_name->data, (const char *) san_name->data, dns_name->size) == 0)) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int s2n_does_cert_cn_match_hostname(const struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, const struct s2n_blob *dns_name)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(dns_name);
struct s2n_array *cn_names = chain_and_key->cn_names;
uint32_t len = 0;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_num_elements(cn_names, &len));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
struct s2n_blob *cn_name = NULL;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_get(cn_names, i, (void **) &cn_name));
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cn_name);
if ((dns_name->size == cn_name->size) && (strncasecmp((const char *) dns_name->data, (const char *) cn_name->data, dns_name->size) == 0)) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_matches_dns_name(const struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, const struct s2n_blob *dns_name)
{
uint32_t len = 0;
POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_array_num_elements(chain_and_key->san_names, &len));
if (len > 0) {
if (s2n_does_cert_san_match_hostname(chain_and_key, dns_name)) {
return 1;
}
} else {
/* Per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.4 we only will
* consider the CN for matching if no valid DNS entries are provided
* in a SAN.
*/
if (s2n_does_cert_cn_match_hostname(chain_and_key, dns_name)) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_and_key_set_ctx(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert_and_key, void *ctx)
{
cert_and_key->context = ctx;
return 0;
}
void *s2n_cert_chain_and_key_get_ctx(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *cert_and_key)
{
return cert_and_key->context;
}
s2n_pkey_type s2n_cert_chain_and_key_get_pkey_type(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key)
{
if (chain_and_key == NULL
|| chain_and_key->cert_chain == NULL
|| chain_and_key->cert_chain->head == NULL) {
return S2N_PKEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
return chain_and_key->cert_chain->head->pkey_type;
}
s2n_cert_private_key *s2n_cert_chain_and_key_get_private_key(struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key)
{
PTR_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
return chain_and_key->private_key;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_get_length(const struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, uint32_t *cert_length)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert_length);
struct s2n_cert *head_cert = chain_and_key->cert_chain->head;
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(head_cert);
*cert_length = 1;
struct s2n_cert *next_cert = head_cert->next;
while (next_cert != NULL) {
*cert_length += 1;
next_cert = next_cert->next;
}
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_chain_get_cert(const struct s2n_cert_chain_and_key *chain_and_key, struct s2n_cert **out_cert,
const uint32_t cert_idx)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(chain_and_key);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(out_cert);
struct s2n_cert *cur_cert = chain_and_key->cert_chain->head;
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cur_cert);
uint32_t counter = 0;
struct s2n_cert *next_cert = cur_cert->next;
while ((next_cert != NULL) && (counter < cert_idx)) {
cur_cert = next_cert;
next_cert = next_cert->next;
counter++;
}
POSIX_ENSURE(counter == cert_idx, S2N_ERR_NO_CERT_FOUND);
POSIX_ENSURE(cur_cert != NULL, S2N_ERR_NO_CERT_FOUND);
*out_cert = cur_cert;
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_get_der(const struct s2n_cert *cert, const uint8_t **out_cert_der, uint32_t *cert_length)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(out_cert_der);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert_length);
*cert_length = cert->raw.size;
*out_cert_der = cert->raw.data;
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
static int s2n_asn1_obj_free(ASN1_OBJECT **data)
{
if (*data != NULL) {
ASN1_OBJECT_free(*data);
}
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
static int s2n_asn1_string_free(ASN1_STRING **data)
{
if (*data != NULL) {
ASN1_STRING_free(*data);
}
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
static int s2n_utf8_string_from_extension_data(const uint8_t *extension_data, uint32_t extension_len, uint8_t *out_data, uint32_t *out_len)
{
DEFER_CLEANUP(ASN1_STRING *asn1_str = NULL, s2n_asn1_string_free);
/* Note that d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING increments *der_in to the byte following the parsed data.
* Using a temporary variable is mandatory to prevent memory free-ing errors.
* Ref to the warning section here for more information:
* https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING.html.
*/
const uint8_t *asn1_str_data = extension_data;
asn1_str = d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING(NULL, (const unsigned char **) (void *) &asn1_str_data, extension_len);
POSIX_ENSURE(asn1_str != NULL, S2N_ERR_INVALID_X509_EXTENSION_TYPE);
/* ASN1_STRING_type() returns the type of `asn1_str`, using standard constants such as V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/ASN1_STRING_type.html.
*/
int type = ASN1_STRING_type(asn1_str);
POSIX_ENSURE(type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, S2N_ERR_INVALID_X509_EXTENSION_TYPE);
int len = ASN1_STRING_length(asn1_str);
if (out_data != NULL) {
POSIX_ENSURE((int64_t) *out_len >= (int64_t) len, S2N_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_SIZE);
/* ASN1_STRING_data() returns an internal pointer to the data.
* Since this is an internal pointer it should not be freed or modified in any way.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/man3/ASN1_STRING_data.html.
*/
unsigned char *internal_data = ASN1_STRING_data(asn1_str);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(internal_data);
POSIX_CHECKED_MEMCPY(out_data, internal_data, len);
}
*out_len = len;
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_get_utf8_string_from_extension_data_length(const uint8_t *extension_data, uint32_t extension_len, uint32_t *utf8_str_len)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(extension_data);
POSIX_ENSURE_GT(extension_len, 0);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(utf8_str_len);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_utf8_string_from_extension_data(extension_data, extension_len, NULL, utf8_str_len));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_get_utf8_string_from_extension_data(const uint8_t *extension_data, uint32_t extension_len, uint8_t *out_data, uint32_t *out_len)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(extension_data);
POSIX_ENSURE_GT(extension_len, 0);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(out_data);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(out_len);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_utf8_string_from_extension_data(extension_data, extension_len, out_data, out_len));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
static int s2n_parse_x509_extension(struct s2n_cert *cert, const uint8_t *oid,
uint8_t *ext_value, uint32_t *ext_value_len, bool *critical)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert->raw.data);
/* Obtain the openssl x509 cert from the ASN1 DER certificate input.
* Note that d2i_X509 increments *der_in to the byte following the parsed data.
* Using a temporary variable is mandatory to prevent memory free-ing errors.
* Ref to the warning section here for more information:
* https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/d2i_X509.html.
*/
uint8_t *der_in = cert->raw.data;
DEFER_CLEANUP(X509 *x509_cert = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **) (void *) &der_in, cert->raw.size),
X509_free_pointer);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(x509_cert);
/* Retrieve the number of x509 extensions present in the certificate
* X509_get_ext_count returns the number of extensions in the x509 certificate.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/X509_get_ext_count.html.
*/
int ext_count_value = X509_get_ext_count(x509_cert);
POSIX_ENSURE_GT(ext_count_value, 0);
size_t ext_count = (size_t) ext_count_value;
/* OBJ_txt2obj() converts the input text string into an ASN1_OBJECT structure.
* If no_name is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted as well as numerical forms.
* If no_name is 1 only the numerical form is acceptable.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/OBJ_txt2obj.html.
*/
DEFER_CLEANUP(ASN1_OBJECT *asn1_obj_in = OBJ_txt2obj((const char *) oid, 0), s2n_asn1_obj_free);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(asn1_obj_in);
for (size_t loc = 0; loc < ext_count; loc++) {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *asn1_str = NULL;
bool match_found = false;
/* Retrieve the x509 extension at location loc.
* X509_get_ext() retrieves extension loc from x.
* The index loc can take any value from 0 to X509_get_ext_count(x) - 1.
* The returned extension is an internal pointer which must not be freed up by the application.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/X509_get_ext.html.
*/
X509_EXTENSION *x509_ext = X509_get_ext(x509_cert, loc);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(x509_ext);
/* Retrieve the extension object/OID/extnId.
* X509_EXTENSION_get_object() returns the extension type of `x509_ext` as an ASN1_OBJECT pointer.
* The returned pointer is an internal value which must not be freed up.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/X509_EXTENSION_get_object.html.
*/
ASN1_OBJECT *asn1_obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(x509_ext);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(asn1_obj);
/* OBJ_cmp() compares two ASN1_OBJECT objects. If the two are identical 0 is returned.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/OBJ_cmp.html.
*/
match_found = (0 == OBJ_cmp(asn1_obj_in, asn1_obj));
/* If match found, retrieve the corresponding OID value for the x509 extension */
if (match_found) {
/* X509_EXTENSION_get_data() returns the data of extension `x509_ext`.
* The returned pointer is an internal value which must not be freed up.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/X509_EXTENSION_get_data.html.
*/
asn1_str = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(x509_ext);
/* ASN1_STRING_length() returns the length of the content of `asn1_str`.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/ASN1_STRING_length.html.
*/
int len = ASN1_STRING_length(asn1_str);
if (ext_value != NULL) {
POSIX_ENSURE_GTE(len, 0);
POSIX_ENSURE(*ext_value_len >= (uint32_t) len, S2N_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_SIZE);
/* ASN1_STRING_data() returns an internal pointer to the data.
* Since this is an internal pointer it should not be freed or modified in any way.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/man3/ASN1_STRING_data.html.
*/
unsigned char *internal_data = ASN1_STRING_data(asn1_str);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(internal_data);
POSIX_CHECKED_MEMCPY(ext_value, internal_data, len);
}
if (critical != NULL) {
/* Retrieve the x509 extension's critical value.
* X509_EXTENSION_get_critical() returns the criticality of extension `x509_ext`,
* it returns 1 for critical and 0 for non-critical.
* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/X509_EXTENSION_get_critical.html.
*/
*critical = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(x509_ext);
}
*ext_value_len = len;
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
}
POSIX_BAIL(S2N_ERR_X509_EXTENSION_VALUE_NOT_FOUND);
}
int s2n_cert_get_x509_extension_value_length(struct s2n_cert *cert, const uint8_t *oid, uint32_t *ext_value_len)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(oid);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(ext_value_len);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_parse_x509_extension(cert, oid, NULL, ext_value_len, NULL));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
int s2n_cert_get_x509_extension_value(struct s2n_cert *cert, const uint8_t *oid,
uint8_t *ext_value, uint32_t *ext_value_len, bool *critical)
{
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(cert);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(oid);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(ext_value);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(ext_value_len);
POSIX_ENSURE_REF(critical);
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_parse_x509_extension(cert, oid, ext_value, ext_value_len, critical));
return S2N_SUCCESS;
}
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