File: Questions.txt

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bastille 1:1.3.0-2.1
  • links: PTS
  • area: main
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FILE: Patches.pm

LABEL: spc_run
SHORT_EXP: "Patching known security vulnerabilities is one of the most 
important steps in securing a system.  Security Patch Check is 
a tool which will analyze the software installed on this system.  It will 
report if any relevant security patches have been announced by Hewlett 
Packard that are not currently installed on this system.  Bastille has 
detected that this tool is installed."
LONG_EXP: "Patching known security vulnerabilities is one of the most 
important steps in securing a system.  Security Patch Check is 
a tool which will analyze the software installed on this system.  When 
Security Patch Check runs, it will report several types of 
problems.  It will (1) report any recalled patches which are 
installed on the system (2) report any security patches have 
been announced by Hewlett Packard that will fix installed software on 
the system, but have not been applied, and (3) report if any currently 
installed patches are not in the proper, \"configured\" state.  Security 
Patch Check can download an up-to-date catalog from HP with security and 
recalled patch information.  It can also work through a proxy-type 
firewall.  This tool will only report patches; it will not indicate 
manual actions described in HP Security Bulletins/Advisories.  
Also, security patches require vigilance, since new vulnerabilities are 
found and fixed on a regular basis.  It is recommended that this tool be 
run frequently, such as in a cron job each night." 
QUESTION: "Should Bastille run Security Patch Check and append the 
output to Bastille's generated TODO list so that you can install the 
latest security patches?  (MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED)" 
DEFAULT_ANSWER: "Y"
NO_CHILD: spc_cron_norun
YES_CHILD: spc_cron_run
SKIP_CHILD: spc_cron_norun
YN_TOGGLE: 1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX11.00 HP-UX11.11
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: spc

LABEL: spc_install
SHORT_EXP: "Patching known security vulnerabilities is one of the most 
important steps in securing a system.  Security Patch Check is 
a tool which will analyze the software installed on this system.  It 
will report any relevant security patches have been announced by 
Hewlett Packard that are not currently installed on this system."
LONG_EXP: "Patching known security vulnerabilities is one of the most 
important steps in securing a system.  Security Patch Check is 
a tool which will analyze the software installed on this system.  When 
Security Patch Check runs, it will report several types of problems.  
It will (1) report any recalled patches which are installed on this 
system (2) report any security patches have been announced by Hewlett 
Packard that will fix installed software on this system, but have not 
been applied, and (3) report if any currently installed patches are not 
in the proper, \" configured\" state.  Security Patch Check can 
download an up-to-date catalog from HP with security and recalled 
patch information.  It can also work through a proxy-type firewall.  
This tool will only report patches; it will not indicate manual 
actions described in HP Security Bulletins/Advisories.  It is 
recommended that this be run on a regular basis, such as in a 
cron job each night."
QUESTION: "Should Bastille remind you to install Security Patch
Check (MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED)?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: "Y"
NO_CHILD: generalperms_1_1
YES_CHILD: spc_cron_norun
SKIP_CHILD: generalperms_1_1
YN_TOGGLE: 1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
PROPER_PARENT: spc_run


LABEL: spc_cron_run
SHORT_EXP: "Bastille can configure Security Patch Check to run on a daily
basis using cron.  Keeping a system secure requires constant vigilance.
Staying up-to-date on patches issued by Hewlett Packard is critical, and
Security Patch Check is the easiest way to make sure that this system's
patches are up-to-date.  In addition, a subscription to HP's security
advisory mailing list is valuable to find the latest security fixes 
from HP, including both patched and manual fixes."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Do you want Bastille to set up a cron job which will email 
root the results of running Security Patch Check?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: "Y"
YN_TOGGLE: 1
NO_CHILD: spc_proxy
YES_CHILD: spc_cron_time
SKIP_CHILD: generalperms_1_1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
PROPER_PARENT: spc_run

LABEL: spc_cron_norun
SHORT_EXP: "Bastille can configure Security Patch Check to run on a daily
basis using cron.  Keeping a system secure requires constant vigilance.
Staying up-to-date on patches issued by Hewlett Packard is critical, and
Security Patch Check is the easiest way to make sure that this system's
patches are up-to-date.  In addition, a subscription to HP's security
advisory mailing list is valuable to find the latest security fixes 
from HP, including both patched and manual fixes.  Note: this question is
asked whether or not you have Security Patch Check installed so
that Bastille can preconfigure cron to run the tool after you have 
installed it."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Do you want Bastille to set up a cron job which will email 
root the results of running Security Patch Check?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: "Y"
YN_TOGGLE: 1
NO_CHILD: generalperms_1_1
YES_CHILD: spc_cron_time
SKIP_CHILD: generalperms_1_1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
PROPER_PARENT: spc_run

LABEL: spc_cron_time
SHORT_EXP: "Specify a number between 0 and 23, corresponding to the hour 
in your time zone that is most convenient to run Security Patch Check."
LONG_EXP: " Specify a number between 0 and 23, corresponding to the hour 
in your time zone that is most convenient to run Security Patch Check.  
For example, if you specify 0, Security Patch Check will run sometime 
between 12:00am and 12:59am in your local time zone.  If you specify 23, 
Security Patch Check will run sometime between 11:00pm and 11:59pm.  You 
can change this by running crontab -e as root.  (see crontab(1))."
QUESTION: "During which hour would you like to schedule Security Patch Check?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_CHILD: spc_proxy
SKIP_CHILD: generalperms_1_1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
PROPER_PARENT: spc_run

LABEL: spc_proxy
SHORT_EXP:  "If this machine is behind a proxy type
firewall, security patch check needs to be configured to traverse
that firewall.  For example, the proxy might be specified as 
\"http://myproxy.mynet.com:8088\"  If this machine does not use a web 
proxy to connect to the Internet, leave this value blank."
LONG_EXP:  "To use the auto-download feature of Security Patch Check 
from behind a proxy type firewall, Security Patch Check needs to be 
configured to traverse that firewall.

The URL for the proxy must be in the form
    <protocol of firewall>://address:port

For example:
    http://myproxy.mynet.com:8088.

A web proxy generally uses the http protocol.  This answer should
correspond closely to settings one would make in a web browser
to point to a proxy server, but use the above syntax.

Bastille will set this for Security Patch Check both in cron and 
at runtime, depending on previous answers.  If this machine does 
not use a web proxy to connect to the Internet, leave this value blank."
QUESTION:  "Please enter the URL for the web proxy."
DEFAULT_ANSWER:
YN_TOGGLE: 0
NO_CHILD: generalperms_1_1
YES_CHILD: generalperms_1_1
SKIP_CHILD: generalperms_1_1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
PROPER_PARENT: spc_run

FILE: FilePermissions.pm

LABEL: generalperms_1_1
SHORT_EXP: "In general, the default file permissions set by most vendors are 
fairly secure.  To make them more secure, though, you can
remove non-root user access to some administrator functions."
LONG_EXP: "In general, the default file permissions set by most vendors are 
fairly secure.  To make them more secure, though, you can remove non-root 
user access to some administrator functions.

If you choose this option, you'll be changing the permissions on
some common system administration utilities so that they're not readable or
executable by users other than root.  These utilities (which include linuxconf,
fsck, ifconfig, runlevel and portmap) are ones that most users should never
have a need to access.  This option will increase your system security, but
there's a chance it will inconvenience your users."
QUESTION: "Would you like to set more restrictive permissions on the
administration utilities? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: RH MN DB SE TB
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YES_CHILD: world_writeable
NO_CHILD: world_writeable
PROPER_PARENT: spc_run

LABEL: world_writeable
SHORT_EXP: "Regarding default directory permission settings on HP-UX, 
Bastille can scan your system for world-writeable directories, including 
base OS, 3rd party applications, and user directories.  A script will be 
created which you can edit to suit your needs and then run to tighten 
these permissions.

Changing the permissions of directories in this way has the potential to
break compatibility with some applications and may require testing in
your environment.  If you find such an application, you should report 
it to the vendor of that application."
LONG_EXP: "Regarding default directory permission settings on HP-UX, 
Bastille can scan your system for world-writeable directories, including 
base OS, 3rd party applications, and user directories.  A script will be 
created which you can edit to suit your needs and then run to tighten 
these permissions.

The fact that a directory is world-writeable does not imply that a 
vulnerability exists, because it depends on how the data stored in that
directory is used.  Still, it is a security best-practice to allow anyone
to write to ONLY temporary directories, such as /tmp and /var/tmp, and to
set the \"sticky\" bit on those directories.

If the \"sticky\" bit is set on a directory, only the file owner, directory
owner, and superuser are allowed to rename or delete (and thus replace) 
the file, regardless of the group and world write permissions on the directory.
The ownerships and permissions of the files and subdirectories in that 
directory determine how those files and subdirectories can be modified, 
respectively.  You can tell that the \"sticky\" bit is set if there is a 
\"t\" in the last permissions column.  (eg: drwxrwxrwt).  Left unedited, 
the created script will set the \"sticky\" bit on any directory with the 
letters \"tmp\" in their name and remove the world-write bit from all others.  

Changing the permissions of directories in this way has the potential to
break compatibility with some applications and may require testing in
your environment.  If you find such an application, you should report 
it to the vendor of that application.

If you find a new security vulnerability in an HP product, you should
report it to security-alert@hp.com.   Please encrypt any exploit 
information using the security-alert PGP key, available from your local 
key server, or by sending a message with a -subject- (not body) of 'get 
key' (no quotes) to security-alert@hp.com." 
QUESTION:  "Should Bastille scan for world-writable directories?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_CHILD: security_level
NO_CHILD: security_level
PROPER_PARENT: generalperms_1_1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX

LABEL: security_level
SHORT_EXP: "Linux Mandrake distributions use the concept of a security
level to decide how tight to lock down file permissions and do other
miscellaneous security-related tasks.  Please choose a level, 1-5.
If you've already chosen one during the install, you should use this
number here."
LONG_EXP: "Linux Mandrake distributions use the concept of a security
level to decide how tight to lock down file permissions and do other
miscellaneous security-related tasks.  Please choose a level, 1-5.
If you've already chosen one during the install, you should use this
number here."
QUESTION: "What security level should we set? [3]"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 3
REQUIRE_DISTRO: MN7.0 MN7.1 MN7.2 MN8.0 MN8.1
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_CHILD: generalperms_1_2_mandrake
NO_CHILD: generalperms_1_2_mandrake
PROPER_PARENT: generalperms_1_1


LABEL: generalperms_1_2_mandrake
SHORT_EXP: "In general, the default file permissions set during the
installation are fairly secure.  To make them more secure, though, you can
remove non-root user access to some administrator functions.

Bastille will set your file permissions according to your security level."
LONG_EXP: "In general, the default file permissions set during the
installation are fairly secure.  To make them more secure, though, you can
remove non-root user access to some administrator functions.

Bastille will set your file permissions according to your security level.

If you choose this option, you'll be changing the permissions on
some common system administration utilities so that they're not readable or
executable by users other than root.  These utilities (which include linuxconf,
fsck, ifconfig, runlevel and portmap) are ones that most users should never
have a need to access.  This option will increase your system security, but
there's a chance it will inconvenience your users."
QUESTION: "Would you like us to modify your file permissions?"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: MN7.0 MN7.1 MN7.2 MN8.0 MN8.1
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: 
NO_EXP: 
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YES_CHILD: suid
NO_CHILD: suid
PROPER_PARENT: security_level


LABEL: suid
SHORT_EXP: "The following questions all pertain to disabling \"SUID root\"
status for particular programs. This status allows non-root users to run
these programs, increasing convenience but decreasing security.  If a
security weakness or vulnerability is found in these programs, it can be
exploited to gain root-level access to your computer through any user
account.

If you don't know what to choose for these questions, you might want to just
answer \"Yes\" because you can always turn it back on later with chmod u+s <file name>."
LONG_EXP: 
QUESTION:
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD:suidmount
NO_CHILD:suidmount
PROPER_PARENT: generalperms_1_2_mandrake

LABEL:suidmount
SHORT_EXP: "Mount and umount are used for mounting (activating) and
unmounting (deactivating) drives that were not automatically mounted at
boot time.  This can include floppy and CD-ROM drives.  Disabling SUID would
still allow anyone with the root password to mount and unmount drives."
LONG_EXP:
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: mount umount
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for mount/umount?"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
YN_TOGGLE: 1
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suidping
NO_CHILD: suidping
PROPER_PARENT:suid

LABEL:suidping
SHORT_EXP: "Ping is used for testing network connectivity--that is, for
testing the  ability of the network to get a packet from this machine to
another and back.  It should probably be used only by the person responsible
for networking this host, who should have root access.  Thus, we recommend
disabling SUID status for it."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for ping? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: ping
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suiddump
NO_CHILD: suiddump
PROPER_PARENT:suidmount

LABEL: suiddump
SHORT_EXP: "Dump and restore are used for backing up file systems and
restoring them from disk.  If used by an attacker, they could be used to
construct an alternate filesystem in place.  Further, anyone who backs up
the machine and restores from backup should have authorization and special
access granted by the administrator.  It's extremely unlikely that there will
be any problems with disabling SUID for dump and restore."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for dump and restore? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: dump restore
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suidcard
NO_CHILD: suidcard
PROPER_PARENT: suidping

LABEL: suidcard
SHORT_EXP: "Cardctl is used for controlling PCMCIA devices, primarily found
in laptop or notebook computers.  Non-admins shouldn't have rights to
modify hardware or devices, so you should probably disable SUID status for
this utility even if this is a notebook or laptop.  If this isn't a laptop or
notebook computer, then you probably don't have any PCMCIA devices, and
you should definitely disable this."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for cardctl? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: cardctl
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suidat
NO_CHILD: suidat
PROPER_PARENT: suiddump

LABEL: suidat
SHORT_EXP: "\"at\" is used for scheduling an individual task to run at a single
later time. There have historically been many exploits that take advantage of
weaknesses in \"at\". Virtually all of the necessary functionality of \"at
\" can be found in cron (and removing cron is not practical) so there is 
no need to retain privileged access for \"at\"."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for at? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: at
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suiddos
NO_CHILD: suiddos
PROPER_PARENT:suidcard

LABEL: suiddos
SHORT_EXP: "DOSEMU is a DOS emulator used to run older DOS programs. 
Any use of a second operating system, or emulation, opens up a whole new
area of security problems.  We recommend that only root have access to
this type of application, unless your users have a pressing need for it."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for DOSEMU? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: dos
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suidnews
NO_CHILD: suidnews
PROPER_PARENT: suidat

LABEL: suidnews
SHORT_EXP: "Ordinary users should not be able to start (or stop) the news
server.  For this reason, we'd like to disable SUID status for the INN news
server tools inndstart and startinnfeed."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for news server tools? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: inndstart
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suidprint
NO_CHILD: suidprint
PROPER_PARENT: suiddos

LABEL: suidprint
SHORT_EXP: "If this machine is not going to be using printers, then you should
disable the SUID status of the printing utilities.  These utilities have a history
of security vulnerabilities." 
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for printing utilities? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: lpr
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suidrtool
NO_CHILD: suidrtool
PROPER_PARENT: suidnews

LABEL: suidrtool
SHORT_EXP: "The BSD r-tools (rsh/remsh, rcp, rlogin, rdist, etc.) have
traditionally been used to make remote connections to other machines.  
They rely on IP addresses for authentication and transmit data in clear
text (including passwords).  Tools are now available which allow you to
spoof (fake) IP addresses as well as to monitor and/or hijack protocols
which use cleartext.  All of the same functionality can be found with the more
secure replacement tools ssh and scp.  Because of these insecurities,
ordinary users should not be allowed to use the r-tools, and admins should
use them only in cases where there are no other connection methods
available."
LONG_EXP: "The BSD r-tools rely on IP-based authentication, which means
that you can allow anyone with (for instance) root access on 192.168.1.1 to
have root access on 192.168.1.2.  Administrators and other users have
traditionally found this useful, as it lets them connect from one host to
another without having to retype a password.

The problem with IP-based authentication, however, is that an intruder can
craft \"spoofed\" or faked packets which claim to be from a trusted machine. 
Since the r-tools rely entirely on IP addresses for authentication, a spoofed
packet will be accepted as real, and any hacker who claims to be from a
trusted host will be trusted and given access to your machine.

These tools also transmit all of your data in cleartext, including passwords.

Tools are now available which allow you to spoof (fake) IP addresses as well 
as to monitor and/or hijack protocols which use cleartext.  All of the same 
functionality can be found with the more secure replacement tools ssh and 
scp.  Because of these insecurities, ordinary users should not be allowed 
to use the r-tools, and admins should use them only in cases where there 
are no other connection methods available."
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for the r-tools? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO:	LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: rsh
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suidusernetctl
NO_CHILD: suidusernetctl
PROPER_PARENT: suidprint

LABEL: suidusernetctl
SHORT_EXP: "usernetctl is a utility that allows ordinary users to control the
network interfaces.  In general, there's no reason for anyone other than the
system administrator to control network interfaces."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for usernetctl? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: usernetctl
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suidtrace
NO_CHILD: suidtrace
PROPER_PARENT: suidrtool

LABEL: suidtrace
SHORT_EXP: "The traceroute utility is used to test network connectivity. 
It is useful for debugging network problems, but it is generally not necessary,
especially for non-privileged users.  If non-root users will be needing to
debug network connections, you can leave the SUID bit on traceroute.  
Otherwise, you should disable it."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SUID status for traceroute? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_IS_SUID: traceroute
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: suid_general
NO_CHILD: suid_general
PROPER_PARENT: suidusernetctl

LABEL: suid_general
SHORT_EXP: "In addition to the above suid programs, there are others
that you should review.  You should be careful when you decide which programs
you are going to remove the suid bit from because usually there was a reason
that your vendor turned on the SUID bit in the first place.  In general, removing
the SUID bit will just disable some functionality for non-privileged users.  However,
in some cases, the effects can be very difficult to predict.  Please make these
changes on a test system to make sure the behavior of the system is what you
expect before putting them into production.  Most combinations of removing
SUID bits have not been tested by your vendor and you may need to undo your changes
to restore your system to a supportable state in case an error occurs.

HP-UX note: Changing the permissions on files and directories without changing the
internal product database will cause swverify to flag the inconsistency.  You can
use the swmodify command to update the internal product database."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like Bastille to put instructions on how to do an
SUID audit into Bastille's generated TODO list? (MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED)"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: "Y"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_CHILD: protectrhost
NO_CHILD: protectrhost
PROPER_PARENT: suidtrace

FILE: AccountSecurity.pm

LABEL: protectrhost
SHORT_EXP: "As mentioned earlier, the r-tools (rlogin, rcp, rsh/remsh, etc) 
are now considered insecure because they use IP-based authentication 
methods which can be easily fooled.  Unfortunately, many users and admins 
are not aware of this danger.  Bastille can prevent users and other 
admins from opening up dangerous holes in your system security by 
restricting rhosts by modifying PAM files(if applicable), removing 
execute permission from rshd/remshd and rlogind, and commenting out the 
services in your inetd.conf file." 
LONG_EXP: "The BSD r-tools rely on IP-based authentication, which means
that you can allow anyone with (for instance) root access on 192.168.1.1
have root access on 192.168.1.2.  Administrators and other users have
traditionally found this useful, as it lets them connect from one host to
another without having to retype a password.  The .rhosts file contains the
names of the accounts and machines that are considered to be trusted.

The problem with IP-based authentication, however, is that an intruder can
craft \"spoofed\" or faked packets which claim to be from a trusted machine. 
Since the r-tools rely entirely on IP addresses for authentication, a spoofed
packet will be accepted as real.

Some of your users, or even possibly other administrators for this machine,
might not be aware of the security problems with the BSD r-tools.  If this is
the case, they might create .rhosts files that would potentially allow
crackers access to the machine.  This option will disable the use of those
r-tools using various methods."
QUESTION: "Would you like to prohibit the clear-text r-protocols which trust
IP addresses for authentication? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: rsh
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: passwdage
NO_CHILD: passwdage
PROPER_PARENT: suidtrace

LABEL: passwdage
SHORT_EXP: "We can set the default password aging on accounts here, such
that accounts are disabled if the password has not changed within the last 
180 days.  At some point before the 180 days are up, the user will be
prompted to change his or her password.  This measure keeps passwords
fresh and also prevents inactive accounts from being attacked by system
crackers."
LONG_EXP: "Your operating system's default behavior, which we would 
change here, is to disable an account when the password hasn't changed 
in 99,999 days.  This interval is too long to be useful.  We can set the
default to 180 days.  At some point before the 180 days have passed, the
system will ask the user to change his or her password.  At the end of the
180 days, if the password has not been changed, the account will be
temporarily disabled.  We would make this change in /etc/login.defs."
QUESTION: "Would you like to enforce password aging? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: cronuser
NO_CHILD: cronuser
PROPER_PARENT: protectrhost

LABEL: cronuser
SHORT_EXP: "Cron allows users to submit jobs for the system to do at a
particular, possibly recurring time.  It can be very useful, but also has a very
real potential for abuse by either users or system crackers.  If you choose
to restrict the use of cron to system administrators, you will still be able to
allow individual users the use of cron at a later date."
LONG_EXP: "Cron can be particularly useful for admins, giving them the ability 
to have the system check logs every night at midnight or confirm file
integrity every hour.  On the other hand, being able to execute jobs later or
automatically represents an abusable privilege for users and also makes
their actions slightly harder to track.

Many sites choose to restrict cron to administrative accounts.  We suggest
this action to new admins especially, until they understand more about how 
cron can be abused and know more about which users need access to cron. 
We would like to create the /etc/cron.allow file of users who may use cron. 
You can add to that later.  If we don't create this file, all users will be
allowed to use cron."
QUESTION: "Would you like to restrict the use of cron to administrative
accounts? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: umask
NO_CHILD: umask
PROPER_PARENT: passwdage

LABEL: umask
SHORT_EXP: "The umask sets a default permission for files that you create.
Bastille can set one of several umasks.  Please select one of the following
or create your own:

002  - Everyone can read your files & people in your group can alter them.

022  - Everyone can read your files, but no one can write to them.

077  - No one on the system can read or write your files."
LONG_EXP: "The umask sets a default permission for files that you create.
Bastille can set one of several umasks.  Please select one of the following
or create your own:

002  - Everyone can read your files & people in your group can alter them.

022  - Everyone can read your files, but no one can write to them.

027  - Only people in your group can read your files, no one can write to them.

077  - No one on the system can read or write your files."
QUESTION: "What umask would you like to set for users on the system? [077]"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 077
REQUIRE_DISTRO: MN7.0 MN7.1 MN7.2 MN8.0 MN8.1 HP-UX DB SE TB
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: rootttylogins
NO_CHILD: rootttylogins
PROPER_PARENT: cronuser

LABEL: rootttylogins
SHORT_EXP: "You can restrict which tty's root can login on.  Some sites choose
to restrict root logins, so that an admin must login with an ordinary user
account and then use su to become root."
LONG_EXP: "You can restrict which tty's root can login on.  Some sites choose
to restrict root logins, so that an admin must login with an ordinary user
account and then use su to become root.

This can stop an attacker who has only been able to steal the root password
from logging in directly.  He has to steal a second account's password to
make use of the root password via the ttys."
QUESTION: "Should we disallow root login on tty's 1-6? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: restrict_path_mdk
NO_CHILD: restrict_path_mdk
PROPER_PARENT: umask

LABEL: restrict_path_mdk
SHORT_EXP: "Some users like to include the current directory (.) in their
PATH environment variable.  This allows you to run a program out of
the current directory by typing   program_name   instead of typing
./program_name  .  Unfortunately, this can also present a security
risk -- a clever attacker might be able to get you to run a 
Trojan-Horsed version of whatever command you run.  We recommend that
you answer No."
LONG_EXP: "Some users like to include the current directory in their
PATH environment variable.  This allows you to run a program out of
the current directory by typing   program_name   instead of typing
./program_name  .  Unfortunately, this can also present a security
risk -- a clever attacker might be able to get you to run a
Trojan-Horsed version of whatever command you run.  For example, you might
being trying to run   ls   to get a listing of the current directory, but
if your current directory is /tmp and an attacker put a program that does
something else in /tmp/ls, you'd run that program instead of your intended
one!

We recommend that you answer No to this question."
QUESTION: "Should we prevent the PATH from including the current directory? [Y]"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
REQUIRE_DISTRO: MN7.0 MN7.1 MN7.2 MN8.0 MN8.1
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: forbiduserview
NO_CHILD: forbiduserview
PROPER_PARENT: rootttylogins

LABEL: forbiduserview
SHORT_EXP: "By default in Linux-Mandrake, when using the graphical login,
you can see a list of all users who login to the system.  This can be a
minor security issue, as it lets an attacker know about every user account
on the system.  We can turn this feature off."
LONG_EXP: "By default in Linux-Mandrake, when using the graphical login,
you can see a list of all users who login to the system.  This can be a
minor security issue, as it lets an attacker know about every user account
on the system.  We can turn this feature off."
QUESTION: "Should we deactivate the graphical login's user list display? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: MN TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: protectgrub
NO_CHILD: protectgrub
PROPER_PARENT: restrict_path_mdk

FILE: BootSecurity.pm

LABEL: protectgrub
SHORT_EXP: "If an attacker has physical access to this machine, and
particularly to the keyboard, s/he could get superuser access through the
Grand Unified Bootloader (GRUB) command line.  We will look at other ways 
to prevent this later, but one easy way is to password-protect the GRUB 
prompt.  If GRUB is password-protected, any user can reboot the machine 
normally, but only users with the password can pass arguments to the GRUB
prompt.

Note that this option can interfere dual-booting with a second operating 
system, since dual booting often requires that type an O/S name to boot
one of the two operating systems.  If this machine sits in a general 
purpose lab and dual boots, you probably shouldn't choose this option.

Otherwise, this is strongly recommended for general use workstations and 
servers which are not locked away in their own room."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to password-protect the GRUB prompt? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: grub.conf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: protectgrub_password
NO_CHILD: protectlilo
SKIP_CHILD: protectlilo
PROPER_PARENT: forbiduserview

LABEL: protectgrub_password
SHORT_EXP: "You've elected to password protect the GRUB prompt.  Please enter
a GRUB password.  

WARNING: Please do not make this the root password for this computer, as the
         GRUB password will be stored unencrypted on the machine."
QUESTION: "Enter GRUB password, please.   []"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: grub.conf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_CHILD: protectlilo
NO_CHILD: protectlilo
PROPER_PARENT: protectgrub

LABEL: protectlilo
SHORT_EXP: "If an attacker has physical access to this machine, and
particularly to the keyboard, s/he could get superuser access through the
Linux Loader (LILO) command line.  We will look at other ways to prevent this
later, but one easy way is to password-protect the LILO prompt.  If LILO is
password-protected, any user can reboot the machine normally, but only
users with the password can pass arguments to the LILO prompt.

Note that this option can interfere dual-booting with a second operating 
system, since dual booting often requires that type an O/S name to boot
one of the two operating systems.  If this machine sits in a general 
purpose lab and dual boots, you probably shouldn't choose this option.

Otherwise, this is strongly recommended for general use workstations and 
servers which are not locked away in their own room."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to password-protect the LILO prompt? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: lilo.conf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: protectlilo_password
NO_CHILD: lilodelay
SKIP_CHILD: lilodelay
PROPER_PARENT: protectgrub

LABEL: protectlilo_password
SHORT_EXP: "You've elected to password protect the LILO prompt.  Please enter
a LILO password.  

WARNING: Please do not make this the root password for this computer, as the
         LILO password will be stored unencrypted on the machine."
QUESTION: "Enter LILO password, please.   []"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: lilo.conf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_CHILD: lilodelay
NO_CHILD: lilodelay
PROPER_PARENT: protectlilo

LABEL: lilodelay
SHORT_EXP: "We can further protect the system by taking away the
attacker's chance to type anything at the LILO prompt.  This is not
dependent on the previous option, nor is it exclusive of it.  If you chose the
previous option, this will make your configuration even tighter, as some
machines will allow an attacker to place keystrokes into the keyboard buffer
before he or she reaches the LILO prompt."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to reduce the LILO delay time to zero? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: lilo.conf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: lilosub_drive
NO_CHILD: lilosub_drive
PROPER_PARENT: protectlilo

LABEL: lilosub_drive
SHORT_EXP: "If you selected \"yes\" on either of the previous options (password-protecting the LILO prompt or reducing its delay to zero), then you need to now write the changes to your LILO configuration.  

Do you boot from your hard drive? That is, is LILO installed on your hard 
drive?"
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Do you ever boot Linux from the hard drive? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: lilo.conf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: lilosub_floppy
NO_CHILD: lilosub_floppy
PROPER_PARENT: protectlilo

LABEL: lilosub_floppy
SHORT_EXP: "If you have a Linux boot floppy, either for normal booting or for emergency use, you should also write these LILO changes to that floppy.  If you do not already have a customized Linux boot floppy, or if you did not choose to make any changes to your LILO configuration, you should answer \"no\" here."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to write the LILO changes to a boot floppy? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: lilo.conf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: lilosub_writefloppy
NO_CHILD: secureinittab
SKIP_CHILD: secureinittab
PROPER_PARENT: protectlilo

LABEL: lilosub_writefloppy
SHORT_EXP: "Please place the boot floppy to be modified in a floppy drive, preferably th first drive, called \"fd0\" or \"a:\".

Now, type in the Linux name of the drive device, like so:
            
	    fd0          floppy drive 1
	    fd1          floppy drive
" 
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Floppy drive device name: [fd0]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: lilo.conf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: fd0
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP: "We will write to this disk when we actually make changes.  Please 
leave this disk in the drive."
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: secureinittab
NO_CHILD: secureinittab
PROPER_PARENT: lilosub_floppy

LABEL: secureinittab
SHORT_EXP:  "In the default configuration, while in
console mode (non-graphical), any user at the keyboard can reboot the
machine by pressing CTRL-ALT-DELETE.  This is an unlikely method of attack,
and disabling CTRL-ALT-DELETE is only a useful precaution in cases where the
attacker would have access to the keyboard but not the power supply; if this
is not the case, it might be a better idea to not disable CTRL-ALT-DELETE."
LONG_EXP: "Disabling CTRL-ALT-DELETE rebooting is designed to prevent an
attacker with access to the machine's keyboard from being able to reboot
the machine.  A reboot done in this manner should not damage the
filesystem, as it shuts the machine down cleanly, writing out all pending data
in the disk cache to disk first.  Even with this functionality disabled, 
however, an attacker could just power cycle machine or pull the power cord.

Unless the power line, switch and case of the machine can
be physically protected, this precaution is wholly unnecessary.  Given the
fact that the attacker _can_ reboot the machine, would you prefer that
s/he do it in a way potentially damages the filesystem? Think carefully here,
as maintaining the integrity of the machine's filesystem may be secondary to
the goal of keeping an attacker off, in which case it is better to answer yes
here, since having to repair/ignore the damage and wait for filesystem
checks may slow the attacker down."
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable CTRL-ALT-DELETE rebooting? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: passsum
NO_CHILD: passsum
PROPER_PARENT: lilodelay

LABEL: passsum
SHORT_EXP: "As we mentioned earlier, anyone who can get to the console on
your machine can bring your machine up in \"single user mode\", where s/he is
given root privileges and everyone else is locked out of the system.  If you
password protect single user mode, you won't have to remember yet
another password--single user mode, or \"root\" mode, will require the root
password.

We HIGHLY recommend that you password protect single user mode."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to password protect single-user mode? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: disable_autologin
NO_CHILD: disable_autologin
PROPER_PARENT: secureinittab

LABEL: disable_autologin
SHORT_EXP: "Autologin logs you in as a particular user without a password.
This option is an extremelely low security feature, intended to make 
Mandrake Linux easier to use."
LONG_EXP:  "Autologin logs you in as a particular user without a password.
This option is an extremelely low security feature, intended to make 
Mandrake Linux easier to use.

While the Autologin is rather convenient, it can also be a 
security risk when other people can obtain physical access to your computer.
We'd suggest that you deactivate this feature."
QUESTION: "May we disable Autologin? [Y]"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
REQUIRE_DISTRO: MN7.0 MN7.1 MN7.2 MN8.0 MN8.1
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: tcpd_default_deny
NO_CHILD: tcpd_default_deny
PROPER_PARENT: passsum

FILE: SecureInetd.pm

LABEL: tcpd_default_deny
SHORT_EXP: "Not recommended for most users:

If you would like, Bastille can configure a default policy for all inetd,
xinetd, and TCP Wrappers-aware services to deny all connection attempts.
While you might have already chosen to install Bastille's firewall, setting
a default deny policy for these services gives more defense in depth.

This will also configure xinetd so that the currently-installed xinetd
services will use xinetd's more flexible access control and *not*
/etc/hosts.allow.  All other wrappers-based programs, like sshd, will
obey the default-deny."
LONG_EXP: "Not recommended for most users:

Many network services can be configured to restrict access
to certain network addresses (and in the case of 'xinetd' services in 
Linux-Mandrake 8.0 and Red Hat 7.x, other criteria as well). For services
running under the older 'inetd' super-server (found in older versions of
Linux-Mandrake and Red Hat, and current versions of some other distributions),
some standalone services like OpenSSH, and --unless otherwise configured--
services running under Red Hat's xinetd super-server, you can configure
restrictions based on network address in /etc/hosts.allow. The services
using inetd or xinetd typically include telnet, ftp, pop, imap, finger,
and a number of other services.

If you would like, Bastille can configure a default policy for all inetd,
xinetd, and TCP Wrappers-aware services to deny all connection attempts.
While you might have already chosen to install Bastille's firewall, setting
a default deny policy for these services gives more defense in depth.

This will also configure xinetd so that the currently-installed xinetd 
services will use xinetd's more flexible access control and *not*
/etc/hosts.allow.  All other wrappers-based programs, like sshd, will
obey the default-deny."
QUESTION: "Would you like to set a default-deny on TCP Wrappers and xinetd? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: 
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: deactivate_telnet
NO_CHILD: deactivate_telnet
PROPER_PARENT: disable_autologin

LABEL: deactivate_telnet
SHORT_EXP: "Telnet has severe design flaws.

telnet is a cleartext protocol, which means that when you type your password, 
it can be seen by a number of other machines on the network.  Any machine on 
your LAN, along with the other machine's LAN, along with many computers/routers 
between the two LANS, can often eavesdrop on the telnet session and grab 
passwords.  There's also another more active attack.  Anyone who can eavesdrop
can usually take over your telnet session, using a tool like Hunt or ettercap.

The standard practice among security-conscious sites is to migrate as rapidly
as possible from telnet to Secure Shell (ssh).  We'd advise you to make this
move as soon as possible.  ssh implementations are available from openssh.org
and ssh.com.  Some Operating System vendors also distribute a version of ssh."
QUESTION: "Should Bastille ensure the telnet service does not run on this system? [y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: deactivate_ftp
NO_CHILD: deactivate_ftp
PROPER_PARENT: tcpd_default_deny


LABEL: deactivate_ftp
SHORT_EXP: "Ftp is another problematic protocol.  First, it is a cleartext
protocol, like telnet -- this allows an attacker to eavesdrop on sessions and
steal passwords.  This also allows an attacker to take over an FTP session,
using a cleartext-takeover tool like Hunt or Ettercap.  Second, it can make
effective firewalling difficult.  Third, every major FTP daemon has had a
long history of security vulnerability -- they represent one of the major
successful attack vectors for remote root attacks.

FTP can often be replaced by Secure Shell's scp and sftp programs."
QUESTION: "Should Bastille ensure the FTP service does not run on this system? [y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: banners
NO_CHILD: banners
PROPER_PARENT: deactivate_telnet

LABEL: banners
SHORT_EXP: "At this point you can create \"Authorized Use Only\" messages for
your site. These may be very helpful in prosecuting system crackers you
may catch trying to break into your system.  Bastille can make you default
messages which you may then later edit.  This is sort of like an 
\"anti-welcome mat\" for your computer."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to display \"Authorized Use\" messages at log-in time? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: "A default login/telnet/ftp \"Authorized Use Only\" banner will be
created, and will be found in /etc/issue.  You should modify this banner to
apply more specifically to your organization (for instance, adding any site-
specific information to the default warnings).  If this is a corporate site,
check with your corporate counsel to determine the most appropriate
warning for the banner.  These banners, according to CIAC's bulletin

   (http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/bulletins/j-043.shtml)
   
may make it much easier to prosecute intruders.  By including this default
banner, neither the Bastille development team nor Hewlett-Packard Company
take any responsibility for your ability to prosecute system crackers.  
Please, especially if you run a corporate site, review/replace this with 
more specific language."
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: owner
NO_CHILD: inetd_general
PROPER_PARENT: deactivate_ftp

LABEL: owner
SHORT_EXP: "Bastille will start to make the banner more specific by 
telling the user who is responsible for this machine.  This will state
explicitly from whom the user needs to obtain authorization to use this
machine."
QUESTION: "Please type in the name of the company, person, or other organization
who owns or is responsible for this machine."
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: "its owner"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_CHILD: inetd_general
NO_CHILD: inetd_general
SKIP_CHILD: inetd_general
PROPER_PARENT: banners

LABEL: inetd_general
SHORT_EXP: "In addition to the previously mentioned services, one should
also disable other unneeded inetd services.  The aim is to only leave 
those services running that are critical to the operation of 
this machine.  This is an example of the frequent tradeoff
between security and functionality.  The most secure
machine is usually not very useful.  For the most secure, but useful
system, you will need to enable only those services which this system
needs to fulfill its intended purpose."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like Bastille to put a reminder to disable unneeded
inetd services in Bastille's generated TODO list? (MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED)"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
YES_CHILD: compiler
NO_CHILD: compiler
SKIP_CHILD: compiler
PROPER_PARENT: banners

FILE: DisableUserTools.pm

LABEL: compiler
SHORT_EXP: "The most common modus operandi for the bulk of the system
crackers out there is to gain access to your system, often through a regular
user account, and then use that access to compile exploits against your
system or other systems.  Disabling the gcc compiler on your system will slow
these crackers down, and may even prevent some attacks entirely.

If this machine is a dedicated server/firewall, which does not have users who
need to compile programs, this action is strongly recommended.  Otherwise,
you should very carefully consider whether you will be inconveniencing your
users by disabling the compiler.  If you do chose to disable it, we'll do so by
only allowing root access to the compiler."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable the gcc compiler? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: gcc
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: limitsconf
NO_CHILD: limitsconf
PROPER_PARENT: banners

FILE: ConfigureMiscPAM.pm

LABEL: limitsconf
SHORT_EXP: "In certain kinds of system attacks, known as Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks, the goal is not to gain access but instead to disrupt the
normal operation of the computer.  You can protect against certain types of
denial of service attacks by setting limits on the resources available to each
user.

Though you should customize this setting later if you're running a high-
output production server, we recommend this action for all machines and
configurations."
LONG_EXP:  "Denial of Service attacks are often very difficult to defend
against, since they don't require access of any kind to the target machine. 
Since several major daemons, including the web, name, and FTP servers, may
run as a particular user, you can limit the effectiveness of many Denial of
Service attacks by modifying /etc/security/limits.conf.  If you restrict the
resources available in this manner, you can effectively cripple most Denial of
Service attacks.  

If you choose this option, you'll be setting the following initial limits on
resource usage:
	
   - The number of allowed core files will be set to zero.  Core files 
     can be useful for diagnosing system problems, but they are very 
     large files and can be exploited by an attacker to fill up your
     filesystem.

   - Individual users are limited to 150 processes each.  This should
     be more than enough for normal system usage, and is not enough 
     to bring down your machine.

   - Individual files are limited to a size of 100MB.  Again, this 
     should be more than enough for normal system usage.

All of these values can be edited later."
QUESTION: "Would you like to put limits on system resource usage? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N 
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: "System resource limits have been set in the file
/etc/security/limits.conf, which you can edit later as necessary."
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: consolelogin
NO_CHILD: consolelogin
PROPER_PARENT: compiler

LABEL: consolelogin
SHORT_EXP: "Under some distributions, users logged in at the console have
some special access rights (like the ability to mount the CD-ROM drive).  You
can disable this special access entirely, but a more flexible option is to
restrict console access to a small group of trusted user accounts."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Should we restrict console access to a small group of user accounts? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: consolelogin_accounts
NO_CHILD: morelogging
SKIP_CHILD: morelogging
PROPER_PARENT: limitsconf

LABEL: consolelogin_accounts
SHORT_EXP: "Please enter in the account names that should be able to login
via the console, placing a space between each name."
QUESTION: "Which accounts should be able to login at console? [root]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: root
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_CHILD: morelogging
NO_CHILD: morelogging
PROPER_PARENT: consolelogin


FILE: Logging.pm

LABEL: morelogging
SHORT_EXP: "We would like to configure additional logging for your system. 
We will give you the option to log to a remote host, if your site already
has one.  We will add two additional logging files to the default setup and 
will also log some status messages to the 7th and 8th virtual terminals 
(the ones you'll see when you hit ALT-F7 and ALT-F8).  This additional 
logging will not change the existing log files at all, so this is by no means 
a \"risky\" move."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to add additional logging? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: "This script is adding additional logging files:

/var/log/kernel       --    kernel messages
/var/log/syslog       --    messages of severity \"warning\" and \"error\"
      
Also, if you check the 7th and 8th TTY's, by hitting ALT-F7 or ALT-F8,
you'll find that we are now logging to virtual TTY's as well.  If you
try this, remember that you can use ALT-F1 to get back to the first
virtual TTY."
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: remotelog
NO_CHILD: pacct
SKIP_CHILD: pacct
PROPER_PARENT: consolelogin

LABEL: remotelog
SHORT_EXP: "If you already have a remote logging host, we can set this
machine to log to it."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Do you have a remote logging host? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: remotelog_host
NO_CHILD: pacct
SKIP_CHILD: pacct
PROPER_PARENT: morelogging

LABEL: remotelog_host
SHORT_EXP: "What is the IP address of the machine you normally log to?
Remember, this should be a machine already configured to accept logging.
If you have no such machine, select <Back> and change your answer.

Note: we ask for an IP address because this is safer -- it avoids DNS cache
      poisoning attacks on logging.  You may use a hostname, but it should be
      added to your /etc/hosts file..."
QUESTION: "What is the IP address of the machine you want to log to? [127.0.0.1]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 127.0.0.1
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_CHILD: pacct
NO_CHILD: pacct
PROPER_PARENT: remotelog

LABEL: pacct
SHORT_EXP: "Linux has the ability to log which commands are run when and by
whom.  This is extremely useful in trying to reconstruct what a potential
cracker actually ran.  The drawbacks are that the logs get large quickly (a
log rotate module is included to offset this), the parameters to commands
are not recorded, and, like all log files, the accounting log is removable if the 
attacker has root.

As this is rather disk and CPU intensive, please choose NO unless you have
carefully considered this option."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to set up process accounting? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: accton
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: security_checks
NO_CHILD: security_checks
PROPER_PARENT: morelogging

LABEL: security_checks
SHORT_EXP: "MandrakeSoft msec program included nightly security checks. 
Bastille can configure these to provide the first warning when a cracker 
has compromised your system."
LONG_EXP: "MandrakeSoft msec program included nightly security checks. 
Bastille can configure these to provide the first warning when a cracker 
has compromised your system."
QUESTION: "Would you like to set up nightly security checks? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: MN7.0 MN7.1 MN7.2 MN8.0 MN8.1
YN_TOGGLE: 1
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: /usr/share/msec/diff_check.sh /usr/share/msec/security.sh /usr/share/msec/security_check.sh /usr/share/msec/promisc_check.sh /usr/bin/promisc_check /usr/bin/msec_find
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: minimalism
NO_CHILD: minimalism
PROPER_PARENT: pacct

FILE: MiscellaneousDaemons.pm

LABEL: minimalism
SHORT_EXP: "To make the operating system more secure, we try to deactivate all
system daemons, especially those running at a high/unlimited level of
privilege.  Each active system daemon serves as a potential point of
break-in, which might allow an attacker illegitimate access to your
system.  An attacker can use these system daemons to gain access if they
are later found to have a bug or security vulnerability.

We practice a minimalism principle here: minimize the number of privileged
system daemons and you can decrease your chances of being a victim should
one of the standard daemons be found later to have a vulnerability.  This
section will require careful attention, but if you have doubts, you should
be able to safely select the default value in most cases."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION:
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: apmd
NO_CHILD: apmd
PROPER_PARENT: security_checks

LABEL: apmd
SHORT_EXP: "apmd is used to monitor battery power and is used almost
exclusively by notebook/laptop computers."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable apmd? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_apmd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: remotefs
NO_CHILD: remotefs
PROPER_PARENT: minimalism

LABEL: remotefs
SHORT_EXP: "We would like to disable the network file systems NFS (Network
File System, common to most Unix variants) and SMB (Samba, which comes with 
most Linux distributions).  We strongly recommend that you disable both of 
these.  NFS has a history of major security vulnerabilities; Samba is slightly 
better, but it is still a shared file system and still raises potentially 
severe security concerns.  Both services use cleartext, meaning that any
data transfered can be monitored by anyone else on your network (even if you
use a switching router, as switches were designed for performance, not 
security).  Transfered data includes filehandles, which can then be used to 
modify files.

These services are safer if you can set your firewall to block
packets for either of them from entering or leaving your network, but it's
probably best to deactivate them until you can investigate whether or not
you need them and how to best secure them."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to deactivate NFS and Samba? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_nfs
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP: 
YES_CHILD: pcmcia
NO_CHILD: pcmcia
PROPER_PARENT: apmd

LABEL: pcmcia
SHORT_EXP: "If this machine is not a notebook, it probably has no PCMCIA
ports.  PCMCIA ports allow the use of easily removable credit-card-sized
devices.  If this machine has no PCMCIA ports, you should be able to disable
PCMCIA services without any problems."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable PCMCIA services? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_pcmcia
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: dhcpd
NO_CHILD: dhcpd
PROPER_PARENT: remotefs

LABEL: dhcpd
SHORT_EXP: "DHCP servers are used to distribute temporary IP (Internet)
addresses to other machines.  An organization generally only has one or two
DHCP servers, if any.  Unless this machine is going to be a DHCP server, you
should deactivate the DHCP daemon.  Deactivating the daemon will not
prevent you from running DHCP as a client."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable the DHCP daemon? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_dhcpd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: gpm
NO_CHILD: gpm
PROPER_PARENT: pcmcia

LABEL: gpm
SHORT_EXP: "GPM is used in console (text) mode to add mouse support to
text mode. If you will be using this machine in console mode and will want
mouse support, leave GPM on."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable GPM? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_gpm
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: innd
NO_CHILD: innd
PROPER_PARENT: dhcpd

LABEL: innd
SHORT_EXP: "innd is the standard internet news server, used to make the
news network. You should only leave it turned on if this machine will serve as
the  organization's news server."  
LONG_EXP: "Very few people need to create their own news server, as your 
ISP or university usually provides one.  Further, they require a great deal 
of disk space, processor power, bandwidth and maintenance.  In all but the 
rarest of cases, you should disable the news server daemon."
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable the news server daemon? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_innd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: routing
NO_CHILD: routing
PROPER_PARENT: gpm

LABEL: routing
SHORT_EXP: "Unless this machine is serving as a router, you should turn off
the routing daemons (routed and gated)."
LONG_EXP: "Very few machines need to be running routing daemons.  If your
machine is only connected to the internet through one method, you can
disable routing protocols. If this machine is at an ISP or major networking
center, you can leave this on, but please prepare to configure your routing
daemon."
QUESTION: "Would you like to deactivate the routing daemons? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: nis
NO_CHILD: gated
SKIP_CHILD: nis
PROPER_PARENT: innd

LABEL: gated
SHORT_EXP: "You've chosen for this machine to act as a router.  In that case,
we recommend using only the gated daemon, which is more secure than the
routed daemon."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to use gated instead of routed? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_gated
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: nis
NO_CHILD: nis
PROPER_PARENT: routing

LABEL: nis
SHORT_EXP: "NIS is a system used for synchronizing key host information,
including account names and passwords.  It is a cleartext protocol, and can be
easily compromised to gain access to accounts on the system.  If you are
really interested in using NIS, you should configure your firewall to block NIS
traffic going in or out of the network.  If you don't have a firewall, you 
shouldn't be running NIS.  

On many systems, including most recent versions of Linux and trusted-mode
HP-UX, passwords are not only encrypted but also readable only by the 
super-user.  This defense measure was taken because encrypted passwords 
can be decrypted fairly quickly with today's computers.  When you use NIS,
the encrypted password is transmitted in cleartext and made available to 
anyone on the network, compromising this defense measure.  Because of this,
HP-UX trusted mode is incompatible with NIS.  If you choose to convert to 
trusted mode, you should also disable NIS.

We very strongly recommend that you deactivate NIS.  Alternatives include
NIS+ and Kerberos."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to deactivate NIS server and client programs? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_ypbind
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: snmpd
NO_CHILD: snmpd
PROPER_PARENT: routing

LABEL: snmpd
SHORT_EXP: "SNMP, or the simple network management protocol, is
used to aid in management of machines over the network.  This
can be a powerful method of monitoring and administering
a set of networked machines.  If you use a network management
software to maintain the computers on your network then you
should audit the way in which SNMP is used by that software.
You should (1) use SNMPv3 wherever possible, (2) set restrictive
access control lists, and (3) block SNMP traffic at your firewall.
Otherwise it makes sense to disable the SNMP daemons.

The average home user has no reason to run these daemons and
depending on their default configuration, could be a major
security risk.  Alternatively if configured correctly, and used
in conjunction with management software these daemons could be
used to dramatically improve accessibility and response time to
problems when they occur."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable SNMPD? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_snmpd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: minimize_chkconfig
NO_CHILD: minimize_chkconfig
PROPER_PARENT: nis

LABEL: minimize_chkconfig
SHORT_EXP: "For the extra paranoid, we can disable all of the chkconfig'd
services, with the exception of: 

	  cron, syslog, keytable, network, gpm, xfs, pcmcia

This is pretty minimalist and should only be undertaken if you understand
how and when to turn the remaining services on."
LONG_EXP: "For the extra paranoid, we can disable all of the chkconfig'd
services, with the exception of: 

	  cron, syslog, keytable, network, gpm, xfs, pcmcia

This is pretty minimalist and should only be undertaken if you understand
how and when to turn the remaining services on."
QUESTION: "Should we disable most chkconfig'd services?"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: MN7.0 MN7.1 MN7.2 MN8.0 MN8.1 
YN_TOGGLE: 1
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
PROPER_PARENT: snmpd
YES_CHILD:disable_ptydaemon
NO_CHILD: disable_ptydaemon
SKIP_CHILD: disable_ptydaemon

LABEL: disable_ptydaemon
SHORT_EXP: "The ptydaemon is used by the shell layers (shl) software.
shl is a historical alternative to job control.  If no one on your system
is going to use shl, you should be able to safely turn the ptydaemon off.

If you disable and remove ptydaemon, Bastille will also disable and
remove vtdaemon since it depends on ptydaemon to operate.

These are both used for very old protocols.  If you don't know what uucp
is, you probably don't need these.  If you want a history lesson, you
can look at the man pages for \"vt\", \"vtdaemon\", \"uucp\" and \"shl\".

The security benefit of turning these off is based on the principle of
minimalism.  These daemons do run as root and accept input from a normal
user.  There is probably a low security risk associated with leaving these
daemons running, but there is little reason to expose yourself to that
risk unnecessarily."
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable both the ptydaemon and vtdaemon?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: "Y"
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_CHILD: disable_pwgrd
NO_CHILD: disable_pwgrd
SKIP_CHILD: disable_pwgrd
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
PROPER_PARENT: minimize_chkconfig


LABEL: disable_pwgrd
SHORT_EXP:"pwgrd is the Password and Group Hashing and Caching daemon.

pwgrd provides accelerated lookup of password and group information
for libc routines like getpwuid and getgrname. However, on systems
with normal sized (less than 50 entries) password files, pwgrd will
probably slow down lookups, due to the overhead presented by pwgrd's
use of unix domain sockets.

The security benefit of turning these off is also based on the principle 
of minimalism.  These daemons do run as root and accept input from non-
privileged users."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable pwgrd?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_CHILD: xaccess
NO_CHILD: xaccess
SKIP_CHILD: xaccess
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_pwgrd
PROPER_PARENT: disable_ptydaemon

LABEL: xaccess
SHORT_EXP: "XDMCP is a protocol which allows remote connections to an
X server.  Using this protocol, someone can get a remote login prompt
even if you have turned off telnet."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disallow remote X logins?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: "Y"
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_CHILD: sendmaildaemon
NO_CHILD: sendmaildaemon
SKIP_CHILD: sendmaildaemon
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: Xconfig
PROPER_PARENT: disable_pwgrd

FILE: Sendmail.pm

LABEL: sendmaildaemon
SHORT_EXP: "Running sendmail in daemon mode makes your system more
vulnerable to sendmail-based attacks, of which there have been many (and
almost certainly more to come).  Unless this machine is a mailserver, 
you probably do not need sendmail to run in daemon mode." 
LONG_EXP: "You do not need to have sendmail running in daemon mode to send 
and receive email, and unless you have a constant network connection, 
you probably cannot run sendmail in daemon mode.  Daemon mode means that
sendmail is constantly listening on a network connection waiting to 
receive mail.  

If you disable daemon mode, Bastille will ask you if you would like to 
run sendmail every few minutes to process the queue of outgoing mail.  
Most programs which send mail will still do so immediately, and
processing the queue will take care of transient errors.

If you receive all of your email via a POP/IMAP  mailbox provided by your ISP,
you may have no need of daemon-mode sendmail, unless you're running a
special fetchmail-style POP/IMAP based retrieval program.  For instance, you
can turn daemon mode  off if you read your mail via Netscape's common
POP/IMAP read  functionality.  The only reason to run sendmail in daemon
mode is if you are running a mail server."
QUESTION: "Do you want to stop sendmail from running in daemon mode? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: sysconfig_sendmail
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: sendmailcron
NO_CHILD: vrfyexpn
SKIP_CHILD: chrootbind
PROPER_PARENT: xaccess

LABEL: sendmailcron
SHORT_EXP: "Should sendmail run every 15 minutes to process
the mail queue, processing and sending out e-mail? If this machine does
not run sendmail in daemon mode, but does have a constant internet link,
this is a possibility.  

If you choose this option, most mailer programs will activate sendmail to
process their particular message.  A message usually only gets written to
the queue if sendmail has trouble delivering it if, say, the receiving mail
server is down."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to run sendmail via cron to process the queue? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: sysconfig_sendmail
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: vrfyexpn
NO_CHILD: vrfyexpn
PROPER_PARENT: sendmaildaemon

LABEL: vrfyexpn
SHORT_EXP: "An attacker can use sendmail's vrfy (verify recipient existence)
and expn (expand recipient alias/list contents) commands to learn more
about accounts on the system.  The expn command, for instance, could be
used to find out who the \"postmaster\" and \"abuse\" aliases redirect mail to,
which identifies which user account belongs to the system administrator.

These sendmail commands can probably be disabled without breaking anything 
and will make the system cracker's job more difficult.  The only reasons
to leave them on are (1) you are running an old-fashioned, friendly site,
(2) you are using them to debug your own mail server, or (3) the very small
chance that some software you use relies on this."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable the VRFY and EXPN sendmail commands? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: sendmail.cf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: chrootbind
NO_CHILD: chrootbind
PROPER_PARENT: sendmailcron

FILE: DNS.pm

LABEL: chrootbind
SHORT_EXP: "The name server, \"named\", needs to run with privileged access,
and was traditionally given full root access.  This allows \"named\" to function
correctly, but increases the security risk if any vulnerabilities are found.
We can decrease this risk by running \"named\" as a non-privileged user and
by putting its files in a restricted file system (called a chroot jail).

HP-UX Note: The general structure of the jail will be created but several
entries will be added to Bastille's generated TODO list which require
MANUAL ACTION on your part.  (HP-UX does not ship with a name server
configured by default, so much of this depends on how your system's name
server is configured.)"
LONG_EXP:  "The name server, \"named\", needs to run with privileged access,
and was traditionally given full root access.  This allows \"named\" to function
correctly, but increases the security risk if any vulnerabilities are found.
We can decrease this risk by running \"named\" as a non-privileged user and
by putting its files in a restricted file system (called a chroot jail).

For security reasons, it would be ideal to restrict every process which
is listening to untrusted data as much as possible.  This is especially true
of network daemons, such as bind.  If a vulnerability is found in the
daemon, then a chroot jail will contain any intrusions.   Only a root process
can break out of a chroot jail, so Bastille will ensure that \"named\" is
not running as root.  A successful attack on \"named\" in a chroot jail
running as a non-privileged user will allow the attacker to modify only
files owned or writeable by that non-privileged user and protect the
rest of the system.

HP-UX Note: The general structure of the jail will be created but several
entries will be added to Bastille's generated TODO list which require
MANUAL ACTION on your part.  (HP-UX does not ship with a name server
configured by default, so much of this depends on how your system's name
server is configured.)"
QUESTION: "Would you like to chroot named and set it to run as a non-root user? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: named
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: "You've changed the name server, named, to run in a safer mode,
one in which it is restricted to operating within the directory /var/named
or /home/dns on Redhat and Mandrake systems and /var/jail/bind on HP-UX 
systems.

This \"chroot jail\" stops an attacker from using named to do more extensive
damage to the system if s/he is able to compromise the named.  This 
should be mostly transparent to you, except in two respects:

  1) All of your configuration edits for named must occur in the jaildir.
  2) If you use ndc to control named, you will need to use
           ndc -c /<jail-dir>/var/run/ndc
  3) Again, all of your configuration files must be moved to the jaildir.
"
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: namedoff
NO_CHILD: namedoff
PROPER_PARENT: vrfyexpn

LABEL: namedoff
SHORT_EXP: "Until you configure your name (DNS) server, we would like to
temporarily turn it off.  In almost all cases, you should only need your own
name server if you own your own domain and you want this _particular_
machine to answer DNS queries.  

This is especially important as there have been dangerous remote-root 
vulnerabilities in several recent versions of BIND.  The security
principle of Minimalism applies here: minimize the number of possible
attack points to be least vulnerable to attack.

Even if you plan on setting up a name server on this machine, you should 
deactivate it for now until you get the configuration files setup.   You
can reactivate it then by typing, as root:     /sbin/chkconfig named on  "
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to deactivate named, at least for now? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX 
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_named
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: apacheoff
NO_CHILD: apacheoff
PROPER_PARENT: chrootbind

FILE: Apache.pm

LABEL: apacheoff
SHORT_EXP: "Will you be using the Apache web server immediately? Again,
minimalism is a critical part of a good site security.  If you don't
need to run a web server, at least not right now, you should deactivate it.
You can restart the web server later by typing:

      /sbin/chkconfig httpd on
"
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to deactivate the Apache web server? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chkconfig_httpd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: "Even though you've deactivated the Apache web server, there are
still a few more questions related to it.  It's good to take the precautions in
the next steps even if you've turned off the web server, since it might get
turned on again later."
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: bindapachelocal
NO_CHILD: bindapachelocal
PROPER_PARENT: namedoff

LABEL: bindapachelocal
SHORT_EXP: "When the web server is on, you may want to have it listen on
only the local interface, or on the local interface and a particular network
interface (like an ethernet card that's only connected to a bank of local
computers, none of which are attached to the internet).  This is a
particularly good option for web developers."
LONG_EXP: "If you bind the apache web server to the local interface, so that
it isn't accessible to other machines, it can still serve up pages to
browsers/web clients on this machine. This is ideal for many web 
developers, who don't need a worldwide accessible web server, but would 
like to edit a web site locally before uploading to another server.  To
access the server, you would simply use, as a URL in your browser:

        http://localhost/
and
        http://localhost/some_page.html
	
Even if you fully deactivated the web server in the previous step, this 
option still makes sense: if you or someone else turns the server back on,
it doesn't represent as great a risk if it isn't set to allow 
connections from the entire internet."
QUESTION: "Would you like to bind the web server to listen only to the localhost? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: httpd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: generalweb
NO_CHILD: bindapachenic
SKIP_CHILD: generalweb
PROPER_PARENT: apacheoff

LABEL: bindapachenic
SHORT_EXP: "We can bind the web server to a specific IP address on your 
machine.  On a machine with multiple network interfaces (like ppp and ethernet)
this has the effect of letting you only allow your internal LAN access to your
web server.  This is highly recommended if you're building an internal-only
web server."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to bind the web server to a particular interface? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: httpd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: bindapacheaddress
NO_CHILD: generalweb
SKIP_CHILD: generalweb
PROPER_PARENT: bindapachelocal

LABEL: bindapacheaddress
SHORT_EXP: "Please enter in the IP address for apache to listen to.  Include the 
port it should listen on--the default port is port 80.  For example:

     192.168.1.1:80
 or
     10.0.0.1:8080"
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Address to bind the web server to? [127.0.0.1]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: httpd
YN_TOGGLE: 0
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 127.0.0.1 
YES_CHILD: generalweb
NO_CHILD: generalweb
PROPER_PARENT: bindapachenic

LABEL: generalweb
SHORT_EXP:" There are a few other changes that we recommend you make to
the web server's configuration.  There are very few intrinsic security flaws
in the Apache web server, but there are two important ones:

  As with all web servers, it is generally required to send and receive
  information to and from anyone on the internet.
  
  In many environments, the people telling the server how to behave are 
  not knowledgeable system administrators by trade.  Before you discount
  this fact, take account of the wide proliferation of configurations
  under which any user on the system can instruct the server to execute 
  arbitrary code for anyone who comes to the site, via CGI scripts."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION:
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: httpd
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: symlink
NO_CHILD: symlink
PROPER_PARENT: bindapachenic

LABEL: symlink
SHORT_EXP: "In general, you should try to limit which information on the web
server's host can be accessed by the myriad of people who may connect to
the web server.

We will prevent the web server from following symbolic links.  Apache runs
as user \"nobody\", and so it can potentially change/read any world 
writable/readable file on the system.  If we don't deactivate this option,
a user could potentially allow a web site visitor to view files not in the
web page directories.  Deactivating \"follow symbolic links\" will help
prevent this.  Further, deactivation can lessen the probability that a future
vulnerability in Apache could be exploited to alter world writable files 
on the system."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to deactivate the following of symbolic links? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: httpd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ssi
NO_CHILD: ssi
PROPER_PARENT: generalweb

LABEL: ssi
SHORT_EXP: "You might also want to deactivate server-side includes. If you
don't know what they are, you should probably turn them off until you do.  In
essence, they are another way for a web server to execute code to modify
web pages, but they represent a security risk you may not want to take until
you better understand the Apache web server."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to deactivate server-side includes? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: httpd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: cgi
NO_CHILD: cgi
PROPER_PARENT: symlink

LABEL: cgi
SHORT_EXP: "As mentioned earlier, one of the few inherent weaknesses in Apache,
true of web servers in general, is that CGI scripts allow any user on the
system to allow anyone who can access the web site (which is usually the
entire internet) to run programs on the web server's host.  This has inherent 
problems, but may be required at your site.  We recommend disabling 
CGI script execution for now, while you take the time to read more about the 
dangers and install some kind of protection."  
LONG_EXP: "One security precaution that you should look into is using a
wrapper program that only allows certain users to execute CGI 
programs.  You may even have your site's security administrator audit each 
script before allowing it onto the system.  CGI scripts are not inherently
dangerous, but they need to be very carefully controlled by people who 
understand the dangers."
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable CGI scripts, at least for now? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: httpd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: apacheindex
NO_CHILD: apacheindex
PROPER_PARENT: ssi

LABEL: apacheindex
SHORT_EXP: "Apache, by default, is configured to generate \"index\" files for
any web directories that don't have them.  These index files basically create
a link to every file in the directory, whether one was intended or not.  This
step isn't necessary, but may be helpful."
LONG_EXP: "This can be mildly problematic, for example, when a user places a
sensitive data file that's required by a CGI script in a web directory.  The
data file must be readable by user \"nobody\", which generally means it must
be world-readable.  Without the automatically generated index file, a
web site visitor couldn't ordinarily read the data file unless they could
guess its name.  Still, this example is weak, as it illustrates the 
flawed, yet all-too-common, principle of \"security through obscurity.\"
No examples were obvious to the authors of this script that didn't rely on
breaking the most obvious rule of web site creation, \"don't put any sensitive
files in a web directory with world readable permissions!\" " 
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable indexes? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: httpd
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: chrootapache
NO_CHILD: chrootapache
PROPER_PARENT: cgi

LABEL: chrootapache
SHORT_EXP: "Apache 1.3.19 and higher for HP-UX have a chroot script built
into the distribution.  This script makes a copy of Apache and related
binaries and libraries and places them inside of a chroot jail.  This
allows Apache to run with limited file system access.  If you are not
currently running the Apache web server then answer no to this question.

Note: This chroot script was written to give a fully functioning web server 
inside of a chroot'ed environment.  For additional security remove unneeded 
libraries and compilers as they may not all be used by your Apache server.
"
LONG_EXP: "Apache 1.3.19 and higher for HP-UX have a chroot script built
into the distribution.  Bastille has detected that your version of Apache
has this functionality.  This script makes a copy of Apache and related
binaries and libraries and places them inside of a chroot jail.  This
allows Apache to run with limited file system access.  If you are not
currently running the Apache web server then answer no to this question.

The apache server, httpd, is given access to several compilers and system 
libraries so that it can process cgi's, login attempts, etc... One way to
lessen the risk presented by this special status is to lock the daemon
(httpd) into a \"chroot jail.\"  In this case, the daemon has access to
only a small segment of the filesystem, a directory created specifically for
the purpose of giving the daemon access to  only the files it needs.  

The adjective \"chroot'ed\" is derived from \"change root\", since 
Bastille sets the daemon's root directory ( / ) to some child node in the 
directory tree.  Note, for experts: a root process can break out of a 
chroot jail, but this is still an effective deterrent, especially since 
Bastille will limit the number of root processes running in the jail.

Note: This chroot script was written to provide for a fully functional web 
server inside of a chroot'ed environment.  For additional security remove 
unneeded libraries and compilers as they may not all be used by your 
Apache server."
QUESTION: "Would you like to chroot your Apache Server? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: chroot_os_cp.sh
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
SKIP_CHILD: updateapache
YES_CHILD: printing
NO_CHILD: printing
PROPER_PARENT: apacheindex

LABEL: updateapache
SHORT_EXP: "Apache 1.3.19 and higher for HP-UX have a chroot script built
into the distribution.  This script makes a copy of Apache and related
binaries and libraries and places them inside of a chroot jail.  This
allows Apache to run with limited file system access, so that even if 
someone breaks into your web server, they can't access anything outside 
of the dedicated web server file system unless there is an additional
root vulnerability inside the jail.  Bastille has detected that your 
version of Apache is missing this functionality.  

Note:  If you are not currently running the Apache web server then you 
should probably look into why it is configured, as Bastille has detected 
an httpd.conf file."
QUESTION: "Would you like a reminder in the TODO list to get the latest 
version of Apache?"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: httpd.conf
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: printing
NO_CHILD: printing
PROPER_PARENT: chrootapache

FILE: Printing.pm

LABEL: printing
SHORT_EXP: "If this machine is not going to need to print, you should disable
lpr and lpd and remove the SUID root (extremely high level of
privilege) setting on lpr/lp.  You could undo this later by typing on Linux:

 # /bin/chmod 06555 /usr/bin/lpr /usr/bin/lprm
 # /sbin/chkconfig lpd on

Or for HP-UX:

 # /bin/chmod 06555 /usr/bin/lp /usr/bin/cancel /usr/bin/lpalt /usr/bin/lpstat
  # /usr/sbin/ch_rc -a -p LP=1

This is only recommended if this machine will not be used for
printing in the near future.  If you deactivate this, you should write
down the commands above, for later use."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable printing? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX HP-UX
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: lpr
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ftpgeneral
NO_CHILD: ftpgeneral
PROPER_PARENT: chrootapache

FILE: FTP.pm

LABEL: ftpgeneral
SHORT_EXP:"FTP is widely considered to be fairly dangerous, but even 
security-conscious sites might still run it because of the perceived 
difficulty in educating users about alternatives.  Available
alternatives include:

 - secure copy, which encrypts names, passwords and traffic
 - web-based file archives, a much safer way of offering files to the public

The lack of widespread, free, Windows-based secure copy clients only 
exacerbates the problem.  FTP is dangerous for several reasons, including:

 1) All passwords travel in the clear across the connection, allowing any
    intermediate hosts (and usually every host on the source and destination's
    local area network) to \"sniff\" unencrypted passwords.
    
 2) Ftp daemons typically need to run with root privileges, and most of the
    common ones have been found to have a multitude of security vulnerabilities
    over the course of their existence.  For instance, the ftp daemon included 
    with RedHat 6.0 has had two major updates to close security holes since
    RH6.0 was released.  Earlier in this session, we updated your wu-ftp to 
    the most recent one that Redhat advertises
"
LONG_EXP:
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: ftpaccess
QUESTION:
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: userftp
NO_CHILD: userftp
PROPER_PARENT: printing

LABEL: userftp
SHORT_EXP:  "Allowing users to access the FTP server from anywhere on the
Internet present a security problem, and you should disallow this access if
possible.  The problem is that many users feel they need FTP access.  You
can disable user use of the ftp daemon, leaving anonymous download still
possible.  We do not recommend this for most site admins, unless they have
management's approval and are prepared to educate their users."
LONG_EXP: "The least safe configuration for an ftp daemon is one which
allows anyone to connect (via \"anonymous\" mode) and upload files.  Most of
the attacks that let an intruder gain root access on your box require that
s/he is able to upload files.  If you don't have anonymous ftp with upload
capability, the intruder cannot use those attacks unless s/he can get a user
name and password.  For the sake of safety, this mode is shut off by default 
in most wu-ftpd configurations.

The next least safe configuration is the one in which users with accounts
on the system are allowed to access the server from the entire Internet.
The dangers stem from 1) clear text passwords being sniffed on the Internet
and 2) common vulnerabilities in ftp daemons that are allowed if anyone has
upload privileges.

Unfortunately, disabling this configuration is difficult, as this is what 
many sites feel a need to use their ftp server for.  With a well 
educated user base (and secure copy clients for their platforms), this
functionality is unnecessary.  Unfortunately, educating your user base may 
be impossible at your site, especially if there are a large number of users.  
If this is a 3 account server, that kind of user education may be quite 
possible."
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable user privileges on the FTP daemon? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: ftpaccess
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: anonftp
NO_CHILD: anonftp
PROPER_PARENT: ftpgeneral

LABEL: anonftp
SHORT_EXP: "The last major FTP server functionality that we allow you to
disable in the name of site security is anonymous download access.  As we have
noted before, this functionality can be mimicked via the traditionally more
secure Apache web server.  Any files that you want accessible to the world
can be placed on an easy-to-configure web server."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to disable anonymous download? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: ftpaccess
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: stack_execute
NO_CHILD: stack_execute
PROPER_PARENT: userftp

FILE: HP_UX.pm

LABEL: stack_execute
SHORT_EXP: "A common way to gain privileged access is to provide some type
of out-of-bounds input that is not checked by a program.  This input can be
used to overflow the stack in a way that leaves some cleverly written
instructions stored in a place that will be executed by the program.  The
HP-UX kernel has the ability to disallow execution of commands from the
stack.  This will contain many of these types of attacks, making them
completely useless.  

Changing this kernel parameter requires Bastille to recompile the kernel.
Ensure that the current running kernel is /stand/vmunix.  A backup of the old
kernel will be placed in /stand/vmunix.prev and /stand/dlkm.vmunix.prev."
LONG_EXP: "A common way to gain privileged access is to provide some type
of out-of-bounds input that is not checked by a program.  This input can be
used to overflow the stack in a way that leaves some cleverly written
instructions stored in a place that will be executed by the program.  The
HP-UX kernel has the ability to disallow execution of commands from the
stack.  This will contain many of these types of attacks, making them
completely useless.  Because this is done at the kernel level, it is 
independent of any application which may have a vulnerability of this type.
Note that this will also break some applications (such as older versions
of Java) which were designed to execute code off of the stack.  However,
you can run \"chatr +es <executeable_file>\" to override this for individual
programs if they break (You could run this on the old Java interpreter, for 
example.)

Changing this kernel parameter requires Bastille to recompile the kernel.
Ensure that the current running kernel is /stand/vmunix.  A backup of the old
kernel will be placed in /stand/vmunix.prev and /stand/dlkm.vmunix.prev."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION:  "Would you like to enable kernel-based stack execute protection?"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX11.11
DEFAULT_ANSWER: "Y"
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: system_is_trusted
NO_CHILD: system_is_trusted
PROPER_PARENT: anonftp

LABEL: system_is_trusted
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
SKIP_CHILD:trusted_system
YES_CHILD:  single_user_password
PROPER_PARENT: stack_execute
REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS: devassign

LABEL: trusted_system
SHORT_EXP: "This system can be configured as a trusted system which 
removes the hashed passwords from the /etc/passwd file and provides 
other useful security features such as auditing and login passwords 
with lengths greater than 8 characters.  Also, more options are 
available, such as password length requirements, and password
aging.  (This, combined with other criteria, mean that HP-UX in
trusted mode is \"C2 compliant.\")

Passwords on existing accounts will expire as a result of the conversion.
Also, certain programs which rely on implementation specific authentication
may not be compatible with this change.  Specific lookups in
/etc/passwd will not work because the encrypted password is no longer
stored in that file.  For example, the some versions of the tool \"sudo\" 
would not properly authenticate users.

Note: You can further configure logging, auditing, and password policy
using SAM.  If too many events are audited, you may experience a decrease 
in performance due to the additional logging required."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to convert to a trusted system?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y 
YN_TOGGLE: 1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
SKIP_CHILD: single_user_password
YES_CHILD: single_user_password
NO_CHILD: restrict_swacls
PROPER_PARENT: system_is_trusted

LABEL: single_user_password
SHORT_EXP: "Trusted HP-UX has the ability to password protect single user 
mode.  This will provide limited protection against anyone who has 
physical access to the machine, because they cannot simply reboot and
have root access without typing the password.  However, if an attacker has
physical access to the machine and enough time, there is very little you
can do to prevent unauthorized access.  This may be more of a pain in the
case when an authorized administrator messes up the machine and can't
remember the password."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to password protect single user mode?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: "HP-UX also has a secure boot option for security which takes 
significant effort to disable.  Bastille cannot set this option for you 
because it has to be done manually at the boot prompt.  Be careful if you 
do this, because to disable it, you will have to open your case, 
physically disconnect all disk drives and other media from your cpu, just 
like an attacker would.  

If you want to set this, reboot your machine and hit the ESC key.  
You will be presented with the BCH prompt.  Type \"CO\" to change BCH 
configuration, then type \"SEC\" to turn on secure boot.
Once again, bear in mind that this is very painful to undo if you ever
need to access the BCH prompt again."
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
YES_CHILD: restrict_swacls
NO_CHILD: restrict_swacls
PROPER_PARENT: trusted_system

LABEL: restrict_swacls
SHORT_EXP:  "The swagentd daemon allows for remote access to list and
install software on your system.  This is a great feature for remote
administration, but can also be a security risk.  The swacl command
lets you control access to this functionality.  We recommend that you
disallow default remote read access."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to restrict remote access to swlist?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
YES_CHILD: ndd
NO_CHILD:  ndd
PROPER_PARENT: trusted_system

LABEL: ndd
SHORT_EXP: "ndd is a utility for getting and setting network device parameters.
Would you like Bastille to change the network settings to improve security?
These settings are based upon the recommendations given in the \"HP-UX
Bastion Host Whitepaper\".

Note: If you already have some non-default settings in effect, you will need to 
merge the settings manually, and a reminder will be added to your TODO list."
LONG_EXP: "ndd is a utility for getting and setting network device parameters.

The following is a list of some ndd parameters which the \"HP-UX Bastion Host
Whitepaper\" suggests that you change for greater security:

                                                Default => Suggested
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
ip_forward_directed_broadcasts                            1   =>   0
ip_forward_src_routed					  1   =>   0
ip_forwarding						  2   =>   0
ip_ire_gw_probe						  1   =>   0
ip_pmtu_strategy					  2   =>   1
ip_send_redirects					  1   =>   0
ip_send_source_quench					  1   =>   0
tcp_conn_request_max					 20   =>   500

For more information on each of these parameters, run

ndd -h

Note: If you already have some non-default settings in effect, you will need to 
merge the settings manually, and a reminder will be added to your TODO list."
QUESTION: "Would you like Bastille to make the suggested ndd changes?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
YES_CHILD:scan_ports
NO_CHILD: scan_ports
PROPER_PARENT: restrict_swacls

LABEL: scan_ports
SHORT_EXP:  "One of the final steps in lockdown is to verify that only the
services you need are still running.  Several tools exist to do this,
including \"netstat\" which is included with HP-UX, and \"lsof\" (LiSt Open
Files), which is a free downloadable tool that can give you a lot of good 
information about all the processes running on your system.  If there are
processes running that you don't recognize, you might take this as an
opportunity to do some research and learn about them."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION:  "Would you like instructions in your TODO list on how to run a
port scan?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
YES_CHILD: ipfilter
NO_CHILD: ipfilter
PROPER_PARENT: ndd

LABEL: ipfilter
SHORT_EXP: "Firewalls generally make up the first line of defense in any
network security architecture.  IPFilter is a free host-based firewall
which is available for HP-UX.  Using IPFilter, you can write rules which
allow only the right types of network traffic into your computer.
This can dramatically improve your system's overall resistance to network 
attacks by limiting the number of ways your system could be attacked in
the first place.  Note that it can take a lot of work and expertise to 
properly configure and maintain firewall rules, and the installation 
process loads a kernel module and requires a reboot."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like information on how to get a copy of IPFilter?"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
YES_CHILD: look_at_todo
NO_CHILD: look_at_todo
PROPER_PARENT: scan_ports

LABEL: look_at_todo
SHORT_EXP:  "Running the Bastille backend will make changes to your system
and create a TODO list in /var/opt/bastille/TODO.txt of
remaining steps which you should do to secure your system, based on
your answers to the questions.  After you have run the Bastille backend,
you should review the list and make the necessary changes to your system.
You should also look at the Error log created in /var/opt/bastille/log/error-log
to make sure that Bastille did not fail unexpectedly in any of its tasks."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION:
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 0
REQUIRE_DISTRO: HP-UX
YES_CHILD: tmpdir
NO_CHILD: tmpdir
PROPER_PARENT: ipfilter

FILE: TMPDIR.pm

LABEL: tmpdir
SHORT_EXP: "Many programs use the /tmp directory in ways that are dangerous
on multiuser systems. Many of those programs will use an alternate directory
if one is specified with the TMPDIR or TMP environment variables. We can
install scripts that will be run when users log in that safely create 
suitable temporary directories and set the TMPDIR and TMP environment
variables. This depends on your system supporting /etc/profile.d scripts."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to install TMPDIR/TMP scripts? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_intro
NO_CHILD: ip_intro
PROPER_PARENT: scan_ports

FILE: Firewall.pm

LABEL: ip_intro
SHORT_EXP: "Using the packet filtering script, you will be able to do packet
filtering/modification via the Linux kernel.  You can use this to block certain types
of connections to or from your machine, to turn your machine into a small firewall,
and to do Network Address Translation (also known as \"IP masquerading\"), which lets
several machines share a single IP address.

If you install the packet filtering script, it will create firewalling instructions for you.  
You will be prompted to make various choices (with suggested defaults), but you may
need to edit it for your particular site and WILL need to individually activate it.

This script supports both kernel 2.2 (ipchains) and 2.4 (iptables if available, otherwise ipchains)."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Would you like to run the packet filtering script? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: End_Screen
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_detail_level_kludge
NO_CHILD: End_Screen 
PROPER_PARENT: tmpdir

LABEL: ip_detail_level_kludge
SHORT_EXP:
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION:
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_exp_type
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_CHILD: ip_exp_type
PROPER_PARENT: ip_intro


LABEL: ip_exp_type
SHORT_EXP: "You will be asked to choose initial settings for the firewall script. The 
defaults are generally the minimal recommended settings. To accept the default (shown
in brackets), press RETURN. To change a non-empty default to an empty value, enter
some white space before pressing RETURN.

Your responses should be white space delimited lists of items. IP addresses may be
entered in plain \"dotted-quad\" notation, with or without netmasks.  For instance,
\"10.0.0.0/8\" \"10.0.0.0/255.0.0.0\" \"10.0.0.0\" will all be read as legitimate ways
to express the 10.*.*.* \"class A\" network space.  If you have \"unexpected\"
networks like \"10.0.0.0/255.255.255.0\" or \"192.168.1.0/255.255.255.128\", you will
need to specify that explicitly.

Services can be entered as names (\"smtp\") or numbers (\"25\").  Be warned that any
names must explicitly match one of those listed in /etc/services. Ranges may be
specified with colons, e.g. \"1024:\" indicates all ports >= 1024, \"6000:6020\"
indicates ports 6000 to 6020, inclusive.

Unless you really understand networking, you should ask for more information on most
of the options in this script."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: 
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_advnetwork	
NO_CHILD: ip_advnetwork
PROPER_PARENT: ip_intro

LABEL: ip_advnetwork
SHORT_EXP: "Do you need the advanced networking options?  If this is a standalone
workstation or server with a single network interface (e.g. may connect to one of
several PPP servers, but is never connected to two different networks simultaneously),
then you do not need advanced networking options.

If this is a server that deals with multiple interfaces or provides IP
Masquerading/NAT service, then you do need the advanced networking options."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Do you need the advanced networking options?"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_dns
YN_TOGGLE: 1
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_dns
NO_CHILD: ip_b_dns
PROPER_PARENT: ip_exp_type

LABEL: ip_s_dns
SHORT_EXP: "This controls what external servers you can use for DNS lookups. For
regular workstations, this should contain all your nameserver addresses, separated by
spaces. If you want to run a caching nameserver and/or run your own DNS, leave this at
\"0.0.0.0/0\" so you can query any DNS server. If you set this to an empty value, the
firewall script will read the current nameservers from /etc/resolv.conf when it is
run, which is the recommended configuration. This default is designed to ensure
functionality.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP: "DNS servers are used to translate names like \"example.org\" into addresses
like \"10.1.2.3\". You need to configure DNS for many pieces of software to function
properly. Your system administrator or Internet Service Provider should be able to
provide you with this information. Most users should simply leave this at
\"0.0.0.0/0\" (or make it blank) so the firewall script will be more forgiving (or do
the right thing automatically). For instance, DHCP clients often re-write
/etc/resolv.conf when obtaining a new lease. (This means you may want to configure
your system to run the firewall script both before _and_ after setting up your
DHCP-configured interface if you set this to the safest value, an empty string.) 

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
QUESTION: "DNS servers: [0.0.0.0/0]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_trustiface
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 0.0.0.0/0
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_trustiface
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_advnetwork

LABEL: ip_s_trustiface
SHORT_EXP: "List the interface names of all interfaces you want to have unrestricted
access to this machine. You should at least trust \"lo\", the \"loopback\" interface."
LONG_EXP: "Interface names normally look like \"eth0\" for the first Ethernet card,
\"ppp0\" for a PPP connection, etc. Any traffic coming from the interfaces listed here
will be allowed by the kernel (though TCP Wrappers or the application itself may end
up denying the connection attempt). Basically, you will have no kernel-level firewall
protecting you from traffic on these interfaces, and should therefore think carefully
before changing the default.

List the interface names of all interfaces you want to have unrestricted
access to this machine. You should at least trust \"lo\", the \"loopback\" interface."
QUESTION: "Trusted interface names: [lo]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_publiciface 
DEFAULT_ANSWER: lo
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_publiciface
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_dns

LABEL: ip_s_publiciface
SHORT_EXP:"List names of all interfaces connected to public/untrusted networks. The
\"+\" character is a wildcard, e.g. \"ppp+\" matches any interface name beginning with
\"ppp\" in case you have multiple dialup profiles."
LONG_EXP: "List names of all interfaces connected to public/untrusted networks. The
\"+\" character is a wildcard, e.g. \"ppp+\" matches any interface name beginning with
\"ppp\" in case you have multiple dialup profiles.

Using the \"+\" suffix allows you to configure more interfaces (for
instance, more PPP dialup entries) without having to modify the firewall script. "
QUESTION: "Public interfaces: [eth+ ppp+ slip+]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_internaliface
DEFAULT_ANSWER: eth+ ppp+ slip+
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_internaliface
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_trustiface

LABEL: ip_s_internaliface
SHORT_EXP: "This is for servers that will act as NAT / IP Masq firewalls between
local, but not fully trusted, networks and public networks like the Internet. List
names of all \"internal\" interfaces that might have full ability to use NAT / IP Masq
to contact public networks, but only limited access to services running on this
machine. Do not use \"+\" characters; name each interface explicitly."
LONG_EXP: "This is for servers that will act as NAT / IP Masq firewalls between
local, but not fully trusted, networks and public networks like the Internet. List
names of all \"internal\" interfaces that might have full ability to use NAT / IP Masq
to contact public networks, but only limited access to services running on this
machine. Do not use \"+\" characters; name each interface explicitly.

Normal workstations should leave this as the empty default. "
QUESTION: "Internal interfaces: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_tcpaudit
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_tcpaudit
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_publiciface

LABEL: ip_s_tcpaudit
SHORT_EXP: "List any TCP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces."
LONG_EXP: "List any TCP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces.

If you have \"syslog\" configured to log \"kern\" messages of \"info\"
level, the kernel will automatically log connection attempts from the \"public\"
interfaces (only the \"public\" interfaces) to these ports and/or services. This is
useful to spot possible probes or attacks. The default setting records connection
attempts to several services, although you may not have them installed or enabled. "
QUESTION: "TCP services to audit: [telnet ftp imap pop3 finger sunrpc exec login
linuxconf ssh]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_udpaudit
DEFAULT_ANSWER: telnet ftp imap pop3 finger sunrpc exec login linuxconf ssh
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_udpaudit
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_internaliface

LABEL: ip_s_udpaudit
SHORT_EXP: "List any UDP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces.  The default here is port
31337, the standard port for the infamous \"Back Orifice\" trojan/remote-control app
for Windows systems."
LONG_EXP: "List any UDP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces.  The default here is port
31337, the standard port for the infamous \"Back Orifice\" trojan/remote-control app
for Windows systems.

While attackers probing for Back Orifice may not pose a threat to your
Linux system, logging their attempts helps identify the \"bad guys\" "
QUESTION: "UDP services to audit: [31337]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_icmpaudit
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 31337
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_icmpaudit
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_tcpaudit

LABEL: ip_s_icmpaudit
SHORT_EXP: "List any ICMP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces.  These should be specified
as types, not numbers. One example is \"echo-request\" which is used by Microsoft ping
and tracert [sic] clients."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "ICMP services to audit: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_publictcp
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_publictcp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_udpaudit

LABEL: ip_s_publictcp
SHORT_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept TCP connection attempts from
the \"public\" interfaces. Typical workstations will not want to make any services
available, though admins may want to enable something like SSH (default port: 22) for
remote administration. Those running caching or \"real\" DNS servers on this machine
will want to enable domain (or port 53). If you want to make FTP available to clients
on the \"public\" interfaces, you will want to allow the range of IP addresses used
for \"passive\" FTP connections."
LONG_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept TCP connection attempts from
the \"public\" interfaces. Typical workstations will not want to make any services
available, though admins may want to enable something like SSH (default port: 22) for
remote administration. Those running caching or \"real\" DNS servers on this machine
will want to enable domain (or port 53). If you want to make FTP available to clients
on the \"public\" interfaces, you will want to allow the range of IP addresses used
for \"passive\" FTP connections.

You will need to list the names or port numbers of any services running on
this machine that you want hosts on the \"public\" network to access. For instance, if
you have a local Web server you want to share, add \"80\" for the normal HTTP port.
Not doing so means you will be able to access the service locally, but \"public\"
hosts will not."
QUESTION: "TCP service names or port numbers to allow on public interfaces:[ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_publicudp
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_publicudp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_icmpaudit

LABEL: ip_s_publicudp
SHORT_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept UDP connection attempts from
the \"public\" interfaces. Again, typical workstations will not want to make any
services  available, but if you're running caching or real DNS servers, you will need
to enable domain (port 53)."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "UDP service names or port numbers to allow on public interfaces:[ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_internaltcp
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_internaltcp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_publictcp
 
LABEL: ip_s_internaltcp
SHORT_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept TCP connection attempts from
the \"internal\" interfaces.  Note that the \"public\" services will not be made
available to \"internal\" hosts unless you also specify those services again here. If
you want to make FTP available to clients on the \"internal\" interfaces, you will
want to allow the range of IP addresses used for \"passive\" FTP connections. "
LONG_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept TCP connection attempts from
the \"internal\" interfaces.  Note that the \"public\" services will not be made
available to \"internal\" hosts unless you also specify those services again here. If
you want to make FTP available to clients on the \"internal\" interfaces, you will
want to allow the range of IP addresses used for \"passive\" FTP connections.

For instance, a corporate firewall/mailserver might have \"smtp\" enabled
on the public side to accept outside mail, and for \"internal\" interfaces it might
allow both \"smtp\" and \"imap\" so local users can both send and get mail; in that
case you would set this value to \"smtp imap\". This does not affect IP Masquerading's
ability to let masq'ed users access any services on outside/Internet hosts. "
QUESTION: "TCP service names or port numbers to allow on private interfaces: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_internaludp
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_internaludp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_publicudp

LABEL: ip_s_internaludp
SHORT_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept UDP connection attempt from
the \"internal\" interfaces. Note that the \"public\" services will not be made
available to \"internal\" hosts unless you also specify those services again here."
LONG_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept UDP connection attempt from
the \"internal\" interfaces. Note that the \"public\" services will not be made
available to \"internal\" hosts unless you also specify those services again here.

As with internal TCP. You do not need to enable domain service if the
internal clients are using IP Masq to query outside DNS servers. "
QUESTION: "UDP service names or port numbers to allow on private interfaces: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_passiveftp
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_passiveftp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_internaltcp

LABEL: ip_s_passiveftp
SHORT_EXP: "This has nothing to do with whether you are running an FTP _server_ on
this machine; this has to do with how clients running on this machine will talk to
_other_ machines running FTP servers reachable through the \"public\" interfaces. By
forcing your local FTP clients to use \"passive\" mode, you will not have to be as
cautious about blocking specific \"high\" TCP services. Set to \"Y\" to force
\"passive\" FTP; the default \"N\" will allow you to use normal, \"active\" FTP.
Forcing passive mode (\"Y\") is recommended, but less convenient."
LONG_EXP: "This has nothing to do with whether you are running an FTP _server_ on
this machine; this has to do with how clients running on this machine will talk to
_other_ machines running FTP servers reachable through the \"public\" interfaces. By
forcing your local FTP clients to use \"passive\" mode, you will not have to be as
cautious about blocking specific \"high\" TCP services. Set to \"Y\" to force
\"passive\" FTP; the default \"N\" will allow you to use normal, \"active\" FTP.
Forcing passive mode (\"Y\") is recommended, but less convenient.

Forcing passive FTP will make using some FTP clients more of a hassle, as
you may need to manually tell them to use passive mode, but many clients such as
Netscape Navigator have no problem with passive FTP. If you have problems with FTP,
this is the first place to look. 

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
QUESTION: "Force passive mode? [N]" 
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: 
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_tcpblock
NO_CHILD: ip_s_tcpblock
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_internaludp

LABEL: ip_s_tcpblock
SHORT_EXP: "Specify TCP services to block.  These rules take effect _after_ the TCP
services to make public. If you allow the use of \"active\" FTP clients
(FORCE_PASV_FTP at its default of \"0\"), you will need to be careful here, and will
want to make sure you block all TCP services listening on high ports. If you are
forcing \"passive\" FTP, you may ignore this setting."
LONG_EXP: "Specify TCP services to block.  These rules take effect _after_ the TCP
services to make public. If you allow the use of \"active\" FTP clients
(FORCE_PASV_FTP at its default of \"0\"), you will need to be careful here, and will
want to make sure you block all TCP services listening on high ports. If you are
forcing \"passive\" FTP, you may ignore this setting.

We have listed the services we have observed. To be more cautious, you
should look at the output of 'lsof -i' (run as root) once the system is up and all
services are running. 

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
QUESTION: "TCP services to block: [2049 2065:2090 6000:6020 7100]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_udpblock
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 2049 2065:2090 6000:6020 7100
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_udpblock
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_passiveftp

LABEL: ip_s_udpblock
SHORT_EXP: "Specify UDP services to block.  As with the TCP services, the UDP services
to make public will take precedence. The high UDP services that you do not block will
be reachable by any allowed NTP or DNS server. Sites with more such \"high UDP\"
services, or global DNS availability (as is the default, DNS_SERVERS=\"0.0.0.0/0\"),
will want to be sure they have all such high UDP services listed.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "UDP services to block: [2049 6770]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_icmpallowed
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 2049 6770
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_icmpallowed
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_tcpblock

LABEL: ip_s_icmpallowed
SHORT_EXP: "Specify the ICMP allowed types.  The default suggestion allows you to
probe other hosts with ping and traceroute. Minimally you will need to allow
\"destination-unreachable\"."
LONG_EXP: "Specify the ICMP allowed types.  The default suggestion allows you to
probe other hosts with ping and traceroute. Minimally you will need to allow
\"destination-unreachable\".

\"destination-unreachable\" lets other machines' servers tell your system
when things aren't right; don't disable this unless you really know what you're
getting into. If you don't allow \"echo-reply\" and \"time-exceeded\", you won't be
able to use ping and traceroute to debug issues on the \"public\" networks. "
QUESTION: "ICMP allowed types: [destination-unreachable echo-reply time-exceeded]"
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_srcaddr
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: destination-unreachable echo-reply time-exceeded
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_srcaddr
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_udpblock

LABEL: ip_s_srcaddr
SHORT_EXP: "Do you want to enable source address verification? This configures the
kernel to block traffic likely to have spoofed IP addresses. Set to \"N\" to disable.
The default (\"Y\") is highly recommended."
LONG_EXP: "Do you want to enable source address verification? This configures the
kernel to block traffic likely to have spoofed IP addresses. Set to \"N\" to disable.
The default (\"Y\") is highly recommended.

This is a standard, and highly recommended, precaution. "
QUESTION: "Enable source address verification? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_ipmasq
NO_CHILD: ip_s_ipmasq
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_icmpallowed

LABEL: ip_s_ipmasq
SHORT_EXP: "If this machine will be used as an IP Masquerading / Network Address
Translation gateway, enter the networks to be masqueraded (from trusted interfaces).
Example: \"10.0.0.0\". If you will not be using IP Masq / NAT, leave this as the empty
default."
LONG_EXP: "If this machine will be used as an IP Masquerading / Network Address
Translation gateway, enter the networks to be masqueraded (from trusted interfaces).
Example: \"10.0.0.0\". If you will not be using IP Masq / NAT, leave this as the empty
default.

If this machine will be used as an IP Masquerading / Network Address
Translation gateway, enter the networks to be masqueraded (from trusted interfaces).
Example: \"10.0.0.0\". If you will not be using IP Masq / NAT, leave this as the empty
default.

Note this expects _network_ addresses (either with 0's on the end or with
explicit netmasks), _not_ interface names. "
QUESTION: "Masqueraded networks: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_kernelmasq
DEFAULT_ANSWER:
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_kernelmasq
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_srcaddr

LABEL: ip_s_kernelmasq
SHORT_EXP: "Do you want to set any kernel modules to do IP masquerading?  Special
kernel modules are required to provide certain services via IP Masquerading. Possible
modules include cuseeme, ftp, irc, quake, raudio, and vdolive. The script assumes each
name should have the usual prefix, e.g. \"raudio\" will cause the script to load the
\"ip_masq_raudio\" module."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Kernel modules to masquerade: [ftp raudio vdolive]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_rejectmethod
DEFAULT_ANSWER: ftp raudio vdolive
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_rejectmethod
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_ipmasq

LABEL: ip_s_rejectmethod 
SHORT_EXP: "You need to set how the kernel rejects blocked traffic. \"REJECT\" is
friendly, lets the remote host know you're blocking their attempt (and can therefore
be used to prove you're on the network). \"DENY\" is unfriendly, simply drops the
connection attempt, leaving the remote host to wait, and probably give up after some
time. (Note you may specify \"DENY\" or \"DROP\" and the  packet filter will
use the appropriate keyword (DENY for kernel 2.2/ipchains, DROP for 2.4/iptables.)"
LONG_EXP: "You need to set how the kernel rejects blocked traffic. \"REJECT\" is
friendly, lets the remote host know you're blocking their attempt (and can therefore
be used to prove you're on the network). \"DENY\" is unfriendly, simply drops the
connection attempt, leaving the remote host to wait, and probably give up after some
time.

There's no definite right answer here. With DENY, your machine will be less
visible, especially if using kernel 2.4/iptables. "
QUESTION: "Reject method: [DENY]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_dhcpiface
DEFAULT_ANSWER: DENY
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_dhcpiface
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_kernelmasq

LABEL: ip_s_dhcpiface
SHORT_EXP: "List the names of any interfaces this machine will need to make DHCP
_queries_ on to configure _its own_ interfaces. For example, a cable modem user with a
single ethernet interface might need to set this to \"eth0\".

Systems that use regular PPP modem dialups may leave this blank.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Interfaces for DHCP queries: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_ntpsrv
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_ntpsrv
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_rejectmethod

LABEL: ip_s_ntpsrv
SHORT_EXP: "If you want to queries NTP time servers to synchronize your system time,
enter IP addresses or networks for those servers here. If you don't intend to make NTP
queries, leave this as the empty default.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP: "If you want to queries NTP time servers to synchronize your system time,
enter IP addresses or networks for those servers here. If you don't intend to make NTP
queries, leave this as the empty default.

The same warnings about blocked UDP services and DNS servers apply here;
the hosts and networks you list here can connect to any high UDP port not explicitly
blocked. 

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
QUESTION: "NTP servers to query: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_s_icmpout
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_s_icmpout
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_dhcpiface

LABEL: ip_s_icmpout
SHORT_EXP: "Do you want to disable any outbound ICMP types?  If you disable the types
listed in the default, your machine will not be visible to normal traceroute probes
from hosts on your \"public\" interfaces."
LONG_EXP: "Do you want to disable any outbound ICMP types?  If you disable the types
listed in the default, your machine will not be visible to normal traceroute probes
from hosts on your \"public\" interfaces.

\"destination-unreachable\" is (ab)used by the traceroute program to check
routing to individual hosts. "
QUESTION: "ICMP types to disallow outbound: [destination-unreachable time-exceeded]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_enable_firewall
DEFAULT_ANSWER: destination-unreachable time-exceeded
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_enable_firewall
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_s_ntpsrv

LABEL: ip_b_dns
SHORT_EXP: "This controls what external servers you can use for DNS lookups. For
regular workstations, this should contain all your nameserver addresses, separated by
spaces. If you want to run a caching nameserver and/or run your own DNS, leave this at
\"0.0.0.0/0\" so you can query any DNS server. If you set this to an empty value, the
firewall script will read the current nameservers from /etc/resolv.conf when it is
run, which is the recommended configuration. This default is designed to ensure
functionality.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP: "This controls what external servers you can use for DNS lookups. For
regular workstations, this should contain all your nameserver addresses, separated by
spaces. If you want to run a caching nameserver and/or run your own DNS, leave this at
\"0.0.0.0/0\" so you can query any DNS server. If you set this to an empty value, the
firewall script will read the current nameservers from /etc/resolv.conf when it is
run, which is the recommended configuration. This default is designed to ensure
functionality.

DNS servers are used to translate names like \"example.org\" into addresses
like \"10.1.2.3\". You need to configure DNS for many pieces of software to function
properly. Your system administrator or Internet Service Provider should be able to
provide you with this information. Most users should simply leave this at
\"0.0.0.0/0\" (or make it blank) so the firewall script will be more forgiving (or do
the right thing automatically). For instance, DHCP clients often re-write
/etc/resolv.conf when obtaining a new lease. (This means you may want to configure
your system to run the firewall script both before _and_ after setting up your
DHCP-configured interface if you set this to the safest value, an empty string.) 

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
QUESTION: "DNS Servers: [0.0.0.0/0]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_trustiface
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 0.0.0.0/0
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_trustiface
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_advnetwork

LABEL: ip_b_trustiface
DEFAULT_ANSWER: lo
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_publiciface
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_publiciface
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_dns

LABEL: ip_b_publiciface
SHORT_EXP:"List names of all interfaces connected to public/untrusted networks. The
\"+\" character is a wildcard, e.g. \"ppp+\" matches any interface name beginning with
\"ppp\" in case you have multiple dialup profiles."
LONG_EXP: "List names of all interfaces connected to public/untrusted networks. The
\"+\" character is a wildcard, e.g. \"ppp+\" matches any interface name beginning with
\"ppp\" in case you have multiple dialup profiles.

Using the \"+\" suffix allows you to configure more interfaces (for
instance, more PPP dialup entries) without having to modify the firewall script. "
QUESTION: "Public interfaces: [eth+ ppp+ slip+]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_internaliface
DEFAULT_ANSWER: eth+ ppp+ slip+
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_internaliface
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_dns

LABEL: ip_b_internaliface
DEFAULT_ANSWER:
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_tcpaudit
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_tcpaudit
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_publiciface

LABEL: ip_b_tcpaudit
SHORT_EXP: "List any TCP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces."
LONG_EXP: "List any TCP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces.

If you have \"syslog\" configured to log \"kern\" messages of \"info\"
level, the kernel will automatically log connection attempts from the \"public\"
interfaces (only the \"public\" interfaces) to these ports and/or services. This is
useful to spot possible probes or attacks. The default setting records connection
attempts to several services, although you may not have them installed or enabled. "
QUESTION: "TCP services to audit: [telnet ftp imap pop3 finger sunrpc exec login
linuxconf ssh]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_udpaudit
DEFAULT_ANSWER: telnet ftp imap pop3 finger sunrpc exec login linuxconf ssh
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_udpaudit
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_publiciface

LABEL: ip_b_udpaudit
SHORT_EXP: "List any UDP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces.  The default here is port
31337, the standard port for the infamous \"Back Orifice\" trojan/remote-control app
for Windows systems."
LONG_EXP: "List any UDP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces.  The default here is port
31337, the standard port for the infamous \"Back Orifice\" trojan/remote-control app
for Windows systems.

While attackers probing for Back Orifice may not pose a threat to your
Linux system, logging their attempts helps identify the \"bad guys\" "
QUESTION: "UDP services to audit: [31337]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_icmpaudit
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 31337
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_icmpaudit
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_tcpaudit

LABEL: ip_b_icmpaudit
SHORT_EXP: "List any ICMP-based services (name or port number) that you want the kernel
to log connection attempts from the \"public\" interfaces.  These should be specified
as types, not numbers. One example is \"echo-request\" which is used by Microsoft ping
and tracert [sic] clients."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "ICMP services to audit: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_publictcp
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_publictcp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_udpaudit

LABEL: ip_b_publictcp
SHORT_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept TCP connection attempts from
the \"public\" interfaces. Typical workstations will not want to make any services
available, though admins may want to enable something like SSH (default port: 22) for
remote administration. Those running caching or \"real\" DNS servers on this machine
will want to enable domain (or port 53). If you want to make FTP available to clients
on the \"public\" interfaces, you will want to allow the range of IP addresses used
for \"passive\" FTP connections."
LONG_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept TCP connection attempts from
the \"public\" interfaces. Typical workstations will not want to make any services
available, though admins may want to enable something like SSH (default port: 22) for
remote administration. Those running caching or \"real\" DNS servers on this machine
will want to enable domain (or port 53). If you want to make FTP available to clients
on the \"public\" interfaces and are using kernel 2.2/ipchains, you will want to allow the range of IP addresses used
for \"passive\" FTP connections.

You will need to list the names or port numbers of any services running on
this machine that you want hosts on the \"public\" network to access. For instance, if
you have a local Web server you want to share, add \"80\" for the normal HTTP port.
Not doing so means you will be able to access the service locally, but \"public\"
hosts will not."
QUESTION: "TCP service names or port numbers to allow on public interfaces: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_publicudp
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_publicudp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_icmpaudit

LABEL: ip_b_publicudp
SHORT_EXP: "List names or port numbers on which to accept UDP connection attempts from
the \"public\" interfaces. Again, typical workstations will not want to make any
services  available, but if you're running caching or real DNS servers, you will need
to enable domain (port 53)."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "UDP service names or port numbers to allow on public interfaces: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_passiveftp
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_internaltcp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_publictcp

LABEL: ip_b_internaltcp
DEFAULT_ANSWER:
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_internaludp
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_internaludp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_publicudp

LABEL: ip_b_internaludp
DEFAULT_ANSWER:
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_passiveftp
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_passiveftp
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_publicudp

LABEL: ip_b_passiveftp
SHORT_EXP: "This has nothing to do with whether you are running an FTP _server_ on
this machine; this has to do with how clients running on this machine will talk to
_other_ machines running FTP servers reachable through the \"public\" interfaces. By
forcing your local FTP clients to use \"passive\" mode, you will not have to be as
cautious about blocking specific \"high\" TCP services. Set to \"Y\" to force
\"passive\" FTP; the default \"N\" will allow you to use normal, \"active\" FTP.
Forcing passive mode (\"Y\") is recommended, but less convenient.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP: "This has nothing to do with whether you are running an FTP _server_ on
this machine; this has to do with how clients running on this machine will talk to
_other_ machines running FTP servers reachable through the \"public\" interfaces. By
forcing your local FTP clients to use \"passive\" mode, you will not have to be as
cautious about blocking specific \"high\" TCP services. Set to \"Y\" to force
\"passive\" FTP; the default \"N\" will allow you to use normal, \"active\" FTP.
Forcing passive mode (\"Y\") is recommended, but less convenient.

Forcing passive FTP will make using some FTP clients more of a hassle, as
you may need to manually tell them to use passive mode, but many clients such as
Netscape Navigator have no problem with passive FTP. If you have problems with FTP,
this is the first place to look. 

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
QUESTION: "Force passive mode? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP: 
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_tcpblock
NO_CHILD: ip_b_tcpblock
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_publicudp

LABEL: ip_b_tcpblock
SHORT_EXP: "Specify TCP services to block.  These rules take effect _after_ the TCP
services to make public. If you allow the use of \"active\" FTP clients
(FORCE_PASV_FTP at its default of \"0\"), you will need to be careful here, and will
want to make sure you block all TCP services listening on high ports. If you are
forcing \"passive\" FTP, you may ignore this setting.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP: "Specify TCP services to block.  These rules take effect _after_ the TCP
services to make public. If you allow the use of \"active\" FTP clients
(FORCE_PASV_FTP at its default of \"0\"), you will need to be careful here, and will
want to make sure you block all TCP services listening on high ports. If you are
forcing \"passive\" FTP, you may ignore this setting.

We have listed the services we have observed. To be more cautious, you
should look at the output of 'lsof -i' (run as root) once the system is up and all
services are running. 

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
QUESTION: "TCP services to block: [2049 2065:2090 6000:6020 7100]"
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 2049 2065:2090 6000:6020 7100
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_udpblock
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_udpblock
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_passiveftp

LABEL: ip_b_udpblock
SHORT_EXP: "Specify UDP services to block.  As with the TCP services, the UDP services
to make public will take precedence. The high UDP services that you do not block will
be reachable by any allowed NTP or DNS server. Sites with more such \"high UDP\"
services, or global DNS availability (as is the default, DNS_SERVERS=\"0.0.0.0/0\"),
will want to be sure they have all such high UDP services listed.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "UDP services to block: [2049 6770]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_icmpallowed
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 2049 6770
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_icmpallowed
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_tcpblock

LABEL: ip_b_icmpallowed
SHORT_EXP: "Specify the ICMP allowed types.  The default suggestion allows you to
probe other hosts with ping and traceroute. Minimally you will need to allow
\"destination-unreachable\"."
LONG_EXP: "Specify the ICMP allowed types.  The default suggestion allows you to
probe other hosts with ping and traceroute. Minimally you will need to allow
\"destination-unreachable\".

\"destination-unreachable\" lets other machines' servers tell your system
when things aren't right; don't disable this unless you really know what you're
getting into. If you don't allow \"echo-reply\" and \"time-exceeded\", you won't be
able to use ping and traceroute to debug issues on the \"public\" networks. "
QUESTION: "ICMP allowed types: [destination-unreachable echo-reply time-exceeded]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_srcaddr
DEFAULT_ANSWER: destination-unreachable echo-reply time-exceeded
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_srcaddr
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_udpblock

LABEL: ip_b_srcaddr
SHORT_EXP: "Do you want to enable source address verification? This configures the
kernel to block traffic likely to have spoofed IP addresses. Set to \"N\" to disable.
The default (\"Y\") is highly recommended."
LONG_EXP: "Do you want to enable source address verification? This configures the
kernel to block traffic likely to have spoofed IP addresses. Set to \"N\" to disable.
The default (\"Y\") is highly recommended.

This is a standard, and highly recommended, precaution. "
QUESTION: "Enable source address verification? [Y]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
DEFAULT_ANSWER: Y
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_ipmasq
NO_CHILD: ip_b_ipmasq
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_icmpallowed

LABEL: ip_b_ipmasq
DEFAULT_ANSWER:
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_kernelmasq
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_kernelmasq
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_srcaddr

LABEL: ip_b_kernelmasq
DEFAULT_ANSWER: ftp raudio vdolive
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_rejectmethod
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_rejectmethod
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_srcaddr 

LABEL: ip_b_rejectmethod 
SHORT_EXP: "You need to set how the kernel rejects blocked traffic. \"REJECT\" is
friendly, lets the remote host know you're blocking their attempt (and can therefore
be used to prove you're on the network). \"DENY\" is unfriendly, simply drops the
connection attempt, leaving the remote host to wait, and probably give up after some
time."
LONG_EXP: "You need to set how the kernel rejects blocked traffic. \"REJECT\" is
friendly, lets the remote host know you're blocking their attempt (and can therefore
be used to prove you're on the network). \"DENY\" is unfriendly, simply drops the
connection attempt, leaving the remote host to wait, and probably give up after some
time.

There's no definite right answer here. You will probably not be
_completely_ invisible, even if you choose \"DENY\", but with \"DENY\" and _no_ public
services, you will not be visible to casual probes. "
QUESTION: "Reject method: [DENY]" 
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_dhcpiface
DEFAULT_ANSWER: DENY
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_dhcpiface
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_srcaddr

LABEL: ip_b_dhcpiface
SHORT_EXP: "List the names of any interfaces this machine will need to make DHCP
_queries_ on to configure _its own_ interfaces. For example, a cable modem user with a
single ethernet interface might need to set this to \"eth0\".

Systems that use regular PPP modem dialups may leave this blank.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Interfaces for DHCP queries: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_ntpsrv
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_ntpsrv
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_rejectmethod

LABEL: ip_b_ntpsrv
SHORT_EXP: "If you want to queries NTP time servers to synchronize your system time,
enter IP addresses or networks for those servers here. If you don't intend to make NTP
queries, leave this as the empty default.

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
LONG_EXP: "If you want to queries NTP time servers to synchronize your system time,
enter IP addresses or networks for those servers here. If you don't intend to make NTP
queries, leave this as the empty default.

The same warnings about blocked UDP services and DNS servers apply here;
the hosts and networks you list here can connect to any high UDP port not explicitly
blocked. 

What you answer is important if you use kernel 2.2/ipchains, but makes no
difference if you use kernel 2.4 and iptables."
QUESTION: "NTP servers to query: [ ]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_b_icmpout
DEFAULT_ANSWER: 
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_b_icmpout
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_dhcpiface

LABEL: ip_b_icmpout
SHORT_EXP: "Do you want to disable any outbound ICMP types?  If you disable the types
listed in the default, your machine will not be visible to normal traceroute probes
from hosts on your \"public\" interfaces."
LONG_EXP: "Do you want to disable any outbound ICMP types?  If you disable the types
listed in the default, your machine will not be visible to normal traceroute probes
from hosts on your \"public\" interfaces.

\"destination-unreachable\" is (ab)used by the traceroute program to check
routing to individual hosts. "
QUESTION: "ICMP types to disallow outbound: [destination-unreachable time-exceeded]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
SKIP_CHILD: ip_enable_firewall
DEFAULT_ANSWER: destination-unreachable time-exceeded
CONFIRM_TEXT: " \nY"
YN_TOGGLE: 0
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
YES_CHILD: ip_enable_firewall
NO_CHILD:
PROPER_PARENT: ip_b_ntpsrv

LABEL: ip_enable_firewall
SHORT_EXP: "The firewall is controlled by /etc/init.d/bastille-firewall.  The
configuration file is /etc/Bastille/bastille-firewall.cfg, which you may modify.
After it has been installed, you can then test the firewall by using
      /etc/init.d/bastille-firewall start
and (to remove all firewall rules)
      /etc/init.d/bastille-firewall stop

 Once you have a configuration that will work on your system, you can make it
 run at every normal boot-up by typing 
     /sbin/chkconfig --add bastille-firewall
     /sbin/chkconfig bastille-firewall reset
       
If you are confident of your selections, Bastille can start the firewall
and configure it to run at boot time for you. 

** It is strongly recommended that you answer N if you are not logged in to 
   the system's console, as your network access my be blocked by the firewall. **"
LONG_EXP:
QUESTION: "Should Bastille run the firewall and enable it at boot time? [N]"
REQUIRE_DISTRO: LINUX DB SE TB
YN_TOGGLE: 1
YES_EXP:
NO_EXP:
DEFAULT_ANSWER: N
YES_CHILD: End_Screen
NO_CHILD: End_Screen
PROPER_PARENT: ip_advnetwork