package smtpsrv

import (
	"bufio"
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"crypto/tls"
	"flag"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"math/rand"
	"net"
	"net/mail"
	"os"
	"os/exec"
	"strconv"
	"strings"
	"syscall"
	"time"

	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/aliases"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/auth"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/dkim"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/domaininfo"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/envelope"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/expvarom"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/haproxy"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/maillog"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/normalize"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/queue"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/set"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/tlsconst"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/chasquid/internal/trace"
	"blitiri.com.ar/go/spf"
)

// Exported variables.
var (
	commandCount = expvarom.NewMap("chasquid/smtpIn/commandCount",
		"command", "count of SMTP commands received, by command")
	responseCodeCount = expvarom.NewMap("chasquid/smtpIn/responseCodeCount",
		"code", "response codes returned to SMTP commands")
	spfResultCount = expvarom.NewMap("chasquid/smtpIn/spfResultCount",
		"result", "SPF result count")
	loopsDetected = expvarom.NewInt("chasquid/smtpIn/loopsDetected",
		"count of loops detected")
	tlsCount = expvarom.NewMap("chasquid/smtpIn/tlsCount",
		"status", "count of TLS usage in incoming connections")
	slcResults = expvarom.NewMap("chasquid/smtpIn/securityLevelChecks",
		"result", "incoming security level check results")
	hookResults = expvarom.NewMap("chasquid/smtpIn/hookResults",
		"result", "count of hook invocations, by result")
	wrongProtoCount = expvarom.NewMap("chasquid/smtpIn/wrongProtoCount",
		"command", "count of commands for other protocols")

	dkimSigned = expvarom.NewInt("chasquid/smtpIn/dkimSigned",
		"count of successful DKIM signs")
	dkimSignErrors = expvarom.NewInt("chasquid/smtpIn/dkimSignErrors",
		"count of DKIM sign errors")

	dkimVerifyFound = expvarom.NewInt("chasquid/smtpIn/dkimVerifyFound",
		"count of messages with at least one DKIM signature")
	dkimVerifyNotFound = expvarom.NewInt("chasquid/smtpIn/dkimVerifyNotFound",
		"count of messages with no DKIM signatures")
	dkimVerifyValid = expvarom.NewInt("chasquid/smtpIn/dkimVerifyValid",
		"count of messages with at least one valid DKIM signature")
	dkimVerifyErrors = expvarom.NewInt("chasquid/smtpIn/dkimVerifyErrors",
		"count of DKIM verification errors")
)

var (
	maxReceivedHeaders = flag.Int("testing__max_received_headers", 50,
		"max Received headers, for loop detection; ONLY FOR TESTING")

	// Some go tests disable SPF, to avoid leaking DNS lookups.
	disableSPFForTesting = false
)

// SocketMode represents the mode for a socket (listening or connection).
// We keep them distinct, as policies can differ between them.
type SocketMode struct {
	// Is this mode submission?
	IsSubmission bool

	// Is this mode TLS-wrapped? That means that we don't use STARTTLS, the
	// connection is directly established over TLS (like HTTPS).
	TLS bool
}

func (mode SocketMode) String() string {
	s := "SMTP"
	if mode.IsSubmission {
		s = "submission"
	}
	if mode.TLS {
		s += "+TLS"
	}
	return s
}

// Valid socket modes.
var (
	ModeSMTP          = SocketMode{IsSubmission: false, TLS: false}
	ModeSubmission    = SocketMode{IsSubmission: true, TLS: false}
	ModeSubmissionTLS = SocketMode{IsSubmission: true, TLS: true}
)

// Conn represents an incoming SMTP connection.
type Conn struct {
	// Main hostname, used for display only.
	hostname string

	// Maximum data size.
	maxDataSize int64

	// Post-DATA hook location.
	postDataHook string

	// Connection information.
	conn         net.Conn
	mode         SocketMode
	tlsConnState *tls.ConnectionState
	remoteAddr   net.Addr

	// Reader and text writer, so we can control limits.
	reader *bufio.Reader
	writer *bufio.Writer

	// Tracer to use.
	tr *trace.Trace

	// TLS configuration.
	tlsConfig *tls.Config

	// Domain given at HELO/EHLO.
	ehloDomain string

	// Envelope.
	mailFrom string
	rcptTo   []string
	data     []byte

	// SPF results.
	spfResult spf.Result
	spfError  error

	// DKIM verification results.
	dkimVerifyResult *dkim.VerifyResult

	// Are we using TLS?
	onTLS bool

	// Have we used EHLO?
	isESMTP bool

	// Authenticator, aliases and local domains, taken from the server at
	// creation time.
	authr        *auth.Authenticator
	localDomains *set.String
	aliasesR     *aliases.Resolver
	dinfo        *domaininfo.DB

	// Map of domain -> DKIM signers. Taken from the server at creation time.
	dkimSigners map[string][]*dkim.Signer

	// Have we successfully completed AUTH?
	completedAuth bool

	// Authenticated user and domain, empty if !completedAuth.
	authUser   string
	authDomain string

	// When we should close this connection, no matter what.
	deadline time.Time

	// Queue where we put incoming mails.
	queue *queue.Queue

	// Time we wait for network operations.
	commandTimeout time.Duration

	// Enable HAProxy on incoming connections.
	haproxyEnabled bool
}

// Close the connection.
func (c *Conn) Close() {
	c.conn.Close()
}

// Handle implements the main protocol loop (reading commands, sending
// replies).
func (c *Conn) Handle() {
	defer c.Close()

	c.tr = trace.New("SMTP.Conn", c.conn.RemoteAddr().String())
	defer c.tr.Finish()
	c.tr.Debugf("Connected, mode: %s", c.mode)

	// Set the first deadline, which covers possibly the TLS handshake and
	// then our initial greeting.
	c.conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(c.commandTimeout))

	if tc, ok := c.conn.(*tls.Conn); ok {
		// For TLS connections, complete the handshake and get the state, so
		// it can be used when we say hello below.
		err := tc.Handshake()
		if err != nil {
			c.tr.Errorf("error completing TLS handshake: %v", err)
			return
		}

		cstate := tc.ConnectionState()
		c.tlsConnState = &cstate
		if name := c.tlsConnState.ServerName; name != "" {
			c.hostname = name
		}
	}

	// Set up a buffered reader and writer from the conn.
	// They will be used to do line-oriented, limited I/O.
	c.reader = bufio.NewReader(c.conn)
	c.writer = bufio.NewWriter(c.conn)

	c.remoteAddr = c.conn.RemoteAddr()
	if c.haproxyEnabled {
		src, dst, err := haproxy.Handshake(c.reader)
		if err != nil {
			c.tr.Errorf("error in haproxy handshake: %v", err)
			return
		}
		c.remoteAddr = src
		c.tr.Debugf("haproxy handshake: %v -> %v", src, dst)
	}

	c.printfLine("220 %s ESMTP chasquid", c.hostname)

	var cmd, params string
	var err error
	var errCount int

loop:
	for {
		if time.Since(c.deadline) > 0 {
			err = fmt.Errorf("connection deadline exceeded")
			c.tr.Error(err)
			break
		}

		c.conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(c.commandTimeout))

		cmd, params, err = c.readCommand()
		if err != nil {
			c.printfLine("554 error reading command: %v", err)
			break
		}

		if cmd == "AUTH" {
			c.tr.Debugf("-> AUTH <redacted>")
		} else {
			c.tr.Debugf("-> %s %s", cmd, params)
		}

		var code int
		var msg string

		switch cmd {
		case "HELO":
			code, msg = c.HELO(params)
		case "EHLO":
			code, msg = c.EHLO(params)
		case "HELP":
			code, msg = c.HELP(params)
		case "NOOP":
			code, msg = c.NOOP(params)
		case "RSET":
			code, msg = c.RSET(params)
		case "VRFY":
			code, msg = c.VRFY(params)
		case "EXPN":
			code, msg = c.EXPN(params)
		case "MAIL":
			code, msg = c.MAIL(params)
		case "RCPT":
			code, msg = c.RCPT(params)
		case "DATA":
			// DATA handles the whole sequence.
			code, msg = c.DATA(params)
		case "STARTTLS":
			code, msg = c.STARTTLS(params)
		case "AUTH":
			code, msg = c.AUTH(params)
		case "QUIT":
			_ = c.writeResponse(221, "2.0.0 Be seeing you...")
			break loop
		case "GET", "POST", "CONNECT":
			// HTTP protocol detection, to prevent cross-protocol attacks
			// (e.g. https://alpaca-attack.com/).
			wrongProtoCount.Add(cmd, 1)
			c.tr.Errorf("http command, closing connection")
			_ = c.writeResponse(502,
				"5.7.0 You hear someone cursing shoplifters")
			break loop
		default:
			// Sanitize it a bit to avoid filling the logs and events with
			// noisy data. Keep the first 6 bytes for debugging.
			cmd = fmt.Sprintf("unknown<%.6q>", cmd)
			code = 500
			msg = "5.5.1 Unknown command"
		}

		commandCount.Add(cmd, 1)
		if code > 0 {
			c.tr.Debugf("<- %d  %s", code, msg)

			if code >= 400 {
				// Be verbose about errors, to help troubleshooting.
				c.tr.Errorf("%s failed: %d  %s", cmd, code, msg)

				// Close the connection after 3 errors.
				// This helps prevent cross-protocol attacks.
				errCount++
				if errCount >= 3 {
					// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321#section-4.3.2
					c.tr.Errorf("too many errors, breaking connection")
					_ = c.writeResponse(421, "4.5.0 Too many errors, bye")
					break
				}
			}

			err = c.writeResponse(code, msg)
			if err != nil {
				break
			}
		} else if code < 0 {
			// Negative code means that we have to break the connection.
			// TODO: This is hacky, it's probably worth it at this point to
			// refactor this into using a custom response type.
			c.tr.Errorf("%s closed the connection: %s", cmd, msg)
			break
		}
	}

	if err != nil {
		if err == io.EOF {
			c.tr.Debugf("client closed the connection")
		} else {
			c.tr.Errorf("exiting with error: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// HELO SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) HELO(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	if len(strings.TrimSpace(params)) == 0 {
		return 501, "Invisible customers are not welcome!"
	}
	c.ehloDomain = strings.Fields(params)[0]

	types := []string{
		"general store", "used armor dealership", "second-hand bookstore",
		"liquor emporium", "antique weapons outlet", "delicatessen",
		"jewelers", "quality apparel and accessories", "hardware",
		"rare books", "lighting store"}
	t := types[rand.Int()%len(types)]
	msg = fmt.Sprintf("Hello my friend, welcome to chasqui's %s!", t)

	return 250, msg
}

// EHLO SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) EHLO(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	if len(strings.TrimSpace(params)) == 0 {
		return 501, "Invisible customers are not welcome!"
	}
	c.ehloDomain = strings.Fields(params)[0]
	c.isESMTP = true

	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
	fmt.Fprintf(buf, c.hostname+" - Your hour of destiny has come.\n")
	fmt.Fprintf(buf, "8BITMIME\n")
	fmt.Fprintf(buf, "PIPELINING\n")
	fmt.Fprintf(buf, "SMTPUTF8\n")
	fmt.Fprintf(buf, "ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES\n")
	fmt.Fprintf(buf, "SIZE %d\n", c.maxDataSize)
	if c.onTLS {
		fmt.Fprintf(buf, "AUTH PLAIN\n")
	} else {
		fmt.Fprintf(buf, "STARTTLS\n")
	}
	fmt.Fprintf(buf, "HELP\n")
	return 250, buf.String()
}

// HELP SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) HELP(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	return 214, "2.0.0 Hoy por ti, mañana por mi"
}

// RSET SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) RSET(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	c.resetEnvelope()

	msgs := []string{
		"Who was that Maud person anyway?",
		"Thinking of Maud you forget everything else.",
		"Your mind releases itself from mundane concerns.",
		"As your mind turns inward on itself, you forget everything else.",
	}
	return 250, "2.0.0 " + msgs[rand.Int()%len(msgs)]
}

// VRFY SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) VRFY(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	// We intentionally don't implement this command.
	return 502, "5.5.1 You have a strange feeling for a moment, then it passes."
}

// EXPN SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) EXPN(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	// We intentionally don't implement this command.
	return 502, "5.5.1 You feel disoriented for a moment."
}

// NOOP SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) NOOP(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	return 250, "2.0.0 You hear a faint typing noise."
}

// MAIL SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) MAIL(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	// params should be: "FROM:<name@host>", and possibly followed by
	// options such as "BODY=8BITMIME" (which we ignore).
	// Check that it begins with "FROM:" first, it's mandatory.
	if !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(params), "from:") {
		return 500, "5.5.2 Unknown command"
	}
	if c.mode.IsSubmission && !c.completedAuth {
		return 550, "5.7.9 Mail to submission port must be authenticated"
	}

	rawAddr := ""
	_, err := fmt.Sscanf(params[5:], "%s ", &rawAddr)
	if err != nil {
		return 500, "5.5.4 Malformed command: " + err.Error()
	}

	// Note some servers check (and fail) if we had a previous MAIL command,
	// but that's not according to the RFC. We reset the envelope instead.
	c.resetEnvelope()

	// Special case a null reverse-path, which is explicitly allowed and used
	// for notification messages.
	// It should be written "<>", we check for that and remove spaces just to
	// be more flexible.
	addr := ""
	if strings.Replace(rawAddr, " ", "", -1) == "<>" {
		addr = "<>"
	} else {
		e, err := mail.ParseAddress(rawAddr)
		if err != nil || e.Address == "" {
			return 501, "5.1.7 Sender address malformed"
		}
		addr = e.Address

		if !strings.Contains(addr, "@") {
			return 501, "5.1.8 Sender address must contain a domain"
		}

		// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321#section-4.5.3.1.3
		if len(addr) > 256 {
			return 501, "5.1.7 Sender address too long"
		}

		// SPF check - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7208#section-2.4
		// We opt not to fail on errors, to avoid accidents from preventing
		// delivery.
		c.spfResult, c.spfError = c.checkSPF(addr)
		if c.spfResult == spf.Fail {
			// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7208#section-8.4
			maillog.Rejected(c.remoteAddr, addr, nil,
				fmt.Sprintf("failed SPF: %v", c.spfError))
			return 550, fmt.Sprintf(
				"5.7.23 SPF check failed: %v", c.spfError)
		}

		if !c.secLevelCheck(addr) {
			maillog.Rejected(c.remoteAddr, addr, nil,
				"security level check failed")
			return 550, "5.7.3 Security level check failed"
		}

		addr, err = normalize.DomainToUnicode(addr)
		if err != nil {
			maillog.Rejected(c.remoteAddr, addr, nil,
				fmt.Sprintf("malformed address: %v", err))
			return 501, "5.1.8 Malformed sender domain (IDNA conversion failed)"
		}
	}

	c.mailFrom = addr
	return 250, "2.1.5 You feel like you are being watched"
}

// checkSPF for the given address, based on the current connection.
func (c *Conn) checkSPF(addr string) (spf.Result, error) {
	// Does not apply to authenticated connections, they're allowed regardless.
	if c.completedAuth {
		return "", nil
	}

	if disableSPFForTesting {
		return "", nil
	}

	if tcp, ok := c.remoteAddr.(*net.TCPAddr); ok {
		spfTr := c.tr.NewChild("SPF", tcp.IP.String())
		defer spfTr.Finish()
		res, err := spf.CheckHostWithSender(
			tcp.IP, envelope.DomainOf(addr), addr,
			spf.WithTraceFunc(func(f string, a ...interface{}) {
				spfTr.Debugf(f, a...)
			}))

		c.tr.Debugf("SPF %v (%v)", res, err)
		spfResultCount.Add(string(res), 1)

		return res, err
	}

	return "", nil
}

// secLevelCheck checks if the security level is acceptable for the given
// address.
func (c *Conn) secLevelCheck(addr string) bool {
	// Only check if SPF passes. This serves two purposes:
	//  - Skip for authenticated connections (we trust them implicitly).
	//  - Don't apply this if we can't be sure the sender is authorized.
	//    Otherwise anyone could raise the level of any domain.
	if c.spfResult != spf.Pass {
		slcResults.Add("skip", 1)
		c.tr.Debugf("SPF did not pass, skipping security level check")
		return true
	}

	domain := envelope.DomainOf(addr)
	level := domaininfo.SecLevel_PLAIN
	if c.onTLS {
		level = domaininfo.SecLevel_TLS_CLIENT
	}

	ok := c.dinfo.IncomingSecLevel(c.tr, domain, level)
	if ok {
		slcResults.Add("pass", 1)
		c.tr.Debugf("security level check for %s passed (%s)", domain, level)
	} else {
		slcResults.Add("fail", 1)
		c.tr.Errorf("security level check for %s failed (%s)", domain, level)
	}

	return ok
}

// RCPT SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) RCPT(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	// params should be: "TO:<name@host>", and possibly followed by options
	// such as "NOTIFY=SUCCESS,DELAY" (which we ignore).
	// Check that it begins with "TO:" first, it's mandatory.
	if !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(params), "to:") {
		return 500, "5.5.2 Unknown command"
	}

	if c.mailFrom == "" {
		return 503, "5.5.1 Sender not yet given"
	}

	rawAddr := ""
	_, err := fmt.Sscanf(params[3:], "%s ", &rawAddr)
	if err != nil {
		return 500, "5.5.4 Malformed command: " + err.Error()
	}

	// RFC says 100 is the minimum limit for this, but it seems excessive.
	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321#section-4.5.3.1.8
	if len(c.rcptTo) > 100 {
		return 452, "4.5.3 Too many recipients"
	}

	e, err := mail.ParseAddress(rawAddr)
	if err != nil || e.Address == "" {
		return 501, "5.1.3 Malformed destination address"
	}

	addr, err := normalize.DomainToUnicode(e.Address)
	if err != nil {
		return 501, "5.1.2 Malformed destination domain (IDNA conversion failed)"
	}

	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321#section-4.5.3.1.3
	if len(addr) > 256 {
		return 501, "5.1.3 Destination address too long"
	}

	localDst := envelope.DomainIn(addr, c.localDomains)
	if !localDst && !c.completedAuth {
		maillog.Rejected(c.remoteAddr, c.mailFrom, []string{addr},
			"relay not allowed")
		return 503, "5.7.1 Relay not allowed"
	}

	if localDst {
		addr, err = normalize.Addr(addr)
		if err != nil {
			maillog.Rejected(c.remoteAddr, c.mailFrom, []string{addr},
				fmt.Sprintf("invalid address: %v", err))
			return 550, "5.1.3 Destination address is invalid"
		}

		ok, err := c.localUserExists(addr)
		if err != nil {
			c.tr.Errorf("error checking if user %q exists: %v", addr, err)
			maillog.Rejected(c.remoteAddr, c.mailFrom, []string{addr},
				fmt.Sprintf("error checking if user exists: %v", err))
			return 451, "4.4.3 Temporary error checking address"
		}
		if !ok {
			maillog.Rejected(c.remoteAddr, c.mailFrom, []string{addr},
				"local user does not exist")
			return 550, "5.1.1 Destination address is unknown (user does not exist)"
		}
	}

	c.rcptTo = append(c.rcptTo, addr)
	return 250, "2.1.5 You have an eerie feeling..."
}

// DATA SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) DATA(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	if c.ehloDomain == "" {
		return 503, "5.5.1 Invisible customers are not welcome!"
	}
	if c.mailFrom == "" {
		return 503, "5.5.1 Sender not yet given"
	}
	if len(c.rcptTo) == 0 {
		return 503, "5.5.1 Need an address to send to"
	}

	// We're going ahead.
	err := c.writeResponse(354, "You suddenly realize it is unnaturally quiet")
	if err != nil {
		return 554, fmt.Sprintf("5.4.0 Error writing DATA response: %v", err)
	}

	c.tr.Debugf("<- 354  You experience a strange sense of peace")
	if c.onTLS {
		tlsCount.Add("tls", 1)
	} else {
		tlsCount.Add("plain", 1)
	}

	// Increase the deadline for the data transfer to the connection-level
	// one, we don't want the command timeout to interfere.
	c.conn.SetDeadline(c.deadline)

	// Read the data. Enforce CRLF correctness, and maximum size.
	c.data, err = readUntilDot(c.reader, c.maxDataSize)
	if err != nil {
		if err == errMessageTooLarge {
			// Message is too big; excess data has already been discarded.
			return 552, "5.3.4 Message too big"
		}
		if err == errInvalidLineEnding {
			// We can't properly recover from this, so we have to drop the
			// connection.
			c.writeResponse(521, "5.5.2 Error reading DATA: invalid line ending")
			return -1, "Invalid line ending, closing connection"
		}
		return 554, fmt.Sprintf("5.4.0 Error reading DATA: %v", err)
	}

	c.tr.Debugf("-> ... %d bytes of data", len(c.data))

	if err := checkData(c.data); err != nil {
		maillog.Rejected(c.remoteAddr, c.mailFrom, c.rcptTo, err.Error())
		return 554, err.Error()
	}

	if c.completedAuth {
		err = c.dkimSign()
		if err != nil {
			// If we failed to sign, then reject to prevent sending unsigned
			// messages. Treat the failure as temporary.
			c.tr.Errorf("DKIM failed: %v", err)
			return 451, "4.3.0 DKIM signing failed"
		}
	} else {
		c.dkimVerify()
	}

	c.addReceivedHeader()

	hookOut, permanent, err := c.runPostDataHook(c.data)
	if err != nil {
		maillog.Rejected(c.remoteAddr, c.mailFrom, c.rcptTo, err.Error())
		if permanent {
			return 554, err.Error()
		}
		return 451, err.Error()
	}
	c.data = append(hookOut, c.data...)

	// There are no partial failures here: we put it in the queue, and then if
	// individual deliveries fail, we report via email.
	// If we fail to queue, return a transient error.
	msgID, err := c.queue.Put(c.tr, c.mailFrom, c.rcptTo, c.data)
	if err != nil {
		return 451, fmt.Sprintf("4.3.0 Failed to queue message: %v", err)
	}

	c.tr.Printf("Queued from %s to %s - %s", c.mailFrom, c.rcptTo, msgID)
	maillog.Queued(c.remoteAddr, c.mailFrom, c.rcptTo, msgID)

	// It is very important that we reset the envelope before returning,
	// so clients can send other emails right away without needing to RSET.
	c.resetEnvelope()

	msgs := []string{
		"You offer the Amulet of Yendor to Anhur...",
		"An invisible choir sings, and you are bathed in radiance...",
		"The voice of Anhur booms out: Congratulations, mortal!",
		"In return to thy service, I grant thee the gift of Immortality!",
		"You ascend to the status of Demigod(dess)...",
	}
	return 250, "2.0.0 " + msgs[rand.Int()%len(msgs)]
}

func (c *Conn) addReceivedHeader() {
	var received string

	// Format is semi-structured, defined by
	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321#section-4.4

	if c.completedAuth {
		// For authenticated users, only show the EHLO domain they gave;
		// explicitly hide their network address.
		received += fmt.Sprintf("from %s\n", c.ehloDomain)
	} else {
		// For non-authenticated users we show the real address as canonical,
		// and then the given EHLO domain for convenience and
		// troubleshooting.
		received += fmt.Sprintf("from [%s] (%s)\n",
			addrLiteral(c.remoteAddr), c.ehloDomain)
	}

	received += fmt.Sprintf("by %s (chasquid) ", c.hostname)

	// https://www.iana.org/assignments/mail-parameters/mail-parameters.xhtml#mail-parameters-7
	with := "SMTP"
	if c.isESMTP {
		with = "ESMTP"
	}
	if c.onTLS {
		with += "S"
	}
	if c.completedAuth {
		with += "A"
	}
	received += fmt.Sprintf("with %s\n", with)

	if c.tlsConnState != nil {
		// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8314#section-4.3
		received += fmt.Sprintf("tls %s\n",
			tlsconst.CipherSuiteName(c.tlsConnState.CipherSuite))
	}

	received += fmt.Sprintf("(over %s, ", c.mode)
	if c.tlsConnState != nil {
		received += fmt.Sprintf("%s, ", tlsconst.VersionName(c.tlsConnState.Version))
	} else {
		received += "plain text!, "
	}

	// Note we must NOT include c.rcptTo, that would leak BCCs.
	received += fmt.Sprintf("envelope from %q)\n", c.mailFrom)

	// This should be the last part in the Received header, by RFC.
	// The ";" is a mandatory separator. The date format is not standard but
	// this one seems to be widely used.
	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5322#section-3.6.7
	received += fmt.Sprintf("; %s\n", time.Now().Format(time.RFC1123Z))
	c.data = envelope.AddHeader(c.data, "Received", received)

	// Add Authentication-Results header too, but only if there's anything to
	// report. We add it above the Received header, so it can easily be
	// associated and traced to it, even though it is not a hard requirement.
	// Note we include results even if they're "none" or "neutral", as that
	// allows MUAs to know that the message was checked.
	arHdr := c.hostname + "\r\n"
	includeAR := false

	if c.spfResult != "" {
		// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7208#section-9.1
		received = fmt.Sprintf("%s (%v)", c.spfResult, c.spfError)
		c.data = envelope.AddHeader(c.data, "Received-SPF", received)

		// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8601#section-2.7.2
		arHdr += fmt.Sprintf(";spf=%s (%v)\r\n", c.spfResult, c.spfError)
		includeAR = true
	}

	if c.dkimVerifyResult != nil {
		// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8601#section-2.7.1
		arHdr += c.dkimVerifyResult.AuthenticationResults() + "\r\n"
		includeAR = true
	}

	if includeAR {
		// Only include the Authentication-Results header if we have something
		// to report.
		c.data = envelope.AddHeader(c.data, "Authentication-Results",
			strings.TrimSpace(arHdr))
	}
}

// addrLiteral converts a net.Addr (must be TCP) into a string for use as
// address literal, compliant with
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321#section-4.1.3.
func addrLiteral(addr net.Addr) string {
	tcp, ok := addr.(*net.TCPAddr)
	if !ok {
		// Fall back to Go's string representation; non-compliant but
		// better than anything for our purposes.
		return addr.String()
	}

	// IPv6 addresses take the "IPv6:" prefix.
	// IPv4 addresses are used literally.
	s := tcp.IP.String()
	if strings.Contains(s, ":") {
		return "IPv6:" + s
	}

	return s
}

// checkData performs very basic checks on the body of the email, to help
// detect very broad problems like email loops. It does not fully check the
// sanity of the headers or the structure of the payload.
func checkData(data []byte) error {
	msg, err := mail.ReadMessage(bytes.NewBuffer(data))
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("5.6.0 Error parsing message: %v", err)
	}

	// This serves as a basic form of loop prevention. It's not infallible but
	// should catch most instances of accidental looping.
	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321#section-6.3
	if len(msg.Header["Received"]) > *maxReceivedHeaders {
		loopsDetected.Add(1)
		return fmt.Errorf("5.4.6 Loop detected (%d hops)",
			*maxReceivedHeaders)
	}

	return nil
}

// Sanitize HELO/EHLO domain.
// RFC is extremely flexible with EHLO domain values, allowing all printable
// ASCII characters. They can be tricky to use in shell scripts (commonly used
// as post-data hooks), so this function sanitizes the value to make it
// shell-safe.
func sanitizeEHLODomain(s string) string {
	n := ""
	for _, c := range s {
		// Allow a-zA-Z0-9 and []-.:
		// That's enough for all domains, IPv4 and IPv6 literals, and also
		// shell-safe.
		// Non-ASCII are forbidden as EHLO domains per RFC.
		switch {
		case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z',
			c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z',
			c >= '0' && c <= '9',
			c == '-', c == '.',
			c == '[', c == ']', c == ':':
			n += string(c)
		}
	}

	return n
}

// runPostDataHook and return the new headers to add, and on error a boolean
// indicating if it's permanent, and the error itself.
func (c *Conn) runPostDataHook(data []byte) ([]byte, bool, error) {
	// TODO: check if the file is executable.
	if _, err := os.Stat(c.postDataHook); os.IsNotExist(err) {
		hookResults.Add("post-data:skip", 1)
		return nil, false, nil
	}
	tr := trace.New("Hook.Post-DATA", c.remoteAddr.String())
	defer tr.Finish()

	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 1*time.Minute)
	defer cancel()
	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, c.postDataHook)
	cmd.Stdin = bytes.NewReader(data)

	// Prepare the environment, copying some common variables so the hook has
	// something reasonable, and then setting the specific ones for this case.
	for _, v := range strings.Fields("USER PWD SHELL PATH") {
		cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, v+"="+os.Getenv(v))
	}
	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "REMOTE_ADDR="+c.remoteAddr.String())
	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "EHLO_DOMAIN="+sanitizeEHLODomain(c.ehloDomain))
	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "EHLO_DOMAIN_RAW="+c.ehloDomain)
	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "MAIL_FROM="+c.mailFrom)
	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "RCPT_TO="+strings.Join(c.rcptTo, " "))

	if c.completedAuth {
		cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "AUTH_AS="+c.authUser+"@"+c.authDomain)
	} else {
		cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "AUTH_AS=")
	}

	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "ON_TLS="+boolToStr(c.onTLS))
	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "FROM_LOCAL_DOMAIN="+boolToStr(
		envelope.DomainIn(c.mailFrom, c.localDomains)))
	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "SPF_PASS="+boolToStr(c.spfResult == spf.Pass))

	out, err := cmd.Output()
	tr.Debugf("stdout: %q", out)
	if err != nil {
		hookResults.Add("post-data:fail", 1)
		tr.Error(err)

		permanent := false
		if ee, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok {
			tr.Printf("stderr: %q", string(ee.Stderr))
			if status, ok := ee.Sys().(syscall.WaitStatus); ok {
				permanent = status.ExitStatus() == 20
			}
		}

		// The error contains the last line of stdout, so filters can pass
		// some rejection information back to the sender.
		err = fmt.Errorf(lastLine(string(out)))
		return nil, permanent, err
	}

	// Check that output looks like headers, to avoid breaking the email
	// contents. If it does not, just skip it.
	if !isHeader(out) {
		hookResults.Add("post-data:badoutput", 1)
		tr.Errorf("error parsing post-data output: %q", out)
		return nil, false, nil
	}

	tr.Debugf("success")
	hookResults.Add("post-data:success", 1)
	return out, false, nil
}

// isHeader checks if the given buffer is a valid MIME header.
func isHeader(b []byte) bool {
	s := string(b)
	if len(s) == 0 {
		return true
	}

	// If it is just a \n, or contains two \n, then it's not a header.
	if s == "\n" || strings.Contains(s, "\n\n") {
		return false
	}

	// If it does not end in \n, not a header.
	if s[len(s)-1] != '\n' {
		return false
	}

	// Each line must either start with a space or have a ':'.
	seen := false
	for _, line := range strings.SplitAfter(s, "\n") {
		if line == "" {
			continue
		}
		if strings.HasPrefix(line, " ") || strings.HasPrefix(line, "\t") {
			if !seen {
				// Continuation without a header first (invalid).
				return false
			}
			continue
		}
		if !strings.Contains(line, ":") {
			return false
		}
		seen = true
	}
	return true
}

func lastLine(s string) string {
	l := strings.Split(s, "\n")
	if len(l) < 2 {
		return ""
	}
	return l[len(l)-2]
}

func boolToStr(b bool) string {
	if b {
		return "1"
	}
	return "0"
}

func (c *Conn) dkimSign() error {
	// We only sign if the user authenticated. However, the authenticated user
	// and the MAIL FROM address may be different; even the domain may be
	// different.
	// We explicitly let this happen and trust authenticated users.
	// So for DKIM signing purposes, we use the MAIL FROM domain: this
	// prevents leaking the authenticated user's domain, and is more in line
	// with expectations around signatures.
	domain := envelope.DomainOf(c.mailFrom)
	signers := c.dkimSigners[domain]
	if len(signers) == 0 {
		return nil
	}

	tr := c.tr.NewChild("DKIM.Sign", domain)
	defer tr.Finish()

	ctx := context.Background()
	ctx = dkim.WithTraceFunc(ctx, tr.Debugf)

	for _, signer := range signers {
		sig, err := signer.Sign(ctx, normalize.StringToCRLF(string(c.data)))
		if err != nil {
			dkimSignErrors.Add(1)
			return err
		}

		// The signature is returned with \r\n; however, our internal
		// representation uses \n, so normalize it.
		sig = strings.ReplaceAll(sig, "\r\n", "\n")
		c.data = envelope.AddHeader(c.data, "DKIM-Signature", sig)
	}
	dkimSigned.Add(1)
	return nil
}

func (c *Conn) dkimVerify() {
	tr := c.tr.NewChild("DKIM.Verify", c.mailFrom)
	defer tr.Finish()

	var err error
	ctx := context.Background()
	ctx = dkim.WithTraceFunc(ctx, tr.Debugf)

	c.dkimVerifyResult, err = dkim.VerifyMessage(
		ctx, string(normalize.ToCRLF(c.data)))
	if err != nil {
		// The only error we expect is because of a malformed mail, which is
		// checked before this is invoked.
		tr.Errorf("Error verifying DKIM: %v", err)
		dkimVerifyErrors.Add(1)
	}

	if c.dkimVerifyResult != nil {
		if c.dkimVerifyResult.Found > 0 {
			dkimVerifyFound.Add(1)
		} else {
			dkimVerifyNotFound.Add(1)
		}

		if c.dkimVerifyResult.Valid > 0 {
			dkimVerifyValid.Add(1)
		}
	}

	// Note we don't fail emails because they failed to verify, in line
	// with RFC recommendations.
	// DMARC policies may cause it to fail at some point, but that is not
	// implemented yet, and would happen separately.
	// The results will get included in the Authentication-Results header, see
	// addReceivedHeader for more details.
}

// STARTTLS SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) STARTTLS(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	if c.onTLS {
		return 503, "5.5.1 You are already wearing that!"
	}

	err := c.writeResponse(220, "2.0.0 You experience a strange sense of peace")
	if err != nil {
		return 554, fmt.Sprintf("5.4.0 Error writing STARTTLS response: %v", err)
	}

	c.tr.Debugf("<- 220  You experience a strange sense of peace")

	server := tls.Server(c.conn, c.tlsConfig)
	err = server.Handshake()
	if err != nil {
		return 554, fmt.Sprintf("5.5.0 Error in TLS handshake: %v", err)
	}

	c.tr.Debugf("<> ...  jump to TLS was successful")

	// Override the connection. We don't need the older one anymore.
	c.conn = server
	c.reader = bufio.NewReader(c.conn)
	c.writer = bufio.NewWriter(c.conn)

	// Take the connection state, so we can use it later for logging and
	// tracing purposes.
	cstate := server.ConnectionState()
	c.tlsConnState = &cstate

	// Reset the envelope; clients must start over after switching to TLS.
	c.resetEnvelope()

	c.onTLS = true

	// If the client requested a specific server and we complied, that's our
	// identity from now on.
	if name := c.tlsConnState.ServerName; name != "" {
		c.hostname = name
	}

	// 0 indicates not to send back a reply.
	return 0, ""
}

// AUTH SMTP command handler.
func (c *Conn) AUTH(params string) (code int, msg string) {
	if !c.onTLS {
		return 503, "5.7.10 You feel vulnerable"
	}

	if c.completedAuth {
		// After a successful AUTH command completes, a server MUST reject
		// any further AUTH commands with a 503 reply.
		// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4954#section-4
		return 503, "5.5.1 You are already wearing that!"
	}

	// We only support PLAIN for now, so no need to make this too complicated.
	// Params should be either "PLAIN" or "PLAIN <response>".
	// If the response is not there, we reply with 334, and expect the
	// response back from the client in the next message.

	sp := strings.SplitN(params, " ", 2)
	if len(sp) < 1 || sp[0] != "PLAIN" {
		// As we only offer plain, this should not really happen.
		return 534, "5.7.9 Asmodeus demands 534 zorkmids for safe passage"
	}

	// Note we use more "serious" error messages from now own, as these may
	// find their way to the users in some circumstances.

	// Get the response, either from the message or interactively.
	response := ""
	if len(sp) == 2 {
		response = sp[1]
	} else {
		// Reply 334 and expect the user to provide it.
		// In this case, the text IS relevant, as it is taken as the
		// server-side SASL challenge (empty for PLAIN).
		// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4954#section-4
		err := c.writeResponse(334, "")
		if err != nil {
			return 554, fmt.Sprintf("5.4.0 Error writing AUTH 334: %v", err)
		}

		response, err = c.readLine()
		if err != nil {
			return 554, fmt.Sprintf("5.4.0 Error reading AUTH response: %v", err)
		}
	}

	user, domain, passwd, err := auth.DecodeResponse(response)
	if err != nil {
		// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4954#section-4
		return 501, fmt.Sprintf("5.5.2 Error decoding AUTH response: %v", err)
	}

	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4954#section-6
	authOk, err := c.authr.Authenticate(c.tr, user, domain, passwd)
	if err != nil {
		c.tr.Errorf("error authenticating %q@%q: %v", user, domain, err)
		maillog.Auth(c.remoteAddr, user+"@"+domain, false)
		return 454, "4.7.0 Temporary authentication failure"
	}
	if authOk {
		c.authUser = user
		c.authDomain = domain
		c.completedAuth = true
		maillog.Auth(c.remoteAddr, user+"@"+domain, true)
		return 235, "2.7.0 Authentication successful"
	}

	maillog.Auth(c.remoteAddr, user+"@"+domain, false)
	return 535, "5.7.8 Incorrect user or password"
}

func (c *Conn) resetEnvelope() {
	c.mailFrom = ""
	c.rcptTo = nil
	c.data = nil
	c.spfResult = ""
	c.spfError = nil
}

func (c *Conn) localUserExists(addr string) (bool, error) {
	if c.aliasesR.Exists(c.tr, addr) {
		return true, nil
	}

	// Remove the drop chars and suffixes, if any, so the database lookup is
	// on a "clean" address.
	addr = c.aliasesR.RemoveDropsAndSuffix(addr)
	user, domain := envelope.Split(addr)
	return c.authr.Exists(c.tr, user, domain)
}

func (c *Conn) readCommand() (cmd, params string, err error) {
	msg, err := c.readLine()
	if err != nil {
		return "", "", err
	}

	sp := strings.SplitN(msg, " ", 2)
	cmd = strings.ToUpper(sp[0])
	if len(sp) > 1 {
		params = sp[1]
	}

	return cmd, params, err
}

func (c *Conn) readLine() (line string, err error) {
	// The bufio reader's ReadLine will only read up to the buffer size, which
	// prevents DoS due to memory exhaustion on extremely long lines.
	l, more, err := c.reader.ReadLine()
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}

	// As per RFC, the maximum length of a text line is 1000 octets.
	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321#section-4.5.3.1.6
	if len(l) > 1000 || more {
		// Keep reading to maintain the protocol status, but discard the data.
		for more && err == nil {
			_, more, err = c.reader.ReadLine()
		}
		return "", fmt.Errorf("line too long")
	}

	return string(l), nil
}

func (c *Conn) writeResponse(code int, msg string) error {
	defer c.writer.Flush()

	responseCodeCount.Add(strconv.Itoa(code), 1)
	return writeResponse(c.writer, code, msg)
}

func (c *Conn) printfLine(format string, args ...interface{}) {
	fmt.Fprintf(c.writer, format+"\r\n", args...)
	c.writer.Flush()
}

// writeResponse writes a multi-line response to the given writer.
// This is the writing version of textproto.Reader.ReadResponse().
func writeResponse(w io.Writer, code int, msg string) error {
	var i int
	lines := strings.Split(msg, "\n")

	// The first N-1 lines use "<code>-<text>".
	for i = 0; i < len(lines)-2; i++ {
		_, err := w.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d-%s\r\n", code, lines[i])))
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
	}

	// The last line uses "<code> <text>".
	_, err := w.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d %s\r\n", code, lines[i])))
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	return nil
}