1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543
|
/*
* Copyright (C) 2007, 2008 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of Apple Computer, Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
* (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
* ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef THIRD_PARTY_BLINK_RENDERER_PLATFORM_WEBORIGIN_SECURITY_ORIGIN_H_
#define THIRD_PARTY_BLINK_RENDERER_PLATFORM_WEBORIGIN_SECURITY_ORIGIN_H_
#include <stdint.h>
#include <memory>
#include <optional>
#include "base/gtest_prod_util.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/platform/platform_export.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/platform/wtf/allocator/allocator.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/platform/wtf/hash_traits.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/platform/wtf/text/wtf_string.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/platform/wtf/thread_safe_ref_counted.h"
#include "url/origin.h"
namespace WTF {
class StringBuilder;
} // namespace WTF
namespace blink {
class KURL;
// An identifier which defines the source of content (e.g. a document) and
// restricts what other objects it is permitted to access (based on their
// security origin). Most commonly, an origin is a (scheme, host, port, domain)
// tuple, such as the tuple origin (https, chromium.org, null, null). However,
// there are also opaque origins which do not have a corresponding tuple.
//
// See also: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/C/#concept-origin
class PLATFORM_EXPORT SecurityOrigin : public RefCounted<SecurityOrigin> {
USING_FAST_MALLOC(SecurityOrigin);
public:
enum class AccessResultDomainDetail {
kDomainNotRelevant,
kDomainNotSet,
kDomainSetByOnlyOneOrigin,
kDomainMatchNecessary,
kDomainMatchUnnecessary,
kDomainMismatch,
kDomainNotRelevantAgentClusterMismatch,
};
// SecurityOrigin::Create() resolves |url| to its SecurityOrigin. When |url|
// contains a standard (scheme, host, port) tuple, |reference_origin| is
// ignored. If |reference_origin| is provided and an opaque origin is returned
// (for example, if |url| has the "data:" scheme), the opaque origin will be
// derived from |reference_origin|, retaining the precursor information. If
// |url| is "about:blank", a copy of |reference_origin| is returned. If no
// |reference_origin| has been provided, then "data:" and "about:blank" URLs
// will resolve into an opaque, unique origin.
static scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> CreateWithReferenceOrigin(
const KURL& url,
const SecurityOrigin* reference_origin);
// Equivalent to CreateWithReferenceOrigin without supplying value for
// |reference_origin|.
static scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> Create(const KURL& url);
// Creates a new opaque SecurityOrigin that is guaranteed to be cross-origin
// to all currently existing SecurityOrigins.
static scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> CreateUniqueOpaque();
static scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> CreateFromString(const String&);
// Constructs a non-opaque tuple origin, analogously to
// url::Origin::Origin(url::SchemeHostPort).
//
// REQUIRES: The tuple be valid: |protocol| must contain a standard scheme and
// |host| must be canonicalized and (except for "file" URLs) nonempty.
static scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> CreateFromValidTuple(
const String& protocol,
const String& host,
uint16_t port);
static scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> CreateFromUrlOrigin(const url::Origin&);
url::Origin ToUrlOrigin() const;
SecurityOrigin(const SecurityOrigin&) = delete;
SecurityOrigin& operator=(const SecurityOrigin&) = delete;
// Some URL schemes use nested URLs for their security context. For example,
// filesystem URLs look like the following:
//
// filesystem:http://example.com/temporary/path/to/file.png
//
// We're supposed to use "http://example.com" as the origin.
//
// Generally, we add URL schemes to this list when Blink supports them. For
// example, we don't include the "jar" scheme, even though Firefox
// understands that "jar" uses an inner URL for its security origin.
static bool ShouldUseInnerURL(const KURL&);
static KURL ExtractInnerURL(const KURL&);
// Create a deep copy of this SecurityOrigin. This method is useful
// when marshalling a SecurityOrigin to another thread.
scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> IsolatedCopy() const;
// Set the domain property of this security origin to newDomain. This
// function does not check whether newDomain is a suffix of the current
// domain. The caller is responsible for validating newDomain.
void SetDomainFromDOM(const String& new_domain);
bool DomainWasSetInDOM() const { return domain_was_set_in_dom_; }
const String& Protocol() const { return protocol_; }
const String& Host() const { return host_; }
const String& Domain() const { return domain_; }
// Returns the registrable domain if available.
// For non-tuple origin, IP address URL, and public suffixes, this returns a
// null string. https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#host-registrable-domain
String RegistrableDomain() const;
// Returns the effective port, even if it is the default port for the
// scheme (e.g. "http" => 80).
uint16_t Port() const { return port_; }
// Returns true if this SecurityOrigin can script objects in the given
// SecurityOrigin. This check is similar to `IsSameOriginDomainWith()`, but
// additionally takes "universal access" flag into account, as well as the
// origin's agent cluster (see https://tc39.es/ecma262/#sec-agent-clusters).
//
// Note: This kind of access check should be rare; `IsSameOriginWith()` is
// almost certainly the right choice for new security checks.
//
// TODO(1027191): We're currently calling this method in a number of places
// where either `IsSameOriginWith()` or `IsSameOriginDomainWith()` might
// be more appropriate. We should audit its existing usage, and it might
// make sense to move it out of SecurityOrigin entirely to align it more
// tightly with `BindingSecurity` where it's clearly necessary.
bool CanAccess(const SecurityOrigin* other) const {
AccessResultDomainDetail unused_detail;
return CanAccess(other, unused_detail);
}
bool CanAccess(const scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin>& other) const {
return CanAccess(other.get());
}
bool CanAccess(const SecurityOrigin* other, AccessResultDomainDetail&) const;
bool CanAccess(const scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin>& other,
AccessResultDomainDetail& detail) const {
return CanAccess(other.get(), detail);
}
// Returns true if this SecurityOrigin can read content retrieved from
// the given URL.
// Note: This function may return false when |url| has data scheme, which
// is not aligned with CORS. If you want a CORS-aligned check, just use
// CORS mode (e.g., network::mojom::RequestMode::kSameOrigin), or
// use CanReadContent.
// See
// https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_BD15unoPJVwKyf5yOUDu5kie492TTaBxzhJ58j1rD4/edit.
bool CanRequest(const KURL& url) const;
// Returns true if content from this URL can be read without CORS from this
// security origin. For example, call this function before drawing an image
// onto an HTML canvas element with the drawImage API.
bool CanReadContent(const KURL&) const;
// Returns true if |document| can display content from the given URL (e.g.,
// in an iframe or as an image). For example, web sites generally cannot
// display content from the user's files system.
bool CanDisplay(const KURL&) const;
// Returns true if the origin loads resources either from the local
// machine or over the network from a
// cryptographically-authenticated origin, as described in
// https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy
bool IsPotentiallyTrustworthy() const;
// Returns a human-readable error message describing that a non-secure
// origin's access to a feature is denied.
static String IsPotentiallyTrustworthyErrorMessage();
// Returns true if this SecurityOrigin can load local resources, such
// as images, iframes, and style sheets, and can link to local URLs.
// For example, call this function before creating an iframe to a
// file:// URL.
//
// Note: A SecurityOrigin might be allowed to load local resources
// without being able to issue an XMLHttpRequest for a local URL.
// To determine whether the SecurityOrigin can issue an
// XMLHttpRequest for a URL, call canReadContent(url).
bool CanLoadLocalResources() const { return can_load_local_resources_; }
// Explicitly grant the ability to load local resources to this
// SecurityOrigin.
//
// Note: This method exists only to support backwards compatibility
// with older versions of WebKit.
void GrantLoadLocalResources();
// Explicitly grant the ability to access every other SecurityOrigin.
//
// WARNING: This is an extremely powerful ability. Use with caution!
void GrantUniversalAccess();
bool IsGrantedUniversalAccess() const { return universal_access_; }
// Whether this origin has ability to access another SecurityOrigin
// if everything but the agent clusters do not match.
void GrantCrossAgentClusterAccess();
bool IsGrantedCrossAgentClusterAccess() const {
return cross_agent_cluster_access_;
}
bool CanAccessDatabase() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessLocalStorage() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessSharedWorkers() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessServiceWorkers() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessCookies() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessPasswordManager() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessFileSystem() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessCacheStorage() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessLocks() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessSessionStorage() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
bool CanAccessStorageBuckets() const { return !IsOpaque(); }
// The local SecurityOrigin is the most privileged SecurityOrigin.
// The local SecurityOrigin can script any document, navigate to local
// resources, and can set arbitrary headers on XMLHttpRequests.
bool IsLocal() const;
// Returns true if the host is one of 127.0.0.1/8, ::1/128, or "localhost".
bool IsLocalhost() const;
// Returns true if the origin is not a tuple origin (i.e. an origin consisting
// of a scheme, host, port, and domain). Opaque origins are created for a
// variety of situations (see https://whatwg.org/C/origin.html#origin for more
// details), such as for documents generated from data: URLs or documents
// with the sandboxed origin browsing context flag set.
bool IsOpaque() const { return !!nonce_if_opaque_; }
// By default 'file:' URLs may access other 'file:' URLs. This method
// denies access. If either SecurityOrigin sets this flag, the access
// check will fail.
void BlockLocalAccessFromLocalOrigin();
// Convert this SecurityOrigin into a string. The string representation of a
// SecurityOrigin is similar to a URL, except it lacks a path component. The
// string representation does not encode the value of the SecurityOrigin's
// domain property.
//
// When using the string value, it's important to remember that it might be
// "null". This typically happens when this SecurityOrigin is opaque (e.g. the
// origin of a sandboxed iframe).
//
// This should be kept in sync with url::Origin::Serialize().
//
// TODO(crbug.com/40554285, crbug.com/40467682): Note that there's a subtle
// difference in how this function handles file: URL origins compared to
// url::Origin::Serialize(). url::Origin always serializes them to "file://",
// whereas this function serializes them to "null" or // "file://" depending
// on the `allow_file_access_from_file_urls` flag in WebPreferences. This
// difference should be cleaned up, along with the workaround for it in
// RenderFrameProxyHost::SerializePostMessageSourceOrigin().
String ToString() const;
AtomicString ToAtomicString() const;
// Similar to ToString(), but does not take into account any factors that
// could make the string return "null".
String ToRawString() const;
// Returns a token that helps distinguish origins, or null string. When not
// null string, the tokens are guaranteed to be different if not the same
// origin, i.e. if two tokens are the same and not null, the two
// SecurityOrigins are the same origin. Thus, tokens can be used for fast
// check of origins.
//
// This is pretty similar to ToString(), but this returns null string instead
// of "null", and includes a host part in case of file: scheme.
//
// Note that the same tokens only guarantee that the SecurityOrigins are
// the same origin and not the same origin-domain. See also:
// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/C/origin.html#same-origin
// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/C/origin.html#same-origin-domain
String ToTokenForFastCheck() const;
// This method implements HTML's "same origin" check, which verifies equality
// of opaque origins, or exact (scheme,host,port) matches. Note that
// `document.domain` does not come into play for this comparison.
//
// This method does not take the "universal access" flag into account. It does
// take the "local access" flag into account, considering `file:` origins that
// set the flag to be same-origin with all other `file:` origins that set the
// flag.
//
// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#same-origin
bool IsSameOriginWith(const SecurityOrigin*) const;
static bool AreSameOrigin(const KURL& a, const KURL& b);
// This method implements HTML's "same origin-domain" check, which takes
// `document.domain` into account when comparing two origins.
//
// This method does not take the "universal access" flag into account. It does
// take the "local access" flag into account, considering `file:` origins that
// set the flag to be same origin-domain with all other `file:` origins that
// set the flag (assuming no `document.domain` mismatch).
//
// Note: Same origin-domain checks should be rare, and `IsSameOriginWith()`
// is almost certainly the right choice for new security checks.
//
// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#same-origin-domain
bool IsSameOriginDomainWith(const SecurityOrigin* other) const {
AccessResultDomainDetail unused_detail;
return IsSameOriginDomainWith(other, unused_detail);
}
bool IsSameOriginDomainWith(const SecurityOrigin*,
AccessResultDomainDetail&) const;
// This method implements HTML's "same site" check, which is true if the two
// origins are schemelessly same site, and either are both opaque or are both
// tuple origins with the same scheme.
//
// Note: Use of "same site" should be avoided when possible, in favor of "same
// origin" checks. A "same origin" check is generally more appropriate for
// security decisions, as registrable domains cannot be relied upon to provide
// a hard security boundary.
//
// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#same-site
bool IsSameSiteWith(const SecurityOrigin* other) const;
static const KURL& UrlWithUniqueOpaqueOrigin();
// Transfer origin privileges from another security origin.
// The following privileges are currently copied over:
//
// - Grant universal access.
// - Grant loading of local resources.
// - Use path-based file:// origins.
struct PrivilegeData {
bool universal_access_;
bool can_load_local_resources_;
bool block_local_access_from_local_origin_;
};
std::unique_ptr<PrivilegeData> CreatePrivilegeData() const;
void TransferPrivilegesFrom(std::unique_ptr<PrivilegeData>);
void SetOpaqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(
bool is_opaque_origin_potentially_trustworthy);
// Creates a new opaque security origin derived from |this| (|this| becomes
// its precursor).
scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> DeriveNewOpaqueOrigin() const;
// If this is an opaque origin that was derived from a tuple origin, return
// the origin from which this was derived. Otherwise returns |this|. This
// method may be used for things like CSP 'self' computation which require
// the origin before sandbox flags are applied. It should NOT be used for
// any security checks (such as bindings).
const SecurityOrigin* GetOriginOrPrecursorOriginIfOpaque() const;
// Only used for document.domain setting. The method should probably be moved
// if we need it for something more general.
static String CanonicalizeSpecialHost(const String& host, bool* success);
static String CanonicalizeHost(const String& host,
const String& scheme,
bool* success);
// Return a security origin that is assigned to the agent cluster. This will
// be a copy of this security origin if the current agent doesn't match the
// provided agent, otherwise it will be a reference to this.
scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> GetOriginForAgentCluster(
const base::UnguessableToken& cluster_id);
const base::UnguessableToken& AgentClusterId() const {
return agent_cluster_id_;
}
// Returns true if this security origin is serialized to "null".
bool SerializesAsNull() const;
// Whether document.open was called in between two different windows, causing
// the SecurityOrigin to be shared by both. This is only used to record
// metrics.
// To be removed after shipping DocumentOpenSandboxInheritanceRemoval feature.
void set_aliased_by_document_open() { aliased_by_document_open_ = true; }
bool aliased_by_document_open() const { return aliased_by_document_open_; }
bool block_local_access_from_local_origin() const {
return block_local_access_from_local_origin_;
}
private:
// Various serialisation and test routines that need direct nonce access.
friend struct mojo::UrlOriginAdapter;
friend struct WTF::HashTraits<scoped_refptr<const SecurityOrigin>>;
friend class SecurityOriginTest;
// For calling GetNonceForSerialization().
friend class BlobURLOpaqueOriginNonceMap;
// Creates a new opaque SecurityOrigin using the supplied |precursor| origin
// and |nonce|.
static scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> CreateOpaque(
const url::Origin::Nonce& nonce,
const SecurityOrigin* precursor);
// Create an opaque SecurityOrigin.
SecurityOrigin(const url::Origin::Nonce& nonce,
const SecurityOrigin* precursor_origin);
// Creates an opaque SecurityOrigin with a new unique nonce. Similar to the
// above, but preferred when there is no pre-existing nonce to copy, as
// copying a nonce requires forcing eager initialisation of that nonce.
enum class NewUniqueOpaque {
kWithLazyInitNonce,
};
SecurityOrigin(NewUniqueOpaque, const SecurityOrigin* precursor_origin);
// Create a tuple SecurityOrigin, with parameters via KURL
static scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> CreateInternal(const KURL& url);
// Constructs a non-opaque tuple origin, analogously to
// url::Origin::Origin(url::SchemeHostPort).
SecurityOrigin(const String& protocol, const String& host, uint16_t port);
enum class ConstructIsolatedCopy { kConstructIsolatedCopyBit };
// Clone a SecurityOrigin which is safe to use on other threads.
SecurityOrigin(const SecurityOrigin* other, ConstructIsolatedCopy);
enum class ConstructSameThreadCopy { kConstructSameThreadCopyBit };
// Clone a SecurityOrigin which is *NOT* safe to use on other threads.
SecurityOrigin(const SecurityOrigin* other, ConstructSameThreadCopy);
// FIXME: Rename this function to something more semantic.
bool PassesFileCheck(const SecurityOrigin*) const;
void BuildRawString(WTF::StringBuilder&) const;
// Get the nonce associated with this origin, if it is opaque. This should be
// used only when trying to send an Origin across an IPC pipe or comparing
// blob URL's opaque origins in the thread-safe way.
const base::UnguessableToken* GetNonceForSerialization() const;
const String protocol_ = g_empty_string;
const String host_ = g_empty_string;
String domain_ = g_empty_string;
const uint16_t port_ = 0;
const std::optional<url::Origin::Nonce> nonce_if_opaque_;
bool universal_access_ = false;
bool domain_was_set_in_dom_ = false;
bool can_load_local_resources_ = false;
bool block_local_access_from_local_origin_ = false;
bool is_opaque_origin_potentially_trustworthy_ = false;
bool cross_agent_cluster_access_ = false;
bool aliased_by_document_open_ = false;
// A security origin can have an empty |agent_cluster_id_|. It occurs in the
// cases where a security origin hasn't been assigned to a document yet.
base::UnguessableToken agent_cluster_id_;
// For opaque origins, tracks the non-opaque origin from which the opaque
// origin is derived.
const scoped_refptr<const SecurityOrigin> precursor_origin_;
};
} // namespace blink
namespace WTF {
// The default HashTraits of SecurityOrigin implements the "same origin"
// equality relation between two origins. As such it ignores the domain that
// might or might not be set on the origin. If you need "same origin-domain"
// equality you'll need to define a custom hash traits type using a different
// hash function.
template <>
struct HashTraits<scoped_refptr<const blink::SecurityOrigin>>
: GenericHashTraits<scoped_refptr<const blink::SecurityOrigin>> {
static unsigned GetHash(const blink::SecurityOrigin* origin) {
const base::UnguessableToken* nonce = origin->GetNonceForSerialization();
size_t nonce_hash = nonce ? base::UnguessableTokenHash()(*nonce) : 0;
unsigned hash_codes[] = {
origin->Protocol().Impl() ? origin->Protocol().Impl()->GetHash() : 0,
origin->Host().Impl() ? origin->Host().Impl()->GetHash() : 0,
origin->Port(),
#if ARCH_CPU_32_BITS
nonce_hash,
#elif ARCH_CPU_64_BITS
static_cast<unsigned>(nonce_hash),
static_cast<unsigned>(nonce_hash >> 32),
#else
#error "Unknown bits"
#endif
};
return StringHasher::HashMemory(base::as_byte_span(hash_codes));
}
static unsigned GetHash(
const scoped_refptr<const blink::SecurityOrigin>& origin) {
return GetHash(origin.get());
}
static bool Equal(const blink::SecurityOrigin* a,
const blink::SecurityOrigin* b) {
return a->IsSameOriginWith(b);
}
static bool Equal(const blink::SecurityOrigin* a,
const scoped_refptr<const blink::SecurityOrigin>& b) {
return Equal(a, b.get());
}
static bool Equal(const scoped_refptr<const blink::SecurityOrigin>& a,
const blink::SecurityOrigin* b) {
return Equal(a.get(), b);
}
static bool Equal(const scoped_refptr<const blink::SecurityOrigin>& a,
const scoped_refptr<const blink::SecurityOrigin>& b) {
return Equal(a.get(), b.get());
}
static constexpr bool kSafeToCompareToEmptyOrDeleted = false;
};
} // namespace WTF
#endif // THIRD_PARTY_BLINK_RENDERER_PLATFORM_WEBORIGIN_SECURITY_ORIGIN_H_
|