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// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
// Use the <code>chrome.enterprise.platformKeys</code> API to generate keys and
// install certificates for these keys. The certificates will be managed by the
// platform and can be used for TLS authentication, network access or by other
// extension through $(ref:platformKeys chrome.platformKeys).
[platforms = ("chromeos")]
namespace enterprise.platformKeys {
[nocompile] dictionary Token {
// Uniquely identifies this <code>Token</code>.
// <p>Static IDs are <code>"user"</code> and <code>"system"</code>,
// referring to the platform's user-specific and the system-wide hardware
// token, respectively. Any other tokens (with other identifiers) might be
// returned by $(ref:enterprise.platformKeys.getTokens).</p>
DOMString id;
// Implements the WebCrypto's
// <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/#subtlecrypto-interface">SubtleCrypto</a>
// interface. The cryptographic operations, including key generation, are
// hardware-backed.
// <p>Only non-extractable keys can be generated. The supported key types
// are RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 and RSA-OAEP (on Chrome versions 135+) with
// <code>modulusLength</code> up to 2048 and ECDSA with
// <code>namedCurve</code> P-256. Each RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 and ECDSA key can
// be used for signing data at most once, unless the extension is
// allowlisted through the
// <a href="https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#KeyPermissions">KeyPermissions policy</a>,
// in which case the key can be used indefinitely. RSA-OAEP keys are
// supported since Chrome version 135 and can be used by extensions
// allowlisted through that same policy to unwrap other keys.</p>
// <p>Keys generated on a specific <code>Token</code> cannot be used with
// any other Tokens, nor can they be used with
// <code>window.crypto.subtle</code>. Equally, <code>Key</code> objects
// created with <code>window.crypto.subtle</code> cannot be used with this
// interface.</p>
[instanceOf = SubtleCrypto] object subtleCrypto;
// Implements the WebCrypto's
// <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/#subtlecrypto-interface">SubtleCrypto</a>
// interface. The cryptographic operations, including key generation, are
// software-backed. Protection of the keys, and thus implementation of the
// non-extractable property, is done in software, so the keys are less
// protected than hardware-backed keys.
// <p>Only non-extractable keys can be generated. The supported key types
// are RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 and RSA-OAEP (on Chrome versions 135+) with
// <code>modulusLength</code> up to 2048. Each RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 key can be
// used for signing data at most once, unless the extension is allowlisted
// through the
// <a href="https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#KeyPermissions">KeyPermissions policy</a>,
// in which case the key can be used indefinitely. RSA-OAEP keys are
// supported since Chrome version 135 and can be used by extensions
// allowlisted through that same policy to unwrap other keys.</p>
// <p>Keys generated on a specific <code>Token</code> cannot be used with
// any other Tokens, nor can they be used with
// <code>window.crypto.subtle</code>. Equally, <code>Key</code> objects
// created with <code>window.crypto.subtle</code> cannot be used with this
// interface.</p>
[instanceOf = SubtleCrypto] object softwareBackedSubtleCrypto;
};
// Whether to use the Enterprise User Key or the Enterprise Machine Key.
enum Scope { USER, MACHINE };
// Type of key to generate.
enum Algorithm { RSA, ECDSA };
// Invoked by <code>getTokens</code> with the list of available Tokens.
// |tokens|: The list of available tokens.
callback GetTokensCallback = void(Token[] tokens);
// Callback to which the certificates are passed.
// |certificates|: The list of certificates, each in DER encoding of a X.509
// certificate.
callback GetCertificatesCallback = void(ArrayBuffer[] certificates);
// Invoked by importCertificate or removeCertificate when the respective
// operation is finished.
callback DoneCallback = void();
// Invoked by <code>challengeMachineKey</code> or
// <code>challengeUserKey</code> with the challenge response.
// |response|: The challenge response.
callback ChallengeCallback = void(ArrayBuffer response);
dictionary RegisterKeyOptions {
// Which algorithm the registered key should use.
Algorithm algorithm;
};
dictionary ChallengeKeyOptions {
// A challenge as emitted by the Verified Access Web API.
ArrayBuffer challenge;
// If present, registers the challenged key with the specified
// <code>scope</code>'s token. The key can then be associated with a
// certificate and used like any other signing key. Subsequent calls to
// this function will then generate a new Enterprise Key in the specified
// <code>scope</code>.
RegisterKeyOptions? registerKey;
// Which Enterprise Key to challenge.
Scope scope;
};
interface Functions {
// Returns the available Tokens. In a regular user's session the list will
// always contain the user's token with <code>id</code> <code>"user"</code>.
// If a system-wide TPM token is available, the returned list will also
// contain the system-wide token with <code>id</code> <code>"system"</code>.
// The system-wide token will be the same for all sessions on this device
// (device in the sense of e.g. a Chromebook).
[nocompile] static void getTokens(GetTokensCallback callback);
// Returns the list of all client certificates available from the given
// token. Can be used to check for the existence and expiration of client
// certificates that are usable for a certain authentication.
// |tokenId|: The id of a Token returned by <code>getTokens</code>.
// |callback|: Called back with the list of the available certificates.
static void getCertificates(DOMString tokenId,
GetCertificatesCallback callback);
// Imports <code>certificate</code> to the given token if the certified key
// is already stored in this token.
// After a successful certification request, this function should be used to
// store the obtained certificate and to make it available to the operating
// system and browser for authentication.
// |tokenId|: The id of a Token returned by <code>getTokens</code>.
// |certificate|: The DER encoding of a X.509 certificate.
// |callback|: Called back when this operation is finished.
static void importCertificate(DOMString tokenId,
ArrayBuffer certificate,
optional DoneCallback callback);
// Removes <code>certificate</code> from the given token if present.
// Should be used to remove obsolete certificates so that they are not
// considered during authentication and do not clutter the certificate
// choice. Should be used to free storage in the certificate store.
// |tokenId|: The id of a Token returned by <code>getTokens</code>.
// |certificate|: The DER encoding of a X.509 certificate.
// |callback|: Called back when this operation is finished.
static void removeCertificate(DOMString tokenId,
ArrayBuffer certificate,
optional DoneCallback callback);
// Similar to <code>challengeMachineKey</code> and
// <code>challengeUserKey</code>, but allows specifying the algorithm of a
// registered key. Challenges a hardware-backed Enterprise Machine Key and
// emits the response as part of a remote attestation protocol. Only useful
// on ChromeOS and in conjunction with the Verified Access Web API which
// both issues challenges and verifies responses.
//
// A successful verification by the Verified Access Web API is a strong
// signal that the current device is a legitimate ChromeOS device, the
// current device is managed by the domain specified during verification,
// the current signed-in user is managed by the domain specified during
// verification, and the current device state complies with enterprise
// device policy. For example, a policy may specify that the device must not
// be in developer mode. Any device identity emitted by the verification is
// tightly bound to the hardware of the current device. If
// <code>"user"</code> Scope is specified, the identity is also tightly
// bound to the current signed-in user.
//
// This function is highly restricted and will fail if the current device is
// not managed, the current user is not managed, or if this operation has
// not explicitly been enabled for the caller by enterprise device policy.
// The challenged key does not reside in the <code>"system"</code> or
// <code>"user"</code> token and is not accessible by any other API.
// |options|: Object containing the fields defined in
// $(ref:ChallengeKeyOptions).
// |callback|: Called back with the challenge response.
static void challengeKey(ChallengeKeyOptions options,
ChallengeCallback callback);
// Challenges a hardware-backed Enterprise Machine Key and emits the
// response as part of a remote attestation protocol. Only useful on
// ChromeOS and in conjunction with the Verified Access Web API which both
// issues challenges and verifies responses. A successful verification by
// the Verified Access Web API is a strong signal of all of the following:
// * The current device is a legitimate ChromeOS device.
// * The current device is managed by the domain specified during
// verification.
// * The current signed-in user is managed by the domain specified during
// verification.
// * The current device state complies with enterprise device policy. For
// example, a policy may specify that the device must not be in developer
// mode.
// * Any device identity emitted by the verification is tightly bound to the
// hardware of the current device.
// This function is highly restricted and will fail if the current device
// is not managed, the current user is not managed, or if this operation
// has not explicitly been enabled for the caller by enterprise device
// policy. The Enterprise Machine Key does not reside in the
// <code>"system"</code> token and is not accessible by any other API.
// |challenge|: A challenge as emitted by the Verified Access Web API.
// |registerKey|: If set, the current Enterprise Machine Key is registered
// with the <code>"system"</code> token and relinquishes the
// Enterprise Machine Key role. The key can then be
// associated with a certificate and used like any other
// signing key. This key is 2048-bit RSA. Subsequent calls
// to this function will then generate a new Enterprise
// Machine Key.
// |callback|: Called back with the challenge response.
[deprecated="Use $(ref:challengeKey) instead."]
static void challengeMachineKey(ArrayBuffer challenge,
optional boolean registerKey,
ChallengeCallback callback);
// Challenges a hardware-backed Enterprise User Key and emits the response
// as part of a remote attestation protocol. Only useful on ChromeOS and in
// conjunction with the Verified Access Web API which both issues challenges
// and verifies responses. A successful verification by the Verified Access
// Web API is a strong signal of all of the following:
// * The current device is a legitimate ChromeOS device.
// * The current device is managed by the domain specified during
// verification.
// * The current signed-in user is managed by the domain specified during
// verification.
// * The current device state complies with enterprise user policy. For
// example, a policy may specify that the device must not be in developer
// mode.
// * The public key emitted by the verification is tightly bound to the
// hardware of the current device and to the current signed-in user.
// This function is highly restricted and will fail if the current device is
// not managed, the current user is not managed, or if this operation has
// not explicitly been enabled for the caller by enterprise user policy.
// The Enterprise User Key does not reside in the <code>"user"</code> token
// and is not accessible by any other API.
// |challenge|: A challenge as emitted by the Verified Access Web API.
// |registerKey|: If set, the current Enterprise User Key is registered with
// the <code>"user"</code> token and relinquishes the
// Enterprise User Key role. The key can then be associated
// with a certificate and used like any other signing key.
// This key is 2048-bit RSA. Subsequent calls to this
// function will then generate a new Enterprise User Key.
// |callback|: Called back with the challenge response.
[deprecated="Use $(ref:challengeKey) instead."]
static void challengeUserKey(ArrayBuffer challenge,
boolean registerKey,
ChallengeCallback callback);
};
};
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