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// Copyright 2011 The Chromium Authors
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#ifndef NET_CERT_CERT_VERIFY_RESULT_H_
#define NET_CERT_CERT_VERIFY_RESULT_H_
#include "base/memory/scoped_refptr.h"
#include "base/values.h"
#include "net/base/hash_value.h"
#include "net/base/net_export.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
#include "net/cert/ct_policy_status.h"
#include "net/cert/signed_certificate_timestamp_and_status.h"
#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/pki/ocsp.h"
namespace ct {
enum class CTPolicyCompliance;
} // namespace ct
namespace net {
class X509Certificate;
// The result of certificate verification.
// LINT.IfChange(CertVerifyResult)
class NET_EXPORT CertVerifyResult {
public:
CertVerifyResult();
CertVerifyResult(const CertVerifyResult& other);
~CertVerifyResult();
void Reset();
// Creates NetLog parameter to describe the CertVerifyResult. |net_error| is
// a net error code to include in the params, if non-zero. It must not be
// ERR_IO_PENDING, as that is not a true error.
base::Value::Dict NetLogParams(int net_error) const;
// The certificate chain that was constructed during verification.
//
// Note: Although |verified_cert| will match the originally supplied
// certificate to be validated, the results of intermediate_buffers()
// may be substantially different, both in order and in content, then the
// originally supplied intermediates.
//
// In the event of validation failures, this may contain the originally
// supplied certificate chain or a partially constructed path, depending on
// the implementation.
//
// In the event of validation success, the trust anchor will be
// |verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().back()| if
// there was a certificate chain to the trust anchor, and will
// be |verified_cert->cert_buffer()| if the certificate was
// the trust anchor.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> verified_cert;
// Bitmask of CERT_STATUS_* from net/cert/cert_status_flags.h. Note that
// these status flags apply to the certificate chain returned in
// |verified_cert|, rather than the originally supplied certificate
// chain.
CertStatus cert_status;
// Hash algorithms used by the certificate chain, excluding the trust
// anchor.
bool has_sha1;
// If the certificate was successfully verified then this contains the
// hashes for all of the SubjectPublicKeyInfos of the chain (target,
// intermediates, and trust anchor)
//
// The ordering of the hashes in this vector is unspecified. Both the SHA1
// and SHA256 hash will be present for each certificate.
HashValueVector public_key_hashes;
// is_issued_by_known_root is true if we recognise the root CA as a standard
// root. If it isn't then it's probably the case that this certificate was
// generated by a MITM proxy whose root has been installed locally. This is
// meaningless if the certificate was not trusted.
bool is_issued_by_known_root;
// Verification of stapled OCSP response, if present.
bssl::OCSPVerifyResult ocsp_result;
// `scts` contains the result of verifying any provided or embedded SCTs for
// this certificate against the set of known logs. Consumers should not simply
// check this for the presence of a successfully verified SCT to determine CT
// compliance. Instead look at `policy_compliance`.
SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList scts;
// The result of evaluating whether the certificate complies with the
// Certificate Transparency policy.
ct::CTPolicyCompliance policy_compliance;
// The result of evaluating CT requirements.
ct::CTRequirementsStatus ct_requirement_status;
};
// LINT.ThenChange(/services/network/public/cpp/net_ipc_param_traits.cc:CertVerifyResult)
} // namespace net
#endif // NET_CERT_CERT_VERIFY_RESULT_H_
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