File: SECURITY.md

package info (click to toggle)
chromium 139.0.7258.154-1~deb13u1
  • links: PTS, VCS
  • area: main
  • in suites: trixie
  • size: 6,120,976 kB
  • sloc: cpp: 35,100,902; ansic: 7,163,530; javascript: 4,103,002; python: 1,436,920; asm: 946,517; xml: 746,709; pascal: 187,653; perl: 88,691; sh: 88,436; objc: 79,953; sql: 51,488; cs: 44,583; fortran: 24,137; makefile: 22,147; tcl: 15,277; php: 13,980; yacc: 8,984; ruby: 7,485; awk: 3,720; lisp: 3,096; lex: 1,327; ada: 727; jsp: 228; sed: 36
file content (36 lines) | stat: -rw-r--r-- 1,903 bytes parent folder | download | duplicates (18)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
# Security Policy

## Supported Versions

Use this section to tell people about which versions of your project are
currently being supported with security updates.

| Version | Supported          |
| ------- | ------------------ |
| 2.4.x   | :white_check_mark: |
| 2.3.x   | :white_check_mark: |
| < 2.0   | :x:                |

## Reporting a Vulnerability

To report a vulnerability, please go to https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/new. We'll attempt to:

* Close the report within 7 days if it's invalid, or if a fix has already been released but some old versions needed to be yanked.
* Provide progress reports at least every 7 days to the original reporter.
* Fix vulnerabilities within 30 days of the initial report.

## Disclosure

A vulnerability will only be publicly disclosed once a fix is released. At that point, the delay before full public disclosure
will be determined as follows:

* If the proof-of-concept is very simple, or an exploit is already in the wild (whether or not it specifically targets `zip`,
  all details will be made public right away.
* If the vulnerability is specific to `zip` and cannot easily be reverse-engineered from the code history, then the
  proof-of-concept and most of the details will be withheld until 14 days after the fix is released and all vulnerable
  versions are yanked with `cargo yank`.
* If a potential victim requests more time to deploy a fix based on a credible risk, then the withholding of details can
  be extended up to 30 days. This may be extended to 90 days if the victim is high-value (e.g. manages over US$1 billion
  worth of financial assets or intellectual property, or has evidence that they're a target of nation-state attackers)
  and there's a valid reason why they cannot deploy the fix as fast as most users (e.g. heavy reliance on an old version's
  interface, or infrastructure damage in a war zone).