// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.

#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/dom_window.h"

#include <algorithm>
#include <memory>

#include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h"
#include "services/network/public/mojom/web_sandbox_flags.mojom-blink.h"
#include "third_party/blink/public/common/action_after_pagehide.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/bindings/core/v8/serialization/post_message_helper.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/bindings/core/v8/source_location.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/bindings/core/v8/v8_binding_for_core.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/bindings/core/v8/v8_window.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/bindings/core/v8/v8_window_post_message_options.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/bindings/core/v8/window_proxy_manager.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/dom/document.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/events/message_event.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/execution_context/execution_context.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/execution_context/security_context.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/coop_access_violation_report_body.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/csp/content_security_policy.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/frame.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/frame_client.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/frame_console.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/local_dom_window.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/location.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/report.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/reporting_context.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/settings.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/user_activation.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/input/input_device_capabilities.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/inspector/console_message.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/loader/mixed_content_checker.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/page/chrome_client.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/page/focus_controller.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/page/page.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/core/probe/core_probes.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/platform/heap/heap.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/platform/instrumentation/use_counter.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/platform/weborigin/kurl.h"
#include "third_party/blink/renderer/platform/weborigin/security_origin.h"

namespace blink {

DOMWindow::DOMWindow(Frame& frame)
    : frame_(frame),
      window_proxy_manager_(frame.GetWindowProxyManager()),
      window_is_closing_(false) {}

DOMWindow::~DOMWindow() {
  // The frame must be disconnected before finalization.
  DCHECK(!frame_);
}

v8::Local<v8::Value> DOMWindow::Wrap(v8::Isolate* isolate,
                                     v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context) {
  // TODO(yukishiino): Get understanding of why it's possible to initialize
  // the context after the frame is detached.  And then, remove the following
  // lines.  See also https://crbug.com/712638 .
  Frame* frame = GetFrame();
  if (!frame)
    return v8::Null(isolate);

  // TODO(yukishiino): Make this function always return the non-empty handle
  // even if the frame is detached because the global proxy must always exist
  // per spec.
  ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::From(isolate->GetCurrentContext());
  return frame->GetWindowProxy(script_state->World())
      ->GlobalProxyIfNotDetached();
}

v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value> DOMWindow::WrapV2(ScriptState* script_state) {
  // TODO(yukishiino): Get understanding of why it's possible to initialize
  // the context after the frame is detached.  And then, remove the following
  // lines.  See also https://crbug.com/712638 .
  Frame* frame = GetFrame();
  if (!frame)
    return v8::Null(script_state->GetIsolate());

  // TODO(yukishiino): Make this function always return the non-empty handle
  // even if the frame is detached because the global proxy must always exist
  // per spec.
  return frame->GetWindowProxy(script_state->World())
      ->GlobalProxyIfNotDetached();
}

v8::Local<v8::Object> DOMWindow::AssociateWithWrapper(
    v8::Isolate*,
    const WrapperTypeInfo*,
    v8::Local<v8::Object> wrapper) {
  NOTREACHED();
  return v8::Local<v8::Object>();
}

const AtomicString& DOMWindow::InterfaceName() const {
  return event_target_names::kWindow;
}

const DOMWindow* DOMWindow::ToDOMWindow() const {
  return this;
}

bool DOMWindow::IsWindowOrWorkerGlobalScope() const {
  return true;
}

Location* DOMWindow::location() const {
  if (!location_)
    location_ = MakeGarbageCollected<Location>(const_cast<DOMWindow*>(this));
  return location_.Get();
}

bool DOMWindow::closed() const {
  return window_is_closing_ || !GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->GetPage();
}

unsigned DOMWindow::length() const {
  return GetFrame() ? GetFrame()->Tree().ScopedChildCount() : 0;
}

DOMWindow* DOMWindow::self() const {
  if (!GetFrame())
    return nullptr;

  return GetFrame()->DomWindow();
}

DOMWindow* DOMWindow::opener() const {
  // FIXME: Use FrameTree to get opener as well, to simplify logic here.
  if (!GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->Client())
    return nullptr;

  Frame* opener = GetFrame()->Opener();
  return opener ? opener->DomWindow() : nullptr;
}

DOMWindow* DOMWindow::parent() const {
  if (!GetFrame())
    return nullptr;

  Frame* parent = GetFrame()->Tree().Parent();
  return parent ? parent->DomWindow() : GetFrame()->DomWindow();
}

DOMWindow* DOMWindow::top() const {
  if (!GetFrame())
    return nullptr;

  return GetFrame()->Tree().Top().DomWindow();
}

void DOMWindow::postMessage(v8::Isolate* isolate,
                            const ScriptValue& message,
                            const String& target_origin,
                            HeapVector<ScriptValue>& transfer,
                            ExceptionState& exception_state) {
  WindowPostMessageOptions* options = WindowPostMessageOptions::Create();
  options->setTargetOrigin(target_origin);
  if (!transfer.IsEmpty())
    options->setTransfer(transfer);
  postMessage(isolate, message, options, exception_state);
}

void DOMWindow::postMessage(v8::Isolate* isolate,
                            const ScriptValue& message,
                            const WindowPostMessageOptions* options,
                            ExceptionState& exception_state) {
  LocalDOMWindow* incumbent_window = IncumbentDOMWindow(isolate);
  UseCounter::Count(incumbent_window->document(),
                    WebFeature::kWindowPostMessage);

  Transferables transferables;
  scoped_refptr<SerializedScriptValue> serialized_message =
      PostMessageHelper::SerializeMessageByMove(isolate, message, options,
                                                transferables, exception_state);
  if (exception_state.HadException())
    return;
  DCHECK(serialized_message);
  DoPostMessage(std::move(serialized_message), transferables.message_ports,
                options, incumbent_window, exception_state);
}

DOMWindow* DOMWindow::AnonymousIndexedGetter(uint32_t index) {
  ReportCoopAccess("indexed");

  if (!GetFrame())
    return nullptr;

  Frame* child = GetFrame()->Tree().ScopedChild(index);
  return child ? child->DomWindow() : nullptr;
}

bool DOMWindow::IsCurrentlyDisplayedInFrame() const {
  if (GetFrame())
    SECURITY_CHECK(GetFrame()->DomWindow() == this);
  return GetFrame() && GetFrame()->GetPage();
}

// FIXME: Once we're throwing exceptions for cross-origin access violations, we
// will always sanitize the target frame details, so we can safely combine
// 'crossDomainAccessErrorMessage' with this method after considering exactly
// which details may be exposed to JavaScript.
//
// http://crbug.com/17325
String DOMWindow::SanitizedCrossDomainAccessErrorMessage(
    const LocalDOMWindow* accessing_window,
    CrossDocumentAccessPolicy cross_document_access) const {
  if (!accessing_window || !GetFrame())
    return String();

  const KURL& accessing_window_url = accessing_window->Url();
  if (accessing_window_url.IsNull())
    return String();

  const SecurityOrigin* active_origin = accessing_window->GetSecurityOrigin();
  String message;
  if (cross_document_access == CrossDocumentAccessPolicy::kDisallowed) {
    message = "Blocked a restricted frame with origin \"" +
              active_origin->ToString() + "\" from accessing another frame.";
  } else {
    message = "Blocked a frame with origin \"" + active_origin->ToString() +
              "\" from accessing a cross-origin frame.";
  }

  // FIXME: Evaluate which details from 'crossDomainAccessErrorMessage' may
  // safely be reported to JavaScript.

  return message;
}

String DOMWindow::CrossDomainAccessErrorMessage(
    const LocalDOMWindow* accessing_window,
    CrossDocumentAccessPolicy cross_document_access) const {
  if (!accessing_window || !GetFrame())
    return String();

  const KURL& accessing_window_url = accessing_window->Url();
  if (accessing_window_url.IsNull())
    return String();

  // FIXME: This message, and other console messages, have extra newlines.
  // Should remove them.
  const SecurityOrigin* active_origin = accessing_window->GetSecurityOrigin();
  const SecurityOrigin* target_origin =
      GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
  auto* local_dom_window = DynamicTo<LocalDOMWindow>(this);
  // It's possible for a remote frame to be same origin with respect to a
  // local frame, but it must still be treated as a disallowed cross-domain
  // access. See https://crbug.com/601629.
  DCHECK(GetFrame()->IsRemoteFrame() ||
         !active_origin->CanAccess(target_origin) ||
         (local_dom_window &&
          accessing_window->GetAgent() != local_dom_window->GetAgent()));

  String message = "Blocked a frame with origin \"" +
                   active_origin->ToString() +
                   "\" from accessing a frame with origin \"" +
                   target_origin->ToString() + "\". ";

  // Sandbox errors: Use the origin of the frames' location, rather than their
  // actual origin (since we know that at least one will be "null").
  KURL active_url = accessing_window->Url();
  // TODO(alexmos): RemoteFrames do not have a document, and their URLs
  // aren't replicated.  For now, construct the URL using the replicated
  // origin for RemoteFrames. If the target frame is remote and sandboxed,
  // there isn't anything else to show other than "null" for its origin.
  KURL target_url = local_dom_window
                        ? local_dom_window->Url()
                        : KURL(NullURL(), target_origin->ToString());
  using SandboxFlags = network::mojom::blink::WebSandboxFlags;
  if (GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(SandboxFlags::kOrigin) ||
      accessing_window->IsSandboxed(SandboxFlags::kOrigin)) {
    message = "Blocked a frame at \"" +
              SecurityOrigin::Create(active_url)->ToString() +
              "\" from accessing a frame at \"" +
              SecurityOrigin::Create(target_url)->ToString() + "\". ";

    if (GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(SandboxFlags::kOrigin) &&
        accessing_window->IsSandboxed(SandboxFlags::kOrigin)) {
      return "Sandbox access violation: " + message +
             " Both frames are sandboxed and lack the \"allow-same-origin\" "
             "flag.";
    }

    if (GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(SandboxFlags::kOrigin)) {
      return "Sandbox access violation: " + message +
             " The frame being accessed is sandboxed and lacks the "
             "\"allow-same-origin\" flag.";
    }

    return "Sandbox access violation: " + message +
           " The frame requesting access is sandboxed and lacks the "
           "\"allow-same-origin\" flag.";
  }

  // Protocol errors: Use the URL's protocol rather than the origin's protocol
  // so that we get a useful message for non-heirarchal URLs like 'data:'.
  if (target_origin->Protocol() != active_origin->Protocol())
    return message + " The frame requesting access has a protocol of \"" +
           active_url.Protocol() +
           "\", the frame being accessed has a protocol of \"" +
           target_url.Protocol() + "\". Protocols must match.\n";

  // 'document.domain' errors.
  if (target_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM() && active_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM())
    return message +
           "The frame requesting access set \"document.domain\" to \"" +
           active_origin->Domain() +
           "\", the frame being accessed set it to \"" +
           target_origin->Domain() +
           "\". Both must set \"document.domain\" to the same value to allow "
           "access.";
  if (active_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM())
    return message +
           "The frame requesting access set \"document.domain\" to \"" +
           active_origin->Domain() +
           "\", but the frame being accessed did not. Both must set "
           "\"document.domain\" to the same value to allow access.";
  if (target_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM())
    return message + "The frame being accessed set \"document.domain\" to \"" +
           target_origin->Domain() +
           "\", but the frame requesting access did not. Both must set "
           "\"document.domain\" to the same value to allow access.";
  if (cross_document_access == CrossDocumentAccessPolicy::kDisallowed)
    return message + "The document-access policy denied access.";

  // Default.
  return message + "Protocols, domains, and ports must match.";
}

void DOMWindow::close(v8::Isolate* isolate) {
  LocalDOMWindow* incumbent_window = IncumbentDOMWindow(isolate);
  Close(incumbent_window);
}

void DOMWindow::Close(LocalDOMWindow* incumbent_window) {
  DCHECK(incumbent_window);

  if (!GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->IsMainFrame())
    return;

  Page* page = GetFrame()->GetPage();
  if (!page)
    return;

  if (page->InsidePortal())
    return;

  Document* active_document = incumbent_window->document();
  if (!(active_document && active_document->GetFrame() &&
        active_document->GetFrame()->CanNavigate(*GetFrame()))) {
    return;
  }

  Settings* settings = GetFrame()->GetSettings();
  bool allow_scripts_to_close_windows =
      settings && settings->GetAllowScriptsToCloseWindows();

  if (!page->OpenedByDOM() && GetFrame()->Client()->BackForwardLength() > 1 &&
      !allow_scripts_to_close_windows) {
    active_document->domWindow()->GetFrameConsole()->AddMessage(
        MakeGarbageCollected<ConsoleMessage>(
            mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kJavaScript,
            mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kWarning,
            "Scripts may close only the windows that were opened by them."));
    return;
  }

  if (!GetFrame()->ShouldClose())
    return;

  ExecutionContext* execution_context = nullptr;
  if (auto* local_dom_window = DynamicTo<LocalDOMWindow>(this)) {
    execution_context = local_dom_window->GetExecutionContext();
  }
  probe::BreakableLocation(execution_context, "DOMWindow.close");

  page->CloseSoon();

  // So as to make window.closed return the expected result
  // after window.close(), separately record the to-be-closed
  // state of this window. Scripts may access window.closed
  // before the deferred close operation has gone ahead.
  window_is_closing_ = true;
}

void DOMWindow::focus(v8::Isolate* isolate) {
  Frame* frame = GetFrame();
  if (!frame)
    return;

  Page* page = frame->GetPage();
  if (!page)
    return;

  // HTML standard doesn't require to check the incumbent realm, but Blink
  // historically checks it for some reasons, maybe the same reason as |close|.
  // (|close| checks whether the incumbent realm is eligible to close the window
  // in order to prevent a (cross origin) window from abusing |close| to close
  // pages randomly or with a malicious intent.)
  // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/C/#dom-window-focus
  // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/C/#focusing-steps
  LocalDOMWindow* incumbent_window = IncumbentDOMWindow(isolate);

  // TODO(mustaq): Use of |allow_focus| and consuming the activation here seems
  // suspicious (https://crbug.com/959815).
  bool allow_focus = incumbent_window->IsWindowInteractionAllowed();
  if (allow_focus) {
    incumbent_window->ConsumeWindowInteraction();
  } else {
    DCHECK(IsMainThread());
    allow_focus = opener() && opener() != this && incumbent_window == opener();
  }

  // If we're a top level window, bring the window to the front.
  if (frame->IsMainFrame() && allow_focus) {
    frame->FocusPage(incumbent_window->GetFrame());
  } else if (auto* local_frame = DynamicTo<LocalFrame>(frame)) {
    // We are depending on user activation twice since IsFocusAllowed() will
    // check for activation. This should be addressed in
    // https://crbug.com/959815.
    if (local_frame->GetDocument() &&
        !local_frame->GetDocument()->IsFocusAllowed()) {
      return;
    }
  }

  page->GetFocusController().FocusDocumentView(GetFrame(),
                                               true /* notifyEmbedder */);
}

InputDeviceCapabilitiesConstants* DOMWindow::GetInputDeviceCapabilities() {
  if (!input_capabilities_) {
    input_capabilities_ =
        MakeGarbageCollected<InputDeviceCapabilitiesConstants>();
  }
  return input_capabilities_;
}

void DOMWindow::PostMessageForTesting(
    scoped_refptr<SerializedScriptValue> message,
    const MessagePortArray& ports,
    const String& target_origin,
    LocalDOMWindow* source,
    ExceptionState& exception_state) {
  WindowPostMessageOptions* options = WindowPostMessageOptions::Create();
  options->setTargetOrigin(target_origin);
  DoPostMessage(std::move(message), ports, options, source, exception_state);
}

void DOMWindow::InstallCoopAccessMonitor(
    network::mojom::blink::CoopAccessReportType report_type,
    LocalFrame* accessing_frame,
    mojo::PendingRemote<network::mojom::blink::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyReporter>
        pending_reporter,
    bool endpoint_defined,
    const WTF::String& reported_window_url) {
  CoopAccessMonitor monitor;

  DCHECK(accessing_frame->IsMainFrame());
  monitor.report_type = report_type;
  monitor.accessing_main_frame = accessing_frame->GetLocalFrameToken();
  monitor.endpoint_defined = endpoint_defined;
  monitor.reported_window_url = std::move(reported_window_url);

  monitor.reporter.Bind(std::move(pending_reporter));
  // CoopAccessMonitor are cleared when their reporter are gone. This avoids
  // accumulation. However it would have been interesting continuing reporting
  // accesses past this point, at least for the ReportingObserver and Devtool.
  // TODO(arthursonzogni): Consider observing |accessing_main_frame| deletion
  // instead.
  monitor.reporter.set_disconnect_handler(
      WTF::Bind(&DOMWindow::DisconnectCoopAccessMonitor,
                WrapWeakPersistent(this), monitor.accessing_main_frame));

  // As long as RenderDocument isn't shipped, it can exist a CoopAccessMonitor
  // for the same |accessing_main_frame|, because it might now host a different
  // Document. Same is true for |this| DOMWindow, it might refer to a window
  // hosting a different document.
  // The new documents will still be part of a different virtual browsing
  // context group, however the new COOPAccessMonitor might now contain updated
  // URLs.
  //
  // There are up to 2 CoopAccessMonitor for the same access, because it can be
  // reported to the accessing and the accessed window at the same time.
  for (CoopAccessMonitor& old : coop_access_monitor_) {
    if (old.accessing_main_frame == monitor.accessing_main_frame &&
        network::IsAccessFromCoopPage(old.report_type) ==
            network::IsAccessFromCoopPage(monitor.report_type)) {
      old = std::move(monitor);
      return;
    }
  }
  coop_access_monitor_.push_back(std::move(monitor));
  // Any attempts to access |this| window from |accessing_main_frame| will now
  // trigger reports (network, ReportingObserver, Devtool).
}

// Check if the accessing context would be able to access this window if COOP
// was enforced. If this isn't a report is sent.
void DOMWindow::ReportCoopAccess(const char* property_name) {
  if (coop_access_monitor_.IsEmpty())  // Fast early return. Very likely true.
    return;

  v8::Isolate* isolate = window_proxy_manager_->GetIsolate();
  LocalDOMWindow* accessing_window = IncumbentDOMWindow(isolate);
  LocalFrame* accessing_frame = accessing_window->GetFrame();

  // A frame might be destroyed, but its context can still be able to execute
  // some code. Those accesses are ignored. See https://crbug.com/1108256.
  if (!accessing_frame)
    return;

  // Iframes are allowed to trigger reports, only when they are same-origin with
  // their top-level document.
  if (accessing_frame->IsCrossOriginToMainFrame())
    return;

  // See https://crbug.com/1183571
  // We assumed accessing_frame->IsCrossOriginToMainFrame() implies
  // accessing_frame->Tree().Top() to be a LocalFrame. This might not be the
  // case after all, some crashes are reported. This block speculatively returns
  // early to avoid crashing.
  // TODO(https://crbug.com/1183571): Check if crashes are still happening and
  // remove this block.
  if (!accessing_frame->Tree().Top().IsLocalFrame()) {
    NOTREACHED();
    return;
  }

  LocalFrame& accessing_main_frame =
      To<LocalFrame>(accessing_frame->Tree().Top());
  const LocalFrameToken accessing_main_frame_token =
      accessing_main_frame.GetLocalFrameToken();

  auto* it = coop_access_monitor_.begin();
  while (it != coop_access_monitor_.end()) {
    if (it->accessing_main_frame != accessing_main_frame_token) {
      ++it;
      continue;
    }

    // TODO(arthursonzogni): Send the blocked-window-url.

    auto location = SourceLocation::Capture(
        ExecutionContext::From(isolate->GetCurrentContext()));
    // TODO(arthursonzogni): Once implemented, use the SourceLocation typemap
    // https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2041657
    auto source_location = network::mojom::blink::SourceLocation::New(
        location->Url() ? location->Url() : "", location->LineNumber(),
        location->ColumnNumber());

    // TODO(https://crbug.com/1124251): Notify Devtool about the access attempt.

    // If the reporting document hasn't specified any network report
    // endpoint(s), then it is likely not interested in receiving
    // ReportingObserver's reports.
    //
    // TODO(arthursonzogni): Reconsider this decision later, developers might be
    // interested.
    if (it->endpoint_defined) {
      it->reporter->QueueAccessReport(it->report_type, property_name,
                                      std::move(source_location),
                                      std::move(it->reported_window_url));
      // Send a coop-access-violation report.
      if (network::IsAccessFromCoopPage(it->report_type)) {
        ReportingContext::From(accessing_main_frame.DomWindow())
            ->QueueReport(MakeGarbageCollected<Report>(
                ReportType::kCoopAccessViolation,
                accessing_main_frame.GetDocument()->Url().GetString(),
                MakeGarbageCollected<CoopAccessViolationReportBody>(
                    std::move(location), it->report_type, String(property_name),
                    it->reported_window_url)));
      }
    }

    // CoopAccessMonitor are used once and destroyed. This avoids sending
    // multiple reports for the same access.
    it = coop_access_monitor_.erase(it);
  }
}

void DOMWindow::DoPostMessage(scoped_refptr<SerializedScriptValue> message,
                              const MessagePortArray& ports,
                              const WindowPostMessageOptions* options,
                              LocalDOMWindow* source,
                              ExceptionState& exception_state) {
  TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "DOMWindow::DoPostMessage");
  auto* source_frame = source->GetFrame();
  bool unload_event_in_progress =
      source_frame && source_frame->GetDocument() &&
      source_frame->GetDocument()->UnloadEventInProgress();
  if (!unload_event_in_progress && source_frame && source_frame->GetPage() &&
      source_frame->GetPage()->DispatchedPagehideAndStillHidden()) {
    // The postMessage call is done after the pagehide event got dispatched
    // and the page is still hidden, which is not normally possible (this
    // might happen if we're doing a same-site cross-RenderFrame navigation
    // where we dispatch pagehide during the new RenderFrame's commit but
    // won't unload/freeze the page after the new RenderFrame finished
    // committing). We should track this case to measure how often this is
    // happening, except for when the unload event is currently in progress,
    // which means the page is not actually stored in the back-forward cache and
    // this behavior is ok.
    UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("BackForwardCache.SameSite.ActionAfterPagehide2",
                              ActionAfterPagehide::kSentPostMessage);
  }
  if (!IsCurrentlyDisplayedInFrame())
    return;

  // Compute the target origin.  We need to do this synchronously in order
  // to generate the SyntaxError exception correctly.
  scoped_refptr<const SecurityOrigin> target =
      PostMessageHelper::GetTargetOrigin(options, *source, exception_state);
  if (exception_state.HadException())
    return;
  if (!target) {
    UseCounter::Count(source, WebFeature::kUnspecifiedTargetOriginPostMessage);
  }

  auto channels = MessagePort::DisentanglePorts(GetExecutionContext(), ports,
                                                exception_state);
  if (exception_state.HadException())
    return;

  const SecurityOrigin* target_security_origin =
      GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
  const SecurityOrigin* source_security_origin = source->GetSecurityOrigin();
  auto* local_dom_window = DynamicTo<LocalDOMWindow>(this);
  KURL target_url = local_dom_window
                        ? local_dom_window->Url()
                        : KURL(NullURL(), target_security_origin->ToString());
  if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedContent(source_security_origin, target_url)) {
    UseCounter::Count(source, WebFeature::kPostMessageFromSecureToInsecure);
  } else if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedContent(target_security_origin,
                                                 source->Url())) {
    UseCounter::Count(source, WebFeature::kPostMessageFromInsecureToSecure);
    if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedContent(
            GetFrame()->Tree().Top().GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin(),
            source->Url())) {
      UseCounter::Count(source,
                        WebFeature::kPostMessageFromInsecureToSecureToplevel);
    }
  }

  if (source->GetFrame() &&
      source->GetFrame()->Tree().Top() != GetFrame()->Tree().Top()) {
    if ((!target_security_origin->RegistrableDomain() &&
         target_security_origin->Host() == source_security_origin->Host()) ||
        (target_security_origin->RegistrableDomain() &&
         target_security_origin->RegistrableDomain() ==
             source_security_origin->RegistrableDomain())) {
      if (target_security_origin->Protocol() ==
          source_security_origin->Protocol()) {
        UseCounter::Count(source, WebFeature::kSchemefulSameSitePostMessage);
      } else {
        UseCounter::Count(source, WebFeature::kSchemelesslySameSitePostMessage);
        if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedContent(source_security_origin,
                                                target_url)) {
          UseCounter::Count(
              source,
              WebFeature::kSchemelesslySameSitePostMessageSecureToInsecure);
        } else if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedContent(target_security_origin,
                                                       source->Url())) {
          UseCounter::Count(
              source,
              WebFeature::kSchemelesslySameSitePostMessageInsecureToSecure);
        }
      }
    } else {
      UseCounter::Count(source, WebFeature::kCrossSitePostMessage);
    }
  }
  if (!source->GetContentSecurityPolicy()->AllowConnectToSource(
          target_url, target_url, RedirectStatus::kNoRedirect,
          ReportingDisposition::kSuppressReporting)) {
    UseCounter::Count(
        source, WebFeature::kPostMessageOutgoingWouldBeBlockedByConnectSrc);
  }
  UserActivation* user_activation = nullptr;
  if (options->includeUserActivation())
    user_activation = UserActivation::CreateSnapshot(source);

  // TODO(mustaq): This is an ad-hoc mechanism to support delegating a single
  // capability.  We need to add a structure to support passing other
  // capabilities.  An explainer for the general delegation API is here:
  // https://github.com/mustaqahmed/capability-delegation
  bool delegate_payment_request = false;
  if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CapabilityDelegationPaymentRequestEnabled(
          GetExecutionContext()) &&
      LocalFrame::HasTransientUserActivation(source_frame) &&
      options->hasCreateToken()) {
    Vector<String> capability_list;
    options->createToken().Split(' ', capability_list);
    delegate_payment_request = capability_list.Contains("paymentrequest");
  }

  MessageEvent* event =
      MessageEvent::Create(std::move(channels), std::move(message),
                           source->GetSecurityOrigin()->ToString(), String(),
                           source, user_activation, delegate_payment_request);

  SchedulePostMessage(event, std::move(target), source);
}

void DOMWindow::Trace(Visitor* visitor) const {
  visitor->Trace(frame_);
  visitor->Trace(window_proxy_manager_);
  visitor->Trace(input_capabilities_);
  visitor->Trace(location_);
  EventTargetWithInlineData::Trace(visitor);
}

void DOMWindow::DisconnectCoopAccessMonitor(
    const LocalFrameToken& accessing_main_frame) {
  auto* it = coop_access_monitor_.begin();
  while (it != coop_access_monitor_.end()) {
    if (it->accessing_main_frame == accessing_main_frame) {
      it = coop_access_monitor_.erase(it);
    } else {
      ++it;
    }
  }
}

}  // namespace blink