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/*
** Copyright 1998 - 2008 Double Precision, Inc. See COPYING for
** distribution information.
*/
#if HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include "courier_auth_config.h"
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "courierauthsasl.h"
#include "courierauth.h"
#include "courierauthdebug.h"
#include "libhmac/hmac.h"
static int nybble(int c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return (c-'0');
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return (c-'a'+10);
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return (c-'A'+10);
return (-1);
}
static int do_auth_verify_cram(struct hmac_hashinfo *hash,
const char *challenge, const char *response,
const char *hashsecret)
{
unsigned char *context;
unsigned i;
if (strlen(hashsecret) != hash->hh_L*4 ||
strlen(response) != hash->hh_L*2)
return (-1);
if ((context=malloc(hash->hh_L*3)) == 0) return (-1);
for (i=0; i<hash->hh_L*2; i++)
{
int a=nybble(hashsecret[i*2]), b=nybble(hashsecret[i*2+1]);
if (a < 0 || b < 0)
{
free(context);
return (-1);
}
context[i]= a*16 + b;
}
hmac_hashtext(hash, challenge, strlen(challenge),
context, context+hash->hh_L,
context+hash->hh_L*2);
for (i=0; i<hash->hh_L; i++)
{
int a=nybble(response[i*2]), b=nybble(response[i*2+1]);
if ( (unsigned char)(a*16+b) !=
context[hash->hh_L*2+i])
{
free(context);
return (-1);
}
}
free(context);
return (0);
}
int auth_verify_cram(struct hmac_hashinfo *hash,
const char *challenge, const char *response,
const char *hashsecret)
{
int rc;
rc = do_auth_verify_cram(hash, challenge, response, hashsecret);
DPRINTF(rc ? "cram validation failed" : "cram validation succeeded");
return rc;
}
static int do_auth_get_cram(const char *authtype, char *authdata,
struct cram_callback_info *craminfo, int logerr)
{
int i;
int challenge_l;
int response_l;
if (strncmp(authtype, "cram-", 5) ||
(craminfo->challenge=strtok(authdata, "\n")) == 0 ||
(craminfo->response=strtok(0, "\n")) == 0)
{
if (logerr)
{
DPRINTF("Unsupported authentication type: %s", authtype);
}
errno=EPERM;
return (-1);
}
for (i=0; hmac_list[i]; i++)
if (strcmp(hmac_list[i]->hh_name, authtype+5) == 0)
break;
if (logerr)
{
DPRINTF("cram: challenge=%s, response=%s", craminfo->challenge,
craminfo->response);
}
if (hmac_list[i] == 0
|| (challenge_l=authsasl_frombase64(craminfo->challenge)) < 0
|| (response_l=authsasl_frombase64(craminfo->response)) < 0)
{
if (logerr)
{
DPRINTF("cram: invalid base64 encoding, or unknown method: %s",
authtype);
}
errno=EACCES;
return (-1);
}
craminfo->h=hmac_list[i];
for (i=response_l; i > 0; )
{
if (craminfo->response[i-1] == ' ')
break;
--i;
}
if (i == 0)
{
if (logerr)
{
DPRINTF("cram: invalid base64 encoding");
}
errno=EACCES;
return (-1);
}
craminfo->response[i-1]=0;
craminfo->user = craminfo->response;
craminfo->response += i;
response_l -= i;
/* Since base64decoded data is always lesser in size (at least),
** we can do the following:
*/
craminfo->challenge[challenge_l]=0;
craminfo->response[response_l]=0;
if (logerr)
{
/* we rely on DPRINTF doing a "safe" print here */
DPRINTF("cram: decoded challenge/response, username '%s'",
craminfo->user);
}
return (0);
}
int auth_cram_callback(struct authinfo *a, void *vp)
{
struct cram_callback_info *cci=(struct cram_callback_info *)vp;
unsigned char *hashbuf;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned i;
static const char hex[]="0123456789abcdef";
int rc;
if (!a->clearpasswd)
return (-1);
/*
hmac->hh_L*2 will be the size of the binary hash.
hmac->hh_L*4+1 will therefore be size of the binary hash,
as a hexadecimal string.
*/
if ((hashbuf=malloc(cci->h->hh_L*6+1)) == 0)
return (1);
hmac_hashkey(cci->h, a->clearpasswd, strlen(a->clearpasswd),
hashbuf, hashbuf+cci->h->hh_L);
p=hashbuf+cci->h->hh_L*2;
for (i=0; i<cci->h->hh_L*2; i++)
{
char c;
c = hex[ (hashbuf[i] >> 4) & 0x0F];
*p++=c;
c = hex[ hashbuf[i] & 0x0F];
*p++=c;
*p=0;
}
rc=auth_verify_cram(cci->h, cci->challenge, cci->response,
(const char *)hashbuf+cci->h->hh_L*2);
free(hashbuf);
if (rc) return (rc);
return (*cci->callback_func)(a, cci->callback_arg);
}
int auth_get_cram(const char *authtype, char *authdata,
struct cram_callback_info *craminfo)
{
return do_auth_get_cram(authtype, authdata, craminfo, 1);
}
int auth_get_cram_silent(const char *authtype, char *authdata,
struct cram_callback_info *craminfo)
{
return do_auth_get_cram(authtype, authdata, craminfo, 0);
}
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