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/*
* Methods for LUKS-related key-management for cryptmount
* (C)Copyright 2005-2024, RW Penney
*/
/*
This file is part of cryptmount
cryptmount is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
cryptmount is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
#include "config.h"
#include <ctype.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "armour.h"
#include "cryptmount.h"
#include "dmutils.h"
#include "utils.h"
#ifdef TESTING
# include "cmtesting.h"
#endif
/*! \addtogroup keymgrs
* @{ */
#ifndef GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION
# define GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION "1.1.42"
#endif
typedef struct {
unsigned keyslot;
} luks_overrides_t;
/*
* ==== LUKS key-management routines ====
*/
#if USE_LUKSCOMPAT
# include <gcrypt.h>
# include <libcryptsetup.h>
static int kmluks_hdrvalid(FILE *fp_key)
/* Check whether a valid LUKS header is present */
{ const uint8_t luks_magic[] = { 'L','U','K','S', 0xba, 0xbe };
const size_t magic_len = sizeof(luks_magic);
char buff[32];
int flg = 0;
if (fp_key == NULL) return 0;
if (cm_fread((void*)buff, magic_len, fp_key) == 0) {
fseek(fp_key, -((long)magic_len), SEEK_CUR);
flg = (strncmp(buff, (const char*)luks_magic,
(size_t)magic_len) == 0);
}
return flg;
}
static void kmluks_splitmode(const char *fullname, char **cipher, char **mode)
/* Split fully-qualified cipher name into algorithm + mode */
{ size_t divpos=0, nlen=0;
const char *pos=fullname;
if (*cipher != NULL) free((void*)*cipher);
if (*mode != NULL) free((void*)*mode);
*cipher = *mode = NULL;
if (fullname != NULL) {
/* Split name according to 'ALGO-MODE' pattern: */
while (*pos != '\0' && *pos != '-') {
++pos; ++nlen; }
divpos = nlen;
while (*pos != '\0') {
++pos; ++nlen; }
if (divpos > 0) {
*cipher = (char*)malloc(divpos + 1);
strncpy(*cipher, fullname, divpos);
(*cipher)[divpos] = '\0';
}
if (divpos < nlen) {
*mode = (char*)malloc((nlen - divpos));
strcpy(*mode, fullname + divpos + 1);
}
}
if (*cipher == NULL) *cipher = cm_strdup("aes");
if (*mode == NULL) *mode = cm_strdup("cbc-plain");
}
static int kmluks_init_algs()
{ static int done_secmem = 0;
int flg = 0;
if (!done_secmem || !gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED_P)) {
if (!gcry_check_version(GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION)) return -1;
/* Disable gcrypt secure-memory initialization as cryptmount makes
* its own arrangements for locking pages in memory.
* gcrypt secmem facilities will also drop setuid privileges,
* which would conflict with device-mapper system calls
* within cryptmount */
(void)gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM);
(void)gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
done_secmem = 1;
}
return flg;
}
static int kmluks_free_algs()
{
/* Nothing needed */
return 0;
}
static int kmluks_bind(bound_tgtdefn_t *bound, FILE *fp_key)
{ int compat = 0;
if (bound->tgt->key.format != NULL) {
compat = (strcmp(bound->tgt->key.format, "luks") == 0);
} else {
/* Check header of existing key-file: */
compat |= kmluks_hdrvalid(fp_key);
}
if (compat) {
tgtdefn_t *tgt = bound->tgt;
if (tgt->key.filename == NULL && tgt->dev != NULL) {
tgt->key.filename = cm_strdup(tgt->dev);
}
if (tgt->key.digestalg == NULL) {
tgt->key.digestalg = cm_strdup("sha1");
}
if (tgt->key.cipheralg == NULL) {
tgt->key.cipheralg = cm_strdup("aes128");
}
}
return compat;
}
static unsigned kmluks_get_properties(const bound_tgtdefn_t *boundtgt)
{ unsigned props;
FILE *fp;
props = KM_PROP_HASPASSWD | KM_PROP_FIXEDLOC;
fp = fopen(boundtgt->tgt->key.filename, "rb");
if (fp != NULL) {
if (kmluks_hdrvalid(fp)) {
props |= KM_PROP_FORMATTED;
}
fclose(fp);
}
return props;
}
/*! @brief Change UID to match EUID when mounting via loopback device
*
* This is a workaround for recent versions of libcryptsetup
* (since January 2017), which check that both uid==0 and euid==0
* before attempting to create a loopback device
* for a filesystem in an ordinary file. Setting up the loopback
* device usually only requires euid==0.
*
* For filesystems in ordinary block devices, this function has no effect.
* Otherwise, this will call setuid() to attempt to make uid==euid==0,
* which appears to be an irreversible change, so will persist
* across any other actions taken by cryptmount within the same process.
*
* @returns The previous value of UID.
*/
static uid_t luks_patch_uid(const bound_tgtdefn_t* boundtgt)
{ const uid_t olduid = getuid();
const char* filename = boundtgt->tgt->key.filename;
struct stat sbuff;
if (stat(filename, &sbuff) == 0
&& S_ISREG(sbuff.st_mode)) {
if (setuid(geteuid()) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Failed to acquire privileges for LUKS container\n"));
}
}
return olduid;
}
/*! @brief Change the password associated with a given LUKS key-slot.
*
* This will either create an entirely new keyslot with the given password,
* or attempt to change the password associated with a particular keyslot
* while taking a temporary backup of the key in that slot. This requires
* that there is at least one spare keyslot available to take that backup.
*
* @param key The volume key for the LUKS device
* @param keyslot Either CRYPT_ANY_SLOT or a nominated slot.
*
* @return The slot associated with the new password.
*/
int kmluks_change_slot_passwd(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
const uint8_t *key, const int keylen,
const char *passwd)
{ const size_t passwdlen = strlen(passwd);
int new_slot = -1, bckp_slot = -1, r;
char logmsg[256];
if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
bckp_slot = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
(const char*)key, keylen,
passwd, passwdlen);
if (bckp_slot < 0) return bckp_slot;
r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot);
if (r < 0) return r;
sprintf(logmsg, "kmluks created keyslot backup %d -> %d",
keyslot, bckp_slot);
crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, logmsg);
}
new_slot = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, keyslot,
(const char*)key, keylen,
passwd, passwdlen);
if (new_slot < 0) return new_slot;
sprintf(logmsg, "kmluks added keyslot %d", new_slot);
crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, logmsg);
if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
&& bckp_slot >= 0 && bckp_slot != new_slot) {
crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, bckp_slot);
sprintf(logmsg, "kmluks removed keyslot backup %d", bckp_slot);
crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, logmsg);
}
return new_slot;
}
void kmluks_log(int level, const char *msg, void *data)
/*! stderr-based logging function for libcryptsetup */
{
fprintf(stderr, "LUKS[%d] - %s\n", level, msg);
}
static int kmluks_get_key(bound_tgtdefn_t *boundtgt,
const km_pw_context_t *pw_ctxt,
uint8_t **key, int *keylen, FILE *fp_key)
/*! Extract key from LUKS header file */
{ tgtdefn_t *tgt = boundtgt->tgt;
char *passwd = NULL, label[256];
struct crypt_device *luks_ctxt = NULL;
int slot = -1, eflag = ERR_NOERROR;
luks_overrides_t *luksor;
int64_t delta;
size_t lcs_keylen = 256;
const size_t namesz = 128;
/* This is vulnerable to permission-issues created by libgcrypt
* -- see http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/issues/detail?id=47,
* which are mitigated by kmluks_init_algs(). */
luks_patch_uid(boundtgt);
snprintf(label, sizeof(label), "cm-luks-tmp-%d-%x",
getpid(), (unsigned)(size_t)tgt);
eflag = km_get_passwd(tgt->ident, pw_ctxt, &passwd, 0, 0);
if (eflag != ERR_NOERROR) goto bail_out;
if (crypt_init(&luks_ctxt, tgt->key.filename) < 0
|| crypt_load(luks_ctxt, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Failed to initialize device for LUKS keyfile\n"));
eflag = ERR_BADDECRYPT;
goto bail_out;
}
//crypt_set_log_callback(luks_ctxt, kmluks_log, NULL); // FIXME - remove soon
slot = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(luks_ctxt, label,
CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passwd, strlen(passwd),
CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
if (slot < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Failed to extract LUKS key for \"%s\" (errno=%d)\n"),
tgt->ident, -slot);
eflag = ERR_BADDECRYPT;
goto bail_out;
}
/* Extract cipher-algorithm parameters from LUKS header: */
delta = (crypt_get_data_offset(luks_ctxt) - tgt->start);
if (delta >= 0) {
tgt->start += delta;
if (tgt->length >= 0) tgt->length -= delta;
}
if (tgt->cipher != NULL) free((void*)tgt->cipher);
tgt->cipher = (char*)malloc(namesz);
snprintf(tgt->cipher, namesz, "%s-%s",
crypt_get_cipher(luks_ctxt), crypt_get_cipher_mode(luks_ctxt));
tgt->ivoffset = crypt_get_iv_offset(luks_ctxt);
if (boundtgt->km_data != NULL) free((void*)boundtgt->km_data);
luksor = (luks_overrides_t*)malloc(sizeof(luks_overrides_t));
luksor->keyslot = slot;
boundtgt->km_data = (void*)luksor;
/* Take copy of LUKS master-key: */
*key = (uint8_t*)sec_realloc((void*)*key, lcs_keylen);
crypt_volume_key_get(luks_ctxt, slot, (char*)*key, &lcs_keylen,
passwd, strlen(passwd));
*keylen = lcs_keylen;
bail_out:
crypt_deactivate(luks_ctxt, label);
crypt_free(luks_ctxt);
await_devmap(label, 0, 5000);
if (passwd != NULL) sec_free((void*)passwd);
return eflag;
}
static int kmluks_put_key(bound_tgtdefn_t *boundtgt,
const km_pw_context_t *pw_ctxt,
const uint8_t *key, const int keylen, FILE *fp_key)
/** Store or create key in LUKS header */
{
const keyinfo_t *keyinfo = &boundtgt->tgt->key;
char *passwd = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *ciphermode = NULL;
struct crypt_device *luks_ctxt = NULL;
unsigned keyslot = 0;
luks_overrides_t *luksor = NULL;
int formatting = 0, r, eflag = ERR_NOERROR;
formatting = (boundtgt->km_data == NULL) && !kmluks_hdrvalid(fp_key);
if (boundtgt->km_data != NULL) {
luksor = (luks_overrides_t*)boundtgt->km_data;
}
if (formatting) {
#ifndef TESTING
char msgbuff[1024];
snprintf(msgbuff, sizeof(msgbuff),
_("Formatting \"%s\", will probably destroy all existing data"),
keyinfo->filename);
if (!cm_confirm(msgbuff)) {
eflag = ERR_ABORT;
goto bail_out;
}
#endif /* !TESTING */
}
eflag = km_get_passwd(boundtgt->tgt->ident, pw_ctxt, &passwd, 1, 1);
if (eflag != ERR_NOERROR) goto bail_out;
if (crypt_init(&luks_ctxt, keyinfo->filename) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Failed to initialize device for LUKS keyfile\n"));
eflag = ERR_BADDECRYPT;
goto bail_out;
}
//crypt_set_log_callback(luks_ctxt, kmluks_log, NULL); // FIXME - remove soon
if (formatting) {
struct crypt_params_luks1 luks_params = { boundtgt->tgt->key.digestalg,
0, NULL };
kmluks_splitmode(boundtgt->tgt->cipher, &ciphername, &ciphermode);
r = crypt_format(luks_ctxt, CRYPT_LUKS1,
ciphername, ciphermode, NULL,
(const char*)key, keylen, &luks_params);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Failed to create LUKS header for \"%s\"\n"),
boundtgt->tgt->ident);
eflag = ERR_BADDEVICE;
goto bail_out;
}
r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(luks_ctxt, 0,
(const char*)key, keylen,
passwd, strlen(passwd));
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Failed to create LUKS key for \"%s\"\n"),
boundtgt->tgt->ident);
}
} else {
int lukserr = 0;
keyslot = (luksor != NULL ? luksor->keyslot : 0);
if (crypt_load(luks_ctxt, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
eflag = ERR_BADDEVICE;
goto bail_out;
}
printf(_("Setting password on LUKS keyslot-%u\n"), keyslot);
lukserr = kmluks_change_slot_passwd(luks_ctxt, keyslot,
key, keylen, passwd);
if (lukserr < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "LUKS error code %d\n", -lukserr);
eflag = ERR_BADENCRYPT;
goto bail_out;
}
}
bail_out:
crypt_free(luks_ctxt);
if (passwd != NULL) sec_free((void*)passwd);
if (ciphername != NULL) free((void*)ciphername);
if (ciphermode != NULL) free((void*)ciphermode);
await_devmap(boundtgt->tgt->ident, 0, 5000);
return eflag;
}
# ifdef TESTING
static int kmluks_test_modesplit()
{ struct tcase {
const char *orig, *cipher, *mode; };
struct tcase tcases[] = {
{ "", "aes", "cbc-plain" },
{ "nothing", "nothing", "cbc-plain" },
{ "alg-mode", "alg", "mode" },
{ "blowfish-cfb-essiv", "blowfish", "cfb-essiv" },
{ "-mode:suffix", "aes", "mode:suffix" },
{ NULL, "aes", "cbc-plain" } };
char *head=NULL, *tail=NULL;
unsigned idx, cnt;
CM_TEST_START("LUKS cipher-mode parsing");
cnt = sizeof(tcases) / sizeof(struct tcase);
for (idx=0; idx<cnt; ++idx) {
kmluks_splitmode(tcases[idx].orig, &head, &tail);
if (strcmp(head, tcases[idx].cipher) != 0) CM_TEST_FAIL();
if (strcmp(tail, tcases[idx].mode) != 0) CM_TEST_FAIL();
}
if (head != NULL) free((void*)head);
if (tail != NULL) free((void*)tail);
CM_TEST_OK();
return 0;
}
static void kmluks_testctxt(cm_testinfo_t *context)
{
test_ctxtptr = context;
}
static int kmluks_runtests()
{ int flg = 0;
flg |= kmluks_test_modesplit();
return flg;
}
# endif /* TESTING */
keymanager_t keymgr_luks = {
"luks", 0, kmluks_init_algs, kmluks_free_algs,
kmluks_bind, kmluks_get_properties,
kmluks_get_key, kmluks_put_key,
NULL
#ifdef TESTING
, kmluks_testctxt, kmluks_runtests, (CM_READONLY | CM_HASLEGACY)
#endif
};
#endif /* USE_LUKSCOMPAT */
keymanager_t *kmluks_gethandle()
{
#if USE_LUKSCOMPAT
return &keymgr_luks;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
/** @} */
/*
* (C)Copyright 2005-2024, RW Penney
*/
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