1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* cryptsetup kernel RNG access functions
*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2025 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/select.h>
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
#include "internal.h"
static int random_initialised = 0;
#define URANDOM_DEVICE "/dev/urandom"
static int urandom_fd = -1;
#define RANDOM_DEVICE "/dev/random"
static int random_fd = -1;
/* Read random chunk - gathered data usually appears with this granularity */
#define RANDOM_DEVICE_CHUNK 8
/* Timeout to print warning if no random data (entropy) */
#define RANDOM_DEVICE_TIMEOUT 5
/* URANDOM_DEVICE access */
static int _get_urandom(char *buf, size_t len)
{
int r;
size_t old_len = len;
char *old_buf = buf;
assert(urandom_fd != -1);
while (len) {
r = read(urandom_fd, buf, len);
if (r == -1 && errno != EINTR)
return -EINVAL;
if (r > 0) {
len -= r;
buf += r;
}
}
assert(len == 0);
assert((size_t)(buf - old_buf) == old_len);
return 0;
}
static void _get_random_progress(struct crypt_device *ctx, int warn,
size_t expected_len, size_t read_len)
{
if (warn)
log_std(ctx,
_("System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
"Please move mouse or type some text in another window "
"to gather some random events.\n"));
log_std(ctx, _("Generating key (%d%% done).\n"),
(int)((expected_len - read_len) * 100 / expected_len));
}
/* RANDOM_DEVICE access */
static int _get_random(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len)
{
int r, warn_once = 1;
size_t n, old_len = len;
char *old_buf = buf;
fd_set fds;
struct timeval tv;
assert(random_fd != -1);
while (len) {
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(random_fd, &fds);
tv.tv_sec = RANDOM_DEVICE_TIMEOUT;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
r = select(random_fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
if(r == -1)
return -EINVAL;
if(!r) {
_get_random_progress(ctx, warn_once, old_len, len);
warn_once = 0;
continue;
}
do {
n = RANDOM_DEVICE_CHUNK;
if (len < RANDOM_DEVICE_CHUNK)
n = len;
r = read(random_fd, buf, n);
if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR) {
r = 0;
continue;
}
/* bogus read? */
if(r > (int)n)
return -EINVAL;
/* random device is opened with O_NONBLOCK, EAGAIN is expected */
if (r == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
if (r > 0) {
len -= r;
buf += r;
}
} while (len && r > 0);
}
assert(len == 0);
assert((size_t)(buf - old_buf) == old_len);
if (!warn_once)
_get_random_progress(ctx, 0, old_len, len);
return 0;
}
/* Initialisation of both RNG file descriptors is mandatory */
int crypt_random_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
if (random_initialised)
return 0;
/* Used for CRYPT_RND_NORMAL */
if(urandom_fd == -1)
urandom_fd = open(URANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if(urandom_fd == -1)
goto err;
/* Used for CRYPT_RND_KEY */
if(random_fd == -1)
random_fd = open(RANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
if(random_fd == -1)
goto err;
if (crypt_fips_mode())
log_verbose(ctx, _("Running in FIPS mode."));
random_initialised = 1;
return 0;
err:
crypt_random_exit();
log_err(ctx, _("Fatal error during RNG initialisation."));
return -ENOSYS;
}
/* coverity[ -taint_source : arg-1 ] */
int crypt_random_get(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len, int quality)
{
int status, rng_type;
switch(quality) {
case CRYPT_RND_NORMAL:
status = _get_urandom(buf, len);
break;
case CRYPT_RND_SALT:
if (crypt_fips_mode())
status = crypt_backend_rng(buf, len, quality, 1);
else
status = _get_urandom(buf, len);
break;
case CRYPT_RND_KEY:
if (crypt_fips_mode()) {
status = crypt_backend_rng(buf, len, quality, 1);
break;
}
rng_type = ctx ? crypt_get_rng_type(ctx) :
crypt_random_default_key_rng();
switch (rng_type) {
case CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM:
status = _get_urandom(buf, len);
break;
case CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM:
status = _get_random(ctx, buf, len);
break;
default:
abort();
}
break;
default:
log_err(ctx, _("Unknown RNG quality requested."));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (status)
log_err(ctx, _("Error reading from RNG."));
return status;
}
void crypt_random_exit(void)
{
random_initialised = 0;
if(random_fd != -1) {
(void)close(random_fd);
random_fd = -1;
}
if(urandom_fd != -1) {
(void)close(urandom_fd);
urandom_fd = -1;
}
}
int crypt_random_default_key_rng(void)
{
/* coverity[pointless_string_compare] */
if (!strcmp(DEFAULT_RNG, RANDOM_DEVICE))
return CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM;
/* coverity[pointless_string_compare] */
if (!strcmp(DEFAULT_RNG, URANDOM_DEVICE))
return CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM;
/* RNG misconfiguration is fatal */
abort();
}
|