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/*
* Dibbler - a portable DHCPv6
*
* author: Michal Kowalczuk <michal@kowalczuk.eu>
* changes: Tomek Mrugalski <thomson@klub.com.pl>
*
* released under GNU GPL v2 licence
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "Portable.h"
#include "OptAuthentication.h"
#include "DHCPConst.h"
#include "Portable.h"
#include "Portable.h"
#include "Logger.h"
#include "Msg.h"
#include "Portable.h"
TOptAuthentication::TOptAuthentication(char* buf, size_t buflen, TMsg* parent)
:TOpt(OPTION_AUTH, parent), authDataPtr_(NULL), AuthInfoLen_(0) {
if (buflen < OPT_AUTH_FIXED_SIZE) {
Valid = false;
return;
}
uint8_t proto = buf[0];
switch (proto) {
case AUTH_PROTO_NONE:
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYED:
case AUTH_PROTO_RECONFIGURE_KEY:
case AUTH_PROTO_DIBBLER:
proto_ = static_cast<AuthProtocols>(proto);
break;
default: {
Log(Warning) << "Auth: unsupported protocol type " << proto
<< " received in auth option." << LogEnd;
Valid = false;
return;
}
}
algo_ = buf[1];
uint8_t rdm = buf[2];
if (rdm <= AUTH_REPLAY_MONOTONIC) {
rdm_ = static_cast<AuthReplay>(rdm);
} else {
Log(Warning) << "Auth: unsupported rdm value " << rdm
<< " received in auth option." << LogEnd;
Valid = false;
return;
}
replay_ = readUint64(buf);
buf += OPT_AUTH_FIXED_SIZE;
buflen -= OPT_AUTH_FIXED_SIZE;
switch (proto_) {
default:
case AUTH_PROTO_NONE:
data_ = std::vector<uint8_t>(buf, buf + buflen);
if (Parent)
Parent->setAuthDigestPtr(buf, buflen);
break;
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYED: {
// We can have 2 cases here:
// 1. this is SOLICIT and client sends no data, buflen should be zero
// 2. this is something else, so the data format should follow section 21.4.1
// i.e. have 4bytes key ID, 128bis of HMAC-MD5 and the rest is 'realm'
if (buflen == 0) {
// SOLICIT option, without any data.
break;
}
if (buflen < DELAYED_AUTH_DIGEST_SIZE + DELAYED_AUTH_KEY_ID_SIZE) {
Log(Warning) << "AUTH: protocol set to delayed-auth, but variable option data"
<< " is smaller (" << buflen << ") than required 20. Invalid auth."
<< LogEnd;
Valid = false;
return;
}
// The gentleman who designed delayed auth protocol was not exactly sober
// during the act of creation.
data_ = std::vector<uint8_t>(buf, buf + buflen); // let's store that crap in data_
// First undetermined number of bytes is DHCP realm
// (fine idea to start with variable field. Why not?)
int realm_size = buflen - DELAYED_AUTH_DIGEST_SIZE - DELAYED_AUTH_KEY_ID_SIZE;
realm_ = std::string(buf, buf + realm_size);
buf += realm_size;
buflen -= realm_size;
// The next 4 bytes (RFC3315 never says that it's exactly 4 bytes. Nah, every
// implementor will just guess the same size)
if (Parent)
Parent->setSPI(readUint32(buf));
buf += sizeof(uint32_t);
buflen -= sizeof(uint32_t);
// The rest should be 16 bytes of of HMAC-MD5 data
if (Parent)
Parent->setAuthDigestPtr(buf, buflen); // that should be the last 16 bytes.
break;
}
case AUTH_PROTO_RECONFIGURE_KEY: {
data_ = std::vector<uint8_t>(buf, buf + buflen);
if (Parent)
Parent->setAuthDigestPtr(buf + 1, buflen);
if (data_.size() != RECONFIGURE_KEY_AUTHINFO_SIZE) {
Log(Warning) << "AUTH: Invalid reconfigure-key data received. Expected size is "
<< RECONFIGURE_KEY_AUTHINFO_SIZE << ", but received " << data_.size()
<< LogEnd;
Valid = false;
return;
}
break;
}
case AUTH_PROTO_DIBBLER: {
if (algo_ >= DIGEST_INVALID) {
Log(Warning) << "Unsupported digest type: " << algo_ << ", max supported "
<< " type is " << DIGEST_INVALID - 1 << LogEnd;
Valid = false;
return;
}
if (!Parent) {
Log(Error) << "Orphaned option AUTH: no parent set." << LogEnd;
Valid = false;
return;
}
Parent->DigestType_ = static_cast<DigestTypes>(algo_);
Parent->setSPI(readUint32(buf));
buf += sizeof(uint32_t);
buflen -= sizeof(uint32_t);
data_ = std::vector<uint8_t>(buf, buf + buflen);
AuthInfoLen_ = getDigestSize(parent->DigestType_);
if (buflen != AuthInfoLen_){
Log(Warning) << "Auth: Invalid digest size for digest type " << algo_
<< ", expected len=" << AuthInfoLen_ << ", received " << buflen << LogEnd;
Valid = false;
return;
}
Parent->setAuthDigestPtr(buf, AuthInfoLen_);
PrintHex(std::string("Auth: Received digest ") + getDigestName(parent->DigestType_) + ": ",
(uint8_t*)buf, AuthInfoLen_);
}
}
Valid = true;
}
uint8_t TOptAuthentication::getAlgorithm() const {
return algo_;
}
AuthReplay TOptAuthentication::getRDM() const {
return rdm_;
}
TOptAuthentication::TOptAuthentication(AuthProtocols proto, uint8_t algo,
AuthReplay rdm, TMsg* parent)
:TOpt(OPTION_AUTH, parent), proto_(proto), algo_(algo), rdm_(rdm), replay_(0),
authDataPtr_(NULL) {
switch (proto) {
default:
AuthInfoLen_ = 0;
return;
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYED:
if (algo != 1) {
Log(Warning) << "AUTH: The only defined protocol for delayed-auth is 1, but "
<< static_cast<int>(algo) << " was specified." << LogEnd;
}
AuthInfoLen_ = 0; // Keep it as zero (we don't know yet if it's a SOLICIT
// (no data at all) or any other (realm + key id + HMAC-MD5)
return;
case AUTH_PROTO_DIBBLER: {
if (parent) {
AuthInfoLen_ = getDigestSize(parent->DigestType_);
} else {
AuthInfoLen_ = 0;
}
return;
}
case AUTH_PROTO_RECONFIGURE_KEY:
AuthInfoLen_ = RECONFIGURE_DIGEST_SIZE; // Sec section 21.5.1, RFC3315
return;
}
}
void TOptAuthentication::setRDM(AuthReplay value) {
rdm_ = value;
}
size_t TOptAuthentication::getSize() {
size_t tmp = TOpt::OPTION6_HDR_LEN + OPT_AUTH_FIXED_SIZE + AuthInfoLen_;
switch (proto_) {
default:
return tmp;
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYED:
if (realm_.empty()) {
return tmp;
} else {
return tmp + realm_.size() + DELAYED_AUTH_KEY_ID_SIZE;
}
case AUTH_PROTO_RECONFIGURE_KEY:
return tmp + 1;
case AUTH_PROTO_DIBBLER:
return tmp + sizeof(uint32_t); // +4 bytes for SPI
}
}
bool TOpt::doDuties() {
return true;
}
char* TOptAuthentication::storeSelf(char* buf) {
// common part (the same for all auth protocols)
buf = writeUint16(buf, OptType);
buf = writeUint16(buf, getSize() - 4);
buf = writeUint8(buf, static_cast<char>(proto_));
buf = writeUint8(buf, algo_);
buf = writeUint8(buf, static_cast<char>(rdm_));
buf = writeUint64(buf, getReplayDetection());
switch (proto_) {
case AUTH_PROTO_RECONFIGURE_KEY: {
if (!data_.size()) {
return buf;
}
switch (data_[0]) {
default:
case 1: // reconfigure-key value
authDataPtr_ = buf;
buf = writeData(buf, (char*)&data_[0], data_.size());
return buf;
case 2: // HMAC-MD5 digest
authDataPtr_ = buf + 1; // The first byte is 1 or 2 (see RFC3315, 21.5.1)
buf[0] = data_[0]; // 2 = HMAC-MD5 digest
memset(buf + 1, 0, RECONFIGURE_DIGEST_SIZE); // 16 bytes
return buf + RECONFIGURE_KEY_AUTHINFO_SIZE;
}
}
default:
case AUTH_PROTO_NONE: {
authDataPtr_ = buf;
buf = writeData(buf, (char*)&data_[0], data_.size());
return buf;
}
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYED: {
if (realm_.empty()) {
// SOLICIT without any data
return buf;
} else {
// Realm set, build the option for real
memcpy(buf, &realm_[0], realm_.size()); // realm (variable)
buf += realm_.size();
if (Parent)
buf = writeUint32(buf, Parent->getSPI()); // key id (4 bytes)
else
buf = writeUint32(buf, 0);
authDataPtr_ = buf; // Digest will be stored here
memset(buf, 0, AuthInfoLen_); // HMAC-MD5 (16 bytes)
buf += AuthInfoLen_;
return buf;
}
}
case AUTH_PROTO_DIBBLER: {
if (!Parent) {
return writeUint32(buf, 0); // no SPI at all
}
AuthInfoLen_ = getDigestSize(Parent->DigestType_);
// write SPI first
buf = writeUint32(buf, Parent->getSPI());
// Reserve space for the digest
Parent->setAuthDigestPtr(buf, AuthInfoLen_);
memset(buf, 0, AuthInfoLen_);
buf += AuthInfoLen_;
}
}
return buf;
}
AuthProtocols TOptAuthentication::getProto() const {
return proto_;
}
void TOptAuthentication::setReplayDetection(uint64_t value) {
replay_ = value;
}
uint64_t TOptAuthentication::getReplayDetection() {
return replay_;
}
void TOptAuthentication::setPayload(const std::vector<uint8_t>& data) {
data_ = data;
}
void TOptAuthentication::getPayload(std::vector<uint8_t>& data) {
data = data_;
}
bool TOptAuthentication::doDuties() {
return true;
}
void TOptAuthentication::setRealm(const std::string& realm) {
realm_ = realm;
if (realm_.empty()) {
AuthInfoLen_ = 0;
} else {
AuthInfoLen_ = DELAYED_AUTH_DIGEST_SIZE;
}
}
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