File: SECURITY

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dietlibc 0.34~cvs20160606-10
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The diet libc was written with small code and embedded devices in mind,
not with security for network servers.

Of course we still try to avoid buffer overflows, but there are some
parts of the code where tradeoffs have been made.  This file is meant to
document them.

  1. The DNS routines do not check whether the answer came from the IP
     of the DNS server.  The rationale is that people who can sniff the
     network to find out the query, source port and DNS sequence number
     can also spoof DNS packets to appear to come from the server we
     asked, so it does not actually increase security to have that
     check.