1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893
|
<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H.W. Ribbers
Request for Comments: 8063 M.W. Groeneweg
Category: Standards Track SIDN
ISSN: 2070-1721 R. Gieben
A.L.J. Verschuren
February 2017
<span class="h1">Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol</span>
Abstract
This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
mapping for a key relay object that relays DNSSEC key material
between EPP clients using the poll queue defined in <a href="./rfc5730">RFC 5730</a>.
This key relay mapping will help facilitate changing the DNS operator
of a domain while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8063">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8063</a>.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
Table of Contents
<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
<a href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a>. <keyRelayData> Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
<a href="#section-3">3</a>. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. EPP <info> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
<a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. EPP <create> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
<a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. EPP <delete> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
<a href="#section-3.2.3">3.2.3</a>. EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
<a href="#section-3.2.4">3.2.4</a>. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
<a href="#section-3.2.5">3.2.5</a>. EPP <update> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
<a href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. XML Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
<a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. EPP Extension Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
<a href="#section-7">7</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
<a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
<a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
There are certain transactions initiated by a DNS operator that
require an authenticated exchange of information between DNS
operators. Often, there is no direct channel between these parties
or it is non-scalable and insecure.
One such transaction is the exchange of DNSSEC key material when
changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC-signed zones. We suggest that
DNS operators use the administrative EPP channel to bootstrap the
delegation by relaying DNSSEC key material for the zone.
In this document, we define an EPP extension to send DNSSEC key
material between EPP clients. This allows DNS operators to
automatically, reliably, and securely bootstrap the transfer of a
domain name while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>
[<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>].
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, the XML
specifications and examples provided in this document MUST be
interpreted in the character case presented in order to develop a
conforming implementation.
In the examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client and
"S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. Indentation and
white space in the examples are provided only to illustrate element
relationships and are not mandatory features of this protocol.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material</span>
Exchanging DNSSEC key material in preparation of a domain name
transfer is one of the phases in the life cycle of a domain name
[<a href="#ref-DNSOP" title=""Changing DNS Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones"">DNSOP</a>].
DNS operators need to exchange DNSSEC key material before the
registration data can be changed to keep the DNSSEC chain of trust
intact. This exchange is normally initiated through the gaining
registrar.
The gaining and losing DNS operators could talk directly to each
other (see Figure 1) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often there is no
trusted path between the two. As both can securely interact with the
registry over the administrative channel through the registrar, the
registry can act as a relay for the key material exchange.
The registry is merely used as a relay channel. Therefore, it is up
to the losing DNS operator to complete the intended transaction. The
registry SHOULD have certain policies in place that require the
losing DNS operator to cooperate with this transaction; however, this
is beyond the scope of this document. This document focuses on the
EPP protocol syntax.
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
+--------------------+ DNSKEY +---------------------+
|gaining DNS operator| ~~~~~~~~> | losing DNS operator |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+
| ^
| |
V |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+
| gaining registrar | | registrar of record |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+
| ^
EPP key relay | | EPP poll
V |
+-----------------------------+
| registry |
+-----------------------------+
Figure 1: Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material
There is no distinction in the EPP protocol between Registrars and
DNS operators, and there is only mention of an EPP client and EPP
server. Therefore, the term "EPP client" will be used for the
interaction with the EPP server for relaying DNSSEC key material.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Object Attributes</span>
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. DNSSEC Key Material</span>
The DNSSEC key material is represented in EPP by a <keyRelayData>
element.
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.1" href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a>. <keyRelayData> Element</span>
The <keyRelayData> contains the following elements:
o One REQUIRED <keyData> element that contains the DNSSEC key
material as described in <a href="./rfc5910#section-4">[RFC5910], Section 4</a>.
o An OPTIONAL <expiry> element that describes the expected lifetime
of the relayed key(s) in the zone. When the <expiry> element is
provided, the losing DNS operator SHOULD remove the inserted key
material from the zone after the expiry time. This may be because
the transaction that needed the insertion should be either
completed or abandoned by that time. If a client receives a key
relay object that has been sent previously, it MUST update the
expiry time of the key material. This enables the clients to
update the lifetime of the key material when a transfer is
delayed.
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
The <expiry> element MUST contain exactly one of the following child
elements:
<absolute>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date
and time until it expires on the specified date and time. If a
date in the past is provided, this MUST be interpreted as a
revocation of a previously sent key relay object.
<relative>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date
and time until the end of the specified duration. If a period of
zero is provided, this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a
previously sent key relay object.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. EPP Command Mapping</span>
A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
in the EPP core protocol specification [<a href="./rfc5730" title=""Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)"">RFC5730</a>]. The command
mapping described here is specifically for use in this key relay
mapping.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. EPP Query Commands</span>
EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
retrieve object transfer status information.
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.1" href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. EPP <check> Command</span>
Check that semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is
no mapping defined for the EPP <check> command and the EPP <check>
response.
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.2" href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. EPP <info> Command</span>
Info command semantics do not apply to the key relay objects, so
there is no mapping defined for the EPP <info> command.
The EPP <info> response for key relay objects is used in the EPP poll
response, as described in [<a href="./rfc5730" title=""Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)"">RFC5730</a>]. The key relay object created
with the <create> command, described in <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section 3.2.1</a> is inserted
into the receiving client's poll queue. The receiving client will
receive the key relay object using the EPP <poll> command, as
described in [<a href="./rfc5730" title=""Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)"">RFC5730</a>].
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
When a <poll> command has been processed successfully for a key relay
poll message, the EPP <resData> element MUST contain a child
<keyrelay:infData> element that is identified by the keyrelay
namespace. The <keyrelay:infData> element contains the following
child elements:
o A REQUIRED <name> element containing the domain name for which the
DNSSEC key material is relayed.
o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
information associated with the domain object (<a href="./rfc5731#section-3.2.1">[RFC5731],
Section 3.2.1</a>).
o One or more REQUIRED <keyRelayData> elements containing data to be
relayed, as defined in <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>. A server MAY apply a server
policy that specifies the number of <keyRelayData> elements that
can be incorporated. When a server policy is violated, a server
MUST respond with an EPP result code 2308 "Data management policy
violation".
o An OPTIONAL <crDate> element that contains the date and time of
the submitted <create> command.
o An OPTIONAL <reID> element that contains the identifier of the
client that requested the key relay.
o An OPTIONAL <acID> element that contains the identifier of the
client that SHOULD act upon the key relay.
Example <poll> response:
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
S: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
S: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1301">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully; ack to dequeue</msg>
S: </result>
S: <msgQ count="5" id="12345">
S: <qDate>1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z</qDate>
S: <msg>Keyrelay action completed successfully.</msg>
S: </msgQ>
S: <resData>
S: <keyrelay:infData>
S: <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name>
S: <keyrelay:authInfo>
S: <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw>
S: </keyrelay:authInfo>
S: <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
S: <keyrelay:keyData>
S: <s:flags>256</s:flags>
S: <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
S: <s:alg>8</s:alg>
S: <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey>
S: </keyrelay:keyData>
S: <keyrelay:expiry>
S: <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative>
S: </keyrelay:expiry>
S: </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
S: <keyrelay:crDate>
S: 1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z
S: </keyrelay:crDate>
S: <keyrelay:reID>
S: ClientX
S: </keyrelay:reID>
S: <keyrelay:acID>
S: ClientY
S: </keyrelay:acID>
S: </keyrelay:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.3" href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. EPP <transfer> Command</span>
Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. EPP Transform Commands</span>
EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create
an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an
object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
<transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
change information associated with an object.
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. EPP <create> Command</span>
The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
client to create a key relay object that includes the domain name and
DNSSEC key material to be relayed. When the <create> command is
validated, the server MUST insert an EPP <poll> message, using the
key relay info response (see <a href="#section-3.1.2">Section 3.1.2</a>), in the receiving
client's poll queue that belongs to the registrar on record of the
provided domain name.
In addition to the standard EPP command elements, the <create>
command MUST contain a <keyrelay:create> element that is identified
by the keyrelay namespace. The <keyrelay:create> element contains
the following child elements:
o A REQUIRED <keyrelay:name> element containing the domain name for
which the DNSSEC key material is relayed.
o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
information associated with the domain object (<a href="./rfc5731#section-3.2.1">[RFC5731],
Section 3.2.1</a>).
o One or more REQUIRED <keyrelay:keyRelayData> elements containing
data to be relayed, as defined in <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>.
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
Example <create> commands:
Note that in the provided example, the second <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
element has a period of zero, and thus represents the revocation of a
previously sent key relay object (see <a href="#section-2.1.1">Section 2.1.1</a>).
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
C: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
C: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <keyrelay:create>
C: <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name>
C: <keyrelay:authInfo>
C: <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw>
C: </keyrelay:authInfo>
C: <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
C: <keyrelay:keyData>
C: <s:flags>256</s:flags>
C: <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
C: <s:alg>8</s:alg>
C: <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey>
C: </keyrelay:keyData>
C: <keyrelay:expiry>
C: <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative>
C: </keyrelay:expiry>
C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
C: <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
C: <keyrelay:keyData>
C: <s:flags>256</s:flags>
C: <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
C: <s:alg>8</s:alg>
C: <s:pubKey>bWFyY2lzdGhlYmVzdA==</s:pubKey>
C: </keyrelay:keyData>
C: <keyrelay:expiry>
C: <keyrelay:relative>P0D</keyrelay:relative>
C: </keyrelay:expiry>
C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
C: </keyrelay:create>
C: </create>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
When a server has successfully processed the <create> command, it
MUST respond with a standard EPP response. See <a href="./rfc5730#section-2.6">[RFC5730],
Section 2.6</a>.
Example <create> response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
When a server cannot process the <create> command due to the server
policy, it MUST return an EPP 2308 error message. This might be the
case when the server knows that the receiving client does not support
key relay transactions. See <a href="./rfc5730#section-2.6">[RFC5730], Section 2.6</a>.
Example <create> response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
S: <response>
S: <result code="2308">
S: <msg>Data management policy violation</msg>
S: </result>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. EPP <delete> Command</span>
Delete semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <delete> command and the EPP <delete>
response.
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.3" href="#section-3.2.3">3.2.3</a>. EPP <renew> Command</span>
Renew semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <renew> command and the EPP <renew>
response.
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4" href="#section-3.2.4">3.2.4</a>. EPP <transfer> Command</span>
Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command and the EPP <transfer>
response.
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.5" href="#section-3.2.5">3.2.5</a>. EPP <update> Command</span>
Update semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <update> command and the EPP <update>
response.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Formal Syntax</span>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:eppcom="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<annotation>
<documentation>
Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 protocol
extension schema for relaying DNSSEC key material.
</documentation>
</annotation>
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" />
<element name="infData" type="keyrelay:infDataType" />
<element name="create" type="keyrelay:createType" />
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
<complexType name="createType">
<sequence>
<element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
<element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="infDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
<element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="crDate" type="dateTime"/>
<element name="reID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
<element name="acID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="keyRelayDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType" />
<element name="expiry" type="keyrelay:keyRelayExpiryType"
minOccurs="0" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="keyRelayExpiryType">
<choice>
<element name="absolute" type="dateTime" />
<element name="relative" type="duration" />
</choice>
</complexType>
</schema>
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. XML Namespace</span>
This document uses URNs to describe an XML namespace conforming to
the registry mechanism described in [<a href="./rfc3688" title=""The IETF XML Registry"">RFC3688</a>]. The following URI
assignment has been made by IANA:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0
Registrant Contact: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this
document.
XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. XML Schema</span>
This document uses URNs to describe an XML schema conforming to the
registry mechanism described in [<a href="./rfc3688" title=""The IETF XML Registry"">RFC3688</a>]. The following URI
assignment has been made by IANA:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyrelay-1.0
XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. EPP Extension Registry</span>
The EPP extension described in this document has been registered by
IANA in the "Extensions for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
(EPP)" registry described in [<a href="./rfc7451" title=""Extension Registry for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol"">RFC7451</a>]. The details of the
registration are as follows:
Name of Extension: "Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning
Protocol"
Document status: Standards Track
Reference: <a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a>
Registrant Name and Email Address: IESG, iesg@ietf.org
Top-Level Domains (TLDs): Any
IPR Disclosure: <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/</a>
Status: Active
Notes: None
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span>
A server SHOULD NOT perform any transformation on data under server
management when processing a <keyrelay:create> command. The intent
of this command is to put DNSSEC key material on the poll queue of
another client. Exceptions to this recommendation are allowable only
for the purposes of achieving interoperability with the different
server policies that have already implemented this EPP extension.
Any EPP client can use this mechanism to put data on the message
queue of another EPP client, allowing for the potential of a denial-
of-service attack. However, this can and should be detected by the
server. A server MAY set a server policy that limits or rejects a
<keyrelay:create> command if it detects that the mechanism is being
abused.
For the <keyrelay:keyRelayData> data, a correct <domain:authInfo>
element should be used as an indication that putting the key material
on the receiving EPP clients poll queue is authorized by the
_registrant_ of that domain name. The authorization of EPP clients
to perform DNS changes is not covered in this document as it depends
on registry-specific policy.
A client that uses this mechanism to send DNSSEC key material to
another client could verify through DNS that the DNSSEC key material
is added to the authoritative zone of the domain. This check can be
used to verify that the DNSSEC key material has traveled end-to-end
from the gaining DNS operator to the losing DNS operator. This check
does not tell anything about the DNSSEC chain of trust and can merely
be used as a verification of a successful transfer of the DNSSEC key
material.
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span>
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References</span>
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC3688">RFC3688</a>] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp81">BCP 81</a>, <a href="./rfc3688">RFC 3688</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC5730">RFC5730</a>] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, <a href="./rfc5730">RFC 5730</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC5731">RFC5731</a>] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, <a href="./rfc5731">RFC 5731</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5731">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5731</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC5910">RFC5910</a>] Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS)
Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", <a href="./rfc5910">RFC 5910</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5910, May 2010,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5910">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5910</a>>.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References</span>
[<a id="ref-DNSOP">DNSOP</a>] Koch, P., Sanz, M., and A. Verschuren, "Changing DNS
Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones", Work in Progress,
<a href="./draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change-06">draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change-06</a>, February 2014.
[<a id="ref-RFC7451">RFC7451</a>] Hollenbeck, S., "Extension Registry for the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol", <a href="./rfc7451">RFC 7451</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7451,
February 2015, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7451">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7451</a>>.
<span class="grey">Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8063">RFC 8063</a> EPP Key Relay February 2017</span>
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the following individuals for their valuable
input, review, and constructive criticism in earlier revisions or
support for the concepts described in this document:
Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids, Ed Lewis, James Mitchell, David Peal,
Patrik Faltstrom, Klaus Malorny, James Gould, Patrick Mevzek, Seth
Goldman, Maarten Bosteels, Ulrich Wisser, Kees Monshouwer, Scott
Hollenbeck, and Job Snijders.
Authors' Addresses
Rik Ribbers
SIDN
Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD
The Netherlands
Email: rik.ribbers@sidn.nl
URI: <a href="https://www.sidn.nl/">https://www.sidn.nl/</a>
Marc Groeneweg
SIDN
Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD
The Netherlands
Email: marc.groeneweg@sidn.nl
URI: <a href="https://www.sidn.nl/">https://www.sidn.nl/</a>
Miek Gieben
Email: miek@miek.nl
Antoin Verschuren
Email: ietf@antoin.nl
Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]
</pre>
|