<pre>Network Working Group                                  G. Waters, Editor
Request for Comments: 1910                   Bell-Northern Research Ltd.
Category: Experimental                                     February 1996


                  <span class="h1">User-based Security Model for SNMPv2</span>

Status of this Memo

   This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
   community.  This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any
   kind.  Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Table of Contents

   <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ................................................    <a href="#page-2">2</a>
   <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a> Threats ....................................................    <a href="#page-3">3</a>
   <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a> Goals and Constraints ......................................    <a href="#page-4">4</a>
   <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a> Security Services ..........................................    <a href="#page-5">5</a>
   <a href="#section-1.4">1.4</a> Mechanisms .................................................    <a href="#page-5">5</a>
   <a href="#section-1.4.1">1.4.1</a> Digest Authentication Protocol ...........................    <a href="#page-7">7</a>
   <a href="#section-1.4.2">1.4.2</a> Symmetric Encryption Protocol ............................    <a href="#page-8">8</a>
   <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Elements of the Model .......................................   <a href="#page-10">10</a>
   <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> SNMPv2 Users ...............................................   <a href="#page-10">10</a>
   <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Contexts and Context Selectors .............................   <a href="#page-11">11</a>
   <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a> Quality of Service (qoS) ...................................   <a href="#page-13">13</a>
   <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a> Access Policy ..............................................   <a href="#page-13">13</a>
   <a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a> Replay Protection ..........................................   <a href="#page-13">13</a>
   <a href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a> agentID ..................................................   <a href="#page-14">14</a>
   <a href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a> agentBoots and agentTime .................................   <a href="#page-14">14</a>
   <a href="#section-2.5.3">2.5.3</a> Time Window ..............................................   <a href="#page-15">15</a>
   <a href="#section-2.6">2.6</a> Error Reporting ............................................   <a href="#page-15">15</a>
   <a href="#section-2.7">2.7</a> Time Synchronization .......................................   <a href="#page-16">16</a>
   <a href="#section-2.8">2.8</a> Proxy Error Propagation ....................................   <a href="#page-16">16</a>
   <a href="#section-2.9">2.9</a> SNMPv2 Messages Using this Model ...........................   <a href="#page-16">16</a>
   <a href="#section-2.10">2.10</a> Local Configuration Datastore (LCD) .......................   <a href="#page-18">18</a>
   <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Elements of Procedure .......................................   <a href="#page-19">19</a>
   <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> Generating a Request or Notification .......................   <a href="#page-19">19</a>
   <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> Processing a Received Communication ........................   <a href="#page-20">20</a>
   <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a> Additional Details .......................................   <a href="#page-28">28</a>
   <a href="#section-3.2.1.1">3.2.1.1</a> ASN.1 Parsing Errors ...................................   <a href="#page-28">28</a>
   <a href="#section-3.2.1.2">3.2.1.2</a> Incorrectly Encoded Parameters .........................   <a href="#page-29">29</a>
   <a href="#section-3.2.1.3">3.2.1.3</a> Generation of a Report PDU .............................   <a href="#page-29">29</a>
   <a href="#section-3.2.1.4">3.2.1.4</a> Cache Timeout ..........................................   <a href="#page-29">29</a>
   <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Generating a Response ......................................   <a href="#page-30">30</a>
   <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Discovery ...................................................   <a href="#page-30">30</a>
   <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Definitions .................................................   <a href="#page-31">31</a>



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   <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a> The USEC Basic Group .......................................   <a href="#page-32">32</a>
   <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a> Conformance Information ....................................   <a href="#page-35">35</a>
   <a href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a> Compliance Statements ....................................   <a href="#page-35">35</a>
   <a href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a> Units of Conformance .....................................   <a href="#page-35">35</a>
   <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations .....................................   <a href="#page-36">36</a>
   <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> Recommended Practices ......................................   <a href="#page-36">36</a>
   <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a> Defining Users .............................................   <a href="#page-37">37</a>
   <a href="#section-6.3">6.3</a> Conformance ................................................   <a href="#page-38">38</a>
   <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Editor's Address ............................................   <a href="#page-38">38</a>
   <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements ............................................   <a href="#page-39">39</a>
   <a href="#section-9">9</a>. References ..................................................   <a href="#page-39">39</a>
   <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> Installation ........................................   <a href="#page-41">41</a>
   <a href="#appendix-A.1">Appendix A.1</a> Agent Installation Parameters .....................   <a href="#page-41">41</a>
   <a href="#appendix-A.2">Appendix A.2</a> Password to Key Algorithm .........................   <a href="#page-43">43</a>
   <a href="#appendix-A.3">Appendix A.3</a> Password to Key Sample ............................   <a href="#page-44">44</a>

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction</span>

   A management system contains:  several (potentially many) nodes, each
   with a processing entity, termed an agent, which has access to
   management instrumentation; at least one management station; and, a
   management protocol, used to convey management information between
   the agents and management stations.  Operations of the protocol are
   carried out under an administrative framework which defines
   authentication, authorization, access control, and privacy policies.

   Management stations execute management applications which monitor and
   control managed elements.  Managed elements are devices such as
   hosts, routers, terminal servers, etc., which are monitored and
   controlled via access to their management information.

   The Administrative Infrastructure for SNMPv2 document [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;An Administrative Infrastructure for SNMPv2&quot;">1</a>] defines an
   administrative framework which realizes effective management in a
   variety of configurations and environments.

   In this administrative framework, a security model defines the
   mechanisms used to achieve an administratively-defined level of
   security for protocol interactions.  Although many such security
   models might be defined, it is the purpose of this document, User-
   based Security Model for SNMPv2, to define the first, and, as of this
   writing, only, security model for this administrative framework.

   This administrative framework includes the provision of an access
   control model.  The enforcement of access rights requires the means
   to identify the entity on whose behalf a request is generated.  This
   SNMPv2 security model identifies an entity on whose behalf an SNMPv2
   message is generated as a "user".




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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>.  Threats</span>

   Several of the classical threats to network protocols are applicable
   to the network management problem and therefore would be applicable
   to any SNMPv2 security model.  Other threats are not applicable to
   the network management problem.  This section discusses principal
   threats, secondary threats, and threats which are of lesser
   importance.

   The principal threats against which this SNMPv2 security model should
   provide protection are:

Modification of Information
     The modification threat is the danger that some unauthorized entity
     may alter in-transit SNMPv2 messages generated on behalf of an
     authorized user in such a way as to effect unauthorized management
     operations, including falsifying the value of an object.

Masquerade
     The masquerade threat is the danger that management operations not
     authorized for some user may be attempted by assuming the identity
     of another user that has the appropriate authorizations.

   Two secondary threats are also identified.  The security protocols
   defined in this memo do provide protection against:

Message Stream Modification
     The SNMPv2 protocol is typically based upon a connectionless
     transport service which may operate over any subnetwork service.
     The re-ordering, delay or replay of messages can and does occur
     through the natural operation of many such subnetwork services.
     The message stream modification threat is the danger that messages
     may be maliciously re-ordered, delayed or replayed to an extent
     which is greater than can occur through the natural operation of a
     subnetwork service, in order to effect unauthorized management
     operations.

Disclosure
     The disclosure threat is the danger of eavesdropping on the
     exchanges between managed agents and a management station.
     Protecting against this threat may be required as a matter of local
     policy.

   There are at least two threats that an SNMPv2 security protocol need
   not protect against.  The security protocols defined in this memo do
   not provide protection against:





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Denial of Service
     An SNMPv2 security protocol need not attempt to address the broad
     range of attacks by which service on behalf of authorized users is
     denied.  Indeed, such denial-of-service attacks are in many cases
     indistinguishable from the type of network failures with which any
     viable network management protocol must cope as a matter of course.

Traffic Analysis
     In addition, an SNMPv2 security protocol need not attempt to
     address traffic analysis attacks.  Indeed, many traffic patterns
     are predictable - agents may be managed on a regular basis by a
     relatively small number of management stations - and therefore
     there is no significant advantage afforded by protecting against
     traffic analysis.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>.  Goals and Constraints</span>

   Based on the foregoing account of threats in the SNMP network
   management environment, the goals of this SNMPv2 security model are
   as follows.

(1)  The protocol should provide for verification that each received
     SNMPv2 message has not been modified during its transmission
     through the network in such a way that an unauthorized management
     operation might result.

(2)  The protocol should provide for verification of the identity of the
     user on whose behalf a received SNMPv2 message claims to have been
     generated.

(3)  The protocol should provide for detection of received SNMPv2
     messages, which request or contain management information, whose
     time of generation was not recent.

(4)  The protocol should provide, when necessary, that the contents of
     each received SNMPv2 message are protected from disclosure.

   In addition to the principal goal of supporting secure network
   management, the design of this SNMPv2 security model is also
   influenced by the following constraints:

(1)  When the requirements of effective management in times of network
     stress are inconsistent with those of security, the design should
     prefer the former.

(2)  Neither the security protocol nor its underlying security
     mechanisms should depend upon the ready availability of other
     network services (e.g., Network Time Protocol (NTP) or key



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     management protocols).

(3)  A security mechanism should entail no changes to the basic SNMP
     network management philosophy.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>.  Security Services</span>

   The security services necessary to support the goals of an SNMPv2
   security model are as follows.

Data Integrity
     is the provision of the property that data has not been altered or
     destroyed in an unauthorized manner, nor have data sequences been
     altered to an extent greater than can occur non-maliciously.

Data Origin Authentication
     is the provision of the property that the claimed identity of the
     user on whose behalf received data was originated is corroborated.

Data Confidentiality
     is the provision of the property that information is not made
     available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or
     processes.

   For the protocols specified in this memo, it is not possible to
   assure the specific originator of a received SNMPv2 message; rather,
   it is the user on whose behalf the message was originated that is
   authenticated.

   For these protocols, it not possible to obtain data integrity without
   data origin authentication, nor is it possible to obtain data origin
   authentication without data integrity.  Further, there is no
   provision for data confidentiality without both data integrity and
   data origin authentication.

   The security protocols used in this memo are considered acceptably
   secure at the time of writing.  However, the procedures allow for new
   authentication and privacy methods to be specified at a future time
   if the need arises.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4" href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>.  Mechanisms</span>

   The security protocols defined in this memo employ several types of
   mechanisms in order to realize the goals and security services
   described above:






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  -  In support of data integrity, a message digest algorithm is
     required.  A digest is calculated over an appropriate portion of an
     SNMPv2 message and included as part of the message sent to the
     recipient.

  -  In support of data origin authentication and data integrity, a
     secret value is both inserted into, and appended to, the SNMPv2
     message prior to computing the digest; the inserted value
     overwritten prior to transmission, and the appended value is not
     transmitted.  The secret value is shared by all SNMPv2 entities
     authorized to originate messages on behalf of the appropriate user.

  -  To protect against the threat of message delay or replay (to an
     extent greater than can occur through normal operation), a set of
     time (at the agent) indicators and a request-id are included in
     each message generated.  An SNMPv2 agent evaluates the time
     indicators to determine if a received message is recent.  An SNMPv2
     manager evaluates the time indicators to ensure that a received
     message is at least as recent as the last message it received from
     the same source.  An SNMPv2 manager uses received authentic
     messages to advance its notion of time (at the agent).  An  SNMPv2
     manager also evaluates the request-id in received Response messages
     and discards messages which do not correspond to outstanding
     requests.

     These mechanisms provide for the detection of messages whose time
     of generation was not recent in all but one circumstance; this
     circumstance is the delay or replay of a Report  message (sent to a
     manager) when the manager has has not recently communicated with
     the source of the Report message.  In this circumstance, the
     detection guarantees only that the Report message is more recent
     than the last communication between source and destination of the
     Report message.  However, Report messages do not request or contain
     management information, and thus, goal #3 in <a href="#section-1.2">Section 1.2</a> above is
     met; further, Report messages can at most cause the manager to
     advance its notion of time (at the agent) by less than the proper
     amount.

     This protection against the threat of message delay or replay does
     not imply nor provide any protection against unauthorized deletion
     or suppression of messages.  Other mechanisms defined independently
     of the security protocol can also be used to detect the re-
     ordering, replay, deletion, or suppression of messages containing
     set operations (e.g., the MIB variable snmpSetSerialNo [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>]).

  -  In support of data confidentiality, an encryption algorithm is
     required.  An appropriate portion of the message is encrypted prior
     to being transmitted.



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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4.1" href="#section-1.4.1">1.4.1</a>.  Digest Authentication Protocol</span>

   The Digest Authentication Protocol defined in this memo provides for:

  -  verifying the integrity of a received message (i.e., the message
     received is the message sent).

     The integrity of the message is protected by computing a digest
     over an appropriate portion of a message.  The digest is computed
     by the originator of the message, transmitted with the message, and
     verified by the recipient of the message.

  -  verifying the user on whose behalf the message was generated.

     A secret value known only to SNMPv2 entities authorized to generate
     messages on behalf of this user is both inserted into, and appended
     to, the message prior to the digest computation.  Thus, the
     verification of the user is implicit with the verification of the
     digest.  (Note that the use of two copies of the secret, one near
     the start and one at the end, is recommended by [<a href="#ref-14" title="&quot;Keyed-MD5 for Message Authentication&quot;">14</a>].)

  -  verifying that a message sent to/from one SNMPv2 entity cannot be
     replayed to/as-if-from another SNMPv2 entity.

     Included in each message is an identifier unique to the SNMPv2
     agent associated with the sender or intended recipient of the
     message.  Also, each message containing a Response PDU contains a
     request-id which associates the message to a recently generated
     request.

     A Report message sent by one SNMPv2 agent to one SNMPv2 manager can
     potentially be replayed to another SNMPv2 manager.  However, Report
     messages do not request or contain management information, and
     thus, goal #3 in <a href="#section-1.2">Section 1.2</a> above is met; further, Report messages
     can at most cause the manager to advance its notion of time (at the
     agent) by less than the correct amount.

  -  detecting messages which were not recently generated.

     A set of time indicators are included in the message, indicating
     the time of generation.  Messages (other than those containing
     Report PDUs) without recent time indicators are not considered
     authentic.  In addition, messages containing Response PDUs have a
     request-id; if the request-id does not match that of a recently
     generated request, then the message is not considered to be
     authentic.





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     A Report message sent by an SNMPv2 agent can potentially be
     replayed at a later time to an SNMPv2 manager which has not
     recently communicated with that agent.  However, Report messages do
     not request or contain management information, and thus, goal #3 in
     <a href="#section-1.2">Section 1.2</a> above is met; further, Report messages can at most
     cause the manager to advance its notion of time (at the agent) by
     less than the correct amount.

   This protocol uses the MD5 [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm&quot;">3</a>] message digest algorithm.  A 128-bit
   digest is calculated over the designated portion of an SNMPv2 message
   and included as part of the message sent to the recipient.  The size
   of both the digest carried in a message and the private
   authentication key is 16 octets.

   This memo allows the same user to be defined on multiple SNMPv2
   agents and managers.  Each SNMPv2 agent maintains a value, agentID,
   which uniquely identifies the agent. This value is included in each
   message sent to/from that agent.  Messages sent from a SNMPv2 dual-
   role entity [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;An Administrative Infrastructure for SNMPv2&quot;">1</a>] to a SNMPv2 manager include the agentID value
   maintained by the dual-role entity's agent.  On receipt of a message,
   an agent checks the value to ensure it is the intended recipient, and
   a manager uses the value to ensure that the message is processed
   using the correct state information.

   Each SNMPv2 agent maintains two values, agentBoots and agentTime,
   which taken together provide an indication of time at that agent.
   Both of these values are included in an authenticated message sent
   to/received from that agent.  Authenticated messages sent from a
   SNMPv2 dual-role entity to a SNMPv2 manager include the agentBoots
   and agentTime values maintained by the dual-role entity's agent.  On
   receipt, the values are checked to ensure that the indicated time is
   within a time window of the current time.  The time window represents
   an administrative upper bound on acceptable delivery delay for
   protocol messages.

   For an SNMPv2 manager to generate a message which an agent will
   accept as authentic, and to verify that a message received from that
   agent is authentic, that manager must first achieve time
   synchronization with that agent.  Similarly, for a manger to verify
   that a message received from an SNMPv2 dual-role entity is authentic,
   that manager must first achieve time synchronization with the dual-
   role entity's agent.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4.2" href="#section-1.4.2">1.4.2</a>.  Symmetric Encryption Protocol</span>

   The Symmetric Encryption Protocol defined in this memo provides
   support for data confidentiality through the use of the Data
   Encryption Standard (DES) in the Cipher Block Chaining mode of



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   operation.  The designated portion of an SNMPv2 message is encrypted
   and included as part of the message sent to the recipient.

   Two organizations have published specifications defining the DES: the
   National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [<a href="#ref-5" title="(January">5</a>] and the
   American National Standards Institute [<a href="#ref-6" title="(December">6</a>].  There is a companion
   Modes of Operation specification for each definition (see [<a href="#ref-7" title="(December">7</a>] and
   [<a href="#ref-8" title="American National Standards Institute. ANSI X3.106-1983">8</a>], respectively).

   The NIST has published three additional documents that implementors
   may find useful.

  -  There is a document with guidelines for implementing and using the
     DES, including functional specifications for the DES and its modes
     of operation [<a href="#ref-9" title="(April">9</a>].

  -  There is a specification of a validation test suite for the DES
     [<a href="#ref-10">10</a>].  The suite is designed to test all aspects of the DES and is
     useful for pinpointing specific problems.

  -  There is a specification of a maintenance test for the DES [<a href="#ref-11" title=" (August">11</a>].
     The test utilizes a minimal amount of data and processing to test
     all components of the DES.  It provides a simple yes-or-no
     indication of correct operation and is useful to run as part of an
     initialization step, e.g., when a computer reboots.

   This Symmetric Encryption Protocol specifies that the size of the
   privacy key is 16 octets, of which the first 8 octets are a DES key
   and the second 8 octets are a DES Initialization Vector.  The 64-bit
   DES key in the first 8 octets of the private key is a 56 bit quantity
   used directly by the algorithm plus 8 parity bits - arranged so that
   one parity bit is the least significant bit of each octet.  The
   setting of the parity bits is ignored by this protocol.

   The length of an octet sequence to be encrypted by the DES must be an
   integral multiple of 8.  When encrypting, the data is padded at the
   end as necessary; the actual pad value is irrelevant.

   If the length of the octet sequence to be decrypted is not an
   integral multiple of 8 octets, the processing of the octet sequence
   is halted and an appropriate exception noted.  When decrypting, the
   padding is ignored.









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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>.  Elements of the Model</span>

   This section contains definitions required to realize the security
   model defined by this memo.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>.  SNMPv2 Users</span>

   Management operations using this security model make use of a defined
   set of user identities.  For any SNMPv2 user on whose behalf
   management operations are authorized at a particular SNMPv2 agent,
   that agent must have knowledge of that user.  A SNMPv2 manager that
   wishes to communicate with a particular agent must also have
   knowledge of a user known to that agent, including knowledge of the
   applicable attributes of that user.  Similarly, a SNMPv2 manager that
   wishes to receive messages from a SNMPv2 dual-role entity must have
   knowledge of the user on whose behalf the dual-role entity sends the
   message.

   A user and its attributes are defined as follows:

&lt;userName&gt;
     An octet string representing the name of the user.

&lt;authProtocol&gt;
     An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of this user can
     be authenticated, and if so, the type of authentication protocol
     which is used.  One such protocol is defined in this memo: the
     Digest Authentication Protocol.

&lt;authPrivateKey&gt;
     If messages sent on behalf of this user can be authenticated, the
     (private) authentication key for use with the authentication
     protocol.  Note that a user's authentication key will normally be
     different at different agents.

&lt;privProtocol&gt;
     An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of this user can
     be protected from disclosure, and if so, the type of privacy
     protocol which is used.  One such protocol is defined in this memo:
     the Symmetric Encryption Protocol.

&lt;privPrivateKey&gt;
     If messages sent on behalf of this user can be protected from
     disclosure, the (private) privacy key for use with the privacy
     protocol.  Note that a user's privacy key will normally be
     different at different agents.





<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 10]</span></pre>
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>.  Contexts and Context Selectors</span>

   An SNMPv2 context is a collection of management information
   accessible (locally or via proxy) by an SNMPv2 agent.  An item of
   management information may exist in more than one context.  An SNMPv2
   agent potentially has access to many contexts.  Each SNMPv2 message
   contains a context selector which unambiguously identifies an SNMPv2
   context accessible by the SNMPv2 agent to which the message is
   directed or by the SNMPv2 agent associated with the sender of the
   message.

   For a local SNMPv2 context which is realized by an SNMPv2 entity,
   that SNMPv2 entity uses locally-defined mechanisms to access the
   management information identified by the SNMPv2 context.

   For a proxy SNMPv2 context, the SNMPv2 entity acts as a proxy SNMPv2
   agent to access the management information identified by the SNMPv2
   context.

   The term remote SNMPv2 context is used at an SNMPv2 manager to
   indicate a SNMPv2 context (either local or proxy) which is not
   realized by the local SNMPv2 entity (i.e., the local SNMPv2 entity
   uses neither locally-defined mechanisms, nor acts as a proxy SNMPv2
   agent to access the management information identified by the SNMPv2
   context).

   Proxy SNMPv2 contexts are further categorized as either local-proxy
   contexts or remote-proxy contexts.  A proxy SNMPv2 agent receives
   Get/GetNext/GetBulk/Set operations for a local-proxy context, and
   forwards them with a remote-proxy context; it receives SNMPv2-Trap
   and Inform operations for a remote-proxy context, and forwards them
   with a local-proxy context; for Response operations, a proxy SNMPv2
   agent receives them with either a local-proxy or remote-proxy
   context, and forwards them with a remote-proxy or local-proxy
   context, respectively.
















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     For the non-proxy situation:

                      context-A
         Manager &lt;----------------&gt; Agent

     the type of context is:

                           +-----------------+
                           |   context-A     |
         +-----------------+-----------------+
         | Manager         |    remote       |
         +-----------------+-----------------+
         | Agent           |    local        |
         +-----------------+-----------------+
         | agentID         |   of Agent      |
         +-----------------+-----------------+
         | contextSelector | locally unique  |
         +-----------------+-----------------+

     For proxy:

                      context-B               context-C
         Manager &lt;----------------&gt; Proxy &lt;----------------&gt; Agent
                                    Agent

     the type and identity of the contexts are:

                           +-----------------+-----------------+
                           |   context-B     |    context-C    |
         +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
         | Manager         |    remote       |       --        |
         +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
         | Proxy-Agent     |  local-proxy    |   remote-proxy  |
         +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
         | Agent           |      --         |      local      |
         +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
         | agentID         | of Proxy agent  |     of Agent    |
         +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
         | contextSelector | locally unique  |  locally unique |
         +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+

   The combination of an agentID value and a context selector provides a
   globally-unique identification of a context.  When a context is
   accessible by multiple agents (e.g., including by proxy SNMPv2
   agents), it has multiple such globally-unique identifications, one
   associated with each agent which can access it. In the example above,
   "context-B" and "context-C" are different names for the same context.




<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 12]</span></pre>
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>.  Quality of Service (qoS)</span>

   Messages are generated with a particular Quality of Service (qoS),
   either:

  -  without authentication and privacy,

  -  with authentication but not privacy,

  -  with authentication and privacy.

   All users are capable of having messages without authentication and
   privacy generated on their behalf.  Users having an authentication
   protocol and an authentication key can have messages with
   authentication but not privacy generated on their behalf. Users
   having an authentication protocol, an authentication key, a privacy
   protocol and a privacy key can have messages with authentication and
   privacy generated on their behalf.

   In addition to its indications of authentication and privacy, the qoS
   may also indicate that the message contains an operation that may
   result in a report PDU being generated (see <a href="#section-2.6">Section 2.6</a> below).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>.  Access Policy</span>

   An administration's access policy determines the access rights of
   users.  For a particular SNMPv2 context to which a user has access
   using a particular qoS, that user's access rights are given by a list
   of authorized operations, and for a local context, a read-view and a
   write-view.  The read-view is the set of object instances authorized
   for the user when reading objects.  Reading objects occurs when
   processing a retrieval (get, get-next, get-bulk) operation and when
   sending a notification.  The write-view is the set of object
   instances authorized for the user when writing objects.  Writing
   objects occurs when processing a set operation.  A user's access
   rights may be different at different agents.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>.  Replay Protection</span>

   Each SNMPv2 agent (or dual-role entity) maintains three objects:

  -  agentID, which is an identifier unique among all agents in (at
     least) an administrative domain;

  -  agentBoots, which is a count of the number of times the agent has
     rebooted/re-initialized since agentID was last configured; and,





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  -  agentTime, which is the number of seconds since agentBoots was last
     incremented.

   An SNMPv2 agent is always authoritative with respect to these
   variables.  It is the responsibility of an SNMPv2 manager to
   synchronize with the agent, as appropriate.  In the case of an SNMPv2
   dual-role entity sending an Inform-Request, it is that entity acting
   in an agent role which is authoritative with respect to these
   variables for the Inform-Request.

   An agent is required to maintain the values of agentID and agentBoots
   in non-volatile storage.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1" href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a>.  agentID</span>

   The agentID value contained in an authenticated message is used to
   defeat attacks in which messages from a manager are replayed to a
   different agent and/or messages from one agent (or dual-role entity)
   are replayed as if from a different agent (or dual-role entity).

   When an agent (or dual-role entity) is first installed, it sets its
   local value of agentID according to a enterprise-specific algorithm
   (see the definition of agentID in <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>).

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.2" href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a>.  agentBoots and agentTime</span>

   The agentBoots and agentTime values contained in an authenticated
   message are used to defeat attacks in which messages are replayed
   when they are no longer valid.  Through use of agentBoots and
   agentTime, there is no requirement for an SNMPv2 agent to have a
   non-volatile clock which ticks (i.e., increases with the passage of
   time) even when the agent is powered off.  Rather, each time an
   SNMPv2 agent reboots, it retrieves, increments, and then stores
   agentBoots in non-volatile storage, and resets agentTime to zero.

   When an agent (or dual-role entity) is first installed, it sets its
   local values of agentBoots and agentTime to zero.  If agentTime ever
   reaches its maximum value (2147483647), then agentBoots is
   incremented as if the agent has rebooted and agentTime is reset to
   zero and starts incrementing again.

   Each time an agent (or dual-role entity) reboots, any SNMPv2 managers
   holding that agent's values of agentBoots and agentTime need to re-
   synchronize prior to sending correctly authenticated messages to that
   agent (see <a href="#section-2.7">Section 2.7</a> for re-synchronization procedures).  Note,
   however, that the procedures do provide for a notification to be
   accepted as authentic by a manager, when sent by an agent which has
   rebooted since the manager last re-synchronized.



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   If an agent (or dual-role entity) is ever unable to determine its
   latest agentBoots value, then it must set its agentBoots value to
   0xffffffff.

   Whenever the local value of agentBoots has the value 0xffffffff, it
   latches at that value and an authenticated message always causes an
   usecStatsNotInWindows authentication failure.

   In order to reset an agent whose agentBoots value has reached the
   value 0xffffffff, manual intervention is required.  The agent must be
   physically visited and re-configured, either with a new agentID
   value, or with new secret values for the authentication and privacy
   keys of all users known to that agent.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.3" href="#section-2.5.3">2.5.3</a>.  Time Window</span>

   The Time Window is a value that specifies the window of time in which
   a message generated on behalf of any user is valid.  This memo
   specifies that the same value of the Time Window, 150 seconds, is
   used for all users.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6" href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>.  Error Reporting</span>

   While processing a received communication, an SNMPv2 entity may
   determine that the message is unacceptable (see <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>).  In
   this case, the appropriate counter from the snmpGroup [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>] or
   usecStatsGroup object groups is incremented and the received message
   is discarded without further processing.

   If an SNMPv2 entity acting in the agent role makes such a
   determination and the qoS indicates that a report may be generated,
   then after incrementing the appropriate counter, it is required to
   generate a message containing a report PDU, with the same user and
   context as the received message, and to send it to the transport
   address which originated the received message.  For all report PDUs,
   except those generated due to incrementing the usecStatsNotInWindows
   counter, the report PDU is unauthenticated.  For those generated due
   to incrementing usecStatsNotInWindows, the report PDU is
   authenticated only if the received message was authenticated.

   The report flag in the qoS may only be set if the message contains a
   Get, GetNext, GetBulk, Set operation.  The report flag should never
   be set for a message that contains a Response, Inform, SNMPv2-Trap or
   Report operation.  Furthermore, a report PDU is never sent by an
   SNMPv2 entity acting in a manager role.






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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7" href="#section-2.7">2.7</a>.  Time Synchronization</span>

   Time synchronization, required by a management entity in order to
   proceed with authentic communications, has occurred when the
   management entity has obtained local values of agentBoots and
   agentTime from the agent that are within the agent's time window.  To
   remain synchronized, the local values must remain within the agent's
   time window and thus must be kept loosely synchronized with the
   values stored at the agent.  In addition to keeping a local version
   of agentBoots and agentTime, a manager must also keep one other local
   variable, latestReceivedAgentTime.  This value records the highest
   value of agentTime that was received by the manager from the agent
   and is used to eliminate the possibility of replaying messages that
   would prevent the manager's notion of the agentTime from advancing.

   Time synchronization occurs as part of the procedures of receiving a
   message (<a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>, step 9d). As such, no explicit time
   synchronization procedure is required by a management entity.  Note,
   that whenever the local value of agentID is changed (e.g., through
   discovery) or when a new secret is configured, the local values of
   agentBoots and latestReceivedAgentTime should be set to zero. This
   will cause the time synchronization to occur when the next authentic
   message is received.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8" href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>.  Proxy Error Propagation</span>

   When a proxy SNMPv2 agent receives a report PDU from a proxied agent
   and it is determined that a proxy-forwarded request cannot be
   delivered to the proxied agent, then the snmpProxyDrops counter [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>]
   is incremented and a report PDU is generated and transmitted to the
   transport address from which the original request was received.
   (Note that the receipt of a report PDU containing snmpProxyDrops as a
   VarBind, is included among the reasons why a proxy-forwarded request
   cannot be delivered.)

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.9" href="#section-2.9">2.9</a>.  SNMPv2 Messages Using this Model</span>

   The syntax of an SNMPv2 message using this security model differs
   from that of an SNMPv1 [<a href="#ref-2" title="&quot;Simple Network Management Protocol&quot;">2</a>] message as follows:

  -  The version component is changed to 2.

  -  The data component contains either a PDU or an OCTET STRING
     containing an encrypted PDU.

   The SNMPv1 community string is now termed the "parameters" component
   and contains a set of administrative information for the message.




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   Only the PDU is protected from disclosure by the privacy protocol.
   This exposes the administrative information to eavesdroppers.
   However, malicious use of this information is considered to be a
   Traffic Analysis attack against which protection is not provided.

   For an authenticated SNMPv2 message, the message digest is applied to
   the entire message given to the transport service.  As such, message
   generation first privatizes the PDU, then adds the message wrapper,
   and then authenticates the message.

   An SNMPv2 message is an ASN.1 value with the following syntax:

     Message ::=
         SEQUENCE {
             version
                 INTEGER { v2 (2) },

             parameters
                 OCTET STRING,
             -- &lt;model=1&gt;
             --      &lt;qoS&gt;&lt;agentID&gt;&lt;agentBoots&gt;&lt;agentTime&gt;&lt;maxSize&gt;
             --      &lt;userLen&gt;&lt;userName&gt;&lt;authLen&gt;&lt;authDigest&gt;
             --      &lt;contextSelector&gt;

             data
                 CHOICE {
                     plaintext
                         PDUs,
                     encrypted
                         OCTET STRING
                 }
         }

where:

  parameters
     a concatenation of the following values in network-byte order.  If
     the first octet (&lt;model&gt;) is one, then

     &lt;qoS&gt;    = 8-bits of quality-of-service

              bitnumber
              7654 3210     meaning
              ---- ----     --------------------------------
              .... ..00     no authentication nor privacy
              .... ..01     authentication, no privacy
              .... ..1.     authentication and privacy
              .... .1..     generation of report PDU allowed



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              where bit 7 is the most significant bit.

     &lt;agentID&gt;    = 12 octets
          a unique identifier for the agent (or dual-role entity).

     &lt;agentBoots&gt; = 32-bits
          an unsigned quantity (0..4294967295) in network-byte order.

     &lt;agentTime&gt;  = 32-bits
          an unsigned quantity (0..2147483647) in network-byte order.

     &lt;maxSize&gt;    = 16-bits
          an unsigned quantity (484..65507) in network-byte order, which
          identifies the maximum message size which the sender of this
          message can receive using the same transport domain as used
          for this message.

     &lt;userLen&gt;    = 1 octet
          the length of following &lt;userName&gt; field.

     &lt;userName&gt;   = 1..16 arbitrary octets
          the user on whose behalf this message is sent.

     &lt;authLen&gt;    = 1 octet
          the length of following &lt;authDigest&gt; field.

     &lt;authDigest&gt; = 0..255 octets
          for authenticated messages, the authentication digest.
          Otherwise, the value has zero-length on transmission and is
          ignored on receipt.

     &lt;contextSelector&gt; = 0..40 arbitrary octets
          the context selector which in combination with agentID
          identifies the SNMPv2 context containing the management
          information referenced by the SNMPv2 message.

  plaintext
     an SNMPv2 PDU as defined in [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">12</a>].

  encrypted
     the encrypted form of an SNMPv2 PDU.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.10" href="#section-2.10">2.10</a>.  Local Configuration Datastore (LCD)</span>

   Each SNMPv2 entity maintains a local conceptually database, called
   the Local Configuration Datastore (LCD), which holds its known set of
   information about SNMPv2 users and other associated (e.g., access
   control) information.  An LCD may potentially be required to hold



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   information about multiple SNMPv2 agent entities. As such, the
   &lt;agentID&gt; should be used to identify a particular agent entity in the
   LCD.

   It is a local implementation issue as to whether information in the
   LCD is stored information or whether it is obtained dynamically
   (e.g., as a part of an SNMPv2 manager's API) on an as-needed basis.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>.  Elements of Procedure</span>

   This section describes the procedures followed by an SNMPv2 entity in
   processing SNMPv2 messages.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>.  Generating a Request or Notification</span>

   This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMPv2 entity
   whenever it generates a message containing a management operation
   (either a request or a notification) on behalf of a user, for a
   particular context and with a particular qoS value.

(1)  Information concerning the user is extracted from the LCD.  The
     transport domain and transport address to which the operation is to
     be sent is determined.  The context is resolved into an agentID
     value and a contextSelector value.

(2)  If the qoS specifies that the message is to be protected from
     disclosure, but the user does not support both an authentication
     and a privacy protocol, or does not have configured authentication
     and privacy keys, then the operation cannot be sent.

(3)  If the qoS specifies that the message is to be authenticated, but
     the user does not support an authentication protocol, or does not
     have a configured authentication key, then the operation cannot be
     sent.

(4)  The operation is serialized (i.e., encoded) according to the
     conventions of [<a href="#ref-13" title="&quot;Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">13</a>] and [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">12</a>] into a PDUs value.

(5)  If the operation is a Get, GetNext, GetBulk, or Set then the report
     flag in the qoS is set to the value 1.

(6)  An SNMPv2 message is constructed using the ASN.1 Message syntax:

     - the version component is set to the value 2.

     - if the qoS specifies that the message is to be protected from
       disclosure, then the octet sequence representing the serialized
       PDUs value is encrypted according to the user's privacy protocol



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       and privacy key, and the encrypted data is encoded as an octet
       string and is used as the data component of the message.

     - if the qoS specifies that the message is not to be protected from
       disclosure, then the serialized PDUs value is used directly as
       the value of the data component.

     - the parameters component is constructed using:

       - the requested qoS, userName, agentID and context selector,

       - if the qoS specifies that the message is to be authenticated or
         the management operation is a notification, then the current
         values of agentBoots, and agentTime corresponding to agentID
         from the LCD are used.  Otherwise, the &lt;agentBoots&gt; and
         &lt;agentTime&gt; fields are set to zero-filled octets.

       - the &lt;maxSize&gt; field is set to the maximum message size which
         the local SNMPv2 entity can receive using the transport domain
         which will be used to send this message.

       - if the qoS specifies that the message is to be authenticated,
         then the &lt;authDigest&gt; field is temporarily set to the user's
         authentication key.  Otherwise, the &lt;authDigest&gt; field is set
         to the zero-length string.

(7)  The constructed Message value is serialized (i.e., encoded)
     according to the conventions of [<a href="#ref-13" title="&quot;Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">13</a>] and [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">12</a>].

(8)  If the qoS specifies that the message is to be authenticated, then
     an MD5 digest value is computed over the octet sequence
     representing the concatenation of the serialized Message value and
     the user's authentication key.  The &lt;authDigest&gt; field is then set
     to the computed digest value.

(9)  The serialized Message value is transmitted to the determined
     transport address.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>.  Processing a Received Communication</span>

   This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMPv2 entity
   whenever it receives an SNMPv2 message.  This procedure is
   independent of the transport service address at which the message was
   received.  For clarity, some of the details of this procedure are
   left out and are described in <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section 3.2.1</a> and its sub-sections.

(1)  The snmpInPkts counter [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>] is incremented.  If the received
     message is not the serialization (according to the conventions of



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     [<a href="#ref-13" title="&quot;Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">13</a>]) of a Message value, then the snmpInASNParseErrs counter [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>]
     is incremented, and the message is discarded without further
     processing.

(2)  If the value of the version component has a value other than 2,
     then the message is either processed according to some other
     version of this protocol, or the snmpInBadVersions counter [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>] is
     incremented, and the message is discarded without further
     processing.

(3)  The value of the &lt;model&gt; field is extracted from the parameters
     component of the Message value.  If the value of the &lt;model&gt; field
     is not 1, then either the message is processed according to some
     other security model, or the usecStatsBadParameters counter is
     incremented, and the message is discarded without further
     processing.

(4)  The values of the rest of the fields are extracted from the
     parameters component of the Message value.

(5)  If the &lt;agentID&gt; field contained in the parameters is unknown then:

     - a manager that performs discovery may optionally create a new LCD
       entry and continue processing; or

     - the usecStatsUnknownContexts counter is incremented, a report PDU
       is generated, and the received message is discarded without
       further processing.

(6)  The LCD is consulted for information about the SNMPv2 context
     identified by the combination of the &lt;agentID&gt; and
     &lt;contextSelector&gt; fields.  If information about this SNMPv2 context
     is absent from the LCD, then the usecStatsUnknownContexts counter
     is incremented, a report PDU is generated, and the received message
     is discarded without further processing.

(7)  Information about the value of the &lt;userName&gt; field is extracted
     from the LCD.  If no information is available, then the
     usecStatsUnknownUserNames counter is incremented, a report PDU [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;An Administrative Infrastructure for SNMPv2&quot;">1</a>]
     is generated, and the received message is discarded without further
     processing.

(8)  If the information about the user indicates that it does not
     support the quality of service indicated by the &lt;qoS&gt; field, then
     the usecStatsUnsupportedQoS counter is incremented, a report PDU is
     generated, and the received message is discarded without further
     processing.




<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 21]</span></pre>
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(9)  If the &lt;qoS&gt; field indicates an authenticated message and the
     user's authentication protocol is the Digest Authentication
     Protocol described in this memo, then:

     a) the local values of agentBoots and agentTime corresponding to
        the value of the &lt;agentID&gt; field are extracted from the LCD.

     b) the value of &lt;authDigest&gt; field is temporarily saved.  A new
        serialized Message is constructed which differs from that
        received in exactly one respect: that the &lt;authDigest&gt; field
        within it has the value of the user's authentication key.  An
        MD5 digest value is computed over the octet sequence
        representing the concatenation of the new serialized Message and
        the user's authentication key.

     c) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        local (i.e., an agent), then:

        - if the computed digest differs from the saved authDigest
          value, then the usecStatsWrongDigestValues counter is
          incremented, a report PDU is generated, and the received
          message is discarded without further processing. However, if
          the snmpEnableAuthenTraps object [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>] is enabled, then the
          SNMPv2 entity sends authenticationFailure traps [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>] according
          to its configuration.

        - if any of the following conditions is true, then the message
          is considered to be outside of the Time Window:

          - the local value of agentBoots is 0xffffffff;

          - the &lt;agentBoots&gt; field differs from the local value of
            agentBoots; or,

          - the value of the &lt;agentTime&gt; field differs from the local
            notion of agentTime by more than +/- 150 seconds.

        - if the message is considered to be outside of the Time Window
          then the usecStatsNotInWindows counter is incremented, an
          authenticated report PDU is generated (see <a href="#section-2.7">section 2.7</a>), and
          the received message is discarded without further processing.

     d) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is not
        realized by the local SNMPv2 entity (i.e., a manager), then:

        - if the computed digest differs from the saved authDigest
          value, then the usecStatsWrongDigestValues counter is
          incremented and the received message is discarded without



<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 22]</span></pre>
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          further processing.

        - if all of the following conditions are true:

             - if the &lt;qoS&gt; field indicates that privacy is not in use;

             - the SNMPv2 operation type determined from the ASN.1 tag
               value associated with the PDU's component is a Report;

             - the Report was generated due to a usecStatsNotInWindows
               error condition; and,

             - the &lt;agentBoots&gt; field is greater than the local value of
               agentBoots, or the &lt;agentBoots&gt; field is equal to the
               local value of agentBoots and the &lt;agentTime&gt; field is
               greater than the value of latestReceivedAgentTime,

          then the LCD entry corresponding to the value of the &lt;agentID&gt;
          field is updated, by setting the local value of agentBoots
          from the &lt;agentBoots&gt; field, the value latestReceivedAgentTime
          from the &lt;agentTime&gt; field, and the local value of agentTime
          from the &lt;agentTime&gt; field.

        - if any of the following conditions is true, then the message
          is considered to be outside of the Time Window:

          - the local value of agentBoots is 0xffffffff;

          - the &lt;agentBoots&gt; field is less than the local value of
            agentBoots; or,

          - the &lt;agentBoots&gt; field is equal to the local value of
            agentBoots and the &lt;agentTime&gt; field is more than 150
            seconds less than the local notion of agentTime.

        - if the message is considered to be outside of the Time Window
          then the usecStatsNotInWindows counter is incremented, and the
          received message is discarded without further processing;
          however, time synchronization procedures may be invoked.  Note
          that this procedure allows for &lt;agentBoots&gt; to be greater than
          the local value of agentBoots to allow for received messages
          to be accepted as authentic when received from an agent that
          has rebooted since the manager last re-synchronized.

        - if at least one of the following conditions is true:

             - the &lt;agentBoots&gt; field is greater than the local value of
               agentBoots; or,



<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 23]</span></pre>
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             - the &lt;agentBoots&gt; field is equal to the local value of
               agentBoots and the &lt;agentTime&gt; field is greater than the
               value of latestReceivedAgentTime,

          then the LCD entry corresponding to the value of the &lt;agentID&gt;
          field is updated, by setting the local value of agentBoots
          from the &lt;agentBoots&gt; field, the local value
          latestReceivedAgentTime from the &lt;agentTime&gt; field, and the
          local value of agentTime from the &lt;agentTime&gt; field.

(10) If the &lt;qoS&gt; field indicates use of a privacy protocol, then the
     octet sequence representing the data component is decrypted
     according to the user's privacy protocol to obtain a serialized
     PDUs value.  Otherwise the data component is assumed to directly
     contain the PDUs value.

(11) The SNMPv2 operation type is determined from the ASN.1 tag value
     associated with the PDUs component.

(12) If the SNMPv2 operation type is a Report, then the request-id in
     the PDU is correlated to an outstanding request, and if the
     correlation is successful, the appropriate action is taken (e.g.,
     time synchronization, proxy error propagation, etc.); in
     particular, if the report PDU indicates a usecStatsNotInWindows
     condition, then the outstanding request may be retransmitted (since
     the procedure in Step 9d above should have resulted in time
     synchronization).

(13) If the SNMPv2 operation type is either a Get, GetNext, GetBulk, or
     Set operation, then:

     a) if the LCD information indicates that the SNMPv2 context is of
        type remote or remote-proxy, then the
        usecStatsUnauthorizedOperations counter is incremented, a report
        PDU is generated, and the received message is discarded without
        further processing.

     b) the LCD is consulted for access rights authorized for
        communications using the indicated qoS, on behalf of the
        indicated user, and concerning management information in the
        indicated SNMPv2 context for the particular SNMPv2 operation
        type.

     c) if the SNMPv2 operation type is not among the authorized access
        rights, then the usecStatsUnauthorizedOperations counter is
        incremented, a report PDU is generated, and the received message
        is discarded without further processing.




<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 24]</span></pre>
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     d) The information extracted from the LCD concerning the user and
        the SNMPv2 context, together with the sending transport address
        of the received message is cached for later use in generating a
        response message.

     e) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        local, then the management operation represented by the PDUs
        value is performed by the receiving SNMPv2 entity with respect
        to the relevant MIB view within the SNMPv2 context according to
        the procedures set forth in [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">12</a>], where the relevant MIB view is
        determined according to the user, the agentID, the
        contextSelector, the qoS values and the type of operation
        requested.

     f) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        local-proxy, then:

        i. the user, qoS, agentID, contextSelector and transport address
           to be used to forward the request are extracted from the LCD.
           If insufficient information concerning the user is currently
           available, then snmpProxyDrops counter [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>] is incremented, a
           report PDU is generated, and the received message is
           discarded.

        ii. if an administrative flag in the LCD indicates that the
           message is to be forwarded using the SNMPv1 administrative
           framework, then the procedures described in [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Coexistence between Version 1 and Version 2 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework&quot;">4</a>] are invoked.
           Otherwise, a new SNMPv2 message is constructed: its PDUs
           component is copied from that in the received message except
           that the contained request-id is replaced by a unique value
           (this value will enable a subsequent response message to be
           correlated with this request); the &lt;userName&gt;, &lt;qoS&gt;,
           &lt;agentID&gt; and &lt;contextSelector&gt; fields are set to the values
           extracted from the LCD; the &lt;maxSize&gt; field is set to the
           minimum of the value in the received message and the local
           system's maximum message size for the transport domain which
           will be used to forward the message; and finally, the message
           is authenticated and/or protected from disclosure according
           to the qoS value.

        iii. the information cached in Step 13d above is augmented with
           the request-id of the received message as well as the
           request-id, agentID and contextSelector of the constructed
           message.

        iv. the constructed message is forwarded to the extracted
           transport address.




<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 25]</span></pre>
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(14) If the SNMPv2 operation type is an Inform, then:

     a) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        local or local-proxy then the usecStatsUnauthorizedOperations
        counter is incremented, a report PDU is generated, and the
        received message is discarded without further processing.

     b) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        remote, then the Inform operation represented by the PDUs value
        is performed by the receiving SNMPv2 entity according to the
        procedures set forth in [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">12</a>].

     c) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        remote-proxy, then:

        i. a single unique request-id is selected for use by all
           forwarded copies of this request.  This value will enable the
           first response message to be correlated with this request;
           other responses are not required and should be discarded when
           received, since the agent that originated the Inform only
           requires one response to its Inform.

        ii. information is extracted from the LCD concerning all
           combinations of userName, qoS, agentID, contextSelector and
           transport address with which the received message is to be
           forwarded.

        iii. for each such combination whose access rights permit Inform
           operations to be forwarded, a new SNMPv2 message is
           constructed, as follows: its PDUs component is copied from
           that in the received message except that the contained
           request-id is replaced by the value selected in Step i above;
           its &lt;userName&gt;, &lt;qoS&gt;, &lt;agentID&gt; and &lt;contextSelector&gt; fields
           are set to the values extracted in Step ii above; and its
           &lt;maxSize&gt; field is set to the minimum of the value in the
           received message and the local system's maximum message size
           for the transport domain which will be used to forward this
           message.

        iv. for each constructed SNMPv2 message, information concerning
           the &lt;userName&gt;, &lt;qoS&gt;, &lt;agentID&gt;, &lt;contextSelector&gt;,
           request-id and sending transport address of the received
           message, as well as the request- id, agentID and
           contextSelector of the constructed message, is cached for
           later use in generating a response message.

        v. each constructed message is forwarded to the appropriate
           transport address extracted from the LCD in step ii above.



<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 26]</span></pre>
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(15) If the SNMPv2 operation type is a Response, then:

     a) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        local, then the usecStatsUnauthorizedOperations counter is
        incremented, a report PDU is generated, and the received message
        is discarded without further processing.

     b) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        remote, then the Response operation represented by the PDUs
        value is performed by the receiving SNMPv2 entity according to
        the procedures set forth in [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">12</a>].

     c) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        local-proxy or remote-proxy, then:

        i. the request-id is extracted from the PDUs component of the
           received message.  The context's agentID and contextSelector
           values together with the extracted request-id are used to
           correlate this response message to the corresponding values
           for a previously forwarded request by inspecting the cache of
           information as augmented in Substep iii of Step 13f above or
           in Substep iv of 14c above.  If no such correlated
           information is found, then the received message is discarded
           without further processing.

        ii. a new SNMPv2 message is constructed: its PDUs component is
           copied from that in the received message except that the
           contained request-id is replaced by the value saved in the
           correlated information from the original request; its
           &lt;userName&gt;, &lt;qoS&gt;, &lt;agentID&gt; and &lt;contextSelector&gt; fields are
           set to the values saved from the received message. The
           &lt;maxSize&gt; field is set to the minimum of the value in the
           received message and the local system's maximum message size
           for the transport domain which will be used to forward the
           message. The message is authenticated and/or protected from
           disclosure according to the saved qoS value.

        iii. the constructed message is forwarded to the transport
           address saved in the correlated information as the sending
           transport address of the original request.

        iv. the correlated information is deleted from the cache of
           information.

(16) If the SNMPv2 operation type is a SNMPv2-Trap, then:

     a) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        local or local-proxy, then the usecStatsUnauthorizedOperations



<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 27]</span></pre>
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        counter is incremented, a report PDU is generated, and the
        received message is discarded without further processing.

     b) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        remote, then the SNMPv2-Trap operation represented by the PDUs
        value is performed by the receiving SNMPv2 entity according to
        the procedures set forth in [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">12</a>].

     c) if the LCD information indicates the SNMPv2 context is of type
        remote-proxy, then:

        i. a unique request-id is selected for use in forwarding the
           message.

        ii. information is extracted from the LCD concerning all
           combinations of userName, qoS, agentID, contextSelector and
           transport address with which the received message is to be
           forwarded.

        iii. for each such combination whose access rights permit
           SNMPv2-Trap operations to be forwarded, a new SNMPv2 message
           is constructed, as follows: its PDUs component is copied from
           that in the received message except that the contained
           request-id is replaced by the value selected in Step i above;
           its &lt;userName&gt;, &lt;qoS&gt;, &lt;agentID&gt; and &lt;contextSelector&gt; fields
           are set to the values extracted in Step ii above.

        iv. each constructed message is forwarded to the appropriate
           transport address extracted from the LCD in step ii above.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>.  Additional Details</span>

   For the sake of clarity and to prevent the above procedure from being
   even longer, the following details were omitted from the above
   procedure.

<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1.1" href="#section-3.2.1.1">3.2.1.1</a>.  ASN.1 Parsing Errors</span>

   For ASN.1 parsing errors, the snmpInASNParseErrs counter [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>] is
   incremented and a report PDU is generated whenever such an ASN.1
   parsing error is discovered.  However, if the parsing error causes
   the information able to be extracted from the message to be
   insufficient for generating a report PDU, then the report PDU is not
   sent.







<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 28]</span></pre>
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<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1.2" href="#section-3.2.1.2">3.2.1.2</a>.  Incorrectly Encoded Parameters</span>

   For an incorrectly encoded parameters component of the Message value
   (e.g., incorrect or inconsistent value of the &lt;userLen&gt; or &lt;authLen&gt;
   fields), the usecStatsBadParameters counter is incremented. Since the
   encoded parameters are in error, the report flag in the qoS cannot be
   reliably determined. Thus, no report PDU is generated for the
   incorrectly encoded parameters error condition.

<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1.3" href="#section-3.2.1.3">3.2.1.3</a>.  Generation of a Report PDU</span>

   Some steps specify that the received message is discarded without
   further processing whenever a report PDU is generated.  However:

  -  An SNMPv2 manager never generates a report PDU.

  -  If the operation type can reliably be determined and it is
     determined to be a Report, SNMPv2-Trap, Inform, or a Response then
     a report PDU is not generated.

  -  A report PDU is only generated when the report flag in the qoS is
     set to the value 1.

   A generated report PDU must always use the current values of agentID,
   agentBoots, and agentTime from the LCD.  In addition, a generated
   report PDU must whenever possible contain the same request-id value
   as in the PDU contained in the received message.  Meeting this
   constraint normally requires the message to be further processed just
   enough so as to extract its request-id. There are two situations in
   which the SNMPv2 request-id cannot be determined. The first situation
   occurs when the userName is unknown and the qoS indicates that the
   message is encrypted.  The other situation is when there is an ASN.1
   parsing error.  In cases where the the request-id cannot be
   determined, the default request-id value 2147483647 is used.

<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1.4" href="#section-3.2.1.4">3.2.1.4</a>.  Cache Timeout</span>

   Some steps specify that information is cached so that a Response
   operation may be correlated to the appropriate Request operation.
   However, a number of situations could cause the cache to grow without
   bound. One such situation is when the Response operation does not
   arrive or arrives "late" at the entity. In order to ensure that the
   cache does not grow without bound, it is recommended that cache
   entries be deleted when they are determined to be no longer valid. It
   is an implementation dependent decision as to how long cache entries
   remain valid, however, caching entries more than 150 seconds is not
   useful since any use of the cache entry after that time would
   generate a usecStatsNotInWindows error condition.



<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 29]</span></pre>
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>.  Generating a Response</span>

   The procedure for generating a response to an SNMPv2 management
   request is identical to the procedure for transmitting a request (see
   <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>), with these exceptions:

  -  The response is sent on behalf of the same user and with the same
     value of the agentID and contextSelector as the request.

  -  The PDUs value of the responding Message value is the response
     which results from performing the operation specified in the
     original PDUs value.

  -  The authentication protocol and other relevant information for the
     user is obtained, not from the LCD, but rather from information
     cached (in Step 13d) when processing the original message.

  -  The serialized Message value is transmitted using any transport
     address belonging to the agent for the transport domain from which
     the corresponding request originated - even if that is different
     from any transport information obtained from the LCD.

  -  If the qoS specifies that the message is to be authenticated or the
     response is being generated by a SNMPv2 entity acting in an agent
     role, then the current values of agentBoots and agentTime from the
     LCD are used.  Otherwise, the &lt;agentBoots&gt; and &lt;agentTime&gt; fields
     are set to zero-filled octets.

  -  The report flag in the qoS is set to the value 0.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>.  Discovery</span>

   This security model requires that a discovery process obtain
   sufficient information about an SNMPv2 entity's agent in order to
   communicate with it.  Discovery requires the SNMPv2 manager to learn
   the agent's agentID value before communication may proceed.  This may
   be accomplished by formulating a get-request communication with the
   qoS set to noAuth/noPriv, the userName set to "public", the agentID
   set to all zeros (binary), the contextSelector set to "", and the
   VarBindList left empty.  The response to this message will be an
   reportPDU that contains the agentID within the &lt;parameters&gt; field
   (and containing the usecStatsUnknownContexts counter in the
   VarBindList). If authenticated communication is required then the
   discovery process may invoke the procedure described in <a href="#section-2.7">Section 2.7</a>
   to synchronize the clocks.






<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 30]</span></pre>
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1910">RFC 1910</a>          User-based Security Model for SNMPv2     February 1996</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>.  Definitions</span>

SNMPv2-USEC-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS
    MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, Counter32, Unsigned32,
    snmpModules
        FROM SNMPv2-SMI
    TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
        FROM SNMPv2-TC
    MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP
        FROM SNMPv2-CONF;


usecMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
    LAST-UPDATED "9601120000Z"
    ORGANIZATION "IETF SNMPv2 Working Group"
    CONTACT-INFO
            "        Glenn W. Waters

             Postal: Bell-Northern Research, Ltd.
                     P.O. Box 3511, Station C
                     Ottawa, ON, K1Y 4H7
                     Canada

                Tel: +1 613 763 3933

             E-mail: gwaters@bnr.ca"
    DESCRIPTION
            "The MIB module for SNMPv2 entities implementing the user-
            based security model."
    ::= { snmpModules 6 }


usecMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usecMIB 1 }


-- Textual Conventions

AgentID ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION
            "An agent's administratively-unique identifier.

            The value for this object may not be all zeros or all 'ff'H.

            The initial value for this object may be configured via an
            operator console entry or via an algorithmic function.  In



<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 31]</span></pre>
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            the later case, the following guidelines are recommended:

              1) The first four octets are set to the binary equivalent
                 of the agent's SNMP network management private
                 enterprise number as assigned by the Internet Assigned
                 Numbers Authority (IANA).  For example, if Acme
                 Networks has been assigned { enterprises 696 }, the
                 first four octets would be assigned '000002b8'H.

              2) The remaining eight octets are the cookie whose
                 contents are determined via one or more enterprise-
                 specific methods.  Such methods must be designed so as
                 to maximize the possibility that the value of this
                 object will be unique in the agent's administrative
                 domain.  For example, the cookie may be the IP address
                 of the agent, or the MAC address of one of the
                 interfaces, with each address suitably padded with
                 random octets.  If multiple methods are defined, then
                 it is recommended that the cookie be further divided
                 into one octet that indicates the method being used and
                 seven octets which are a function of the method."
    SYNTAX     OCTET STRING (SIZE (12))


-- the USEC Basic group
--
-- a collection of objects providing basic instrumentation of
-- the SNMPv2 entity implementing the user-based security model


usecAgent       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usecMIBObjects 1 }

agentID OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     AgentID
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The agent's administratively-unique identifier."
    ::= { usecAgent 1 }

agentBoots OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     Unsigned32
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The number of times that the agent has re-initialized
            itself since its initial configuration."
    ::= { usecAgent 2 }



<span class="grey">Waters                        Experimental                     [Page 32]</span></pre>
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agentTime OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     Unsigned32 (0..2147483647)
    UNITS      "seconds"
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The number of seconds since the agent last incremented the
            agentBoots object."
    ::= { usecAgent 3 }

agentSize OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     INTEGER (484..65507)
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The maximum length in octets of an SNMPv2 message which
            this agent will accept using any transport mapping."
    ::= { usecAgent 4 }


-- USEC statistics
--
-- a collection of objects providing basic instrumentation of
-- the SNMPv2 entity implementing the user-based security model

usecStats      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usecMIBObjects 2 }


usecStatsUnsupportedQoS OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The total number of packets received by the SNMPv2 entity
            which were dropped because they requested a quality-of-
            service that was unknown to the agent or otherwise
            unavailable."
    ::= { usecStats 1 }

usecStatsNotInWindows OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The total number of packets received by the SNMPv2 entity
            which were dropped because they appeared outside of the
            agent's window."
    ::= { usecStats 2 }



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usecStatsUnknownUserNames OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The total number of packets received by the SNMPv2 entity
            which were dropped because they referenced a user that was
            not known to the agent."
    ::= { usecStats 3 }

usecStatsWrongDigestValues OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The total number of packets received by the SNMPv2 entity
            which were dropped because they didn't contain the expected
            digest value."
    ::= { usecStats 4 }

usecStatsUnknownContexts OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The total number of packets received by the SNMPv2 entity
            which were dropped because they referenced a context that
            was not known to the agent."
    ::= { usecStats 5 }

usecStatsBadParameters OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The total number of packets received by the SNMPv2 entity
            which were dropped because the &lt;parameters&gt; field was
            improperly encoded or had invalid syntax."
    ::= { usecStats 6 }

usecStatsUnauthorizedOperations OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX     Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS     current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The total number of packets received by the SNMPv2 entity
            which were dropped because the PDU type referred to an
            operation that is invalid or not authorized."



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    ::= { usecStats 7 }


-- conformance information

usecMIBConformance
               OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usecMIB 2 }

usecMIBCompliances
               OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usecMIBConformance 1 }
usecMIBGroups  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usecMIBConformance 2 }


-- compliance statements

usecMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
    STATUS  current
    DESCRIPTION
            "The compliance statement for SNMPv2 entities which
            implement the SNMPv2 USEC model."
    MODULE  -- this module
        MANDATORY-GROUPS { usecBasicGroup,
                          usecStatsGroup }
    ::= { usecMIBCompliances 1 }


-- units of conformance

usecBasicGroup OBJECT-GROUP
    OBJECTS { agentID,
              agentBoots,
              agentTime,
              agentSize }
    STATUS  current
    DESCRIPTION
            "A collection of objects providing identification, clocks,
            and capabilities of an SNMPv2 entity which implements the
            SNMPv2 USEC model."
    ::= { usecMIBGroups 1 }

usecStatsGroup OBJECT-GROUP
    OBJECTS { usecStatsUnsupportedQoS,
              usecStatsNotInWindows,
              usecStatsUnknownUserNames,
              usecStatsWrongDigestValues,
              usecStatsUnknownContexts,
              usecStatsBadParameters,
              usecStatsUnauthorizedOperations }



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    STATUS  current
    DESCRIPTION
            "A collection of objects providing basic error statistics of
            an SNMPv2 entity which implements the SNMPv2 USEC model."
    ::= { usecMIBGroups 2 }

END

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>.  Security Considerations</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>.  Recommended Practices</span>

   This section describes practices that contribute to the secure,
   effective operation of the mechanisms defined in this memo.

  -  A management station must discard SNMPv2 responses for which
     neither the request-id component nor the represented management
     information corresponds to any currently outstanding request.

     Although it would be typical for a management station to do this as
     a matter of course, when using these security protocols it is
     significant due to the possibility of message duplication
     (malicious or otherwise).

  -  A management station must generate unpredictable request-ids in
     authenticated messages in order to protect against the possibility
     of message duplication (malicious or otherwise).

  -  A management station should perform time synchronization using
     authenticated messages in order to protect against the possibility
     of message duplication (malicious or otherwise).

  -  When sending state altering messages to a managed agent, a
     management station should delay sending successive messages to the
     managed agent until a positive acknowledgement is received for the
     previous message or until the previous message expires.

     No message ordering is imposed by the SNMPv2. Messages may be
     received in any order relative to their time of generation and each
     will be processed in the ordered received. Note that when an
     authenticated message is sent to a managed agent, it will be valid
     for a period of time of approximately 150 seconds under normal
     circumstances, and is subject to replay during this period.
     Indeed, a management station must cope with the loss and re-
     ordering of messages resulting from anomalies in the network as a
     matter of course.





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     However, a managed object, snmpSetSerialNo [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>], is specifically
     defined for use with SNMPv2 set operations in order to provide a
     mechanism to ensure the processing of SNMPv2 messages occurs in a
     specific order.

  -  The frequency with which the secrets of an SNMPv2 user should be
     changed is indirectly related to the frequency of their use.

     Protecting the secrets from disclosure is critical to the overall
     security of the protocols. Frequent use of a secret provides a
     continued source of data that may be useful to a cryptanalyst in
     exploiting known or perceived weaknesses in an algorithm.  Frequent
     changes to the secret avoid this vulnerability.

     Changing a secret after each use is generally regarded as the most
     secure practice, but a significant amount of overhead may be
     associated with that approach.

     Note, too, in a local environment the threat of disclosure may be
     less significant, and as such the changing of secrets may be less
     frequent.  However, when public data networks are the communication
     paths, more caution is prudent.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>.  Defining Users</span>

   The mechanisms defined in this document employ the notion of "users"
   having access rights.  How "users" are defined is subject to the
   security policy of the network administration. For example, users
   could be individuals (e.g., "joe" or "jane"), or a particular role
   (e.g., "operator" or "administrator"), or a combination (e.g., "joe-
   operator", "jane-operator" or "joe-admin").  Furthermore, a "user"
   may be a logical entity, such as a manager station application or set
   of manager station applications, acting on behalf of a individual or
   role, or set of individuals, or set of roles, including combinations.

   <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> describes an algorithm for mapping a user "password" to a
   16 octet value for use as either a user's authentication key or
   privacy key (or both).  Passwords are often generated, remembered,
   and input by a human.  Human-generated passwords may be less than the
   16 octets required by the authentication and privacy protocols, and
   brute force attacks can be quite easy on a relatively short ASCII
   character set.  Therefore, the algorithm is <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> performs a
   transformation on the password.  If the <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> algorithm is used,
   agent implementations (and agent configuration applications) must
   ensure that passwords are at least 8 characters in length.

   Because the <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> algorithm uses such passwords (nearly)
   directly, it is very important that they not be easily guessed.  It



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   is suggested that they be composed of mixed-case alphanumeric and
   punctuation characters that don't form words or phrases that might be
   found in a dictionary.  Longer passwords improve the security of the
   system.  Users may wish to input multiword phrases to make their
   password string longer while ensuring that it is memorable.

   Note that there is security risk in configuring the same "user" on
   multiple systems where the same password is used on each system,
   since the compromise of that user's secrets on one system results in
   the compromise of that user on all other systems having the same
   password.

   The algorithm in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> avoids this problem by including the
   agent's agentID value as well as the user's password in the
   calculation of a user's secrets; this results in the user's secrets
   being different at different agents; however, if the password is
   compromised the algorithm in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> is not effective.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>.  Conformance</span>

   To be termed a "Secure SNMPv2 implementation", an SNMPv2
   implementation:

 - must implement the Digest Authentication Protocol.

 - must, to the maximal extent possible, prohibit access to the
   secret(s) of each user about which it maintains information in a LCD,
   under all circumstances except as required to generate and/or
   validate SNMPv2 messages with respect to that user.

 - must implement the SNMPv2 USEC MIB.

   In addition, an SNMPv2 agent must provide initial configuration in
   accordance with <a href="#appendix-A.1">Appendix A.1</a>.

   Implementation of the Symmetric Encryption Protocol is optional.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>.  Editor's Address</span>

   Glenn W. Waters
   Bell-Northern Research Ltd.
   P.O. Box 3511, Station C
   Ottawa, Ontario  K1Y 4H7
   CA

   Phone: +1 613 763 3933
   EMail: gwaters@bnr.ca




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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>.  Acknowledgements</span>

   This document is the result of significant work by three major
   contributors:

     Keith McCloghrie (Cisco Systems, kzm@cisco.com)
     Marshall T. Rose (Dover Beach Consulting, mrose@dbc.mtview.ca.us)
     Glenn W. Waters (Bell-Northern Research Ltd., gwaters@bnr.ca)

   The authors wish to acknowledge James M. Galvin of Trusted
   Information Systems who contributed significantly to earlier work on
   which this memo is based, and the general contributions of members of
   the SNMPv2 Working Group, and, in particular, Aleksey Y. Romanov and
   Steven L. Waldbusser.

   A special thanks is extended for the contributions of:

     Uri Blumenthal (IBM)
     Shawn Routhier (Epilogue)
     Barry Sheehan (IBM)
     Bert Wijnen (IBM)

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>.  References</span>

[<a id="ref-1">1</a>]  McCloghrie, K., Editor, "An Administrative Infrastructure for
     SNMPv2", <a href="./rfc1909">RFC 1909</a>, Cisco Systems, January 1996.

[<a id="ref-2">2</a>]  Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin, "Simple
     Network Management Protocol", STD 15, <a href="./rfc1157">RFC 1157</a>, SNMP Research,
     Performance Systems International, MIT Laboratory for Computer
     Science, May 1990.

[<a id="ref-3">3</a>]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>, MIT
     Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992.

[<a id="ref-4">4</a>]  The SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and
     S. Waldbusser, "Coexistence between Version 1 and Version 2 of
     the Internet-standard Network Management Framework", <a href="./rfc1908">RFC 1908</a>,
     January 1996.

[<a id="ref-5">5</a>]  Data Encryption Standard, National Institute of Standards and
     Technology.  Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
     Publication 46-1.  Supersedes FIPS Publication 46, (January, 1977;
     reaffirmed January, 1988).

[<a id="ref-6">6</a>]  Data Encryption Algorithm, American National Standards Institute.
     ANSI X3.92-1981, (December, 1980).




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[<a id="ref-7">7</a>]  DES Modes of Operation, National Institute of Standards and
     Technology.  Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
     Publication 81, (December, 1980).

[<a id="ref-8">8</a>]  Data Encryption Algorithm - Modes of Operation, American National
     Standards Institute.  ANSI X3.106-1983, (May 1983).

[<a id="ref-9">9</a>]  Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Data Encryption
     Standard, National Institute of Standards and Technology.  Federal
     Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 74, (April,
     1981).

[<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Validating the Correctness of Hardware Implementations of the NBS
     Data Encryption Standard, National Institute of Standards and
     Technology.  Special Publication 500-20.

[<a id="ref-11">11</a>] Maintenance Testing for the Data Encryption Standard, National
     Institute of Standards and Technology.  Special Publication 500-61,
     (August, 1980).

[<a id="ref-12">12</a>] The SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and
     S., Waldbusser, "Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple
     Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", <a href="./rfc1905">RFC 1905</a>, January 1996.

[<a id="ref-13">13</a>] The SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and
     S. Waldbusser, "Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple
     Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", <a href="./rfc1906">RFC 1906</a>, January 1996.

[<a id="ref-14">14</a>] Krawczyk, H., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&amp;q=inurl:draft-+%22Keyed-MD5+for+Message+Authentication%22'>"Keyed-MD5 for Message Authentication"</a>, Work in
     Progress, IBM, June 1995.

[<a id="ref-15">15</a>] The SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and
     S. Waldbusser, "Management Information Base for Version 2 of the
     Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", <a href="./rfc1907">RFC 1907</a>
     January 1996.
















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APPENDIX A - Installation

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>.   Agent Installation Parameters</span>

During installation, an agent is configured with several parameters.
These include:

(1)  a security posture

     The choice of security posture determines the extent of the view
     configured for unauthenticated access.  One of three possible
     choices is selected:

          minimum-secure,
          semi-secure, or
          very-secure.

(2)  one or more transport service addresses

     These parameters may be specified explicitly, or they may be
     specified implicitly as the same set of network-layer addresses
     configured for other uses by the device together with the well-
     known transport-layer "port" information for the appropriate
     transport domain [<a href="#ref-13" title="&quot;Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">13</a>].  The agent listens on each of these
     transport service addresses for messages sent on behalf of any user
     it knows about.

(3)  one or more secrets

     These are the authentication/privacy secrets for the first user to
     be configured.

     One way to accomplish this is to have the installer enter a
     "password" for each required secret. The password is then
     algorithmically converted into the required secret by:

     - forming a string of length 1,048,576 octets by repeating the
       value of the password as often as necessary, truncating
       accordingly, and using the resulting string as the input to the
       MD5 algorithm. The resulting digest, termed "digest1", is used in
       the next step.

     - a second string of length 44 octets is formed by concatenating
       digest1, the agent's agentID value, and digest1. This string is
       used as input to the MD5 algorithm. The resulting digest is the
       required secret (see <a href="#appendix-A.2">Appendix A.2</a>).





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   With these configured parameters, the agent instantiates the
   following user, context, views and access rights.  This configuration
   information should be readOnly (persistent).

  -  One user:

                         privacy not supported   privacy supported
                         ---------------------   -----------------
       &lt;userName&gt;        "public"                "public"
       &lt;authProtocol&gt;    Digest Auth. Protocol   Digest Auth. Protocol
       &lt;authPrivateKey&gt;  authentication key      authentication key
       &lt;privProtocol&gt;    none                    Symmetric Privacy Protocol
       &lt;privPrivateKey&gt;  --                      privacy key

  -  One local context with its &lt;contextSelector&gt; as the empty-string.

  -  One view for authenticated access:

          - the &lt;all&gt; MIB view is the "internet" subtree.

  -  A second view for unauthenticated access.  This view is configured
     according to the selected security posture.  For the "very-secure"
     posture:

          - the &lt;restricted&gt; MIB view is the union of the "snmp" [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>],
          "usecAgent" and "usecStats" subtrees.

     For the "semi-secure" posture:

          - the &lt;restricted&gt; MIB view is the union of the "snmp" [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Management Information Base for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)&quot;">15</a>],
          "usecAgent", "usecStats" and "system" subtrees.

     For the "minimum-secure" posture:

          - the &lt;restricted&gt; MIB view is the "internet" subtree.

  -  Access rights to allow:

        - read-only access for unauthenticated messages on behalf of the
          user "public" to the &lt;restricted&gt; MIB view of contextSelector
          "".

        - read-write access for authenticated but not private messages
          on behalf of the user "public" to the &lt;all&gt; MIB view of
          contextSelector "".

        - if privacy is supported, read-write access for authenticated
          and private messages on behalf of the user "public" to the



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          &lt;all&gt; MIB view of contextSelector "".

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>.   Password to Key Algorithm</span>

   The following code fragment demonstrates the password to key
   algorithm which can be used when mapping a password to an
   authentication or privacy key. (The calls to MD5 are as documented in
   <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>.)

void password_to_key(password, passwordlen, agentID, key)
    u_char *password;       /* IN */
    u_int   passwordlen;    /* IN */
    u_char *agentID;        /* IN - pointer to 12 octet long agentID */
    u_char *key;            /* OUT - caller supplies pointer to 16
                               octet buffer */ {
    MD5_CTX     MD;
    u_char      *cp, password_buf[64];
    u_long      password_index = 0;
    u_long      count = 0, i;

    MD5Init (&amp;MD);   /* initialize MD5 */

    /* loop until we've done 1 Megabyte */
    while (count &lt; 1048576) {
        cp = password_buf;
        for(i = 0; i &lt; 64; i++) {
            *cp++ = password[ password_index++ % passwordlen ];
            /*
             * Take the next byte of the password, wrapping to the
             * beginning of the password as necessary.
             */
        }
        MDupdate (&amp;MD, password_buf, 64);
        count += 64;
    }
    MD5Final (key, &amp;MD);              /* tell MD5 we're done */

    /* localize the key with the agentID and pass through MD5
      to produce final key */
    memcpy (password_buf, key, 16);
    memcpy (password_buf+16, agentID, 12);
    memcpy (password_buf+28, key, 16);

    MD5Init (&amp;MD);
    MDupdate (&amp;MD, password_buf, 44);
    MD5Final (key, &amp;MD);

    return; }



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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.3" href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>.   Password to Key Sample</span>

   The following shows a sample output of the password to key algorithm.

   With a password of "maplesyrup" the output of the password to key
   algorithm before the key is localized with the agent's agentID is:

    '9f af 32 83 88 4e 92 83 4e bc 98 47 d8 ed d9 63'H

   After the intermediate key (shown above) is localized with the
   agentID value of:

    '00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02'H

   the final output of the password to key algorithm is:

    '52 6f 5e ed 9f cc e2 6f 89 64 c2 93 07 87 d8 2b'H


































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</pre>