<pre>Network Working Group                                     P. Eronen, Ed.
Request for Comments: 4555                                         Nokia
Category: Standards Track                                      June 2006


            <span class="h1">IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE)</span>

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This document describes the MOBIKE protocol, a mobility and
   multihoming extension to Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2).  MOBIKE
   allows the IP addresses associated with IKEv2 and tunnel mode IPsec
   Security Associations to change.  A mobile Virtual Private Network
   (VPN) client could use MOBIKE to keep the connection with the VPN
   gateway active while moving from one address to another.  Similarly,
   a multihomed host could use MOBIKE to move the traffic to a different
   interface if, for instance, the one currently being used stops
   working.





















<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                     [Page 1]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


Table of Contents

   <a href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-3">3</a>
     <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>.  Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-3">3</a>
     <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>.  Scope and Limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-4">4</a>
     <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>.  Terminology and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-4">4</a>
   <a href="#section-2">2</a>.  Protocol Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-5">5</a>
     <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>.  Basic Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-5">5</a>
     <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>.  Example Protocol Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-6">6</a>
     <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>.  MOBIKE and Network Address Translation (NAT) . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-9">9</a>
   <a href="#section-3">3</a>.  Protocol Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
     <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>.  Initial IKE Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
     <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>.  Signaling Support for MOBIKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
     <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>.  Initial Tunnel Header Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
     <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>.  Additional Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
     <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>.  Changing Addresses in IPsec SAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
     <a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>.  Updating Additional Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
     <a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>.  Return Routability Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
     <a href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>.  Changes in NAT Mappings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
     <a href="#section-3.9">3.9</a>.  NAT Prohibition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
     <a href="#section-3.10">3.10</a>. Path Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
     <a href="#section-3.11">3.11</a>. Failure Recovery and Timeouts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
     <a href="#section-3.12">3.12</a>. Dead Peer Detection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
   <a href="#section-4">4</a>.  Payload Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
     <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>.  Notify Messages - Error Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
     <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>.  Notify Messages - Status Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
   <a href="#section-5">5</a>.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
     <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>.  Traffic Redirection and Hijacking  . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
     <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>.  IPsec Payload Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
     <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>.  Denial-of-Service Attacks against Third Parties  . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
     <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>.  Spoofing Network Connectivity Indications  . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a>
     <a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>.  Address and Topology Disclosure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
   <a href="#section-6">6</a>.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
   <a href="#section-7">7</a>.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
   <a href="#section-8">8</a>.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
     <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
     <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
   <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
     <a href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>.  Links from SPD Cache to Outbound SAD Entries . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
     <a href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>.  Creating Outbound SAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>











<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                     [Page 2]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>.  Motivation</span>

   IKEv2 is used for performing mutual authentication, as well as
   establishing and maintaining IPsec Security Associations (SAs).  In
   the base IKEv2 protocol [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>], the IKE SAs and tunnel mode IPsec
   SAs are created implicitly between the IP addresses that are used
   when the IKE_SA is established.  These IP addresses are then used as
   the outer (tunnel header) addresses for tunnel mode IPsec packets
   (transport mode IPsec SAs are beyond the scope of this document).
   Currently, it is not possible to change these addresses after the
   IKE_SA has been created.

   There are scenarios where these IP addresses might change.  One
   example is mobility: a host changes its point of network attachment
   and receives a new IP address.  Another example is a multihoming host
   that would like to change to a different interface if, for instance,
   the currently used interface stops working for some reason.

   Although the problem can be solved by creating new IKE and IPsec SAs
   when the addresses need to be changed, this may not be optimal for
   several reasons.  In some cases, creating a new IKE_SA may require
   user interaction for authentication, such as entering a code from a
   token card.  Creating new SAs often involves expensive calculations
   and possibly a large number of round-trips.  For these reasons, a
   mechanism for updating the IP addresses of existing IKE and IPsec SAs
   is needed.  The MOBIKE protocol described in this document provides
   such a mechanism.

   The main scenario for MOBIKE is enabling a remote access VPN user to
   move from one address to another without re-establishing all security
   associations with the VPN gateway.  For instance, a user could start
   from fixed Ethernet in the office and then disconnect the laptop and
   move to the office's wireless LAN.  When the user leaves the office,
   the laptop could start using General Packet Radio Service (GPRS);
   when the user arrives home, the laptop could switch to the home
   wireless LAN.  MOBIKE updates only the outer (tunnel header)
   addresses of IPsec SAs, and the addresses and other traffic selectors
   used inside the tunnel stay unchanged.  Thus, mobility can be
   (mostly) invisible to applications and their connections using the
   VPN.









<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                     [Page 3]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   MOBIKE also supports more complex scenarios where the VPN gateway
   also has several network interfaces: these interfaces could be
   connected to different networks or ISPs, they may be a mix of IPv4
   and IPv6 addresses, and the addresses may change over time.
   Furthermore, both parties could be VPN gateways relaying traffic for
   other parties.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>.  Scope and Limitations</span>

   This document focuses on the main scenario outlined above and
   supports only tunnel mode IPsec SAs.

   The mobility support in MOBIKE allows both parties to move, but does
   not provide a "rendezvous" mechanism that would allow simultaneous
   movement of both parties or discovery of the addresses when the
   IKE_SA is first established.  Therefore, MOBIKE is best suited for
   situations where the address of at least one endpoint is relatively
   stable and can be discovered using existing mechanisms such as DNS
   (see <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>).

   MOBIKE allows both parties to be multihomed; however, only one pair
   of addresses is used for an SA at a time.  In particular, load
   balancing is beyond the scope of this specification.

   MOBIKE follows the IKEv2 practice where a response message is sent to
   the same address and port from which the request was received.  This
   implies that MOBIKE does not work over address pairs that provide
   only unidirectional connectivity.

   Network Address Translators (NATs) introduce additional limitations
   beyond those listed above.  For details, refer to <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>.

   The base version of the MOBIKE protocol does not cover all potential
   future use scenarios, such as transport mode, application to securing
   SCTP, or optimizations desirable in specific circumstances.  Future
   extensions may be defined later to support additional requirements.
   Please consult the MOBIKE design document [<a href="#ref-Design" title="&quot;Design of the MOBIKE protocol&quot;">Design</a>] for further
   information and rationale behind these limitations.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>.  Terminology and Notation</span>

   When messages containing IKEv2 payloads are described, optional
   payloads are shown in brackets (for instance, "[FOO]"), and a plus
   sign indicates that a payload can be repeated one or more times (for
   instance, "FOO+").  To provide context, some diagrams also show what
   existing IKEv2 payloads would typically be included in the exchanges.
   These payloads are shown for illustrative purposes only; see [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>]
   for an authoritative description.



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                     [Page 4]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   When this document describes updating the source/destination
   addresses of an IPsec SA, it means updating IPsec-related state so
   that outgoing Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)/Authentication
   Header (AH) packets use those addresses in the tunnel header.
   Depending on how the nominal divisions between Security Association
   Database (SAD), Security Policy Database (SPD), and Peer
   Authorization Database (PAD) described in [<a href="#ref-IPsecArch" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">IPsecArch</a>] are actually
   implemented, an implementation can have several different places that
   have to be updated.

   In this document, the term "initiator" means the party who originally
   initiated the first IKE_SA (in a series of possibly several rekeyed
   IKE_SAs); "responder" is the other peer.  During the lifetime of the
   IKE_SA, both parties may initiate INFORMATIONAL or CREATE_CHILD_SA
   exchanges; in this case, the terms "exchange initiator" and "exchange
   responder" are used.  The term "original initiator" (which in [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>]
   refers to the party who started the latest IKE_SA rekeying) is not
   used in this document.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="#ref-KEYWORDS" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">KEYWORDS</a>].

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>.  Protocol Overview</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>.  Basic Operation</span>

   MOBIKE allows both parties to have several addresses, and there are
   up to N*M pairs of IP addresses that could potentially be used.  The
   decision of which of these pairs to use has to take into account
   several factors.  First, the parties may have preferences about which
   interface should be used due to, for instance, performance and cost
   reasons.  Second, the decision is constrained by the fact that some
   of the pairs may not work at all due to incompatible IP versions,
   outages in the network, problems at the local link at either end, and
   so on.

   MOBIKE solves this problem by taking a simple approach: the party
   that initiated the IKE_SA (the "client" in a remote access VPN
   scenario) is responsible for deciding which address pair is used for
   the IPsec SAs and for collecting the information it needs to make
   this decision (such as determining which address pairs work or do not
   work).  The other party (the "gateway" in a remote access VPN
   scenario) simply tells the initiator what addresses it has, but does
   not update the IPsec SAs until it receives a message from the
   initiator to do so.  This approach applies to the addresses in the
   IPsec SAs; in the IKE_SA case, the exchange initiator can decide
   which addresses are used.



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                     [Page 5]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   Making the decision at the initiator is consistent with how normal
   IKEv2 works: the initiator decides which addresses it uses when
   contacting the responder.  It also makes sense, especially when the
   initiator is a mobile node: it is in a better position to decide
   which of its network interfaces should be used for both upstream and
   downstream traffic.

   The details of exactly how the initiator makes the decision, what
   information is used in making it, how the information is collected,
   how preferences affect the decision, and when a decision needs to be
   changed are largely beyond the scope of MOBIKE.  This does not mean
   that these details are unimportant: on the contrary, they are likely
   to be crucial in any real system.  However, MOBIKE is concerned with
   these details only to the extent that they are visible in IKEv2/IPsec
   messages exchanged between the peers (and thus need to be
   standardized to ensure interoperability).

   Many of these issues are not specific to MOBIKE, but are common with
   the use of existing hosts in dynamic environments or with mobility
   protocols such as Mobile IP [<a href="#ref-MIP4" title="&quot;IP Mobility Support for IPv4&quot;">MIP4</a>] [<a href="#ref-MIP6" title="&quot;Mobility Support in IPv6&quot;">MIP6</a>].  A number of mechanisms
   already exist or are being developed to deal with these issues.  For
   instance, link-layer and IP-layer mechanisms can be used to track the
   status of connectivity within the local link [<a href="./rfc2461" title="&quot;Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)&quot;">RFC2461</a>]; movement
   detection is being specified for both IPv4 and IPv6 in [<a href="#ref-DNA4" title="&quot;Detecting Network Attachment in IPv4 (DNAv4)&quot;">DNA4</a>],
   [<a href="#ref-DNA6" title="&quot;Detecting Network Attachment in IPv6 - Best Current Practices for hosts&quot;">DNA6</a>], and so on.

   Naturally, updating the addresses of IPsec SAs has to take into
   account several security considerations.  MOBIKE includes two
   features designed to address these considerations.  First, a "return
   routability" check can be used to verify the addresses provided by
   the peer.  This makes it more difficult to flood third parties with
   large amounts of traffic.  Second, a "NAT prohibition" feature
   ensures that IP addresses have not been modified by NATs, IPv4/IPv6
   translation agents, or other similar devices.  This feature is
   enabled only when NAT Traversal is not used.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>.  Example Protocol Exchanges</span>

   A simple MOBIKE exchange in a mobile scenario is illustrated below.
   The notation is based on [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>], Section 1.2.  In addition, the
   source/destination IP addresses and ports are shown for each packet:
   here IP_I1, IP_I2, IP_R1, and IP_R2 represent IP addresses used by
   the initiator and the responder.








<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                     [Page 6]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


      Initiator                  Responder
     -----------                -----------
   1) (IP_I1:500 -&gt; IP_R1:500)
      HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
           N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
           N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  --&gt;

                            &lt;--  (IP_R1:500 -&gt; IP_I1:500)
                                 HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr,
                                      N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                      N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)

   2) (IP_I1:4500 -&gt; IP_R1:4500)
      HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
                CP(CFG_REQUEST),
                SAi2, TSi, TSr,
                N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED) }  --&gt;

                            &lt;--  (IP_R1:4500 -&gt; IP_I1:4500)
                                 HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
                                           CP(CFG_REPLY),
                                           SAr2, TSi, TSr,
                                           N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED) }

   (Initiator gets information from lower layers that its attachment
   point and address have changed.)

   3) (IP_I2:4500 -&gt; IP_R1:4500)
      HDR, SK { N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES),
                N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }  --&gt;

                            &lt;-- (IP_R1:4500 -&gt; IP_I2:4500)
                                HDR, SK { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                     N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }

   (Responder verifies that the initiator has given it a correct IP
   address.)

   4)                       &lt;-- (IP_R1:4500 -&gt; IP_I2:4500)
                                HDR, SK { N(COOKIE2) }

      (IP_I2:4500 -&gt; IP_R1:4500)
      HDR, SK { N(COOKIE2) }  --&gt;

   Step 1 is the normal IKE_INIT exchange.  In step 2, the peers inform
   each other that they support MOBIKE.  In step 3, the initiator
   notices a change in its own address, and informs the responder about



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                     [Page 7]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   this by sending an INFORMATIONAL request containing the
   UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification.  The request is sent using the new
   IP address.  At this point, it also starts to use the new address as
   a source address in its own outgoing ESP traffic.  Upon receiving the
   UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification, the responder records the new
   address and, if it is required by policy, performs a return
   routability check of the address.  When this check (step 4)
   completes, the responder starts to use the new address as the
   destination for its outgoing ESP traffic.

   Another protocol run in a multihoming scenario is illustrated below.
   In this scenario, the initiator has one address but the responder has
   two.

      Initiator                  Responder
     -----------                -----------
   1) (IP_I1:500 -&gt; IP_R1:500)
      HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
           N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
           N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  --&gt;

                            &lt;--  (IP_R1:500 -&gt; IP_I1:500)
                                 HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr,
                                      N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                      N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)

   2) (IP_I1:4500 -&gt; IP_R1:4500)
      HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
                CP(CFG_REQUEST),
                SAi2, TSi, TSr,
                N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED) }  --&gt;

                            &lt;--  (IP_R1:4500 -&gt; IP_I1:4500)
                                 HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
                                           CP(CFG_REPLY),
                                           SAr2, TSi, TSr,
                                           N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
                                           N(ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS) }

   (The initiator suspects a problem in the currently used address pair
   and probes its liveness.)










<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                     [Page 8]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   3) (IP_I1:4500 -&gt; IP_R1:4500)
      HDR, SK { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }  --&gt;

      (IP_I1:4500 -&gt; IP_R1:4500)
      HDR, SK { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }  --&gt;

      ...

   (Eventually, the initiator gives up on the current address pair and
   tests the other available address pair.)

   4) (IP_I1:4500 -&gt; IP_R2:4500)
      HDR, SK { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }

                            &lt;--  (IP_R2:4500 -&gt; IP_I1:4500)
                                 HDR, SK { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                      N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }

   (This worked, and the initiator requests the peer to switch to new
   addresses.)

   5) (IP_I1:4500 -&gt; IP_R2:4500)
      HDR, SK { N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES),
                N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
                N(COOKIE2) }  --&gt;

                            &lt;--  (IP_R2:4500 -&gt; IP_I1:4500)
                                 HDR, SK { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                      N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
                                      N(COOKIE2) }

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>.  MOBIKE and Network Address Translation (NAT)</span>

   In some MOBIKE scenarios, the network may contain NATs or stateful
   packet filters (for brevity, the rest of this document simply
   describes NATs).  The NAT Traversal feature specified in [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>]
   allows IKEv2 to work through NATs in many cases, and MOBIKE can
   leverage this functionality: when the addresses used for IPsec SAs
   are changed, MOBIKE can enable or disable IKEv2 NAT Traversal, as
   needed.

   Nevertheless, there are some limitations because NATs usually
   introduce an asymmetry into the network: only packets coming from the
   "inside" cause state to be created.  This asymmetry leads to



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                     [Page 9]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   restrictions on what MOBIKE can do.  To give a concrete example,
   consider a situation where both peers have only a single address, and
   the initiator is behind a NAT.  If the responder's address now
   changes, it needs to send a packet to the initiator using its new
   address.  However, if the NAT is, for instance, of the common
   "restricted cone" type (see [<a href="#ref-STUN" title="&quot;STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Through Network Address Translators (NATs)&quot;">STUN</a>] for one description of different
   NAT types), this is not possible.  The NAT will drop packets sent
   from the new address (unless the initiator has previously sent a
   packet to that address -- which it cannot do until it knows the
   address).

   For simplicity, MOBIKE does not attempt to handle all possible NAT-
   related scenarios.  Instead, MOBIKE assumes that if NATs are present,
   the initiator is the party "behind" the NAT, and the case where the
   responder's addresses change is not fully supported (meaning that no
   special effort is made to support this functionality).  Responders
   may also be unaware of NATs or specific types of NATs they are
   behind.  However, when a change has occurred that will cause a loss
   of connectivity, MOBIKE responders will still attempt to inform the
   initiator of the change.  Depending on, for instance, the exact type
   of NAT, it may or may not succeed.  However, analyzing the exact
   circumstances when this will or will not work is not done in this
   document.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>.  Protocol Exchanges</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>.  Initial IKE Exchange</span>

   The initiator is responsible for finding a working pair of addresses
   so that the initial IKE exchange can be carried out.  Any information
   from MOBIKE extensions will only be available later, when the
   exchange has progressed far enough.  Exactly how the addresses used
   for the initial exchange are discovered is beyond the scope of this
   specification; typical sources of information include local
   configuration and DNS.

   If either or both of the peers have multiple addresses, some
   combinations may not work.  Thus, the initiator SHOULD try various
   source and destination address combinations when retransmitting the
   IKE_SA_INIT request.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>.  Signaling Support for MOBIKE</span>

   Implementations that wish to use MOBIKE for a particular IKE_SA MUST
   include a MOBIKE_SUPPORTED notification in the IKE_AUTH exchange (in
   case of multiple IKE_AUTH exchanges, in the message containing the SA
   payload).




<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 10]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   The format of the MOBIKE_SUPPORTED notification is described in
   <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>.  Initial Tunnel Header Addresses</span>

   When an IPsec SA is created, the tunnel header IP addresses (and
   port, if doing UDP encapsulation) are taken from the IKE_SA, not the
   IP header of the IKEv2 message requesting the IPsec SA.  The
   addresses in the IKE_SA are initialized from the IP header of the
   first IKE_AUTH request.

   The addresses are taken from the IKE_AUTH request because IKEv2
   requires changing from port 500 to 4500 if a NAT is discovered.  To
   simplify things, implementations that support both this specification
   and NAT Traversal MUST change to port 4500 if the correspondent also
   supports both, even if no NAT was detected between them (this way,
   there is no need to change the ports later if a NAT is detected on
   some other path).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>.  Additional Addresses</span>

   Both the initiator and responder MAY include one or more
   ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and/or ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications in
   the IKE_AUTH exchange (in case of multiple IKE_AUTH exchanges, in the
   message containing the SA payload).  Here "ADDITIONAL_*_ADDRESS"
   means either an ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS or an ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS
   notification.

      Initiator                  Responder
     -----------                -----------
      HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT], [IDr], AUTH,
                [CP(CFG_REQUEST)]
                SAi2, TSi, TSr,
                N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
                [N(ADDITIONAL_*_ADDRESS)+] }  --&gt;

                            &lt;--  HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT], AUTH,
                                           [CP(CFG_REPLY)],
                                           SAr2, TSi, TSr,
                                           N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED)
                                           [N(ADDITIONAL_*_ADDRESS)+] }

   The recipient stores this information, but no other action is taken
   at this time.

   Although both the initiator and responder maintain a set of peer
   addresses (logically associated with the IKE_SA), it is important to
   note that they use this information for slightly different purposes.



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 11]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   The initiator uses the set of responder addresses as an input to its
   address selection policy; it may, at some later point, decide to move
   the IPsec traffic to one of these addresses using the procedure
   described in <a href="#section-3.5">Section 3.5</a>.  The responder normally does not use the
   set of initiator addresses for anything: the addresses are used only
   when the responder's own addresses change (see <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>).

   The set of addresses available to the peers can change during the
   lifetime of the IKE_SA.  The procedure for updating this information
   is described in <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>.

   Note that if some of the initiator's interfaces are behind a NAT
   (from the responder's point of view), the addresses received by the
   responder will be incorrect.  This means the procedure for changing
   responder addresses described in <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a> does not fully work when
   the initiator is behind a NAT.  For the same reason, the peers also
   SHOULD NOT use this information for any other purpose than what is
   explicitly described either in this document or a future
   specification updating it.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>.  Changing Addresses in IPsec SAs</span>

   In MOBIKE, the initiator decides what addresses are used in the IPsec
   SAs.  That is, the responder does not normally update any IPsec SAs
   without receiving an explicit UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES request from the
   initiator.  (As described below, the responder can, however, update
   the IKE_SA in some circumstances.)

   The reasons why the initiator wishes to change the addresses are
   largely beyond the scope of MOBIKE.  Typically, triggers include
   information received from lower layers, such as changes in IP
   addresses or link-down indications.  Some of this information can be
   unreliable: for instance, ICMP messages could be spoofed by an
   attacker.  Unreliable information SHOULD be treated only as a hint
   that there might be a problem, and the initiator SHOULD trigger Dead
   Peer Detection (that is, send an INFORMATIONAL request) to determine
   if the current path is still usable.

   Changing addresses can also be triggered by events within IKEv2.  At
   least the following events can cause the initiator to re-evaluate its
   local address selection policy, possibly leading to changing the
   addresses.

   o  An IKEv2 request has been re-transmitted several times, but no
      valid reply has been received.  This suggests the current path is
      no longer working.





<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 12]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   o  An INFORMATIONAL request containing an ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS,
      ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS, or NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES notification is
      received.  This means the peer's addresses may have changed.  This
      is particularly important if the announced set of addresses no
      longer contains the currently used address.

   o  An UNACCEPTABLE_ADDRESSES notification is received as a response
      to address update request (described below).

   o  The initiator receives a NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP notification
      that does not match the previous UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES response (see
      <a href="#section-3.8">Section 3.8</a> for a more detailed description).

   The description in the rest of this section assumes that the
   initiator has already decided what the new addresses should be.  When
   this decision has been made, the initiator:

   o  Updates the IKE_SA with the new addresses, and sets the
      "pending_update" flag in the IKE_SA.

   o  Updates the IPsec SAs associated with this IKE_SA with the new
      addresses (unless the initiator's policy requires a return
      routability check before updating the IPsec SAs, and the check has
      not been done for this responder address yet).

   o  If the IPsec SAs were updated in the previous step: If NAT
      Traversal is not enabled, and the responder supports NAT Traversal
      (as indicated by NAT detection payloads in the IKE_SA_INIT
      exchange), and the initiator either suspects or knows that a NAT
      is likely to be present, enables NAT Traversal (that is, enables
      UDP encapsulation of outgoing ESP packets and sending of NAT-
      Keepalive packets).

   o  If there are outstanding IKEv2 requests (requests for which the
      initiator has not yet received a reply), continues retransmitting
      them using the addresses in the IKE_SA (the new addresses).

   o  When the window size allows, sends an INFORMATIONAL request
      containing the UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification (which does not
      contain any data), and clears the "pending_update" flag.  The
      request will be as follows:










<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 13]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


      Initiator                  Responder
     -----------                -----------
      HDR, SK { N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES),
                [N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                 N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)],
                [N(NO_NATS_ALLOWED)],
                [N(COOKIE2)] } --&gt;

   o  If a new address change occurs while waiting for the response,
      starts again from the first step (and ignores responses to this
      UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES request).

   When processing an INFORMATIONAL request containing the
   UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification, the responder:

   o  Determines whether it has already received a newer
      UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES request than this one (if the responder uses a
      window size greater than one, it is possible that requests are
      received out of order).  If it has, a normal response message
      (described below) is sent, but no other action is taken.

   o  If the NO_NATS_ALLOWED notification is present, processes it as
      described in <a href="#section-3.9">Section 3.9</a>.

   o  Checks that the (source IP address, destination IP address) pair
      in the IP header is acceptable according to local policy.  If it
      is not, replies with a message containing the
      UNACCEPTABLE_ADDRESSES notification (and possibly COOKIE2).

   o  Updates the IP addresses in the IKE_SA with the values from the IP
      header.  (Using the address from the IP header is consistent with
      normal IKEv2, and allows IKEv2 to work with NATs without needing
      unilateral self-address fixing [<a href="#ref-UNSAF" title="&quot;IAB Considerations for UNilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) Across Network Address Translation&quot;">UNSAF</a>].)

   o  Replies with an INFORMATIONAL response:

      Initiator                  Responder
     -----------                -----------
                            &lt;--  HDR, SK { [N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                      N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)],
                                      [N(COOKIE2)] }

   o  If necessary, initiates a return routability check for the new
      initiator address (see <a href="#section-3.7">Section 3.7</a>) and waits until the check is
      completed.

   o  Updates the IPsec SAs associated with this IKE_SA with the new
      addresses.



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 14]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   o  If NAT Traversal is supported and NAT detection payloads were
      included, enables or disables NAT Traversal.

   When the initiator receives the reply:

   o  If an address change has occurred after the request was first
      sent, no MOBIKE processing is done for the reply message because a
      new UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES is going to be sent (or has already been
      sent, if window size greater than one is in use).

   o  If the response contains the UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED notification,
      the initiator processes the response as described in <a href="#section-3.9">Section 3.9</a>.

   o  If the response contains an UNACCEPTABLE_ADDRESSES notification,
      the initiator MAY select another addresses and retry the exchange,
      keep on using the previously used addresses, or disconnect.

   o  It updates the IPsec SAs associated with this IKE_SA with the new
      addresses (unless this was already done earlier before sending the
      request; this is the case when no return routability check was
      required).

   o  If NAT Traversal is supported and NAT detection payloads were
      included, the initiator enables or disables NAT Traversal.

   There is one exception to the rule that the responder never updates
   any IPsec SAs without receiving an UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES request.  If
   the source address that the responder is currently using becomes
   unavailable (i.e., sending packets using that source address is no
   longer possible), the responder is allowed to update the IPsec SAs to
   use some other address (in addition to initiating the procedure
   described in the next section).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>.  Updating Additional Addresses</span>

   As described in <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>, both the initiator and responder can
   send a list of additional addresses in the IKE_AUTH exchange.  This
   information can be updated by sending an INFORMATIONAL exchange
   request message that contains either one or more
   ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS/ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications or the
   NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES notification.

   If the exchange initiator has only a single IP address, it is placed
   in the IP header, and the message contains the
   NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES notification.  If the exchange initiator has
   several addresses, one of them is placed in the IP header, and the
   rest in ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS/ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications.




<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 15]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   The new list of addresses replaces the old information (in other
   words, there are no separate add/delete operations; instead, the
   complete list is sent every time these notifications are used).

   The message exchange will look as follows:

      Initiator                  Responder
     -----------                -----------
      HDR, SK { [N(ADDITIONAL_*_ADDRESS)+],
                [N(NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES)],
                [N(NO_NATS_ALLOWED)],
                [N(COOKIE2)] }  --&gt;

                            &lt;--  HDR, SK { [N(COOKIE2)] }

   When a request containing an ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS,
   ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS, or NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES notification is
   received, the exchange responder:

   o  Determines whether it has already received a newer request to
      update the addresses (if a window size greater than one is used,
      it is possible that the requests are received out of order).  If
      it has, a response message is sent, but the address set is not
      updated.

   o  If the NO_NATS_ALLOWED notification is present, processes it as
      described in <a href="#section-3.9">Section 3.9</a>.

   o  Updates the set of peer addresses based on the IP header and the
      ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS, ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS, and
      NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES notifications.

   o  Sends a response.

   The initiator MAY include these notifications in the same request as
   UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES.

   If the request to update the addresses is retransmitted using several
   different source addresses, a new INFORMATIONAL request MUST be sent.

   There is one additional complication: when the responder wants to
   update the address set, the currently used addresses may no longer
   work.  In this case, the responder uses the additional address list
   received from the initiator, and the list of its own addresses, to
   determine which addresses to use for sending the INFORMATIONAL
   request.  This is the only time the responder uses the additional
   address list received from the initiator.




<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 16]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   Note that both peers can have their own policies about what addresses
   are acceptable to use, and certain types of policies may simplify
   implementation.  For instance, if the responder has a single fixed
   address, it does not need to process the ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and
   ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications it receives (beyond ignoring
   unrecognized status notifications, as already required in [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>]).
   Furthermore, if the initiator has a policy saying that only the
   responder address specified in local configuration is acceptable, it
   does not have to send its own additional addresses to the responder
   (since the responder does not need them except when changing its own
   address).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>.  Return Routability Check</span>

   Both parties can optionally verify that the other party can actually
   receive packets at the claimed address.  By default, this "return
   routability check" SHOULD be performed.  In environments where the
   peer is expected to be well-behaved (many corporate VPNs, for
   instance), or the address can be verified by some other means (e.g.,
   a certificate issued by an authority trusted for this purpose), the
   return routability check MAY be omitted.

   The check can be done before updating the IPsec SAs, immediately
   after updating them, or continuously during the connection.  By
   default, the return routability check SHOULD be done before updating
   the IPsec SAs, but in some environments it MAY be postponed until
   after the IPsec SAs have been updated.

   Any INFORMATIONAL exchange can be used for return routability
   purposes, with one exception (described later in this section): when
   a valid response is received, we know the other party can receive
   packets at the claimed address.

   To ensure that the peer cannot generate the correct INFORMATIONAL
   response without seeing the request, a new payload is added to
   INFORMATIONAL messages.  The sender of an INFORMATIONAL request MAY
   include a COOKIE2 notification, and if included, the recipient of an
   INFORMATIONAL request MUST copy the notification as-is to the
   response.  When processing the response, the original sender MUST
   verify that the value is the same one as sent.  If the values do not
   match, the IKE_SA MUST be closed.  (See also <a href="#section-4.2.5">Section 4.2.5</a> for the
   format of the COOKIE2 notification.)









<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 17]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   The exception mentioned earlier is as follows: If the same
   INFORMATIONAL request has been sent to several different addresses
   (i.e., the destination address in the IKE_SA has been updated after
   the request was first sent), receiving the INFORMATIONAL response
   does not tell which address is the working one.  In this case, a new
   INFORMATIONAL request needs to be sent to check return routability.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.8" href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>.  Changes in NAT Mappings</span>

   IKEv2 performs Dead Peer Detection (DPD) if there has recently been
   only outgoing traffic on all of the SAs associated with the IKE_SA.

   In MOBIKE, these messages can also be used to detect if NAT mappings
   have changed (for example, if the keepalive interval is too long, or
   the NAT box is rebooted).  More specifically, if both peers support
   both this specification and NAT Traversal, the
   NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP and NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP
   notifications MAY be included in any INFORMATIONAL request; if the
   request includes them, the responder MUST also include them in the
   response (but no other action is taken, unless otherwise specified).

   When the initiator is behind a NAT (as detected earlier using the
   NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP and NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP
   notifications), it SHOULD include these notifications in DPD messages
   and compare the received NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP notifications
   with the value from the previous UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES response (or the
   IKE_SA_INIT response).  If the values do not match, the IP address
   and/or port seen by the responder has changed, and the initiator
   SHOULD send UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES as described in <a href="#section-3.5">Section 3.5</a>.  If the
   initiator suspects that the NAT mapping has changed, it MAY also skip
   the detection step and send UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES immediately.  This
   saves one roundtrip if the NAT mapping has indeed changed.

   Note that this approach to detecting NAT mapping changes may cause an
   extra address update when the IKE_SA is rekeyed.  This is because the
   NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP hash also includes the IKE Security
   Parameter Indexes (SPIs), which change when performing rekeying.
   This unnecessary update is harmless, however.

   When MOBIKE is in use, the dynamic updates (specified in [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>],
   Section 2.23), where the peer address and port are updated from the
   last valid authenticated packet, work in a slightly different
   fashion.  The host not behind a NAT MUST NOT use these dynamic
   updates for IKEv2 packets, but MAY use them for ESP packets.  This
   ensures that an INFORMATIONAL exchange that does not contain
   UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES does not cause any changes, allowing it to be
   used for, e.g., testing whether a particular path works.




<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 18]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.9" href="#section-3.9">3.9</a>.  NAT Prohibition</span>

   Basic IKEv2/IPsec without NAT Traversal support may work across some
   types of one-to-one "basic" NATs and IPv4/IPv6 translation agents in
   tunnel mode.  This is because the IKEv2 integrity checksum does not
   cover the addresses in the IP header.  This may be considered a
   problem in some circumstances, because in some sense any modification
   of the IP addresses can be considered an attack.

   This specification addresses the issue by protecting the IP addresses
   when NAT Traversal has not been explicitly enabled.  This means that
   MOBIKE without NAT Traversal support will not work if the paths
   contain NATs, IPv4/IPv6 translation agents, or other nodes that
   modify the addresses in the IP header.  This feature is mainly
   intended for IPv6 and site-to-site VPN cases, where the
   administrators may know beforehand that NATs are not present, and
   thus any modification to the packet can be considered an attack.

   More specifically, when NAT Traversal is not enabled, all messages
   that can update the addresses associated with the IKE_SA and/or IPsec
   SAs (the first IKE_AUTH request and all INFORMATIONAL requests that
   contain any of the following notifications: UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES,
   ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS, ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS,
   NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES) MUST also include a NO_NATS_ALLOWED
   notification.  The exchange responder MUST verify that the contents
   of the NO_NATS_ALLOWED notification match the addresses in the IP
   header.  If they do not match, a response containing an
   UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED notification is sent.  The response message
   is sent to the address and port that the corresponding request came
   from, not to the address contained in the NO_NATS_ALLOWED
   notification.

   If the exchange initiator receives an UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED
   notification in response to its INFORMATIONAL request, it SHOULD
   retry the operation several times using new INFORMATIONAL requests.
   Similarly, if the initiator receives UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED in the
   IKE_AUTH exchange, it SHOULD retry IKE_SA establishment several
   times, starting from a new IKE_SA_INIT request.  This ensures that an
   attacker who is able to modify only a single packet does not
   unnecessarily cause a path to remain unused.  The exact number of
   retries is not specified in this document because it does not affect
   interoperability.  However, because the IKE message will also be
   rejected if the attacker modifies the integrity checksum field, a
   reasonable number here would be the number of retries that is being
   used for normal retransmissions.






<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 19]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   If an UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED notification is sent, the exchange
   responder MUST NOT use the contents of the NO_NATS_ALLOWED
   notification for any other purpose than possibly logging the
   information for troubleshooting purposes.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.10" href="#section-3.10">3.10</a>.  Path Testing</span>

   IKEv2 Dead Peer Detection allows the peers to detect if the currently
   used path has stopped working.  However, if either of the peers has
   several addresses, Dead Peer Detection alone does not tell which of
   the other paths might work.

   If required by its address selection policy, the initiator can use
   normal IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL request/response messages to test whether
   a certain path works.  Implementations MAY do path testing even if
   the path currently being used is working to, for example, detect when
   a better (but previously unavailable) path becomes available.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.11" href="#section-3.11">3.11</a>.  Failure Recovery and Timeouts</span>

   In MOBIKE, the initiator is responsible for detecting and recovering
   from most failures.

   To give the initiator enough time to detect the error, the responder
   SHOULD use relatively long timeout intervals when, for instance,
   retransmitting IKEv2 requests or deciding whether to initiate Dead
   Peer Detection.  While no specific timeout lengths are required, it
   is suggested that responders continue retransmitting IKEv2 requests
   for at least five minutes before giving up.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.12" href="#section-3.12">3.12</a>.  Dead Peer Detection</span>

   MOBIKE uses the same Dead Peer Detection method as normal IKEv2, but
   as addresses may change, it is not sufficient to just verify that the
   peer is alive, but also that it is synchronized with the address
   updates and has not, for instance, ignored an address update due to
   failure to complete return routability test.  This means that when
   there are incoming IPsec packets, MOBIKE nodes SHOULD inspect the
   addresses used in those packets and determine that they correspond to
   those that should be employed.  If they do not, such packets SHOULD
   NOT be used as evidence that the peer is able to communicate with
   this node and or that the peer has received all address updates.









<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 20]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>.  Payload Formats</span>

   This specification defines several new IKEv2 Notify payload types.
   See [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>], Section 3.10, for a general description of the Notify
   payload.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>.  Notify Messages - Error Types</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>.  UNACCEPTABLE_ADDRESSES Notify Payload</span>

   The responder can include this notification in an INFORMATIONAL
   exchange response to indicate that the address change in the
   corresponding request message (which contained an UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES
   notification) was not carried out.

   The Notify Message Type for UNACCEPTABLE_ADDRESSES is 40.  The
   Protocol ID and SPI Size fields are set to zero.  There is no data
   associated with this Notify type.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.2" href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>.  UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED Notify Payload</span>

   See <a href="#section-3.9">Section 3.9</a> for a description of this notification.

   The Notify Message Type for UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED is 41.  The
   Protocol ID and SPI Size fields are set to zero.  There is no data
   associated with this Notify type.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>.  Notify Messages - Status Types</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>.  MOBIKE_SUPPORTED Notify Payload</span>

   The MOBIKE_SUPPORTED notification is included in the IKE_AUTH
   exchange to indicate that the implementation supports this
   specification.

   The Notify Message Type for MOBIKE_SUPPORTED is 16396.  The Protocol
   ID and SPI Size fields are set to zero.  The notification data field
   MUST be left empty (zero-length) when sending, and its contents (if
   any) MUST be ignored when this notification is received.  This allows
   the field to be used by future versions of this protocol.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.2" href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>.  ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS Notify</span>
<span class="h4">        Payloads</span>

   Both parties can include ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and/or
   ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications in the IKE_AUTH exchange and
   INFORMATIONAL exchange request messages; see <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> and
   <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a> for more detailed description.



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 21]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   The Notify Message Types for ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and
   ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS are 16397 and 16398, respectively.  The
   Protocol ID and SPI Size fields are set to zero.  The data associated
   with these Notify types is either a four-octet IPv4 address or a
   16-octet IPv6 address.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3" href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>.  NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES Notify Payload</span>

   The NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES notification can be included in an
   INFORMATIONAL exchange request message to indicate that the exchange
   initiator does not have addresses beyond the one used in the exchange
   (see <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a> for more detailed description).

   The Notify Message Type for NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES is 16399.  The
   Protocol ID and SPI Size fields are set to zero.  There is no data
   associated with this Notify type.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.4" href="#section-4.2.4">4.2.4</a>.  UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES Notify Payload</span>

   This notification is included in INFORMATIONAL exchange requests sent
   by the initiator to update addresses of the IKE_SA and IPsec SAs (see
   <a href="#section-3.5">Section 3.5</a>).

   The Notify Message Type for UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES is 16400.  The
   Protocol ID and SPI Size fields are set to zero.  There is no data
   associated with this Notify type.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.5" href="#section-4.2.5">4.2.5</a>.  COOKIE2 Notify Payload</span>

   This notification MAY be included in any INFORMATIONAL request for
   return routability check purposes (see <a href="#section-3.7">Section 3.7</a>).  If the
   INFORMATIONAL request includes COOKIE2, the exchange responder MUST
   copy the notification to the response message.

   The data associated with this notification MUST be between 8 and 64
   octets in length (inclusive), and MUST be chosen by the exchange
   initiator in a way that is unpredictable to the exchange responder.
   The Notify Message Type for this message is 16401.  The Protocol ID
   and SPI Size fields are set to zero.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.6" href="#section-4.2.6">4.2.6</a>.  NO_NATS_ALLOWED Notify Payload</span>

   See <a href="#section-3.9">Section 3.9</a> for a description of this notification.

   The Notify Message Type for this message is 16402.  The notification
   data contains the IP addresses and ports from/to which the packet was
   sent.  For IPv4, the notification data is 12 octets long and is
   defined as follows:



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 22]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


                           1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      !                      Source IPv4 address                      !
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      !                   Destination IPv4 address                    !
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      !          Source port          !       Destination port        !
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   For IPv6, the notification data is 36 octets long and is defined as
   follows:

                           1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      !                                                               !
      !                      Source IPv6 address                      !
      !                                                               !
      !                                                               !
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      !                                                               !
      !                   Destination IPv6 address                    !
      !                                                               !
      !                                                               !
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      !          Source port          !       Destination port        !
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The Protocol ID and SPI Size fields are set to zero.





















<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 23]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>.  Security Considerations</span>

   The main goals of this specification are to maintain the security
   offered by usual IKEv2 procedures and to counter mobility-related
   threats in an appropriate manner.  This section describes new
   security considerations introduced by MOBIKE.  See [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>] for
   security considerations for IKEv2 in general.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>.  Traffic Redirection and Hijacking</span>

   MOBIKE payloads relating to updating addresses are encrypted,
   integrity protected, and replay protected using the IKE_SA.  This
   assures that no one except the participants can, for instance, give a
   control message to change the addresses.

   However, as with normal IKEv2, the actual IP addresses in the IP
   header are not covered by the integrity protection.  This means that
   a NAT between the parties (or an attacker acting as a NAT) can modify
   the addresses and cause incorrect tunnel header (outer) IP addresses
   to be used for IPsec SAs.  The scope of this attack is limited mainly
   to denial of service because all traffic is protected using IPsec.

   This attack can only be launched by on-path attackers that are
   capable of modifying IKEv2 messages carrying NAT detection payloads
   (such as Dead Peer Detection messages).  By modifying the IP header
   of these packets, the attackers can lead the peers to believe a new
   NAT or a changed NAT binding exists between them.  The attack can
   continue as long as the attacker is on the path, modifying the IKEv2
   messages.  If this is no longer the case, IKEv2 and MOBIKE mechanisms
   designed to detect NAT mapping changes will eventually recognize that
   the intended traffic is not getting through, and will update the
   addresses appropriately.

   MOBIKE introduces the NO_NATS_ALLOWED notification that is used to
   detect modification, by outsiders, of the addresses in the IP header.
   When this notification is used, communication through NATs and other
   address translators is impossible, so it is sent only when not doing
   NAT Traversal.  This feature is mainly intended for IPv6 and site-to-
   site VPN cases, where the administrators may know beforehand that
   NATs are not present.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>.  IPsec Payload Protection</span>

   The use of IPsec protection on payload traffic protects the
   participants against disclosure of the contents of the traffic,
   should the traffic end up in an incorrect destination or be subject
   to eavesdropping.




<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 24]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   However, security associations originally created for the protection
   of a specific flow between specific addresses may be updated by
   MOBIKE later on.  This has to be taken into account if the (outer) IP
   address of the peer was used when deciding what kind of IPsec SAs the
   peer is allowed to create.

   For instance, the level of required protection might depend on the
   current location of the VPN client, or access might be allowed only
   from certain IP addresses.

   It is recommended that security policies, for peers that are allowed
   to use MOBIKE, are configured in a manner that takes into account
   that a single security association can be used at different times
   through paths of varying security properties.

   This is especially critical for traffic selector authorization.  The
   (logical) Peer Authorization Database (PAD) contains the information
   used by IKEv2 when determining what kind of IPsec SAs a peer is
   allowed to create.  This process is described in [<a href="#ref-IPsecArch" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">IPsecArch</a>], <a href="#section-4.4.3">Section</a>
   <a href="#section-4.4.3">4.4.3</a>.  When a peer requests the creation of an IPsec SA with some
   traffic selectors, the PAD must contain "Child SA Authorization Data"
   linking the identity authenticated by IKEv2 and the addresses
   permitted for traffic selectors.  See also [<a href="#ref-Clarifications" title="&quot;IKEv2 Clarifications and Implementation Guidelines&quot;">Clarifications</a>] for a
   more extensive discussion.

   It is important to note that simply sending IKEv2 packets using some
   particular address does not automatically imply a permission to
   create IPsec SAs with that address in the traffic selectors.
   However, some implementations are known to use policies where simply
   being reachable at some address X implies a temporary permission to
   create IPsec SAs for address X.  Here "being reachable" usually means
   the ability to send (or spoof) IP packets with source address X and
   receive (or eavesdrop) packets sent to X.

   Using this kind of policies or extensions with MOBIKE may need
   special care to enforce the temporary nature of the permission.  For
   example, when the peer moves to some other address Y (and is no
   longer reachable at X), it might be necessary to close IPsec SAs with
   traffic selectors matching X.  However, these interactions are beyond
   the scope of this document.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>.  Denial-of-Service Attacks against Third Parties</span>

   Traffic redirection may be performed not just to gain access to the
   traffic or to deny service to the peers, but also to cause a denial-
   of-service attack on a third party.  For instance, a high-speed TCP
   session or a multimedia stream may be redirected towards a victim
   host, causing its communications capabilities to suffer.



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 25]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   The attackers in this threat can be either outsiders or even one of
   the IKEv2 peers.  In usual VPN usage scenarios, attacks by the peers
   can be easily dealt with if the authentication performed in the
   initial IKEv2 negotiation can be traced to persons who can be held
   responsible for the attack.  This may not be the case in all
   scenarios, particularly with opportunistic approaches to security.

   If the attack is launched by an outsider, the traffic flow would
   normally stop soon due to the lack of responses (such as transport
   layer acknowledgements).  However, if the original recipient of the
   flow is malicious, it could maintain the traffic flow for an extended
   period of time, since it often would be able to send the required
   acknowledgements (see [<a href="#ref-Aura02" title="&quot;Security of Internet Location Management&quot;">Aura02</a>] for more discussion).

   It should also be noted, as shown in [<a href="#ref-Bombing" title="&quot;A note about 3rd party bombing in Mobile IPv6&quot;">Bombing</a>], that without ingress
   filtering in the attacker's network, such attacks are already
   possible simply by sending spoofed packets from the attacker to the
   victim directly.  Furthermore, if the attacker's network has ingress
   filtering, this attack is largely prevented for MOBIKE as well.
   Consequently, it makes little sense to protect against attacks of
   similar nature in MOBIKE.  However, it still makes sense to limit the
   amplification capabilities provided to attackers, so that they cannot
   use stream redirection to send a large number of packets to the
   victim by sending just a few packets themselves.

   This specification includes return routability tests to limit the
   duration of any "third party bombing" attacks by off-path (relative
   to the victim) attackers.  The tests are authenticated messages that
   the peer has to respond to, and can be performed before the address
   change takes effect, immediately afterwards, or even periodically
   during the session.  The tests contain unpredictable data, and only
   someone who has the keys associated with the IKE SA and has seen the
   request packet can properly respond to the test.

   The duration of the attack can also be limited if the victim reports
   the unwanted traffic to the originating IPsec tunnel endpoint using
   ICMP error messages or INVALID_SPI notifications.  As described in
   [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>], Section 2.21, this SHOULD trigger a liveness test, which
   also doubles as a return routability check if the COOKIE2
   notification is included.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>.  Spoofing Network Connectivity Indications</span>

   Attackers may spoof various indications from lower layers and the
   network in an effort to confuse the peers about which addresses are
   or are not working.  For example, attackers may spoof link-layer
   error messages in an effort to cause the parties to move their
   traffic elsewhere or even to disconnect.  Attackers may also spoof



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 26]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   information related to network attachments, router discovery, and
   address assignments in an effort to make the parties believe they
   have Internet connectivity when, in reality, they do not.

   This may cause use of non-preferred addresses or even denial of
   service.

   MOBIKE does not provide any protection of its own for indications
   from other parts of the protocol stack.  These vulnerabilities can be
   mitigated through the use of techniques specific to the other parts
   of the stack, such as validation of ICMP errors [<a href="#ref-ICMPAttacks" title="&quot;ICMP attacks against TCP&quot;">ICMPAttacks</a>], link
   layer security, or the use of [<a href="#ref-SEND" title="&quot;SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)&quot;">SEND</a>] to protect IPv6 Router and
   Neighbor Discovery.

   Ultimately, MOBIKE depends on the delivery of IKEv2 messages to
   determine which paths can be used.  If IKEv2 messages sent using a
   particular source and destination addresses reach the recipient and a
   reply is received, MOBIKE will usually consider the path working; if
   no reply is received even after retransmissions, MOBIKE will suspect
   the path is broken.  An attacker who can consistently control the
   delivery or non-delivery of the IKEv2 messages in the network can
   thus influence which addresses actually get used.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.5" href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>.  Address and Topology Disclosure</span>

   MOBIKE address updates and the ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS/
   ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications reveal information about which
   networks the peers are connected to.

   For example, consider a host A with two network interfaces: a
   cellular connection and a wired Ethernet connection to a company LAN.
   If host A now contacts host B using IKEv2 and sends
   ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS/ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications, host B
   receives additional information it might not otherwise know.  If host
   A used the cellular connection for the IKEv2 traffic, host B can also
   see the company LAN address (and perhaps further guess that host A is
   used by an employee of that company).  If host A used the company LAN
   to make the connection, host B can see that host A has a subscription
   from this particular cellular operator.

   These additional addresses can also disclose more accurate location
   information than just a single address.  Suppose that host A uses its
   cellular connection for IKEv2 traffic, but also sends an
   ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS notification containing an IP address
   corresponding to, say, a wireless LAN at a particular coffee shop
   location.  It is likely that host B can now make a much better guess
   at A's location than would be possible based on the cellular IP
   address alone.



<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 27]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   Furthermore, as described in <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>, some of the addresses could
   also be private addresses behind a NAT.

   In many environments, disclosing address information is not a problem
   (and indeed it cannot be avoided if the hosts wish to use those
   addresses for IPsec traffic).  For instance, a remote access VPN
   client could consider the corporate VPN gateway sufficiently
   trustworthy for this purpose.  Furthermore, the
   ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications are
   sent encrypted, so the addresses are not visible to eavesdroppers
   (unless, of course, they are later used for sending IKEv2/IPsec
   traffic).

   However, if MOBIKE is used in some more opportunistic approach, it
   can be desirable to limit the information that is sent.  Naturally,
   the peers do not have to disclose any addresses they do not want to
   use for IPsec traffic.  Also, as noted in <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>, an initiator
   whose policy is to always use the locally configured responder
   address does not have to send any ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS/
   ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS payloads.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>.  IANA Considerations</span>

   This document does not create any new namespaces to be maintained by
   IANA, but it requires new values in namespaces that have been defined
   in the IKEv2 base specification [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>].

   This document defines several new IKEv2 notifications whose values
   have been allocated from the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types" namespace.

      Notify Messages - Error Types     Value
      -----------------------------     -----
      UNACCEPTABLE_ADDRESSES            40
      UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED           41

      Notify Messages - Status Types    Value
      ------------------------------    -----
      MOBIKE_SUPPORTED                  16396
      ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS            16397
      ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS            16398
      NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES           16399
      UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES               16400
      COOKIE2                           16401
      NO_NATS_ALLOWED                   16402

   These notifications are described in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.





<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 28]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>.  Acknowledgements</span>

   This document is a collaborative effort of the entire MOBIKE WG.  We
   would particularly like to thank Jari Arkko, Tuomas Aura, Marcelo
   Bagnulo, Stephane Beaulieu, Elwyn Davies, Lakshminath Dondeti,
   Francis Dupont, Paul Hoffman, James Kempf, Tero Kivinen, Pete McCann,
   Erik Nordmark, Mohan Parthasarathy, Pekka Savola, Bill Sommerfeld,
   Maureen Stillman, Shinta Sugimoto, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sami
   Vaarala.  This document also incorporates ideas and text from earlier
   MOBIKE-like protocol proposals, including [<a href="#ref-AddrMgmt" title="&quot;Address Management for IKE version 2&quot;">AddrMgmt</a>], [<a href="#ref-Kivinen" title="&quot;MOBIKE protocol&quot;">Kivinen</a>],
   [<a href="#ref-MOPO" title="&quot;Mobility Protocol Options for IKEv2 (MOPO-IKE)&quot;">MOPO</a>], and [<a href="#ref-SMOBIKE" title="&quot;Simple Mobility and Multihoming Extensions for IKEv2 (SMOBIKE)&quot;">SMOBIKE</a>], and the MOBIKE design document [<a href="#ref-Design" title="&quot;Design of the MOBIKE protocol&quot;">Design</a>].

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>.  References</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>.  Normative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-IKEv2">IKEv2</a>]           Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
                     Protocol", <a href="./rfc4306">RFC 4306</a>, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-IPsecArch">IPsecArch</a>]       Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
                     Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-KEYWORDS">KEYWORDS</a>]        Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                     Requirement Levels", <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>.  Informative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-AddrMgmt">AddrMgmt</a>]        Dupont, F., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&amp;q=inurl:draft-+%22Address+Management+for+IKE+version+2%22'>"Address Management for IKE version 2"</a>,
                     Work in Progress, November 2005.

   [<a id="ref-Aura02">Aura02</a>]          Aura, T., Roe, M., and J. Arkko, "Security of
                     Internet Location Management",  Proc. 18th Annual
                     Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC),
                     December 2002.

   [<a id="ref-Bombing">Bombing</a>]         Dupont, F., "A note about 3rd party bombing in
                     Mobile IPv6", Work in Progress, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-Clarifications">Clarifications</a>]  Eronen, P. and P. Hoffman, "IKEv2 Clarifications
                     and Implementation Guidelines", Work in Progress,
                     February 2006.

   [<a id="ref-DNA4">DNA4</a>]            Aboba, B., Carlson, J., and S. Cheshire, "Detecting
                     Network Attachment in IPv4 (DNAv4)", <a href="./rfc4436">RFC 4436</a>,
                     March 2006.






<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 29]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


   [<a id="ref-DNA6">DNA6</a>]            Narayanan, S., Daley, G., and N. Montavont,
                     "Detecting Network Attachment in IPv6 - Best
                     Current Practices for hosts", Work in Progress,
                     October 2005.

   [<a id="ref-Design">Design</a>]          Kivinen, T. and H. Tschofenig, "Design of the
                     MOBIKE protocol", Work in Progress, January 2006.

   [<a id="ref-ICMPAttacks">ICMPAttacks</a>]     Gont, F., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&amp;q=inurl:draft-+%22ICMP+attacks+against+TCP%22'>"ICMP attacks against TCP"</a>, Work in
                     Progress, October 2005.

   [<a id="ref-Kivinen">Kivinen</a>]         Kivinen, T., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&amp;q=inurl:draft-+%22MOBIKE+protocol%22'>"MOBIKE protocol"</a>, Work in Progress,
                     February 2004.

   [<a id="ref-MIP4">MIP4</a>]            Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4",
                     <a href="./rfc3344">RFC 3344</a>, August 2002.

   [<a id="ref-MIP6">MIP6</a>]            Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility
                     Support in IPv6", <a href="./rfc3775">RFC 3775</a>, June 2004.

   [<a id="ref-MOPO">MOPO</a>]            Eronen, P., "Mobility Protocol Options for IKEv2
                     (MOPO-IKE)", Work in Progress, February 2005.

   [<a id="ref-RFC2461">RFC2461</a>]         Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
                     Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc2461">RFC 2461</a>,
                     December 1998.

   [<a id="ref-SEND">SEND</a>]            Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
                     "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc3971">RFC 3971</a>,
                     March 2005.

   [<a id="ref-SMOBIKE">SMOBIKE</a>]         Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Simple Mobility and
                     Multihoming Extensions for IKEv2 (SMOBIKE)",
                     Work in Progress, March 2004.

   [<a id="ref-STUN">STUN</a>]            Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R.
                     Mahy, "STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram
                     Protocol (UDP) Through Network Address Translators
                     (NATs)", <a href="./rfc3489">RFC 3489</a>, March 2003.

   [<a id="ref-UNSAF">UNSAF</a>]           Daigle, L., "IAB Considerations for UNilateral
                     Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) Across Network Address
                     Translation", <a href="./rfc3424">RFC 3424</a>, November 2002.








<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 30]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.  Implementation Considerations</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>.  Links from SPD Cache to Outbound SAD Entries</span>

   [<a href="#ref-IPsecArch" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">IPsecArch</a>], Section 4.4.2, says that "For outbound processing, each
   SAD entry is pointed to by entries in the SPD-S part of the SPD
   cache".  The document does not specify how exactly this "pointing" is
   done, since this is an implementation detail that does not have to be
   standardized.

   However, it is clear that the links between the SPD cache and the SAD
   have to be done correctly to ensure that outbound packets are sent
   over the right SA.  Some implementations are known to have problems
   in this area.

   In particular, simply storing the (remote tunnel header IP address,
   remote SPI) pair in the SPD cache is not sufficient, since the pair
   does not always uniquely identify a single SAD entry.  For instance,
   two hosts behind the same NAT can accidentally happen to choose the
   same SPI value.  The situation can also occur when a host is assigned
   an IP address previously used by some other host, and the SAs
   associated with the old host have not yet been deleted by Dead Peer
   Detection.  This may lead to packets being sent over the wrong SA or,
   if the key management daemon ensures the pair is unique, denying the
   creation of otherwise valid SAs.

   Storing the remote tunnel header IP address in the SPD cache may also
   complicate the implementation of MOBIKE, since the address can change
   during the lifetime of the SA.  Thus, we recommend implementing the
   links between the SPD cache and the SAD in a way that does not
   require modification when the tunnel header IP address is updated by
   MOBIKE.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>.  Creating Outbound SAs</span>

   When an outbound packet requires IPsec processing but no suitable SA
   exists, a new SA will be created.  In this case, the host has to
   determine (1) who is the right peer for this SA, (2) whether the host
   already has an IKE_SA with this peer, and (3) if no IKE_SA exists,
   the IP address(es) of the peer for contacting it.

   Neither [<a href="#ref-IPsecArch" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">IPsecArch</a>] nor MOBIKE specifies how exactly these three
   steps are carried out.  [<a href="#ref-IPsecArch" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">IPsecArch</a>], Section 4.4.3.4, says:








<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 31]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


      For example, assume that IKE A receives an outbound packet
      destined for IP address X, a host served by a security gateway.
      <a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> [<a href="./rfc2401">RFC2401</a>] and this document do not specify how A
      determines the address of the IKE peer serving X.  However, any
      peer contacted by A as the presumed representative for X must be
      registered in the PAD in order to allow the IKE exchange to be
      authenticated.  Moreover, when the authenticated peer asserts that
      it represents X in its traffic selector exchange, the PAD will be
      consulted to determine if the peer in question is authorized to
      represent X.

   In step 1, there may be more than one possible peer (e.g., several
   security gateways that are allowed to represent X).  In step 3, the
   host may need to consult a directory such as DNS to determine the
   peer IP address(es).

   When performing these steps, implementations may use information
   contained in the SPD, the PAD, and possibly some other
   implementation-specific databases.  Regardless of how exactly the
   steps are implemented, it is important to remember that IP addresses
   can change, and that an IP address alone does not always uniquely
   identify a single IKE peer (for the same reasons as why the
   combination of the remote IP address and SPI does not uniquely
   identify an outbound IPsec SA; see <a href="#appendix-A.1">Appendix A.1</a>).  Thus, in steps 1
   and 2 it may be easier to identify the "right peer" using its
   authenticated identity instead of its current IP address.  However,
   these implementation details are beyond the scope of this
   specification.

Author's Address

   Pasi Eronen (editor)
   Nokia Research Center
   P.O. Box 407
   FIN-00045 Nokia Group
   Finland

   EMail: pasi.eronen@nokia.com













<span class="grey">Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 32]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>                    MOBIKE Protocol                    June 2006</span>


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   <a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).







Eronen                      Standards Track                    [Page 33]
</pre>