<pre>Network Working Group                                         P. Hoffman
Request for Comments: 4894                                VPN Consortium
Category: Informational                                         May 2007


    <span class="h1">Use of Hash Algorithms in Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and IPsec</span>

Status of This Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This document describes how the IKEv1 (Internet Key Exchange version
   1), IKEv2, and IPsec protocols use hash functions, and explains the
   level of vulnerability of these protocols to the reduced collision
   resistance of the MD5 and SHA-1 hash algorithms.

Table of Contents

   <a href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-2">2</a>
   <a href="#section-2">2</a>.  Hashes in IKEv1 and IKEv2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-2">2</a>
   <a href="#section-3">3</a>.  Hashes in IPsec  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-3">3</a>
   <a href="#section-4">4</a>.  PKIX Certificates in IKEv1 and IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-3">3</a>
   <a href="#section-5">5</a>.  Choosing Cryptographic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-3">3</a>
     <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>.  Different Cryptographic Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-4">4</a>
     <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>.  Specifying Cryptographic Functions in the Protocol . . . .  <a href="#page-4">4</a>
     <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>.  Specifying Cryptographic Functions in Authentication . . .  <a href="#page-5">5</a>
   <a href="#section-6">6</a>.  Suggested Changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-6">6</a>
     <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>.  Suggested Changes for the Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-6">6</a>
     <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>.  Suggested Changes for Implementors . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-7">7</a>
   <a href="#section-7">7</a>.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-7">7</a>
   <a href="#section-8">8</a>.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-8">8</a>
   <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>











<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                      [Page 1]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction</span>

   Recently, attacks on the collision-resistance properties of MD5 and
   SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [<a href="#ref-HashAttacks" title="&quot;Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols&quot;">HashAttacks</a>] summarizes
   the discoveries.  The security community is now reexamining how
   various Internet protocols use hash functions.  The goal of this
   reexamination is to be sure that the current usage is safe in the
   face of these new attacks, and whether protocols can easily use new
   hash functions when they become recommended.

   Different protocols use hash functions quite differently.  Because of
   this, the IETF has asked for reviews of all protocols that use hash
   functions.  This document reviews the many ways that three protocols
   (IKEv1 [<a href="#ref-IKEv1" title="&quot;The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)&quot;">IKEv1</a>], IKEv2 [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>], and IPsec [<a href="#ref-ESP" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">ESP</a>] and [<a href="#ref-AH" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">AH</a>]) use hash
   functions.

   In this document, "IKEv1" refers to only "Phase 1" of IKEv1 and the
   agreement process.  "IKEv2" refers to the IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH
   exchanges.  "IPsec" refers to IP encapsulated in either the
   Authentication Header (AH) or Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>.  Hashes in IKEv1 and IKEv2</span>

   Both IKEv1 and IKEv2 can use hash functions as pseudo-random
   functions (PRFs).  The inputs to the PRFs always contain nonce values
   from both the initiator and the responder that the other party cannot
   predict in advance.  In IKEv1, the length of this nonce is at least
   64 bits; in IKEv2, it is at least 128 bits.  Because of this, the use
   of hash functions in IKEv1 and IKEv2 are not susceptible to any known
   collision-reduction attack.

   IKEv1 also uses hash functions on the inputs to the PRF.  The inputs
   are a combination of values from both the initiator and responder,
   and thus the hash function here is not susceptible to any known
   collision-reduction attack.

   In IKEv2, hashes are used as integrity protection for all messages
   after the IKE_SA_INIT Exchange.  These hashes are used in Hashed
   Message Authentication Codes (HMACs).  As described in
   [<a href="#ref-HMAC-reduction" title="&quot;Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions&quot;">HMAC-reduction</a>], MD5 used in HMACs is susceptible to forgery, and it
   is suspected that full SHA-1 used in HMAC is susceptible to forgery.
   There is no known reason for the person who creates legitimate
   integrity protection to want to spoof it.

   Both IKEv1 and IKEv2 have authentication modes that use digital
   signatures.  Digital signatures use hashes to make unique digests of
   the message being signed.  With the current known attacks, the only
   party that can create the two messages that collide is the IKE entity



<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                      [Page 2]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


   that generates the message.  As shown in [<a href="#ref-Target-collisions" title="&quot;Target Collisions for MD5 and Colliding X.509 Certificates for Different Identities&quot;">Target-collisions</a>], an
   attacker can create two different Public Key Infrastructure using
   X.509 (PKIX) certificates with different identities that have the
   same signatures.

   IKEv1 has two modes, "public key encryption" and "revised public key
   encryption", that use hashes to identify the public key used.  The
   hash function here is used simply to reduce the size of the
   identifier.  In IKEv2 with public-key certificates, a hash function
   is used for similar purposes, both for identifying the sender's
   public key and the trust anchors.  Using a collision-reduction
   attack, an individual could create two public keys that have the same
   hash value.  This is not considered to be a useful attack because the
   key generator holds both private keys.

   IKEv1 can be used together with Network Access Translator (NAT)
   traversal support, as described in [<a href="#ref-NAT-T" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">NAT-T</a>]; IKEv2 includes this NAT
   traversal support.  In both of these cases, hash functions are used
   to obscure the IP addresses used by the initiator and/or the
   responder.  The hash function here is not susceptible to any known
   collision-reduction attack.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>.  Hashes in IPsec</span>

   AH uses hash functions for authenticating packets; the same is true
   for ESP when ESP is using its own authentication.  For both uses of
   IPsec, hash functions are always used in hashed MACs (HMACs).  As
   described in [<a href="#ref-HMAC-reduction" title="&quot;Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions&quot;">HMAC-reduction</a>], MD5 used in HMACs is susceptible to
   forgery, and it is suspected that full SHA-1 used in HMAC is
   susceptible to forgery.  There is no known reason for the person who
   creates legitimate packet authentication to want to spoof it.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>.  PKIX Certificates in IKEv1 and IKEv2</span>

   Some implementations of IKEv1 and IKEv2 use PKIX certificates for
   authentication.  Any weaknesses in PKIX certificates due to
   particular ways hash functions are used, or due to weaknesses in
   particular hash functions used in certificates, will be inherited in
   IKEv1 and IKEv2 implementations that use PKIX-based authentication.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>.  Choosing Cryptographic Functions</span>

   Recently, there has been more discussion in the IETF about the
   ability of one party in a protocol to tell the other party which
   cryptographic functions the first party prefers the second party to
   use.  The discussion was spurred in part by [<a href="#ref-Deploying" title="&quot;Deploying a New Hash Algorithm&quot;">Deploying</a>].  Although
   that paper focuses on hash functions, it is relevant to other
   cryptographic functions as well.



<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                      [Page 3]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


   There are (at least) three distinct subtopics related to choosing
   cryptographic functions in protocols:

   o  The ability to pick between different cryptographic functions
      instead of having just one specified in the protocol

   o  If there are multiple functions, the ability to agree on which
      function will be used in the main protocol

   o  The ability to suggest to the other party which kinds of
      cryptographic functions should be used in the other party's public
      key certificates

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>.  Different Cryptographic Functions</span>

   Protocols that use cryptographic functions can either specify a
   single function, or can allow different functions.  Protocols in the
   first category are susceptible to attack if the specified function is
   later found to be too weak for the stated purpose; protocols in the
   second category can usually avoid such attacks, but at a cost of
   increased protocol complexity.  In the IETF, protocols that allow a
   choice of cryptographic functions are strongly preferred.

   IKEv1, IKEv2, and IPsec already allow different hash functions in
   every significant place where hash functions are used (that is, in
   every place that has any susceptibility to a collision-reduction
   attack).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>.  Specifying Cryptographic Functions in the Protocol</span>

   Protocols that allow a choice of cryptographic functions need to have
   a way for all parties to agree on which function is going to be used.
   Some protocols, such as secure electronic mail, allow the initiator
   to simply pick a set of cryptographic functions; if the responder
   does not understand the functions used, the transmission fails.
   Other protocols allow for the two parties to agree on which
   cryptographic functions will be used.  This is sometimes called
   "negotiation", but the term "negotiation" is inappropriate for
   protocols in which one party (the "proposer") lists all the functions
   it is willing to use, and the other party (the "chooser") simply
   picks the ones that will be used.

   When a new cryptographic function is introduced, one party may want
   to tell the other party that they can use the new function.  If it is
   the proposer who wants to use the new function, the situation is
   easy: the proposer simply adds the new function to its list, possibly





<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                      [Page 4]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


   removing other parallel functions that the proposer no longer wants
   to use.

   On the other hand, if it is the chooser who wants to use the new
   function and the proposer didn't list it, the chooser may want to
   signal the proposer that they are capable of using the new function
   or the chooser may want to say that it is only willing to use the new
   function.  If a protocol wants to handle either of these cases, it
   has to have a way for the chooser to specify this information to the
   proposer in its acceptance and/or rejection message.

   It is not clear from a design standpoint how important it might be to
   let the chooser specify the additional functions it knows.  As long
   as the proposer offers all the functions it wants to use, there is no
   reason for the chooser to say "I know one you don't know".  The only
   place where the chooser is able to signal the proposer with different
   functions is in protocols where listing all the functions might be
   prohibitive, such as where they would add additional round trips or
   significant packet length.

   IKEv1 and IKEv2 allow the proposer to list all functions.  Neither
   allows the chooser to specify which functions that were not proposed
   it could have used, either in a successful or unsuccessful Security
   Association (SA) establishment.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>.  Specifying Cryptographic Functions in Authentication</span>

   Passing public key certificates and signatures used in authentication
   creates additional issues for protocols.  When specifying
   cryptographic functions for a protocol, it is an agreement between
   the proposer and the chooser.  When choosing cryptographic functions
   for public key certificates, however, the proposer and the chooser
   are beholden to functions used by the trusted third parties, the
   certification authorities (CAs).  It doesn't really matter what
   either party wants the other party to use, since the other party is
   not the one issuing the certificates.

   In this discussion, the term "certificate" does not necessarily mean
   a PKIX certificate.  Instead, it means any message that binds an
   identity to a public key, where the message is signed by a trusted
   third party.  This can be non-PKIX certificates or other types of
   cryptographic identity-binding structures that may be used in the
   future.

   The question of specifying cryptographic functions is only relevant
   if one party has multiple certificates or signatures with different
   cryptographic functions.  In this section, the terms "proposer" and
   "chooser" have a different meaning than in the previous section.



<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                      [Page 5]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


   Here, both parties act as proposers of the identity they want to use
   and the certificates with which they are backing up that identity,
   and both parties are choosers of the other party's identity and
   certificate.

   Some protocols allow the proposer to send multiple certificates or
   signatures, while other protocols only allow the proposer to send a
   single certificate or signature.  Some protocols allow the proposer
   to send multiple certificates but advise against it, given that
   certificates can be fairly large (particularly when the CA loads the
   certificate with lots of information).

   IKEv1 and IKEv2 allow both parties to list all the certificates that
   they want to use.  [<a href="#ref-PKI4IPsec" title="&quot;The Internet IP Security PKI Profile of IKEv1/ISAKMP, IKEv2, and PKIX&quot;">PKI4IPsec</a>] proposes to restrict this by saying
   that all the certificates for a proposer have to have the same
   identity.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>.  Suggested Changes</span>

   In investigating how protocols use hash functions, the IETF is
   looking at (at least) two areas of possible changes to individual
   protocols: how the IETF might need to change the protocols, and how
   implementors of current protocols might change what they do.  This
   section describes both of these areas with respect to IKEv1, IKEv2,
   and IPsec.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>.  Suggested Changes for the Protocols</span>

   Protocols might need to be changed if they rely on the collision-
   resistance of particular hash functions.  They might also need to be
   changed if they do not allow for the agreement of hash functions
   because it is expected that the "preferred" hash function for
   different users will change over time.

   IKEv1 and IKEv2 already allow for the agreement of hash functions for
   both IKE and IPsec, and thus do not need any protocol change.

   IKEv1 and IKEv2, when used with public key authentication, already
   allow each party to send multiple PKIX certificates, and thus do not
   need any protocol change.

   There are known weaknesses in PKIX with respect to collision-
   resistance of some hash functions.  Because of this, it is hoped that
   there will be changes to PKIX fostered by the PKIX Working Group.
   Some of the changes to PKIX may be usable in IKEv1 and IKEv2 without
   having to change IKEv1 and IKEv2.  Other changes to PKIX may require
   changes to IKEv1 and IKEv2 in order to incorporate them, but that
   will not be known until the changes to PKIX are finalized.



<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                      [Page 6]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>.  Suggested Changes for Implementors</span>

   As described in earlier sections, IKE and IPsec themselves are not
   susceptible to any known collision-reduction attacks on hash
   functions.  Thus, implementors do not need to make changes such as
   prohibiting the use of MD5 or SHA-1.  The mandatory and suggested
   algorithms for IKEv2 and IPsec are given in [<a href="#ref-IKEv2Algs" title="&quot;Cryptographic Algorithms for use in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2&quot;">IKEv2Algs</a>] and
   [<a href="#ref-IPsecAlgs" title="&quot;Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements For ESP And AH&quot;">IPsecAlgs</a>].

   Note that some IKE and IPsec users will misunderstand the relevance
   of the known attacks and want to use "stronger" hash functions.
   Thus, implementors should strongly consider adding support for
   alternatives, particularly the AES-XCBC-PRF-128 [<a href="#ref-AES-PRF" title="&quot;The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)&quot;">AES-PRF</a>] and AES-
   XCBC-MAC-96 [<a href="#ref-AES-MAC" title="&quot;The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec&quot;">AES-MAC</a>] algorithms, as well as forthcoming algorithms
   based on the SHA-2 family [<a href="#ref-SHA2-HMAC" title="&quot;Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 With IPsec&quot;">SHA2-HMAC</a>].

   Implementations of IKEv1 and IKEv2 that use PKIX certificates for
   authentication may be susceptible to attacks based on weaknesses in
   PKIX.  It is widely expected that PKIX certificates in the future
   will use hash functions other than MD5 and SHA-1.  Implementors of
   IKE that allow certificate authentication should strongly consider
   allowing the use of certificates that are signed with the SHA-256,
   SHA-384, and SHA-512 hash algorithms.  Similarly, those implementors
   should also strongly consider allowing the sending of multiple
   certificates for identification.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>.  Security Considerations</span>

   This entire document is about the security implications of reduced
   collision-resistance of common hash algorithms for the IKE and IPsec
   protocols.

   The Security Considerations section of [<a href="#ref-HashAttacks" title="&quot;Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols&quot;">HashAttacks</a>] gives much more
   detail about the security of hash functions.

















<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                      [Page 7]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>.  Informative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-AES-MAC">AES-MAC</a>]            Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96
                        Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", <a href="./rfc3566">RFC 3566</a>,
                        September 2003.

   [<a id="ref-AES-PRF">AES-PRF</a>]            Hoffman, P., "The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 Algorithm for
                        the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)",
                        <a href="./rfc4434">RFC 4434</a>, February 2006.

   [<a id="ref-AH">AH</a>]                 Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc4302">RFC 4302</a>,
                        December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-Deploying">Deploying</a>]          Bellovin, S. and E. Rescorla, "Deploying a New
                        Hash Algorithm", NDSS '06, February 2006.

   [<a id="ref-ESP">ESP</a>]                Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
                        (ESP)", <a href="./rfc4303">RFC 4303</a>, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-HashAttacks">HashAttacks</a>]        Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on
                        Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols",
                        <a href="./rfc4270">RFC 4270</a>, November 2005.

   [<a id="ref-HMAC-reduction">HMAC-reduction</a>]     Contini, S. and YL. Yin, "Forgery and Partial
                        Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash
                        Collisions", Cryptology ePrint Report 2006/319,
                        September 2006.

   [<a id="ref-IKEv1">IKEv1</a>]              Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key
                        Exchange (IKE)", <a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a>, November 1998.

   [<a id="ref-IKEv2">IKEv2</a>]              Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
                        Protocol", <a href="./rfc4306">RFC 4306</a>, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-IKEv2Algs">IKEv2Algs</a>]          Schiller, J., "Cryptographic Algorithms for use
                        in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2",
                        <a href="./rfc4307">RFC 4307</a>, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-IPsecAlgs">IPsecAlgs</a>]          Eastlake, D., "Cryptographic Algorithm
                        Implementation Requirements For ESP And AH",
                        <a href="./rfc4305">RFC 4305</a>, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-NAT-T">NAT-T</a>]              Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V.
                        Volpe, "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the
                        IKE", <a href="./rfc3947">RFC 3947</a>, January 2005.






<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                      [Page 8]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


   [<a id="ref-PKI4IPsec">PKI4IPsec</a>]          Korver, B., "The Internet IP Security PKI
                        Profile of IKEv1/ISAKMP, IKEv2, and PKIX", Work
                        in Progress, April 2007.

   [<a id="ref-SHA2-HMAC">SHA2-HMAC</a>]          Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256,
                        HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 With IPsec",
                        <a href="./rfc4868">RFC 4868</a>, May 2007.

   [<a id="ref-Target-collisions">Target-collisions</a>]  Stevens, M., Lenstra, A., and B. de Weger,
                        "Target Collisions for MD5 and Colliding X.509
                        Certificates for Different Identities",
                        Cryptology ePrint Report 2006/360, October 2006.







































<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                      [Page 9]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.  Acknowledgments</span>

   Tero Kivinen helped with ideas in the first version of this document.
   Many participants on the SAAG and IPsec mailing lists contributed
   ideas in later versions.  In particular, suggestions were made by
   Alfred Hoenes, Michael Richardson, Hugo Krawczyk, Steve Bellovin,
   David McGrew, Russ Housley, Arjen Lenstra, and Pasi Eronen.

Author's Address

   Paul Hoffman
   VPN Consortium
   127 Segre Place
   Santa Cruz, CA  95060
   US

   EMail: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org


































<span class="grey">Hoffman                      Informational                     [Page 10]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4894">RFC 4894</a>                 IKE and IPsec Hash Use                 May 2007</span>


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   <a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.







Hoffman                      Informational                     [Page 11]
</pre>