<pre>Network Working Group                                         S. Vaarala
Request for Comments: 5265                                       Codebay
Category: Standards Track                                    E. Klovning
                                                                Birdstep
                                                               June 2008


         <span class="h1">Mobile IPv4 Traversal across IPsec-Based VPN Gateways</span>

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   This document outlines a solution for the Mobile IPv4 (MIPv4) and
   IPsec coexistence problem for enterprise users.  The solution
   consists of an applicability statement for using Mobile IPv4 and
   IPsec for session mobility in corporate remote access scenarios, and
   a required mechanism for detecting the trusted internal network
   securely.

Table of Contents

   <a href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-3">3</a>
     <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-3">3</a>
     <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-5">5</a>
     <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>.  Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-5">5</a>
     <a href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>.  Terms and Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-5">5</a>
     <a href="#section-1.5">1.5</a>.  Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-6">6</a>
     <a href="#section-1.6">1.6</a>.  Assumptions and Rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-7">7</a>
     <a href="#section-1.7">1.7</a>.  Why IPsec Lacks Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-8">8</a>
   <a href="#section-2">2</a>.  The Network Environment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-9">9</a>
     <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>.  Access Mode: 'c' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
     <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>.  Access Mode: 'f' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
     <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>.  Access Mode: 'cvc' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
     <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>.  Access Mode: 'fvc' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
     <a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>.  NAT Traversal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
   <a href="#section-3">3</a>.  Internal Network Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
     <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>.  Assumptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
     <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>.  Implementation Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
       <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>.  Separate Tracking of Network Interfaces  . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
       <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>.  Connection Status Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
       <a href="#section-3.2.3">3.2.3</a>.  Registration-Based Internal Network Detection  . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                     [Page 1]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


       <a href="#section-3.2.4">3.2.4</a>.  Registration-Based Internal Network Monitoring . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
     <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>.  Proposed Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
     <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>.  Trusted Networks Configured (TNC) Extension  . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
     <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>.  Implementation Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
     <a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>.  Rationale for Design Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
       <a href="#section-3.6.1">3.6.1</a>.  Firewall Configuration Requirements  . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
       <a href="#section-3.6.2">3.6.2</a>.  Registration-Based Internal Network Monitoring . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
       <a href="#section-3.6.3">3.6.3</a>.  No Encryption When Inside  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
     <a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>.  Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
   <a href="#section-4">4</a>.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
     <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>.  Mobile Node Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
     <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>.  VPN Device Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
     <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>.  Home Agent Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
   <a href="#section-5">5</a>.  Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
     <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>.  Comparison against Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
     <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>.  Packet Overhead  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a>
     <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>.  Latency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
     <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>.  Firewall State Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
     <a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>.  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
     <a href="#section-5.6">5.6</a>.  Implementation of the Mobile Node  . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
     <a href="#section-5.7">5.7</a>.  Non-IPsec VPN Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
   <a href="#section-6">6</a>.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
     <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>.  Internal Network Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
     <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>.  Mobile IPv4 versus IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
   <a href="#section-7">7</a>.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
   <a href="#section-8">8</a>.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
   <a href="#section-9">9</a>.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-32">32</a>
     <a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-32">32</a>
     <a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
   <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.  Packet Flow Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-34">34</a>
     <a href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>.  Connection Setup for Access Mode 'cvc' . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-34">34</a>




















<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                     [Page 2]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction</span>

   The Mobile IP working group set out to explore the problem and
   solution spaces of IPsec and Mobile IP coexistence.  The problem
   statement and solution requirements for Mobile IPv4 case were first
   documented in [<a href="./rfc4093" title="&quot;Problem Statement: Mobile IPv4 Traversal of Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways&quot;">RFC4093</a>].  This document outlines a solution for IPv4.

   The document contains two parts:

   o  a basic solution that is an applicability statement of Mobile IPv4
      and IPsec to provide session mobility between enterprise intranets
      and external networks, intended for enterprise mobile users; and

   o  a technical specification and a set of requirements for secure
      detection of the internal and the external networks, including a
      new extension that must be implemented by a mobile node and a home
      agent situated inside the enterprise network.

   There are many useful ways to combine Mobile IPv4 and IPsec.  The
   solution specified in this document is most applicable when the
   assumptions documented in the problem statement [<a href="./rfc4093" title="&quot;Problem Statement: Mobile IPv4 Traversal of Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways&quot;">RFC4093</a>] are valid;
   among others that the solution:

   o  must minimize changes to existing firewall/VPN/DMZ (DeMilitarized
      Zone) deployments;

   o  must ensure that traffic is not routed through the DMZ when the
      mobile node is inside (to avoid scalability and management
      issues);

   o  must support foreign networks with only foreign agent access;

   o  should not require changes to existing IPsec or key exchange
      protocols;

   o  must comply with the Mobile IPv4 protocol (but may require new
      extensions or multiple instances of Mobile IPv4); and

   o  must propose a mechanism to avoid or minimize IPsec re-negotiation
      when the mobile node moves.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>.  Overview</span>

   Typical corporate networks consist of three different domains: the
   Internet (untrusted external network), the intranet (trusted internal
   network), and the DMZ, which connects the two networks.  Access to
   the internal network is guarded both by a firewall and a VPN device;




<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                     [Page 3]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   access is only allowed if both firewall and VPN security policies are
   respected.

   Enterprise mobile users benefit from unrestricted seamless session
   mobility between subnets, regardless of whether the subnets are part
   of the internal or the external network.  Unfortunately, the current
   Mobile IPv4 and IPsec standards alone do not provide such a service
   [<a href="#ref-tessier" title="&quot;Guidelines for Mobile IP and IPsec VPN Usage&quot;">tessier</a>].

   The solution is to use standard Mobile IPv4 (except for a new
   extension used by the home agent in the internal network to aid in
   network detection) when the mobile node is in the internal network,
   and to use the VPN tunnel endpoint address for the Mobile IPv4
   registration when outside.  IPsec-based VPN tunnels require re-
   negotiation after movement.  To overcome this limitation, another
   layer of Mobile IPv4 is used underneath IPsec, in effect making IPsec
   unaware of movement.  Thus, the mobile node can freely move in the
   external network without disrupting the VPN connection.

   Briefly, when outside, the mobile node:

   o  detects that it is outside (<a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>);

   o  registers its co-located or foreign agent care-of address with the
      external home agent;

   o  establishes a VPN tunnel using, e.g., Internet Key Exchange
      Protocol (IKE) (or IKEv2) if security associations are not already
      available;

   o  registers the VPN tunnel address as its co-located care-of address
      with the internal home agent; this registration request is sent
      inside the IPsec tunnel.

   The solution requires control over the protocol layers in the mobile
   node.  It must be capable of (1) detecting whether it is inside or
   outside in a secure fashion, and (2) controlling the protocol layers
   accordingly.  For instance, if the mobile node is inside, the IPsec
   layer needs to become dormant.

   Except for the new Mobile IPv4 extension to improve security of
   internal network detection, current Mobile IPv4 and IPsec standards,
   when used in a suitable combination, are sufficient to implement the
   solution.  No changes are required to existing VPN devices or foreign
   agents.

   The solution described is compatible with different kinds of IPsec-
   based VPNs, and no particular kind of VPN is required.  Because the



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                     [Page 4]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   appropriate Security Policy Database (SPD) entries and other IKE and
   IPsec specifics differ between deployed IPsec-based VPN products,
   these details are not discussed in the document.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>.  Scope</span>

   This document describes a solution for IPv4 only.  The downside of
   the described approach is that an external home agent is required and
   that the packet overhead (see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>) and overall complexity
   increase.  Optimizations would require significant changes to Mobile
   IPv4 and/or IPsec, and are out of scope of this document.

   VPN, in this document, refers to an IPsec-based remote access VPN.
   Other types of VPNs are out of scope.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>.  Related Work</span>

   Related work has been done on Mobile IPv6 in [<a href="./rfc3776" title="&quot;Using IPsec to Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and Home Agents&quot;">RFC3776</a>], which
   discusses the interaction of IPsec and Mobile IPv6 in protecting
   Mobile IPv6 signaling.  The document also discusses dynamic updating
   of the IPsec endpoint based on Mobile IP signaling packets.

   The "transient pseudo-NAT" attack, described in [<a href="#ref-pseudonat" title="&quot;Transient pseudo-NAT attacks or how NATs are even more evil than you believed&quot;">pseudonat</a>] and
   [<a href="#ref-mipnat" title="&quot;Mobile IP Traversal of Network Address Translation (NAT) Devices&quot;">mipnat</a>], affects any approach that attempts to provide security of
   mobility signaling in conjunction with NAT devices.  In many cases,
   one cannot assume any cooperation from NAT devices, which thus have
   to be treated as any other networking entity.

   The IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE) [<a href="./rfc4555" title="&quot;IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE)&quot;">RFC4555</a>]
   provides better mobility for IPsec.  This would allow the external
   Mobile IPv4 layer described in this specification to be removed.
   However, deploying MOBIKE requires changes to VPN devices, and is
   thus out of scope of this specification.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4" href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>.  Terms and Abbreviations</span>

   co-CoA:   co-located care-of address.

   DMZ:   (DeMilitarized Zone) a small network inserted as a "neutral
      zone" between a company's private network and the outside public
      network to prevent outside users from getting direct access to the
      company's private network.

   external network:   the untrusted network (i.e., Internet).  Note
      that a private network (e.g., another corporate network) other
      than the mobile node's internal network is considered an external
      network.




<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                     [Page 5]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   FA:   mobile IPv4 foreign agent.

   FA-CoA:   foreign agent care-of address.

   FW:   firewall.

   internal network:   the trusted network; for instance, a physically
      secure corporate network where the i-HA is located.

   i-FA:   Mobile IPv4 foreign agent residing in the internal network.

   i-HA:   Mobile IPv4 home agent residing in the internal network;
      typically has a private address [<a href="#ref-privaddr" title="&quot;Address Allocation for Private Internets&quot;">privaddr</a>].

   i-HoA:   home address of the mobile node in the internal home agent.

   MN:   mobile node.

   NAI:   Network Access Identifier [<a href="./rfc4282" title="&quot;The Network Access Identifier&quot;">RFC4282</a>].

   R:   router.

   VPN:   Virtual Private Network based on IPsec.

   VPN-TIA:   VPN tunnel inner address, the address(es) negotiated
      during IKE phase 2 (quick mode), assigned manually, using IPsec-
      DHCP [<a href="./rfc3456" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of IPsec Tunnel Mode&quot;">RFC3456</a>], using the "de facto" standard Internet Security
      Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) configuration
      mode, or by some other means.  Some VPN clients use their current
      care-of address as their Tunnel Inner Address (TIA) for
      architectural reasons.

   VPN tunnel:   an IPsec-based tunnel; for instance, IPsec tunnel mode
      IPsec connection, or Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) combined
      with IPsec transport connection.

   x-FA:   Mobile IPv4 foreign agent residing in the external network.

   x-HA:   Mobile IPv4 home agent residing in the external network.

   x-HoA:   home address of the mobile node in the external home agent.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.5" href="#section-1.5">1.5</a>.  Requirement Levels</span>

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>
   [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                     [Page 6]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.6" href="#section-1.6">1.6</a>.  Assumptions and Rationale</span>

   The solution is an attempt to solve the problem described in
   [<a href="./rfc4093" title="&quot;Problem Statement: Mobile IPv4 Traversal of Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways&quot;">RFC4093</a>].  The major assumptions and their rationale is summarized
   below.

   Changes to existing firewall and VPN deployments should be minimized:

   o  The current deployment of firewalls and IPsec-based VPNs is much
      larger than corresponding Mobile IPv4 elements.  Thus, a solution
      should work within the existing VPN infrastructure.

   o  Current enterprise network deployments typically centralize
      management of security and network access into a compact DMZ.

   When the mobile node is inside, traffic should not go through the DMZ
   network:

   o  Routing all mobile node traffic through the DMZ is seen as a
      performance problem in existing deployments of firewalls.  The
      more sophisticated firewall technology is used (e.g., content
      scanning), the more serious the performance problem is.

   o  Current deployments of firewalls and DMZs in general have been
      optimized for the case where only a small minority of total
      enterprise traffic goes through the DMZ.  Furthermore, users of
      current VPN remote access solutions do not route their traffic
      through the DMZ when connected to an internal network.

   A home agent inside the enterprise cannot be reached directly from
   outside, even if the home agent contains IPsec functionality:

   o  Deployment of current combined IPsec/MIPv4 solutions are not
      common in large installations.

   o  Doing decryption in the home agents "deep inside" the enterprise
      effectively means having a security perimeter much larger than the
      typical, compact DMZ used by a majority of enterprises today.

   o  In order to maintain a security level equal to current firewall/
      DMZ deployments, every home agent decapsulating IPsec would need
      to do the same firewalling as the current DMZ firewalls (content
      scanning, connection tracking, etc.).








<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                     [Page 7]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   Traffic cannot be encrypted when the mobile node is inside:

   o  There is a considerable performance impact on home agents (which
      currently do rather light processing) and mobile nodes (especially
      for small devices).  Note that traffic throughput inside the
      enterprise is typically an order (or more) of magnitude larger
      than the remote access traffic through a VPN.

   o  Encryption consumes processing power and has a significant impact
      on device battery life.

   o  There is also a usability issue involved; the user needs to
      authenticate the connection to the IPsec layer in the home agent
      to gain access.  For interactive authentication mechanisms (e.g.,
      SecurID), this always means user interaction.

   o  Furthermore, if there is a separate VPN device in the DMZ for
      remote access, the user needs to authenticate to both devices, and
      might need to have separate credentials for both.

   o  Current Mobile IPv4 home agents do not typically incorporate IPsec
      functionality, which is relevant for the solution when we assume
      zero or minimal changes to existing Mobile IPv4 nodes.

   o  Note, however, that the assumption (no encryption when inside)
      does not necessarily apply to all solutions in the solution space;
      if the above mentioned problems were resolved, there is no
      fundamental reason why encryption could not be applied when
      inside.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.7" href="#section-1.7">1.7</a>.  Why IPsec Lacks Mobility</span>

   IPsec, as currently specified [<a href="./rfc4301" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">RFC4301</a>], requires that a new IKE
   negotiation be done whenever an IPsec peer moves, i.e., changes
   care-of address.  The main reason is that a security association is
   unidirectional and identified by a triplet consisting of (1) the
   destination address (which is the outer address when tunnel mode is
   used), (2) the security protocol (Encapsulating Security Payload
   (ESP) or Authentication Header (AH)), and (3) the Security Parameter
   Index (SPI) (<a href="./rfc4301#section-4.1">[RFC4301], Section&nbsp;4.1</a>).  Although an implementation is
   not required to use all of these for its own Security Associations
   (SAs), an implementation cannot assume that a peer does not.

   When a mobile IPsec peer sends packets to a stationary IPsec peer,
   there is no problem; the SA is "owned" by the stationary IPsec peer,
   and therefore the destination address does not need to change.  The
   (outer) source address should be ignored by the stationary peer
   (although some implementations do check the source address as well).



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                     [Page 8]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   The problem arises when packets are sent from the stationary peer to
   the mobile peer.  The destination address of this SA (SAs are
   unidirectional) is established during IKE negotiation, and is
   effectively the care-of address of the mobile peer at time of
   negotiation.  Therefore, the packets will be sent to the original
   care-of address, not a changed care-of address.

   The IPsec NAT traversal mechanism can also be used for limited
   mobility, but UDP tunneling needs to be used even when there is no
   NAT in the route between the mobile and the stationary peers.
   Furthermore, support for changes in current NAT mapping is not
   required by the NAT traversal specification [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>].

   In summary, although the IPsec standard does not as such prevent
   mobility (in the sense of updating security associations on-the-fly),
   the standard does not include a built-in mechanism (explicit or
   implicit) for doing so.  Therefore, it is assumed throughout this
   document that any change in the addresses comprising the identity of
   an SA requires IKE re-negotiation, which implies too heavy
   computation and too large latency for useful mobility.

   The IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE) [<a href="./rfc4555" title="&quot;IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE)&quot;">RFC4555</a>]
   provides better mobility for IPsec.  This would allow the external
   Mobile IPv4 layer described in this specification to be removed.
   However, deploying MOBIKE requires changes to VPN devices, and is
   thus out of scope of this specification.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>.  The Network Environment</span>

   Enterprise users will access both the internal and external networks
   using different networking technologies.  In some networks, the MN
   will use FAs and in others it will anchor at the HA using co-located
   mode.  The following figure describes an example network topology
   illustrating the relationship between the internal and external
   networks, and the possible locations of the mobile node (i.e., (MN)).
















<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                     [Page 9]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


      (MN) {fvc}                            {home} (MN)   [i-HA]
       !                                             \     /
    .--+---.                                        .-+---+-.
   (        )                                      (         )
    `--+---'                      [VPN]             `--+----'
        \                           !                  !
      [R/FA]        [x-HA]       .--+--.              [R]
           \         /          (  DMZ  )              !
          .-+-------+--.         `--+--'         .-----+------.
         (              )           !           (              )
         ( external net +---[R]----[FW]----[R]--+ internal net )
         (              )                       (              )
          `--+---------'                         `---+---+----'
            /                                       /     \
  [DHCP]  [R]                              [DHCP] [R]     [R]    [i-FA]
     \    /                                   \   /         \    /
     .+--+---.                               .-+-+--.     .--+--+-.
    (         )                             (        )   (         )
     `---+---'                               `--+---'     `---+---'
         !                                      !             !
        (MN) {cvc}                             (MN) {c}      (MN) {f}

      Figure 1:  Basic topology, possible MN locations, and access modes

   In every possible location described in the figure, the mobile node
   can establish a connection to the corresponding HA(s) by using a
   suitable "access mode".  An access mode is here defined to consist
   of:

   1.  a composition of the mobile node networking stack (i-MIP or
       x-MIP/VPN/i-MIP); and

   2.  registration mode(s) of i-MIP and x-MIP (if used); i.e., co-
       located care-of address or foreign agent care-of address.

   Each possible access mode is encoded as "xyz", where:

   o  "x" indicates whether the x-MIP layer is used, and if used, the
      mode ("f" indicates FA-CoA, "c" indicates co-CoA, absence
      indicates not used);

   o  "y" indicates whether the VPN layer is used ("v" indicates VPN
      used, absence indicates not used); and

   o  "z" indicates mode of i-MIP layer ("f" indicates FA-CoA, "c"
      indicates co-CoA).





<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 10]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   This results in four access modes:

         c:  i-MIP with co-CoA
         f:  i-MIP with FA-CoA
       cvc:  x-MIP with co-CoA, VPN-TIA as i-MIP co-CoA
       fvc:  x-MIP with FA-CoA, VPN-TIA as i-MIP co-CoA

   This notation is more useful when optimizations to protocol layers
   are considered.  The notation is preserved here so that work on the
   optimizations can refer to a common notation.

   The internal network is typically a multi-subnetted network using
   private addressing [<a href="#ref-privaddr" title="&quot;Address Allocation for Private Internets&quot;">privaddr</a>].  Subnets may contain internal home
   agent(s), DHCP server(s), and/or foreign agent(s).  Current IEEE
   802.11 wireless LANs are typically deployed in the external network
   or the DMZ because of security concerns.

   The figure leaves out a few details worth noticing:

   o  There may be multiple NAT devices anywhere in the diagram.

      *  When the MN is outside, the NAT devices may be placed between
         the MN and the x-HA or the x-HA and the VPN.

      *  There may also be NAT(s) between the VPN and the i-HA, or a NAT
         integrated into the VPN.  In essence, any router in the figure
         may be considered to represent zero or more routers, each
         possibly performing NAT and/or ingress filtering.

      *  When the MN is inside, there may be NAT devices between the MN
         and the i-HA.

   o  Site-to-site VPN tunnels are not shown.  Although mostly
      transparent, IPsec endpoints may perform ingress filtering as part
      of enforcing their policy.

   o  The figure represents a topology where each functional entity is
      illustrated as a separate device.  However, it is possible that
      several network functions are co-located in a single device.  In
      fact, all three server components (x-HA, VPN, and i-HA) may be co-
      located in a single physical device.

   The following issues are also important when considering enterprise
   mobile users:

   o  Some firewalls are configured to block ICMP messages and/or
      fragments.  Such firewalls (routers) cannot be detected reliably.




<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 11]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   o  Some networks contain transparent application proxies, especially
      for HTTP.  Like firewalls, such proxies cannot be detected
      reliably in general.  IPsec and Mobile IPv4 are incompatible with
      such networks.

   Whenever a mobile node obtains either a co-CoA or an FA-CoA, the
   following conceptual steps take place:

   o  The mobile node detects whether the subnet where the care-of
      address was obtained belongs to the internal or the external
      network using the method described in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> (or a vendor-
      specific mechanism fulfilling the requirements described).

   o  The mobile node performs necessary registrations and other
      connection setup signaling for the protocol layers (in the
      following order):

      *  x-MIP (if used);

      *  VPN (if used); and

      *  i-MIP.

   Note that these two tasks are intertwined to some extent: detection
   of the internal network results in a successful registration to the
   i-HA using the proposed network detection algorithm.  An improved
   network detection mechanism not based on Mobile IPv4 registration
   messages might not have this side effect.

   The following subsections describe the different access modes and the
   requirements for registration and connection setup phase.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>.  Access Mode: 'c'</span>

   This access mode is standard Mobile IPv4 [<a href="./rfc3344" title="&quot;IP Mobility Support for IPv4&quot;">RFC3344</a>] with a co-located
   address, except that:

   o  the mobile node MUST detect that it is in the internal network;
      and

   o  the mobile node MUST re-register periodically (with a configurable
      interval) to ensure it is still inside the internal network (see
      <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>).








<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 12]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>.  Access Mode: 'f'</span>

   This access mode is standard Mobile IPv4 [<a href="./rfc3344" title="&quot;IP Mobility Support for IPv4&quot;">RFC3344</a>] with a foreign
   agent care-of address, except that

   o  the mobile node MUST detect that it is in the internal network;
      and

   o  the mobile node MUST re-register periodically (with a configurable
      interval) to ensure it is still inside the internal network (see
      <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>.  Access Mode: 'cvc'</span>

   Steps:

   o  The mobile node obtains a care-of address.

   o  The mobile node detects it is not inside and registers with the
      x-HA, where

      *  T-bit MAY be set (reverse tunneling), which minimizes the
         probability of firewall-related connectivity problems

   o  If the mobile node does not have an existing IPsec security
      association, it uses IKE to set up an IPsec security association
      with the VPN gateway, using the x-HoA as the IP address for IKE/
      IPsec communication.  How the VPN-TIA is assigned is outside the
      scope of this document.

   o  The mobile node sends a MIPv4 Registration Request (RRQ) to the
      i-HA, registering the VPN-TIA as a co-located care-of address,
      where

      *  T-bit SHOULD be set (reverse tunneling) (see discussion below)

   Reverse tunneling in the inner Mobile IPv4 layer is often required
   because of IPsec security policy limitations.  IPsec selectors define
   allowed IP addresses for packets sent inside the IPsec tunnel.
   Typical IPsec remote VPN selectors restrict the client address to be
   VPN-TIA (remote address is often unrestricted).  If reverse tunneling
   is not used, the source address of a packet sent by the MN will be
   the MN's home address (registered with i-HA), which is different from
   the VPN-TIA, thus violating IPsec security policy.  Consequently, the
   packet will be dropped, resulting in a connection black hole.






<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 13]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   Some types of IPsec-based VPNs, in particular L2TP/IPsec VPNs (PPP-
   over-L2TP-over-IPsec), do not have this limitation and can use
   triangular routing.

   Note that although the MN can use triangular routing, i.e., skip the
   inner MIPv4 layer, it MUST NOT skip the VPN layer for security
   reasons.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>.  Access Mode: 'fvc'</span>

   Steps:

   o  The mobile node obtains a foreign agent advertisement from the
      local network.

   o  The mobile node detects it is outside and registers with the x-HA,
      where

      *  T-bit MAY be set (reverse tunneling), which minimizes the
         probability of firewall-related connectivity problems

   o  If necessary, the mobile node uses IKE to set up an IPsec
      connection with the VPN gateway, using the x-HoA as the IP address
      for IKE/IPsec communication.  How the VPN-TIA is assigned is
      outside the scope of this document.

   o  The mobile node sends a MIPv4 RRQ to the i-HA, registering the
      VPN-TIA as a co-located care-of address, where

      *  T-bit SHOULD be set (reverse tunneling) (see discussion in
         <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>)

   Note that although the MN can use triangular routing, i.e., skip the
   inner MIPv4 layer, it MUST NOT skip the VPN layer for security
   reasons.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>.  NAT Traversal</span>

   NAT devices may affect each layer independently.  Mobile IPv4 NAT
   traversal [<a href="#ref-mipnat" title="&quot;Mobile IP Traversal of Network Address Translation (NAT) Devices&quot;">mipnat</a>] SHOULD be supported for x-MIP and i-MIP layers,
   while IPsec NAT traversal [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>][RFC3948] SHOULD be supported for
   the VPN layer.

   Note that NAT traversal for the internal MIPv4 layer may be necessary
   even when there is no separate NAT device between the VPN gateway and
   the internal network.  Some VPN implementations NAT VPN tunnel inner
   addresses before routing traffic to the intranet.  Sometimes this is
   done to make a deployment easier, but in some cases this approach



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 14]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   makes VPN client implementation easier.  Mobile IPv4 NAT traversal is
   required to establish a MIPv4 session in this case.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>.  Internal Network Detection</span>

   Secure detection of the internal network is critical to prevent
   plaintext traffic from being sent over an untrusted network.  In
   other words, the overall security (confidentiality and integrity of
   user data) relies on the security of the internal network detection
   mechanism in addition to IPsec.  For this reason, security
   requirements are described in this section.

   In addition to detecting entry into the internal network, the mobile
   node must also detect when it has left the internal network.  Entry
   into the internal network is easier security-wise: the mobile node
   can ensure that it is inside the internal network before sending any
   plaintext traffic.  Exit from the internal network is more difficult
   to detect, and the MN may accidentally leak plaintext packets if the
   event is not detected in time.

   Several events can cause the mobile node to leave the internal
   network, including:

   o  a routing change upstream;

   o  a reassociation of 802.11 on layer 2 that the mobile node software
      does not detect;

   o  a physical cable disconnect and reconnect that the mobile node
      software does not detect.

   Whether the mobile node can detect such changes in the current
   connection reliably depends on the implementation and the networking
   technology.  For instance, some mobile nodes may be implemented as
   pure layer three entities.  Even if the mobile node software has
   access to layer 2 information, such information is not trustworthy
   security-wise, and depends on the network interface driver.

   If the mobile node does not detect these events properly, it may leak
   plaintext traffic into an untrusted network.  A number of approaches
   can be used to detect exit from the internal network, ranging from
   frequent re-registration to the use of layer two information.

   A mobile node MUST implement a detection mechanism fulfilling the
   requirements described in <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>; this ensures that basic
   security requirements are fulfilled.  The basic algorithm described
   in <a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a> is one way to do that, but alternative methods may be
   used instead or in conjunction.  The assumptions that the



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 15]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   requirements and the proposed mechanism rely upon are described in
   <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>.  Assumptions</span>

   The enterprise firewall MUST be configured to block traffic
   originating from external networks going to the i-HA.  In other
   words, the mobile node MUST NOT be able to perform a successful
   Registration Request/Registration Reply (RRQ/RRP) exchange (without
   using IPsec) unless it is connected to the trusted internal network;
   the mobile node can then stop using IPsec without compromising data
   confidentiality.

   If this assumption does not hold, data confidentiality is compromised
   in a potentially silent and thus dangerous manner.  To minimize the
   impact of this scenario, the i-HA is also required to check the
   source address of any RRQ to determine whether it comes from a
   trusted (internal network) address.  The i-HA needs to indicate to
   the MN that it supports the checking of trusted source addresses by
   including a Trusted Networks Configured extension in its registration
   reply.  This new extension, which needs to be implemented by both
   i-HA and the MN, is described in <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>.

   The firewall MAY be configured to block registration traffic to the
   x-HA originating from within the internal network, which makes the
   network detection algorithm simpler and more robust.  However, as the
   registration request is basically UDP traffic, an ordinary firewall
   (even a stateful one) would typically allow the registration request
   to be sent and a registration reply to be received through the
   firewall.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>.  Implementation Requirements</span>

   Any mechanism used to detect the internal network MUST fulfill the
   requirements described in this section.  An example of a network
   detection mechanism fulfilling these requirements is given in
   <a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>.  Separate Tracking of Network Interfaces</span>

   The mobile node implementation MUST track each network interface
   separately.  Successful registration with the i-HA through interface
   X does not imply anything about the status of interface Y.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>.  Connection Status Change</span>

   When the mobile node detects that its connection status on a certain
   network interface changes, the mobile node MUST:



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 16]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   o  immediately stop relaying user data packets;

   o  detect whether this interface is connected to the internal or the
      external network; and

   o  resume data traffic only after the internal network detection and
      necessary registrations and VPN tunnel establishment have been
      completed.

   The mechanisms used to detect a connection status change depends on
   the mobile node implementation, the networking technology, and the
   access mode.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.3" href="#section-3.2.3">3.2.3</a>.  Registration-Based Internal Network Detection</span>

   The mobile node MUST NOT infer that an interface is connected to the
   internal network unless a successful registration has been completed
   through that particular interface to the i-HA, the i-HA registration
   reply contained a Trusted Networks Configured extension
   (<a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>), and the connection status of the interface has not
   changed since.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4" href="#section-3.2.4">3.2.4</a>.  Registration-Based Internal Network Monitoring</span>

   Some leak of plaintext packets to a (potentially) untrusted network
   cannot always be completely prevented; this depends heavily on the
   client implementation.  In some cases, the client cannot detect such
   a change, e.g., if upstream routing is changed.

   More frequent re-registrations when the MN is inside is a simple way
   to ensure that the MN is still inside.  The MN SHOULD start re-
   registration every (T_MONITOR - N) seconds when inside, where N is a
   grace period that ensures that re-registration is completed before
   T_MONITOR seconds are up.  To bound the maximum amount of time that a
   plaintext leak may persist, the mobile node must fulfill the
   following security requirements when inside:

   o  The mobile node MUST NOT send or receive a user data packet if
      more than T_MONITOR seconds have elapsed since the last successful
      (re-)registration with the i-HA.

   o  If more than T_MONITOR seconds have elapsed, data packets MUST be
      either dropped or queued.  If the packets are queued, the queues
      MUST NOT be processed until the re-registration has been
      successfully completed without a connection status change.






<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 17]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   o  The T_MONITOR parameter MUST be configurable, and have the default
      value of 60 seconds.  This default is a trade-off between traffic
      overhead and a reasonable bound to exposure.

   This approach is reasonable for a wide range of mobile nodes (e.g.,
   laptops), but has unnecessary overhead when the mobile node is idle
   (not sending or receiving packets).  If re-registration does not
   complete before T_MONITOR seconds are up, data packets must be queued
   or dropped as specified above.  Note that re-registration packets
   MUST be sent even if bidirectional user data traffic is being
   relayed: data packets are no substitute for an authenticated re-
   registration.

   To minimize traffic overhead when the mobile node is idle, re-
   registrations can be stopped when no traffic is being sent or
   received.  If the mobile node subsequently receives or needs to send
   a packet, the packet must be dropped or queued (as specified above)
   until a re-registration with the i-HA has been successfully
   completed.  Although this approach adds packet processing complexity,
   it may be appropriate for small, battery-powered devices, which may
   be idle much of the time.  (Note that ordinary re-registration before
   the mobility binding lifetime is exhausted should still be done to
   keep the MN reachable.)

   T_MONITOR is required to be configurable so that an administrator can
   determine the required security level for the particular deployment.
   Configuring T_MONITOR in the order of a few seconds is not practical;
   alternative mechanisms need to be considered if such confidence is
   required.

   The re-registration mechanism is a worst-case fallback mechanism.  If
   additional information (such as layer two triggers) is available to
   the mobile node, the mobile node SHOULD use the triggers to detect MN
   movement and restart the detection process to minimize exposure.

   Note that re-registration is required by Mobile IPv4 by default
   (except for the atypical case of an infinite binding lifetime);
   however, the re-registration interval may be much larger when using
   an ordinary Mobile IPv4 client.  A shorter re-registration interval
   is usually not an issue, because the internal network is typically a
   fast, wired network, and the shortened re-registration interval
   applies only when the mobile node is inside the internal network.
   When outside, the ordinary Mobile IPv4 re-registration process (based
   on binding lifetime) is used.







<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 18]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>.  Proposed Algorithm</span>

   When the MN detects that it has changed its point of network
   attachment on a certain interface, it issues two simultaneous
   registration requests, one to the i-HA and another to the x-HA.
   These registration requests are periodically retransmitted if reply
   messages are not received.

   Registration replies are processed as follows:

   o  If a response from the x-HA is received, the MN stops
      retransmitting its registration request to the x-HA and
      tentatively determines it is outside.  However, the MN MUST keep
      on retransmitting its registration to the i-HA for a period of
      time.  The MN MAY postpone the IPsec connection setup for some
      period of time while it waits for a (possible) response from the
      i-HA.

   o  If a response from the i-HA is received and the response contains
      the Trusted Networks Configured extension (<a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>), the MN
      SHOULD determine that it is inside.  In any case, the MN MUST stop
      retransmitting its registration requests to both i-HA and x-HA.

   o  When successfully registered with the i-HA directly, MN SHOULD de-
      register with the x-HA.

   If the MN ends up detecting that it is inside, it MUST re-register
   periodically (regardless of binding lifetime); see <a href="#section-3.2.4">Section 3.2.4</a>.  If
   the re-registration fails, the MN MUST stop sending and receiving
   plaintext traffic, and MUST restart the detection algorithm.

   Plaintext re-registration messages are always addressed either to the
   x-HA or the i-HA, not to both.  This is because the MN knows, after
   initial registration, whether it is inside or outside.  (However,
   when the mobile node is outside, it re-registers independently with
   the x-HA using plaintext, and with the i-HA through the VPN tunnel.)

   Postponing the IPsec connection setup could prevent aborted IKE
   sessions.  Aborting IKE sessions may be a problem in some cases
   because IKE does not provide a reliable, standardized, and mandatory-
   to-implement mechanism for terminating a session cleanly.

   If the x-HA is not reachable from inside (i.e., the firewall
   configuration is known), a detection period of zero is preferred, as
   it minimizes connection setup overhead and causes no timing problems.
   Should the assumption have been invalid and a response from the i-HA
   received after a response from the x-HA, the MN SHOULD re-register
   with the i-HA directly.



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 19]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>.  Trusted Networks Configured (TNC) Extension</span>

   This extension is a skippable extension.  An i-HA sending the
   extension must fulfill the requirements described in <a href="#section-4.3">Section 4.3</a>,
   while an MN processing the extension must fulfill the requirements
   described in <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>.  The format of the extension is described
   below.  It adheres to the short extension format described in
   [<a href="./rfc3344" title="&quot;IP Mobility Support for IPv4&quot;">RFC3344</a>]:

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |    Length     |    Sub-Type   |   Reserved    |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

          Type        149

          Length      2

          Sub-Type    0

          Reserved    Set to 0 when sending, ignored when receiving

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>.  Implementation Issues</span>

   When the MN uses a parallel detection algorithm and is using an FA,
   the MN sends two registration requests through the same FA with the
   same Media Acces Control (MAC) address (or equivalent) and possibly
   even the same home address.  Although this is not in conflict with
   existing specifications, it is an unusual scenario; hence some FA
   implementations may not work properly in such a situation.  However,
   testing against deployed foreign agents seems to indicate that a
   majority of available foreign agents handle this situation.

   When the x-HA and i-HA addresses are the same, the scenario is even
   more difficult for the FA, and it is almost certain that existing FAs
   do not deal with the situation correctly.  Therefore, it is required
   that x-HA and i-HA addresses MUST be different.

   Regardless, if the MN detects that i-HA and x-HA have the same
   address, it MUST assume that it is in the external network and bypass
   network detection to avoid confusing the FA.  Because the HA
   addresses are used at different layers, achieving connectivity is
   possible without address confusion.

   The mobile node MAY use the following hints to determine that it is
   inside, but MUST verify reachability of the i-HA anyway:




<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 20]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   o  a domain name in a DHCPDISCOVER / DHCPOFFER message

   o  an NAI in a foreign agent advertisement

   o  a list of default gateway MAC addresses that are known to reside
      in the internal network (i.e., configured as such, or have been
      previously verified to be inside)

   For instance, if the MN has reason to believe it is inside, it MAY
   postpone sending a registration request to the x-HA for some time.
   Similarly, if the MN has reason to believe it is outside, it may
   start IPsec connection setup immediately after receiving a
   registration reply from the x-HA.  However, should the MN receive a
   registration reply from the i-HA after IPsec connection setup has
   been started, the MN SHOULD still switch to using the i-HA directly.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>.  Rationale for Design Choices</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6.1" href="#section-3.6.1">3.6.1</a>.  Firewall Configuration Requirements</span>

   The requirement that the i-HA cannot be reached from the external
   network is necessary.  If not, a successful registration with the
   i-HA (without IPsec) cannot be used as a secure indication that the
   mobile node is inside.  A possible solution to the obvious security
   problem would be to define and deploy a secure internal network
   detection mechanism based on, e.g., signed FA advertisement or signed
   DHCP messages.

   However, unless the mechanism is defined for both FA and DHCP
   messages and is deployed in every internal network, it has limited
   applicability.  In other words, the mobile node MUST NOT assume it is
   in the internal network unless it receives a signed FA or DHCP
   message (regardless of whether or not it can register directly with
   the i-HA).  If it receives an unsigned FA or DHCP message, it MUST
   use IPsec; otherwise, the mobile node can be easily tricked into
   using plaintext.

   Assuming that all FA and DHCP servers in the internal network are
   upgraded to support such a feature does not seem realistic; it is
   highly desirable to be able to take advantage of existing DHCP and FA
   deployments.  Similar analysis seems to apply regardless of what kind
   of additional security mechanism is defined.

   Because a firewall configuration error can have catastrophic data
   security consequences (silent exposure of user data to external
   attackers), a separate protection mechanism is provided by the i-HA.
   The i-HA must be configured, by the administrator, with a list of
   trusted networks.  The i-HA advertises that it knows which



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 21]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   registration request source addresses are trusted, using a
   registration reply extension (Trusted Networks Configured extension,
   <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>).  Without this extension, an MN may not rely on a
   successful registration to indicate that it is connected to the
   internal network.  This ensures that user data compromise does not
   occur unless both the firewall and the i-HA are configured
   incorrectly.  Further, occurrences of registration requests from
   untrusted addresses should be logged by the i-HA, exposing them to
   administrator review.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6.2" href="#section-3.6.2">3.6.2</a>.  Registration-Based Internal Network Monitoring</span>

   This issue also affects IPsec client security.  However, as IPsec
   specifications take no stand on how and when client IPsec policies
   are configured or changed (for instance, in response to a change in
   network connectivity), the issue is out of scope for IPsec.  Because
   this document describes an algorithm and requirements for (secure)
   internal network detection, the issue is in scope of the document.

   The current requirement for internal network monitoring was added as
   a fallback mechanism.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6.3" href="#section-3.6.3">3.6.3</a>.  No Encryption When Inside</span>

   If encryption was applied also when MN was inside, there would be no
   security reason to monitor the internal network periodically.

   The main rationale for why encryption cannot be applied when the MN
   is inside was given in <a href="#section-1.6">Section 1.6</a>.  In short, the main issues are
   (1) power consumption; (2) extra CPU load, especially because
   internal networks are typically switched networks and a lot of data
   may be routinely transferred; (3) existing HA devices do not
   typically integrate IPsec functionality; (4) (IPsec) encryption
   requires user authentication, which may be interactive in some cases
   (e.g., SecurID) and thus a usability issue; and (5) user may need to
   have separate credentials for VPN devices in the DMZ and the HA.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>.  Improvements</span>

   The registration process can be improved in many ways.  One simple
   way is to make the x-HA detect whether a registration request came
   from inside or outside the enterprise network.  If it came from
   inside the enterprise network, the x-HA can simply drop the
   registration request.

   This approach is feasible without protocol changes in scenarios where
   a corporation owns both the VPN and the x-HA.  The x-HA can simply
   determine based on the incoming interface identifier (or the router



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 22]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   that relayed the packet) whether or not the registration request came
   from inside.

   In other scenarios, protocol changes may be needed.  Such changes are
   out of scope of this document.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>.  Requirements</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>.  Mobile Node Requirements</span>

   The mobile node MUST implement an internal network detection
   algorithm fulfilling the requirements set forth in <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>.  A
   new configurable MN parameter, T_MONITOR, is required.  The value of
   this parameter reflects a balance between security and the amount of
   signaling overhead, and thus needs to be configurable.  In addition,
   when doing internal network detection, the MN MUST NOT disable IPsec
   protection unless the registration reply from the i-HA contains a
   Trusted Networks Configured extension (<a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>).

   The mobile node MUST support access modes c, f, cvc, fvc (<a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>).

   The mobile node SHOULD support Mobile IPv4 NAT traversal [<a href="#ref-mipnat" title="&quot;Mobile IP Traversal of Network Address Translation (NAT) Devices&quot;">mipnat</a>] for
   both internal and external Mobile IP.

   The mobile node SHOULD support IPsec NAT traversal [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>]
   [<a href="./rfc3948" title="&quot;UDP Encapsulation of IPsec packets&quot;">RFC3948</a>].

   When the mobile node has direct access to the i-HA, it SHOULD use
   only the inner Mobile IPv4 layer to minimize firewall and VPN impact.

   When the mobile node is outside and using the VPN connection, IPsec
   policies MUST be configured to encrypt all traffic sent to and from
   the enterprise network.  The particular Security Policy Database
   (SPD) entries depend on the type and configuration of the particular
   VPN (e.g., plain IPsec vs. L2TP/IPsec, full tunneling or split
   tunneling).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>.  VPN Device Requirements</span>

   The VPN security policy MUST allow communication using UDP to the
   internal home agent(s), with home agent port 434 and any remote port.
   The security policy SHOULD allow IP-IP to internal home agent(s) in
   addition to UDP port 434.

   The VPN device SHOULD implement the IPsec NAT traversal mechanism
   described in [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>] and [<a href="./rfc3948" title="&quot;UDP Encapsulation of IPsec packets&quot;">RFC3948</a>].





<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 23]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>.  Home Agent Requirements</span>

   The home agent SHOULD implement the Mobile IPv4 NAT traversal
   mechanism described in [<a href="#ref-mipnat" title="&quot;Mobile IP Traversal of Network Address Translation (NAT) Devices&quot;">mipnat</a>].  (This also refers to the i-HA: NAT
   traversal is required to support VPNs that NAT VPN tunnel addresses
   or block IP-IP traffic.)

   To protect user data confidentiality against firewall configuration
   errors, the i-HA:

   o  MUST be configured with a list of trusted IP subnets (containing
      only addresses from the internal network), with no subnets being
      trusted by default.

   o  MUST reject (drop silently) any registration request coming from a
      source address that is not inside any of the configured trusted
      subnets.  These dropped registration requests SHOULD be logged.

   o  MUST include a Trusted Networks Configured extension (<a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>)
      in a registration reply sent in response to a registration request
      coming from a trusted address.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>.  Analysis</span>

   This section provides a comparison against guidelines described in
   <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> of the problem statement [<a href="./rfc4093" title="&quot;Problem Statement: Mobile IPv4 Traversal of Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways&quot;">RFC4093</a>] and additional analysis
   of packet overhead with and without the optional mechanisms.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>.  Comparison against Guidelines</span>

   Preservation of existing VPN infrastructure

   o  The solution does not mandate any changes to existing VPN
      infrastructure, other than possibly changes in configuration to
      avoid stateful filtering of traffic.

   Software upgrades to existing VPN clients and gateways

   o  The solution described does not require any changes to VPN
      gateways or Mobile IPv4 foreign agents.

   IPsec protocol

   o  The solution does not require any changes to existing IPsec or key
      exchange standard protocols, and does not require implementation
      of new protocols in the VPN device.





<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 24]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   Multi-vendor interoperability

   o  The solution provides easy multi-vendor interoperability between
      server components (VPN device, foreign agents, and home agents).
      Indeed, these components need not be aware of each other.

   o  The mobile node networking stack is somewhat complex to implement,
      which may be an issue for multi-vendor interoperability.  However,
      this is a purely software architecture issue, and there are no
      known protocol limitations for multi-vendor interoperability.

   MIPv4 protocol

   o  The solution adheres to the MIPv4 protocol, but requires the new
      Trusted Networks Configured extension to improve the
      trustworthiness of internal network detection.

   o  The solution requires the use of two parallel MIPv4 layers.

   Handoff overhead

   o  The solution provides a mechanism to avoid VPN tunnel SA
      renegotiation upon movement by using the external MIPv4 layer.

   Scalability, availability, reliability, and performance

   o  The solution complexity is linear with the number of MNs
      registered and accessing resources inside the intranet.

   o  Additional overhead is imposed by the solution.

   Functional entities

   o  The solution does not impose any new types of functional entities
      or required changes to existing entities.  However, an external HA
      device is required.

   Implications of intervening NAT gateways

   o  The solution leverages existing MIPv4 NAT traversal [<a href="#ref-mipnat" title="&quot;Mobile IP Traversal of Network Address Translation (NAT) Devices&quot;">mipnat</a>] and
      IPsec NAT traversal [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>] [<a href="./rfc3948" title="&quot;UDP Encapsulation of IPsec packets&quot;">RFC3948</a>] solutions and does not
      require any new functionality to deal with NATs.

   Security implications

   o  The solution requires a new mechanism to detect whether the mobile
      node is in the internal or the external network.  The security of
      this mechanism is critical in ensuring that the security level



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 25]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


      provided by IPsec is not compromised by a faulty detection
      mechanism.

   o  When the mobile node is outside, the external Mobile IPv4 layer
      may allow some traffic redirection attacks that plain IPsec does
      not allow.  Other than that, IPsec security is unchanged.

   o  More security considerations are described in <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a>.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>.  Packet Overhead</span>

   The maximum packet overhead depends on access mode as follows:

   o  f: 0 octets

   o  c: 20 octets

   o  fvc: 77 octets

   o  cvc: 97 octets

   The maximum overhead of 97 octets in the 'cvc' access mode consists
   of the following:

   o  IP-IP for i-MIPv4: 20 octets

   o  IPsec ESP: 57 octets total, consisting of 20 (new IP header),
      4+4+8 = 16 (SPI, sequence number, cipher initialization vector),
      7+2 = 9 (padding, padding length field, next header field), 12
      (ESP authentication trailer)

   o  IP-IP for x-MIPv4: 20 octets

   When IPsec is used, a variable amount of padding is present in each
   ESP packet.  The figures were computed for a cipher with 64-bit block
   size, padding overhead of 9 octets (next header field, padding length
   field, and 7 octets of padding; see <a href="./rfc4303#section-2.4">Section&nbsp;2.4 of [RFC4303]</a>), and
   ESP authentication field of 12 octets (HMAC-SHA1-96 or HMAC-MD5-96).
   Note that an IPsec implementation MAY pad with more than a minimum
   amount of octets.

   NAT traversal overhead is not included, and adds 8 octets when IPsec
   NAT traversal [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>] [<a href="./rfc3948" title="&quot;UDP Encapsulation of IPsec packets&quot;">RFC3948</a>] is used and 12 octets when MIP NAT
   traversal [<a href="#ref-mipnat" title="&quot;Mobile IP Traversal of Network Address Translation (NAT) Devices&quot;">mipnat</a>] is used.  For instance, when using access mode
   cvc, the maximum NAT traversal overhead is 12+8+12 = 32 octets.
   Thus, the worst case scenario (with the above mentioned ESP
   assumptions) is 129 octets for cvc.




<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 26]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>.  Latency Considerations</span>

   When the MN is inside, connection setup latency does not increase
   compared to standard MIPv4 if the MN implements the suggested
   parallel registration sequence (see <a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>).  Exchange of RRQ/
   RRP messages with the i-HA confirms the MN is inside, and the MN may
   start sending and receiving user traffic immediately.  For the same
   reason, handovers in the internal network have no overhead relative
   to standard MIPv4.

   When the MN is outside, the situation is slightly different.  Initial
   connection setup latency essentially consists of (1) registration
   with the x-HA, (2) optional detection delay (waiting for i-HA
   response), (3) IPsec connection setup (IKE), and (4) registration
   with the i-HA.  All but (4) are in addition to standard MIPv4.

   However, handovers in the external network have performance
   comparable to standard MIPv4.  The MN simply re-registers with the
   x-HA and starts to send IPsec traffic to the VPN gateway from the new
   address.

   The MN may minimize latency by (1) not waiting for an i-HA response
   before triggering IKE if the x-HA registration succeeds and (2)
   sending first the RRQ most likely to succeed (e.g., if the MN is most
   likely outside).  These can be done based on heuristics about the
   network, e.g., addresses, MAC address of the default gateway (which
   the mobile node may remember from previous access); based on the
   previous access network (i.e., optimize for inside-inside and
   outside-outside movement); etc.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>.  Firewall State Considerations</span>

   A separate firewall device or an integrated firewall in the VPN
   gateway typically performs stateful inspection of user traffic.  The
   firewall may, for instance, track TCP session status and block TCP
   segments not related to open connections.  Other stateful inspection
   mechanisms also exist.

   Firewall state poses a problem when the mobile node moves between the
   internal and external networks.  The mobile node may, for instance,
   initiate a TCP connection while inside, and later go outside while
   expecting to keep the connection alive.  From the point of view of
   the firewall, the TCP connection has not been initiated, as it has
   not witnessed the TCP connection setup packets, thus potentially
   resulting in connectivity problems.

   When the VPN-TIA is registered as a co-located care-of address with
   the i-HA, all mobile node traffic appears as IP-IP for the firewall.



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 27]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   Typically, firewalls do not continue inspection beyond the IP-IP
   tunnel, but support for deeper inspection is available in many
   products.  In particular, an administrator can configure traffic
   policies in many firewall products even for IP-IP encapsulated
   traffic.  If this is done, similar statefulness issues may arise.

   In summary, the firewall must allow traffic coming from and going
   into the IPsec connection to be routed, even though they may not have
   successfully tracked the connection state.  How this is done is out
   of scope of this document.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.5" href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>.  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)</span>

   Many firewalls incorporate intrusion detection systems monitoring
   network traffic for unusual patterns and clear signs of attack.
   Since traffic from a mobile node implementing this specification is
   UDP to i-HA port 434, and possibly IP-IP traffic to the i-HA address,
   existing IDSs may treat the traffic differently than ordinary VPN
   remote access traffic.  Like firewalls, IDSs are not standardized, so
   it is impossible to guarantee interoperability with any particular
   IDS system.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.6" href="#section-5.6">5.6</a>.  Implementation of the Mobile Node</span>

   Implementation of the mobile node requires the use of three tunneling
   layers, which may be used in various configurations depending on
   whether that particular interface is inside or outside.  Note that it
   is possible that one interface is inside and another interface is
   outside, which requires a different layering for each interface at
   the same time.

   For multi-vendor implementation, the IPsec and MIPv4 layers need to
   interoperate in the same mobile node.  This implies that a flexible
   framework for protocol layering (or protocol-specific APIs) is
   required.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.7" href="#section-5.7">5.7</a>.  Non-IPsec VPN Protocols</span>

   The solution also works for VPN tunneling protocols that are not
   IPsec-based, provided that the mobile node is provided IPv4
   connectivity with an address suitable for registration.  However,
   such VPN protocols are not explicitly considered.









<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 28]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>.  Security Considerations</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>.  Internal Network Detection</span>

   If the mobile node by mistake believes it is in the internal network
   and sends plaintext packets, it compromises IPsec security.  For this
   reason, the overall security (confidentiality and integrity) of user
   data is a minimum of (1) IPsec security and (2) security of the
   internal network detection mechanism.

   Security of the internal network detection relies on a successful
   registration with the i-HA.  For standard Mobile IPv4 [<a href="./rfc3344" title="&quot;IP Mobility Support for IPv4&quot;">RFC3344</a>], this
   means HMAC-MD5 and Mobile IPv4 replay protection.  The solution also
   assumes that the i-HA is not directly reachable from the external
   network, requiring careful enterprise firewall configuration.  To
   minimize the impact of a firewall configuration problem, the i-HA is
   separately required to be configured with trusted source addresses
   (i.e., addresses belonging to the internal network), and to include
   an indication of this in a new Trusted Networks Configured extension.
   The MN is required not to trust a registration as an indication of
   being connected to the internal network, unless this extension is
   present in the registration reply.  Thus, to actually compromise user
   data confidentiality, both the enterprise firewall and the i-HA have
   to be configured incorrectly, which reduces the likelihood of the
   scenario.

   When the mobile node sends a registration request to the i-HA from an
   untrusted network that does not go through the IPsec tunnel, it will
   reveal the i-HA's address, its own identity including the NAI and the
   home address, and the Authenticator value in the authentication
   extensions to the untrusted network.  This may be a concern in some
   deployments.

   When the connection status of an interface changes, an interface
   previously connected to the trusted internal network may suddenly be
   connected to an untrusted network.  Although the same problem is also
   relevant to IPsec-based VPN implementations, the problem is
   especially relevant in the scope of this specification.

   In most cases, mobile node implementations are expected to have layer
   2 information available, making connection change detection both fast
   and robust.  To cover cases where such information is not available
   (or fails for some reason), the mobile node is required to
   periodically re-register with the internal home agent to verify that
   it is still connected to the trusted network.  It is also required
   that this re-registration interval be configurable, thus giving the
   administrator a parameter by which potential exposure may be
   controlled.



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 29]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>.  Mobile IPv4 versus IPsec</span>

   MIPv4 and IPsec have different goals and approaches for providing
   security services.  MIPv4 typically uses a shared secret for
   authentication of signaling traffic, while IPsec typically uses IKE
   (an authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange) to set up session keys.
   Thus, the overall security properties of a combined MIPv4 and IPsec
   system depend on both mechanisms.

   In the solution outlined in this document, the external MIPv4 layer
   provides mobility for IPsec traffic.  If the security of MIPv4 is
   broken in this context, traffic redirection attacks against the IPsec
   traffic are possible.  However, such routing attacks do not affect
   other IPsec properties (confidentiality, integrity, replay
   protection, etc.), because IPsec does not consider the network
   between two IPsec endpoints to be secure in any way.

   Because MIPv4 shared secrets are usually configured manually, they
   may be weak if easily memorizable secrets are chosen, thus opening up
   redirection attacks described above.  Note especially that a weak
   secret in the i-HA is fatal to security, as the mobile node can be
   fooled into dropping encryption if the i-HA secret is broken.

   Assuming the MIPv4 shared secrets have sufficient entropy, there are
   still at least the following differences and similarities between
   MIPv4 and IPsec worth considering:

   o  Both IPsec and MIPv4 are susceptible to the "transient pseudo NAT"
      attack described in [<a href="#ref-pseudonat" title="&quot;Transient pseudo-NAT attacks or how NATs are even more evil than you believed&quot;">pseudonat</a>] and [<a href="#ref-mipnat" title="&quot;Mobile IP Traversal of Network Address Translation (NAT) Devices&quot;">mipnat</a>], assuming that NAT
      traversal is enabled (which is typically the case).  "Pseudo NAT"
      attacks allow an attacker to redirect traffic flows, resulting in
      resource consumption, lack of connectivity, and denial of service.
      However, such attacks cannot compromise the confidentiality of
      user data protected using IPsec.

   o  When considering a "pseudo NAT" attack against standard IPsec and
      standard MIP (with NAT traversal), redirection attacks against MIP
      may be easier because:

      *  MIPv4 re-registrations typically occur more frequently than
         IPsec SA setups (although this may not be the case for mobile
         hosts).

      *  It suffices to catch and modify a single registration request,
         whereas attacking IKE requires that multiple IKE packets are
         caught and modified.





<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 30]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   o  There may be concerns about mixing of algorithms.  For instance,
      IPsec may be using HMAC-SHA1-96, while MIP is always using HMAC-
      MD5 (<a href="./rfc3344">RFC 3344</a>) or prefix+suffix MD5 (<a href="./rfc2002">RFC 2002</a>).  Furthermore,
      while IPsec algorithms are typically configurable, MIPv4 clients
      typically use only HMAC-MD5 or prefix+suffix MD5.  Although this
      is probably not a security problem as such, it is more difficult
      to communicate to users.

   o  When IPsec is used with a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the key
      management properties are superior to those of basic MIPv4.  Thus,
      adding MIPv4 to the system makes key management more complex.

   o  In general, adding new security mechanisms increases overall
      complexity and makes the system more difficult to understand.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>.  IANA Considerations</span>

   This document specifies a new skippable extension (in the short
   format) in <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>, whose Type and Sub-Type values have been
   assigned.

   Allocation of new Sub-Type values can be made via Expert Review and
   Specification Required [<a href="./rfc5226" title="">RFC5226</a>].

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>.  Acknowledgements</span>

   This document is a joint work of the contributing authors (in
   alphabetical order):

           - Farid Adrangi (Intel Corporation)
           - Nitsan Baider (Check Point Software Technologies, Inc.)
           - Gopal Dommety (Cisco Systems)
           - Eli Gelasco (Cisco Systems)
           - Dorothy Gellert (Nokia Corporation)
           - Espen Klovning (Birdstep)
           - Milind Kulkarni (Cisco Systems)
           - Henrik Levkowetz (ipUnplugged AB)
           - Frode Nielsen (Birdstep)
           - Sami Vaarala (Codebay)
           - Qiang Zhang (Liqwid Networks, Inc.)

   The authors would like to thank the MIP/VPN design team, especially
   Mike Andrews, Gaetan Feige, Prakash Iyer, Brijesh Kumar, Joe Lau,
   Kent Leung, Gabriel Montenegro, Ranjit Narjala, Antti Nuopponen, Alan
   O'Neill, Alpesh Patel, Ilkka Pietikainen, Phil Roberts, Hans
   Sjostrand, and Serge Tessier for their continuous feedback and
   helping us improve this document.  Special thanks to Radia Perlman
   for giving the document a thorough read and a security review.  Tom



<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 31]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   Hiller pointed out issues with battery-powered devices.  We would
   also like to thank the previous Mobile IP working group chairs
   (Gabriel Montenegro, Basavaraj Patil, and Phil Roberts) for important
   feedback and guidance.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>.  References</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>.  Normative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3344">RFC3344</a>]    Perkins, C., Ed., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4",
                <a href="./rfc3344">RFC 3344</a>, August 2002.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3947">RFC3947</a>]    Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe,
                "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", <a href="./rfc3947">RFC 3947</a>,
                January 2005.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3948">RFC3948</a>]    Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and
                M. Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec packets",
                <a href="./rfc3948">RFC 3948</a>, January 2005.

   [<a id="ref-RFC4301">RFC4301</a>]    Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
                Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>]    Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
                <a href="./rfc4303">RFC 4303</a>, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5226">RFC5226</a>]    Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
                IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp26">BCP 26</a>, <a href="./rfc5226">RFC 5226</a>,
                May 2008.

   [<a id="ref-mipnat">mipnat</a>]     Levkowetz, H. and S. Vaarala, "Mobile IP Traversal of
                Network Address Translation (NAT) Devices", <a href="./rfc3519">RFC 3519</a>,
                April 2003.

   [<a id="ref-privaddr">privaddr</a>]   Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot,
                G., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private
                Internets", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp5">BCP 5</a>, <a href="./rfc1918">RFC 1918</a>, February 1996.











<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 32]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>.  Informative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-RFC2002">RFC2002</a>]    Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support", <a href="./rfc2002">RFC 2002</a>,
                October 1996.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3456">RFC3456</a>]    Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S., and V. Gupta, "Dynamic
                Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of
                IPsec Tunnel Mode", <a href="./rfc3456">RFC 3456</a>, January 2003.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3776">RFC3776</a>]    Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V., and F. Dupont, "Using IPsec
                to Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes
                and Home Agents", <a href="./rfc3776">RFC 3776</a>, June 2004.

   [<a id="ref-RFC4093">RFC4093</a>]    Adrangi, F. and H. Levkowetz, "Problem Statement: Mobile
                IPv4 Traversal of Virtual Private Network (VPN)
                Gateways", <a href="./rfc4093">RFC 4093</a>, August 2005.

   [<a id="ref-RFC4282">RFC4282</a>]    Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
                Network Access Identifier", <a href="./rfc4282">RFC 4282</a>, December 2005.

   [<a id="ref-RFC4555">RFC4555</a>]    Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
                (MOBIKE)", <a href="./rfc4555">RFC 4555</a>, June 2006.

   [<a id="ref-pseudonat">pseudonat</a>]  Dupont, F. and J. Bernard, "Transient pseudo-NAT attacks
                or how NATs are even more evil than you believed", Work
                in Progress, June 2004.

   [<a id="ref-tessier">tessier</a>]    Tessier, S., "Guidelines for Mobile IP and IPsec VPN
                Usage", Work in Progress, December 2002.






















<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 33]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.  Packet Flow Examples</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>.  Connection Setup for Access Mode 'cvc'</span>

   The following figure illustrates connection setup when the mobile
   node is outside and using a co-located care-of address.  IKE
   connection setup is not shown in full, and involves multiple round
   trips (4.5 round trips when using main mode followed by quick mode).











































<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 34]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


    MN-APP      MN        x-HA       VPN        i-HA        CN
     !          !          !          !          !          !
     !          ! -------&gt; !          !          !          !
     !          !  rrq     !          !          !          !
     !          ! -----------------X  !          !          ! rrq not
     !          !  rrq     !          !          !          ! received
     !          !          !          !          !          ! by i-HA
     !          ! &lt;------- !          !          !          !
     !          !  rrp     !          !          !          !
     !          !          !          !          !          !
     !  [wait for detection period for response from i-HA]  !
     !  [may also retransmit to i-HA, depending on config]  ! no rrp
     !          !          !          !          !          ! from i-HA
     !          ! ==(1)==&gt; !          !          !          !
     !          !  ike {1a}! -------&gt; !          !          !
     !          !          !  ike     !          !          !
     !          !          ! &lt;------- !          !          !
     !          ! &lt;==(1)== !  ike     !          !          !
     !          !  ike     !          !          !          !
     :          :          :          :          :          :
     :          :          :          :          :          :
     !          !          !          !          !          !
     !          ! ==(2)==&gt; !          !          !          !
     !          !  rrq {2a}! ==(1)==&gt; !          !          !
     !          !          !  rrq {2b}! -------&gt; !          !
     !          !          !          !  rrq {2c}!          !
     !          !          !          ! &lt;------- !          !
     !          !          ! &lt;==(1)== !  rrp     !          !
     !          ! &lt;==(2)== !  rrp     !          !          !
     !          !  rrp     !          !          !          !
     !          !          !          !          !          !
    [[--- connection setup ok, bidirectional connection up ---]]
     !          !          !          !          !          !
     ! -------&gt; !          !          !          !          !
     !  pkt {3a}! ==(3)==&gt; !          !          !          !
     !          !  pkt {3b}! ==(2)==&gt; !          !          !
     !          !          !  pkt {3c}! ==(1)==&gt; !          !
     !          !          !          !  pkt {3d}! -------&gt; !
     !          !          !          !          !  pkt {3e}!
     !          !          !          !          ! &lt;------- !
     !          !          !          ! &lt;==(1)== !  pkt     !
     !          !          ! &lt;==(2)== !  pkt     !          !
     !          ! &lt;==(3)== !  pkt     !          !          !
     !  &lt;------ !  pkt     !          !          !          !
     !   pkt    !          !          !          !          !
     :          :          :          :          :          :
     :          :          :          :          :          :




<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 35]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   The notation "==(N)==&gt;" or "&lt;==(N)==" indicates that the innermost
   packet has been encapsulated N times, using IP-IP, ESP, or MIP NAT
   traversal.

   Packets marked with {xx} are shown in more detail below.  Each area
   represents a protocol header (labeled).  Source and destination
   addresses or ports are shown underneath the protocol name when
   applicable.  Note that there are no NAT traversal headers in the
   example packets.

       Packet {1a}
           .------------------------------------.
           ! IP      ! IP      ! UDP   ! IKE    !
           !  co-CoA !  x-HoA  !  500  !        !
           !  x-HA   !  VPN-GW !  500  !        !
           `------------------------------------'

       Packet {2a}
           .--------------------------------------------------------.
           ! IP      ! IP      ! ESP   ! IP       ! UDP   ! MIP RRQ !
           !  co-CoA !  x-HoA  !       !  VPN-TIA !  ANY  !         !
           !  x-HA   !  VPN-GW !       !  i-HA    !  434  !         !
           `--------------------------------------------------------'

       Packet {2b}
           .----------------------------------------------.
           ! IP      ! ESP   ! IP       ! UDP   ! MIP RRQ !
           !  x-HoA  !       !  VPN-TIA !  ANY  !         !
           !  VPN-GW !       !  i-HA    !  434  !         !
           `----------------------------------------------'

       Packet {2c}
           .----------------------------.
           ! IP       ! UDP   ! MIP RRQ !
           !  VPN-TIA !  ANY  !         !
           !  i-HA    !  434  !         !
           `----------------------------'

       Packet {3a}
           .-------------------.
           ! IP     ! user     !
           !  i-HoA ! protocol !
           !  CN    !          !
           `-------------------'







<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 36]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


       Packet {3b}
           .------------------------------------------------------- -
           ! IP      ! IP      ! ESP ! IP       ! IP     ! user      \
           !  co-CoA !  x-HoA  !     !  VPN-TIA !  i-HoA ! protocol../
           !  x-HA   !  VPN-GW !     !  i-HA    !  CN    !           \
           `------------------------------------------------------- -
              - - -----------------.
             \..user     ! ESP     !
             /  protocol ! trailer !
             \           !         !
              - - -----------------'

       Packet {3c}
           .--------------------------------------------------------.
           ! IP      ! ESP ! IP       ! IP     ! user     ! ESP     !
           !  x-HoA  !     !  VPN-TIA !  i-HoA ! protocol ! trailer !
           !  VPN-GW !     !  i-HA    !  CN    !          !         !
           `--------------------------------------------------------'

       Packet {3d}
           .------------------------------.
           ! IP       ! IP     ! user     !
           !  VPN-TIA !  i-HoA ! protocol !
           !  i-HA    !  CN    !          !
           `------------------------------'

       Packet {3e}
           .-------------------.
           ! IP     ! user     !
           !  i-HoA ! protocol !
           !  CN    !          !
           `-------------------'



















<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 37]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


   Packet {3b} with all NAT traversal headers (x-MIP, ESP, and i-MIP) is
   shown below for comparison.

       Packet {3b} (with NAT traversal headers)
           .------------------------------------------------- -
           ! IP      ! UDP  ! MIP    ! IP      ! UDP   ! ESP.. \
           !  co-CoA !  ANY ! tunnel !  x-HoA  !  4500 !       /
           !  x-HA   !  434 ! data   !  VPN-GW !  4500 !       \
           `------------------------------------------------- -
            &lt;=== external MIPv4 ====&gt; &lt;=== IPsec ESP ======== = =

              - - ------------------------------------------------ -
             \..ESP ! IP       ! UDP  ! MIP    ! IP     ! user      \
             /      !  VPN-TIA !  ANY ! tunnel !  i-HoA ! protocol../
             \      !  i-HA    !  434 ! data   !  CN    !           \
              - - ------------------------------------------------ -
              = ===&gt; &lt;==== internal MIPv4 ====&gt; &lt;== user packet == =

              - - -----------------.
             \..user     ! ESP     !
             /  protocol ! trailer !
             \           !         !
              - - -----------------'
              = = ======&gt; &lt;= ESP =&gt;


Authors' Addresses

   Sami Vaarala
   Codebay
   P.O. Box 63
   Espoo  02601
   FINLAND

   Phone: +358 (0)50 5733 862
   EMail: sami.vaarala@iki.fi


   Espen Klovning
   Birdstep
   Bryggegata 7
   Oslo  0250
   NORWAY

   Phone: +47 95 20 26 29
   EMail: espen@birdstep.com





<span class="grey">Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 38]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5265">RFC 5265</a>                       MIPv4-VPN                       June 2008</span>


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   <a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.












Vaarala &amp; Klovning          Standards Track                    [Page 39]
</pre>