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<pre>Network Working Group M. Badra
Request for Comments: 5487 CNRS/LIMOS Laboratory
Category: Standards Track March 2009
<span class="h1">Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with</span>
<span class="h1">SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode</span>
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
publication of this document (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Abstract
<a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> and <a href="./rfc4785">RFC 4785</a> describe pre-shared key cipher suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, all those cipher suites use
SHA-1 in their Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm. This
document describes a set of pre-shared key cipher suites for TLS that
uses stronger digest algorithms (i.e., SHA-256 or SHA-384) and
another set that uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in
Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
<span class="grey">Badra Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5487">RFC 5487</a> TLS PSK New MAC and AES-GCM March 2009</span>
Table of Contents
<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
2. PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithms with
AES-GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
<a href="#section-3">3</a>. PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK Key Exchange with SHA-256/384 . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
<a href="#section-7">7</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
<a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
<a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
The benefits of pre-shared symmetric-key vs. public-/private-key pair
based authentication for the key exchange in TLS have been explained
in the Introduction of [<a href="./rfc4279" title=""Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4279</a>]. This document leverages the
already defined algorithms for the application of newer, generally
regarded stronger, cryptographic primitives and building blocks.
TLS 1.2 [<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] adds support for authenticated encryption with
additional data (AEAD) cipher modes [<a href="./rfc5116" title=""An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption"">RFC5116</a>]. This document
describes the use of Advanced Encryption Standard [<a href="#ref-AES" title=""Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)"">AES</a>] in Galois
Counter Mode [<a href="#ref-GCM" title=""Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication"">GCM</a>] (AES-GCM) with various pre-shared key (PSK)
authenticated key exchange mechanisms ([<a href="./rfc4279" title=""Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4279</a>] and [<a href="./rfc4785" title=""Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4785</a>]) in
cipher suites for TLS.
This document also specifies PSK cipher suites for TLS that replace
SHA-1 by SHA-256 or SHA-384 [<a href="#ref-SHS" title=""Secure Hash Standard"">SHS</a>]. <a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> [<a href="./rfc4279" title=""Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4279</a>] and <a href="./rfc4785">RFC 4785</a>
[<a href="./rfc4785" title=""Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4785</a>] describe PSK cipher suites for TLS. However, all of the
<a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> and the <a href="./rfc4785">RFC 4785</a> cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
algorithm. Due to recent analytic work on SHA-1 [<a href="#ref-Wang05" title=""Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1"">Wang05</a>], the IETF
is gradually moving away from SHA-1 and towards stronger hash
algorithms.
Related TLS cipher suites with key exchange algorithms that are
authenticated using public/private key pairs have recently been
specified:
o RSA-, DSS-, and Diffie-Hellman-based cipher suites in [<a href="./rfc5288" title=""AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS"">RFC5288</a>],
and
<span class="grey">Badra Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5487">RFC 5487</a> TLS PSK New MAC and AES-GCM March 2009</span>
o ECC-based cipher suites with SHA-256/384 and AES-GCM in [<a href="./rfc5289" title=""TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA- 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"">RFC5289</a>].
The reader is expected to become familiar with these two memos prior
to studying this document.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Applicability Statement</span>
The cipher suites defined in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> can be negotiated, whatever
the negotiated TLS version is.
The cipher suites defined in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> can be negotiated in TLS
version 1.2 or higher.
The applicability statement in [<a href="./rfc4279" title=""Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4279</a>] applies to this document as
well.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>].
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithms with AES-GCM</span>
The following six cipher suites use the new authenticated encryption
modes defined in TLS 1.2 with AES in Galois Counter Mode [<a href="#ref-GCM" title=""Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication"">GCM</a>]. The
cipher suites with the DHE_PSK key exchange algorithm
(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA348) provide Perfect Forward Secrecy
(PFS).
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA8};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA9};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAA};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAB};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAC};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAD};
These cipher suites use authenticated encryption with additional data
(AEAD) algorithms, AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM, as
described in <a href="./rfc5116">RFC 5116</a>. GCM is used as described in [<a href="./rfc5288" title=""AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS"">RFC5288</a>].
The PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK key exchanges are performed as defined
in [<a href="./rfc4279" title=""Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4279</a>].
<span class="grey">Badra Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5487">RFC 5487</a> TLS PSK New MAC and AES-GCM March 2009</span>
The Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) algorithms SHALL be as follows:
o For cipher suites ending with _SHA256, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
o For cipher suites ending with _SHA384, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] with SHA-384 as the hash function.
Implementations MUST send a TLS Alert 'bad_record_mac' for all types
of failures encountered in processing the AES-GCM algorithm.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK Key Exchange with SHA-256/384</span>
The first two cipher suites described in each of the following three
sections use AES [<a href="#ref-AES" title=""Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)"">AES</a>] in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode [<a href="#ref-MODES" title=""Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods and Techniques"">MODES</a>]
for data confidentiality, whereas the other two cipher suites do not
provide data confidentiality; all cipher suites provide integrity
protection and authentication using HMAC-based MACs.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384</span>
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAE};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAF};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB0};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB1};
The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher
suites in <a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> and <a href="./rfc4785">RFC 4785</a> (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF algorithms,
as explained below.
o For cipher suites with names ending in "_SHA256":
* The MAC is HMAC [<a href="./rfc2104" title=""HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication"">RFC2104</a>] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
* When negotiated in a version of TLS prior to 1.2, the PRF from
that version is used; otherwise, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
o For cipher suites with names ending in "_SHA384":
* The MAC is HMAC [<a href="./rfc2104" title=""HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication"">RFC2104</a>] with SHA-384 as the hash function.
* When negotiated in a version of TLS prior to 1.2, the PRF from
that version is used; otherwise, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] with SHA-384 as the hash function.
<span class="grey">Badra Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5487">RFC 5487</a> TLS PSK New MAC and AES-GCM March 2009</span>
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384</span>
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB2};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB3};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB4};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB5};
The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher
suites in <a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> and <a href="./rfc4785">RFC 4785</a> (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF algorithms,
as explained in <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384</span>
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB6};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB7};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB8};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB9};
The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher
suites in <a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> and <a href="./rfc4785">RFC 4785</a> (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF algorithms,
as explained in <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations</span>
The security considerations in [<a href="./rfc4279" title=""Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4279</a>], [<a href="./rfc4785" title=""Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4785</a>], and [<a href="./rfc5288" title=""AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS"">RFC5288</a>]
apply to this document as well. In particular, as authentication-
only cipher suites (with no encryption) defined here do not support
confidentiality, care should be taken not to send sensitive
information (such as passwords) over connections protected with one
of the cipher suites with NULL encryption defined in this document.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
IANA has assigned the following values for the cipher suites defined
in this document:
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA8};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA9};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAA};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAB};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAC};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAD};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAE};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAF};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB0};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB1};
<span class="grey">Badra Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5487">RFC 5487</a> TLS PSK New MAC and AES-GCM March 2009</span>
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB2};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB3};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB4};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB5};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB6};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB7};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB8};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB9};
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
This document borrows from [<a href="./rfc5289" title=""TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA- 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"">RFC5289</a>]. The author appreciates Alfred
Hoenes for his detailed review and effort on resolving issues in
discussion. The author would like also to acknowledge Ibrahim
Hajjeh, Simon Josefsson, Hassnaa Moustafa, Joseph Salowey, and Pascal
Urien for their reviews of the content of the document.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span>
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References</span>
[<a id="ref-AES">AES</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[<a id="ref-GCM">GCM</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and
Authentication", SP 800-38D, November 2007.
[<a id="ref-MODES">MODES</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation -
Methods and Techniques", SP 800-38A, December 2001.
[<a id="ref-RFC2104">RFC2104</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>,
February 1997.
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
[<a id="ref-RFC4279">RFC4279</a>] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a>,
December 2005.
[<a id="ref-RFC4785">RFC4785</a>] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc4785">RFC 4785</a>, January 2007.
<span class="grey">Badra Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5487">RFC 5487</a> TLS PSK New MAC and AES-GCM March 2009</span>
[<a id="ref-RFC5116">RFC5116</a>] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", <a href="./rfc5116">RFC 5116</a>, January 2008.
[<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August 2008.
[<a id="ref-RFC5288">RFC5288</a>] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", <a href="./rfc5288">RFC 5288</a>,
August 2008.
[<a id="ref-SHS">SHS</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References</span>
[<a id="ref-RFC5289">RFC5289</a>] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", <a href="./rfc5289">RFC 5289</a>,
August 2008.
[<a id="ref-Wang05">Wang05</a>] Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the
Full SHA-1", CRYPTO 2005, August 2005.
Author's Address
Mohamad Badra
CNRS/LIMOS Laboratory
Campus de cezeaux, Bat. ISIMA
Aubiere 63170
France
EMail: badra@isima.fr
Badra Standards Track [Page 7]
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