<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                  A. Jerman Blazic
Request for Comments: 6283                                     S. Saljic
Category: Standards Track                                         SETCCE
ISSN: 2070-1721                                               T. Gondrom
                                                               July 2011

       <span class="h1">Extensible Markup Language Evidence Record Syntax (XMLERS)</span>

Abstract

   In many scenarios, users must be able to demonstrate the (time of)
   existence, integrity, and validity of data including signed data for
   long or undetermined periods of time.  This document specifies XML
   syntax and processing rules for creating evidence for long-term non-
   repudiation of existence and integrity of data.  The Extensible
   Markup Language Evidence Record Syntax XMLERS provides alternative
   syntax and processing rules to the ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation
   One) ERS (Evidence Record Syntax) (<a href="./rfc4998">RFC 4998</a>) syntax by using XML.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6283">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6283</a>.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.




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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


Table of Contents

   <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
      <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Motivation .................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
      <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. General Overview and Requirements ..........................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
      <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Terminology ................................................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
      <a href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
   <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Evidence Record .................................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
      <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Structure ..................................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
      <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Generation ................................................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
      <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Verification ..............................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
   <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Archive Time-Stamp .............................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
      <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Structure .................................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
           <a href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Hash Tree ..........................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
           <a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Time-Stamp .........................................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
           <a href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. Cryptographic Information List .....................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
      <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Generation ................................................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
           <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Generation of Hash Tree ............................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
           <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Reduction of Hash Tree .............................<a href="#page-19">19</a>
      <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Verification ..............................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
   <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Archive Time-Stamp Sequence and Archive Time-Stamp Chain .......<a href="#page-22">22</a>
      <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Structure .................................................<a href="#page-23">23</a>
           <a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Digest Method ......................................<a href="#page-23">23</a>
           <a href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Canonicalization Method ............................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
      <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Generation ................................................<a href="#page-25">25</a>
           <a href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. Time-Stamp Renewal .................................<a href="#page-25">25</a>
           <a href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. Hash Tree Renewal ..................................<a href="#page-26">26</a>
      <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Verification ..............................................<a href="#page-27">27</a>
   <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Encryption .....................................................<a href="#page-28">28</a>
   <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Version ........................................................<a href="#page-29">29</a>
   <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Storage of Policies ............................................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
   <a href="#section-8">8</a>. XSD Schema for the Evidence Record .............................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
   <a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-34">34</a>
      <a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Secure Algorithms .........................................<a href="#page-34">34</a>
      <a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Redundancy ................................................<a href="#page-34">34</a>
      <a href="#section-9.3">9.3</a>. Secure Time-Stamps ........................................<a href="#page-35">35</a>
      <a href="#section-9.4">9.4</a>. Time-Stamp Verification ...................................<a href="#page-35">35</a>
   <a href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations ...........................................<a href="#page-36">36</a>
   <a href="#section-11">11</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-37">37</a>
      <a href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-37">37</a>
      <a href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-39">39</a>
   <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Detailed Verification Process of an Evidence Record ...<a href="#page-41">41</a>









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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction</span>

   The purpose of the document is to define XML schema and processing
   rules for Evidence Record Syntax in XML (Extensible Markup Language)
   format.  The document is related to initial ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax
   Notation One) syntax for Evidence Record Syntax as defined in
   [<a href="./rfc4998" title="&quot;Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)&quot;">RFC4998</a>].

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>.  Motivation</span>

   The evolution of electronic commerce and electronic data exchange in
   general requires introduction of non-repudiable proof of data
   existence as well as data integrity and authenticity.  Such data and
   non-repudiable proof of existence must endure for long periods of
   time, even when the initial information to prove its existence and
   integrity weakens or ceases to exist.  Mechanisms such as digital
   signatures defined in [<a href="./rfc5652" title="&quot;Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)&quot;">RFC5652</a>], for example, do not provide absolute
   reliability on a long-term basis.  Algorithms and cryptographic
   material used to create a signature can become weak in the course of
   time, and information needed to validate digital signatures may
   become compromised or simply cease to exist, for example, due to the
   disbanding of a certificate service provider.  Providing a stable
   environment for electronic data on a long-term basis requires the
   introduction of additional means to continually provide an
   appropriate level of trust in evidence on data existence, integrity,
   and authenticity.

   All integrity and authenticity protecting techniques used today
   suffer from the problem of degrading reliability over time, including
   techniques for Time-Stamping, which are generally recognized as data
   existence and integrity proof mechanisms.  Over long periods of time
   cryptographic algorithms used may become weak or encryption keys
   compromised.  Some of the problems might not even be of technical
   nature like a Time-Stamping Authority going out of business and
   ceasing its service.  To create a stable environment where proof of
   existence and integrity can endure well into the future a new
   technical approach must be used.

   Long-term non-repudiation of data existence and demonstration of data
   integrity techniques have been already introduced, for example, by
   long-term signature syntaxes like those defined in [<a href="./rfc5126" title="&quot;CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAdES)&quot;">RFC5126</a>].  Long-
   term signature syntaxes and processing rules address only the long-
   term endurance of the digital signatures themselves, while Evidence
   Record Syntax broadens this approach for data of any type or format
   including digital signatures.






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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


   XMLERS (Extensible Markup Language Evidence Record Syntax) is based
   on Evidence Record Syntax as defined in [<a href="./rfc4998" title="&quot;Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)&quot;">RFC4998</a>] and is addressing
   the same problem of long-term non-repudiable proof of data existence
   and demonstration of data integrity on a long-term basis.  XMLERS
   does not supplement the [<a href="./rfc4998" title="&quot;Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)&quot;">RFC4998</a>] specification.  Following
   extensible markup language standards and [<a href="./rfc3470" title="&quot;Guidelines for the Use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) within IETF Protocols&quot;">RFC3470</a>] guidelines it
   introduces the same approach but in a different format and with
   adapted processing rules.

   The use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) format is already
   recognized by a wide range of applications and services and is being
   selected as the de facto standard for many applications based on data
   exchange.  The introduction of Evidence Record Syntax in XML format
   broadens the horizon of XML use and presents a harmonized syntax with
   a growing community of XML-based standards including those related to
   security services such as [<a href="#ref-XMLDSig" title="&quot;XML-Signature Syntax and Processing&quot;">XMLDSig</a>] or [<a href="#ref-XAdES" title="&quot;XML Advanced Electronic Signatures&quot;">XAdES</a>].

   Due to the differences in XML processing rules and other
   characteristics of XML, XMLERS does not present a direct
   transformation of ERS in ASN.1 syntax.  XMLERS is based on different
   processing rules as defined in [<a href="./rfc4998" title="&quot;Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)&quot;">RFC4998</a>] and it does not support, for
   example, the import of ASN.1 values in XML tags.  Creating Evidence
   Records in XML syntax must follow the steps as defined in this
   document.  XMLERS is a standalone document and is based on [<a href="./rfc4998" title="&quot;Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)&quot;">RFC4998</a>]
   conceptually only.  The content of this document provides enough
   information for implementation of Evidence Record Syntax (represented
   in XML format).  References to [<a href="./rfc4998" title="&quot;Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)&quot;">RFC4998</a>] are for informative purposes
   only.

   Evidence Record Syntax in XML format is based on long-term archive
   service requirements as defined in [<a href="./rfc4810" title="&quot;Long-Term Archive Service Requirements&quot;">RFC4810</a>].  XMLERS delivers the
   same (level of) non-repudiable proof of data existence as ASN.1 ERS
   [<a href="./rfc4998" title="&quot;Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)&quot;">RFC4998</a>].  The XML syntax supports archive data grouping (and de-
   grouping) together with simple or complex Time-Stamp renewal
   processes.  Evidence Records can be embedded in the data itself or
   stored separately as a standalone XML file.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>.  General Overview and Requirements</span>

   XMLERS specifies the XML syntax and processing rules for creating
   evidence for the long-term non-repudiation of existence and integrity
   of data in a unit called the "Evidence Record".  XMLERS is defined to
   meet the requirements for data structures as set out in [<a href="./rfc4810" title="&quot;Long-Term Archive Service Requirements&quot;">RFC4810</a>].
   This document also refers to the ASN.1 ERS specification as defined
   in [<a href="./rfc4998" title="&quot;Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)&quot;">RFC4998</a>].






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   An Evidence Record may be generated and maintained for a single data
   object or a group of data objects that form an archive object.  A
   data object (binary chunk or a file) may represent any kind of
   document or part of it.  Dependencies among data objects, their
   validation, or any other relationship than "a data object is a part
   of particular archived object" are outside the scope of this
   document.

   Evidence Record is closely related to Time-Stamping techniques.
   However, Time-Stamps as defined in [<a href="./rfc3161" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)&quot;">RFC3161</a>] can cover only a single
   unit of data and do not provide processing rules for maintaining a
   long-term stability of Time-Stamps applied over a data object.
   Evidence for an archive object is created by acquiring a Time-Stamp
   from a trustworthy authority for a specific value that is
   unambiguously related to a single or more data objects.  Relationship
   between several data objects and a single Time-Stamped value is
   addressed using a hash tree, a technique first described by Merkle
   [<a href="#ref-MER1980" title="&quot;Protocols for Public Key Cryptosystems, Proceedings of the 1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA, USA)&quot;">MER1980</a>] and later in [<a href="./rfc4998" title="&quot;Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)&quot;">RFC4998</a>], with data structures and procedures
   as specified in this document.  The Evidence Record Syntax enables
   processing of several archive objects within a single processing pass
   using a hash tree technique and acquiring only one Time-Stamp to
   protect all archive objects.  The leaves of the hash tree are hash
   values of the data objects in a group.  A Time-Stamp is requested
   only for the root hash of the hash tree.  The deletion of a data
   object in the tree does not influence the provability of others.  For
   any particular data object, the hash tree can be reduced to a few
   sets of hash values, which are sufficient to prove the existence of a
   single data object.  Similarly, the hash tree can be reduced to prove
   existence of a data group, provided all members of the data group
   have the same parent node in the hash tree.  Archive Time-Stamps are
   comprised of an optional reduced hash tree and a Time-Stamp.

   Besides a Time-Stamp other artifacts are also preserved in Evidence
   Record: data necessary to verify the relationship between a time-
   stamped value and a specific data object, packed into a structure
   called a "hash tree", and long-term proofs for the formal
   verification of the included Time-Stamp(s).

   Because digest algorithms or cryptographic methods used may become
   weak or certificates used within a Time-Stamp (and signed data) may
   be revoked or expire, the collected evidence data must be monitored
   and renewed before such events occur.  This document introduces XML-
   based syntax and processing rules for the creation and continuous
   renewal of evidence data.







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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>.  Terminology</span>

   Archive Data Object: An archive data object is a data unit that is
   archived and has to be preserved for a long time by the long-term
   archive service.

   Archive Data Object Group: An archive data object group is a set of
   archive data objects that, for some reason, (logically) belong
   together; e.g., a group of document files or a document file and a
   signature file could represent an archive data object group.

   Archive Object (AO): An AO is an archive data object or an archive
   data object group.

   Archive Time-Stamp (ATS): An ATS contains a Time-Stamp Token, useful
   data for validation, and optionally a set of ordered lists of hash
   values (a hash tree).  An Archive Time-Stamp relates to a data object
   if the hash value of this data object is part of the first hash value
   list of the Archive Time-Stamp or its hash value matches the Time-
   Stamped value.  An Archive Time-Stamp relates to a data object group
   if it relates to every data object of the group and no other data
   object (i.e., the hash values of all but no other data objects of the
   group are part of the first hash value list of the Archive Time-
   Stamp) (see <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>).

   Archive Time-Stamp Chain (ATSC): An ATSC holds a sequence of Archive
   Time-Stamps generated during the preservation period.

   Archive Time-Stamp Sequence (ATSSeq): AN ATSSeq is a sequence of
   Archive Time-Stamp Chains.

   Canonicalization: Canonicalization refers to processing rules for
   transforming an XML document into its canonical form.  Two XML
   documents may have different physical representations, but they may
   have the same canonical form.  For example, a sort order of
   attributes does not change the meaning of the document as defined in
   [<a href="#ref-XMLC14N" title="&quot;Canonical XML&quot;">XMLC14N</a>].

   Cryptographic Information: Cryptographic information is data or part
   of data related to the validation process of signed data, e.g.,
   digital certificates, digital certificate chains, and Certificate
   Revocation Lists.

   Digest Method: Digest method is a digest algorithm, which is a strong
   one-way function, for which it is computationally infeasible to find
   an input that corresponds to a given output or to find two different





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   input values that correspond to the same output.  A digest algorithm
   transforms input data into a short value of fixed length.  The output
   is called digest value, hash value, or data fingerprint.

   Evidence: Evidence is information that may be used to resolve a
   dispute about various aspects of authenticity, validity, and
   existence of archived data objects.

   Evidence Record: An Evidence Record is a collection of evidence
   compiled for a given archive object over time.  An Evidence Record
   includes ordered collection of ATSs, which are grouped into ATSCs and
   ATSSeqs.

   Long-Term Archive (LTA): An LTA is a service responsible for
   generation, collection, and maintenance (renewal) of evidence data.
   An LTA may also preserve data for long periods of time, e.g.  storage
   of archive data and associated evidences.

   Hash Tree: A hash tree is a collection of hash values of protected
   objects (input data objects and generated evidence within archival
   period) that are unambiguously related to the Time-Stamped value
   within an Archive Time-Stamp.

   Time-Stamp Token (TS): A TS is a cryptographically secure
   confirmation generated by a Time-Stamping Authority (TSA), e.g.,
   [<a href="./rfc3161" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)&quot;">RFC3161</a>], which specifies a structure for Time-Stamps and a protocol
   for communicating with a Time-Stamp Authority.  Besides this, other
   data structures and protocols may also be appropriate, such as
   defined in [<a href="#ref-ISO-18014-1.2002">ISO-18014-1.2002</a>], [<a href="#ref-ISO-18014-2.2002">ISO-18014-2.2002</a>],
   [<a href="#ref-ISO-18014-3.2004">ISO-18014-3.2004</a>], and [<a href="#ref-ANSI.X9-95.2005">ANSI.X9-95.2005</a>].

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4" href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>.  Conventions Used in This Document</span>

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>.  Evidence Record</span>

   An Evidence Record is a unit of data that is to be used to prove the
   existence of an archive object (a single archive data object or a
   archive data object group) at a certain time.  Through the lifetime
   of an archive object, an Evidence Record also demonstrates the data
   objects' integrity and non-repudiability.  To achieve this,
   cryptographic means are used, i.e., the LTA obtains Time-Stamp Tokens
   from the Time-Stamping Authority (TSA).  It is possible to store the
   Evidence Record separately from the archive object or to integrate it
   into the data itself.



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   As cryptographic means are used to support Evidence Records, such
   records may lose their value over time.  Time-Stamps obtained from
   Time-Stamping Authorities may become invalid for a number of reasons,
   usually due to time constraints of Time-Stamp validity or when
   cryptographic algorithms lose their security properties.  Before the
   used Time-Stamp Tokens become unreliable, the Evidence Record has to
   be renewed.  This may result in a series of Time-Stamp Tokens, which
   are linked between themselves according to the cryptographic methods
   and algorithms used.

   Evidence Records can be supported with additional information, which
   can be used to ease the processes of Evidence Record validation and
   renewal.  Information such as digital certificates and Certificate
   Revocation Lists as defined in [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>] or other cryptographic
   material can be collected, enclosed, and processed together with
   archive object data (i.e., Time-Stamped).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>.  Structure</span>

   The Evidence Record contains one or several Archive Time-Stamps
   (ATSs).  An ATS contains a Time-Stamp Token and optionally other
   useful data for Time-Stamp validation, e.g., certificates, CRLs
   (Certificate Revocation Lists), or OCSP (Online Certificate Status
   Protocol) responses and also specific attributes such as service
   policies.

   Initially, an ATS is acquired and later, before it expires or becomes
   invalid, a new ATS is acquired, which prolongs the validity of the
   archived object (its data objects together with all previously
   generated Archive Time-Stamps).  This process MUST continue during
   the desired archiving period of the archive data object(s).  A series
   of successive Archive Time-Stamps is collected in Archive Time-Stamp
   Chains and a series of chains in Archive Time-Stamp Sequence.

   In XML syntax the Evidence Record is represented by the
   &lt;EvidenceRecord&gt; root element, which has the following structure
   described in Pseudo-XML with the full XML schema defined in <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>
   (where "?" denotes zero or one occurrences, "+" denotes one or more
   occurrences, and "*" denotes zero or more occurrences):












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   &lt;EvidenceRecord Version&gt;

      &lt;EncryptionInformation&gt;
         &lt;EncryptionInformationType&gt;
         &lt;EncryptionInformationValue&gt;
      &lt;/EncryptionInformation&gt; ?
      &lt;SupportingInformationList&gt;
         &lt;SupportingInformation Type /&gt; +
      &lt;/SupportingInformationList&gt; ?
      &lt;ArchiveTimeStampSequence&gt;
         &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain Order&gt;
            &lt;DigestMethod Algorithm /&gt;
            &lt;CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm /&gt;
            &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp Order&gt;
               &lt;HashTree /&gt; ?
               &lt;TimeStamp&gt;
                  &lt;TimeStampToken Type /&gt;
                  &lt;CryptographicInformationList&gt;
                     &lt;CryptographicInformation Order Type /&gt; +
                  &lt;/CryptographicInformationList&gt; ?
               &lt;/TimeStamp&gt;
               &lt;Attributes&gt;
                  &lt;Attribute Order Type /&gt; +
               &lt;/Attributes&gt; ?
            &lt;/ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; +
         &lt;/ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; +
      &lt;/ArchiveTimeStampSequence&gt;
   &lt;/EvidenceRecord&gt;

   The syntax of an Evidence Record is defined as an XML schema
   [<a href="#ref-XMLSchema" title="&quot;XML Schema Part 1: Structures Second Edition&quot;">XMLSchema</a>], see <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>.  The schema uses the following XML
   namespace [<a href="#ref-XMLName" title="&quot;Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Second Edition)&quot;">XMLName</a>] urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers as default namespace
   with a detailed xml schema header listed in <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>.

   The XML elements and attributes have the following meanings:

      The "Version" attribute MUST be included and indicates the syntax
      version, for compatibility with future revisions of this
      specification and to distinguish it from earlier non-conformant or
      proprietary versions of XMLERS.  Current version of XMLERS is 1.0.
      The used versioning scheme is described in detail in <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a>.
      &lt;EncryptionInformation&gt; element is OPTIONAL and holds information
      on cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic material used to
      encrypt archive data (in case archive data is encrypted, e.g., for
      privacy purposes).  This optional information is needed to
      unambiguously re-encrypt data objects when processing Evidence
      Records.  When omitted, data objects are not encrypted or




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      non-repudiation proof is not needed for the unencrypted data.
      Details on how to process encrypted archive data and generate
      Evidence Record(s) are described in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>.

      &lt;SupportingInformationList&gt; element is OPTIONAL and can hold
      information to support processing of Evidence Records.  An example
      of this supporting information may be a processing policy, like a
      cryptographic policy (e.g., [<a href="./rfc5698" title="&quot;Data Structure for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms (DSSC)&quot;">RFC5698</a>]) or archiving policies,
      which can provide input about preservation and evidence
      validation.  Each data object is put into a separate child element
      &lt;SupportingInformation&gt;, with an OPTIONAL Type attribute to
      indicate its type for processing directions.  As outlined, Types
      to be used must be defined in the specification of the information
      structure to be stored or in this standard.  As outlined in
      <a href="#section-9.4">Section 9.4</a>, cryptographic information may also be stored in the
      SupportingInformation element, in which case its <a href="#section-3.1.3">Section 3.1.3</a>
      defined type MUST be used.  Or as defined in <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>
      cryptographic policies [<a href="./rfc5698" title="&quot;Data Structure for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms (DSSC)&quot;">RFC5698</a>] MAY be stored, in which case the
      used type is defined in the relevant RFC.  Note that if supporting
      information and policies are relevant for and already available at
      or before the time of individual renewal steps (e.g., to indicate
      the DSSC crypto policy [<a href="./rfc5698" title="&quot;Data Structure for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms (DSSC)&quot;">RFC5698</a>]) that was used at the time of the
      individual renewal) they SHOULD be stored in the &lt;Attributes&gt;
      element of the individual Archive Time-Stamp (see below) as this
      is integrity protected by the Archive Time-Stamps.  Supporting
      information that is relevant for the whole Evidence Record (like
      the LTA's current Cryptographic Algorithms Security Suitability
      policy (DSSC, [<a href="./rfc5698" title="&quot;Data Structure for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms (DSSC)&quot;">RFC5698</a>]) or that was not available at the time of
      renewal (and therefore could not later be stored in the protected
      &lt;Attributes&gt; element) can be stored in this
      &lt;SupportingInformation&gt; element.

      &lt;ArchiveTimeStampSequence&gt; is REQUIRED and contains a sequence of
      one or more &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt;.

      &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; is a REQUIRED element that holds a
      sequence of Archive Time-Stamps generated during the preservation
      period.  Details on Archive Time-Stamp Chains and Archive Time-
      Stamp Sequences are described in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.  The sequences of
      Archive Time-Stamp Chains and Archive Time-Stamps MUST be ordered
      and the order MUST be indicated with "Order" attribute of the
      &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; and &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; elements.

      &lt;DigestMethod&gt; is a REQUIRED element and contains an attribute
      "Algorithm" that identifies the digest algorithm used within one
      Archive Time-Stamp Chain to calculate digest values from the
      archive data object(s), previous Archive Time-Stamp Sequence,
      Time-Stamps, and within a Time-Stamp Token.



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      &lt;CanonicalizationMethod&gt; is a REQUIRED element that specifies
      which canonicalization algorithm is applied to the archive data
      for XML data objects or &lt;ArchiveTimeStampSequence&gt; or &lt;TimeStamp&gt;
      elements prior to performing digest value calculations.

      &lt;HashTree&gt; is an OPTIONAL element that holds a structure as
      described in <a href="#section-3.1.1">Section 3.1.1</a>.

      &lt;TimeStamp&gt; is REQUIRED and holds a &lt;TimeStampToken&gt; element with
      a Time-Stamp Token (as defined in <a href="#section-3.1.2">Section 3.1.2</a>) provided by the
      Time-Stamping Authority and an OPTIONAL element
      &lt;CryptographicInformationList&gt;.

      &lt;CryptographicInformationList&gt; is an OPTIONAL element that allows
      the storage of data needed in the process of Time-Stamp Token
      validation in case when such data is not provided by the Time-
      Stamp Token itself.  This could include possible trust anchors,
      certificates, revocation information, or the current definition of
      the suitability of cryptographic algorithms, past and present.
      Each data object is put into a separate child element
      &lt;CryptographicInformation&gt;, with a REQUIRED Order attribute to
      indicate the order within its parent element.  These items may be
      added based on the policy used.  This data is protected by
      successive Time-Stamps in the sequence of the Archive Time-Stamps.

      &lt;Attributes&gt; element is OPTIONAL and contains additional
      information that may be provided by an LTA used to support
      processing of Evidence Records.  An example of this supporting
      information may be a processing policy, like a renewal, a
      cryptographic (e.g., [<a href="./rfc5698" title="&quot;Data Structure for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms (DSSC)&quot;">RFC5698</a>]), or an archiving policy.  Such
      policies can provide inputs, which are relevant for preservation
      of the data object(s) and evidence validation at a later stage.
      Each data object is put into a separate child element &lt;Attribute&gt;,
      with a REQUIRED Order attribute to indicate the order within the
      parent element and an OPTIONAL Type attribute to indicate
      processing directions.  The type to be used must be defined in the
      specification of the information structure.  For example, the type
      to be used when storing a cryptographic policy [<a href="./rfc5698" title="&quot;Data Structure for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms (DSSC)&quot;">RFC5698</a>] is
      defined in <a href="./rfc5698#appendix-A.2">Appendix&nbsp;A.2 of [RFC5698]</a>.

      The Order attribute is REQUIRED in all cases when one or more XML
      elements with the same name occur on the same level in XMLERS'
      &lt;ArchiveTimeStampSequence&gt; structure.  Although most of the XML
      parsers will preserve the order of the sibling elements having the
      same name, within XML structure there is no definition how to
      unambiguously define such order.  Preserving the correct order in
      such cases is of significant importance for digest value
      calculations over XML structures.



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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>.  Generation</span>

   The generation of an &lt;EvidenceRecord&gt; element MUST be as follows:

   1. Select an archive object (a data object or a data object group) to
      archive.

   2. Create the initial &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt;.  This is the first ATS
      within the initial &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; element of the
      &lt;ArchiveTimeStampSequence&gt; element.

   3. Refresh the &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; when necessary by Time-Stamp
      renewal or hash tree renewal (see <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>).

   The Time-Stamping service may be, for a large number of archived
   objects, expensive and time-demanding, so the LTA may benefit from
   acquiring one Time-Stamp Token for many archived objects, which are
   not otherwise related to each other.  It is possible to collect many
   archive objects, build a hash tree to generate a single value to be
   Time-Stamped, and respectively reduce that hash tree to small subsets
   that for each archive object provide necessary binding with the Time-
   Stamped hash value (see <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section 3.2.1</a>).

   For performance reasons or in case of local Time-Stamp generation,
   building a hash tree (&lt;HashTree&gt; element) can be omitted.  It is also
   possible to convert existing Time-Stamps into an ATS for renewal.

   The case when only essential parts of documents or objects shall be
   protected is out of scope for this standard, and an application that
   is not defined in this document must ensure that the correct
   unambiguous extraction of binary data is made for the generation of
   Evidence Record.

   An application may also provide evidence such as certificates,
   revocation lists, etc. needed to verify and validate signed data
   objects or a data object group.  This evidence may be added to the
   archive data object group and will be protected within the initial
   (and successive) Time-Stamp(s).

   Note that the &lt;CryptographicInformationList&gt; element of Evidence
   Record is not to be used to store and protect cryptographic material
   related to signed archive data.  The use of this element is limited
   to cryptographic material related to the Time-Stamp(s).








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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>.  Verification</span>

   The overall verification of an Evidence Record MUST be as follows:

   1. Select an archive object (a data object or a data object group).

   2. Re-encrypt data object or data object group, if encryption field
      is used (for details, see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>).

   3. Verify Archive Time-Stamp Sequence (details in Sections <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> and
      4.3).

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>.  Archive Time-Stamp</span>

   An Archive Time-Stamp is a Time-Stamp with additional artifacts that
   allow the verification of the existence of several data objects at a
   certain time.

   The process of construction of an ATS must support evidence on a
   long-term basis and prove that the archive object existed and was
   identical, at the time of the Time-Stamp, to the currently present
   archive object (at the time of verification).  To achieve this, an
   ATS MUST be renewed before it becomes invalid (which may happen for
   several reasons such as, e.g., weakening used cryptographic
   algorithms, invalidation of digital certificate, or a TSA terminating
   its business or ceasing its service).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>.  Structure</span>

   An Archive Time-Stamp contains a Time-Stamp Token, with useful data
   for its validation (cryptographic information), such as the
   certificate chain or Certificate Revocation Lists, an optional
   ordered set of ordered lists of hash values (a hash tree) that were
   protected with the Time-Stamp Token and optional information
   describing the renewal steps (&lt;Attributes&gt; element).  A hash tree may
   be used to store data needed to bind the Time-Stamped value with
   protected objects by the Archive Time-Stamp.  If a hash tree is not
   present, the ATS simply refers to a single object, either input data
   object or a previous TS.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.1" href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>.  Hash Tree</span>

   Hash tree structure is an optional container for significant values,
   needed to unambiguously relate a Time-Stamped value to protected data
   objects, and is represented by the &lt;HashTree&gt; element.  The root hash
   value that is generated from the values of the hash tree MUST be the
   same as the Time-Stamped value.




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   &lt;HashTree&gt;
      &lt;Sequence Order&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded hash value&lt;/DigestValue&gt; +
      &lt;/Sequence&gt; +
   &lt;/HashTree&gt;

   The algorithm by which a root hash value is generated from the
   &lt;HashTree&gt; element is as follows: the content of each &lt;DigestValue&gt;
   element within the first &lt;Sequence&gt; element is base64 ([<a href="./rfc4648" title="&quot;The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings&quot;">RFC4648</a>],
   using the base64 alphabet not the base64url alphabet) decoded to
   obtain a binary value (representing the hash value).  All collected
   hash values from the sequence are ordered in binary ascending order,
   concatenated and a new hash value is generated from that string.
   With one exception to this rule: when the first &lt;Sequence&gt; element
   has only one &lt;DigestValue&gt; element, then its binary value is added to
   the next list obtained from the next &lt;Sequence&gt; element.

   The newly calculated hash value is added to the next list of hashes
   obtained from the next &lt;Sequence&gt; element and the previous step is
   repeated until there is only one hash value left, i.e., when there
   are no &lt;Sequence&gt; elements left.  The last calculated hash value is
   the root hash value.  When an archive object is a group and composed
   of more than one data object, the first hash list MUST contain the
   hash values of all its data objects.

   When a single Time-Stamp is obtained for a set of archive objects,
   the LTA MUST construct a hash tree to generate a single hash value to
   bind all archive objects from that group and then a reduced hash tree
   MUST be calculated from the hash tree for each archive object
   respectively (see <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section 3.2.1</a>).

   For example: A SHA-1 digest value is a 160-bit string.  The text
   value of the &lt;DigestValue&gt; element shall be the base64 encoding of
   this bit string viewed as a 20-octet octet stream.  And to continue
   the example, using an example message digest value of
   A9993E364706816ABA3E25717850C26C9CD0D89D (note this is a HEX encoded
   value of the 160-bit message digest), its base64 representation would
   be &lt;DigestValue&gt;qZk+NkcGgWq6PiVxeFDCbJzQ2J0=&lt;/DigestValue&gt;.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.2" href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>.  Time-Stamp</span>

   Time-Stamp Token is an attestation generated by a TSA that a data
   item existed at a certain time.  The Time-Stamp Token is a signed
   data object that contains the hash value, the identity of the TSA,
   and the exact time (obtained from trusted time source) of Time-
   Stamping.  This proves that the given data existed before the time of
   Time-Stamping.  For example, [<a href="./rfc3161" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)&quot;">RFC3161</a>] specifies a structure for
   signed Time-Stamp Tokens in ASN.1 format.  Since at the time being



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   there is no standard for an XML Time-Stamp, the following structure
   example is provided [<a href="#ref-TS-ENTRUST" title="Entrust XML Schema for Time-Stamp">TS-ENTRUST</a>], which is a digital signature
   compliant to [<a href="#ref-XMLDSig" title="&quot;XML-Signature Syntax and Processing&quot;">XMLDSig</a>] specification containing Time-Stamp specific
   data, such as Time-Stamped value and time within the &lt;Object&gt; element
   of a signature.

   &lt;element name="TimeStampInfo"&gt;
      &lt;complexType&gt;
         &lt;sequence&gt;
            &lt;element ref="Policy" /&gt;
            &lt;element ref="Digest" /&gt;
            &lt;element ref="SerialNumber" minOccurs="0" /&gt;
            &lt;element ref="CreationTime" /&gt;
            &lt;element ref="Accuracy" minOccurs="0" /&gt;
            &lt;element ref="Ordering" minOccurs="0" /&gt;
            &lt;element ref="Nonce" minOccurs="0" /&gt;
            &lt;element ref="Extensions" minOccurs="0" /&gt;
         &lt;/sequence&gt;
      &lt;/complexType&gt;
   &lt;/element&gt;

   A &lt;TimeStamp&gt; element of ATS holds a complete structure of Time-Stamp
   Token as provided by a TSA.  Time-Stamp Token may be in XML or ASN.1
   format.  The Attribute type MUST be used to indicate the format for
   processing purposes, with values "XMLENTRUST" or "<a href="./rfc3161">RFC3161</a>"
   respectively.  For an <a href="./rfc3161">RFC3161</a> type Time-Stamp Token, the &lt;TimeStamp&gt;
   element MUST contain base64 encoding of a DER-encoded ASN1 data.
   These type values are registered by IANA (see <a href="#section-10">Section 10</a>).  For
   support of future types of Time-Stamps (in particular for future XML
   Time-Stamp standards), these need to be registered there as well.

   For example:

   &lt;TimeStamp Type="<a href="./rfc3161">RFC3161</a>"&gt;MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEH...&lt;/TimeStamp&gt;

   or

   &lt;TimeStamp Type="XMLENTRUST"&gt;&lt;dsig:Signature&gt;...&lt;/dsig:Signature&gt;
   &lt;/TimeStamp&gt;

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.3" href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>.  Cryptographic Information List</span>

   Digital certificates, CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists), SCVP
   (Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol), or OCSP-Responses
   (Online Certificate Status Protocol) needed to verify the Time-Stamp
   Token SHOULD be stored in the Time-Stamp Token itself.  When this is
   not possible, such data MAY be stored in the




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   &lt;CryptographicInformationList&gt; element; each data object is stored
   into a separate &lt;CryptographicInformation&gt; element, with a REQUIRED
   Order attribute.

   The attribute Type is REQUIRED and is used to store processing
   information about the type of stored cryptographic information.  The
   Type attribute MUST use a value registered with IANA, as identifiers:
   CRL, OCSP, SCVP, or CERT, and for each type the content MUST be
   encoded respectively:

   o  for type CRL, a base64 encoding of a DER-encoded X.509 CRL
      [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]

   o  for type OCSP, a base64 encoding of a DER-encoded OCSPResponse
      [<a href="./rfc2560" title="&quot;X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP&quot;">RFC2560</a>]

   o  for type SCVP, a base64 encoding of a DER-encoded CVResponse;
      [<a href="./rfc5055" title="&quot;Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)&quot;">RFC5055</a>]

   o  for type CERT, a base64 encoding of a DER-encoded X.509
      certificate [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]

   The supported type identifiers are registered by IANA (see <a href="#section-10">Section</a>
   <a href="#section-10">10</a>).  Future supported types can be registered there (for example, to
   support future validation standards).

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>.  Generation</span>

   An initial ATS relates to a data object or a data object group that
   represents an archive object.  The generation of the initial ATS
   element can be done in a single process pass for one or for many
   archived objects.  It MUST be done as described in the following
   steps:

   1. Collect one or more archive objects to be Time-Stamped.

   2. Select a canonicalization method C to be used for obtaining binary
      representation of archive data and for Archive Time-Stamp at a
      later stage in the renewing process (see <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>).  Note that
      the selected canonicalization method MUST be used also for archive
      data when data is represented in XML format.

   3. Select a valid digest algorithm H.  The selected secure hash
      algorithm MUST be the same as the hash algorithm used in the Time-
      Stamp Token and for the hash tree computations.

   4. Generate a hash tree for selected archive object (see <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section</a>
      <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>).



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      The hash tree may be omitted in the initial ATS, when an archive
      object has a single data object; then the Time-Stamped value MUST
      match the digest value of that single data object.

   5. Acquire Time-Stamp token from TSA for root hash value of a hash
      tree (see <a href="#section-3.1.1">Section 3.1.1</a>).  If the Time-Stamp token is valid, the
      initial Archive Time-Stamp may be generated.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>.  Generation of Hash Tree</span>

   The &lt;DigestValue&gt; elements within the &lt;Sequence&gt; element MUST be
   ordered in binary ascending order to ensure the correct calculation
   of digest values at the time of renewal and later for verification
   purposes.  Note that the text value of the &lt;DigestValue&gt; element is
   base64 encoded, so it MUST be base64 decoded in order to obtain a
   binary representation of the hash value.

   A hash tree MUST be generated when the Time-Stamped value is not
   equal to the hash value of the input data object.  This is the case
   when either of the following is true:

   1. When an archive object has more than one data object (i.e., is an
      archive data object group), its digest value is the digest value
      of binary ascending ordered and concatenated digest values of all
      its containing data objects.  Note that in this case the first
      list of the hash tree MUST contain hash values of all data objects
      and only those values.

   2. When for more than one archive object a single Time-Stamp Token is
      generated, then the hash tree is a reduced hash tree extracted
      from the hash tree for that archive object (see <a href="#section-3.2.2">Section 3.2.2</a>).

   The hash tree for a set of archive objects is built from the leaves
   to the root.  First the leaves of the tree are collected, each leaf
   representing the digest value of an archive object.  You MUST use the
   following procedure to calculate the hash tree:

   1. Collect archive objects and for each archive object its
      corresponding data objects.

   2. Choose a secure hash algorithm H and calculate the digest values
      for the data objects and put them into the input list for the hash
      tree as follows: a digest value of an archive object is the digest
      value of its data object, if there is only one data object in the
      archive object; if there is more than one data object in the
      archive object (i.e., it is an archive data object group) the
      digest value is the digest value of binary sorted, concatenated
      digest values of all its containing data objects.



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      Note that for an archive object group (having more than one data
      object), lists of their sub-digest values are stored and later,
      when creating a reduced hash tree for that archive object, they
      will become members of the first hash list.

   3. Group together items in the input list by the order of N (e.g.,
      for a binary tree group in pairs, for a tertiary tree group in
      triplets, and so forth) and for each group: binary ascending sort,
      concatenate, and calculate the hash value.  The result is a new
      input for the next list.  For improved processing it is
      RECOMMENDED to have the same number of children for each node.
      For this purpose you MAY extend the tree with arbitrary values to
      make every node have the same number of children.

   4. Repeat step 3, until only one digest value is left; this is the
      root value of the hash tree, which is Time-Stamped.

   Note that the selected secure hash algorithm MUST be the same as the
   one defined in the &lt;DigestMethod&gt; element of the ATSChain.

   Example: An input list with 18 hash values, where the h'1 is
   generated for a group of data objects (d4, d5, d6, and d7) and has
   been grouped by 3.  The group could be of any size (2, 3...).  Note
   that the addition of the arbitrary values h''6 and h'''3 are OPTIONAL
   and can be used for improved processing as outlined in step 3 above.


























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                    ----------
                    d1  -&gt; h1 \
                               \
       G1           d2  -&gt; h2  |-&gt; h''1
   +--------+                  /       \
   |d4 -&gt; h4|\      d3  -&gt; h3 /         \
   |d5 -&gt; h5| \     ----------          |
   |        | |  -&gt;        h'1\         |
   |d6 -&gt; h6| /                \        |
   |d7 -&gt; h7|/      d8  -&gt; h8  |-&gt; h''2 |-&gt;  h'''1
   +--------+                  /        |         \
                    d9  -&gt; h9 /         |          \
                    ----------          |          |
                    d10 -&gt; h10\         /          |
                               \       /           |
                    d11 -&gt; h11 |-&gt; h''3            |
                               /                   |
                    d12 -&gt; h12/                    |-&gt; root hash value
                    ----------                     |
                    d13 -&gt; h13\                    |
                               \                   |
                    d14 -&gt; h14 |-&gt; h''4            |
                               /       \           |
                    d15 -&gt; h15/         \          |
                    ----------          |-&gt;  h'''2 |
                    d16 -&gt; h16\         |          |
                               \        |          |
                    d17 -&gt; h17 |-&gt; h''5 |          |
                               /        |          |
                    d18 -&gt; h18/         |          |
                    ----------          /          |
                                       /           /
                  (any arbitrary)  h''6           /
                           (any arbitrary)   h'''3

           Figure 1. Generation of the Merkle Hash Tree

   Note that there are no restrictions on the quantity of hash value
   lists and of their length.  Also note that it is beneficial but not
   required to build hash trees and reduce hash trees.  An Archive Time-
   Stamp may consist only of one list of hash values and a Time-Stamp or
   in an extreme case only a Time-Stamp with no hash value lists.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>.  Reduction of Hash Tree</span>

   The generated Merkle hash tree can be reduced to lists of hash
   values, necessary as a proof of existence for a single archive object
   as follows:



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   1. For a selected archive object (AO) select its hash value h within
      the leaves of the hash tree.

   2. Put h as base64 encoded text value of a new &lt;DigestValue&gt; element
      within a first &lt;Sequence&gt; element.  If the selected AO is a data
      object group (i.e., has more than one data object), the first
      &lt;Sequence&gt; element MUST in this case be formed from the hash
      values of all AOs data objects, each within a separate
      &lt;DigestValue&gt; element.

   3. Select all hash values that have the same father node as hash
      value h.  Place these hash values each as a base64 encoded text
      value of a new &lt;DigestValue&gt; element within a new &lt;Sequence&gt;
      element, increasing its Order attribute value by 1.

   4. Repeat step 3 for the parent node until the root hash value is
      reached, with each step create a new &lt;Sequence&gt; element and
      increase its Order attribute by one.  Note that node values are
      not saved as they are computable.

   The order of &lt;DigestValue&gt; elements within each &lt;Sequence&gt; element
   MUST be binary ascending (by base64 decoded values).

   Reduced hash tree for data object d4 (from the previous example,
   presented in Figure 1):

   &lt;HashTree&gt;
     &lt;Sequence Order='1'&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h4&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h5&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h6&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h7&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
     &lt;/Sequence&gt;
     &lt;Sequence Order='2'&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h8&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h9&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
     &lt;/Sequence&gt;
     &lt;Sequence Order='3'&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h''1&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h''3&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
     &lt;/Sequence&gt;
     &lt;Sequence Order='4'&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h'''2&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
     &lt;/Sequence&gt;
   &lt;/HashTree&gt;

   Reduced hash tree for data object d2 (from the previous example,
   presented in Figure 1):



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   &lt;HashTree&gt;
     &lt;Sequence Order='1'&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h2&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
     &lt;/Sequence&gt;
     &lt;Sequence Order='2'&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h1&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h3&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
     &lt;/Sequence&gt;
     &lt;Sequence Order='3'&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h''2&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h''3&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
     &lt;/Sequence&gt;
     &lt;Sequence Order='4'&gt;
         &lt;DigestValue&gt;base64 encoded h'''2&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
     &lt;/Sequence&gt;
   &lt;/HashTree&gt;

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>.  Verification</span>

   The initial Archive Time-Stamp shall prove that an archive object
   existed at a certain time, indicated by its Time-Stamp Token.  The
   verification procedure MUST be as follows:

   1. Identify hash algorithm H (from &lt;DigestMethod&gt; element) and
      calculate the hash value for each data object of the archive
      object.

   2. If the hash tree is present, search for hash values in the first
      &lt;Sequence&gt; element.  If hash values are not present, terminate
      verification process with negative result.  If the verifying party
      also seeks additional proof that the Archive Time-Stamp relates to
      a data object group (e.g., a document and all its digital
      signatures), it SHOULD also be verified that only the hash values
      of the data objects that are members of the given data object
      group are in the first hash value list.

   3. If the hash tree is present, calculate its root hash value.
      Compare the root hash value with the Time-Stamped value.  If they
      are not equal, terminate the verification process with negative
      result.

   4. If the hash tree is omitted, compare the hash value of the single
      data object with the Time-Stamped value.  If they are not equal,
      terminate the verification process with negative result.  If an
      archive object is having more data objects and the hash tree is
      omitted, also exit with negative result.





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   5. Check the validity of the Time-Stamp Token.  If the needed
      information to verify formal validity of the Time-Stamp Token is
      not available or found within the &lt;TimeStampToken&gt; element or
      within the &lt;CryptographicInformationList&gt; element or in
      &lt;SupportingInformationList&gt; (see <a href="#section-9.4">Section 9.4</a>), exit with a
      negative result.

   Information for formal verification of the Time-Stamp Token includes
   digital certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, Online
   Certificate Status Protocol responses, etc.  This information needs
   to be collected prior to the Time-Stamp renewal process and protected
   with the succeeding Time-Stamp, i.e., included in the
   &lt;TimeStampToken&gt; or &lt;CryptographicInformation&gt; element (see <a href="#section-9.4">Section</a>
   <a href="#section-9.4">9.4</a> for additional information and <a href="#section-4.2.1">Section 4.2.1</a> for details on the
   Time-Stamp renewal process).  For the current (latest) Time-Stamp),
   information for formal verification of the (latest) Time-Stamp should
   be provided by the Time-Stamping Authority.  This information can
   also be provided with the Evidence Record within the
   &lt;SupportingInformation&gt; element, which is not protected by any Time-
   Stamp.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>.  Archive Time-Stamp Sequence and Archive Time-Stamp Chain</span>

   An Archive Time-Stamp proves the existence of single data objects or
   a data object group at a certain time.  However, the initial Evidence
   Record created can become invalid due to losing the validity of the
   Time-Stamp Token for a number of reasons: hash algorithms or public
   key algorithms used in its hash tree or the Time-Stamp may become
   weak or the validity period of the Time-Stamp authority certificate
   expires or is revoked.

   To preserve the validity of an Evidence Record before such events
   occur, the Evidence Record has to be renewed.  This can be done by
   creating a new ATS.  Depending on the reason for renewing the
   Evidence Record (the Time-Stamp becomes invalid or the hash algorithm
   of the hash tree becomes weak) two types of renewal processes are
   possible:

   o  Time-Stamp renewal: For this process a new Archive Time-Stamp is
      generated, which is applied over the last Time-Stamp created.  The
      process results in a series of Archive Time-Stamps, which are
      contained within a single Archive Time-Stamp Chain (ATSC).

   o  Hash tree renewal: For this process a new Archive Time-Stamp is
      generated, which is applied to all existing Time-Stamps and data
      objects.  The newly generated Archive Time-Stamp is placed in a





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      new Archive Time-Stamp Chain.  The process results in a series of
      Archive Time-Stamp Chains, which are contained within a single
      Archive Time-Stamp Sequence (ATSSeq).

   After the renewal process, only the most recent (i.e., the last
   generated) Archive Time-Stamp has to be monitored for expiration or
   validity loss.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>.  Structure</span>

   Archive Time-Stamp Chain and Archive Time-Stamp Sequence are
   containers for sequences of Archive Time-Stamp(s) that are generated
   through renewal processes.  The renewal process results in a series
   of Evidence Record elements: the &lt;ArchiveTimeStampSequence&gt; element
   contains an ordered sequence of &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; elements, and
   the &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; element contains an ordered sequence of
   &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; elements.  Both elements MUST be sorted by time of
   the Time-Stamp in ascending order.  Order is indicated by the Order
   attribute.

   When an Archive Time-Stamp must be renewed, a new &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt;
   element is generated and depending on the generation process, it is
   either placed:

   o  as the last &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; child element in a sequence of the
      last &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; element in case of Time-Stamp renewal
      or

   o  as the first &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; child element in a sequence of the
      newly created &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; element in case of hash tree
      renewal.

   The ATS with the largest Order attribute value within the ATSC with
   the largest Order attribute value is the latest ATS and MUST be valid
   at the present time.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>.  Digest Method</span>

   Digest method is a required element that identifies the digest
   algorithm used to calculate hash values of archive data (and node
   values of hash tree).  The digest method is specified in the
   &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; element by the required &lt;DigestMethod&gt;
   element and indicates the digest algorithm that MUST be used for all
   hash value calculations related to the Archive Time-Stamps within the
   Archive Time-Stamp Chain.






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   The Algorithm attribute contains URIs [<a href="./rfc3986" title="&quot;Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;">RFC3986</a>] for identifiers that
   MUST be used as defined in [<a href="./rfc3275" title="&quot;(Extensible Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing&quot;">RFC3275</a>] and [<a href="./rfc4051" title="&quot;Additional XML Security Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)&quot;">RFC4051</a>].  For example,
   when the SHA-1 algorithm is used, the algorithm identifier is:

   &lt;DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/&gt;

   Within a single ATSC, the digest algorithms used for the hash trees
   of its Archive Time-Stamps and the Time-Stamp Tokens MUST be the
   same.  When algorithms used by a TSA are changed (e.g., upgraded) a
   new ATSC MUST be started using an equal or stronger digest algorithm.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.2" href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>.  Canonicalization Method</span>

   Prior to hash value calculations of an XML element, a proper binary
   representation must be extracted from its (abstract) XML data
   presentation.  The binary representation is determined by UTF-8
   [<a href="./rfc3629" title="&quot;UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646&quot;">RFC3629</a>] encoding and canonicalization of the XML element.  The XML
   element includes the entire text of the start and end tags as well as
   all descendant markup and character data (i.e., the text and sub-
   elements) between those tags.

   &lt;CanonicalizationMethod&gt; is a required element that identifies the
   canonicalization algorithm used to obtain binary representation of an
   XML element or elements.  Algorithm identifiers (URIs) MUST be used
   as defined in [<a href="./rfc3275" title="&quot;(Extensible Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing&quot;">RFC3275</a>] and [<a href="./rfc4051" title="&quot;Additional XML Security Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)&quot;">RFC4051</a>].  For example, when Canonical
   XML 1.0 (omits comments) is used, algorithm identifier is

   &lt;CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-
   xml-c14n-20010315"/&gt;

   Canonicalization MUST be applied over XML structured archive data and
   MUST be applied over elements of Evidence Record (namely, ATS and
   ATSC in the renewing process).

   The canonicalization method is specified in the &lt;Algorithm&gt; attribute
   of the &lt;CanonicalizationMethod&gt; element within the
   &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; element and indicates the canonicalization
   method that MUST be used for all binary representations of the
   Archive Time-Stamps within that Archive Time-Stamp Chain.  In case of
   succeeding ATSC the canonicalization method indicated within the ATSC
   must also be used for the calculation of the digest value of the
   preceding ATSC.  Note that the canonicalization method is unlikely to
   change over time as it does not impose the same constraints as the
   digest method.  In theory, the same canonicalization method can be
   used for a whole Archive Time-Stamp Sequence.  Although alternative
   canonicalization methods may be used, it is recommended to use c14n-
   20010315 [<a href="#ref-XMLC14N" title="&quot;Canonical XML&quot;">XMLC14N</a>].




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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>.  Generation</span>

   Before the cryptographic algorithms used within the most recent
   Archive Time-Stamp become weak or the Time-Stamp certificates are
   invalidated, the LTA has to renew the Archive Time-Stamps by
   generating a new Archive Time-Stamp using one of two procedures:
   Time-Stamp renewal or hash tree renewal.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>.  Time-Stamp Renewal</span>

   In case of Time-Stamp renewal, i.e., if the digest algorithm (H) to
   be used in the renewal process is the same as digest algorithm (H')
   used in the last Archive Time-Stamp, the complete content of the last
   &lt;TimeStamp&gt; element MUST be Time-Stamped and a new &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt;
   element created as follows:

   1. If the current &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; element does not contain needed
      proof for long-term formal validation of its Time-Stamp Token
      within the &lt;TimeStamp&gt; element, collect needed data such as root
      certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, etc., and include them
      in the &lt;CryptographicInformationList&gt; element of the last Archive
      Time-Stamp (each data object into a separate
      &lt;CryptographicInformation&gt; element).

   2. Select the canonicalization method from the
      &lt;CanonicalizationMethod&gt; element and select the digest algorithm
      from the &lt;DigestMethod&gt; element.  Calculate hash value from binary
      representation of the &lt;TimeStamp&gt; element of the last
      &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; element including added cryptographic
      information.  Acquire the Time-Stamp for the calculated hash
      value.  If the Time-Stamp is valid, the new Archive Time-Stamp may
      be generated.

   3. Increase the value order of the new ATS by one and place the new
      ATS into the last &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; element.

   The new ATS and its hash tree MUST use the same digest algorithm as
   the preceding one, which is specified in the &lt;DigestMethod&gt; element
   within the &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; element.  Note that the new ATS
   MAY not contain a hash tree.  However, the Time-Stamp renewal process
   may be optimized to acquire one Time-Stamp for many Archive Time-
   Stamps using a hash tree.  Note that each hash of the &lt;TimeStamp&gt;
   element is treated as the document hash in <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section 3.2.1</a>.








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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.2" href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>.  Hash Tree Renewal</span>

   The process of hash tree renewal occurs when the new digest algorithm
   is different from the one used in the last Archive Time-Stamp (H &lt;&gt;
   H').  In this case the complete Archive Time-Stamp Sequence and the
   archive data objects covered by existing Archive Time-Stamp must be
   Time-Stamped as follows:

   1. Select one or more archive objects to be renewed and their current
      &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; elements.

   2. For each archive object check the current &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt;
      element.  If it does not contain the proof needed for long-term
      formal validation of its Time-Stamp Token within the Time-Stamp
      Token, collect the needed data such as root certificates,
      Certificate Revocation Lists, etc., and include them in the
      &lt;CryptographicInformationList&gt; element of the last Archive Time-
      Stamp (each data object into a separate &lt;CryptographicInformation&gt;
      element).

   3. Select a canonicalization method C and select a new secure hash
      algorithm H.

   4. For each archive object select its data objects d(i).  Generate
      hash values h(i) = H(d(i)), for example: h(1), h(2).., h(n).

   5. For each archive object calculate a hash hseq=H(ATSSeq) from
      binary representation of the &lt;ArchiveTimeStampSequence&gt; element,
      corresponding to that archive object.  Note that Archive Time-
      Stamp Chains and Archive Time-Stamps MUST be chronologically
      ordered, each respectively to its Order attribute, and that the
      canonicalization method C MUST be applied.

   6. For each archive object sort in binary ascending order and
      concatenate all h(i) and the hseq.  Generate a new digest value
      h(j)=H(h(1)..h(n),hseq).

   7. Build a new Archive Time-Stamp for each h(j) (hash tree generation
      and reduction is defined in Sections <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a> and <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>).  Note that
      each h(j) is treated as the document hash in <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section 3.2.1</a>.  The
      first hash value list in the reduced hash tree should only contain
      h(i) and hseq.

   8. Create the new &lt;ArchiveTimeStampChain&gt; containing the new
      &lt;ArchiveTimeStamp&gt; element (with order number 1), and place it
      into the existing &lt;ArchiveTimeStampSequence&gt; as a last child with
      the order number increased by one.




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   Example for an archive object with 3 data objects: Select a new hash
   algorithm and canonicalization method.  Collect all 3 data objects
   and currently generated Archive Time-Stamp Sequence.

               AO

            /  |   \

         d1    d2    d3

   ATSSeq
         ATSChain1: ATS0, ATS1

         ATSChain2: ATS0, ATS1, ATS2

   The hash values MUST be calculated with the new hash algorithm H for
   all data objects and for the whole ATSSeq.  Note that ATSSeq MUST be
   chronologically ordered and canonicalized before retrieving its
   binary representation.

   When generating the hash tree for the new ATS, the first sequence
   become values: H(d1), H(d2),..., H(dn), H(ATSSeq).  Note: hash values
   MUST be sorted in binary ascending order.

   &lt;HashTree&gt;
      &lt;Sequence Order='1'&gt;
            &lt;DigestValue&gt;H(d1)&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
            &lt;DigestValue&gt;H(d2)&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
            &lt;DigestValue&gt;H(d3)&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
            &lt;DigestValue&gt;H(ATSSeq)&lt;/DigestValue&gt;
      &lt;/Sequence&gt;
   &lt;/HashTree&gt;

   Note that if the group processing is being performed, the hash value
   of the concatenation of the first sequence is an input hash value
   into the hash tree.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>.  Verification</span>

   An Evidence Record shall prove that an archive object existed and has
   not been changed from the time of the initial Time-Stamp Token within
   the first ATS.  In order to complete the non-repudiation proof for an
   archive object, the last ATS has to be valid and ATSCs and their
   relations to each other have to be proved:

   1. Select archive object and re-encrypt its data object or data
      object group, if &lt;EncryptionInformation&gt; field is used.  Select
      the initial digest algorithm specified within the first Archive



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      Time-Stamp Chain and calculate the hash value of the archive
      object.  Verify that the initial Archive Time-Stamp contains
      (identical) hash value of the AO's data object (or hash values of
      AO's data object group).  Note that when the hash tree is omitted,
      calculated AO's value MUST match the Time-Stamped value.

   2. Verify each Archive Time-Stamp Chain and each Archive Time-Stamp
      within.  If the hash tree is present within the second and the
      next Archive Time-Stamps of an Archive Time-Stamp Chain, the first
      &lt;Sequence&gt; MUST contain the hash value of the &lt;TimeStamp&gt; element
      before.  Each Archive Time-Stamp MUST be valid relative to the
      time of the succeeding Archive Time-Stamp.  All Archive Time-
      Stamps with the Archive Time-Stamp Chain MUST use the same hash
      algorithm, which was secure at the time of the first Archive Time-
      Stamp of the succeeding Archive Time-Stamp Chain.

   3. Verify that the first hash value list of the first Archive Time-
      Stamp of all succeeding Archive Time-Stamp Chains contains hash
      values of data object and the hash value of Archive Time-Stamp
      Sequence of the preceding Archive Time-Stamp Chains.  Verify that
      Archive Time-Stamp was created when the last Archive Time-Stamp of
      the preceding Archive Time-Stamp Chain was valid.

   4. To prove the Archive Time-Stamp Sequence relates to a data object
      group, verify that the first Archive Time-Stamp of the first
      Archive Time-Stamp Chain does not contain other hash values in its
      first hash value list than the hash values of those data objects.

   For non-repudiation proof for the data object, the last Archive Time-
   Stamp MUST be valid at the time of verification process.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>.  Encryption</span>

   In some archive services scenarios it may be required that clients
   send encrypted data only, preventing information disclosure to third
   parties, such as archive service providers.  In such scenarios it
   must be clear that Evidence Records generated refer to encrypted data
   objects.  Evidence Records in general protect the bit-stream (or
   binary representation of XML data), which freezes the bit structure
   at the time of archiving.  Encryption schemes in such scenarios
   cannot be changed afterwards without losing the integrity proof.
   Therefore, an ERS record must hold and preserve encryption
   information in a consistent manner.  To avoid problems when using
   Evidence Records in the future, additional special precautions have
   to be taken.






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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


   Encryption is a two-way process, whose result depends on the
   cryptographic material used, e.g., encryption keys and encryption
   algorithms.  Encryption and decryption keys as well as algorithms
   must match in order to reconstruct the original message or data that
   was encrypted.  Evidence generated to prove the existence of
   encrypted data cannot always be relied upon to prove the existence of
   unencrypted data.  It may be possible to choose different
   cryptographic material, i.e., an algorithm or a key for decryption
   that is not the algorithm or key used for encryption.  In this case,
   the evidence record would not be a non-repudiation proof for the
   unencrypted data.  Therefore, only encryption methods should be used
   that make it possible to prove that archive Time-Stamped encrypted
   data objects unambiguously represent unencrypted data objects.  In
   cases when evidence was generated to prove the existence of encrypted
   data the corresponding algorithm and decryption keys used for
   encryption must become a part of the Evidence Record and is used to
   unambiguously represent original (unencrypted) data that was
   encrypted.  (Note: In addition, the long-term security of the
   encryption schemes should be analyzed to determine if it could be
   used to create collision attacks.)  Cryptographic material may also
   be used in scenarios when a client submits encrypted data to the
   archive service provider for preservation but stores himself the data
   only in an unencrypted form.  In such scenarios cryptographic
   material is used to re-encrypt the unencrypted data kept by a client
   for the purpose of performing validation of the Evidence Record,
   which is related to the encrypted form of client's data.  An OPTIONAL
   extensible structure &lt;EncryptionInformation&gt; is defined to store the
   necessary parameters of the encryption methods.  Its
   &lt;EncryptionInformationType&gt; element is used to store the type of
   stored encryption information, e.g., whether it is an encryption
   algorithm or encryption key.  The &lt;EncryptionInformationValue&gt;
   element then contains the relevant encryption information itself.
   The use of encryption elements heavily depends on the cryptographic
   mechanism and has to be defined by other specifications.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>.  Version</span>

   The numbering scheme for XMLERS versions is "&lt;major&gt;.&lt;minor&gt;".  The
   major and minor numbers MUST be treated as separate integers and each
   number MAY be incremented higher than a single digit.  Thus, "2.4"
   would be a lower version than "2.13", which in turn would be lower
   than "12.3".  Leading zeros (e.g., "6.01") MUST be ignored by
   recipients and MUST NOT be sent.








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   The major version number will be incremented only if the data format
   has changed so dramatically that an older version entity would not be
   able to interoperate with a newer version entity if it simply ignored
   the elements and attributes it did not understand and took the
   actions defined in the older specification.

   The minor version number will be incremented if significant new
   capabilities have been added to the core format (e.g., new optional
   elements).

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>.  Storage of Policies</span>

   As explained above policies can be stored in the Evidence Record in
   the &lt;Attribute&gt; or the &lt;SupportingInformation&gt; element.  In the case
   of storing DSSC policies [<a href="./rfc5698" title="&quot;Data Structure for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms (DSSC)&quot;">RFC5698</a>], the types to be used in the
   &lt;Attribute&gt; or &lt;SupportingInformation&gt; element are defined in
   <a href="./rfc5698#appendix-A.2">Appendix&nbsp;A.2 of [RFC5698]</a> for both ASN.1 and XML representation.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>.  XSD Schema for the Evidence Record</span>

   &lt;?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?&gt;
   &lt;xs:schema  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
               xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers"
               targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers"
               elementFormDefault="qualified"
               attributeFormDefault="unqualified"&gt;
   &lt;xs:element name="EvidenceRecord" type="EvidenceRecordType"/&gt;

   &lt;!-- TYPE DEFINITIONS--&gt;

   &lt;xs:complexType name="EvidenceRecordType"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="EncryptionInformation"
                     type="EncryptionInfo" minOccurs="0"/&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="SupportingInformationList"
                     type="SupportingInformationType" minOccurs="0"/&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="ArchiveTimeStampSequence"
                     type="ArchiveTimeStampSequenceType"/&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
      &lt;xs:attribute name="Version" type="xs:decimal" use="required"
                                                       fixed="1.0"/&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;

   &lt;xs:complexType name="EncryptionInfo"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="EncryptionInformationType"
                     type="ObjectIdentifier"/&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="EncryptionInformationValue"&gt;



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            &lt;xs:complexType mixed="true"&gt;
               &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
                  &lt;xs:any minOccurs="0"/&gt;
               &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
            &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;
         &lt;/xs:element&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;

   &lt;xs:complexType name="ArchiveTimeStampSequenceType"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="ArchiveTimeStampChain" maxOccurs="unbounded"&gt;
            &lt;xs:complexType&gt;
               &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
                  &lt;xs:element name="DigestMethod"
                              type="DigestMethodType"/&gt;
                  &lt;xs:element name="CanonicalizationMethod"
                              type="CanonicalizationMethodType"/&gt;
                  &lt;xs:element name="ArchiveTimeStamp"
                              type="ArchiveTimeStampType"
                              maxOccurs="unbounded" /&gt;
               &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
               &lt;xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType"
                             use="required"/&gt;
            &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;
         &lt;/xs:element&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;

   &lt;xs:complexType name="ArchiveTimeStampType"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="HashTree" type="HashTreeType" minOccurs="0"/&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="TimeStamp" type="TimeStampType"/&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="Attributes" type="Attributes" minOccurs="0"/&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
      &lt;xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType" use="required"/&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;

   &lt;xs:complexType name="DigestMethodType" mixed="true"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:any namespace="##other" minOccurs="0"/&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
      &lt;xs:attribute name="Algorithm" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;

   &lt;xs:complexType name="CanonicalizationMethodType" mixed="true"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence minOccurs="0"&gt;
         &lt;xs:any namespace="##any" minOccurs="0"/&gt;



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      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
      &lt;xs:attribute name="Algorithm" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;

   &lt;xs:complexType name="TimeStampType"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="TimeStampToken"&gt;
            &lt;xs:complexType mixed="true"&gt;
               &lt;xs:complexContent mixed="true"&gt;
                  &lt;xs:restriction base="xs:anyType"&gt;
                     &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
                        &lt;xs:any processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"
                                maxOccurs="unbounded"/&gt;
                     &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
                     &lt;xs:attribute name="Type" type="xs:NMTOKEN"
                                   use="required"/&gt;
                  &lt;/xs:restriction&gt;
               &lt;/xs:complexContent&gt;
            &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;
         &lt;/xs:element&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="CryptographicInformationList"
                     type="CryptographicInformationType" minOccurs="0"/&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;
   &lt;xs:complexType name="HashTreeType"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="Sequence" maxOccurs="unbounded"&gt;
            &lt;xs:complexType&gt;
               &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
                  &lt;xs:element name="DigestValue" type="xs:base64Binary"
                              maxOccurs="unbounded"/&gt;
               &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
               &lt;xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType"
                             use="required"/&gt;
            &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;
         &lt;/xs:element&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;

   &lt;xs:complexType name="Attributes"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="Attribute" maxOccurs="unbounded"&gt;
            &lt;xs:complexType mixed="true"&gt;
               &lt;xs:complexContent mixed="true"&gt;
                  &lt;xs:restriction base="xs:anyType"&gt;
                     &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
                        &lt;xs:any processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"
                                maxOccurs="unbounded"/&gt;



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                     &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
                     &lt;xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType"
                                   use="required"/&gt;
                     &lt;xs:attribute name="Type" type="xs:string"
                                   use="optional"/&gt;
                  &lt;/xs:restriction&gt;
               &lt;/xs:complexContent&gt;
            &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;
         &lt;/xs:element&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;
   &lt;xs:complexType name="CryptographicInformationType"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="CryptographicInformation"
               maxOccurs="unbounded"&gt;
            &lt;xs:complexType mixed="true"&gt;
               &lt;xs:complexContent mixed="true"&gt;
                  &lt;xs:restriction base="xs:anyType"&gt;
                     &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
                        &lt;xs:any processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"
                                maxOccurs="unbounded"/&gt;
                     &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
                     &lt;xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType"
                                   use="required"/&gt;
                     &lt;xs:attribute name="Type" type="xs:NMTOKEN"
                                   use="required"/&gt;
                  &lt;/xs:restriction&gt;
               &lt;/xs:complexContent&gt;
            &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;
         &lt;/xs:element&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;

   &lt;xs:complexType name="SupportingInformationType"&gt;
      &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
         &lt;xs:element name="SupportingInformation"
               maxOccurs="unbounded"&gt;
            &lt;xs:complexType mixed="true"&gt;
               &lt;xs:complexContent mixed="true"&gt;
                  &lt;xs:restriction base="xs:anyType"&gt;
                     &lt;xs:sequence&gt;
                        &lt;xs:any processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"
                                maxOccurs="unbounded"/&gt;
                     &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
                     &lt;xs:attribute name="Type" type="xs:string"
                                   use="required"/&gt;
                  &lt;/xs:restriction&gt;
               &lt;/xs:complexContent&gt;



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            &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;
         &lt;/xs:element&gt;
      &lt;/xs:sequence&gt;
   &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;

   &lt;xs:simpleType name="ObjectIdentifier"&gt;
      &lt;xs:restriction base="xs:token"&gt;
         &lt;xs:pattern value="[0-2](\.[1-3]?[0-9]?(\.\d+)*)?"/&gt;
      &lt;/xs:restriction&gt;
   &lt;/xs:simpleType&gt;

   &lt;xs:simpleType name="OrderType"&gt;
      &lt;xs:restriction base="xs:int"&gt;
         &lt;xs:minInclusive value="1"/&gt;
      &lt;/xs:restriction&gt;
   &lt;/xs:simpleType&gt;
   &lt;/xs:schema&gt;

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>.  Security Considerations</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>.  Secure Algorithms</span>

   Cryptographic algorithms and parameters that are used within Archive
   Time-Stamps must always be secure at the time of generation.  This
   concerns the hash algorithm used in the hash lists of Archive Time-
   Stamp as well as hash algorithms and public key algorithms of the
   Time-Stamps.  Publications regarding security suitability of
   cryptographic algorithms ([<a href="#ref-NIST.800-57-Part1.2006">NIST.800-57-Part1.2006</a>] and
   [<a href="#ref-ETSI-TS-102-176-1-V2.0.0">ETSI-TS-102-176-1-V2.0.0</a>]) have to be considered during the
   verification.  A generic solution for automatic interpretation of
   security suitability policies in electronic form is not the subject
   of this specification.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>.  Redundancy</span>

   Evidence Records may become affected by weakening cryptographic
   algorithms even before this is publicly known.  Retrospectively this
   has an impact on Archive Time-Stamps generated and renewed during the
   archival period.  In this case the validity of Evidence Records
   created may end without any options for retroactive action.

   Many TSAs are using the same cryptographic algorithms.  While
   compromise of a private key of a TSA may compromise the security of
   only one TSA (and only one Archive Time-Stamp, for example),
   weakening cryptographic algorithms used to generate Time-Stamp Tokens
   would affect many TSAs at the same time.





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   To manage such risks and to avoid the loss of Evidence Record
   validity due to weakening cryptographic algorithms used, it is
   RECOMMENDED to generate and manage at least two redundant Evidence
   Records for a single data object.  In such scenarios redundant
   Evidence Records SHOULD use different hash algorithms within Archive
   Time-Stamp Sequences and different TSAs using different cryptographic
   algorithms for Time-Stamp Tokens.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.3" href="#section-9.3">9.3</a>.  Secure Time-Stamps</span>

   Archive Time-Stamps depend upon the security of normal Time-Stamping
   provided by TSA and stated in security policies.  Renewed Archive
   Time-Stamps MUST have the same or higher quality as the initial
   Archive Time-Stamp of archive data.  Archive Time-Stamps used for
   signed archive data SHOULD have the same or higher quality than the
   maximum quality of the signatures.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.4" href="#section-9.4">9.4</a>.  Time-Stamp Verification</span>

   It is important to consider for renewal and verification that when a
   new Time-Stamp is applied, it MUST be ascertained that prior to the
   time of renewal (i.e., when the new Time-Stamp is applied) the
   certificate of the before current Time-Stamp was not revoked due to a
   key compromise.  Otherwise, in the case of a key compromise, there is
   the risk that the authenticity of the used Time-Stamp and therefore
   its security in the chain of evidence cannot be guaranteed.  Other
   revocation reasons like the revocation for cessation of activity do
   not necessarily pose this risk, as in that case the private key of
   the Time-Stamp unit would have been previously destroyed and thus
   cannot be used nor compromised.

   Both elements &lt;CryptographicInformationList&gt; and &lt;Attribute&gt; are
   protected by future Archive Time_Stamp renewals and can store
   information as outlined in <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a> that is available at or before
   the time of the renewal of the specific Archive Time-Stamp.  At the
   time of renewal all previous Archive Time-Stamp data structures
   become protected by the new Archive Time-Stamp and frozen by it,
   i.e., no data MUST be added or modified in these elements afterwards.
   If, however, some supporting information is relevant for the overall
   Evidence Record or information that only becomes available later,
   this can be provided in the Evidence Record in the
   &lt;SupportingInformationList&gt; element.  Data in the
   &lt;SupportingInformatonList&gt; can be added later to an Evidence Record,
   but it must rely on its own authenticity and integrity protection
   mechanism, like, for example, signed by current strong cryptographic
   means and/or provided by a trusted source (for example, this could be
   the LTA providing its current system DSSC policy, signed with current
   strong cryptographic means).



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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>.  IANA Considerations</span>

   For all IANA registrations related to this document, the
   "Specification Required" [<a href="./rfc5226" title="">RFC5226</a>] allocation policies MUST be used.

   This document defines the XML namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers"
   according to the guidelines in [<a href="./rfc3688" title="&quot;The IETF XML Registry&quot;">RFC3688</a>].  This namespace has been
   registered in the IANA XML Registry.

   This document defines an XML schema (see <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>) according to the
   guidelines in [<a href="./rfc3688" title="&quot;The IETF XML Registry&quot;">RFC3688</a>].  This XML schema has been registered in the
   IANA XML Registry and can be identified with the URN
   "urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:ers".

   This specification defines a new IANA registry entitled "XML Evidence
   Record Syntax (XMLERS)".  This registry contains two sub-registries
   entitled "Time-Stamp Token Type" and "Cryptographic Information
   Type".  The policy for future assignments to both sub-registries is
   "RFC Required".

   The sub-registry "Time-Stamp Token Type" contains textual names and
   description, which should refer to the specification or standard
   defining that type.  It serves as assistance when validating a Time-
   Stamp Token.

   When registering a new Time-Stamp Token type, the following
   information MUST be provided:

   o  The textual name of the Time-Stamp Token type (value).  The value
      MUST conform to the XML datatype "xs:NMTOKEN".

   o  A reference to a publicly available specification that defines the
      Time-Stamp Token type (description).

   The initial values for the "Time-Stamp Token Type" sub-registry are:

   Value
     Description
     Reference
   -------------

   <a href="./rfc3161">RFC3161</a>
      <a href="./rfc3161">RFC3161</a> Time-Stamp
      <a href="./rfc3161">RFC 3161</a>

   XMLENTRUST
      EnTrust XML Schema
      <a href="http://www.si-tsa.gov.si/dokumenti/timestamp-protocol-20020207.xsd">http://www.si-tsa.gov.si/dokumenti/timestamp-protocol-20020207.xsd</a>



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   The sub-registry "Cryptographic Information Type" contains textual
   names and description, which should refer to a specification or
   standard defining that type.  It serves as assistance when validating
   cryptographic information such as digital certificates, CRLs, or
   OCSP-Responses.

   When registering a new cryptographic information type, the following
   information MUST be provided:

   o  The textual name of the cryptographic information type (value).
      The value MUST conform to the XML datatype "xs:NMTOKEN".

   o  A reference to a publicly available specification that defines the
      cryptographic information type (description).

   The initial values for the "Cryptographic Information Type" sub-
   registry are:

   Value       Description                         Reference
   -----       ------------------                  -----------------

   CERT        DER-encoded X.509 Certificate       <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>

   CRL         DER-encoded X.509                   <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>
               Certificate Revocation List

   OCSP        DER-encoded OCSPResponse            <a href="./rfc2560">RFC 2560</a>

   SCVP        DER-encoded SCVP response           <a href="./rfc5055">RFC 5055</a>
               (CVResponse)

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>.  References</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.1" href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>.  Normative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.

   [<a id="ref-RFC2560">RFC2560</a>]    Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
                Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
                Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", <a href="./rfc2560">RFC 2560</a>, June
                1999.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3161">RFC3161</a>]    Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato,
                "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp
                Protocol (TSP)", <a href="./rfc3161">RFC 3161</a>, August 2001.





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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


   [<a id="ref-RFC3688">RFC3688</a>]    Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp81">BCP 81</a>, <a href="./rfc3688">RFC 3688</a>,
                January 2004.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3275">RFC3275</a>]    Eastlake 3rd, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible
                Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing",
                <a href="./rfc3275">RFC 3275</a>, March 2002.

   [<a id="ref-RFC4051">RFC4051</a>]    Eastlake 3rd, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform
                Resource Identifiers (URIs)", <a href="./rfc4051">RFC 4051</a>, April 2005.

   [<a id="ref-RFC4648">RFC4648</a>]    Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
                Encodings", <a href="./rfc4648">RFC 4648</a>, October 2006.

   [<a id="ref-RFC4998">RFC4998</a>]    Gondrom, T., Brandner, R., and U. Pordesch, "Evidence
                Record Syntax (ERS)", <a href="./rfc4998">RFC 4998</a>, August 2007.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5055">RFC5055</a>]    Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and
                W. Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
                (SCVP)", <a href="./rfc5055">RFC 5055</a>, December 2007.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5280">RFC5280</a>]    Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
                Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
                Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
                List (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, May 2008.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5226">RFC5226</a>]    Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
                IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp26">BCP 26</a>, <a href="./rfc5226">RFC 5226</a>,
                May 2008.

   [<a id="ref-XMLC14N">XMLC14N</a>]    Boyer, J., "Canonical XML", W3C Recommendation, March
                2001.

   [<a id="ref-XMLDSig">XMLDSig</a>]    Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Solo, D., Hirsch, F.,
                Roessler, T., "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing",
                XMLDSig, W3C Recommendation, July 2006.

   [<a id="ref-XMLName">XMLName</a>]    Layman, A., Hollander, D., Tobin, R., and T. Bray,
                "Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Second Edition)", W3C
                Recommendation, August 2006.

   [<a id="ref-XMLSchema">XMLSchema</a>]  Thompson, H., Beech, D., Mendelsohn, N., and M. Maloney,
                "XML Schema Part 1: Structures Second Edition", W3C
                Recommendation, October 2004.








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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.2" href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>.  Informative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-ANSI.X9-95.2005">ANSI.X9-95.2005</a>]
                American National Standard for Financial Services,
                "Trusted Timestamp Management and Security", ANSI X9.95,
                June 2005.

   [<a id="ref-ETSI-TS-102-176-1-V2.0.0">ETSI-TS-102-176-1-V2.0.0</a>]
                ETSI, "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI);
                Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic
                Signatures; Part 1: Hash functions and asymmetric
                algorithms", ETSI TS 102 176-1 V2.0.0 (2007-11),
                November 2007.

   [<a id="ref-ISO-18014-1.2002">ISO-18014-1.2002</a>]
                ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, "Time stamping services - Part 1:
                Framework", ISO ISO-18014-1, February 2002.

   [<a id="ref-ISO-18014-2.2002">ISO-18014-2.2002</a>]
                ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, "Time stamping services - Part 2:
                Mechanisms producing independent tokens", ISO
                ISO-18014-2, December 2002.

   [<a id="ref-ISO-18014-3.2004">ISO-18014-3.2004</a>]
                ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, "Time stamping services - Part 3:
                Mechanisms producing linked tokens", ISO ISO-18014-3,
                February 2004.

   [<a id="ref-MER1980">MER1980</a>]    Merkle, R., "Protocols for Public Key Cryptosystems,
                Proceedings of the 1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and
                Privacy (Oakland, CA, USA)", pages 122-134, April 1980.

   [<a id="ref-NIST.800-57-Part1.2006">NIST.800-57-Part1.2006</a>]
                National Institute of Standards and Technology,
                "Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: General
                (Revised)", NIST 800-57 Part1, May 2006.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3470">RFC3470</a>]    Hollenbeck, S., Rose, M., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines
                for the Use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) within
                IETF Protocols", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp70">BCP 70</a>, <a href="./rfc3470">RFC 3470</a>, January 2003.

   [<a id="ref-RFC4810">RFC4810</a>]    Wallace, C., Pordesch, U., and R. Brandner, "Long-Term
                Archive Service Requirements", <a href="./rfc4810">RFC 4810</a>, March 2007.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5126">RFC5126</a>]    Pinkas, D., Pope, N., and J. Ross, "CMS Advanced
                Electronic Signatures (CAdES)", <a href="./rfc5126">RFC 5126</a>, March 2008.





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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


   [<a id="ref-TS-ENTRUST">TS-ENTRUST</a>] The Slovenian Time Stamping Authority, Entrust XML
                Schema for Time-Stamp, <a href="http://www.si-tsa.gov.si/dokumenti/timestamp-protocol-20020207.xsd">http://www.si-tsa.gov.si/</a>
                <a href="http://www.si-tsa.gov.si/dokumenti/timestamp-protocol-20020207.xsd">dokumenti/timestamp-protocol-20020207.xsd</a>.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3629">RFC3629</a>]    Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
                10646", STD 63, <a href="./rfc3629">RFC 3629</a>, November 2003.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3986">RFC3986</a>]    Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
                Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, <a href="./rfc3986">RFC</a>
                <a href="./rfc3986">3986</a>, January 2005.

   [<a id="ref-XAdES">XAdES</a>]      Cruellas, J. C., Karlinger, G., Pinkas, D., Ross, J.,
                "XML Advanced Electronic Signatures", XAdES, W3C Note,
                February 2003.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5652">RFC5652</a>]    Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD
                70, <a href="./rfc5652">RFC 5652</a>, September 2009.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5698">RFC5698</a>]    Kunz, T., Okunick, S., and U. Pordesch, "Data Structure
                for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms
                (DSSC)", <a href="./rfc5698">RFC 5698</a>, November 2009.






























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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.  Detailed Verification Process of an Evidence Record</span>

   To verify the validity of an Evidence Record start with the first ATS
   till the last ATS (ordered by attribute Order) and perform
   verification for each ATS, as follows:

   1. Select corresponding archive object and its data object or a group
      of data objects.

   2. Re-encrypt data object or data object group, if the
      &lt;EncryptionInformation&gt; field is used (see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> for more
      details)

   3. Get a canonicalization method C and a digest method H from the
      &lt;DigestMethod&gt; element of the current chain.

   4. Make a new list L of digest values of (binary representation of)
      objects (data, ATS, or sequence) that MUST be protected with this
      ATS as follows:

      a. If this ATS is the first in the Archive Time-Stamp Chain:

         i. If this is the first ATS of the first ATSC (the initial ATS)
            in the ATSSeq, calculate digest values of data objects with
            H and add each digest value to the list L.

        ii. If this ATS is not the initial ATS, calculate a digest value
            with H of ordered ATSSeq without this and successive chains.
            Add value H and digest values of data objects to the list L.

      b. If this ATS is not the first in the ATSC:

         i. Calculate the digest value with H of the previous
            &lt;TimeSatmp&gt; element and add this digest value to the list L.

   5. Verify the ATS's Time-Stamped value as follows.  Get the first
      sequence of the hash tree for this ATS.

      a. If this ATS has no hash tree elements then:

        ii. If this ATS is not the first in the ATSSeq (the initial
            ATS), then the Time-Stamped value must be equal to the
            digest value of previous Time-Stamp element.  If not, exit
            with a negative result.







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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


       iii. If this ATS is the initial ATS in the ATSC, there must be
            only one data object of the archive object.  The digest
            value of that data object must be the same as its Time-
            Stamped value.  If not, exit with a negative result.

      b. If this ATS has a hash tree then: If there is a digest value in
         the list L of digest values of protected objects, which cannot
         be found in the first sequence of the hash tree or if there is
         a hash value in the first sequence of the hash tree which is
         not in the list L of digest values of protected objects, exit
         with a negative result.

         i. Get the hash tree from the current ATS and use H to
            calculate the root hash value (see Sections <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a> and
            3.2.2).

        ii. Get Time-Stamped value from the Time-Stamp Token.  If
            calculated root hash value from the hash tree does not match
            the Time-Stamped value, exit with a negative result.

      6. Verify Time-Stamp cryptographically and formally (validate the
         used certificate and its chain, which may be available within
         the Time-Stamp Token itself or &lt;CryptographicInformation&gt;
         element).

      7. If this ATS is the last ATS, check formal validity for the
         current time (now), or get "valid from" time of the next ATS
         and verify formal validity at that specific time.

      8. If the needed information to verify formal validity is not
         found within the Time-Stamp or within its Cryptographic
         Information section of ATS, exit with a negative result.



















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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6283">RFC 6283</a>                         XMLERS                        July 2011</span>


Authors' Addresses

   Aleksej Jerman Blazic
   SETCCE
   Tehnoloski park 21
   1000 Ljubljana
   Slovenia

   Phone: +386 (0) 1 620 4500
   Fax:   +386 (0) 1 620 4509
   EMail: aljosa@setcce.si


   Svetlana Saljic
   SETCCE
   Tehnoloski park 21
   1000 Ljubljana
   Slovenia

   Phone: +386 (0) 1 620 4506
   Fax:   +386 (0) 1 620 4509
   EMail: svetlana.saljic@setcce.si


   Tobias Gondrom
   Kruegerstr. 5A
   85716 Unterschleissheim
   Germany

   Phone: +49 (0) 89 320 5330
   EMail: tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org




















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