<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           S. Kent
Request for Comments: 6484                                       D. Kong
BCP: 173                                                          K. Seo
Category: Best Current Practice                                 R. Watro
ISSN: 2070-1721                                         BBN Technologies
                                                           February 2012


                      <span class="h1">Certificate Policy (CP) for</span>
             <span class="h1">the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)</span>

Abstract

   This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) used to support attestations about Internet
   Number Resource (INR) holdings.  Each organization that distributes
   IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization
   will, in parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this
   distribution.  These certificates will enable verification that the
   resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the
   holder of the associated private key and that this organization is
   the current, unique holder of these resources.

Status of This Memo

   This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   BCPs is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484</a>.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



<span class="grey">Kent, et al.              Best Current Practice                 [Page 1]</span></pre>
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6484">RFC 6484</a>             Certificate Policy for the RPKI       February 2012</span>


   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
      <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Overview ...................................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
      <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Document Name and Identification ...........................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
      <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. PKI Participants ...........................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
           <a href="#section-1.3.1">1.3.1</a>. Certification Authorities ...........................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
           <a href="#section-1.3.2">1.3.2</a>. Registration Authorities ............................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
           <a href="#section-1.3.3">1.3.3</a>. Subscribers .........................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
           <a href="#section-1.3.4">1.3.4</a>. Relying Parties .....................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
           <a href="#section-1.3.5">1.3.5</a>. Other Participants ..................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
      <a href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>. Certificate Usage ..........................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
           <a href="#section-1.4.1">1.4.1</a>. Appropriate Certificate Uses ........................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
           <a href="#section-1.4.2">1.4.2</a>. Prohibited Certificate Uses .........................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
      <a href="#section-1.5">1.5</a>. Policy Administration ......................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
           <a href="#section-1.5.1">1.5.1</a>. Organization Administering the Document .............<a href="#page-9">9</a>
           <a href="#section-1.5.2">1.5.2</a>. Contact Person ......................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
           <a href="#section-1.5.4">1.5.4</a>. CP Approval Procedures ..............................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
      <a href="#section-1.6">1.6</a>. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
   <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
      <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Repositories ..............................................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
      <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Publication of Certification Information ..................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
      <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
      <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
   <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Identification and Authentication ..............................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
      <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Naming ....................................................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
           <a href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Types of Names .....................................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
           <a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
           <a href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........<a href="#page-13">13</a>
           <a href="#section-3.1.4">3.1.4</a>. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........<a href="#page-13">13</a>
           <a href="#section-3.1.5">3.1.5</a>. Uniqueness of Names ................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
      <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Initial Identity Validation ...............................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
           <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key ......<a href="#page-13">13</a>
           <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Authentication of Organization Identity ............<a href="#page-13">13</a>
           <a href="#section-3.2.3">3.2.3</a>. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............<a href="#page-14">14</a>
           <a href="#section-3.2.4">3.2.4</a>. Non-Verified Subscriber Information ................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
           <a href="#section-3.2.5">3.2.5</a>. Validation of Authority ............................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
           <a href="#section-3.2.6">3.2.6</a>. Criteria for Interoperation ........................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
      <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests .....<a href="#page-14">14</a>
           3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
                  Routine Re-Key .....................................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
           3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
                  Re-Key after Revocation ............................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
      <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..15



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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6484">RFC 6484</a>             Certificate Policy for the RPKI       February 2012</span>


   <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements ................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
      <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Certificate Application ...................................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
           <a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........<a href="#page-16">16</a>
           <a href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............<a href="#page-16">16</a>
      <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Certificate Application Processing ........................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
           4.2.1. Performing Identification and
                  Authentication Functions ...........................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
           <a href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..16
           <a href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........<a href="#page-17">17</a>
      <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Certificate Issuance ......................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
           <a href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............<a href="#page-17">17</a>
           4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
                  Issuance of Certificate ............................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
      <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Certificate Acceptance ....................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
           <a href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a>. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........<a href="#page-17">17</a>
           <a href="#section-4.4.2">4.4.2</a>. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........<a href="#page-17">17</a>
           4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                  CA to Other Entities ...............................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
      <a href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
           <a href="#section-4.5.1">4.5.1</a>. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......<a href="#page-18">18</a>
           <a href="#section-4.5.2">4.5.2</a>. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....<a href="#page-18">18</a>
      <a href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>. Certificate Renewal .......................................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
           <a href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a>. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............<a href="#page-19">19</a>
           <a href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a>. Who May Request Renewal ............................<a href="#page-19">19</a>
           <a href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a>. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............<a href="#page-19">19</a>
           4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                  Subscriber .........................................<a href="#page-19">19</a>
           4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                  Renewal Certificate ................................<a href="#page-19">19</a>
           <a href="#section-4.6.6">4.6.6</a>. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...<a href="#page-20">20</a>
           4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                  CA to Other Entities ...............................<a href="#page-20">20</a>
      <a href="#section-4.7">4.7</a>. Certificate Re-Key ........................................<a href="#page-20">20</a>
           <a href="#section-4.7.1">4.7.1</a>. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key ................<a href="#page-20">20</a>
           <a href="#section-4.7.2">4.7.2</a>. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..20
           <a href="#section-4.7.3">4.7.3</a>. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests ..........<a href="#page-21">21</a>
           4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                  Subscriber .........................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
           4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                  Re-Keyed Certificate ...............................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
           <a href="#section-4.7.6">4.7.6</a>. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA ..21
           4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                  CA to Other Entities ...............................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
      <a href="#section-4.8">4.8</a>. Certificate Modification ..................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
           <a href="#section-4.8.1">4.8.1</a>. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........<a href="#page-21">21</a>
           <a href="#section-4.8.2">4.8.2</a>. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........<a href="#page-21">21</a>
           <a href="#section-4.8.3">4.8.3</a>. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......<a href="#page-22">22</a>




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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6484">RFC 6484</a>             Certificate Policy for the RPKI       February 2012</span>


           4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                  Subscriber .........................................<a href="#page-22">22</a>
           4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
                  Certificate ........................................<a href="#page-22">22</a>
           <a href="#section-4.8.6">4.8.6</a>. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..22
           4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                  CA to Other Entities ...............................<a href="#page-22">22</a>
      <a href="#section-4.9">4.9</a>. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................<a href="#page-22">22</a>
           <a href="#section-4.9.1">4.9.1</a>. Circumstances for Revocation .......................<a href="#page-22">22</a>
           <a href="#section-4.9.2">4.9.2</a>. Who Can Request Revocation .........................<a href="#page-22">22</a>
           <a href="#section-4.9.3">4.9.3</a>. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................<a href="#page-23">23</a>
           <a href="#section-4.9.4">4.9.4</a>. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................<a href="#page-23">23</a>
           4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the
                  Revocation Request .................................<a href="#page-23">23</a>
           4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
                  Parties ............................................<a href="#page-23">23</a>
           <a href="#section-4.9.7">4.9.7</a>. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................<a href="#page-23">23</a>
           <a href="#section-4.9.8">4.9.8</a>. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................<a href="#page-23">23</a>
      <a href="#section-4.10">4.10</a>. Certificate Status Services ..............................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
   <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
      <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Physical Controls .........................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
           <a href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a>. Site Location and Construction .....................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
           <a href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a>. Physical Access ....................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
           <a href="#section-5.1.3">5.1.3</a>. Power and Air Conditioning .........................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
           <a href="#section-5.1.4">5.1.4</a>. Water Exposures ....................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
           <a href="#section-5.1.5">5.1.5</a>. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
           <a href="#section-5.1.6">5.1.6</a>. Media Storage ......................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
           <a href="#section-5.1.7">5.1.7</a>. Waste Disposal .....................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
           <a href="#section-5.1.8">5.1.8</a>. Off-Site Backup ....................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
      <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Procedural Controls .......................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
           <a href="#section-5.2.1">5.2.1</a>. Trusted Roles ......................................<a href="#page-25">25</a>
           <a href="#section-5.2.2">5.2.2</a>. Number of Persons Required per Task ................<a href="#page-25">25</a>
           <a href="#section-5.2.3">5.2.3</a>. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....<a href="#page-25">25</a>
           <a href="#section-5.2.4">5.2.4</a>. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............<a href="#page-25">25</a>
      <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Personnel Controls ........................................<a href="#page-25">25</a>
      <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................<a href="#page-25">25</a>
           <a href="#section-5.4.1">5.4.1</a>. Types of Events Recorded ...........................<a href="#page-25">25</a>
           <a href="#section-5.4.2">5.4.2</a>. Frequency of Processing Log ........................<a href="#page-25">25</a>
           <a href="#section-5.4.3">5.4.3</a>. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................<a href="#page-26">26</a>
           <a href="#section-5.4.4">5.4.4</a>. Protection of Audit Log ............................<a href="#page-26">26</a>
           <a href="#section-5.4.5">5.4.5</a>. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................<a href="#page-26">26</a>
           <a href="#section-5.4.8">5.4.8</a>. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................<a href="#page-26">26</a>
      <a href="#section-5.6">5.6</a>. Key Changeover ............................................<a href="#page-26">26</a>
      <a href="#section-5.7">5.7</a>. CA or RA Termination ......................................<a href="#page-26">26</a>
   <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Technical Security Controls ....................................<a href="#page-26">26</a>
      <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................<a href="#page-27">27</a>
           <a href="#section-6.1.1">6.1.1</a>. Key Pair Generation ................................<a href="#page-27">27</a>
           <a href="#section-6.1.2">6.1.2</a>. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................<a href="#page-27">27</a>



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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6484">RFC 6484</a>             Certificate Policy for the RPKI       February 2012</span>


           <a href="#section-6.1.3">6.1.3</a>. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........<a href="#page-27">27</a>
           <a href="#section-6.1.4">6.1.4</a>. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........<a href="#page-27">27</a>
           <a href="#section-6.1.5">6.1.5</a>. Key Sizes ..........................................<a href="#page-27">27</a>
           6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and
                  Quality Checking ...................................<a href="#page-28">28</a>
           6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
                  Usage Field) .......................................<a href="#page-28">28</a>
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
           Engineering Controls ......................................<a href="#page-28">28</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.1">6.2.1</a>. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........<a href="#page-28">28</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.2">6.2.2</a>. Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control ......<a href="#page-28">28</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.3">6.2.3</a>. Private Key Escrow .................................<a href="#page-28">28</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.4">6.2.4</a>. Private Key Backup .................................<a href="#page-28">28</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.5">6.2.5</a>. Private Key Archival ...............................<a href="#page-28">28</a>
           6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
                  Cryptographic Module ...............................<a href="#page-29">29</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.7">6.2.7</a>. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........<a href="#page-29">29</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.8">6.2.8</a>. Method of Activating a Private Key .................<a href="#page-29">29</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.9">6.2.9</a>. Method of Deactivating a Private Key ...............<a href="#page-29">29</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.10">6.2.10</a>. Method of Destroying a Private Key ................<a href="#page-29">29</a>
           <a href="#section-6.2.11">6.2.11</a>. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................<a href="#page-29">29</a>
      <a href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................<a href="#page-29">29</a>
           <a href="#section-6.3.1">6.3.1</a>. Public Key Archival ................................<a href="#page-29">29</a>
           6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
                  Pair Usage Periods .................................<a href="#page-29">29</a>
      <a href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Activation Data ...........................................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
      <a href="#section-6.5">6.5</a>. Computer Security Controls ................................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
      <a href="#section-6.6">6.6</a>. Life-Cycle Technical Controls .............................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
           <a href="#section-6.6.1">6.6.1</a>. System Development Controls ........................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
           <a href="#section-6.6.2">6.6.2</a>. Security Management Controls .......................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
           <a href="#section-6.6.3">6.6.3</a>. Life-Cycle Security Controls .......................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
      <a href="#section-6.7">6.7</a>. Network Security Controls .................................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
      <a href="#section-6.8">6.8</a>. Timestamping ..............................................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
   <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................<a href="#page-31">31</a>
   <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................<a href="#page-31">31</a>
   <a href="#section-9">9</a>. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................<a href="#page-31">31</a>
      <a href="#section-9.12">9.12</a>.  Amendments ..............................................<a href="#page-31">31</a>
           <a href="#section-9.12.1">9.12.1</a>. Procedure for Amendment ...........................<a href="#page-31">31</a>
           <a href="#section-9.12.2">9.12.2</a>. Notification Mechanism and Period .................<a href="#page-31">31</a>
           <a href="#section-9.12.3">9.12.3</a>. Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed .....<a href="#page-32">32</a>
   <a href="#section-10">10</a>. Security Considerations .......................................<a href="#page-32">32</a>
   <a href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgments ...............................................<a href="#page-33">33</a>
   <a href="#section-12">12</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-33">33</a>
      <a href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-33">33</a>
      <a href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-33">33</a>






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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6484">RFC 6484</a>             Certificate Policy for the RPKI       February 2012</span>


<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction</span>

   This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) used to attest to Internet Number Resource (INR)
   holdings (IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers).  An
   organization that distributes INRs to another organization MAY, in
   parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this
   distribution.  These certificates will enable verification that the
   resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the
   holder of the associated private key and that this organization is
   the current holder of these resources.

   The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
   this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
   INR holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued
   to that entity.  Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is
   intended to enable an entity to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that
   it is the current holder of an INR based on the current records of
   the entity responsible for the resources in question.  Verification
   of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
   to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key
   contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that
   certificate in the context of this PKI.

   This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of
   claims related to current INR holdings.  This includes any
   certificates issued in support of operation of this infrastructure,
   e.g., for integrity or access control of the repository system
   described in <a href="#section-2.4">Section 2.4</a>.  Such transitive uses of certificates also
   are permitted under this policy.  Use of the certificates and
   Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) managed under this PKI for any
   other purpose is a violation of this CP, and relying parties (RPs)
   SHOULD reject certificates presented for such uses.

   Note: This document is based on the template specified in <a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a>
   [<a href="./rfc3647" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework&quot;">RFC3647</a>], a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
   stream.  In the interest of keeping the document as short as
   reasonable, a number of sections contained in the template have been
   omitted from this policy because they do not apply to this PKI.
   However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in
   <a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> to facilitate comparison with the outline in <a href="./rfc3647#section-6">Section&nbsp;6 of
   RFC 3647</a>.  Each of these omitted sections should be read as "No
   stipulation" in Certificate Policy (CP) / Certification Practice
   Statement (CPS) parlance.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].



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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>.  Overview</span>

   This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
   holders of INRs, in accordance with the records of the organizations
   that act as Certification Authorities (CAs) in this PKI.  The ability
   to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unambiguous
   distribution of these resources [<a href="./rfc6480" title="&quot;An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing&quot;">RFC6480</a>].

   The structure of the RPKI is congruent with the number resource
   allocation framework of the Internet.  The IANA allocates number
   resources to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), to others, and for
   special purposes [<a href="./rfc5736" title="&quot;IANA IPv4 Special Purpose Address Registry&quot;">RFC5736</a>].  The RIRs, in turn, manage the allocation
   of number resources to end users, Internet Service Providers, and
   others.

   This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [<a href="./rfc6487" title="&quot;A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6487</a>] for
   more details):

   o  CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
      INR holders

   o  End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to validate digital
      signatures on RPKI signed objects

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>.  Document Name and Identification</span>

   The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the
   Resource PKI (RPKI)".

   This policy has been assigned the following OID:

   id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)

                         identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)

                         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 }

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>.  PKI Participants</span>

   Note that in a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
   organization that is a subject of a certificate issued by a CA.  The
   term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
   qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
   the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
   service from an ISP.  In such cases, the term "network subscriber"
   will be used.  Also note that, for brevity, this document always
   refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
   some of them are individuals.



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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.1" href="#section-1.3.1">1.3.1</a>.  Certification Authorities</span>

   The organizations that distribute IP addresses and AS numbers (IANA,
   RIRs, NIRs, ISPs) act as CAs in this PKI.

   Organizations that do not distribute INRs but hold such resources
   also act as CAs when they create EE certificates.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.2" href="#section-1.3.2">1.3.2</a>.  Registration Authorities</span>

   This PKI does not require establishment or use of a registration
   authority (RA) function separate from the one provided inherently in
   conjunction with the CA function.  The RA function MUST be provided
   by the same entity operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in
   <a href="#section-1.3.1">Section 1.3.1</a>.  An entity acting as a CA in this PKI already has a
   formal relationship with each organization to which it distributes
   INRs.  These entities (the CAs) already perform the RA function
   implicitly since they already assume responsibility for distributing
   INRs.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.3" href="#section-1.3.3">1.3.3</a>.  Subscribers</span>

   These are the organizations receiving distributions of INRs: RIRs,
   NIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.

   Note that any of these organizations may have received distributions
   from more than one source over time.  This is true even for RIRs,
   which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space.  This
   PKI accommodates such relationships.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.4" href="#section-1.3.4">1.3.4</a>.  Relying Parties</span>

   Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI
   signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.  Relying
   parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI.  (See <a href="#section-1.6">Section</a>
   <a href="#section-1.6">1.6</a> for the definition of an RPKI signed object.)

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.5" href="#section-1.3.5">1.3.5</a>.  Other Participants</span>

   Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is
   responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system
   with the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects that it issues.
   The organization MAY operate its own publication point, or it MAY
   outsource this function (see Sections <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> and <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>).







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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4" href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>.  Certificate Usage</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4.1" href="#section-1.4.1">1.4.1</a>.  Appropriate Certificate Uses</span>

   The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
   support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.

   Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
   cited above, also are permitted under this policy.  For example,
   certificates may be issued in support of integrity and access control
   for the repository system described in <a href="#section-2.4">Section 2.4</a>.  Such transitive
   uses are permitted under this policy.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4.2" href="#section-1.4.2">1.4.2</a>.  Prohibited Certificate Uses</span>

   Any uses other than those described in <a href="#section-1.4.1">Section 1.4.1</a> are prohibited
   under this policy.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.5" href="#section-1.5">1.5</a>.  Policy Administration</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.5.1" href="#section-1.5.1">1.5.1</a>.  Organization Administering the Document</span>

   This CP is administered by

   Internet Engineering Steering Group
   c/o Internet Society
   1775 Wiehle Avenue, Suite 201
   Reston, VA 20190-5108
   U.S.A.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.5.2" href="#section-1.5.2">1.5.2</a>.  Contact Person</span>

   The contact information is

   EMail: iesg@ietf.org
   Phone: +1-703-439-2120 (Internet Society)

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.5.4" href="#section-1.5.4">1.5.4</a>.  CP Approval Procedures</span>

   If a replacement BCP is needed that updates or obsoletes the current
   BCP, then the replacement BCP MUST be approved by the IESG following
   the procedures of the IETF Standards Process as defined in <a href="./rfc2026">RFC 2026</a>
   [<a href="./rfc2026" title="&quot;The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3&quot;">RFC2026</a>].








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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.6" href="#section-1.6">1.6</a>.  Definitions and Acronyms</span>

   CPS -  Certification Practice Statement.  A CPS is a document that
          specifies the practices that a Certification Authority (CA)
          employs in issuing certificates in this PKI.

   Distribution of INRs - A process of distribution of the INRs along
          the respective number hierarchy.  IANA distributes blocks of
          IP addresses and AS numbers to the five Regional Internet
          Registries (RIRs).  RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and
          AS numbers to organizations within their service regions, who
          in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers.

   IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.  IANA is responsible for
          global coordination of the IP addressing system and AS numbers
          used for routing Internet traffic.  IANA distributes INRs to
          Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).

   INRs - Internet Number Resources.  INRs are number values for three
          protocol parameter sets, namely:

          o  IP version 4 addresses,

          o  IP version 6 addresses, and

          o  Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing,
             currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 AS numbers.

   ISP -  Internet Service Provider.  This is an organization managing
          and providing Internet services to other organizations.

   LIR -  Local Internet Registry.  In some regions, this term is used
          to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions.

   NIR -  National Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
          manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
          geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry.  NIRs form
          an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage
          INRs.

   RIR -  Regional Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
          manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.









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   RPKI signed object - An RPKI signed object is a digitally signed data
          object (other than a certificate or CRL) that is declared to
          be such by a Standards Track RFC, and that can be validated
          using certificates issued under this PKI.  The content and
          format of these data constructs depend on the context in which
          validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place.
          Examples of these objects are repository manifests [<a href="./rfc6486" title="&quot;Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)&quot;">RFC6486</a>]
          and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [<a href="./rfc6482" title="&quot;A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)&quot;">RFC6482</a>].

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>.  Publication and Repository Responsibilities</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>.  Repositories</span>

   Certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects (intended for public
   consumption) MUST be made available for downloading by all relying
   parties, to enable them to validate this data.  This motivates use of
   a robust, distributed repository system.  Each CA MUST maintain a
   publicly accessible online repository and publish all RPKI-signed
   objects (intended for public consumption) via this repository in a
   manner that conforms with "A Profile for Resource Certificate
   Repository Structure" [<a href="./rfc6481" title="&quot;A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure&quot;">RFC6481</a>].  (This function MAY be outsourced,
   as noted in <a href="#section-2.2">Section 2.2</a> below.)  The collection of repositories forms
   the RPKI distributed repository system.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>.  Publication of Certification Information</span>

   Each CA MUST publish the certificates (intended for public
   consumption) that it issues via the repository system.

   Each CA MUST publish the CRLs (intended for public consumption) that
   it issues via the repository system.

   Each CA MUST publish its RPKI signed objects (intended for public
   consumption) via the repository system.

   Each CA that issues certificates to entities outside of its
   administrative domain SHOULD create and publish a CPS that meets the
   requirements set forth in this CP.  Publication means that the
   entities to which the CA issues certificates MUST be able to acquire
   a copy of the CPS, and MUST be able to ascertain when the CPS
   changes.  (An organization that does not allocate or assign INRs does
   not need to create or publish a CPS.)

   An organization MAY choose to outsource publication of RPKI data --
   certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects.

   The CP will be published as an IETF-stream RFC and will be available
   from the RFC repository.



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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>.  Time or Frequency of Publication</span>

   The CPS for each CA MUST specify the following information:

   The period of time within which a certificate will be published after
   the CA issues the certificate.

   The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry
   for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate.

   Expired and revoked certificates SHOULD be removed from the RPKI
   repository system, upon expiration or revocation, respectively.
   Also, please note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
   nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>.  Access Controls on Repositories</span>

   Each CA or repository operator MUST implement access controls to
   prevent unauthorized persons from adding, modifying, or deleting
   repository entries.  A CA or repository operator MUST NOT
   intentionally use technical means of limiting read access to its CPS,
   certificates, CRLs, or RPKI signed objects.  This data is intended to
   be accessible to the public.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>.  Identification and Authentication</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>.  Naming</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.1" href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>.  Types of Names</span>

   The distinguished name for every CA and end-entity consists of a
   single CommonName (CN) attribute with a value generated by the issuer
   of the certificate.  Optionally, the serialNumber attribute MAY be
   included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative
   distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of
   certificates associated with the same entity.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.2" href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>.  Need for Names to Be Meaningful</span>

   The subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful",
   i.e., the name is not intended to convey the identity of the subject
   to relying parties.  The rationale here is that certificates issued
   under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications
   that make use of attestations of INR holdings.  They are not used to
   identify subjects.






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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.3" href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>.  Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers</span>

   Although subject (and issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
   appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI; thus, no
   explicit support for this feature is provided.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.4" href="#section-3.1.4">3.1.4</a>.  Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms</span>

   None.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.5" href="#section-3.1.5">3.1.5</a>.  Uniqueness of Names</span>

   There is no guarantee that subject names are globally unique in this
   PKI.  Each CA certifies subject names that MUST be unique among the
   certificates it issues.  Although it is desirable that these subject
   names be unique throughout the PKI, name uniqueness within the RPKI
   cannot be guaranteed.

   However, subject names in certificates SHOULD be constructed in a way
   that minimizes the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
   assigned the same name.  The RPKI Certificate Profile [<a href="./rfc6487" title="&quot;A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6487</a>]
   provides an example of how to generate (meaningless) subject names in
   a way that minimizes the likelihood of collisions.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>.  Initial Identity Validation</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>.  Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key</span>

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST require each
   subject to demonstrate proof of possession (PoP) of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
   the certificate.  The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
   each CA and MUST be declared in the CPS of that CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>.  Authentication of Organization Identity</span>

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
   reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
   has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate.  The specific
   procedures employed for this purpose MUST be described by the CPS for
   each CA.  Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
   commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP in
   the management of the INRs.  This authentication is solely for use by
   each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it distributes
   INRs, and thus should not be relied upon outside of this
   CA-subscriber relationship.




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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.3" href="#section-3.2.3">3.2.3</a>.  Authentication of Individual Identity</span>

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative of
   each organization that is an INR holder.  The specific means by which
   each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an
   organization MUST be described by the CPS for each CA.  Relying
   parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with
   those it already employs as a registry or ISP in authenticating
   individuals as representatives for INR holders.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4" href="#section-3.2.4">3.2.4</a>.  Non-Verified Subscriber Information</span>

   A CA MUST NOT include any non-verified subscriber data in
   certificates issued under this certificate policy except for Subject
   Information Access (SIA) extensions.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.5" href="#section-3.2.5">3.2.5</a>.  Validation of Authority</span>

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
   organization to which a certificate is issued is authorized to
   represent that organization in this context.  The procedures MUST be
   described by the CPS for the CA.  Relying parties can expect each CA
   to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
   registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for
   INR holders.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.6" href="#section-3.2.6">3.2.6</a>.  Criteria for Interoperation</span>

   This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
   other PKI.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>.  Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.1" href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a>.  Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key</span>

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
   legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed and the
   associated INRs, and MUST require PoP of the private key
   corresponding to the new public key.  The procedures employed for
   these purposes MUST be described in the CPS for the CA.  With respect
   to authentication of the holder of the INRs, relying parties can
   expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
   already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs.





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   Note: An issuer MAY choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
   with contractual agreements with the recipient.  If so, this MUST be
   described by the CPS for the CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.2" href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>.  Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after Revocation</span>

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
   revocation is the same entity to which the revoked certificate was
   issued and is the legitimate holder of the associated INR.  The CA
   MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public
   key.  The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be
   described by the CPS for the CA.  With respect to authentication of
   the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ
   procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
   or ISP, in the management of INRs.  Note that there MAY be different
   procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses
   the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has
   access to that key.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>.  Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request</span>

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to ensure that:

   o  an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder of
      the certificate to be revoked.

   o  each certificate it revokes accurately reflects its records with
      regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed the
      INRs identified in the certificate.

   o  an individual claiming to represent an organization for which a
      certificate is to be revoked is authorized to represent that
      organization in this context.

   The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described
   by the CPS for the CA.  Relying parties can expect each CA to employ
   procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
   or ISP, in the management of INRs.











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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>.  Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>.  Certificate Application</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>.  Who Can Submit a Certificate Application</span>

   Any entity that distributes INRs SHOULD acquire a certificate.  This
   includes Internet Registries and ISPs.  Additionally, entities that
   hold INRs from an Internet Registry, or that are multi-homed, MAY
   acquire a certificate under this PKI.  The (CA) certificates issued
   to these entities MUST include one or both of the extensions defined
   by <a href="./rfc3779">RFC 3779</a> [<a href="./rfc3779" title="&quot;X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers&quot;">RFC3779</a>], "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS
   Identifiers", as appropriate.

   The application procedure MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.2" href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>.  Enrollment Process and Responsibilities</span>

   The enrollment process and procedures MUST be described by the CPS
   for each CA.  An entity that desires one or more certificates should
   contact the organization from which it receives its INRs.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>.  Certificate Application Processing</span>

   CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate application
   processing.  <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> of the Resource Certificate Profile [<a href="./rfc6487" title="&quot;A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6487</a>]
   defines the standard certificate request formats that MUST be
   supported.

   Each CA MUST define via its CPS, the certificate request/response
   standards that it employs.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>.  Performing Identification and Authentication Functions</span>

   Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
   authenticate organizations that receive INRs form the basis for
   issuance of certificates to these subscribers.  It is important to
   note that the Resource PKI SHOULD NOT be used to authenticate the
   identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the
   INRs they hold.  Because identity is not being vouched for by this
   PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal
   organization names, etc.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.2" href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>.  Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications</span>

   Certificate applications MUST be approved based on the normal
   business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
   records of INR holders.  Each CA MUST follow the procedures specified



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   in <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section 3.2.1</a> to verify that the requester holds the private key
   corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate
   the CA issues to the requester.  The details of how certificate
   applications are approved MUST be described in the CPS for the CA in
   question.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3" href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>.  Time to Process Certificate Applications</span>

   No stipulation.  As part of its CPS, each CA MUST declare its
   expected time frame to process (approve, issue, and publish) a
   certificate application.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>.  Certificate Issuance</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.1" href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>.  CA Actions during Certificate Issuance</span>

   If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it MUST issue the
   corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed
   repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's
   repository publication point.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.2" href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>.  Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate</span>

   The CA MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
   The means by which a subscriber is notified MUST be defined by each
   CA in its CPS.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>.  Certificate Acceptance</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1" href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a>.  Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance</span>

   Within the timeframe specified in its CPS, the CA MUST place the
   certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber.  This MAY be
   done without subscriber review and acceptance.  Each CA MUST state in
   its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing of the certificate
   and notification to the subscriber.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.2" href="#section-4.4.2">4.4.2</a>.  Publication of the Certificate by the CA</span>

   Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
   system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository
   publication point as per the conduct described in <a href="#section-4.4.1">Section 4.4.1</a>.  The
   procedures for publication MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.3" href="#section-4.4.3">4.4.3</a>.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities</span>

   The CPS of each CA MUST indicate whether any other entities will be
   notified when a certificate is issued.



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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>.  Key Pair and Certificate Usage</span>

   A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1" href="#section-4.5.1">4.5.1</a>.  Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage</span>

   Each holder of an INR is eligible to request an X.509 [<a href="#ref-X.509" title="&quot;Information technology -- Open systems interconnection -- The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks&quot;">X.509</a>] CA
   certificate containing appropriate <a href="./rfc3779">RFC 3779</a> extensions.  Holders of
   CA resource certificates also MAY issue EE certificates to themselves
   to enable verification of RPKI signed objects that they generate.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.2" href="#section-4.5.2">4.5.2</a>.  Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage</span>

   Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances.
   If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, the
   relying party must obtain such assurances in order for such reliance
   to be deemed reasonable.

   Before any act of reliance, relying parties MUST independently (1)
   verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose
   that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP (see
   <a href="#section-1.4">Section 1.4</a>), and (2) assess the status of the certificate and all
   the certificates in the chain (terminating at a trust anchor (TA)
   accepted by the RP) that issued the certificates relevant to the
   certificate in question.  If any of the certificates in the
   certificate chain have been revoked or have expired, the relying
   party is solely responsible for determining whether reliance on a
   digital signature to be verified by the certificate in question is
   acceptable.  Any such reliance is made solely at the risk of the
   relying party.

   If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is
   appropriate, the relying party must utilize appropriate software
   and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a
   condition of relying on the certificate.  Moreover, the relying party
   MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI
   Certificate Profile [<a href="./rfc6487" title="&quot;A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6487</a>], which specifies the extended
   validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6" href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>.  Certificate Renewal</span>

   This section describes the procedures for certificate renewal.
   Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to replace
   an old one prior to its expiration.  Only the validity dates and the
   serial number (the field in the certificate, not the DN attribute)
   are changed.  The public key and all other information remain the
   same.




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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.1" href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a>.  Circumstance for Certificate Renewal</span>

   A certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on its expiration
   date or a renewal request from the subscriber.  Prior to the
   expiration of an existing subscriber's certificate, it is the
   responsibility of the subscriber to renew the certificate to maintain
   continuity of certificate usage.  If the issuing CA initiates the
   renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then that
   CA MUST notify the holder in advance of the renewal process.  The
   validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate SHOULD overlap
   that of the previous certificate to ensure continuity of certificate
   usage.  It is RECOMMENDED that the renewed certificate be issued and
   published at least 1 week prior to the expiration of the certificate
   it replaces.

   Certificate renewal SHOULD incorporate the same public key as the
   previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
   compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
   <a href="#section-4.7">Section 4.7</a> apply.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.2" href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a>.  Who May Request Renewal</span>

   Only the certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the
   renewal process.  The certificate holder MAY request an early
   renewal, for example, if it expects to be unavailable to support the
   renewal process during the normal expiration period.  An issuing CA
   MAY initiate the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
   date.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.3" href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a>.  Processing Certificate Renewal Requests</span>

   Renewal procedures MUST ensure that the person or organization
   seeking to renew a certificate is in fact the subscriber (or
   authorized by the subscriber) of the certificate and the legitimate
   holder of the INR associated with the renewed certificate.  Renewal
   processing MUST verify that the certificate in question has not been
   revoked.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.4" href="#section-4.6.4">4.6.4</a>.  Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.3.2">Section 4.3.2</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.5" href="#section-4.6.5">4.6.5</a>.  Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.4.1">Section 4.4.1</a>.






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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.6" href="#section-4.6.6">4.6.6</a>.  Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.7" href="#section-4.6.7">4.6.7</a>.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.4.3">Section 4.4.3</a>.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7" href="#section-4.7">4.7</a>.  Certificate Re-Key</span>

   This section describes the procedures for certificate re-key.
   Certificate re-key is the issuance of a new certificate to replace an
   old one because the key needs to be replaced.  Unlike with
   certificate renewal, the public key is changed.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.1" href="#section-4.7.1">4.7.1</a>.  Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key</span>

   Re-key of a certificate SHOULD be performed only when required, based
   on:

   1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
      private key, or

   2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
      pair

   A CA re-key operation has dramatic consequences, requiring the
   reissuance of all certificates issued by the re-keyed entity.  So it
   should be performed only when necessary and in a way that preserves
   the ability of relying parties to validate certificates whose
   validation path includes the re-keyed entity.  CA key rollover MUST
   follow the procedures defined in "CA Key Rollover in the RPKI"
   [<a href="./rfc6489" title="&quot;CA Key Rollover in the RPKI&quot;">RFC6489</a>].

   Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the <a href="./rfc3779">RFC 3779</a>
   extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same
   public key rather than a new key.  This applies when one is adding
   INRs (revocation not required) and when one is removing INRs
   (revocation required (see <a href="#section-4.8.1">Section 4.8.1</a>)).

   If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
   certificate MUST be revoked.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.2" href="#section-4.7.2">4.7.2</a>.  Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key</span>

   The holder of the certificate may request a re-key.  In addition, the
   CA that issued the certificate MAY choose to initiate a re-key based
   on a verified compromise report.



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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.3" href="#section-4.7.3">4.7.3</a>.  Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests</span>

   The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
   generation as defined in <a href="#section-4.3">Section 4.3</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.4" href="#section-4.7.4">4.7.4</a>.  Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.3.2">Section 4.3.2</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.5" href="#section-4.7.5">4.7.5</a>.  Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.4.1">Section 4.4.1</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.6" href="#section-4.7.6">4.7.6</a>.  Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.7" href="#section-4.7.7">4.7.7</a>.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.4.3">Section 4.4.3</a>.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8" href="#section-4.8">4.8</a>.  Certificate Modification</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8.1" href="#section-4.8.1">4.8.1</a>.  Circumstance for Certificate Modification</span>

   Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to selected
   attribute values in a certificate.  In the context of the RPKI, the
   only changes that are accommodated by certificate modification are
   changes to the INR holdings described by the <a href="./rfc3779">RFC 3779</a> extension(s)
   and changes to the SIA extension.

   When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
   issued.  If no INR holdings are removed from the certificate, the new
   certificate MUST contain the same public key and the same expiration
   date as the original certificate, but with the SIA extension and/or
   the INR set expanded.  In this case, revocation of the previous
   certificate is not required.

   When previously distributed INRs are removed from a certificate, then
   the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate MUST be
   issued, reflecting the changed INR holdings.  (The SIA extension in
   the new certificate will be unchanged, unless the affected INR holder
   supplies a new SIA value.)

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8.2" href="#section-4.8.2">4.8.2</a>.  Who May Request Certificate Modification</span>

   Either the certificate holder or the issuer may initiate the
   certificate modification process.



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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8.3" href="#section-4.8.3">4.8.3</a>.  Processing Certificate Modification Requests</span>

   The CA MUST determine that the requested modification is appropriate
   and that the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
   followed (see <a href="#section-4.3">Section 4.3</a>).

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8.4" href="#section-4.8.4">4.8.4</a>.  Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.3.2">Section 4.3.2</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8.5" href="#section-4.8.5">4.8.5</a>.  Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.4.1">Section 4.4.1</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8.6" href="#section-4.8.6">4.8.6</a>.  Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8.7" href="#section-4.8.7">4.8.7</a>.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities</span>

   No additional stipulations beyond those of <a href="#section-4.4.3">Section 4.4.3</a>.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9" href="#section-4.9">4.9</a>.  Certificate Revocation and Suspension</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.1" href="#section-4.9.1">4.9.1</a>.  Circumstances for Revocation</span>

   A certificate MUST be revoked (and published on a CRL) if there is
   reason to believe that there has been a compromise of a subscriber's
   private key.  A certificate also MAY be revoked to invalidate a data
   object signed by the private key associated with that certificate.
   Other circumstances that justify revocation of a certificate MAY be
   specified in a CA's CPS.

   Note:  If new INRs are being added to an organization's existing
   distribution, the old certificate need not be revoked.  Instead, a
   new certificate MAY be issued with both the old and the new resources
   and the old key.  If INRs are being removed or if there has been a
   key compromise, then the old certificate MUST be revoked (and a
   re-key MUST be performed in the event of key compromise).

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.2" href="#section-4.9.2">4.9.2</a>.  Who Can Request Revocation</span>

   This MUST be defined in the CPS of the organization that issued the
   certificate.







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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.3" href="#section-4.9.3">4.9.3</a>.  Procedure for Revocation Request</span>

   A subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a
   revocation.  This request MUST identify the certificate to be revoked
   and MUST be authenticated.  The procedures for making the request
   MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.  The RPKI provisioning
   document [<a href="./rfc6492" title="&quot;A Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6492</a>] describes a protocol that MAY be used to make
   revocation requests.

   A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when revoking a
   certificate.  The notification requirement is satisfied by CRL
   publication.  The CPS for a CA MUST indicate the means by which the
   CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.4" href="#section-4.9.4">4.9.4</a>.  Revocation Request Grace Period</span>

   A subscriber SHOULD request revocation as soon as possible after the
   need for revocation has been identified.  There is no specified grace
   period for the subscriber in this process.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.5" href="#section-4.9.5">4.9.5</a>.  Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request</span>

   No stipulation.  Each CA SHOULD specify its expected revocation
   processing time in its CPS.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.6" href="#section-4.9.6">4.9.6</a>.  Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties</span>

   A relying party MUST acquire and check the most recent, scheduled CRL
   from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party
   validates a certificate.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.7" href="#section-4.9.7">4.9.7</a>.  CRL Issuance Frequency</span>

   The CRL issuance frequency MUST be determined by each CA and stated
   in its CPS.  Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value, and a new
   CRL MUST be published at or before that time.  A CA MUST set the
   nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL to signal when the next
   scheduled CRL will be issued.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.8" href="#section-4.9.8">4.9.8</a>.  Maximum Latency for CRLs</span>

   The CPS for each CA MUST specify the maximum latency associated with
   posting its CRL to the repository system.








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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.10" href="#section-4.10">4.10</a>.  Certificate Status Services</span>

   This PKI does not make provision for use of the Online Certificate
   Status Protocol (OCSP) [<a href="./rfc2560" title="&quot;X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP&quot;">RFC2560</a>] or Server-Based Certificate
   Validation Protocol (SCVP) [<a href="./rfc5055" title="&quot;Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)&quot;">RFC5055</a>].  This is because it is
   anticipated that the primary RPs (ISPs) will acquire and validate
   certificates for all participating resource holders.  These protocols
   are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status
   checking.  RPs MUST check for new CRLs at least daily.  It is
   RECOMMENDED that RPs perform this check several times per day, but no
   more than 8-12 times per day (to avoid excessive repository
   accesses).

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>.  Facility, Management, and Operational Controls</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>.  Physical Controls</span>

   Each CA MUST maintain physical security controls for its operation
   that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
   management of INR distribution.  The physical controls employed for
   CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS.  Possible topics to be
   covered in the CPS are shown below.  (These sections are taken from
   [<a href="./rfc3647" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework&quot;">RFC3647</a>].)

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.1" href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a>.  Site Location and Construction</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.2" href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a>.  Physical Access</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.3" href="#section-5.1.3">5.1.3</a>.  Power and Air Conditioning</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.4" href="#section-5.1.4">5.1.4</a>.  Water Exposures</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.5" href="#section-5.1.5">5.1.5</a>.  Fire Prevention and Protection</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.6" href="#section-5.1.6">5.1.6</a>.  Media Storage</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.7" href="#section-5.1.7">5.1.7</a>.  Waste Disposal</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.8" href="#section-5.1.8">5.1.8</a>.  Off-Site Backup</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>.  Procedural Controls</span>

   Each CA MUST maintain procedural security controls that are
   commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
   management of INR distribution.  The procedural security controls
   employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS.  Possible
   topics to be covered in the CPS are shown below.  (These sections are
   taken from [<a href="./rfc3647" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework&quot;">RFC3647</a>].)



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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.1" href="#section-5.2.1">5.2.1</a>.  Trusted Roles</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.2" href="#section-5.2.2">5.2.2</a>.  Number of Persons Required per Task</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.3" href="#section-5.2.3">5.2.3</a>.  Identification and Authentication for Each Role</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.4" href="#section-5.2.4">5.2.4</a>.  Roles Requiring Separation of Duties</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>.  Personnel Controls</span>

   Each CA MUST maintain personnel security controls that are
   commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
   management of INR distribution.  The details for each CA MUST be
   specified in its CPS.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>.  Audit Logging Procedures</span>

   Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in
   Sections <a href="#section-5.4.1">5.4.1</a> to <a href="#section-5.4.8">5.4.8</a> MUST be addressed in its CPS.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4.1" href="#section-5.4.1">5.4.1</a>.  Types of Events Recorded</span>

   Audit records MUST be generated for the basic operations of the
   certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records MUST
   include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
   content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

   o  Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

   o  Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate
      requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
      notifications)

   o  Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

   o  Posting of any material to a repository

   o  Any attempts to change or delete audit data

   o  Key generation

   o  Software and/or configuration updates to the CA

   o  Clock adjustments

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4.2" href="#section-5.4.2">5.4.2</a>.  Frequency of Processing Log</span>

   Each CA MUST establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.



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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4.3" href="#section-5.4.3">5.4.3</a>.  Retention Period for Audit Log</span>

   Each CA MUST establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4.4" href="#section-5.4.4">5.4.4</a>.  Protection of Audit Log</span>

   The audit log SHOULD be protected based on current industry
   standards.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4.5" href="#section-5.4.5">5.4.5</a>.  Audit Log Backup Procedures</span>

   The audit log SHOULD be backed up based on current industry
   standards.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4.8" href="#section-5.4.8">5.4.8</a>.  Vulnerability Assessments</span>

   The RPKI subsystems of a registry or ISP SHOULD participate in any
   vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
   their normal business practice.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.6" href="#section-5.6">5.6</a>.  Key Changeover</span>

   When a CA wishes to change keys, it MUST acquire a new certificate
   containing its new public key.  See [<a href="./rfc6489" title="&quot;CA Key Rollover in the RPKI&quot;">RFC6489</a>] for a description of
   how key changeover is effected in the RPKI.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.7" href="#section-5.7">5.7</a>.  CA or RA Termination</span>

   In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA for the specified INRs that
   were distributed to that entity.  Procedures associated with the
   termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS for that CA.  These
   procedures MUST include a provision to notify each entity that issued
   a certificate to the organization that is operating the CA that is
   terminating.

   Since the RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating
   as the CA (see <a href="#section-1.3.2">Section 1.3.2</a>), there are no separate stipulations for
   RAs.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>.  Technical Security Controls</span>

   The organizations that distribute INRs to network subscribers are
   authoritative for these distributions.  This PKI is designed to
   enable ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the
   holders of the INRs that have been distributed to them.  Accordingly,
   the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need
   only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for
   administering the distribution of INR data by the extant



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   organizations.  Details of each CA's security controls MUST be
   described in the CPS issued by the CA.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>.  Key Pair Generation and Installation</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.1" href="#section-6.1.1">6.1.1</a>.  Key Pair Generation</span>

   In most instances, public key pairs will be generated by the subject,
   i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs.  However,
   some CAs MAY offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their subjects
   at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate subscribers who
   do not have the ability to perform key generation in a secure
   fashion.  (The CA has to check the quality of the keys only if it
   generates them; see <a href="#section-6.1.6">Section 6.1.6</a>.)  Since the keys used in this PKI
   are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs
   does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI.  Each CA MUST
   describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2" href="#section-6.1.2">6.1.2</a>.  Private Key Delivery to Subscriber</span>

   If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
   CPS MUST describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
   subscribers in a secure fashion.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.3" href="#section-6.1.3">6.1.3</a>.  Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer</span>

   When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified,
   it MUST be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public key
   has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses
   the private key corresponding to the transferred public key.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.4" href="#section-6.1.4">6.1.4</a>.  CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties</span>

   CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
   contained in certificates issued by other CAs.  These certificates
   MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system.  Relying
   parties download these certificates from the repositories.  Public
   key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors are
   distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis
   of locally defined criteria.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.5" href="#section-6.1.5">6.1.5</a>.  Key Sizes</span>

   The algorithms and key sizes used in the RPKI are specified in "A
   Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure" [<a href="./rfc6485" title="&quot;The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)&quot;">RFC6485</a>].





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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.6" href="#section-6.1.6">6.1.6</a>.  Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking</span>

   The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in
   [<a href="./rfc6485" title="&quot;The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)&quot;">RFC6485</a>].  Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on
   the quality of its key pair.  A CA is not responsible for performing
   such checks for subscribers except in the case where the CA generates
   the key pair on behalf of the subscriber.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.7" href="#section-6.1.7">6.1.7</a>.  Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)</span>

   The Key usage extension bit values used in the RPKI are specified in
   RPKI Certificate Profile [<a href="./rfc6487" title="&quot;A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6487</a>].

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>.  Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering</span>
<span class="h3">      Controls</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.1" href="#section-6.2.1">6.2.1</a>.  Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls</span>

   The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
   MUST be described in the CPS issued by that CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.2" href="#section-6.2.2">6.2.2</a>.  Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control</span>

   CAs MAY employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their
   private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI.
   The CPS for each CA MUST describe which, if any, multi-person
   controls it employs.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.3" href="#section-6.2.3">6.2.3</a>.  Private Key Escrow</span>

   No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.4" href="#section-6.2.4">6.2.4</a>.  Private Key Backup</span>

   Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
   loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA MUST employ a
   secure means to back up its private keys.  The details of the
   procedures for backing up a CA's private key MUST be described in the
   CPS issued by the CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.5" href="#section-6.2.5">6.2.5</a>.  Private Key Archival</span>

   The details of the process and procedures used to archive the CA's
   private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.







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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.6" href="#section-6.2.6">6.2.6</a>.  Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module</span>

   The details of the process and procedures used to transfer the CA's
   private key into or from a cryptographic module MUST be described in
   the CPS issued by the CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.7" href="#section-6.2.7">6.2.7</a>.  Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module</span>

   The details of the process and procedures used to store the CA's
   private key on a cryptographic module and protect it from
   unauthorized use MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.8" href="#section-6.2.8">6.2.8</a>.  Method of Activating a Private Key</span>

   The details of the process and procedures used to activate the CA's
   private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.9" href="#section-6.2.9">6.2.9</a>.  Method of Deactivating a Private Key</span>

   The details of the process and procedures used to deactivate the CA's
   private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.10" href="#section-6.2.10">6.2.10</a>.  Method of Destroying a Private Key</span>

   The details of the process and procedures used to destroy the CA's
   private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2.11" href="#section-6.2.11">6.2.11</a>.  Cryptographic Module Rating</span>

   The security rating of the cryptographic module MUST be described in
   the CPS issued by the CA.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>.  Other Aspects of Key Pair Management</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3.1" href="#section-6.3.1">6.3.1</a>.  Public Key Archival</span>

   Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
   to archive public keys.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3.2" href="#section-6.3.2">6.3.2</a>.  Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods</span>

   The INRs held by a CA may periodically change when it receives new
   distributions.  To minimize disruption, the CA key pair MUST NOT
   change when INRs are added to its certificate.

   If ISP and network-subscriber certificates are tied to the duration
   of service agreements, these certificates should have validity
   periods commensurate with the duration of these agreements.  In any



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   case, the validity period for certificates MUST be chosen by the
   issuing CA and described in its CPS.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>.  Activation Data</span>

   Each CA MUST document in its CPS how it will generate, install, and
   protect its activation data.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.5" href="#section-6.5">6.5</a>.  Computer Security Controls</span>

   Each CA MUST document the technical security requirements it employs
   for CA computer operation in its CPS.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.6" href="#section-6.6">6.6</a>.  Life-Cycle Technical Controls</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.6.1" href="#section-6.6.1">6.6.1</a>.  System Development Controls</span>

   The CPS for each CA MUST document any system development controls
   required by that CA, if applicable.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.6.2" href="#section-6.6.2">6.6.2</a>.  Security Management Controls</span>

   The CPS for each CA MUST document the security controls applied to
   the software and equipment used for this PKI.  These controls MUST be
   commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for
   managing the INRs.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.6.3" href="#section-6.6.3">6.6.3</a>.  Life-Cycle Security Controls</span>

   The CPS for each CA MUST document how the equipment (hardware and
   software) used for this PKI will be procured, installed, maintained,
   and updated.  This MUST be done in a fashion commensurate with the
   way in which equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is
   handled.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.7" href="#section-6.7">6.7</a>.  Network Security Controls</span>

   The CPS for each CA MUST document the network security controls
   employed for CA operation.  These MUST be commensurate with the
   protection it employs for the computers used for managing
   distribution of INRs.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.8" href="#section-6.8">6.8</a>.  Timestamping</span>

   The RPKI does not make use of timestamping.






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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>.  Certificate and CRL Profiles</span>

   Please refer to the RPKI Certificate and CRL Profile [<a href="./rfc6487" title="&quot;A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6487</a>].

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>.  Compliance Audit and Other Assessments</span>

   The certificate policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria against
   which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes requirements that
   they must meet.  In this PKI, the CAs are already authoritative for
   the management of INRs, and the PKI simply supports verification of
   the distribution of these resources to network subscribers.
   Accordingly, whatever audit and other assessments are already used to
   ensure the security of the management of INRs is sufficient for this
   PKI.  The CPS for each CA MUST describe what audits and other
   assessments are used.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>.  Other Business and Legal Matters</span>

   As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
   managing the distribution of INRs are authoritative in their roles as
   managers of this data.  They MUST operate this PKI to allow the
   holders of INRs to generate digitally signed data that attest to
   these distributions.  Therefore, the manner in which the
   organizations in question manage their business and legal matters for
   this PKI MUST be commensurate with the way in which they already
   manage business and legal matters in their existing roles.  Since
   there is no single set of responses to this section that would apply
   to all organizations, the topics listed in Sections <a href="#section-4.9.1">4.9.1</a> to <a href="#section-4.9.11">4.9.11</a>
   and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of <a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> SHOULD be covered in the CPS issued
   by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all of these
   topics.  Please note that the topics in the above sections of <a href="./rfc3647">RFC</a>
   <a href="./rfc3647">3647</a> become sections <a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a> to <a href="#section-9.11">9.11</a> and <a href="#section-9.13">9.13</a> to <a href="#section-9.17">9.17</a> in the CPS.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.12" href="#section-9.12">9.12</a>.  Amendments</span>

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.12.1" href="#section-9.12.1">9.12.1</a>.  Procedure for Amendment</span>

   The procedure for amending this CP is via written notice from the
   IESG in the form of a new (BCP) RFC that updates or obsoletes this
   document.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.12.2" href="#section-9.12.2">9.12.2</a>.  Notification Mechanism and Period</span>

   Successive versions of the CP will be published with the following
   statement:

      This CP takes effect on MM/DD/YYYY.




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   MM/DD/YYYY MUST be a minimum of 6 months from the date of
   publication.

<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.12.3" href="#section-9.12.3">9.12.3</a>.  Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed</span>

   If the IESG judges that changes to the CP do not materially reduce
   the acceptability of certificates issued for RPKI purposes, there
   will be no change to the CP OID.  If the IESG judges that changes to
   the CP do materially change the acceptability of certificates for
   RPKI purposes, then there MUST be a new CP OID.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>.  Security Considerations</span>

   According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
   rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
   particular community and/or class of applications with common
   security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
   in deciding whether a certificate and the binding therein are
   sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
   application.  This document describes the CP for the Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  There are separate documents (CPSs) that
   cover the factors that determine the degree to which a relying party
   can trust the binding embodied in a certificate.  The degree to which
   such a binding can be trusted depends on several factors, e.g., the
   practices followed by the CA in authenticating the subject; the CA's
   operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls,
   including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for
   example, in protecting the private key), and the stated
   responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
   example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
   liability).

   Since name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed, there is
   a risk that two or more CAs in the RPKI will issue certificates and
   CRLs under the same issuer name.  Path validation implementations
   that conform to the resource certification path validation algorithm
   (see [<a href="./rfc6487" title="&quot;A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6487</a>]) verify that the same key was used to sign both the
   target (the resource certificate) and the corresponding CRL.  So, a
   name collision will not change the result.  Use of the basic X.509
   path validation algorithm, which assumes name uniqueness, could
   result in a revoked certificate being accepted as valid or a valid
   certificate being rejected as revoked.  Relying parties must ensure
   that the software they use to validate certificates issued under this
   policy verifies that the same key was used to sign both the
   certificate and the corresponding CRL, as specified in [<a href="./rfc6487" title="&quot;A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6487</a>].






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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>.  Acknowledgments</span>

   The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Andrei
   Robachevsky, and other members of the RPKI community for reviewing
   this document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>.  References</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.1" href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>.  Normative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.

   [<a id="ref-RFC2026">RFC2026</a>]   Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
               3", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp9">BCP 9</a>, <a href="./rfc2026">RFC 2026</a>, October 1996.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3779">RFC3779</a>]   Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
               Addresses and AS Identifiers", <a href="./rfc3779">RFC 3779</a>, June 2004.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6481">RFC6481</a>]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile
               for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", <a href="./rfc6481">RFC 6481</a>,
               February 2012.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6485">RFC6485</a>]   Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
               Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
               <a href="./rfc6485">RFC 6485</a>, February 2012.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6487">RFC6487</a>]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile
               for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", <a href="./rfc6487">RFC 6487</a>, February
               2012.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6489">RFC6489</a>]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "CA Key Rollover
               in the RPKI", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp174">BCP 174</a>, <a href="./rfc6489">RFC 6489</a>, February 2012.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.2" href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>.  Informative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-RFC2560">RFC2560</a>]   Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
               Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
               Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", <a href="./rfc2560">RFC 2560</a>, June 1999.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3647">RFC3647</a>]   Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
               Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
               Policy and Certification Practices Framework", <a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a>,
               November 2003.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5055">RFC5055</a>]   Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
               Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
               (SCVP)", <a href="./rfc5055">RFC 5055</a>, December 2007.



<span class="grey">Kent, et al.              Best Current Practice                [Page 33]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6484">RFC 6484</a>             Certificate Policy for the RPKI       February 2012</span>


   [<a id="ref-RFC5736">RFC5736</a>]   Huston, G., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IANA IPv4 Special
               Purpose Address Registry", <a href="./rfc5736">RFC 5736</a>, January 2010.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6480">RFC6480</a>]   Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
               Secure Internet Routing", <a href="./rfc6480">RFC 6480</a>, February 2012.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6482">RFC6482</a>]   Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
               Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", <a href="./rfc6482">RFC 6482</a>, February 2012.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6486">RFC6486</a>]   Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
               "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
               (RPKI)", <a href="./rfc6486">RFC 6486</a>, February 2012.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6492">RFC6492</a>]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., and R. Austein, "A
               Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", <a href="./rfc6492">RFC</a>
               <a href="./rfc6492">6492</a>, February 2012.

   [<a id="ref-X.509">X.509</a>]     ITU-T Recommendation X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8, "Information
               technology -- Open systems interconnection -- The
               Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
               frameworks", November 2008.






























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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6484">RFC 6484</a>             Certificate Policy for the RPKI       February 2012</span>


Authors' Addresses

   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 617 873 3988
   EMail: skent@bbn.com


   Derrick Kong
   BBN Technologies
   Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 617 873 1951
   EMail: dkong@bbn.com


   Karen Seo
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 617 873 3152
   EMail: kseo@bbn.com


   Ronald Watro
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 617 873 2551
   EMail: rwatro@bbn.com











Kent, et al.              Best Current Practice                [Page 35]
</pre>