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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Konstantynowicz, Ed.
Request for Comments: 8159 G. Heron, Ed.
Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems
ISSN: 2070-1721 R. Schatzmayr
Deutsche Telekom AG
W. Henderickx
Alcatel-Lucent, Inc.
May 2017
<span class="h1">Keyed IPv6 Tunnel</span>
Abstract
This document describes a tunnel encapsulation for Ethernet over IPv6
with a mandatory 64-bit cookie for connecting Layer 2 (L2) Ethernet
attachment circuits identified by IPv6 addresses. The encapsulation
is based on the Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol Version 3 (L2TPv3) over IP
and does not use the L2TPv3 control plane.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8159">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8159</a>.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8159">RFC 8159</a> Keyed IPv6 Tunnel May 2017</span>
Table of Contents
<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Static 1:1 Mapping without a Control Plane . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
<a href="#section-3">3</a>. 64-Bit Cookie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
<a href="#section-6">6</a>. OAM Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
<a href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
<a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
<a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
<a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
L2TPv3, as defined in [<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>], provides a mechanism for tunneling
Layer 2 (L2) "circuits" across a packet-oriented data network (e.g.,
over IP), with multiple attachment circuits multiplexed over a single
pair of IP address endpoints (i.e., a tunnel) using the L2TPv3
Session ID as a circuit discriminator.
Implementing L2TPv3 over IPv6 [<a href="./rfc2460" title=""Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">RFC2460</a>] provides the opportunity to
utilize unique IPv6 addresses to identify Ethernet attachment
circuits directly, leveraging the key property that IPv6 offers -- a
vast number of unique IP addresses. In this case, processing of the
L2TPv3 Session ID may be bypassed upon receipt, as each tunnel has
one and only one associated session. This local optimization does
not hinder the ability to continue supporting the multiplexing of
circuits via the Session ID on the same router for other L2TPv3
tunnels.
There are various advantages to this approach when compared to the
"traditional" L2TPv3 approach of using a loopback address to
terminate the tunnel and then carrying multiple sessions over the
tunnel. These include better ECMP load balancing (since each tunnel
has a unique source/destination IPv6 address pair) and finer-grained
control when advertising tunnel endpoints using a routing protocol.
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8159">RFC 8159</a> Keyed IPv6 Tunnel May 2017</span>
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a>
<a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>].
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Static 1:1 Mapping without a Control Plane</span>
The L2TPv3 control plane defined in [<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>] is not used for this
encapsulation. The management plane is used to create and maintain
matching configurations at either end of each tunnel. Local
configuration by the management plane creates a one-to-one mapping
between the access-side L2 attachment circuit and the IP address used
in the network-side IPv6 encapsulation.
The IPv6 L2TPv3 tunnel encapsulating device uniquely identifies each
Ethernet L2 attachment connection by a port ID or a combination of a
port ID and VLAN ID(s) on the access side and by a local IPv6 address
on the network side. The local IPv6 address also identifies the
tunnel endpoint. The local IPv6 addresses identifying L2TPv3 tunnels
SHOULD NOT be assigned from connected IPv6 subnets facing towards
remote tunnel endpoints, since that approach would result in an IPv6
Neighbor Discovery cache entry per tunnel on the next-hop router
towards the remote tunnel endpoint. It is RECOMMENDED that local
IPv6 addresses identifying L2TPv3 tunnels are assigned from dedicated
subnets used only for such tunnel endpoints.
Certain deployment scenarios may require using a single IPv6 address
(such as a unicast or anycast address assigned to a specific service
instance, for example, a virtual switch) to identify a tunnel
endpoint for multiple IPv6 L2TPv3 tunnels. For such cases, the
tunnel decapsulating device uses the local IPv6 address to identify
the service instance and the remote IPv6 address to identify the
individual tunnel within that service instance.
As mentioned above, Session ID processing is not required, as each
keyed IPv6 tunnel has one and only one associated session. However,
for compatibility with existing [<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>] implementations, the
packets need to be sent with the Session ID. Routers implementing
L2TPv3 according to [<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>] can be configured with multiple L2TPv3
tunnels, with one session per tunnel, to interoperate with routers
implementing the keyed IPv6 tunnel as specified by this document.
Note that as Session ID processing is not enabled for keyed IPv6
tunnels, there can only be a single keyed IPv6 tunnel between two
IPv6 addresses.
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8159">RFC 8159</a> Keyed IPv6 Tunnel May 2017</span>
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. 64-Bit Cookie</span>
In line with [<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>], the 64-bit cookie is used for an additional
tunnel endpoint context check. This is the largest cookie size
permitted in [<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>]. All packets MUST carry the 64-bit L2TPv3
cookie field. The cookie MUST be 64 bits long in order to provide
sufficient protection against spoofing and brute-force blind
insertion attacks. The cookie values SHOULD be randomly selected.
In the absence of the L2TPv3 control plane, the L2TPv3 encapsulating
router MUST be provided with a local configuration of the 64-bit
cookie for each local and remote IPv6 endpoint. Note that cookies
are asymmetric, so local and remote endpoints may send different
cookie values and, in fact, SHOULD do so. The value of the cookie
MUST be able to be changed at any time in a manner that does not drop
any legitimate tunneled packets, i.e., the receiver MUST be
configurable to accept two discrete cookies for a single tunnel
simultaneously. This enables the receiver to hold both the 'old' and
'new' cookie values during a change of cookie value. Cookie values
SHOULD be changed periodically by the management plane.
Note that mandating a 64-bit cookie is a change from the optional
variable-length cookie of [<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>] and that this requirement
constrains interoperability with existing [<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>] implementations
to those supporting a 64-bit cookie. The management plane MUST NOT
configure a keyed IP tunnel unless both endpoints support the 64-bit
cookie.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Encapsulation</span>
The ingress router encapsulates the entire Ethernet frame, without
the preamble and Frame Check Sequence (FCS) in L2TPv3 as per
[<a href="./rfc4719" title=""Transport of Ethernet Frames over Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC4719</a>]. The L2-specific sublayer MAY be carried if Virtual
Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV) [<a href="./rfc5085" title=""Pseudowire Virtual Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV): A Control Channel for Pseudowires"">RFC5085</a>] and/or frame
sequencing is required, but it SHOULD NOT be carried otherwise. The
L2TPv3 packet is encapsulated directly over IPv6 (i.e., no UDP header
is carried).
The ingress router MAY retain the FCS as per [<a href="./rfc4720" title=""Pseudowire Emulation Edge-to-Edge (PWE3) Frame Check Sequence Retention"">RFC4720</a>]. Support for
retaining the FCS and for receiving packets with a retained FCS is
OPTIONAL and, if present, MUST be configurable. In the absence of
the L2TPv3 control plane, such configuration MUST be consistent for
the two endpoints of any given tunnel, i.e., if one router is
configured to retain the FCS, then the other router MUST be
configured to receive packets with the retained FCS. Any router
configured to retain FCS for a tunnel MUST retain FCS for all frames
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8159">RFC 8159</a> Keyed IPv6 Tunnel May 2017</span>
sent over that tunnel. All routers implementing this specification
MUST support the ability to send frames without retaining the FCS and
to receive such frames.
Any service-delimiting IEEE 802.1Q [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.1Q">IEEE802.1Q</a>] or IEEE 802.1ad
[<a href="#ref-IEEE802.1ad">IEEE802.1ad</a>] VLAN IDs -- S-tag, C-tag, or the tuple (S-tag, C-tag)
-- are treated with local significance within the Ethernet L2 port
and MUST NOT be forwarded over the IPv6 L2TPv3 tunnel.
Note that the same approach may be used to transport protocols other
than Ethernet, though this is outside the scope of this
specification.
The full encapsulation is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ IPv6 Header (320 bits) +
~ ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session ID (32 bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cookie (0:31) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cookie (32:63) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| (Optional) L2-Specific Sublayer (32 bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| |
| Payload (variable) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The combined IPv6 and keyed IP tunnel header contains the following
fields:
o IPv6 Header. Note that:
* The traffic class may be set by the ingress router to ensure
correct Per-Hop Behavior (PHB) treatment by transit routers
between the ingress and egress and to correct QoS disposition
at the egress router.
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8159">RFC 8159</a> Keyed IPv6 Tunnel May 2017</span>
* The flow label, as defined in [<a href="./rfc6437" title=""IPv6 Flow Label Specification"">RFC6437</a>], may be set by the
ingress router to indicate a flow of packets from the client,
which may not be reordered by the network (if there is a
requirement for finer-grained ECMP load balancing rather than
per-circuit load balancing).
* The next header will be set to 0x73 to indicate that the next
header is L2TPv3.
* In the "Static 1:1 Mapping" case described in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, the
IPv6 source address may correspond to a port or port/VLAN being
transported as an L2 circuit, or it may correspond to a virtual
interface terminating inside the router (e.g., if L2 circuits
are being used within a multipoint VPN or if an anycast address
is being terminated on a set of data-center virtual machines.)
* As with the source address, the IPv6 destination address may
correspond to a port or port/VLAN being transported as an L2
circuit or to a virtual interface.
o Session ID. In the "Static 1:1 Mapping" case described in
<a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, the IPv6 address identifies an L2TPv3 session directly;
thus, at endpoints supporting one-stage resolution (IPv6 Address
Only), the Session ID SHOULD be ignored upon receipt. It is
RECOMMENDED that the remote endpoint is configured to set the
Session ID to all ones (0xFFFFFFFF) for easy identification in
case of troubleshooting. For compatibility with other tunnel
termination platforms supporting only two-stage resolution (IPv6
Address + Session ID), this specification recommends supporting
explicit configuration of Session ID to any value other than zero
(including all ones). The Session ID of zero MUST NOT be used, as
it is reserved for use by L2TP control messages as specified in
[<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>]. Note that the Session ID is unidirectional; the sent
and received Session IDs at an endpoint may be different.
o Cookie. The 64-bit cookie, configured and described as in
<a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. All packets for a destined L2 circuit (or L2TPv3
Session) MUST match one of the cookie values configured for that
circuit. Any packets that do not contain a valid cookie value
MUST be discarded (see [<a href="./rfc3931" title=""Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)"">RFC3931</a>] for more details).
o L2-Specific Sublayer (Optional). As noted above, this will be
present if VCCV and/or frame sequencing is required. If VCCV is
required, then any frames with bit 0 (the "V-bit") set are VCCV
messages. If frame sequencing is required, then any frames with
bit 1 (the "S-bit") set have a valid frame sequence number in bits
8-31.
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8159">RFC 8159</a> Keyed IPv6 Tunnel May 2017</span>
o Payload (variable). As noted above, the preamble and any service-
delimiting tags MUST be stripped before encapsulation, and the FCS
MUST be stripped unless FCS retention is configured at both
ingress and egress routers. Since a new FCS is added at each hop
when the encapsulating IP packet is transmitted, the payload is
protected against bit errors.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Fragmentation and Reassembly</span>
Using tunnel encapsulation of Ethernet L2 datagrams in IPv6 will
reduce the effective MTU allowed for the encapsulated traffic.
The recommended solution to deal with this problem is for the network
operator to increase the MTU size of all the links between the
devices acting as IPv6 L2TPv3 tunnel endpoints to accommodate both
the IPv6 L2TPv3 encapsulation header and the Ethernet L2 datagram
without requiring fragmentation of the IPv6 packet.
It is RECOMMENDED that routers implementing this specification
implement IPv6 Path MTU (PMTU) discovery as defined in [<a href="./rfc1981" title=""Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6"">RFC1981</a>] to
confirm that the path over which packets are sent has sufficient MTU
to transport a maximum-length Ethernet frame plus encapsulation
overhead.
Routers implementing this specification MAY implement L2TPv3
fragmentation (as defined in <a href="./rfc4623#section-5">Section 5 of [RFC4623]</a>). In the absence
of the L2TPv3 control plane, it is RECOMMENDED that fragmentation (if
implemented) is locally configured on a per-tunnel basis.
Fragmentation configuration MUST be consistent between the two ends
of a tunnel.
It is NOT RECOMMENDED for routers implementing this specification to
enable IPv6 fragmentation (as defined in <a href="./rfc2460#section-4.5">Section 4.5 of [RFC2460]</a>)
for keyed IP tunnels.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. OAM Considerations</span>
Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) is an important
consideration when providing circuit-oriented services such as those
described in this document; it is all the more important in the
absence of a dedicated tunnel control plane, as OAM becomes the only
way to detect failures in the tunnel overlay.
Note that in the context of keyed IP tunnels, failures in the IPv6
underlay network can be detected using the usual methods such as
through the routing protocol, including the use of single-hop
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
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Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) [<a href="./rfc5881" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)"">RFC5881</a>] to rapidly detect
link failures. Multihop BFD MAY also be enabled between tunnel
endpoints as per [<a href="./rfc5883" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for Multihop Paths"">RFC5883</a>].
Since keyed IP tunnels always carry an Ethernet payload and since OAM
at the tunnel layer is unable to detect failures in the Ethernet
service processing at the ingress or egress router or on the Ethernet
attachment circuit between the router and the Ethernet client, it is
RECOMMENDED that Ethernet OAM as defined in [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.1ag">IEEE802.1ag</a>] and/or
[<a href="#ref-Y.1731" title=""Operation, administration and maintenance (OAM) functions and mechanisms for Ethernet-based networks"">Y.1731</a>] be enabled for keyed IP tunnels. As defined in those
specifications, the following Connectivity Fault Management (CFM)
and/or Ethernet Continuity Check (ETH-CC) configurations are to be
used in conjunction with keyed IPv6 tunnels:
o Connectivity verification between the tunnel endpoints across
the tunnel: Use an Up Maintenance End Point (MEP) located at the
tunnel endpoint for transmitting the CFM PDUs towards, and
receiving them from, the direction of the tunnel.
o Connectivity verification from the tunnel endpoint across
the local attachment circuit: Use a Down MEP located at the tunnel
endpoint for transmitting the CFM PDUs towards, and receiving them
from, the direction of the local attachment circuit.
o Intermediate connectivity verification: Use a Maintenance
Intermediate Point (MIP) located at the tunnel endpoint to relay
CFM PDUs.
In addition, Pseudowire VCCV [<a href="./rfc5085" title=""Pseudowire Virtual Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV): A Control Channel for Pseudowires"">RFC5085</a>] MAY be used. Furthermore, BFD
MAY be enabled over the VCCV channel [<a href="./rfc5885" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for the Pseudowire Virtual Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV)"">RFC5885</a>].
Note that since there is no control plane, it is RECOMMENDED that the
management plane take action when attachment circuit failure is
detected, for example, by dropping the remote attachment circuit.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
This document does not require any IANA actions.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span>
Packet spoofing for any type of Virtual Private Network (VPN)
tunneling protocol is of particular concern as insertion of carefully
constructed rogue packets into the VPN transit network could result
in a violation of VPN traffic separation, leaking data into a
customer VPN. This is complicated by the fact that it may be
particularly difficult for the operator of the VPN to even be aware
that it has become a point of transit into or between customer VPNs.
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
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Keyed IPv6 encapsulation provides traffic separation for its VPNs via
the use of separate 128-bit IPv6 addresses to identify the endpoints.
The mandatory use of the 64-bit L2TPv3 cookie provides an additional
check to ensure that an arriving packet is intended for the
identified tunnel.
In the presence of a blind packet-spoofing attack, the 64-bit L2TPv3
cookie provides security against inadvertent leaking of frames into a
customer VPN, as documented in <a href="./rfc3931#section-8.2">Section 8.2 of [RFC3931]</a>.
For protection against brute-force blind insertion attacks, the 64-
bit cookie MUST be used with all tunnels.
Note that the cookie provides no protection against a sophisticated
man-in-the-middle attacker who can sniff and correlate captured data
between nodes for use in a coordinated attack.
The L2TPv3 64-bit cookie must not be regarded as a substitute for
security such as that provided by IPsec when operating over an open
or untrusted network where packets may be sniffed, decoded, and
correlated for use in a coordinated attack.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span>
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span>
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC2460">RFC2460</a>] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
December 1998, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC3931">RFC3931</a>] Lau, J., Ed., Townsley, M., Ed., and I. Goyret, Ed.,
"Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)",
<a href="./rfc3931">RFC 3931</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3931, March 2005,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3931">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3931</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC4719">RFC4719</a>] Aggarwal, R., Ed., Townsley, M., Ed., and M. Dos Santos,
Ed., "Transport of Ethernet Frames over Layer 2 Tunneling
Protocol Version 3 (L2TPv3)", <a href="./rfc4719">RFC 4719</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4719, November 2006,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4719">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4719</a>>.
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span>
[<a id="ref-IEEE802.1ad">IEEE802.1ad</a>]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks - Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks, Amendment
4: Provider Bridges", IEEE 802.1ad-2005, DOI
10.1109/IEEESTD.2006.216360.
[<a id="ref-IEEE802.1ag">IEEE802.1ag</a>]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks - Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks, Amendment
5: Connectivity Fault Management", IEEE 802.1ag-2007, DOI
10.1109/IEEESTD.2007.4431836.
[<a id="ref-IEEE802.1Q">IEEE802.1Q</a>]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks - Bridges and Bridged Networks", IEEE 802.1Q-
2014, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2014.6991462.
[<a id="ref-RFC1981">RFC1981</a>] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
for IP version 6", <a href="./rfc1981">RFC 1981</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC1981, August
1996, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1981">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1981</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC4623">RFC4623</a>] Malis, A. and M. Townsley, "Pseudowire Emulation Edge-to-
Edge (PWE3) Fragmentation and Reassembly", <a href="./rfc4623">RFC 4623</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4623, August 2006,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4623">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4623</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC4720">RFC4720</a>] Malis, A., Allan, D., and N. Del Regno, "Pseudowire
Emulation Edge-to-Edge (PWE3) Frame Check Sequence
Retention", <a href="./rfc4720">RFC 4720</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4720, November 2006,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4720">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4720</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC5085">RFC5085</a>] Nadeau, T., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Pseudowire Virtual
Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV): A Control
Channel for Pseudowires", <a href="./rfc5085">RFC 5085</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5085,
December 2007, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5085">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5085</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC5881">RFC5881</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", <a href="./rfc5881">RFC 5881</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5881, June 2010,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5881">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5881</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC5883">RFC5883</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for Multihop Paths", <a href="./rfc5883">RFC 5883</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5883,
June 2010, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5883">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5883</a>>.
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
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[<a id="ref-RFC5885">RFC5885</a>] Nadeau, T., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection (BFD) for the Pseudowire Virtual
Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV)", <a href="./rfc5885">RFC 5885</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5885, June 2010,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5885">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5885</a>>.
[<a id="ref-RFC6437">RFC6437</a>] Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
"IPv6 Flow Label Specification", <a href="./rfc6437">RFC 6437</a>,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011,
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437</a>>.
[<a id="ref-Y.1731">Y.1731</a>] ITU-T, "Operation, administration and maintenance (OAM)
functions and mechanisms for Ethernet-based networks",
Recommendation ITU-T G.8013/Y.1731, August 2015.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Carlos Pignataro, Stewart Bryant,
Karsten Thomann, Qi Sun, and Ian Farrer for their insightful
suggestions and review.
Contributors
Peter Weinberger
Cisco Systems
Email: peweinbe@cisco.com
Michael Lipman
Cisco Systems
Email: mlipman@cisco.com
Mark Townsley
Cisco Systems
Email: townsley@cisco.com
<span class="grey">Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
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Authors' Addresses
Maciek Konstantynowicz (editor)
Cisco Systems
Email: maciek@cisco.com
Giles Heron (editor)
Cisco Systems
Email: giheron@cisco.com
Rainer Schatzmayr
Deutsche Telekom AG
Email: rainer.schatzmayr@telekom.de
Wim Henderickx
Alcatel-Lucent, Inc.
Email: wim.henderickx@alcatel-lucent.com
Konstantynowicz, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]
</pre>
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