<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           E. Lear
Request for Comments: 8520                                 Cisco Systems
Category: Standards Track                                       R. Droms
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                   Google
                                                            D. Romascanu
                                                              March 2019


              <span class="h1">Manufacturer Usage Description Specification</span>

Abstract

   This memo specifies a component-based architecture for Manufacturer
   Usage Descriptions (MUDs).  The goal of MUD is to provide a means for
   end devices to signal to the network what sort of access and network
   functionality they require to properly function.  The initial focus
   is on access control.  Later work can delve into other aspects.

   This memo specifies two YANG modules, IPv4 and IPv6 DHCP options, a
   Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) TLV, a URL, an X.509 certificate
   extension, and a means to sign and verify the descriptions.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 7841</a>.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8520">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8520</a>.
















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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   <a href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   <a href="#page-4">4</a>
     <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>.  What MUD Doesn't Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   <a href="#page-5">5</a>
     <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>.  A Simple Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   <a href="#page-5">5</a>
     <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   <a href="#page-6">6</a>
     <a href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>.  Determining Intended Use  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   <a href="#page-6">6</a>
     <a href="#section-1.5">1.5</a>.  Finding a Policy: The MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   <a href="#page-7">7</a>
     <a href="#section-1.6">1.6</a>.  Processing of the MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   <a href="#page-8">8</a>
     <a href="#section-1.7">1.7</a>.  Types of Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   <a href="#page-8">8</a>
     <a href="#section-1.8">1.8</a>.  The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture . . . . .  <a href="#page-10">10</a>
     <a href="#section-1.9">1.9</a>.  Order of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-12">12</a>
   <a href="#section-2">2</a>.  The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-12">12</a>
     <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>.  The IETF-MUD YANG Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-14">14</a>
   <a href="#section-3">3</a>.  MUD Model Definitions for the Root "mud" Container  . . . . .  <a href="#page-15">15</a>
     <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>.  mud-version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-15">15</a>
     <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>.  MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-15">15</a>
     <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>.  to-device-policy and from-device-policy Containers  . . .  <a href="#page-16">16</a>
     <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>.  last-update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-16">16</a>
     <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>.  cache-validity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-16">16</a>
     <a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>.  is-supported  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-16">16</a>
     <a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>.  systeminfo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-16">16</a>
     <a href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>.  mfg-name, software-rev, model-name, and firmware-rev  . .  <a href="#page-17">17</a>
     <a href="#section-3.9">3.9</a>.  extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-17">17</a>
   <a href="#section-4">4</a>.  Augmentation to the ACL Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-17">17</a>
     <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>.  manufacturer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-17">17</a>
     <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>.  same-manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-17">17</a>
     <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>.  documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-18">18</a>
     <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>.  model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-18">18</a>
     <a href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>.  local-networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-18">18</a>
     <a href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>.  controller  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-18">18</a>
     <a href="#section-4.7">4.7</a>.  my-controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-19">19</a>
     <a href="#section-4.8">4.8</a>.  direction-initiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-19">19</a>



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   <a href="#section-5">5</a>.  Processing of the MUD File  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-19">19</a>
   <a href="#section-6">6</a>.  What Does a MUD URL Look Like?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-19">19</a>
   <a href="#section-7">7</a>.  The MUD YANG Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-20">20</a>
   <a href="#section-8">8</a>.  The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model  . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-26">26</a>
     <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>.  src-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-27">27</a>
     <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>.  dst-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-27">27</a>
     <a href="#section-8.3">8.3</a>.  The ietf-acldns Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-28">28</a>
   <a href="#section-9">9</a>.  MUD File Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-30">30</a>
   <a href="#section-10">10</a>. The MUD URL DHCP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-32">32</a>
     <a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>.  Client Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-33">33</a>
     <a href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>.  Server Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-33">33</a>
     <a href="#section-10.3">10.3</a>.  Relay Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-33">33</a>
   11. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension   34
   <a href="#section-12">12</a>. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP Extension . . . . . .  <a href="#page-36">36</a>
   <a href="#section-13">13</a>. The Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-38">38</a>
     <a href="#section-13.1">13.1</a>.  Creating a MUD File Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-38">38</a>
     <a href="#section-13.2">13.2</a>.  Verifying a MUD File Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-38">38</a>
   <a href="#section-14">14</a>. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-39">39</a>
   <a href="#section-15">15</a>. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-39">39</a>
   <a href="#section-16">16</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-40">40</a>
   <a href="#section-17">17</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-43">43</a>
     <a href="#section-17.1">17.1</a>.  YANG Module Registrations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-43">43</a>
     <a href="#section-17.2">17.2</a>.  URI Registrations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-43">43</a>
     <a href="#section-17.3">17.3</a>.  DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-43">43</a>
     <a href="#section-17.4">17.4</a>.  PKIX Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-43">43</a>
     <a href="#section-17.5">17.5</a>.  Media Type Registration for MUD Files  . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-44">44</a>
     <a href="#section-17.6">17.6</a>.  IANA LLDP TLV Subtype Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-45">45</a>
     <a href="#section-17.7">17.7</a>.  The MUD Well-Known Universal Resource Name (URNs)  . . .  <a href="#page-45">45</a>
     <a href="#section-17.8">17.8</a>.  Extensions Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-46">46</a>
   <a href="#section-18">18</a>. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-46">46</a>
     <a href="#section-18.1">18.1</a>.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-46">46</a>
     <a href="#section-18.2">18.2</a>.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-49">49</a>
   <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.  Default MUD Nodes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-52">52</a>
   <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>.  A Sample Extension: DETNET-indicator . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-56">56</a>
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-60">60</a>
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  <a href="#page-60">60</a>















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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>.  Introduction</span>

   The Internet has largely been constructed for general purpose
   computers, those devices that may be used for a purpose that is
   specified by those who own the device.  In [<a href="./rfc1984" title="&quot;IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet&quot;">RFC1984</a>], it was presumed
   that an end device would be most capable of protecting itself.  This
   made sense when the typical device was a workstation or a mainframe,
   and it continues to make sense for general purpose computing devices
   today, including laptops, smart phones, and tablets.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7452">RFC7452</a>] discusses design patterns for, and poses questions about,
   smart objects.  Let us then posit a group of objects that are
   specifically not intended to be used for general purpose computing
   tasks.  These devices, which this memo refers to as Things, have a
   specific purpose.  By definition, therefore, all other uses are not
   intended.  If a small number of communication patterns follows from
   those small number of uses, the combination of these two statements
   can be restated as a Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) that can be
   applied at various points within a network.  MUD primarily addresses
   threats to the device rather than the device as a threat.  In some
   circumstances, however, MUD may offer some protection in the latter
   case, depending on how the MUD URL is communicated and how devices
   and their communications are authenticated.

   We use the notion of "manufacturer" loosely in this context to refer
   to the entity or organization that will state how a device is
   intended to be used.  For example, in the context of a light bulb,
   this might indeed be the light bulb manufacturer.  In the context of
   a smarter device that has a built in Linux stack, it might be an
   integrator of that device.  The key points are that the device itself
   is assumed to serve a limited purpose, and that there exists an
   organization in the supply chain of that device that will take
   responsibility for informing the network about that purpose.

   The intent of MUD is to provide the following:

   o  Substantially reduce the threat surface on a device to those
      communications intended by the manufacturer.

   o  Provide a means to scale network policies to the ever-increasing
      number of types of devices in the network.

   o  Provide a means to address at least some vulnerabilities in a way
      that is faster than the time it might take to update systems.
      This will be particularly true for systems that are no longer
      supported.





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   o  Keep the cost of implementation of such a system to the bare
      minimum.

   o  Provide a means of extensibility for manufacturers to express
      other device capabilities or requirements.

   MUD consists of three architectural building blocks:

   o  A URL that can be used to locate a description;

   o  The description itself, including how it is interpreted; and

   o  A means for local network management systems to retrieve the
      description.

   MUD is most effective when the network is able to identify in some
   way the remote endpoints that Things will talk to.

   In this specification, we describe each of these building blocks and
   how they are intended to be used together.  However, they may also be
   used separately, independent of this specification, by local
   deployments for their own purposes.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>.  What MUD Doesn't Do</span>

   MUD is not intended to address network authorization of general
   purpose computers, as their manufacturers cannot envision a specific
   communication pattern to describe.  In addition, even those devices
   that have a single or small number of uses might have very broad
   communication patterns.  MUD on its own is not for them either.

   Although MUD can provide network administrators with some additional
   protection when device vulnerabilities exist, it will never replace
   the need for manufacturers to patch vulnerabilities.

   Finally, no matter what the manufacturer specifies in a MUD file,
   these are not directives, but suggestions.  How they are instantiated
   locally will depend on many factors and will be ultimately up to the
   local network administrator, who must decide what is appropriate in a
   given circumstances.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>.  A Simple Example</span>

   A light bulb is intended to light a room.  It may be remotely
   controlled through the network, and it may make use of a rendezvous
   service (which could be accessed by an application on a smart phone).
   What we can say about that light bulb, then, is that all other
   network access is unwanted.  It will not contact a news service, nor



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   speak to the refrigerator, and it has no need of a printer or other
   devices.  It has no social networking friends.  Therefore, applying
   an access list to it that states it will only connect to the single
   rendezvous service will not impede performing its function; at the
   same time, this will allow the network to provide the light bulb and
   other devices an additional layer of protection.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>.  Terminology</span>

   MUD:  Manufacturer Usage Description.

   MUD file:  a file containing YANG-based JSON that describes a Thing
      and associated suggested specific network behavior.

   MUD file server:  a web server that hosts a MUD file.

   MUD manager:  the system that requests and receives the MUD file from
      the MUD server.  After it has processed a MUD file, it may direct
      changes to relevant network elements.

   MUD controller:  a synonym that has been used in the past for MUD
      manager.

   MUD URL:  a URL that can be used by the MUD manager to receive the
      MUD file.

   Thing:  the device emitting a MUD URL.

   Manufacturer:  the entity that configures the Thing to emit the MUD
      URL and the one who asserts a recommendation in a MUD file.  The
      manufacturer might not always be the entity that constructs a
      Thing.  It could, for instance, be a systems integrator, or even a
      component provider.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title="&quot;Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words&quot;">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4" href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>.  Determining Intended Use</span>

   The notion of intended use is in itself not new.  Network
   administrators apply access lists every day to allow for only such
   use.  This notion of white listing was well described by Chapman and
   Zwicky in [<a href="#ref-FW95" title="&quot;Building Internet Firewalls&quot;">FW95</a>].  Profiling systems that make use of heuristics to
   identify types of systems have existed for years as well.




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   A Thing could just as easily tell the network what sort of access it
   requires without going into what sort of system it is.  This would,
   in effect, be the converse of [<a href="./rfc7488" title="&quot;Port Control Protocol (PCP) Server Selection&quot;">RFC7488</a>].  In seeking a general
   solution, however, we assume that a device will implement
   functionality necessary to fulfill its limited purpose.  This is
   basic economic constraint.  Unless the network would refuse access to
   such a device, its developers would have no reason to provide the
   network any information.  To date, such an assertion has held true.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.5" href="#section-1.5">1.5</a>.  Finding a Policy: The MUD URL</span>

   Our work begins with the device emitting a Universal Resource Locator
   (URL) [<a href="./rfc3986" title="&quot;Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;">RFC3986</a>].  This URL serves both to classify the device type
   and to provide a means to locate a policy file.

   MUD URLs MUST use the "https" scheme [<a href="./rfc7230" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing&quot;">RFC7230</a>].

   In this memo, three means are defined to emit the MUD URL, as
   follows:

   o  A DHCP option [<a href="./rfc2131" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol&quot;">RFC2131</a>] [<a href="./rfc8415" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)&quot;">RFC8415</a>] that the DHCP client uses to
      inform the DHCP server.  The DHCP server may take further actions,
      such as acting as the MUD manager or passing the MUD URL along to
      the MUD manager.

   o  An X.509 constraint.  The IEEE has developed IEEE 802.1AR
      [<a href="#ref-IEEE8021AR">IEEE8021AR</a>] to provide a certificate-based approach to
      communicate device characteristics, which itself relies on
      [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>].  The MUD URL extension is non-critical, as required by
      IEEE 802.1AR.  Various means may be used to communicate that
      certificate, including the Tunnel Extensible Authentication
      Protocol (TEAP) [<a href="./rfc7170" title="&quot;Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version 1&quot;">RFC7170</a>].

   o  Finally, a Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) frame is defined
      [<a href="#ref-IEEE8021AB">IEEE8021AB</a>].

   It is possible that there may be other means for a MUD URL to be
   learned by a network.  For instance, some devices may already be
   fielded or have very limited ability to communicate a MUD URL, and
   yet they can be identified through some means, such as a serial
   number or a public key.  In these cases, manufacturers may be able to
   map those identifiers to particular MUD URLs (or even the files
   themselves).  Similarly, there may be alternative resolution
   mechanisms available for situations where Internet connectivity is
   limited or does not exist.  Such mechanisms are not described in this
   memo, but they are possible.  Implementors are encouraged to allow
   for the flexibility of how MUD URLs may be learned.




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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.6" href="#section-1.6">1.6</a>.  Processing of the MUD URL</span>

   MUD managers that are able to do so SHOULD retrieve MUD URLs and
   signature files as per [<a href="./rfc7230" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing&quot;">RFC7230</a>], using the GET method [<a href="./rfc7231" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content&quot;">RFC7231</a>].
   They MUST validate the certificate using the rules in <a href="./rfc2818#section-3.1">[RFC2818],
   Section&nbsp;3.1</a>.

   Requests for MUD URLs SHOULD include an "Accept" header field
   (<a href="./rfc7231#section-5.3.2">[RFC7231], Section&nbsp;5.3.2</a>) containing "application/mud+json", an
   "Accept-Language" header field (<a href="./rfc7231#section-5.3.5">[RFC7231], Section&nbsp;5.3.5</a>), and a
   "User-Agent" header field (<a href="./rfc7231#section-5.5.3">[RFC7231], Section&nbsp;5.5.3</a>).

   MUD managers SHOULD automatically process 3xx response status codes.

   If a MUD manager is not able to fetch a MUD URL, other means MAY be
   used to import MUD files and associated signature files.  So long as
   the signature of the file can be validated, the file can be used.  In
   such environments, controllers SHOULD warn administrators when cache-
   validity expiry is approaching so that they may check for new files.

   It may not be possible for a MUD manager to retrieve a MUD file at
   any given time.  Should a MUD manager fail to retrieve a MUD file, it
   SHOULD consider the existing one safe to use, at least for a time.
   After some period, it SHOULD log that it has been unable to retrieve
   the file.  There may be very good reasons for such failures,
   including the possibility that the MUD manager is in an offline
   environment, the local Internet connection has failed, or the remote
   Internet connection has failed.  It is also possible that an attacker
   is attempting to interfere with the deployment of a device.  How to
   handle such circumstances is a local decision.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.7" href="#section-1.7">1.7</a>.  Types of Policies</span>

   When the MUD URL is resolved, the MUD manager retrieves a file that
   describes what sort of communications a device is designed to have.
   The manufacturer may specify either specific hosts for cloud-based
   services or certain classes for access within an operational network.
   An example of a class might be "devices of a specified manufacturer
   type", where the manufacturer type itself is indicated simply by the
   authority component (e.g., the domain name) of the MUD URL.  Another
   example might be to allow or disallow local access.  Just like other
   policies, these may be combined.  For example:

   o  Allow access to devices of the same manufacturer

   o  Allow access to and from controllers via the Constrained
      Application Protocol (COAP) [<a href="./rfc7252" title="&quot;The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)&quot;">RFC7252</a>]




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   o  Allow access to local DNS/NTP

   o  Deny all other access

   A printer might have a description that states:

   o  Allow access for port IPP or port LPD

   o  Allow local access for port HTTP

   o  Deny all other access

   In this way, anyone can print to the printer, but local access would
   be required for the management interface.

   The files that are retrieved are intended to be closely aligned to
   existing network architectures so that they are easy to deploy.  We
   make use of YANG [<a href="./rfc7950" title="&quot;The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language&quot;">RFC7950</a>] because it provides accurate and adequate
   models for use by network devices.  JSON [<a href="./rfc8259" title="&quot;The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format&quot;">RFC8259</a>] is used as a
   serialization format for compactness and readability, relative to
   XML.  Other formats may be chosen with later versions of MUD.

   While the policy examples given here focus on access control, this is
   not intended to be the sole focus.  By structuring the model
   described in this document with clear extension points, other
   descriptions could be included.  One that often comes to mind is
   quality of service.

   The YANG modules specified here are extensions of [<a href="./rfc8519" title="&quot;YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)&quot;">RFC8519</a>].  The
   extensions to this model allow for a manufacturer to express classes
   of systems that a manufacturer would find necessary for the proper
   function of the device.  Two modules are specified.  The first module
   specifies a means for domain names to be used in Access Control Lists
   (ACLs) so that devices that have their controllers in the cloud may
   be appropriately authorized with domain names, where the mapping of
   those names to addresses may rapidly change.

   The other module abstracts away IP addresses into certain classes
   that are instantiated into actual IP addresses through local
   processing.  Through these classes, manufacturers can specify how the
   device is designed to communicate, so that network elements can be
   configured by local systems that have local topological knowledge.
   That is, the deployment populates the classes that the manufacturer
   specifies.  The abstractions below map to zero or more hosts, as
   follows:

   Manufacturer:  A device made by a particular manufacturer, as
      identified by the authority component of its MUD URL.



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   same-manufacturer:  Devices that have the same authority component of
      their MUD URL.

   controller:  Devices that the local network administrator admits to
      the particular class.

   my-controller:  Devices intended to serve as controllers for the MUD
      URL that the Thing emitted.

   local:  The class of IP addresses that are scoped within some
      administrative boundary.  By default, it is suggested that this be
      the local subnet.

   The "manufacturer" classes can be easily specified by the
   manufacturer, whereas controller classes are initially envisioned to
   be specified by the administrator.

   Because manufacturers do not know who will be using their devices, it
   is important for functionality referenced in usage descriptions to be
   relatively ubiquitous and mature.  For these reasons, the YANG-based
   configuration in a MUD file is limited to the modules either
   specified or referenced in this document, or specified in documented
   extensions.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.8" href="#section-1.8">1.8</a>.  The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture</span>

   With these components laid out, we now have the basis for an
   architecture.  This leads us to ASCII art.

    .......................................
    .                      ____________   .           _____________
    .                     |            |  .          |             |
    .                     |    MUD     |--&gt;get URL--&gt;|    MUD      |
    .                     |  Manager   |  .(https)   | File Server |
    .  End system network |____________|&lt;-MUD file&lt;-&lt;|_____________|
    .                             .       .
    .                             .       .
    . _______                 _________   .
    .|       | (DHCP et al.) | router  |  .
    .| Thing |----&gt;MUD URL--&gt;|   or    |  .
    .|_______|               | switch  |  .
    .                        |_________|  .
    .......................................

                        Figure 1: MUD Architecture






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   In the above diagram, the switch or router collects MUD URLs and
   forwards them to the MUD manager (a network management system) for
   processing.  This happens in different ways, depending on how the URL
   is communicated.  For instance, in the case of DHCP, the DHCP server
   might receive the URL and then process it.  In the case of IEEE
   802.1X [<a href="#ref-IEEE8021X">IEEE8021X</a>], the switch would carry the URL via a certificate
   to the authentication server via the Extensible Authentication
   Protocol (EAP) over Radius [<a href="./rfc3748" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">RFC3748</a>], which would then process it.
   One method to do this is TEAP, as described in [<a href="./rfc7170" title="&quot;Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version 1&quot;">RFC7170</a>].  The
   certificate extension is described below.

   The information returned by the MUD file server is valid for as long
   as the Thing is connected.  There is no expiry.  However, if the MUD
   manager has detected that the MUD file for a Thing has changed, it
   SHOULD update the policy expeditiously, taking into account whatever
   approval flow is required in a deployment.  In this way, new
   recommendations from the manufacturer can be processed in a timely
   fashion.

   The information returned by the MUD file server (a web server) is
   valid for the duration of the Thing's connection, or as specified in
   the description.  Thus, if the Thing is disconnected, any associated
   configuration in the switch can be removed.  Similarly, from time to
   time the description may be refreshed, based on new capabilities or
   communication patterns or vulnerabilities.

   The web server is typically run by or on behalf of the manufacturer.
   Its domain name is that of the authority found in the MUD URL.  For
   legacy cases where Things cannot emit a URL, if the switch is able to
   determine the appropriate URL, it may proxy it.  In a trivial case,
   it may hardcode a MUD URL on a switch port or a map from some
   available identifier such as an L2 address or certificate hash to a
   MUD URL.

   The role of the MUD manager in this environment is to do the
   following:

   o  receive MUD URLs,

   o  fetch MUD files,

   o  translate abstractions in the MUD files to specific network
      element configuration,

   o  maintain and update any required mappings of the abstractions, and

   o  update network elements with appropriate configuration.




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   A MUD manager may be a component of an Authentication, Authorization,
   and Accounting (AAA) system or a network management system.
   Communication within those systems and from those systems to network
   elements is beyond the scope of this memo.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.9" href="#section-1.9">1.9</a>.  Order of Operations</span>

   As mentioned above, MUD contains architectural building blocks, so
   the order of operation may vary.  However, here is one clear intended
   example:

   1.  Thing emits a URL.

   2.  That URL is forwarded to a MUD manager by the nearest switch (how
       this happens depends on the way in which the MUD URL is emitted).

   3.  The MUD manager retrieves the MUD file and signature from the MUD
       file server, assuming it doesn't already have copies.  After
       validating the signature, it may test the URL against a web or
       domain reputation service, and it may test any hosts within the
       file against those reputation services, as it deems fit.

   4.  The MUD manager may query the administrator for permission to add
       the Thing and associated policy.  If the Thing is known or the
       Thing type is known, it may skip this step.

   5.  The MUD manager instantiates local configuration based on the
       abstractions defined in this document.

   6.  The MUD manager configures the switch nearest the Thing.  Other
       systems may be configured as well.

   7.  When the Thing disconnects, policy is removed.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>.  The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning</span>

   A MUD file consists of a YANG model instance that has been serialized
   in JSON [<a href="./rfc7951" title="&quot;JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG&quot;">RFC7951</a>].  For purposes of MUD, the nodes that can be
   modified are access lists as augmented by this model.  The MUD file
   is limited to the serialization of only the following YANG schema:

   o  ietf-access-control-list [<a href="./rfc8519" title="&quot;YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)&quot;">RFC8519</a>]

   o  ietf-mud (<a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>)

   o  ietf-acldns (<a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>)





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   Extensions may be used to add additional schema.  This is described
   further on.

   To provide the widest possible deployment, publishers of MUD files
   SHOULD make use of the abstractions in this memo and avoid the use of
   IP addresses.  A MUD manager SHOULD NOT automatically implement any
   MUD file that contains IP addresses, especially those that might have
   local significance.  The addressing of one side of an access list is
   implicit, based on whether it is applied as to-device-policy or
   from-device-policy.

   With the exceptions of the "name" of the ACL, "type", "name" of the
   Access Control Entry (ACE), and TCP and UDP source and destination
   port information, publishers of MUD files SHOULD limit the use of ACL
   model leaf nodes expressed to those found in this specification.
   Absent any extensions, MUD files are assumed to implement only the
   following ACL model features:

   o  match-on-ipv4, match-on-ipv6, match-on-tcp, match-on-udp,
      match-on-icmp

   Furthermore, only "accept" or "drop" actions SHOULD be included.  A
   MUD manager MAY choose to interpret "reject" as "drop".  A MUD
   manager SHOULD ignore all other actions.  This is because
   manufacturers do not have sufficient context within a local
   deployment to know whether reject is appropriate.  That is a decision
   that should be left to a network administrator.

   Given that MUD does not deal with interfaces, the support of the
   "ietf-interfaces" module [<a href="./rfc8343" title="&quot;A YANG Data Model for Interface Management&quot;">RFC8343</a>] is not required.  Specifically,
   the support of interface-related features and branches (e.g.,
   interface-attachment and interface-stats) of the ACL YANG module is
   not required.

   In fact, MUD managers MAY ignore any particular component of a
   description or MAY ignore the description in its entirety, and they
   SHOULD carefully inspect all MUD descriptions.  Publishers of MUD
   files MUST NOT include other nodes except as described in
   <a href="#section-3.9">Section 3.9</a>.  See that section for more information.












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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>.  The IETF-MUD YANG Module</span>

   This module is structured into three parts:

   o  The first component, the "mud" container, holds information that
      is relevant to retrieval and validity of the MUD file itself, as
      well as policy intended to and from the Thing.

   o  The second component augments the matching container of the ACL
      model to add several nodes that are relevant to the MUD URL, or
      they are otherwise abstracted for use within a local environment.

   o  The third component augments the tcp-acl container of the ACL
      model to add the ability to match on the direction of initiation
      of a TCP connection.

   A valid MUD file will contain two root objects: a "mud" container and
   an "acls" container.  Extensions may add additional root objects as
   required.  As a reminder, when parsing acls, elements within a
   "match" block are logically ANDed.  In general, a single abstraction
   in a match statement should be used.  For instance, it makes little
   sense to match both "my-controller" and "controller" with an
   argument, since they are highly unlikely to be the same value.

   A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in
   this document.  The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is
   explained in [<a href="./rfc8340" title="&quot;YANG Tree Diagrams&quot;">RFC8340</a>].
























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   module: ietf-mud
     +--rw mud!
        +--rw mud-version           uint8
        +--rw mud-url               inet:uri
        +--rw last-update           yang:date-and-time
        +--rw mud-signature?        inet:uri
        +--rw cache-validity?       uint8
        +--rw is-supported          boolean
        +--rw systeminfo?           string
        +--rw mfg-name?             string
        +--rw model-name?           string
        +--rw firmware-rev?         string
        +--rw software-rev?         string
        +--rw documentation?        inet:uri
        +--rw extensions*           string
        +--rw from-device-policy
        |  +--rw acls
        |     +--rw access-list* [name]
        |        +--rw name    -&gt; /acl:acls/acl/name
        +--rw to-device-policy
           +--rw acls
              +--rw access-list* [name]
                 +--rw name    -&gt; /acl:acls/acl/name

     augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches:
       +--rw mud
          +--rw manufacturer?        inet:host
          +--rw same-manufacturer?   empty
          +--rw model?               inet:uri
          +--rw local-networks?      empty
          +--rw controller?          inet:uri
          +--rw my-controller?       empty
     augment
       /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches
          /acl:l4/acl:tcp/acl:tcp:
       +--rw direction-initiated?   direction

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>.  MUD Model Definitions for the Root "mud" Container</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>.  mud-version</span>

   This node specifies the integer version of the MUD specification.
   This memo specifies version 1.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>.  MUD URL</span>

   This URL identifies the MUD file.  This is useful when the file and
   associated signature are manually uploaded, say, in an offline mode.



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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>.  to-device-policy and from-device-policy Containers</span>

   [<a id="ref-RFC8519">RFC8519</a>] describes access lists.  In the case of MUD, a MUD file
   must be explicit in describing the communication pattern of a Thing,
   and that includes indicating what is to be permitted or denied in
   either direction of communication.  Hence, each of these containers
   indicates the appropriate direction of a flow in association with a
   particular Thing.  They contain references to specific access lists.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>.  last-update</span>

   This is a date-and-time value of when the MUD file was generated.
   This is akin to a version number.  Its form is taken from [<a href="./rfc6991" title="&quot;Common YANG Data Types&quot;">RFC6991</a>].

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>.  cache-validity</span>

   This uint8 is the period of time in hours that a network management
   station MUST wait since its last retrieval before checking for an
   update.  It is RECOMMENDED that this value be no less than 24, and it
   MUST NOT be more than 168 for any Thing that is supported.  This
   period SHOULD be no shorter than any period determined through HTTP
   caching directives (e.g., "cache-control" or "Expires").  N.B., the
   expiring of this timer does not require the MUD manager to discard
   the MUD file, nor terminate access to a Thing.  See <a href="#section-16">Section 16</a> for
   more information.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>.  is-supported</span>

   This boolean is an indication from the manufacturer to the network
   administrator as to whether or not the Thing is supported.  In this
   context, a Thing is said to not be supported if the manufacturer
   intends never to issue a firmware or software update to the Thing or
   never to update the MUD file.  A MUD manager MAY still periodically
   check for updates.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>.  systeminfo</span>

   This is a textual UTF-8 description of the Thing to be connected.
   The intent is for administrators to be able to see a brief
   displayable description of the Thing.  It SHOULD NOT exceed 60
   characters worth of display space.










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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.8" href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>.  mfg-name, software-rev, model-name, and firmware-rev</span>

   These optional fields are filled in as specified by [<a href="./rfc8348" title="&quot;A YANG Data Model for Hardware Management&quot;">RFC8348</a>].  Note
   that firmware-rev and software-rev MUST NOT be populated in a MUD
   file if the device can be upgraded but the MUD URL cannot be.  This
   would be the case, for instance, with MUD URLs that are contained in
   802.1AR certificates.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.9" href="#section-3.9">3.9</a>.  extensions</span>

   This optional leaf-list names MUD extensions that are used in the MUD
   file.  Note that MUD extensions MUST NOT be used in a MUD file
   without the extensions being declared.  Implementations MUST ignore
   any node in this file that they do not understand.

   Note that extensions can either extend the MUD file as described in
   the previous paragraph or reference other work.  An extension example
   can be found in <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>.  Augmentation to the ACL Model</span>

   Note that in this section, when we use the term "match", we are
   referring to the ACL model "matches" node.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>.  manufacturer</span>

   This node consists of a hostname that would be matched against the
   authority component of another Thing's MUD URL.  In its simplest
   form, "manufacturer" and "same-manufacturer" may be implemented as
   access lists.  In more complex forms, additional network capabilities
   may be used.  For example, if one saw the line "manufacturer" :
   "flobbidy.example.com", then all Things that registered with a MUD
   URL that contained flobbity.example.com in its authority section
   would match.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>.  same-manufacturer</span>

   This null-valued node is an equivalent for when the manufacturer
   element is used to indicate that the authority found in another
   Thing's MUD URL matches that of the authority found in this Thing's
   MUD URL.  For example, if the Thing's MUD URL were
   "https://b1.example.com/ThingV1", then all devices that had a MUD URL
   with an authority section of b1.example.com would match.








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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>.  documentation</span>

   This URI consists of a URL that points to documentation relating to
   the device and the MUD file.  This can prove particularly useful when
   the "controller" class is used, so that its use can be explained.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>.  model</span>

   This string matches the entire MUD URL, thus covering the model that
   is unique within the context of the authority.  It may contain not
   only model information, but versioning information as well, and any
   other information that the manufacturer wishes to add.  The intended
   use is for devices of this precise class to match, to permit or deny
   communication between one another.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>.  local-networks</span>

   This null-valued node expands to include local networks.  Its default
   expansion is that packets must not traverse toward a default route
   that is received from the router.  However, administrators may expand
   the expression as is appropriate in their deployments.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6" href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>.  controller</span>

   This URI specifies a value that a controller will register with the
   MUD manager.  The node then is expanded to the set of hosts that are
   so registered.  This node may also be a URN.  In this case, the URN
   describes a well-known service, such as DNS or NTP, that has been
   standardized.  Both of those URNs may be found in <a href="#section-17.7">Section 17.7</a>.

   When "my-controller" is used, it is possible that the administrator
   will be prompted to populate that class for each and every model.
   Use of "controller" with a named class allows the user to populate
   that class only once for many different models that a manufacturer
   may produce.

   Controller URIs MAY take the form of a URL (e.g., "http[s]://").
   However, MUD managers MUST NOT resolve and retrieve such files, and
   it is RECOMMENDED that there be no such file at this time, as their
   form and function may be defined at a point in the future.  For now,
   URLs should serve simply as class names and may be populated by the
   local deployment administrator.

   Great care should be taken by MUD managers when invoking the
   controller class in the form of URLs.  For one thing, it requires
   some understanding by the administrator as to when it is appropriate.





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   Pre-registration in such classes by controllers with the MUD server
   is encouraged.  The mechanism to do that is beyond the scope of this
   work.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7" href="#section-4.7">4.7</a>.  my-controller</span>

   This null-valued node signals to the MUD manager to use whatever
   mapping it has for this MUD URL to a particular group of hosts.  This
   may require prompting the administrator for class members.  Future
   work should seek to automate membership management.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8" href="#section-4.8">4.8</a>.  direction-initiated</span>

   This MUST only be applied to TCP.  This matches the direction in
   which a TCP connection is initiated.  When the direction initiated is
   "from-device", packets that are transmitted in the direction of a
   Thing MUST be dropped unless the Thing has first initiated a TCP
   connection.  By way of example, this node may be implemented in its
   simplest form by looking at naked SYN bits, but it may also be
   implemented through more stateful mechanisms.

   When applied, this matches packets when the flow was initiated in the
   corresponding direction.  [<a href="./rfc6092" title="&quot;Recommended Simple Security Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service&quot;">RFC6092</a>] specifies IPv6 guidance best
   practices.  While that document is scoped specifically to IPv6, its
   contents are applicable for IPv4 as well.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>.  Processing of the MUD File</span>

   To keep things relatively simple in addition to whatever definitions
   exist, we also apply two additional default behaviors:

   o  Anything not explicitly permitted is denied.

   o  Local DNS and NTP are, by default, permitted to and from the
      Thing.

   An explicit description of the defaults can be found in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.
   These are applied AFTER all other explicit rules.  Thus, a default
   behavior can be changed with a "drop" action.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>.  What Does a MUD URL Look Like?</span>

   MUD URLs are required to use the "https" scheme, in order to
   establish the MUD file server's identity and assure integrity of the
   MUD file.






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   Any "https://" URL can be a MUD URL.  For example:

     https://things.example.org/product_abc123/v5
     https://www.example.net/mudfiles/temperature_sensor/
     https://example.com/lightbulbs/colour/v1

   A manufacturer may construct a MUD URL in any way, so long as it
   makes use of the "https" scheme.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>.  The MUD YANG Model</span>

   &lt;CODE BEGINS&gt;file "ietf-mud@2019-01-28.yang"
   module ietf-mud {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud";
     prefix ietf-mud;

     import ietf-access-control-list {
       prefix acl;
     }
     import ietf-yang-types {
       prefix yang;
     }
     import ietf-inet-types {
       prefix inet;
     }

     organization
       "IETF OPSAWG (Operations and Management Area Working Group)";
     contact
       "WG Web: &lt;<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/</a>&gt;
        WG List: opsawg@ietf.org

        Author: Eliot Lear
                lear@cisco.com

        Author: Ralph Droms
                rdroms@gmail.com

        Author: Dan Romascanu
                dromasca@gmail.com
       ";
     description
       "This YANG module defines a component that augments the
        IETF description of an access list.  This specific module
        focuses on additional filters that include local, model,
        and same-manufacturer.




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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>             Manufacturer Usage Descriptions          March 2019</span>


        This module is intended to be serialized via JSON and stored
        as a file, as described in <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>.

        The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
        NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
        'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
        described in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> (<a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>) (<a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>) when, and only when,
        they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

        Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
        authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

        Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
        without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
        to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
        set forth in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
        Relating to IETF Documents
        (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>).

        This version of this YANG module is part of <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>; see
        the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

     revision 2019-01-28 {
       description
         "Initial proposed standard.";
       reference
         "<a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>: Manufacturer Usage Description
          Specification";
     }

     typedef direction {
       type enumeration {
         enum to-device {
           description
             "packets or flows destined to the target
              Thing.";
         }
         enum from-device {
           description
             "packets or flows destined from
              the target Thing.";
         }
       }
       description
         "Which way are we talking about?";
     }

     container mud {



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       presence "Enabled for this particular MUD URL";
       description
         "MUD-related information, as specified
          by <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>.";
       uses mud-grouping;
     }

     grouping mud-grouping {
       description
         "Information about when support ends (or ended)
          and when to refresh.";
       leaf mud-version {
         type uint8;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "This is the version of the MUD
            specification.  This memo specifies version 1.";
       }
       leaf mud-url {
         type inet:uri;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "This is the MUD URL associated with the entry found
            in a MUD file.";
       }
       leaf last-update {
         type yang:date-and-time;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "This is intended to be when the current MUD file
            was generated.  MUD managers SHOULD NOT check
            for updates between this time plus cache validity.";
       }
       leaf mud-signature {
         type inet:uri;
         description
           "A URI that resolves to a signature as
            described in this specification.";
       }
       leaf cache-validity {
         type uint8 {
           range "1..168";
         }
         units "hours";
         default "48";
         description
           "The information retrieved from the MUD server is
            valid for these many hours, after which it should



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            be refreshed.  N.B., MUD manager implementations
            need not discard MUD files beyond this period.";
       }
       leaf is-supported {
         type boolean;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "This boolean indicates whether or not the Thing is
            currently supported by the manufacturer.";
       }
       leaf systeminfo {
         type string;
         description
           "A UTF-8 description of this Thing.  This
            should be a brief description that may be
            displayed to the user to determine whether
            to allow the Thing on the
            network.";
       }
       leaf mfg-name {
         type string;
         description
           "Manufacturer name, as described in
            the ietf-hardware YANG module.";
       }
       leaf model-name {
         type string;
         description
           "Model name, as described in the
            ietf-hardware YANG module.";
       }
       leaf firmware-rev {
         type string;
         description
           "firmware-rev, as described in the
            ietf-hardware YANG module.  Note that this field
            MUST NOT be included when the device can be
            updated but the MUD URL cannot.";
       }
       leaf software-rev {
         type string;
         description
           "software-rev, as described in the
            ietf-hardware YANG module.  Note that this field
            MUST NOT be included when the device can be
            updated but the MUD URL cannot.";
       }
       leaf documentation {



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         type inet:uri;
         description
           "This URL points to documentation that
            relates to this device and any classes that it uses
            in its MUD file.  A caution: MUD managers need
            not resolve this URL on their own but rather simply
            provide it to the administrator.  Parsing HTML is
            not an intended function of a MUD manager.";
       }
       leaf-list extensions {
         type string {
           length "1..40";
         }
         description
           "A list of extension names that are used in this MUD
            file.  Each name is registered with the IANA and
            described in an RFC.";
       }
       container from-device-policy {
         description
           "The policies that should be enforced on traffic
            coming from the device.  These policies are not
            necessarily intended to be enforced at a single
            point but may be rendered by the controller to any
            relevant enforcement points in the network or
            elsewhere.";
         uses access-lists;
       }
       container to-device-policy {
         description
           "The policies that should be enforced on traffic
            going to the device.  These policies are not
            necessarily intended to be enforced at a single
            point but may be rendered by the controller to any
            relevant enforcement points in the network or
            elsewhere.";
         uses access-lists;
       }
     }

     grouping access-lists {
       description
         "A grouping for access lists in the context of device
          policy.";
       container access-lists {
         description
           "The access lists that should be applied to traffic
            to or from the device.";



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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>             Manufacturer Usage Descriptions          March 2019</span>


         list access-list {
           key "name";
           description
             "Each entry on this list refers to an ACL that
              should be present in the overall access list
              data model.  Each ACL is identified by name and
              type.";
           leaf name {
             type leafref {
               path "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:name";
             }
             description
               "The name of the ACL for this entry.";
           }
         }
       }
     }

     augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches" {
       description
         "adding abstractions to avoid the need of IP addresses.";
       container mud {
         description
           "MUD-specific matches.";
         leaf manufacturer {
           type inet:host;
           description
             "A domain that is intended to match the authority
              section of the MUD URL.  This node is used to specify
              one or more manufacturers a device should
              be authorized to access.";
         }
         leaf same-manufacturer {
           type empty;
           description
             "This node matches the authority section of the MUD URL
              of a Thing.  It is intended to grant access to all
              devices with the same authority section.";
         }
         leaf model {
           type inet:uri;
           description
             "Devices of the specified model type will match if
              they have an identical MUD URL.";
         }
         leaf local-networks {
           type empty;
           description



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             "IP addresses will match this node if they are
              considered local addresses.  A local address may be
              a list of locally defined prefixes and masks
              that indicate a particular administrative scope.";
         }
         leaf controller {
           type inet:uri;
           description
             "This node names a class that has associated with it
              zero or more IP addresses to match against.  These
              may be scoped to a manufacturer or via a standard
              URN.";
         }
         leaf my-controller {
           type empty;
           description
             "This node matches one or more network elements that
              have been configured to be the controller for this
              Thing, based on its MUD URL.";
         }
       }
     }
     augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches"
           + "/acl:l4/acl:tcp/acl:tcp" {
       description
         "add direction-initiated";
       leaf direction-initiated {
         type direction;
         description
           "This node matches based on which direction a
            connection was initiated.  The means by which that
            is determined is discussed in this document.";
       }
     }
   }
   &lt;CODE ENDS&gt;

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>.  The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model</span>

   This module specifies an extension to the IETF-ACL model such that
   domain names may be referenced by augmenting the "matches" node.
   Different implementations may deploy differing methods to maintain
   the mapping between the IP address and domain name, if indeed any are
   needed.  However, the intent is that resources that are referred to
   using a name should be authorized (or not) within an access list.






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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>             Manufacturer Usage Descriptions          March 2019</span>


   The structure of the change is as follows:

   module: ietf-acldns
     augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/
       acl:matches/acl:l3/acl:ipv4/acl:ipv4:
       +--rw src-dnsname?   inet:host
       +--rw dst-dnsname?   inet:host
     augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/
       acl:matches/acl:l3/acl:ipv6/acl:ipv6:
       +--rw src-dnsname?   inet:host
       +--rw dst-dnsname?   inet:host

   The choice of these particular points in the access control list
   model is based on the assumption that we are in some way referring to
   IP-related resources, as that is what the DNS returns.  A domain name
   in our context is defined in [<a href="./rfc6991" title="&quot;Common YANG Data Types&quot;">RFC6991</a>].  The augmentations are
   replicated across IPv4 and IPv6 to allow MUD file authors the ability
   to control the IP version that the Thing may utilize.

   The following nodes are defined.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>.  src-dnsname</span>

   The argument corresponds to a domain name of a source as specified by
   inet:host.  A number of means may be used to resolve hosts.  What is
   important is that such resolutions be consistent with ACLs that are
   required by Things to properly operate.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>.  dst-dnsname</span>

   The argument corresponds to a domain name of a destination as
   specified by inet:host.  See the previous section (<a href="#section-8.1">Section 8.1</a>)
   relating to resolution.

   Note that when using either of these with a MUD file, because access
   is associated with a particular Thing, MUD files MUST NOT contain
   either a src-dnsname in an ACL associated with from-device-policy or
   a dst-dnsname associated with to-device-policy.













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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.3" href="#section-8.3">8.3</a>.  The ietf-acldns Model</span>

   &lt;CODE BEGINS&gt;file "ietf-acldns@2019-01-28.yang"
   module ietf-acldns {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns";
     prefix ietf-acldns;

     import ietf-access-control-list {
       prefix acl;
     }
     import ietf-inet-types {
       prefix inet;
     }

     organization
       "IETF OPSAWG (Operations and Management Area Working Group)";
     contact
       "WG Web: &lt;<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/</a>&gt;
        WG List: opsawg@ietf.org

        Author: Eliot Lear
                lear@cisco.com

        Author: Ralph Droms
                rdroms@gmail.com

        Author: Dan Romascanu
                dromasca@gmail.com
       ";
     description
       "This YANG module defines a component that augments the
        IETF description of an access list to allow DNS names
        as matching criteria.

        Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
        authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

        Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
        without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
        to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
        set forth in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
        Relating to IETF Documents
        (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>).";

     revision 2019-01-28 {
       description
         "Base version of dnsname extension of the ACL model.";



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       reference
         "<a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>: Manufacturer Usage Description
          Specification";
     }

     grouping dns-matches {
       description
         "Domain names for matching.";
       leaf src-dnsname {
         type inet:host;
         description
           "domain name to be matched against.";
       }
       leaf dst-dnsname {
         type inet:host;
         description
           "domain name to be matched against.";
       }
     }

     augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches"
           + "/acl:l3/acl:ipv4/acl:ipv4" {
       description
         "Adding domain names to matching.";
       uses dns-matches;
     }
     augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches"
           + "/acl:l3/acl:ipv6/acl:ipv6" {
       description
         "Adding domain names to matching.";
       uses dns-matches;
     }
   }
   &lt;CODE ENDS&gt;

















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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>.  MUD File Example</span>

   This example contains two access lists that are intended to provide
   outbound access to a cloud service on TCP port 443.

   {
     "ietf-mud:mud": {
       "mud-version": 1,
       "mud-url": "https://lighting.example.com/lightbulb2000",
       "last-update": "2019-01-28T11:20:51+01:00",
       "cache-validity": 48,
       "is-supported": true,
       "systeminfo": "The BMS Example Light Bulb",
       "from-device-policy": {
         "access-lists": {
           "access-list": [
             {
               "name": "mud-76100-v6fr"
             }
           ]
         }
       },
       "to-device-policy": {
         "access-lists": {
           "access-list": [
             {
               "name": "mud-76100-v6to"
             }
           ]
         }
       }
     },
     "ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
       "acl": [
         {
           "name": "mud-76100-v6to",
           "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "cl0-todev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv6": {
                     "ietf-acldns:src-dnsname": "test.example.com",
                     "protocol": 6
                   },
                   "tcp": {
                     "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",



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                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 443
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         },
         {
           "name": "mud-76100-v6fr",
           "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "cl0-frdev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv6": {
                     "ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname": "test.example.com",
                     "protocol": 6
                   },
                   "tcp": {
                     "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 443
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   In this example, two policies are declared: one from the Thing and
   the other to the Thing.  Each policy names an access list that
   applies to the Thing and one that applies from the Thing.  Within
   each access list, access is permitted to packets flowing to or from



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   the Thing that can be mapped to the domain name of
   "service.bms.example.com".  For each access list, the enforcement
   point should expect that the Thing initiated the connection.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>.  The MUD URL DHCP Option</span>

   The IPv4 MUD URL client option has the following format:

     +------+-----+------------------------------
     | code | len |  MUDstring
     +------+-----+------------------------------

   Code OPTION_MUD_URL_V4 (161) has been assigned by IANA.  len is a
   single octet that indicates the length of the MUD string in octets.
   The MUDstring is defined as follows:

    MUDstring = mudurl [ " " reserved ]
    mudurl = URI; a URL [<a href="./rfc3986" title="&quot;Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;">RFC3986</a>] that uses the "https" scheme [<a href="./rfc7230" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing&quot;">RFC7230</a>]
    reserved = 1*( OCTET ) ; from [<a href="./rfc5234" title="&quot;Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF&quot;">RFC5234</a>]

   The entire option MUST NOT exceed 255 octets.  If a space follows the
   MUD URL, a reserved string that will be defined in future
   specifications follows.  MUD managers that do not understand this
   field MUST ignore it.

   The IPv6 MUD URL client option has the following format:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |         OPTION_MUD_URL_V6     |        option-length          |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                            MUDstring                          |
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 (112).

   option-length contains the length of the MUDstring, as defined above,
   in octets.

   The intent of this option is to provide both a new Thing classifier
   to the network as well as some recommended configuration to the
   routers that implement the policy.  However, it is entirely the
   purview of the network system as managed by the network administrator
   to decide what to do with this information.  The key function of this





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   option is simply to identify the type of Thing to the network in a
   structured way such that the policy can be easily found with existing
   toolsets.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.1" href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>.  Client Behavior</span>

   A DHCPv4 client MAY emit a DHCPv4 option, and a DHCPv6 client MAY
   emit a DHCPv6 option.  These options are singletons, as specified in
   [<a href="./rfc7227" title="&quot;Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options&quot;">RFC7227</a>].  Because clients are intended to have at most one MUD URL
   associated with them, they may emit at most one MUD URL option via
   DHCPv4 and one MUD URL option via DHCPv6.  In the case where both v4
   and v6 DHCP options are emitted, the same URL MUST be used.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.2" href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>.  Server Behavior</span>

   A DHCP server may ignore these options or take action based on
   receipt of these options.  When a server consumes this option, it
   will either forward the URL and relevant client information (such as
   the gateway address or giaddr and requested IP address, and lease
   length) to a network management system or retrieve the usage
   description itself by resolving the URL.

   DHCP servers may implement MUD functionality themselves or they may
   pass along appropriate information to a network management system or
   MUD manager.  A DHCP server that does process the MUD URL MUST adhere
   to the process specified in [<a href="./rfc2818" title="&quot;HTTP Over TLS&quot;">RFC2818</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>] to validate the
   TLS certificate of the web server hosting the MUD file.  Those
   servers will retrieve the file, process it, and create and install
   the necessary configuration on the relevant network element.  Servers
   SHOULD monitor the gateway for state changes on a given interface.  A
   DHCP server that does not provide MUD functionality and has forwarded
   a MUD URL to a MUD manager MUST notify the MUD manager of any
   corresponding change to the DHCP state of the client (such as
   expiration or explicit release of a network address lease).

   Should the DHCP server fail, in the case when it implements the MUD
   manager functionality, any backup mechanisms SHOULD include the MUD
   state, and the server SHOULD resolve the status of clients upon its
   restart, similar to what it would do absent MUD manager
   functionality.  In the case where the DHCP server forwards
   information to the MUD manager, the MUD manager will either make use
   of redundant DHCP servers for information or clear state based on
   other network information, such as monitoring port status on a switch
   via SNMP, Radius accounting, or similar mechanisms.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.3" href="#section-10.3">10.3</a>.  Relay Requirements</span>

   There are no additional requirements for relays.



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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>.  The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension</span>

   This section defines an X.509 non-critical certificate extension that
   contains a single URL that points to an online Manufacturer Usage
   Description concerning the certificate subject.  The URI must be
   represented as described in <a href="./rfc5280#section-7.4">Section&nbsp;7.4 of [RFC5280]</a>.

   Any Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) MUST be mapped to
   URIs as specified in <a href="./rfc3987#section-3.1">Section&nbsp;3.1 of [RFC3987]</a> before they are placed
   in the certificate extension.

   The semantics of the URL are defined <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> of this document.

   The choice of id-pe is based on guidance found in <a href="./rfc5280#section-4.2.2">Section&nbsp;4.2.2 of
   [RFC5280]</a>:

         These extensions may be used to direct applications to on-line
         information about the issuer or the subject.

   The MUD URL is precisely that: online information about the
   particular subject.

   In addition, a separate new extension is defined as id-pe-mudsigner.
   This contains the subject field of the signing certificate of the MUD
   file.  Processing of this field is specified in <a href="#section-13.2">Section 13.2</a>.

   The purpose of this signature is to make a claim that the MUD file
   found on the server is valid for a given device, independent of any
   other factors.  There are several security considerations below in
   <a href="#section-16">Section 16</a>.

   A new content-type id-ct-mud is also defined.  While signatures are
   detached today, should a MUD file be transmitted as part of a
   Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) message, this content-type SHOULD
   be used.
















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   This module imports from [<a href="./rfc5912" title="&quot;New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)&quot;">RFC5912</a>] and [<a href="./rfc6268" title="&quot;Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)&quot;">RFC6268</a>].  The new extension
   is identified as follows:

   &lt;CODE BEGINS&gt;
      MUDURLExtnModule-2016 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
                   internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
                   id-mod(0) id-mod-mudURLExtn2016(88) }
       DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

       -- EXPORTS ALL --

      IMPORTS

        -- <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a>
        EXTENSION
        FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
             { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
               security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
               id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }

        -- <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a>
        id-ct
        FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
             { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
               security(5)  mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
               id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }

        -- <a href="./rfc6268">RFC 6268</a>
        CONTENT-TYPE
        FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
          { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
            pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }

        -- <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a>
        id-pe, Name
        FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
              { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
                security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
                id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ;

       --
       -- Certificate Extensions
       --

       MUDCertExtensions EXTENSION ::=
          { ext-MUDURL | ext-MUDsigner, ... }

       ext-MUDURL EXTENSION ::=



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          { SYNTAX MUDURLSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mud-url }

       id-pe-mud-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 25 }

       MUDURLSyntax ::= IA5String

       ext-MUDsigner EXTENSION ::=
          { SYNTAX MUDsignerSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mudsigner }

       id-pe-mudsigner OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 30 }

       MUDsignerSyntax ::= Name

       --
       -- CMS Content Types
       --

       MUDContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::=
          { ct-mud, ... }

        ct-mud CONTENT-TYPE ::=
          { -- directly include the content
            IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-mudtype }
          -- The binary data that is in the form
          -- "application/mud+json" is directly encoded as the
          -- signed data.  No additional ASN.1 encoding is added.

       id-ct-mudtype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 41 }

       END
   &lt;CODE ENDS&gt;

   While this extension can appear in either an 802.AR manufacturer
   certificate (IDevID) or a deployment certificate (LDevID), of course
   it is not guaranteed in either, nor is it guaranteed to be carried
   over.  It is RECOMMENDED that MUD manager implementations maintain a
   table that maps a Thing to its MUD URL based on IDevIDs.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>.  The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP Extension</span>

   The IEEE802.1AB Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) is a one-hop,
   vendor-neutral link-layer protocol used by end host network Things
   for advertising their identity, capabilities, and neighbors on an
   IEEE 802 local area network.  Its Type-Length-Value (TLV) design
   allows for "vendor-specific" extensions to be defined.  IANA has a
   registered IEEE 802 organizationally unique identifier (OUI) defined
   as documented in [<a href="./rfc7042" title="&quot;IANA Considerations and IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE 802 Parameters&quot;">RFC7042</a>].  The MUD LLDP extension uses a subtype
   defined in this document to carry the MUD URL.



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   The LLDP vendor-specific frame has the following format:

   +--------+--------+----------+---------+--------------
   |TLV Type|  len   |   OUI    |subtype  | MUDString
   |  =127  |        |= 00 00 5E|  = 1    |
   |(7 bits)|(9 bits)|(3 octets)|(1 octet)|(1-255 octets)
   +--------+--------+----------+---------+--------------

   where:

   o  TLV Type = 127 indicates a vendor-specific TLV

   o  len = indicates the TLV string length

   o  OUI = 00 00 5E is the organizationally unique identifier of IANA

   o  subtype = 1 (as assigned by IANA for the MUDstring)

   o  MUDstring = the length MUST NOT exceed 255 octets

   The intent of this extension is to provide both a new Thing
   classifier to the network as well as some recommended configuration
   to the routers that implement the policy.  However, it is entirely
   the purview of the network system as managed by the network
   administrator to decide what to do with this information.  The key
   function of this extension is simply to identify the type of Thing to
   the network in a structured way such that the policy can be easily
   found with existing toolsets.

   Hosts, routers, or other network elements that implement this option
   are intended to have at most one MUD URL associated with them, so
   they may transmit at most one MUD URL value.

   Hosts, routers, or other network elements that implement this option
   may ignore these options or take action based on receipt of these
   options.  For example, they may fill in information in the respective
   extensions of the LLDP Management Information Base (MIB).  LLDP
   operates in a one-way direction.  Link Layer Discovery Protocol Data
   Units (LLDPDUs) are not exchanged as information requests by one
   Thing and responses sent by another Thing.  The other Things do not
   acknowledge LLDP information received from a Thing.  No specific
   network behavior is guaranteed.  When a Thing consumes this
   extension, it may either forward the URL and relevant remote Thing
   information to a MUD manager or retrieve the usage description by
   resolving the URL in accordance with normal HTTP semantics.






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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-13" href="#section-13">13</a>.  The Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files</span>

   Because MUD files contain information that may be used to configure
   network access lists, they are sensitive.  To ensure that they have
   not been tampered with, it is important that they be signed.  We make
   use of DER-encoded Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [<a href="./rfc5652" title="&quot;Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)&quot;">RFC5652</a>] for
   this purpose.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-13.1" href="#section-13.1">13.1</a>.  Creating a MUD File Signature</span>

   A MUD file MUST be signed using CMS as an opaque binary object.  In
   order to make successful verification more likely, intermediate
   certificates SHOULD be included.  The signature is stored at the
   location specified in the MUD file.  Signatures are transferred using
   content-type "application/pkcs7-signature".

   For example:

   % openssl cms -sign -signer mancertfile -inkey mankey \
                 -in mudfile -binary -outform DER -binary \
                 -certfile intermediatecert -out mudfile.p7s

   Note: A MUD file may need to be re-signed if the signature expires.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-13.2" href="#section-13.2">13.2</a>.  Verifying a MUD File Signature</span>

   Prior to processing the rest of a MUD file, the MUD manager MUST
   retrieve the MUD signature file by retrieving the value of "mud-
   signature" and validating the signature across the MUD file.  The Key
   Usage Extension in the signing certificate MUST be present and have
   the bit digitalSignature(0) set.  When the id-pe-mudsigner extension
   is present in a device's X.509 certificate, the MUD signature file
   MUST have been generated by a certificate whose subject matches the
   contents of that id-pe-mudsigner extension.  If these conditions are
   not met, or if it cannot validate the chain of trust to a known trust
   anchor, the MUD manager MUST cease processing the MUD file until an
   administrator has given approval.

   The purpose of the signature on the file is to assign accountability
   to an entity, whose reputation can be used to guide administrators on
   whether or not to accept a given MUD file.  It is already common
   place to check web reputation on the location of a server on which a
   file resides.  While it is likely that the manufacturer will be the
   signer of the file, this is not strictly necessary, and it may not be
   desirable.  For one thing, in some environments, integrators may
   install their own certificates.  For another, what is more important
   is the accountability of the recommendation, and not just the
   relationship between the Thing and the file.



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   An example:

   % openssl cms -verify -in mudfile.p7s -inform DER -content mudfile

   Note the additional step of verifying the common trust root.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-14" href="#section-14">14</a>.  Extensibility</span>

   One of our design goals is to see that MUD files are able to be
   understood by as broad a cross-section of systems as is possible.
   Coupled with the fact that we have also chosen to leverage existing
   mechanisms, we are left with no ability to negotiate extensions and a
   limited desire for those extensions in any event.  As such, a two-
   tier extensibility framework is employed, as follows:

   1.  At a coarse grain, a protocol version is included in a MUD URL.
       This memo specifies MUD version 1.  Any and all changes are
       entertained when this version is bumped.  Transition approaches
       between versions would be a matter for discussion in future
       versions.

   2.  At a finer grain, only extensions that would not incur additional
       risk to the Thing are permitted.  Specifically, adding nodes to
       the mud container is permitted with the understanding that such
       additions will be ignored by unaware implementations.  Any such
       extensions SHALL be standardized through the IETF process and
       MUST be named in the "extensions" list.  MUD managers MUST ignore
       YANG nodes they do not understand and SHOULD create an exception
       to be resolved by an administrator, so as to avoid any policy
       inconsistencies.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-15" href="#section-15">15</a>.  Deployment Considerations</span>

   Because MUD consists of a number of architectural building blocks, it
   is possible to assemble different deployment scenarios.  One key
   aspect is where to place policy enforcement.  In order to protect the
   Thing from other Things within a local deployment, policy can be
   enforced on the nearest switch or access point.  In order to limit
   unwanted traffic within a network, it may also be advisable to
   enforce policy as close to the Internet as possible.  In some
   circumstances, policy enforcement may not be available at the closest
   hop.  At that point, the risk of lateral infection (infection of
   devices that reside near one another) is increased to the number of
   Things that are able to communicate without protection.

   A caution about some of the classes: admission of a Thing into the
   "manufacturer" and "same-manufacturer" class may have impact on the
   access of other Things.  Put another way, the admission may grow the



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   access list on switches connected to other Things, depending on how
   access is managed.  Some care should be given on managing that access
   list growth.  Alternative methods such as additional network
   segmentation can be used to keep that growth within reason.

   Because as of this writing MUD is a new concept, one can expect a
   great many devices to not have implemented it.  It remains a local
   deployment decision as to whether a device that is first connected
   should be allowed broad or limited access.  Furthermore, as mentioned
   in the introduction, a deployment may choose to ignore a MUD policy
   in its entirety and simply take into account the MUD URL as a
   classifier to be used as part of a local policy decision.

   Finally, please see directly below information regarding device
   lifetimes and use of domain names.

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-16" href="#section-16">16</a>.  Security Considerations</span>

   Based on how a MUD URL is emitted, a Thing may be able to lie about
   what it is, thus gaining additional network access.  This can happen
   in a number of ways when a device emits a MUD URL using DHCP or LLDP,
   such as being inappropriately admitted to a class such as
   "same-manufacturer", being given access to a device such as
   "my-controller", or being permitted access to an Internet resource,
   where such access would otherwise be disallowed.  Whether that is the
   case will depend on the deployment.  Implementations SHOULD be
   configurable to disallow additive access for devices using MUD URLs
   that are not emitted in a secure fashion such as in a certificate.
   Similarly, implementations SHOULD NOT grant elevated permissions
   (beyond those of devices presenting no MUD policy) to devices that do
   not strongly bind their identity to their L2/L3 transmissions.  When
   insecure methods are used by the MUD manager, the classes SHOULD NOT
   contain devices that use both insecure and secure methods, in order
   to prevent privilege escalation attacks, and MUST NOT contain devices
   with the same MUD URL that are derived from both strong and weak
   authentication methods.

   Devices may forge source (L2/L3) information.  Deployments should
   apply appropriate protections to bind communications to the
   authentication that has taken place.  For 802.1X authentication, IEEE
   802.1AE (MACsec) [<a href="#ref-IEEE8021AE">IEEE8021AE</a>] is one means by which this may happen.
   A similar approach can be used with 802.11i (Wi-Fi Protected Access 2
   (WPA2)) [<a href="#ref-IEEE80211i">IEEE80211i</a>].  Other means are available with other lower-
   layer technologies.  Implementations using session-oriented access
   that is not cryptographically bound should take care to remove state
   when any form of break in the session is detected.





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   A rogue certification authority (CA) may sign a certificate that
   contains the same subject name as is listed in the MUDsigner field in
   the manufacturer certificate, thus seemingly permitting a substitute
   MUD file for a device.  There are two mitigations available: First,
   if the signer changes, this may be flagged as an exception by the MUD
   manager.  Second, if the MUD file also changes, the MUD manager
   SHOULD seek administrator approval (it should do this in any case).
   In all circumstances, the MUD manager MUST maintain a cache of
   trusted CAs for this purpose.  When such a rogue is discovered, it
   SHOULD be removed.

   Additional mitigations are described below.

   When certificates are not present, Things claiming to be of a certain
   manufacturer SHOULD NOT be included in that manufacturer grouping
   without additional validation of some form.  This will be relevant
   when the MUD manager makes use of primitives such as "manufacturer"
   for the purpose of accessing Things of a particular type.  Similarly,
   network management systems may be able to fingerprint the Thing.  In
   such cases, the MUD URL can act as a classifier that can be proven or
   disproven.  Fingerprinting may have other advantages as well: when
   802.1AR certificates are used, because they themselves cannot change,
   fingerprinting offers the opportunity to add artifacts to the MUD
   string in the form of the reserved field discussed in <a href="#section-10">Section 10</a>.
   The meaning of such artifacts is left as future work.

   MUD managers SHOULD NOT accept a usage description for a Thing with
   the same Media Access Control (MAC) address that has indicated a
   change of the URL authority without some additional validation (such
   as review by a network administrator).  New Things that present some
   form of unauthenticated MUD URL SHOULD be validated by some external
   means when they would be given increased network access.

   It may be possible for a rogue manufacturer to inappropriately
   exercise the MUD file parser, in order to exploit a vulnerability.
   There are two recommended approaches to address this threat.  The
   first is to validate that the signer of the MUD file is known to and
   trusted by the MUD manager.  The second is to have a system do a
   primary scan of the file to ensure that it is both parseable and
   believable at some level.  MUD files will likely be relatively small,
   to start with.  The number of ACEs used by any given Thing should be
   relatively small as well.  It may also be useful to limit retrieval
   of MUD URLs to only those sites that are known to have decent web or
   domain reputations.

   Use of a URL necessitates the use of domain names.  If a domain name
   changes ownership, the new owner of that domain may be able to
   provide MUD files that MUD managers would consider valid.  MUD



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   managers SHOULD cache certificates used by the MUD file server.  When
   a new certificate is retrieved for whatever reason, the MUD manager
   should check to see if ownership of the domain has changed.  A fair
   programmatic approximation of this is when the name servers for the
   domain have changed.  If the actual MUD file has changed, the MUD
   manager MAY check the WHOIS database to see if registration ownership
   of a domain has changed.  If a change has occurred, or if for some
   reason it is not possible to determine whether ownership has changed,
   further review may be warranted.  Note, this remediation does not
   take into account the case of a Thing that was produced long ago and
   only recently fielded, or the case where a new MUD manager has been
   installed.

   The release of a MUD URL by a Thing reveals what the Thing is and
   provides an attacker with guidance on what vulnerabilities may be
   present.

   While the MUD URL itself is not intended to be unique to a specific
   Thing, the release of the URL may aid an observer in identifying
   individuals when combined with other information.  This is a privacy
   consideration.

   In addressing both of these concerns, implementors should take into
   account what other information they are advertising through
   mechanisms such as Multicast DNS (mDNS) [<a href="./rfc6872" title="&quot;The Common Log Format (CLF) for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Framework and Information Model&quot;">RFC6872</a>]; how a Thing might
   otherwise be identified, perhaps through how it behaves when it is
   connected to the network; and whether a Thing is intended to be used
   by individuals or carry personal identifying information, and then
   apply appropriate data minimization techniques.  One approach is to
   make use of TEAP [<a href="./rfc7170" title="&quot;Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version 1&quot;">RFC7170</a>] as the means to share information with
   authorized components in the network.  Network elements may also
   assist in limiting access to the MUD URL through the use of
   mechanisms such as DHCPv6-Shield [<a href="./rfc7610" title="&quot;DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers&quot;">RFC7610</a>].

   There is the risk of the MUD manager itself being spied on to
   determine what things are connected to the network.  To address this
   risk, MUD managers may choose to make use of TLS proxies that they
   trust that would aggregate other information.

   Please note that the security considerations mentioned in <a href="./rfc8407#section-3.7">Section&nbsp;3.7
   of [RFC8407]</a> are not applicable in this case because the YANG
   serialization is not intended to be accessed via NETCONF.  However,
   for those who try to instantiate this model in a network element via
   the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF), all objects in each
   model in this document exhibit similar security characteristics as
   [<a href="./rfc8519" title="&quot;YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)&quot;">RFC8519</a>].  The basic purpose of MUD is to configure access, so by
   its very nature, it can be disruptive if used by unauthorized
   parties.



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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-17" href="#section-17">17</a>.  IANA Considerations</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-17.1" href="#section-17.1">17.1</a>.  YANG Module Registrations</span>

   The following YANG modules have been registered in the "YANG Module
   Names" registry:

      Name: ietf-mud
      URN: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud
      Prefix: ietf-mud
      Registrant contact: The IESG
      Reference: <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>

      Name: ietf-acldns
      URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns
      Prefix: ietf-acldns
      Registrant contact: The IESG
      Reference: <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-17.2" href="#section-17.2">17.2</a>.  URI Registrations</span>

   IANA has added the following entries to the "IETF XML registry":

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns
   Registrant Contact: The IESG.
   XML: N/A.  The requested URI is an XML namespace.

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud
   Registrant Contact: The IESG.
   XML: N/A.  The requested URI is an XML namespace.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-17.3" href="#section-17.3">17.3</a>.  DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options</span>

   The IANA has allocated OPTION_MUD_URL_V4 (161) in the "Dynamic Host
   Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP)
   Parameters" registry, and OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 (112) in the "Dynamic
   Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)" registry, as described
   in <a href="#section-10">Section 10</a>.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-17.4" href="#section-17.4">17.4</a>.  PKIX Extensions</span>

   IANA has made the following assignments for:

   o  The MUDURLExtnModule-2016 ASN.1 module (88) in the "SMI Security
      for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).

   o  id-pe-mud-url object identifier (25) from the "SMI Security for
      PKIX Certificate Extension" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1).



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   o  id-pe-mudsigner object identifier (30) from the "SMI Security for
      PKIX Certificate Extension" registry.

   o  id-ct-mudtype object identifier (41) from the "SMI Security for
      S/MIME CMS Content Type" registry.

   o  The use of these values is specified in <a href="#section-11">Section 11</a>.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-17.5" href="#section-17.5">17.5</a>.  Media Type Registration for MUD Files</span>

   The following media type is defined for the transfer of MUD files:

   o  Type name: application

   o  Subtype name: mud+json

   o  Required parameters: N/A

   o  Optional parameters: N/A

   o  Encoding considerations: 8bit; "application/mud+json" values are
      represented as JSON objects; UTF-8 encoding MUST be employed
      [<a href="./rfc3629" title="&quot;UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646&quot;">RFC3629</a>].

   o  Security considerations: See Security Considerations of <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>
      and <a href="./rfc8259#section-12">Section&nbsp;12 of [RFC8259]</a>.

   o  Interoperability considerations: N/A

   o  Published specification: <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>

   o  Applications that use this media type: MUD managers as specified
      by <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>.

   o  Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   o  Additional information:
      Magic number(s): N/A
      File extension(s): N/A
      Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   o  Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:
      Eliot Lear &lt;lear@cisco.com&gt;, Ralph Droms &lt;rdroms@gmail.com&gt;,
      Dan Romascanu &lt;dromasca@gmail.com&gt;

   o  Intended usage: COMMON

   o  Restrictions on usage: none



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   o  Author:
      Eliot Lear &lt;lear@cisco.com&gt;
      Ralph Droms &lt;rdroms@gmail.com&gt;
      Dan Romascanu &lt;dromasca@gmail.com&gt;

   o  Change controller: IESG

   o  Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-17.6" href="#section-17.6">17.6</a>.  IANA LLDP TLV Subtype Registry</span>

   IANA has created a new registry titled "IANA Link Layer Discovery
   Protocol (LLDP) TLV Subtypes" under "IEEE 802 Numbers".  The policy
   for this registry is Expert Review [<a href="./rfc8126" title="">RFC8126</a>].  The maximum number of
   entries in the registry is 256.

   IANA has populated the initial registry as follows:

   LLDP subtype value: 1 (All the other 255 values are initially marked
   as "Unassigned".)

   Description: the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) Uniform
   Resource Locator (URL)

   Reference: <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-17.7" href="#section-17.7">17.7</a>.  The MUD Well-Known Universal Resource Name (URNs)</span>

   The following parameter registry has been added in accordance with
   [<a href="./rfc3553" title="&quot;An IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameters&quot;">RFC3553</a>].

      Registry name: MUD Well-Known Universal Resource Name (URN)
      Specification: <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>
      Repository: <a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/mud">https://www.iana.org/assignments/mud</a>
      Index value:  Encoded identically to a TCP/UDP port service
                    name, as specified in <a href="./rfc6335#section-5.1">Section&nbsp;5.1 of [RFC6335]</a>

   The following entries have been added to the "MUD Well-Known
   Universal Resource Name (URN)" registry:

   "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" refers to the service specified by
   [<a href="./rfc1123" title="&quot;Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and Support&quot;">RFC1123</a>].  "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp" refers to the service specified
   by [<a href="./rfc5905" title="&quot;Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification&quot;">RFC5905</a>].








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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-17.8" href="#section-17.8">17.8</a>.  Extensions Registry</span>

   The IANA has established a registry of extensions as follows:

      Registry name: MUD Extensions
      Registry policy: Standards Action
      Reference: <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>
      Extension name: UTF-8-encoded string, not to exceed 40 characters.

   Each extension MUST follow the rules specified in this specification.
   As is usual, the IANA issues early allocations in accordance with
   [<a href="./rfc7120" title="&quot;Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code Points&quot;">RFC7120</a>].

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-18" href="#section-18">18</a>.  References</span>

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-18.1" href="#section-18.1">18.1</a>.  Normative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-IEEE8021AB">IEEE8021AB</a>]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
              Networks-- Station and Media Access Control Connectivity
              Discovery", IEEE 802.1AB.

   [<a id="ref-RFC1123">RFC1123</a>]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Application and Support", STD 3, <a href="./rfc1123">RFC 1123</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC2131">RFC2131</a>]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              <a href="./rfc2131">RFC 2131</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC2818">RFC2818</a>]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", <a href="./rfc2818">RFC 2818</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3629">RFC3629</a>]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, <a href="./rfc3629">RFC 3629</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
              2003, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3748">RFC3748</a>]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP)", <a href="./rfc3748">RFC 3748</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748</a>&gt;.



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   [<a id="ref-RFC3986">RFC3986</a>]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              <a href="./rfc3986">RFC 3986</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC3987">RFC3987</a>]  Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource
              Identifiers (IRIs)", <a href="./rfc3987">RFC 3987</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3987,
              January 2005, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5234">RFC5234</a>]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, <a href="./rfc5234">RFC 5234</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5280">RFC5280</a>]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5652">RFC5652</a>]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              <a href="./rfc5652">RFC 5652</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5905">RFC5905</a>]  Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
              "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
              Specification", <a href="./rfc5905">RFC 5905</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC5912">RFC5912</a>]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6268">RFC6268</a>]  Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
              for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
              Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", <a href="./rfc6268">RFC 6268</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6335">RFC6335</a>]  Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
              Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
              Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
              Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp165">BCP 165</a>,
              <a href="./rfc6335">RFC 6335</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335</a>&gt;.





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   [<a id="ref-RFC6991">RFC6991</a>]  Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
              <a href="./rfc6991">RFC 6991</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7120">RFC7120</a>]  Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
              Points", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp100">BCP 100</a>, <a href="./rfc7120">RFC 7120</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
              2014, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7120">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7120</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7227">RFC7227</a>]  Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
              S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
              <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp187">BCP 187</a>, <a href="./rfc7227">RFC 7227</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7230">RFC7230</a>]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              <a href="./rfc7230">RFC 7230</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7231">RFC7231</a>]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", <a href="./rfc7231">RFC 7231</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7610">RFC7610</a>]  Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
              Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp199">BCP 199</a>,
              <a href="./rfc7610">RFC 7610</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7950">RFC7950</a>]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              <a href="./rfc7950">RFC 7950</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7951">RFC7951</a>]  Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
              <a href="./rfc7951">RFC 7951</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a>
              <a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC8259">RFC8259</a>]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", STD 90, <a href="./rfc8259">RFC 8259</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC8340">RFC8340</a>]  Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
              <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp215">BCP 215</a>, <a href="./rfc8340">RFC 8340</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340</a>&gt;.



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   [<a id="ref-RFC8348">RFC8348</a>]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Dong, J., and D. Romascanu, "A
              YANG Data Model for Hardware Management", <a href="./rfc8348">RFC 8348</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8348, March 2018,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8348">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8348</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC8415">RFC8415</a>]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              <a href="./rfc8415">RFC 8415</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC8519">RFC8519</a>]  Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
              "YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)",
              <a href="./rfc8519">RFC 8519</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8519">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8519</a>&gt;.

<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-18.2" href="#section-18.2">18.2</a>.  Informative References</span>

   [<a id="ref-FW95">FW95</a>]     Chapman, D. and E. Zwicky, "Building Internet Firewalls",
              First Edition, November 1995.

   [<a id="ref-IEEE80211i">IEEE80211i</a>]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for information technology-
              Telecommunications and information exchange between
              systems-Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific
              requirements-Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
              (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications: Amendment
              6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements",
              IEEE 802.11i.

   [<a id="ref-IEEE8021AE">IEEE8021AE</a>]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
              networks-Media Access Control (MAC) Security",
              IEEE 802.1AE.

   [<a id="ref-IEEE8021AR">IEEE8021AR</a>]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
              networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR.

   [<a id="ref-IEEE8021X">IEEE8021X</a>]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
              networks--Port-Based Network Access Control", IEEE 802.1X.

   [<a id="ref-RFC1984">RFC1984</a>]  IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic
              Technology and the Internet", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp200">BCP 200</a>, <a href="./rfc1984">RFC 1984</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1984">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1984</a>&gt;.




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   [<a id="ref-RFC3553">RFC3553</a>]  Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
              IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
              Parameters", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp73">BCP 73</a>, <a href="./rfc3553">RFC 3553</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3553, June
              2003, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3553">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3553</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6092">RFC6092</a>]  Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security
              Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
              Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", <a href="./rfc6092">RFC 6092</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC6872">RFC6872</a>]  Gurbani, V., Ed., Burger, E., Ed., Anjali, T., Abdelnur,
              H., and O. Festor, "The Common Log Format (CLF) for the
              Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Framework and
              Information Model", <a href="./rfc6872">RFC 6872</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC6872,
              February 2013, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6872">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6872</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7042">RFC7042</a>]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and J. Abley, "IANA Considerations and
              IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE 802
              Parameters", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp141">BCP 141</a>, <a href="./rfc7042">RFC 7042</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7042,
              October 2013, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7042">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7042</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7170">RFC7170</a>]  Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
              "Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
              1", <a href="./rfc7170">RFC 7170</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7252">RFC7252</a>]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", <a href="./rfc7252">RFC 7252</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7452">RFC7452</a>]  Tschofenig, H., Arkko, J., Thaler, D., and D. McPherson,
              "Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking",
              <a href="./rfc7452">RFC 7452</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7452, March 2015,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7452">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7452</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC7488">RFC7488</a>]  Boucadair, M., Penno, R., Wing, D., Patil, P., and T.
              Reddy, "Port Control Protocol (PCP) Server Selection",
              <a href="./rfc7488">RFC 7488</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7488, March 2015,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7488">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7488</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC8126">RFC8126</a>]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp26">BCP 26</a>,
              <a href="./rfc8126">RFC 8126</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126</a>&gt;.





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   [<a id="ref-RFC8343">RFC8343</a>]  Bjorklund, M., "A YANG Data Model for Interface
              Management", <a href="./rfc8343">RFC 8343</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8343, March 2018,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8343">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8343</a>&gt;.

   [<a id="ref-RFC8407">RFC8407</a>]  Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
              Documents Containing YANG Data Models", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp216">BCP 216</a>, <a href="./rfc8407">RFC 8407</a>,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
              &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407</a>&gt;.











































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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.  Default MUD Nodes</span>

   What follows is the portion of a MUD file that permits DNS traffic to
   a controller that is registered with the URN
   "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" and traffic NTP to a controller that is
   registered with "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp".  This is considered the
   default behavior, and the ACEs are in effect appended to whatever
   other "ace" entries that a MUD file contains.  To block DNS or NTP,
   one repeats the matching statement but replaces the "forwarding"
   action "accept" with "drop".  Because ACEs are processed in the order
   they are received, the defaults would not be reached.  A MUD manager
   might further decide to optimize to simply not include the defaults
   when they are overridden.

   Four "acl" list entries that implement default MUD nodes are listed
   below.  Two are for IPv4 and two are for IPv6 (one in each direction
   for both versions of IP).  Note that neither the access list name nor
   the ace name need be retained or used in any way by local
   implementations; they are simply there for the sake of completeness.

    "ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
       "acl": [
         {
           "name": "mud-59776-v4to",
           "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "ent0-todev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:mud": {
                     "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
                   },
                   "ipv4": {
                     "protocol": 17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 53
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               },
               {



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                 "name": "ent1-todev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:mud": {
                     "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
                   },
                   "ipv4": {
                     "protocol": 17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 123
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         },
         {
           "name": "mud-59776-v4fr",
           "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "ent0-frdev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:mud": {
                     "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
                   },
                   "ipv4": {
                     "protocol": 17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 53
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               },
               {



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                 "name": "ent1-frdev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:mud": {
                     "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
                   },
                   "ipv4": {
                     "protocol": 17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 123
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         },
         {
           "name": "mud-59776-v6to",
           "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "ent0-todev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:mud": {
                     "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
                   },
                   "ipv6": {
                     "protocol": 17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 53
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               },
               {



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                 "name": "ent1-todev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:mud": {
                     "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
                   },
                   "ipv6": {
                     "protocol": 17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 123
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         },
         {
           "name": "mud-59776-v6fr",
           "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "ent0-frdev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:mud": {
                     "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
                   },
                   "ipv6": {
                     "protocol": 17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 53
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               },
               {



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                 "name": "ent1-frdev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:mud": {
                     "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
                   },
                   "ipv6": {
                     "protocol": 17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 123
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         }
       ]
     }

<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B" href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>.  A Sample Extension: DETNET-indicator</span>

   In this sample extension, we augment the core MUD model to indicate
   whether the device implements DETNET.  If a device claims not to use
   DETNET, but then later attempts to do so, a notification or exception
   might be generated.  Note that this example is intended only for
   illustrative purposes.

 Extension Name: "Example-Extension" (to be used in the extensions list)
 Standard: <a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a> (but do not register the example)

   This extension augments the MUD model to include a single node, using
   the following sample module that has the following tree structure:

   module: ietf-mud-detext-example
     augment /ietf-mud:mud:
       +--rw is-detnet-required?   boolean









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   The model is defined as follows:

   &lt;CODE BEGINS&gt;file "ietf-mud-detext-example@2019-01-28.yang"
   module ietf-mud-detext-example {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-detext-example";
     prefix ietf-mud-detext-example;

     import ietf-mud {
       prefix ietf-mud;
     }

     organization
       "IETF OPSAWG (Operations and Management Area Working Group)";
     contact
       "WG Web: &lt;<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/</a>&gt;
        WG List: opsawg@ietf.org

        Author: Eliot Lear
                lear@cisco.com

        Author: Ralph Droms
                rdroms@gmail.com

        Author: Dan Romascanu
                dromasca@gmail.com
       ";
     description
       "Sample extension to a MUD module to indicate a need
        for DETNET support.";

     revision 2019-01-28 {
       description
         "Initial revision.";
       reference
         "<a href="./rfc8520">RFC 8520</a>: Manufacturer Usage Description
          Specification";
     }

     augment "/ietf-mud:mud" {
       description
         "This adds a simple extension for a manufacturer
           to indicate whether DETNET is required by a
          device.";
       leaf is-detnet-required {
         type boolean;
         description
           "This value will equal 'true' if a device requires



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            DETNET to properly function.";
       }
     }
   }
   &lt;CODE ENDS&gt;

   Using the previous example, we now show how the extension would be
   expressed:

   {
     "ietf-mud:mud": {
       "mud-version": 1,
       "mud-url": "https://lighting.example.com/lightbulb2000",
       "last-update": "2019-01-28T11:20:51+01:00",
       "cache-validity": 48,
       "extensions": [
           "ietf-mud-detext-example"
        ],
       "ietf-mud-detext-example:is-detnet-required": "false",
       "is-supported": true,
       "systeminfo": "The BMS Example Light Bulb",
       "from-device-policy": {
         "access-lists": {
           "access-list": [
             {
               "name": "mud-76100-v6fr"
             }
           ]
         }
       },
       "to-device-policy": {
         "access-lists": {
           "access-list": [
             {
               "name": "mud-76100-v6to"
             }
           ]
         }
       }
     },
     "ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
       "acl": [
         {
           "name": "mud-76100-v6to",
           "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {



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                 "name": "cl0-todev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv6": {
                     "ietf-acldns:src-dnsname": "test.example.com",
                     "protocol": 6
                   },
                   "tcp": {
                     "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",
                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 443
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         },
         {
           "name": "mud-76100-v6fr",
           "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "cl0-frdev",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv6": {
                     "ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname": "test.example.com",
                     "protocol": 6
                   },
                   "tcp": {
                     "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 443
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         }



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       ]
     }
   }

Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Einar Nilsen-Nygaard, who
   singlehandedly updated the model to match the updated ACL model,
   Bernie Volz, Tom Gindin, Brian Weis, Sandeep Kumar, Thorsten Dahm,
   John Bashinski, Steve Rich, Jim Bieda, Dan Wing, Joe Clarke, Henk
   Birkholz, Adam Montville, Jim Schaad, and Robert Sparks for their
   valuable advice and reviews.  Russ Housley entirely rewrote
   <a href="#section-11">Section 11</a> to be a complete module.  Adrian Farrel provided the basis
   for the privacy considerations text.  Kent Watsen provided a thorough
   review of the architecture and the YANG model.  The remaining errors
   in this work are entirely the responsibility of the authors.

Authors' Addresses

   Eliot Lear
   Cisco Systems
   Richtistrasse 7
   Wallisellen  CH-8304
   Switzerland

   Phone: +41 44 878 9200
   Email: lear@cisco.com


   Ralph Droms
   Google
   355 Main St., 5th Floor
   Cambridge, MA  02142
   United States of America

   Phone: +1 978 376 3731
   Email: rdroms@gmail.com


   Dan Romascanu

   Phone: +972 54 5555347
   Email: dromasca@gmail.com








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