File: rfc8935.html

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<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en" class="RFC">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta content="Common,Latin" name="scripts">
<meta content="initial-scale=1.0" name="viewport">
<title>RFC 8935: Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP</title>
<meta content="Annabelle Backman" name="author">
<meta content="Michael B. Jones" name="author">
<meta content="Marius Scurtescu" name="author">
<meta content="Morteza Ansari" name="author">
<meta content="Anthony Nadalin" name="author">
<meta content="
       
        This specification defines how a Security Event Token (SET) can be
        delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS.  The SET
        is transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST request to an endpoint
        operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or
        failed transmission via the HTTP response.
       
    " name="description">
<meta content="xml2rfc 3.5.0" name="generator">
<meta content="JSON Web Token" name="keyword">
<meta content="JWT" name="keyword">
<meta content="Security Event Token" name="keyword">
<meta content="SET" name="keyword">
<meta content="Delivery" name="keyword">
<meta content="JavaScript Object Notation" name="keyword">
<meta content="JSON" name="keyword">
<meta content="8935" name="rfc.number">
<!-- Generator version information:
  xml2rfc 3.5.0
    Python 3.6.10
    appdirs 1.4.4
    ConfigArgParse 1.2.3
    google-i18n-address 2.3.5
    html5lib 1.0.1
    intervaltree 3.0.2
    Jinja2 2.11.2
    kitchen 1.2.6
    lxml 4.4.2
    pycairo 1.19.0
    pycountry 19.8.18
    pyflakes 2.1.1
    PyYAML 5.3.1
    requests 2.22.0
    setuptools 40.6.2
    six 1.14.0
    WeasyPrint 51
-->
<link href="rfc8935.xml" rel="alternate" type="application/rfc+xml">
<link href="#copyright" rel="license">
<style type="text/css">/*

  NOTE: Changes at the bottom of this file overrides some earlier settings.

  Once the style has stabilized and has been adopted as an official RFC style,
  this can be consolidated so that style settings occur only in one place, but
  for now the contents of this file consists first of the initial CSS work as
  provided to the RFC Formatter (xml2rfc) work, followed by itemized and
  commented changes found necssary during the development of the v3
  formatters.

*/

/* fonts */
@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Sans'); /* Sans-serif */
@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Serif'); /* Serif (print) */
@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto+Mono'); /* Monospace */

@viewport {
  zoom: 1.0;
  width: extend-to-zoom;
}
@-ms-viewport {
  width: extend-to-zoom;
  zoom: 1.0;
}
/* general and mobile first */
html {
}
body {
  max-width: 90%;
  margin: 1.5em auto;
  color: #222;
  background-color: #fff;
  font-size: 14px;
  font-family: 'Noto Sans', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
  line-height: 1.6;
  scroll-behavior: smooth;
}
.ears {
  display: none;
}

/* headings */
#title, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
  margin: 1em 0 0.5em;
  font-weight: bold;
  line-height: 1.3;
}
#title {
  clear: both;
  border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
  margin: 0 0 0.5em 0;
  padding: 1em 0 0.5em;
}
.author {
  padding-bottom: 4px;
}
h1 {
  font-size: 26px;
  margin: 1em 0;
}
h2 {
  font-size: 22px;
  margin-top: -20px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 33px;
}
h3 {
  font-size: 18px;
  margin-top: -36px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 42px;
}
h4 {
  font-size: 16px;
  margin-top: -36px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 42px;
}
h5, h6 {
  font-size: 14px;
}
#n-copyright-notice {
  border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
  padding-bottom: 1em;
  margin-bottom: 1em;
}
/* general structure */
p {
  padding: 0;
  margin: 0 0 1em 0;
  text-align: left;
}
div, span {
  position: relative;
}
div {
  margin: 0;
}
.alignRight.art-text {
  background-color: #f9f9f9;
  border: 1px solid #eee;
  border-radius: 3px;
  padding: 1em 1em 0;
  margin-bottom: 1.5em;
}
.alignRight.art-text pre {
  padding: 0;
}
.alignRight {
  margin: 1em 0;
}
.alignRight > *:first-child {
  border: none;
  margin: 0;
  float: right;
  clear: both;
}
.alignRight > *:nth-child(2) {
  clear: both;
  display: block;
  border: none;
}
svg {
  display: block;
}
.alignCenter.art-text {
  background-color: #f9f9f9;
  border: 1px solid #eee;
  border-radius: 3px;
  padding: 1em 1em 0;
  margin-bottom: 1.5em;
}
.alignCenter.art-text pre {
  padding: 0;
}
.alignCenter {
  margin: 1em 0;
}
.alignCenter > *:first-child {
  border: none;
  /* this isn't optimal, but it's an existence proof.  PrinceXML doesn't
     support flexbox yet.
  */
  display: table;
  margin: 0 auto;
}

/* lists */
ol, ul {
  padding: 0;
  margin: 0 0 1em 2em;
}
ol ol, ul ul, ol ul, ul ol {
  margin-left: 1em;
}
li {
  margin: 0 0 0.25em 0;
}
.ulCompact li {
  margin: 0;
}
ul.empty, .ulEmpty {
  list-style-type: none;
}
ul.empty li, .ulEmpty li {
  margin-top: 0.5em;
}
ul.compact, .ulCompact,
ol.compact, .olCompact {
  line-height: 100%;
  margin: 0 0 0 2em;
}

/* definition lists */
dl {
}
dl > dt {
  float: left;
  margin-right: 1em;
}
/* 
dl.nohang > dt {
  float: none;
}
*/
dl > dd {
  margin-bottom: .8em;
  min-height: 1.3em;
}
dl.compact > dd, .dlCompact > dd {
  margin-bottom: 0em;
}
dl > dd > dl {
  margin-top: 0.5em;
  margin-bottom: 0em;
}

/* links */
a {
  text-decoration: none;
}
a[href] {
  color: #22e; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
}
a[href]:hover {
  background-color: #f2f2f2;
}
figcaption a[href],
a[href].selfRef {
  color: #222;
}
/* XXX probably not this:
a.selfRef:hover {
  background-color: transparent;
  cursor: default;
} */

/* Figures */
tt, code, pre, code {
  background-color: #f9f9f9;
  font-family: 'Roboto Mono', monospace;
}
pre {
  border: 1px solid #eee;
  margin: 0;
  padding: 1em;
}
img {
  max-width: 100%;
}
figure {
  margin: 0;
}
figure blockquote {
  margin: 0.8em 0.4em 0.4em;
}
figcaption {
  font-style: italic;
  margin: 0 0 1em 0;
}
@media screen {
  pre {
    overflow-x: auto;
    max-width: 100%;
    max-width: calc(100% - 22px);
  }
}

/* aside, blockquote */
aside, blockquote {
  margin-left: 0;
  padding: 1.2em 2em;
}
blockquote {
  background-color: #f9f9f9;
  color: #111; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  border: 1px solid #ddd;
  border-radius: 3px;
  margin: 1em 0;
}
cite {
  display: block;
  text-align: right;
  font-style: italic;
}

/* tables */
table {
  width: 100%;
  margin: 0 0 1em;
  border-collapse: collapse;
  border: 1px solid #eee;
}
th, td {
  text-align: left;
  vertical-align: top;
  padding: 0.5em 0.75em;
}
th {
  text-align: left;
  background-color: #e9e9e9;
}
tr:nth-child(2n+1) > td {
  background-color: #f5f5f5;
}
table caption {
  font-style: italic;
  margin: 0;
  padding: 0;
  text-align: left;
}
table p {
  /* XXX to avoid bottom margin on table row signifiers. If paragraphs should
     be allowed within tables more generally, it would be far better to select on a class. */
  margin: 0;
}

/* pilcrow */
a.pilcrow {
  color: #666; /* Arlen: AHDJ 2019 */
  text-decoration: none;
  visibility: hidden;
  user-select: none;
  -ms-user-select: none;
  -o-user-select:none;
  -moz-user-select: none;
  -khtml-user-select: none;
  -webkit-user-select: none;
  -webkit-touch-callout: none;
}
@media screen {
  aside:hover > a.pilcrow,
  p:hover > a.pilcrow,
  blockquote:hover > a.pilcrow,
  div:hover > a.pilcrow,
  li:hover > a.pilcrow,
  pre:hover > a.pilcrow {
    visibility: visible;
  }
  a.pilcrow:hover {
    background-color: transparent;
  }
}

/* misc */
hr {
  border: 0;
  border-top: 1px solid #eee;
}
.bcp14 {
  font-variant: small-caps;
}

.role {
  font-variant: all-small-caps;
}

/* info block */
#identifiers {
  margin: 0;
  font-size: 0.9em;
}
#identifiers dt {
  width: 3em;
  clear: left;
}
#identifiers dd {
  float: left;
  margin-bottom: 0;
}
#identifiers .authors .author {
  display: inline-block;
  margin-right: 1.5em;
}
#identifiers .authors .org {
  font-style: italic;
}

/* The prepared/rendered info at the very bottom of the page */
.docInfo {
  color: #666; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  font-size: 0.9em;
  font-style: italic;
  margin-top: 2em;
}
.docInfo .prepared {
  float: left;
}
.docInfo .prepared {
  float: right;
}

/* table of contents */
#toc  {
  padding: 0.75em 0 2em 0;
  margin-bottom: 1em;
}
nav.toc ul {
  margin: 0 0.5em 0 0;
  padding: 0;
  list-style: none;
}
nav.toc li {
  line-height: 1.3em;
  margin: 0.75em 0;
  padding-left: 1.2em;
  text-indent: -1.2em;
}
/* references */
.references dt {
  text-align: right;
  font-weight: bold;
  min-width: 7em;
}
.references dd {
  margin-left: 8em;
  overflow: auto;
}

.refInstance {
  margin-bottom: 1.25em;
}

.references .ascii {
  margin-bottom: 0.25em;
}

/* index */
.index ul {
  margin: 0 0 0 1em;
  padding: 0;
  list-style: none;
}
.index ul ul {
  margin: 0;
}
.index li {
  margin: 0;
  text-indent: -2em;
  padding-left: 2em;
  padding-bottom: 5px;
}
.indexIndex {
  margin: 0.5em 0 1em;
}
.index a {
  font-weight: 700;
}
/* make the index two-column on all but the smallest screens */
@media (min-width: 600px) {
  .index ul {
    -moz-column-count: 2;
    -moz-column-gap: 20px;
  }
  .index ul ul {
    -moz-column-count: 1;
    -moz-column-gap: 0;
  }
}

/* authors */
address.vcard {
  font-style: normal;
  margin: 1em 0;
}

address.vcard .nameRole {
  font-weight: 700;
  margin-left: 0;
}
address.vcard .label {
  font-family: "Noto Sans",Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;
  margin: 0.5em 0;
}
address.vcard .type {
  display: none;
}
.alternative-contact {
  margin: 1.5em 0 1em;
}
hr.addr {
  border-top: 1px dashed;
  margin: 0;
  color: #ddd;
  max-width: calc(100% - 16px);
}

/* temporary notes */
.rfcEditorRemove::before {
  position: absolute;
  top: 0.2em;
  right: 0.2em;
  padding: 0.2em;
  content: "The RFC Editor will remove this note";
  color: #9e2a00; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
}
.rfcEditorRemove {
  position: relative;
  padding-top: 1.8em;
  background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  border-radius: 3px;
}
.cref {
  background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  padding: 2px 4px;
}
.crefSource {
  font-style: italic;
}
/* alternative layout for smaller screens */
@media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
  body {
    padding-top: 2em;
  }
  #title {
    padding: 1em 0;
  }
  h1 {
    font-size: 24px;
  }
  h2 {
    font-size: 20px;
    margin-top: -18px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
    padding-top: 38px;
  }
  #identifiers dd {
    max-width: 60%;
  }
  #toc {
    position: fixed;
    z-index: 2;
    top: 0;
    right: 0;
    padding: 0;
    margin: 0;
    background-color: inherit;
    border-bottom: 1px solid #ccc;
  }
  #toc h2 {
    margin: -1px 0 0 0;
    padding: 4px 0 4px 6px;
    padding-right: 1em;
    min-width: 190px;
    font-size: 1.1em;
    text-align: right;
    background-color: #444;
    color: white;
    cursor: pointer;
  }
  #toc h2::before { /* css hamburger */
    float: right;
    position: relative;
    width: 1em;
    height: 1px;
    left: -164px;
    margin: 6px 0 0 0;
    background: white none repeat scroll 0 0;
    box-shadow: 0 4px 0 0 white, 0 8px 0 0 white;
    content: "";
  }
  #toc nav {
    display: none;
    padding: 0.5em 1em 1em;
    overflow: auto;
    height: calc(100vh - 48px);
    border-left: 1px solid #ddd;
  }
}

/* alternative layout for wide screens */
@media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
  body {
    max-width: 724px;
    margin: 42px auto;
    padding-left: 1.5em;
    padding-right: 29em;
  }
  #toc {
    position: fixed;
    top: 42px;
    right: 42px;
    width: 25%;
    margin: 0;
    padding: 0 1em;
    z-index: 1;
  }
  #toc h2 {
    border-top: none;
    border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
    font-size: 1em;
    font-weight: normal;
    margin: 0;
    padding: 0.25em 1em 1em 0;
  }
  #toc nav {
    display: block;
    height: calc(90vh - 84px);
    bottom: 0;
    padding: 0.5em 0 0;
    overflow: auto;
  }
  img { /* future proofing */
    max-width: 100%;
    height: auto;
  }
}

/* pagination */
@media print {
  body {

    width: 100%;
  }
  p {
    orphans: 3;
    widows: 3;
  }
  #n-copyright-notice {
    border-bottom: none;
  }
  #toc, #n-introduction {
    page-break-before: always;
  }
  #toc {
    border-top: none;
    padding-top: 0;
  }
  figure, pre {
    page-break-inside: avoid;
  }
  figure {
    overflow: scroll;
  }
  h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
    page-break-after: avoid;
  }
  h2+*, h3+*, h4+*, h5+*, h6+* {
    page-break-before: avoid;
  }
  pre {
    white-space: pre-wrap;
    word-wrap: break-word;
    font-size: 10pt;
  }
  table {
    border: 1px solid #ddd;
  }
  td {
    border-top: 1px solid #ddd;
  }
}

/* This is commented out here, as the string-set: doesn't
   pass W3C validation currently */
/*
.ears thead .left {
  string-set: ears-top-left content();
}

.ears thead .center {
  string-set: ears-top-center content();
}

.ears thead .right {
  string-set: ears-top-right content();
}

.ears tfoot .left {
  string-set: ears-bottom-left content();
}

.ears tfoot .center {
  string-set: ears-bottom-center content();
}

.ears tfoot .right {
  string-set: ears-bottom-right content();
}
*/

@page :first {
  padding-top: 0;
  @top-left {
    content: normal;
    border: none;
  }
  @top-center {
    content: normal;
    border: none;
  }
  @top-right {
    content: normal;
    border: none;
  }
}

@page {
  size: A4;
  margin-bottom: 45mm;
  padding-top: 20px;
  /* The follwing is commented out here, but set appropriately by in code, as
     the content depends on the document */
  /*
  @top-left {
    content: 'Internet-Draft';
    vertical-align: bottom;
    border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @top-left {
    content: string(ears-top-left);
    vertical-align: bottom;
    border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @top-center {
    content: string(ears-top-center);
    vertical-align: bottom;
    border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @top-right {
    content: string(ears-top-right);
    vertical-align: bottom;
    border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @bottom-left {
    content: string(ears-bottom-left);
    vertical-align: top;
    border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @bottom-center {
    content: string(ears-bottom-center);
    vertical-align: top;
    border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @bottom-right {
      content: '[Page ' counter(page) ']';
      vertical-align: top;
      border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  */

}

/* Changes introduced to fix issues found during implementation */
/* Make sure links are clickable even if overlapped by following H* */
a {
  z-index: 2;
}
/* Separate body from document info even without intervening H1 */
section {
  clear: both;
}


/* Top align author divs, to avoid names without organization dropping level with org names */
.author {
  vertical-align: top;
}

/* Leave room in document info to show Internet-Draft on one line */
#identifiers dt {
  width: 8em;
}

/* Don't waste quite as much whitespace between label and value in doc info */
#identifiers dd {
  margin-left: 1em;
}

/* Give floating toc a background color (needed when it's a div inside section */
#toc {
  background-color: white;
}

/* Make the collapsed ToC header render white on gray also when it's a link */
@media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
  #toc h2 a,
  #toc h2 a:link,
  #toc h2 a:focus,
  #toc h2 a:hover,
  #toc a.toplink,
  #toc a.toplink:hover {
    color: white;
    background-color: #444;
    text-decoration: none;
  }
}

/* Give the bottom of the ToC some whitespace */
@media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
  #toc {
    padding: 0 0 1em 1em;
  }
}

/* Style section numbers with more space between number and title */
.section-number {
  padding-right: 0.5em;
}

/* prevent monospace from becoming overly large */
tt, code, pre, code {
  font-size: 95%;
}

/* Fix the height/width aspect for ascii art*/
pre.sourcecode,
.art-text pre {
  line-height: 1.12;
}


/* Add styling for a link in the ToC that points to the top of the document */
a.toplink {
  float: right;
  margin-right: 0.5em;
}

/* Fix the dl styling to match the RFC 7992 attributes */
dl > dt,
dl.dlParallel > dt {
  float: left;
  margin-right: 1em;
}
dl.dlNewline > dt {
  float: none;
}

/* Provide styling for table cell text alignment */
table td.text-left,
table th.text-left {
  text-align: left;
}
table td.text-center,
table th.text-center {
  text-align: center;
}
table td.text-right,
table th.text-right {
  text-align: right;
}

/* Make the alternative author contact informatio look less like just another
   author, and group it closer with the primary author contact information */
.alternative-contact {
  margin: 0.5em 0 0.25em 0;
}
address .non-ascii {
  margin: 0 0 0 2em;
}

/* With it being possible to set tables with alignment
  left, center, and right, { width: 100%; } does not make sense */
table {
  width: auto;
}

/* Avoid reference text that sits in a block with very wide left margin,
   because of a long floating dt label.*/
.references dd {
  overflow: visible;
}

/* Control caption placement */
caption {
  caption-side: bottom;
}

/* Limit the width of the author address vcard, so names in right-to-left
   script don't end up on the other side of the page. */

address.vcard {
  max-width: 30em;
  margin-right: auto;
}

/* For address alignment dependent on LTR or RTL scripts */
address div.left {
  text-align: left;
}
address div.right {
  text-align: right;
}

/* Provide table alignment support.  We can't use the alignX classes above
   since they do unwanted things with caption and other styling. */
table.right {
 margin-left: auto;
 margin-right: 0;
}
table.center {
 margin-left: auto;
 margin-right: auto;
}
table.left {
 margin-left: 0;
 margin-right: auto;
}

/* Give the table caption label the same styling as the figcaption */
caption a[href] {
  color: #222;
}

@media print {
  .toplink {
    display: none;
  }

  /* avoid overwriting the top border line with the ToC header */
  #toc {
    padding-top: 1px;
  }

  /* Avoid page breaks inside dl and author address entries */
  .vcard {
    page-break-inside: avoid;
  }

}
/* Tweak the bcp14 keyword presentation */
.bcp14 {
  font-variant: small-caps;
  font-weight: bold;
  font-size: 0.9em;
}
/* Tweak the invisible space above H* in order not to overlay links in text above */
 h2 {
  margin-top: -18px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 31px;
 }
 h3 {
  margin-top: -18px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 24px;
 }
 h4 {
  margin-top: -18px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 24px;
 }
/* Float artwork pilcrow to the right */
@media screen {
  .artwork a.pilcrow {
    display: block;
    line-height: 0.7;
    margin-top: 0.15em;
  }
}
/* Make pilcrows on dd visible */
@media screen {
  dd:hover > a.pilcrow {
    visibility: visible;
  }
}
/* Make the placement of figcaption match that of a table's caption
   by removing the figure's added bottom margin */
.alignLeft.art-text,
.alignCenter.art-text,
.alignRight.art-text {
   margin-bottom: 0;
}
.alignLeft,
.alignCenter,
.alignRight {
  margin: 1em 0 0 0;
}
/* In print, the pilcrow won't show on hover, so prevent it from taking up space,
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<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc8935" rel="alternate">
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<table class="ears">
<thead><tr>
<td class="left">RFC 8935</td>
<td class="center">Push-Based SET Using HTTP</td>
<td class="right">November 2020</td>
</tr></thead>
<tfoot><tr>
<td class="left">Backman, et al.</td>
<td class="center">Standards Track</td>
<td class="right">[Page]</td>
</tr></tfoot>
</table>
<div id="external-metadata" class="document-information"></div>
<div id="internal-metadata" class="document-information">
<dl id="identifiers">
<dt class="label-stream">Stream:</dt>
<dd class="stream">Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)</dd>
<dt class="label-rfc">RFC:</dt>
<dd class="rfc"><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8935" class="eref">8935</a></dd>
<dt class="label-category">Category:</dt>
<dd class="category">Standards Track</dd>
<dt class="label-published">Published:</dt>
<dd class="published">
<time datetime="2020-11" class="published">November 2020</time>
    </dd>
<dt class="label-issn">ISSN:</dt>
<dd class="issn">2070-1721</dd>
<dt class="label-authors">Authors:</dt>
<dd class="authors">
<div class="author">
      <div class="author-name">A. Backman, <span class="editor">Ed.</span>
</div>
<div class="org">Amazon</div>
</div>
<div class="author">
      <div class="author-name">M. Jones, <span class="editor">Ed.</span>
</div>
<div class="org">Microsoft</div>
</div>
<div class="author">
      <div class="author-name">M. Scurtescu</div>
<div class="org">Coinbase</div>
</div>
<div class="author">
      <div class="author-name">M. Ansari</div>
<div class="org">Independent</div>
</div>
<div class="author">
      <div class="author-name">A. Nadalin</div>
<div class="org">Independent</div>
</div>
</dd>
</dl>
</div>
<h1 id="rfcnum">RFC 8935</h1>
<h1 id="title">Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP</h1>
<section id="section-abstract">
      <h2 id="abstract"><a href="#abstract" class="selfRef">Abstract</a></h2>
<p id="section-abstract-1">
        This specification defines how a Security Event Token (SET) can be
        delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS.  The SET
        is transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST request to an endpoint
        operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or
        failed transmission via the HTTP response.<a href="#section-abstract-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
<div id="status-of-memo">
<section id="section-boilerplate.1">
        <h2 id="name-status-of-this-memo">
<a href="#name-status-of-this-memo" class="section-name selfRef">Status of This Memo</a>
        </h2>
<p id="section-boilerplate.1-1">
            This is an Internet Standards Track document.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-boilerplate.1-2">
            This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
            (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
            received public review and has been approved for publication by
            the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further
            information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of 
            RFC 7841.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-boilerplate.1-3">
            Information about the current status of this document, any
            errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
            <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8935">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8935</a></span>.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="copyright">
<section id="section-boilerplate.2">
        <h2 id="name-copyright-notice">
<a href="#name-copyright-notice" class="section-name selfRef">Copyright Notice</a>
        </h2>
<p id="section-boilerplate.2-1">
            Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
            document authors. All rights reserved.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-boilerplate.2-2">
            This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
            Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
            (<span><a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a></span>) in effect on the date of
            publication of this document. Please review these documents
            carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
            respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
            document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in
            Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
            warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="toc">
<section id="section-toc.1">
        <a href="#" onclick="scroll(0,0)" class="toplink">▲</a><h2 id="name-table-of-contents">
<a href="#name-table-of-contents" class="section-name selfRef">Table of Contents</a>
        </h2>
<nav class="toc"><ul class="ulEmpty compact toc">
<li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.1">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1" class="xref">1</a>.  <a href="#name-introduction-and-overview" class="xref">Introduction and Overview</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="ulEmpty compact toc">
<li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1.1" class="xref">1.1</a>.  <a href="#name-notational-conventions" class="xref">Notational Conventions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.1.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.2">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.2.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1.2" class="xref">1.2</a>.  <a href="#name-definitions" class="xref">Definitions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.1.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.2">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.2.1"><a href="#section-2" class="xref">2</a>.  <a href="#name-set-delivery" class="xref">SET Delivery</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="ulEmpty compact toc">
<li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.2.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.2.2.1.1"><a href="#section-2.1" class="xref">2.1</a>.  <a href="#name-transmitting-a-set" class="xref">Transmitting a SET</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.2.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.2.2.2">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.2.2.2.1"><a href="#section-2.2" class="xref">2.2</a>.  <a href="#name-success-response" class="xref">Success Response</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.2.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.2.2.3">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.2.2.3.1"><a href="#section-2.3" class="xref">2.3</a>.  <a href="#name-failure-response" class="xref">Failure Response</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.2.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.2.2.4">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.2.2.4.1"><a href="#section-2.4" class="xref">2.4</a>.  <a href="#name-security-event-token-error-" class="xref">Security Event Token Error Codes</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.2.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.3">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><a href="#section-3" class="xref">3</a>.  <a href="#name-authentication-and-authoriz" class="xref">Authentication and Authorization</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.4">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><a href="#section-4" class="xref">4</a>.  <a href="#name-delivery-reliability" class="xref">Delivery Reliability</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.5">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><a href="#section-5" class="xref">5</a>.  <a href="#name-security-considerations" class="xref">Security Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="ulEmpty compact toc">
<li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.1" class="xref">5.1</a>.  <a href="#name-authentication-using-signed" class="xref">Authentication Using Signed SETs</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.2" class="xref">5.2</a>.  <a href="#name-http-considerations" class="xref">HTTP Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.3">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.3.1"><a href="#section-5.3" class="xref">5.3</a>.  <a href="#name-confidentiality-of-sets" class="xref">Confidentiality of SETs</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.4">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.4.1"><a href="#section-5.4" class="xref">5.4</a>.  <a href="#name-denial-of-service" class="xref">Denial of Service</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.5">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.5.1"><a href="#section-5.5" class="xref">5.5</a>.  <a href="#name-authenticating-persisted-se" class="xref">Authenticating Persisted SETs</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.6">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><a href="#section-6" class="xref">6</a>.  <a href="#name-privacy-considerations" class="xref">Privacy Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.7">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><a href="#section-7" class="xref">7</a>.  <a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="xref">IANA Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="ulEmpty compact toc">
<li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.1" class="xref">7.1</a>.  <a href="#name-security-event-token-error-c" class="xref">Security Event Token Error Codes</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="ulEmpty compact toc">
<li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.2.1">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.1.1" class="xref">7.1.1</a>.  <a href="#name-registration-template" class="xref">Registration Template</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.2.2">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.2.2.1"><a href="#section-7.1.2" class="xref">7.1.2</a>.  <a href="#name-initial-registry-contents" class="xref">Initial Registry Contents</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
                </ul>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.8">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><a href="#section-8" class="xref">8</a>.  <a href="#name-references" class="xref">References</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.8.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="ulEmpty compact toc">
<li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1"><a href="#section-8.1" class="xref">8.1</a>.  <a href="#name-normative-references" class="xref">Normative References</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.1"><a href="#section-8.2" class="xref">8.2</a>.  <a href="#name-informative-references" class="xref">Informative References</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.9">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><a href="#section-appendix.a" class="xref">Appendix A</a>.  <a href="#name-unencrypted-transport-consi" class="xref">Unencrypted Transport Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.10">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><a href="#section-appendix.b" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-acknowledgments" class="xref">Acknowledgments</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.10.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="ulEmpty compact toc" id="section-toc.1-1.11">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><a href="#section-appendix.c" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-authors-addresses" class="xref">Authors' Addresses</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.11.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</li>
        </ul>
</nav>
</section>
</div>
<div id="intro">
<section id="section-1">
      <h2 id="name-introduction-and-overview">
<a href="#section-1" class="section-number selfRef">1. </a><a href="#name-introduction-and-overview" class="section-name selfRef">Introduction and Overview</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-1-1">
                This specification defines a mechanism by which a transmitter of a
                <span><a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">Security Event Token (SET)</a> [<a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">RFC8417</a>]</span> can deliver
                the SET to an intended SET Recipient via <span><a href="#RFC7231" class="xref">HTTP POST</a> [<a href="#RFC7231" class="xref">RFC7231</a>]</span>
 over TLS.
 This is an alternative SET delivery method to the one defined in
 <span>[<a href="#RFC8936" class="xref">RFC8936</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-1-2">
                Push-based SET delivery over HTTP POST is intended for scenarios where all of
                the following apply:<a href="#section-1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-1-3.1">The transmitter of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP requests.<a href="#section-1-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        <li class="normal" id="section-1-3.2">
                        The recipient is capable of hosting a TLS-enabled HTTP endpoint that is accessible
                        to the transmitter.<a href="#section-1-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        <li class="normal" id="section-1-3.3">
       The transmitter and recipient are willing to exchange data with one another.<a href="#section-1-3.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
      </ul>
<p id="section-1-4">
 In some scenarios, either push-based or poll-based delivery could be used,
 and in others, only one of them would be applicable.<a href="#section-1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-1-5">
                A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint URLs,
                cryptographic keys,
 and possible implementation constraints such as buffer size limitations
 between the transmitter and recipient is
                out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the process
                by which security events are identified for SET Recipients are specified
                in <span>[<a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">RFC8417</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<div id="notat">
<section id="section-1.1">
        <h3 id="name-notational-conventions">
<a href="#section-1.1" class="section-number selfRef">1.1. </a><a href="#name-notational-conventions" class="section-name selfRef">Notational Conventions</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-1.1-1">
    The key words "<span class="bcp14">MUST</span>", "<span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span>",
    "<span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHALL</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHALL NOT</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHOULD NOT</span>",
    "<span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>", "<span class="bcp14">NOT RECOMMENDED</span>",
    "<span class="bcp14">MAY</span>", and "<span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>" in this document are
    to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <span>[<a href="#RFC2119" class="xref">RFC2119</a>]</span>
          <span>[<a href="#RFC8174" class="xref">RFC8174</a>]</span> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
    as shown here.<a href="#section-1.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-1.1-2">
  Throughout this document, all figures may contain spaces and extra
  line wrapping for readability and due to space limitations.<a href="#section-1.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="defs">
<section id="section-1.2">
        <h3 id="name-definitions">
<a href="#section-1.2" class="section-number selfRef">1.2. </a><a href="#name-definitions" class="section-name selfRef">Definitions</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-1.2-1">
                    This specification utilizes the following terms defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">RFC8417</a>]</span>:
                    "Security Event Token (SET)", "SET Issuer", "SET Recipient", and "Event Payload",
                    as well as the term defined below:<a href="#section-1.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-1.2-2">
          <dt id="section-1.2-2.1">SET Transmitter:</dt>
          <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-1.2-2.2">
          An entity that delivers SETs in its possession to one or more SET
          Recipients.<a href="#section-1.2-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
        <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="Delivery">
<section id="section-2">
      <h2 id="name-set-delivery">
<a href="#section-2" class="section-number selfRef">2. </a><a href="#name-set-delivery" class="section-name selfRef">SET Delivery</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-2-1">
                To deliver a SET to a given SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter
                makes a SET Transmission Request to the SET Recipient, with the SET
                itself contained within the request. The SET Recipient replies to
                this request with a response either acknowledging successful
                transmission of the SET or indicating that an error occurred
                while receiving, parsing, and/or validating the SET.<a href="#section-2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2-2">
                Upon receipt of a SET, the SET Recipient <span class="bcp14">SHALL</span> validate that all of
                the following are true:<a href="#section-2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-2-3.1">The SET Recipient can parse the SET.<a href="#section-2-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        <li class="normal" id="section-2-3.2">
                        The SET is authentic (i.e., it was issued by the issuer
                        specified within the SET,
 and if signed, was signed by a key belonging to the issuer).<a href="#section-2-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        <li class="normal" id="section-2-3.3">
                        The SET Recipient is identified as an intended audience of
                        the SET.<a href="#section-2-3.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        <li class="normal" id="section-2-3.4">
                        The SET Issuer is recognized as an issuer that the SET Recipient
                        is willing to receive SETs from (e.g., the issuer is listed as allowed
                        by the SET Recipient).<a href="#section-2-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        <li class="normal" id="section-2-3.5">
       The SET Recipient is willing to accept this SET from this SET Transmitter
       (e.g., the SET Transmitter is expected to send SETs
       with the issuer and subject of the SET in question).<a href="#section-2-3.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
      </ul>
<p id="section-2-4">
                The mechanisms by which the SET Recipient performs this validation
                are out of scope for this document. SET parsing, issuer identification,
 and audience identification are defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">RFC8417</a>]</span>.
                The mechanism for validating the authenticity of a SET is deployment
                specific and may vary depending on the authentication mechanisms in
                use and whether the SET is signed and/or encrypted (See <a href="#aa" class="xref">Section 3</a>).<a href="#section-2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2-5">
                SET Transmitters <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> transmit SETs issued by another entity. The SET
                Recipient may accept or reject (i.e., return an error response such as
                <code>access_denied</code>) a SET at its own discretion.<a href="#section-2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2-6">
                The SET Recipient persists the SET in a way that
                is sufficient to meet the SET Recipient's own reliability requirements.
 The level and method of retention of SETs
 by SET Recipients is out of scope of this specification.
                Once the SET has been validated and persisted, the SET Recipient <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span>
                immediately return a response indicating that the SET was successfully
                delivered. The SET Recipient <span class="bcp14">SHOULD NOT</span> perform further processing of the SET
 beyond the required validation steps prior to sending this response.
                Any additional steps <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> be executed asynchronously from delivery
 to minimize the time the SET Transmitter is waiting for a response.<a href="#section-2-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2-7">
                The SET Transmitter <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> transmit the same SET to the SET Recipient multiple
                times, regardless of the response from the SET Recipient. The SET Recipient
                <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> respond as it would if the SET had not been previously received by the 
                SET Recipient. The SET Recipient <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> expect or depend on a SET Transmitter
                to retransmit a SET or otherwise make a SET available to the SET Recipient
                once the SET Recipient acknowledges that it was received successfully.<a href="#section-2-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2-8">
                The SET Transmitter should not retransmit a SET unless the SET Transmitter
                suspects that previous transmissions may have failed due to potentially
                recoverable errors (such as network outage or temporary service interruption at
                either the SET Transmitter or SET Recipient). In all other cases, the SET
                Transmitter <span class="bcp14">SHOULD NOT</span> retransmit a SET. The SET
                Transmitter <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> delay retransmission for an appropriate amount of time
                to avoid overwhelming the SET Recipient (see <a href="#reliability" class="xref">Section 4</a>).<a href="#section-2-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<div id="httpPost">
<section id="section-2.1">
        <h3 id="name-transmitting-a-set">
<a href="#section-2.1" class="section-number selfRef">2.1. </a><a href="#name-transmitting-a-set" class="section-name selfRef">Transmitting a SET</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-2.1-1">
                    To transmit a SET to a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter makes
                    an HTTP POST request to a TLS-enabled HTTP endpoint provided by the SET Recipient.  The
                    <code>Content-Type</code> header field of this request <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
                    be <code>application/secevent+jwt</code> as defined in
                    Sections <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8417#section-2.3" class="relref">2.3</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8417#section-7.2" class="relref">7.2</a> of <span>[<a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">RFC8417</a>]</span>, and the
                    <code>Accept</code> header field <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be <code>application/json</code>.  The
                    request body <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> consist of the SET itself, represented as a
                    <span><a href="#RFC7519" class="xref">JSON Web Token (JWT)</a> [<a href="#RFC7519" class="xref">RFC7519</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-2.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2.1-2">
                    The SET Transmitter <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> include in the request an <code>Accept-Language</code>
                    header field to indicate to the SET Recipient the preferred language(s) in which to
                    receive error messages.<a href="#section-2.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2.1-3">
                    The mechanisms by which the SET Transmitter determines the HTTP endpoint to
                    use when transmitting a SET to a given SET Recipient are not defined by this
                    specification and are deployment specific.<a href="#section-2.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2.1-4" class="keepWithNext">
                        The following is a non-normative example of a SET Transmission Request:<a href="#section-2.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span id="name-example-set-transmission-re"></span><div id="postSet">
<figure id="figure-1">
          <div id="section-2.1-5.1">
<pre class="sourcecode lang-http-message">
  POST /Events HTTP/1.1
  Host: notify.rp.example.com
  Accept: application/json
  Accept-Language: en-US, en;q=0.5
  Content-Type: application/secevent+jwt

  eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9Cg
  .
  eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lkcC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS8iLCJqdGkiOiI3NTZFNjk
  3MTc1NjUyMDY5NjQ2NTZFNzQ2OTY2Njk2NTcyIiwiaWF0IjoxNTA4MTg0ODQ1LC
  JhdWQiOiI2MzZDNjk2NTZFNzQ1RjY5NjQiLCJldmVudHMiOnsiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY
  2hlbWFzLm9wZW5pZC5uZXQvc2VjZXZlbnQvcmlzYy9ldmVudC10eXBlL2FjY291
  bnQtZGlzYWJsZWQiOnsic3ViamVjdCI6eyJzdWJqZWN0X3R5cGUiOiJpc3Mtc3V
  iIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9pZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vIiwic3ViIjoiNzM3NT
  YyNkE2NTYzNzQifSwicmVhc29uIjoiaGlqYWNraW5nIn19fQ
  .
  Y4rXxMD406P2edv00cr9Wf3_XwNtLjB9n-jTqN1_lLc
</pre>
</div>
<figcaption><a href="#figure-1" class="selfRef">Figure 1</a>:
<a href="#name-example-set-transmission-re" class="selfRef">Example SET Transmission Request</a>
          </figcaption></figure>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="successResponse">
<section id="section-2.2">
        <h3 id="name-success-response">
<a href="#section-2.2" class="section-number selfRef">2.2. </a><a href="#name-success-response" class="section-name selfRef">Success Response</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-2.2-1">If the SET is determined to be valid, the SET Recipient <span class="bcp14">SHALL</span>
                    acknowledge successful transmission by responding with HTTP
                    Response Status Code 202 (Accepted) (see <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231#section-6.3.3" class="relref">Section 6.3.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC7231" class="xref">RFC7231</a>]</span>).
     The body of the response <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be empty.<a href="#section-2.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2.2-2" class="keepWithNext">The following is a non-normative example of a successful
                        receipt of a SET.<a href="#section-2.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span id="name-example-successful-delivery"></span><div id="goodPostResponse">
<figure id="figure-2">
          <div id="section-2.2-3.1">
<pre class="sourcecode lang-http-message">
  HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
</pre>
</div>
<figcaption><a href="#figure-2" class="selfRef">Figure 2</a>:
<a href="#name-example-successful-delivery" class="selfRef">Example Successful Delivery Response</a>
          </figcaption></figure>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="failureResponse">
<section id="section-2.3">
        <h3 id="name-failure-response">
<a href="#section-2.3" class="section-number selfRef">2.3. </a><a href="#name-failure-response" class="section-name selfRef">Failure Response</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-2.3-1">In the event of a general HTTP error condition, the SET Recipient
                    responds with the applicable HTTP Status Code, as defined in
                    <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231#section-6" class="relref">Section 6</a> of [<a href="#RFC7231" class="xref">RFC7231</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-2.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2.3-2">
                    When the SET Recipient detects an error parsing,
                    validating, or authenticating a SET transmitted in a SET
                    Transmission Request, the SET Recipient
                    <span class="bcp14">SHALL</span> respond with an HTTP Response Status
                    Code of 400 (Bad Request).  The <code>Content-Type</code>
                    header field of this response <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be
                    <code>application/json</code>, and the body <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be a
                    UTF-8 encoded <span><a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">JSON</a> [<a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">RFC8259</a>]</span> object containing the
                    following name/value pairs:<a href="#section-2.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-2.3-3">
          <dt id="section-2.3-3.1">err:</dt>
          <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-2.3-3.2">
                            A Security Event Token Error Code (see <a href="#error_codes" class="xref">Section 2.4</a>).<a href="#section-2.3-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
          <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-2.3-3.3">description:</dt>
          <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-2.3-3.4">
                            A UTF-8 string containing a human-readable description of the error
                            that may provide additional diagnostic information. The exact content
                            of this field is implementation specific.<a href="#section-2.3-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
        <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
<p id="section-2.3-4">
                    The response <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include a
                    <code>Content-Language</code> header field whose value
                    indicates the language of the error descriptions included
                    in the response body. If the SET Recipient can provide
                    error descriptions in multiple languages, they
                    <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> choose the language to use according
                    to the value of the <code>Accept-Language</code> header field
                    sent by the SET Transmitter in the transmission request,
                    as described in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231#section-5.3.5" class="relref">Section 5.3.5</a> of [<a href="#RFC7231" class="xref">RFC7231</a>]</span>. If the SET Transmitter did not send an
                    <code>Accept-Language</code> header field, or if the SET
                    Recipient does not support any of the languages included
                    in the header field, the SET Recipient <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
                    respond with messages that are understandable by an
                    English-speaking person, as described in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2277#section-4.5" class="relref">Section 4.5</a> of [<a href="#RFC2277" class="xref">RFC2277</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-2.3-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2.3-5" class="keepWithNext">The following is a non-normative example error response indicating
                        that the key used to encrypt the SET has been revoked.<a href="#section-2.3-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span id="name-example-error-response-inva"></span><div id="errorResponseInvalidKey">
<figure id="figure-3">
          <div id="section-2.3-6.1">
<pre class="sourcecode">
  HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
  Content-Language: en-US
  Content-Type: application/json

  {
    "err": "invalid_key",
    "description": "Key ID 12345 has been revoked."
  }
</pre>
</div>
<figcaption><a href="#figure-3" class="selfRef">Figure 3</a>:
<a href="#name-example-error-response-inva" class="selfRef">Example Error Response (invalid_key)</a>
          </figcaption></figure>
</div>
<p id="section-2.3-7" class="keepWithNext">The following is a non-normative example error response indicating
                        that the access token included in the request is expired.<a href="#section-2.3-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span id="name-example-error-response-auth"></span><div id="errorResponseExpiredToken">
<figure id="figure-4">
          <div id="section-2.3-8.1">
<pre class="sourcecode lang-http-message">
  HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
  Content-Language: en-US
  Content-Type: application/json

  {
    "err": "authentication_failed",
    "description": "Access token has expired."
  }
</pre>
</div>
<figcaption><a href="#figure-4" class="selfRef">Figure 4</a>:
<a href="#name-example-error-response-auth" class="selfRef">Example Error Response (authentication_failed)</a>
          </figcaption></figure>
</div>
<p id="section-2.3-9" class="keepWithNext">The following is a non-normative example error response indicating
                        that the SET Receiver is not willing to accept SETs issued by the specified
                        issuer from this particular SET Transmitter.<a href="#section-2.3-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span id="name-example-error-response-acce"></span><div id="errorResponseBadIssuer">
<figure id="figure-5">
          <div id="section-2.3-10.1">
<pre class="sourcecode lang-http-message">
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "err": "invalid_issuer",
  "description": "Not authorized for issuer https://iss.example.com/"
}
</pre>
</div>
<figcaption><a href="#figure-5" class="selfRef">Figure 5</a>:
<a href="#name-example-error-response-acce" class="selfRef">Example Error Response (access_denied)</a>
          </figcaption></figure>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="error_codes">
<section id="section-2.4">
        <h3 id="name-security-event-token-error-">
<a href="#section-2.4" class="section-number selfRef">2.4. </a><a href="#name-security-event-token-error-" class="section-name selfRef">Security Event Token Error Codes</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-2.4-1">Security Event Token Error Codes are strings that identify a
                    specific category of error that may occur when parsing or validating a SET.


                    Every Security Event Token Error Code <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> have a unique name
                    registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Error Codes"
                    registry established by <a href="#iana_set_errors" class="xref">Section 7.1</a>.<a href="#section-2.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-2.4-2">The following table presents the initial set of Error Codes that are registered
                    in the IANA "Security Event Token Error Codes" registry:<a href="#section-2.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span id="name-set-error-codes"></span><div id="reqErrors">
<table class="center" id="table-1">
          <caption>
<a href="#table-1" class="selfRef">Table 1</a>:
<a href="#name-set-error-codes" class="selfRef">SET Error Codes</a>
          </caption>
<thead>
            <tr>
              <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Error Code</th>
              <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Description</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">invalid_request</td>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">The request body cannot be parsed as a SET, or the
                        Event Payload within the SET does not conform to the event's definition.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">invalid_key</td>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">One or more keys used to encrypt or sign the SET is
                        invalid or otherwise unacceptable to the SET Recipient (expired,
                        revoked, failed certificate validation, etc.).</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">invalid_issuer</td>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">The SET Issuer is invalid for the SET Recipient.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">invalid_audience</td>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">The SET Audience does not correspond to the SET Recipient.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">authentication_failed</td>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">The SET Recipient could not authenticate the
                        SET Transmitter.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">access_denied</td>
              <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">The SET Transmitter is not authorized to transmit the
                        SET to the SET Recipient.</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
</div>
<p id="section-2.4-4">
   Other Error Codes may also be received,
   as the set of Error Codes is extensible
   via the IANA "Security Event Token Error Codes" registry
   established in <a href="#iana_set_errors" class="xref">Section 7.1</a>.<a href="#section-2.4-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="aa">
<section id="section-3">
      <h2 id="name-authentication-and-authoriz">
<a href="#section-3" class="section-number selfRef">3. </a><a href="#name-authentication-and-authoriz" class="section-name selfRef">Authentication and Authorization</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-3-1">The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
      HTTP over TLS <span>[<a href="#RFC2818" class="xref">RFC2818</a>]</span> and standard
      HTTP authentication and authorization schemes, as per <span>[<a href="#RFC7235" class="xref">RFC7235</a>]</span>.  The TLS server certificate
      <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be validated using DNS-ID <span>[<a href="#RFC6125" class="xref">RFC6125</a>]</span> and/or DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
      (DANE) <span>[<a href="#RFC6698" class="xref">RFC6698</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3-2">
       Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be determined by
       using the identity of the SET Issuer,
       the identity of the SET Transmitter, perhaps using mutual TLS,
       or via other employed authentication methods.
       Because SETs are
       not commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that
       are not of interest.<a href="#section-3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="reliability">
<section id="section-4">
      <h2 id="name-delivery-reliability">
<a href="#section-4" class="section-number selfRef">4. </a><a href="#name-delivery-reliability" class="section-name selfRef">Delivery Reliability</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-4-1">
                Delivery reliability requirements may vary depending upon the use cases.
 This specification defines the response from the SET
                Recipient in such a way as to provide the SET Transmitter with the
                information necessary to determine what further action is required,
                if any, in order to meet their requirements.  SET Transmitters with
                high reliability requirements may be tempted to always retry failed
                transmissions. However, it should be noted that for many types of SET
                delivery errors, a retry is extremely unlikely to be successful.  For
                example, <code>invalid_request</code> indicates a structural
                error in the content of the request body that is likely to remain when
                retransmitting the same SET.  Others such as <code>access_denied</code>
                may be transient, for example, if the SET Transmitter refreshes expired
                credentials prior to retransmission.<a href="#section-4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-4-2">
                The SET Transmitter may be unaware of whether or not a SET has been delivered
                to a SET Recipient. For example, a network interruption could prevent the
                SET Transmitter from receiving the success response, or a service outage could
                prevent the SET Transmitter from recording the fact that the SET was delivered. 
                It is left to the implementer to decide how to handle such cases, based on
                their requirements. For example, it may be appropriate for the SET Transmitter to
                retransmit the SET to the SET Recipient, erring on the side of guaranteeing delivery,
                or it may be appropriate to assume delivery was successful, erring on the side of
                not spending resources retransmitting previously delivered SETs. Other options,
                such as sending the SET to a "dead letter queue" for manual examination may also
                be appropriate.<a href="#section-4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-4-3">
                Implementers <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> evaluate the reliability requirements of their use cases and the
                impact of various retry mechanisms and retransmission policies on the performance
                of their systems to determine an appropriate strategy for handling various error
                conditions.<a href="#section-4-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="Security">
<section id="section-5">
      <h2 id="name-security-considerations">
<a href="#section-5" class="section-number selfRef">5. </a><a href="#name-security-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Security Considerations</a>
      </h2>
<div id="payloadAuthentication">
<section id="section-5.1">
        <h3 id="name-authentication-using-signed">
<a href="#section-5.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.1. </a><a href="#name-authentication-using-signed" class="section-name selfRef">Authentication Using Signed SETs</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-5.1-1">
   JWS signed SETs can be
   used (see <span>[<a href="#RFC7515" class="xref">RFC7515</a>]</span> and
   <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8417#section-5" class="relref">Section 5</a> of [<a href="#RFC8417" class="xref">RFC8417</a>]</span>)
   to enable the SET Recipient
   to validate that the SET Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs.<a href="#section-5.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="HTTP">
<section id="section-5.2">
        <h3 id="name-http-considerations">
<a href="#section-5.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.2. </a><a href="#name-http-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">HTTP Considerations</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-5.2-1">SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and
        is thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP (<span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7230#section-9" class="relref">Section 9</a> of [<a href="#RFC7230" class="xref">RFC7230</a>]</span>) and its related
        specifications.<a href="#section-5.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="Confidentiality">
<section id="section-5.3">
        <h3 id="name-confidentiality-of-sets">
<a href="#section-5.3" class="section-number selfRef">5.3. </a><a href="#name-confidentiality-of-sets" class="section-name selfRef">Confidentiality of SETs</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-5.3-1">
   SETs may contain sensitive information, including Personally
   Identifiable Information (PII), or be distributed through
   third parties.  In such cases, SET Transmitters and SET
   Recipients <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> protect the confidentiality
   of the SET contents.  TLS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be used to
   secure the transmitted SETs.  In some use cases, encrypting
   the SET as described in <span><a href="#RFC7516" class="xref">JWE</a> [<a href="#RFC7516" class="xref">RFC7516</a>]</span> will also be required.  The
   Event delivery endpoint <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> support at least
   TLS version 1.2 <span>[<a href="#RFC5246" class="xref">RFC5246</a>]</span>
   and <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> support the newest version of TLS
   that meets its security requirements, which as of the time
   of this publication is TLS 1.3 <span>[<a href="#RFC8446" class="xref">RFC8446</a>]</span>.  The client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> perform
   a TLS/SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID <span>[<a href="#RFC6125" class="xref">RFC6125</a>]</span> and/or DANE <span>[<a href="#RFC6698" class="xref">RFC6698</a>]</span>.  How a SET Transmitter
   determines the expected service identity to match the SET
   Recipient's server certificate against is out of scope for
   this document.  The implementation security considerations
   for TLS in "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport
   Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
   (DTLS)" <span>[<a href="#RFC7525" class="xref">RFC7525</a>]</span>
          <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be followed.<a href="#section-5.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="DoS">
<section id="section-5.4">
        <h3 id="name-denial-of-service">
<a href="#section-5.4" class="section-number selfRef">5.4. </a><a href="#name-denial-of-service" class="section-name selfRef">Denial of Service</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-5.4-1">
                    The SET Recipient may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack where a
                    malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing invalid SETs,
                    causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on cryptographic
                    operations that are bound to fail. This may be mitigated by authenticating
                    SET Transmitters with a mechanism such as mutual TLS.
     Rate-limiting problematic transmitters is also a possible means of mitigation.<a href="#section-5.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="Persisted">
<section id="section-5.5">
        <h3 id="name-authenticating-persisted-se">
<a href="#section-5.5" class="section-number selfRef">5.5. </a><a href="#name-authenticating-persisted-se" class="section-name selfRef">Authenticating Persisted SETs</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-5.5-1">
                    At the time of receipt, the SET Recipient can rely upon TLS
                    mechanisms, HTTP authentication methods, and/or other context from the
                    transmission request to authenticate the SET Transmitter and validate the
                    authenticity of the SET.  However, this context is typically unavailable to
                    systems to which the SET Recipient forwards the SET, or to systems that
                    retrieve the SET from storage.  If the SET Recipient requires the ability to
                    validate SET authenticity outside of the context of the transmission request,
                    then the SET Recipient <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> ensure that such SETs have been signed in
                    accordance with <span>[<a href="#RFC7515" class="xref">RFC7515</a>]</span>.
     Needed context could also be stored with the SET and retrieved with it.<a href="#section-5.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="Privacy">
<section id="section-6">
      <h2 id="name-privacy-considerations">
<a href="#section-6" class="section-number selfRef">6. </a><a href="#name-privacy-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Privacy Considerations</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-6-1">
                SET Transmitters should attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to the specific
                business and protocol needs of subscribers.<a href="#section-6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-2">When sharing personally identifiable information or information
                that is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
                Transmitters and Recipients <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> have the appropriate legal agreements
                and user consent or terms of service in place.
 Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encrypted,
 at least with TLS
 and sometimes also using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) <span>[<a href="#RFC7516" class="xref">RFC7516</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-3">
       In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered sensitive
       information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be considered a violation
       of privacy.  SET Issuers and SET Transmitters should consider the ramifications of sharing a
       particular subject identifier with a SET Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could
       enable correlation and/or de-anonymization of data) and choose appropriate
       subject identifiers for their use cases.<a href="#section-6-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="IANA">
<section id="section-7">
      <h2 id="name-iana-considerations">
<a href="#section-7" class="section-number selfRef">7. </a><a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">IANA Considerations</a>
      </h2>
<div id="iana_set_errors">
<section id="section-7.1">
        <h3 id="name-security-event-token-error-c">
<a href="#section-7.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.1. </a><a href="#name-security-event-token-error-c" class="section-name selfRef">Security Event Token Error Codes</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-7.1-1">
                    This document defines Security Event Token Error
                    Codes, for which IANA has created and now maintains a
                    new registry titled "Security Event Token Error
                    Codes".  Initial values for the "Security Event Token
                    Error Codes" registry are defined in <a href="#reqErrors" class="xref">Table 1</a> and registered
                    below.  Future assignments are to be made through the
                    Specification Required registration policy <span>[<a href="#RFC8126" class="xref">RFC8126</a>]</span> and shall follow the
                    template below.<a href="#section-7.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7.1-2">
                    Error Codes are intended to be interpreted by automated
                    systems; therefore, they <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> identify
                    classes of errors to which an automated system could
                    respond in a meaningfully distinct way (e.g., by
                    refreshing authentication credentials and retrying the
                    request).<a href="#section-7.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7.1-3">
   Error Code names are case sensitive.
   Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner
   unless the Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason
   to allow an exception.<a href="#section-7.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7.1-4">
   Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
   determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality,
   whether it is likely to be of general applicability
   or whether it is useful only for a single application,
   and whether the registration description is clear.<a href="#section-7.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7.1-5">
   It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be
   appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of
   different applications using this specification in order to
   enable broadly informed review of registration decisions.
   In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as
   creating a conflict of interest for a particular expert,
   that expert should defer to the judgment of the other
   experts.<a href="#section-7.1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<div id="iana_set_errors_template">
<section id="section-7.1.1">
          <h4 id="name-registration-template">
<a href="#section-7.1.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.1.1. </a><a href="#name-registration-template" class="section-name selfRef">Registration Template</a>
          </h4>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-7.1.1-1">
            <dt id="section-7.1.1-1.1">Error Code</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.1-1.2">
                                The name of the Security Event Token 
                                Error Code, as described in <a href="#error_codes" class="xref">Section 2.4</a>. The
                                name <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be a case-sensitive
                                ASCII string consisting only of letters,
                                digits, and underscore; these are the
                                characters whose codes fall within the
                                inclusive ranges 0x30-39, 0x41-5A, 0x5F, and
                                0x61-7A.<a href="#section-7.1.1-1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.1-1.3">Description</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.1-1.4">
                                A brief human-readable description of the Security Event Token 
                                Error Code.<a href="#section-7.1.1-1.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.1-1.5">Change Controller</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.1-1.6">
                                For error codes registered by the IETF or its working groups, list "IETF".
 For all other error codes, list the name of the
                                party responsible for the registration.  Contact information such as
                                mailing address, email address, or phone number may also be provided.<a href="#section-7.1.1-1.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.1-1.7">Reference</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.1-1.8">
                                A reference to the document or documents that define the Security Event
                                Token Error Code. The definition <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify the name and
                                description of the error code and explain under what circumstances the
                                error code may be used. URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of each
                                document at no cost <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> be included.<a href="#section-7.1.1-1.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
          <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
</section>
</div>
<div id="InitialContents">
<section id="section-7.1.2">
          <h4 id="name-initial-registry-contents">
<a href="#section-7.1.2" class="section-number selfRef">7.1.2. </a><a href="#name-initial-registry-contents" class="section-name selfRef">Initial Registry Contents</a>
          </h4>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel dlCompact" id="section-7.1.2-1">
            <dt id="section-7.1.2-1.1">Error Code:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-1.2">invalid_request<a href="#section-7.1.2-1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-1.3">Description:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-1.4">The request body cannot be parsed as a SET or the Event
                          Payload within the SET does not conform to the event's definition.<a href="#section-7.1.2-1.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-1.5">Change Controller:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-1.6">IETF<a href="#section-7.1.2-1.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-1.7">Reference:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-1.8">
              <a href="#error_codes" class="xref">Section 2.4</a> of RFC 8935<a href="#section-7.1.2-1.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
          <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel dlCompact" id="section-7.1.2-2">
            <dt id="section-7.1.2-2.1">Error Code:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-2.2">invalid_key<a href="#section-7.1.2-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-2.3">Description:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-2.4">One or more keys used to encrypt or sign the SET is invalid
                          or otherwise unacceptable to the SET Recipient (expired, revoked,
                          failed certificate validation, etc.).<a href="#section-7.1.2-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-2.5">Change Controller:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-2.6">IETF<a href="#section-7.1.2-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-2.7">Reference:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-2.8">
              <a href="#error_codes" class="xref">Section 2.4</a> of RFC 8935<a href="#section-7.1.2-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
          <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel dlCompact" id="section-7.1.2-3">
            <dt id="section-7.1.2-3.1">Error Code:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-3.2">invalid_issuer<a href="#section-7.1.2-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-3.3">Description:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-3.4">The SET Issuer is invalid for the SET Recipient.<a href="#section-7.1.2-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-3.5">Change Controller:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-3.6">IETF<a href="#section-7.1.2-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-3.7">Reference:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-3.8">
              <a href="#error_codes" class="xref">Section 2.4</a> of RFC 8935<a href="#section-7.1.2-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
          <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel dlCompact" id="section-7.1.2-4">
            <dt id="section-7.1.2-4.1">Error Code:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-4.2">invalid_audience<a href="#section-7.1.2-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-4.3">Description:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-4.4">The SET Audience does not correspond to the SET Recipient.<a href="#section-7.1.2-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-4.5">Change Controller:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-4.6">IETF<a href="#section-7.1.2-4.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-4.7">Reference:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-4.8">
              <a href="#error_codes" class="xref">Section 2.4</a> of RFC 8935<a href="#section-7.1.2-4.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
          <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel dlCompact" id="section-7.1.2-5">
            <dt id="section-7.1.2-5.1">Error Code:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-5.2">authentication_failed<a href="#section-7.1.2-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-5.3">Description:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-5.4">The SET Recipient could not authenticate the SET Transmitter.<a href="#section-7.1.2-5.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-5.5">Change Controller:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-5.6">IETF<a href="#section-7.1.2-5.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-5.7">Reference:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-5.8">
              <a href="#error_codes" class="xref">Section 2.4</a> of RFC 8935<a href="#section-7.1.2-5.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
          <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel dlCompact" id="section-7.1.2-6">
            <dt id="section-7.1.2-6.1">Error Code:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-6.2">access_denied<a href="#section-7.1.2-6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-6.3">Description:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-6.4">The SET Transmitter is not authorized to transmit the
                          SET to the SET Recipient.<a href="#section-7.1.2-6.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-6.5">Change Controller:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-6.6">IETF<a href="#section-7.1.2-6.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
            <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-7.1.2-6.7">Reference:</dt>
            <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1.2-6.8">
              <a href="#error_codes" class="xref">Section 2.4</a> of RFC 8935<a href="#section-7.1.2-6.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
          <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<section id="section-8">
      <h2 id="name-references">
<a href="#section-8" class="section-number selfRef">8. </a><a href="#name-references" class="section-name selfRef">References</a>
      </h2>
<section id="section-8.1">
        <h3 id="name-normative-references">
<a href="#section-8.1" class="section-number selfRef">8.1. </a><a href="#name-normative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Normative References</a>
        </h3>
<dl class="references">
<dt id="RFC2119">[RFC2119]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Bradner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2119</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2119</span>, <time datetime="1997-03" class="refDate">March 1997</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC2277">[RFC2277]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Alvestrand, H.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 18</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2277</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2277</span>, <time datetime="1998-01" class="refDate">January 1998</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2277">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2277</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC2818">[RFC2818]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"HTTP Over TLS"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2818</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2818</span>, <time datetime="2000-05" class="refDate">May 2000</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5246">[RFC5246]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Dierks, T.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and E. Rescorla</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5246</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5246</span>, <time datetime="2008-08" class="refDate">August 2008</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6125">[RFC6125]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Saint-Andre, P.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and J. Hodges</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6125</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6125</span>, <time datetime="2011-03" class="refDate">March 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6698">[RFC6698]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Hoffman, P.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and J. Schlyter</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6698</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6698</span>, <time datetime="2012-08" class="refDate">August 2012</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7230">[RFC7230]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Fielding, R., Ed.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and J. Reschke, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7230</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7230</span>, <time datetime="2014-06" class="refDate">June 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7231">[RFC7231]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Fielding, R., Ed.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and J. Reschke, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7231</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7231</span>, <time datetime="2014-06" class="refDate">June 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7515">[RFC7515]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Bradley, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and N. Sakimura</span>, <span class="refTitle">"JSON Web Signature (JWS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7515</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7515</span>, <time datetime="2015-05" class="refDate">May 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7516">[RFC7516]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and J. Hildebrand</span>, <span class="refTitle">"JSON Web Encryption (JWE)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7516</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7516</span>, <time datetime="2015-05" class="refDate">May 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7519">[RFC7519]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Bradley, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and N. Sakimura</span>, <span class="refTitle">"JSON Web Token (JWT)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7519</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7519</span>, <time datetime="2015-05" class="refDate">May 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7525">[RFC7525]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Sheffer, Y.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Holz, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and P. Saint-Andre</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 195</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7525</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7525</span>, <time datetime="2015-05" class="refDate">May 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8126">[RFC8126]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Cotton, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Leiba, B.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and T. Narten</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 26</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8126</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8126</span>, <time datetime="2017-06" class="refDate">June 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8174">[RFC8174]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Leiba, B.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8174</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8174</span>, <time datetime="2017-05" class="refDate">May 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8259">[RFC8259]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Bray, T., Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 90</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8259</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8259</span>, <time datetime="2017-12" class="refDate">December 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8417">[RFC8417]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Hunt, P., Ed.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jones, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Denniss, W.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and M. Ansari</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Security Event Token (SET)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8417</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8417</span>, <time datetime="2018-07" class="refDate">July 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8446">[RFC8446]</dt>
      <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8446</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8446</span>, <time datetime="2018-08" class="refDate">August 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
</section>
<section id="section-8.2">
        <h3 id="name-informative-references">
<a href="#section-8.2" class="section-number selfRef">8.2. </a><a href="#name-informative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Informative References</a>
        </h3>
<dl class="references">
<dt id="RFC7235">[RFC7235]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Fielding, R., Ed.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and J. Reschke, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7235</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7235</span>, <time datetime="2014-06" class="refDate">June 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8936">[RFC8936]</dt>
      <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Backman, A., Ed.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jones, M., Ed.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Scurtescu, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Ansari, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and A. Nadalin</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8936</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8936</span>, <time datetime="2020-11" class="refDate">November 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8936">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8936</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
</section>
</section>
<div id="Unencrypted">
<section id="section-appendix.a">
      <h2 id="name-unencrypted-transport-consi">
<a href="#section-appendix.a" class="section-number selfRef">Appendix A. </a><a href="#name-unencrypted-transport-consi" class="section-name selfRef">Unencrypted Transport Considerations</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-appendix.a-1">
     Earlier versions of this specification made the use of TLS optional
     and described security and privacy considerations resulting from use
     of unencrypted HTTP as the underlying transport.
     When the working group decided to mandate usage of HTTP over TLS,
     it also decided to preserve the description of these considerations
     in this non-normative appendix.<a href="#section-appendix.a-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-appendix.a-2">
     SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered
     Personally Identifiable Information (PII).
     In such cases, SET Transmitters and
     SET Recipients <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> protect the confidentiality of the SET contents.
     When TLS is not used, this means that the SET <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encrypted
     as described in <span><a href="#RFC7516" class="xref">JWE</a> [<a href="#RFC7516" class="xref">RFC7516</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-appendix.a-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-appendix.a-3">
     If SETs were allowed to be transmitted over unencrypted channels, some privacy-sensitive
     information about them might leak, even though the SETs themselves are encrypted.
     For instance, an attacker may be able to determine whether or not a SET was accepted and the reason for its rejection
     or may be able to derive information from being able to observe the size of the encrypted SET.
     (Note that even when TLS is utilized, some information leakage is still possible;
     message padding algorithms to prevent side channels remain an open research topic.)<a href="#section-appendix.a-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="Acknowledgments">
<section id="section-appendix.b">
      <h2 id="name-acknowledgments">
<a href="#name-acknowledgments" class="section-name selfRef">Acknowledgments</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-appendix.b-1">
     The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM Working Group, which
     began discussions of provisioning events starting with draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015.
     We would like to thank <span class="contact-name">Phil Hunt</span> and the other authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02,
     upon which this specification is based.
     We would like to thank the participants in the SecEvents
     Working Group for their contributions to this specification.<a href="#section-appendix.b-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-appendix.b-2">
     Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for their reviews of the specification:
     <span class="contact-name">Joe Clarke</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Roman Danyliw</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Vijay Gurbani</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Benjamin Kaduk</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Erik Kline</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Murray Kucherawy</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Barry Leiba</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Yaron Sheffer</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Robert Sparks</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Valery Smyslov</span>,
     <span class="contact-name">Éric Vyncke</span>,
     and
     <span class="contact-name">Robert Wilton</span>.<a href="#section-appendix.b-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="authors-addresses">
<section id="section-appendix.c">
      <h2 id="name-authors-addresses">
<a href="#name-authors-addresses" class="section-name selfRef">Authors' Addresses</a>
      </h2>
<address class="vcard">
        <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Annabelle Backman (<span class="role">editor</span>)</span></div>
<div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Amazon</span></div>
<div class="email">
<span>Email:</span>
<a href="mailto:richanna@amazon.com" class="email">richanna@amazon.com</a>
</div>
</address>
<address class="vcard">
        <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Michael B. Jones (<span class="role">editor</span>)</span></div>
<div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Microsoft</span></div>
<div class="email">
<span>Email:</span>
<a href="mailto:mbj@microsoft.com" class="email">mbj@microsoft.com</a>
</div>
<div class="url">
<span>URI:</span>
<a href="https://self-issued.info/" class="url">https://self-issued.info/</a>
</div>
</address>
<address class="vcard">
        <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Marius Scurtescu</span></div>
<div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Coinbase</span></div>
<div class="email">
<span>Email:</span>
<a href="mailto:marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com" class="email">marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com</a>
</div>
</address>
<address class="vcard">
        <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Morteza Ansari</span></div>
<div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Independent</span></div>
<div class="email">
<span>Email:</span>
<a href="mailto:morteza@sharppics.com" class="email">morteza@sharppics.com</a>
</div>
</address>
<address class="vcard">
        <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Anthony Nadalin</span></div>
<div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Independent</span></div>
<div class="email">
<span>Email:</span>
<a href="mailto:nadalin@prodigy.net" class="email">nadalin@prodigy.net</a>
</div>
</address>
</section>
</div>
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