File: rfc9152.html

package info (click to toggle)
doc-rfc 20230121-1
links: PTS, VCS
area: non-free
in suites: bookworm, forky, sid, trixie
size: 1,609,944 kB
file content (2491 lines) | stat: -rw-r--r-- 117,930 bytes
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en" class="RFC">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta content="Common,Latin" name="scripts">
<meta content="initial-scale=1.0" name="viewport">
<title>RFC 9152: Secure Object Delivery Protocol (SODP) Server Interfaces: NSA's Profile for Delivery of Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and Symmetric Keys to Clients</title>
<meta content="Michael Jenkins" name="author">
<meta content="Sean Turner" name="author">
<meta content="
       
   This document specifies protocol interfaces profiled by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) for National Security System (NSS) servers that provide public key certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and symmetric keys to NSS clients.
   Servers that support these interfaces are referred to as Secure
   Object Delivery Protocol (SODP) servers. The intended audience for this
   profile comprises developers of client devices that will obtain key
   management services from NSA-operated SODP servers.  Interfaces
   supported by SODP servers include Enrollment over Secure
   Transport (EST) and its extensions as well as Certificate Management
   over CMS (CMC). 
       
   This profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation of
   all components of US National Security Systems (SP 800-59). It is also
   appropriate for other US Government systems that process high-value
   information. It is made publicly available for use by developers and
   operators of these and any other system deployments. 
    " name="description">
<meta content="xml2rfc 3.12.2" name="generator">
<meta content="CNSA" name="keyword">
<meta content="NSS" name="keyword">
<meta content="9152" name="rfc.number">
<!-- Generator version information:
  xml2rfc 3.12.2
    Python 3.6.15
    appdirs 1.4.4
    ConfigArgParse 1.4.1
    google-i18n-address 2.4.0
    html5lib 1.0.1
    intervaltree 3.0.2
    Jinja2 2.11.3
    kitchen 1.2.6
    lxml 4.4.2
    pycairo 1.15.1
    pycountry 19.8.18
    pyflakes 2.1.1
    PyYAML 5.4.1
    requests 2.24.0
    setuptools 40.5.0
    six 1.14.0
    WeasyPrint 52.5
-->
<link href="rfc9152.xml" rel="alternate" type="application/rfc+xml">
<link href="#copyright" rel="license">
<style type="text/css">/*

  NOTE: Changes at the bottom of this file overrides some earlier settings.

  Once the style has stabilized and has been adopted as an official RFC style,
  this can be consolidated so that style settings occur only in one place, but
  for now the contents of this file consists first of the initial CSS work as
  provided to the RFC Formatter (xml2rfc) work, followed by itemized and
  commented changes found necssary during the development of the v3
  formatters.

*/

/* fonts */
@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Sans'); /* Sans-serif */
@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Serif'); /* Serif (print) */
@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto+Mono'); /* Monospace */

@viewport {
  zoom: 1.0;
  width: extend-to-zoom;
}
@-ms-viewport {
  width: extend-to-zoom;
  zoom: 1.0;
}
/* general and mobile first */
html {
}
body {
  max-width: 90%;
  margin: 1.5em auto;
  color: #222;
  background-color: #fff;
  font-size: 14px;
  font-family: 'Noto Sans', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
  line-height: 1.6;
  scroll-behavior: smooth;
}
.ears {
  display: none;
}

/* headings */
#title, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
  margin: 1em 0 0.5em;
  font-weight: bold;
  line-height: 1.3;
}
#title {
  clear: both;
  border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
  margin: 0 0 0.5em 0;
  padding: 1em 0 0.5em;
}
.author {
  padding-bottom: 4px;
}
h1 {
  font-size: 26px;
  margin: 1em 0;
}
h2 {
  font-size: 22px;
  margin-top: -20px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 33px;
}
h3 {
  font-size: 18px;
  margin-top: -36px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 42px;
}
h4 {
  font-size: 16px;
  margin-top: -36px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 42px;
}
h5, h6 {
  font-size: 14px;
}
#n-copyright-notice {
  border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
  padding-bottom: 1em;
  margin-bottom: 1em;
}
/* general structure */
p {
  padding: 0;
  margin: 0 0 1em 0;
  text-align: left;
}
div, span {
  position: relative;
}
div {
  margin: 0;
}
.alignRight.art-text {
  background-color: #f9f9f9;
  border: 1px solid #eee;
  border-radius: 3px;
  padding: 1em 1em 0;
  margin-bottom: 1.5em;
}
.alignRight.art-text pre {
  padding: 0;
}
.alignRight {
  margin: 1em 0;
}
.alignRight > *:first-child {
  border: none;
  margin: 0;
  float: right;
  clear: both;
}
.alignRight > *:nth-child(2) {
  clear: both;
  display: block;
  border: none;
}
svg {
  display: block;
}
.alignCenter.art-text {
  background-color: #f9f9f9;
  border: 1px solid #eee;
  border-radius: 3px;
  padding: 1em 1em 0;
  margin-bottom: 1.5em;
}
.alignCenter.art-text pre {
  padding: 0;
}
.alignCenter {
  margin: 1em 0;
}
.alignCenter > *:first-child {
  border: none;
  /* this isn't optimal, but it's an existence proof.  PrinceXML doesn't
     support flexbox yet.
  */
  display: table;
  margin: 0 auto;
}

/* lists */
ol, ul {
  padding: 0;
  margin: 0 0 1em 2em;
}
ol ol, ul ul, ol ul, ul ol {
  margin-left: 1em;
}
li {
  margin: 0 0 0.25em 0;
}
.ulCompact li {
  margin: 0;
}
ul.empty, .ulEmpty {
  list-style-type: none;
}
ul.empty li, .ulEmpty li {
  margin-top: 0.5em;
}
ul.ulBare, li.ulBare {
  margin-left: 0em !important;
}
ul.compact, .ulCompact,
ol.compact, .olCompact {
  line-height: 100%;
  margin: 0 0 0 2em;
}

/* definition lists */
dl {
}
dl > dt {
  float: left;
  margin-right: 1em;
}
/* 
dl.nohang > dt {
  float: none;
}
*/
dl > dd {
  margin-bottom: .8em;
  min-height: 1.3em;
}
dl.compact > dd, .dlCompact > dd {
  margin-bottom: 0em;
}
dl > dd > dl {
  margin-top: 0.5em;
  margin-bottom: 0em;
}

/* links */
a {
  text-decoration: none;
}
a[href] {
  color: #22e; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
}
a[href]:hover {
  background-color: #f2f2f2;
}
figcaption a[href],
a[href].selfRef {
  color: #222;
}
/* XXX probably not this:
a.selfRef:hover {
  background-color: transparent;
  cursor: default;
} */

/* Figures */
tt, code, pre, code {
  background-color: #f9f9f9;
  font-family: 'Roboto Mono', monospace;
}
pre {
  border: 1px solid #eee;
  margin: 0;
  padding: 1em;
}
img {
  max-width: 100%;
}
figure {
  margin: 0;
}
figure blockquote {
  margin: 0.8em 0.4em 0.4em;
}
figcaption {
  font-style: italic;
  margin: 0 0 1em 0;
}
@media screen {
  pre {
    overflow-x: auto;
    max-width: 100%;
    max-width: calc(100% - 22px);
  }
}

/* aside, blockquote */
aside, blockquote {
  margin-left: 0;
  padding: 1.2em 2em;
}
blockquote {
  background-color: #f9f9f9;
  color: #111; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  border: 1px solid #ddd;
  border-radius: 3px;
  margin: 1em 0;
}
cite {
  display: block;
  text-align: right;
  font-style: italic;
}

/* tables */
table {
  width: 100%;
  margin: 0 0 1em;
  border-collapse: collapse;
  border: 1px solid #eee;
}
th, td {
  text-align: left;
  vertical-align: top;
  padding: 0.5em 0.75em;
}
th {
  text-align: left;
  background-color: #e9e9e9;
}
tr:nth-child(2n+1) > td {
  background-color: #f5f5f5;
}
table caption {
  font-style: italic;
  margin: 0;
  padding: 0;
  text-align: left;
}
table p {
  /* XXX to avoid bottom margin on table row signifiers. If paragraphs should
     be allowed within tables more generally, it would be far better to select on a class. */
  margin: 0;
}

/* pilcrow */
a.pilcrow {
  color: #666; /* Arlen: AHDJ 2019 */
  text-decoration: none;
  visibility: hidden;
  user-select: none;
  -ms-user-select: none;
  -o-user-select:none;
  -moz-user-select: none;
  -khtml-user-select: none;
  -webkit-user-select: none;
  -webkit-touch-callout: none;
}
@media screen {
  aside:hover > a.pilcrow,
  p:hover > a.pilcrow,
  blockquote:hover > a.pilcrow,
  div:hover > a.pilcrow,
  li:hover > a.pilcrow,
  pre:hover > a.pilcrow {
    visibility: visible;
  }
  a.pilcrow:hover {
    background-color: transparent;
  }
}

/* misc */
hr {
  border: 0;
  border-top: 1px solid #eee;
}
.bcp14 {
  font-variant: small-caps;
}

.role {
  font-variant: all-small-caps;
}

/* info block */
#identifiers {
  margin: 0;
  font-size: 0.9em;
}
#identifiers dt {
  width: 3em;
  clear: left;
}
#identifiers dd {
  float: left;
  margin-bottom: 0;
}
/* Fix PDF info block run off issue */
@media print {
  #identifiers dd {
    float: none;
  }
}
#identifiers .authors .author {
  display: inline-block;
  margin-right: 1.5em;
}
#identifiers .authors .org {
  font-style: italic;
}

/* The prepared/rendered info at the very bottom of the page */
.docInfo {
  color: #666; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  font-size: 0.9em;
  font-style: italic;
  margin-top: 2em;
}
.docInfo .prepared {
  float: left;
}
.docInfo .prepared {
  float: right;
}

/* table of contents */
#toc  {
  padding: 0.75em 0 2em 0;
  margin-bottom: 1em;
}
nav.toc ul {
  margin: 0 0.5em 0 0;
  padding: 0;
  list-style: none;
}
nav.toc li {
  line-height: 1.3em;
  margin: 0.75em 0;
  padding-left: 1.2em;
  text-indent: -1.2em;
}
/* references */
.references dt {
  text-align: right;
  font-weight: bold;
  min-width: 7em;
}
.references dd {
  margin-left: 8em;
  overflow: auto;
}

.refInstance {
  margin-bottom: 1.25em;
}

.references .ascii {
  margin-bottom: 0.25em;
}

/* index */
.index ul {
  margin: 0 0 0 1em;
  padding: 0;
  list-style: none;
}
.index ul ul {
  margin: 0;
}
.index li {
  margin: 0;
  text-indent: -2em;
  padding-left: 2em;
  padding-bottom: 5px;
}
.indexIndex {
  margin: 0.5em 0 1em;
}
.index a {
  font-weight: 700;
}
/* make the index two-column on all but the smallest screens */
@media (min-width: 600px) {
  .index ul {
    -moz-column-count: 2;
    -moz-column-gap: 20px;
  }
  .index ul ul {
    -moz-column-count: 1;
    -moz-column-gap: 0;
  }
}

/* authors */
address.vcard {
  font-style: normal;
  margin: 1em 0;
}

address.vcard .nameRole {
  font-weight: 700;
  margin-left: 0;
}
address.vcard .label {
  font-family: "Noto Sans",Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;
  margin: 0.5em 0;
}
address.vcard .type {
  display: none;
}
.alternative-contact {
  margin: 1.5em 0 1em;
}
hr.addr {
  border-top: 1px dashed;
  margin: 0;
  color: #ddd;
  max-width: calc(100% - 16px);
}

/* temporary notes */
.rfcEditorRemove::before {
  position: absolute;
  top: 0.2em;
  right: 0.2em;
  padding: 0.2em;
  content: "The RFC Editor will remove this note";
  color: #9e2a00; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
}
.rfcEditorRemove {
  position: relative;
  padding-top: 1.8em;
  background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  border-radius: 3px;
}
.cref {
  background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
  padding: 2px 4px;
}
.crefSource {
  font-style: italic;
}
/* alternative layout for smaller screens */
@media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
  body {
    padding-top: 2em;
  }
  #title {
    padding: 1em 0;
  }
  h1 {
    font-size: 24px;
  }
  h2 {
    font-size: 20px;
    margin-top: -18px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
    padding-top: 38px;
  }
  #identifiers dd {
    max-width: 60%;
  }
  #toc {
    position: fixed;
    z-index: 2;
    top: 0;
    right: 0;
    padding: 0;
    margin: 0;
    background-color: inherit;
    border-bottom: 1px solid #ccc;
  }
  #toc h2 {
    margin: -1px 0 0 0;
    padding: 4px 0 4px 6px;
    padding-right: 1em;
    min-width: 190px;
    font-size: 1.1em;
    text-align: right;
    background-color: #444;
    color: white;
    cursor: pointer;
  }
  #toc h2::before { /* css hamburger */
    float: right;
    position: relative;
    width: 1em;
    height: 1px;
    left: -164px;
    margin: 6px 0 0 0;
    background: white none repeat scroll 0 0;
    box-shadow: 0 4px 0 0 white, 0 8px 0 0 white;
    content: "";
  }
  #toc nav {
    display: none;
    padding: 0.5em 1em 1em;
    overflow: auto;
    height: calc(100vh - 48px);
    border-left: 1px solid #ddd;
  }
}

/* alternative layout for wide screens */
@media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
  body {
    max-width: 724px;
    margin: 42px auto;
    padding-left: 1.5em;
    padding-right: 29em;
  }
  #toc {
    position: fixed;
    top: 42px;
    right: 42px;
    width: 25%;
    margin: 0;
    padding: 0 1em;
    z-index: 1;
  }
  #toc h2 {
    border-top: none;
    border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
    font-size: 1em;
    font-weight: normal;
    margin: 0;
    padding: 0.25em 1em 1em 0;
  }
  #toc nav {
    display: block;
    height: calc(90vh - 84px);
    bottom: 0;
    padding: 0.5em 0 0;
    overflow: auto;
  }
  img { /* future proofing */
    max-width: 100%;
    height: auto;
  }
}

/* pagination */
@media print {
  body {

    width: 100%;
  }
  p {
    orphans: 3;
    widows: 3;
  }
  #n-copyright-notice {
    border-bottom: none;
  }
  #toc, #n-introduction {
    page-break-before: always;
  }
  #toc {
    border-top: none;
    padding-top: 0;
  }
  figure, pre {
    page-break-inside: avoid;
  }
  figure {
    overflow: scroll;
  }
  h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
    page-break-after: avoid;
  }
  h2+*, h3+*, h4+*, h5+*, h6+* {
    page-break-before: avoid;
  }
  pre {
    white-space: pre-wrap;
    word-wrap: break-word;
    font-size: 10pt;
  }
  table {
    border: 1px solid #ddd;
  }
  td {
    border-top: 1px solid #ddd;
  }
}

/* This is commented out here, as the string-set: doesn't
   pass W3C validation currently */
/*
.ears thead .left {
  string-set: ears-top-left content();
}

.ears thead .center {
  string-set: ears-top-center content();
}

.ears thead .right {
  string-set: ears-top-right content();
}

.ears tfoot .left {
  string-set: ears-bottom-left content();
}

.ears tfoot .center {
  string-set: ears-bottom-center content();
}

.ears tfoot .right {
  string-set: ears-bottom-right content();
}
*/

@page :first {
  padding-top: 0;
  @top-left {
    content: normal;
    border: none;
  }
  @top-center {
    content: normal;
    border: none;
  }
  @top-right {
    content: normal;
    border: none;
  }
}

@page {
  size: A4;
  margin-bottom: 45mm;
  padding-top: 20px;
  /* The follwing is commented out here, but set appropriately by in code, as
     the content depends on the document */
  /*
  @top-left {
    content: 'Internet-Draft';
    vertical-align: bottom;
    border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @top-left {
    content: string(ears-top-left);
    vertical-align: bottom;
    border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @top-center {
    content: string(ears-top-center);
    vertical-align: bottom;
    border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @top-right {
    content: string(ears-top-right);
    vertical-align: bottom;
    border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @bottom-left {
    content: string(ears-bottom-left);
    vertical-align: top;
    border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @bottom-center {
    content: string(ears-bottom-center);
    vertical-align: top;
    border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  @bottom-right {
      content: '[Page ' counter(page) ']';
      vertical-align: top;
      border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
  }
  */

}

/* Changes introduced to fix issues found during implementation */
/* Make sure links are clickable even if overlapped by following H* */
a {
  z-index: 2;
}
/* Separate body from document info even without intervening H1 */
section {
  clear: both;
}


/* Top align author divs, to avoid names without organization dropping level with org names */
.author {
  vertical-align: top;
}

/* Leave room in document info to show Internet-Draft on one line */
#identifiers dt {
  width: 8em;
}

/* Don't waste quite as much whitespace between label and value in doc info */
#identifiers dd {
  margin-left: 1em;
}

/* Give floating toc a background color (needed when it's a div inside section */
#toc {
  background-color: white;
}

/* Make the collapsed ToC header render white on gray also when it's a link */
@media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
  #toc h2 a,
  #toc h2 a:link,
  #toc h2 a:focus,
  #toc h2 a:hover,
  #toc a.toplink,
  #toc a.toplink:hover {
    color: white;
    background-color: #444;
    text-decoration: none;
  }
}

/* Give the bottom of the ToC some whitespace */
@media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
  #toc {
    padding: 0 0 1em 1em;
  }
}

/* Style section numbers with more space between number and title */
.section-number {
  padding-right: 0.5em;
}

/* prevent monospace from becoming overly large */
tt, code, pre, code {
  font-size: 95%;
}

/* Fix the height/width aspect for ascii art*/
pre.sourcecode,
.art-text pre {
  line-height: 1.12;
}


/* Add styling for a link in the ToC that points to the top of the document */
a.toplink {
  float: right;
  margin-right: 0.5em;
}

/* Fix the dl styling to match the RFC 7992 attributes */
dl > dt,
dl.dlParallel > dt {
  float: left;
  margin-right: 1em;
}
dl.dlNewline > dt {
  float: none;
}

/* Provide styling for table cell text alignment */
table td.text-left,
table th.text-left {
  text-align: left;
}
table td.text-center,
table th.text-center {
  text-align: center;
}
table td.text-right,
table th.text-right {
  text-align: right;
}

/* Make the alternative author contact informatio look less like just another
   author, and group it closer with the primary author contact information */
.alternative-contact {
  margin: 0.5em 0 0.25em 0;
}
address .non-ascii {
  margin: 0 0 0 2em;
}

/* With it being possible to set tables with alignment
  left, center, and right, { width: 100%; } does not make sense */
table {
  width: auto;
}

/* Avoid reference text that sits in a block with very wide left margin,
   because of a long floating dt label.*/
.references dd {
  overflow: visible;
}

/* Control caption placement */
caption {
  caption-side: bottom;
}

/* Limit the width of the author address vcard, so names in right-to-left
   script don't end up on the other side of the page. */

address.vcard {
  max-width: 30em;
  margin-right: auto;
}

/* For address alignment dependent on LTR or RTL scripts */
address div.left {
  text-align: left;
}
address div.right {
  text-align: right;
}

/* Provide table alignment support.  We can't use the alignX classes above
   since they do unwanted things with caption and other styling. */
table.right {
 margin-left: auto;
 margin-right: 0;
}
table.center {
 margin-left: auto;
 margin-right: auto;
}
table.left {
 margin-left: 0;
 margin-right: auto;
}

/* Give the table caption label the same styling as the figcaption */
caption a[href] {
  color: #222;
}

@media print {
  .toplink {
    display: none;
  }

  /* avoid overwriting the top border line with the ToC header */
  #toc {
    padding-top: 1px;
  }

  /* Avoid page breaks inside dl and author address entries */
  .vcard {
    page-break-inside: avoid;
  }

}
/* Tweak the bcp14 keyword presentation */
.bcp14 {
  font-variant: small-caps;
  font-weight: bold;
  font-size: 0.9em;
}
/* Tweak the invisible space above H* in order not to overlay links in text above */
 h2 {
  margin-top: -18px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 31px;
 }
 h3 {
  margin-top: -18px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 24px;
 }
 h4 {
  margin-top: -18px;  /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
  padding-top: 24px;
 }
/* Float artwork pilcrow to the right */
@media screen {
  .artwork a.pilcrow {
    display: block;
    line-height: 0.7;
    margin-top: 0.15em;
  }
}
/* Make pilcrows on dd visible */
@media screen {
  dd:hover > a.pilcrow {
    visibility: visible;
  }
}
/* Make the placement of figcaption match that of a table's caption
   by removing the figure's added bottom margin */
.alignLeft.art-text,
.alignCenter.art-text,
.alignRight.art-text {
   margin-bottom: 0;
}
.alignLeft,
.alignCenter,
.alignRight {
  margin: 1em 0 0 0;
}
/* In print, the pilcrow won't show on hover, so prevent it from taking up space,
   possibly even requiring a new line */
@media print {
  a.pilcrow {
    display: none;
  }
}
/* Styling for the external metadata */
div#external-metadata {
  background-color: #eee;
  padding: 0.5em;
  margin-bottom: 0.5em;
  display: none;
}
div#internal-metadata {
  padding: 0.5em;                       /* to match the external-metadata padding */
}
/* Styling for title RFC Number */
h1#rfcnum {
  clear: both;
  margin: 0 0 -1em;
  padding: 1em 0 0 0;
}
/* Make .olPercent look the same as <ol><li> */
dl.olPercent > dd {
  margin-bottom: 0.25em;
  min-height: initial;
}
/* Give aside some styling to set it apart */
aside {
  border-left: 1px solid #ddd;
  margin: 1em 0 1em 2em;
  padding: 0.2em 2em;
}
aside > dl,
aside > ol,
aside > ul,
aside > table,
aside > p {
  margin-bottom: 0.5em;
}
/* Additional page break settings */
@media print {
  figcaption, table caption {
    page-break-before: avoid;
  }
}
/* Font size adjustments for print */
@media print {
  body  { font-size: 10pt;      line-height: normal; max-width: 96%; }
  h1    { font-size: 1.72em;    padding-top: 1.5em; } /* 1*1.2*1.2*1.2 */
  h2    { font-size: 1.44em;    padding-top: 1.5em; } /* 1*1.2*1.2 */
  h3    { font-size: 1.2em;     padding-top: 1.5em; } /* 1*1.2 */
  h4    { font-size: 1em;       padding-top: 1.5em; }
  h5, h6 { font-size: 1em;      margin: initial; padding: 0.5em 0 0.3em; }
}
/* Sourcecode margin in print, when there's no pilcrow */
@media print {
  .artwork,
  .sourcecode {
    margin-bottom: 1em;
  }
}
/* Avoid narrow tables forcing too narrow table captions, which may render badly */
table {
  min-width: 20em;
}
/* ol type a */
ol.type-a { list-style-type: lower-alpha; }
ol.type-A { list-style-type: upper-alpha; }
ol.type-i { list-style-type: lower-roman; }
ol.type-I { list-style-type: lower-roman; }
/* Apply the print table and row borders in general, on request from the RPC,
and increase the contrast between border and odd row background sligthtly */
table {
  border: 1px solid #ddd;
}
td {
  border-top: 1px solid #ddd;
}
tr:nth-child(2n+1) > td {
  background-color: #f8f8f8;
}
/* Use style rules to govern display of the TOC. */
@media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
  #toc nav { display: none; }
  #toc.active nav { display: block; }
}
/* Add support for keepWithNext */
.keepWithNext {
  break-after: avoid-page;
  break-after: avoid-page;
}
/* Add support for keepWithPrevious */
.keepWithPrevious {
  break-before: avoid-page;
}
/* Change the approach to avoiding breaks inside artwork etc. */
figure, pre, table, .artwork, .sourcecode  {
  break-before: auto;
  break-after: auto;
}
/* Avoid breaks between <dt> and <dd> */
dl {
  break-before: auto;
  break-inside: auto;
}
dt {
  break-before: auto;
  break-after: avoid-page;
}
dd {
  break-before: avoid-page;
  break-after: auto;
  orphans: 3;
  widows: 3
}
span.break, dd.break {
  margin-bottom: 0;
  min-height: 0;
  break-before: auto;
  break-inside: auto;
  break-after: auto;
}
/* Undo break-before ToC */
@media print {
  #toc {
    break-before: auto;
  }
}
/* Text in compact lists should not get extra bottim margin space,
   since that would makes the list not compact */
ul.compact p, .ulCompact p,
ol.compact p, .olCompact p {
 margin: 0;
}
/* But the list as a whole needs the extra space at the end */
section ul.compact,
section .ulCompact,
section ol.compact,
section .olCompact {
  margin-bottom: 1em;                    /* same as p not within ul.compact etc. */
}
/* The tt and code background above interferes with for instance table cell
   backgrounds.  Changed to something a bit more selective. */
tt, code {
  background-color: transparent;
}
p tt, p code, li tt, li code {
  background-color: #f8f8f8;
}
/* Tweak the pre margin -- 0px doesn't come out well */
pre {
   margin-top: 0.5px;
}
/* Tweak the comact list text */
ul.compact, .ulCompact,
ol.compact, .olCompact,
dl.compact, .dlCompact {
  line-height: normal;
}
/* Don't add top margin for nested lists */
li > ul, li > ol, li > dl,
dd > ul, dd > ol, dd > dl,
dl > dd > dl {
  margin-top: initial;
}
/* Elements that should not be rendered on the same line as a <dt> */
/* This should match the element list in writer.text.TextWriter.render_dl() */
dd > div.artwork:first-child,
dd > aside:first-child,
dd > figure:first-child,
dd > ol:first-child,
dd > div:first-child > pre.sourcecode,
dd > table:first-child,
dd > ul:first-child {
  clear: left;
}
/* fix for weird browser behaviour when <dd/> is empty */
dt+dd:empty::before{
  content: "\00a0";
}
/* Make paragraph spacing inside <li> smaller than in body text, to fit better within the list */
li > p {
  margin-bottom: 0.5em
}
/* Don't let p margin spill out from inside list items */
li > p:last-of-type {
  margin-bottom: 0;
}
</style>
<link href="rfc-local.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc9152" rel="alternate">
  <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate">
  <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-turner-sodp-profile-08" rel="prev">
  </head>
<body>
<script src="https://www.rfc-editor.org/js/metadata.min.js"></script>
<table class="ears">
<thead><tr>
<td class="left">RFC 9152</td>
<td class="center">SODP Server Interfaces</td>
<td class="right">April 2022</td>
</tr></thead>
<tfoot><tr>
<td class="left">Jenkins &amp; Turner</td>
<td class="center">Informational</td>
<td class="right">[Page]</td>
</tr></tfoot>
</table>
<div id="external-metadata" class="document-information"></div>
<div id="internal-metadata" class="document-information">
<dl id="identifiers">
<dt class="label-stream">Stream:</dt>
<dd class="stream">Independent Submission</dd>
<dt class="label-rfc">RFC:</dt>
<dd class="rfc"><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9152" class="eref">9152</a></dd>
<dt class="label-category">Category:</dt>
<dd class="category">Informational</dd>
<dt class="label-published">Published:</dt>
<dd class="published">
<time datetime="2022-04" class="published">April 2022</time>
    </dd>
<dt class="label-issn">ISSN:</dt>
<dd class="issn">2070-1721</dd>
<dt class="label-authors">Authors:</dt>
<dd class="authors">
<div class="author">
      <div class="author-name">M. Jenkins</div>
<div class="org">NSA</div>
</div>
<div class="author">
      <div class="author-name">S. Turner</div>
<div class="org">sn3rd</div>
</div>
</dd>
</dl>
</div>
<h1 id="rfcnum">RFC 9152</h1>
<h1 id="title">Secure Object Delivery Protocol (SODP) Server Interfaces: NSA's Profile for Delivery of Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and Symmetric Keys to Clients</h1>
<section id="section-abstract">
      <h2 id="abstract"><a href="#abstract" class="selfRef">Abstract</a></h2>
<p id="section-abstract-1">
   This document specifies protocol interfaces profiled by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) for National Security System (NSS) servers that provide public key certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and symmetric keys to NSS clients.
   Servers that support these interfaces are referred to as Secure
   Object Delivery Protocol (SODP) servers. The intended audience for this
   profile comprises developers of client devices that will obtain key
   management services from NSA-operated SODP servers.  Interfaces
   supported by SODP servers include Enrollment over Secure
   Transport (EST) and its extensions as well as Certificate Management
   over CMS (CMC).<a href="#section-abstract-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-abstract-2">
   This profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation of
   all components of US National Security Systems (SP 800-59). It is also
   appropriate for other US Government systems that process high-value
   information. It is made publicly available for use by developers and
   operators of these and any other system deployments.<a href="#section-abstract-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
<div id="status-of-memo">
<section id="section-boilerplate.1">
        <h2 id="name-status-of-this-memo">
<a href="#name-status-of-this-memo" class="section-name selfRef">Status of This Memo</a>
        </h2>
<p id="section-boilerplate.1-1">
            This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
            published for informational purposes.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-boilerplate.1-2">
            This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any
            other RFC stream.  The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this
            document at its discretion and makes no statement about its value
            for implementation or deployment.  Documents approved for
            publication by the RFC Editor are not candidates for any level of
            Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-boilerplate.1-3">
            Information about the current status of this document, any
            errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
            <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9152">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9152</a></span>.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="copyright">
<section id="section-boilerplate.2">
        <h2 id="name-copyright-notice">
<a href="#name-copyright-notice" class="section-name selfRef">Copyright Notice</a>
        </h2>
<p id="section-boilerplate.2-1">
            Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
            document authors. All rights reserved.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-boilerplate.2-2">
            This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
            Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
            (<span><a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a></span>) in effect on the date of
            publication of this document. Please review these documents
            carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
            respect to this document.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="toc">
<section id="section-toc.1">
        <a href="#" onclick="scroll(0,0)" class="toplink">▲</a><h2 id="name-table-of-contents">
<a href="#name-table-of-contents" class="section-name selfRef">Table of Contents</a>
        </h2>
<nav class="toc"><ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
<li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.1">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.1"><a href="#section-1" class="xref">1</a>.  <a href="#name-introduction" class="xref">Introduction</a></p>
<ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
<li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1.1" class="xref">1.1</a>.  <a href="#name-documents-to-be-familiar-wi" class="xref">Documents to be Familiar With</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.2">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.2.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1.2" class="xref">1.2</a>.  <a href="#name-document-organization" class="xref">Document Organization</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.3">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.2.3.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1.3" class="xref">1.3</a>.  <a href="#name-environment" class="xref">Environment</a></p>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.2">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.2.1"><a href="#section-2" class="xref">2</a>.  <a href="#name-abstract-syntax-notation-on" class="xref">Abstract Syntax Notation One</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><a href="#section-3" class="xref">3</a>.  <a href="#name-est-interface" class="xref">EST Interface</a></p>
<ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
<li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1.1"><a href="#section-3.1" class="xref">3.1</a>.  <a href="#name-hypertext-transfer-protocol" class="xref">Hypertext Transfer Protocol Layer</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2.1"><a href="#section-3.2" class="xref">3.2</a>.  <a href="#name-transport-layer-security" class="xref">Transport Layer Security</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.3">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.3.1"><a href="#section-3.3" class="xref">3.3</a>.  <a href="#name-eligibility" class="xref">Eligibility</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.4">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.4.1"><a href="#section-3.4" class="xref">3.4</a>.  <a href="#name-authentication" class="xref">Authentication</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.5">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.5.1"><a href="#section-3.5" class="xref">3.5</a>.  <a href="#name-authorization" class="xref">Authorization</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.1"><a href="#section-3.6" class="xref">3.6</a>.  <a href="#name-est-and-est-extensions" class="xref">EST and EST Extensions</a></p>
<ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
<li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.1">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.1.1"><a href="#section-3.6.1" class="xref">3.6.1</a>.  <a href="#name-pal" class="xref">/pal</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.2">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.2.1"><a href="#section-3.6.2" class="xref">3.6.2</a>.  <a href="#name-cacerts" class="xref">/cacerts</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.3">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.3.1"><a href="#section-3.6.3" class="xref">3.6.3</a>.  <a href="#name-simpleenroll" class="xref">/simpleenroll</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.4">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.4.1"><a href="#section-3.6.4" class="xref">3.6.4</a>.  <a href="#name-simplereenroll" class="xref">/simplereenroll</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.5">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.5.1"><a href="#section-3.6.5" class="xref">3.6.5</a>.  <a href="#name-fullcmc" class="xref">/fullcmc</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.6">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.6.1"><a href="#section-3.6.6" class="xref">3.6.6</a>.  <a href="#name-serverkeygen" class="xref">/serverkeygen</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.7">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.7.1"><a href="#section-3.6.7" class="xref">3.6.7</a>.  <a href="#name-csrattrs" class="xref">/csrattrs</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.8">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.8.1"><a href="#section-3.6.8" class="xref">3.6.8</a>.  <a href="#name-crls" class="xref">/crls</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.9">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.9.1"><a href="#section-3.6.9" class="xref">3.6.9</a>.  <a href="#name-symmetrickeys" class="xref">/symmetrickeys</a></p>
</li>
                  <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.10">
                    <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.6.2.10.1"><a href="#section-3.6.10" class="xref">3.6.10</a>. <a href="#name-eecerts-firmware-tamp" class="xref">/eecerts, /firmware, /tamp</a></p>
</li>
                </ul>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><a href="#section-4" class="xref">4</a>.  <a href="#name-cmc-interface" class="xref">CMC Interface</a></p>
<ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
<li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-4.1" class="xref">4.1</a>.  <a href="#name-rfc-5273-transport-protocol" class="xref">RFC 5273 Transport Protocols</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.1"><a href="#section-4.2" class="xref">4.2</a>.  <a href="#name-eligibility-2" class="xref">Eligibility</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.1"><a href="#section-4.3" class="xref">4.3</a>.  <a href="#name-authentication-2" class="xref">Authentication</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.4">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.4.1"><a href="#section-4.4" class="xref">4.4</a>.  <a href="#name-authorization-2" class="xref">Authorization</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.5">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.5.1"><a href="#section-4.5" class="xref">4.5</a>.  <a href="#name-full-pki-requests-responses" class="xref">Full PKI Requests/Responses</a></p>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><a href="#section-5" class="xref">5</a>.  <a href="#name-trust-anchor-profile" class="xref">Trust Anchor Profile</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><a href="#section-6" class="xref">6</a>.  <a href="#name-non-self-signed-certificati" class="xref">Non-Self-Signed Certification Authority Certificate Profile</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><a href="#section-7" class="xref">7</a>.  <a href="#name-end-entity-certificate-prof" class="xref">End-Entity Certificate Profile</a></p>
<ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
<li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.1" class="xref">7.1</a>.  <a href="#name-source-of-authority-certifi" class="xref">Source of Authority Certificate Profile</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1"><a href="#section-7.2" class="xref">7.2</a>.  <a href="#name-client-certificate-profile" class="xref">Client Certificate Profile</a></p>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><a href="#section-8" class="xref">8</a>.  <a href="#name-relying-party-applications" class="xref">Relying Party Applications</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><a href="#section-9" class="xref">9</a>.  <a href="#name-crl-profile" class="xref">CRL Profile</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.10">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><a href="#section-10" class="xref">10</a>. <a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="xref">IANA Considerations</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.11">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><a href="#section-11" class="xref">11</a>. <a href="#name-security-considerations" class="xref">Security Considerations</a></p>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.12">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.12.1"><a href="#section-12" class="xref">12</a>. <a href="#name-references" class="xref">References</a></p>
<ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
<li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.12.2.1">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.12.2.1.1"><a href="#section-12.1" class="xref">12.1</a>.  <a href="#name-normative-references" class="xref">Normative References</a></p>
</li>
              <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.12.2.2">
                <p id="section-toc.1-1.12.2.2.1"><a href="#section-12.2" class="xref">12.2</a>.  <a href="#name-informative-references" class="xref">Informative References</a></p>
</li>
            </ul>
</li>
          <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.13">
            <p id="section-toc.1-1.13.1"><a href="#appendix-A" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-authors-addresses" class="xref">Authors' Addresses</a></p>
</li>
        </ul>
</nav>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-1">
<section id="section-1">
      <h2 id="name-introduction">
<a href="#section-1" class="section-number selfRef">1. </a><a href="#name-introduction" class="section-name selfRef">Introduction</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-1-1">
   This document specifies protocol interfaces profiled by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) for National Security
   System (NSS) servers that provide public key certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and symmetric keys to NSS clients.
   Servers that support these interfaces are referred to as Secure
   Object Delivery Protocol (SODP) servers.  The purpose of this document is
   to indicate options from, and requirements in addition to, the base
   specifications listed in <a href="#sect-1.1" class="xref">Section 1.1</a> that are necessary for client
   interoperability with NSA-operated SODP servers.  Clients are always
   devices and need not implement all of the interfaces specified
   herein; clients are free to choose which interfaces to implement
   based on their operational requirements.  Interfaces supported by
   SODP servers include:<a href="#section-1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-1-2.1">Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) <span>[<a href="#RFC7030" class="xref">RFC7030</a>]</span> and its
       extensions <span>[<a href="#RFC8295" class="xref">RFC8295</a>]</span>, and<a href="#section-1-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        <li class="normal" id="section-1-2.2">Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) <span>[<a href="#RFC5274" class="xref">RFC5274</a>]</span> <span>[<a href="#RFC6402" class="xref">RFC6402</a>]</span> for both Simple Public Key
       Infrastructure (PKI) requests and responses (i.e., PKCS#10 requests
       and PKCS#7 responses) and Full PKI requests and responses.<a href="#section-1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
      </ul>
<p id="section-1-3">
   This profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation of
   all components of US National Security Systems <span>[<a href="#SP-800-59" class="xref">SP-800-59</a>]</span>. It is also
   appropriate for other US Government systems that process high-value
   information. It is made publicly available for use by developers and
   operators of these and any other system deployments.<a href="#section-1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-1-4">
   This profile conforms to the existing requirements of the NSA's
   Commercial National Security Algorithms (CNSAs).  As operational needs evolve
   over time, this profile will be updated to incorporate new commercial
   algorithms and protocols as they are developed and approved for use.<a href="#section-1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<div id="sect-1.1">
<section id="section-1.1">
        <h3 id="name-documents-to-be-familiar-wi">
<a href="#section-1.1" class="section-number selfRef">1.1. </a><a href="#name-documents-to-be-familiar-wi" class="section-name selfRef">Documents to be Familiar With</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-1.1-1">Familiarity with the follow specifications is assumed:<a href="#section-1.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-1.1-2.1">EST and EST extensions: <span>[<a href="#RFC7030" class="xref">RFC7030</a>]</span> and <span>[<a href="#RFC8295" class="xref">RFC8295</a>]</span><a href="#section-1.1-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-1.1-2.2">PKI-related specifications: <span>[<a href="#RFC2986" class="xref">RFC2986</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC3739" class="xref">RFC3739</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC5274" class="xref">RFC5274</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC5280" class="xref">RFC5280</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC5912" class="xref">RFC5912</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC5913" class="xref">RFC5913</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC5916" class="xref">RFC5916</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC5917" class="xref">RFC5917</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC6010" class="xref">RFC6010</a>]</span>, and <span>[<a href="#RFC6402" class="xref">RFC6402</a>]</span><a href="#section-1.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-1.1-2.3">Key-format-related specifications: <span>[<a href="#RFC5915" class="xref">RFC5915</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC5958" class="xref">RFC5958</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC5959" class="xref">RFC5959</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC6031" class="xref">RFC6031</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC6032" class="xref">RFC6032</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC6160" class="xref">RFC6160</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC6161" class="xref">RFC6161</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC6162" class="xref">RFC6162</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC7191" class="xref">RFC7191</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC7192" class="xref">RFC7192</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC7292" class="xref">RFC7292</a>]</span>, and <span>[<a href="#RFC7906" class="xref">RFC7906</a>]</span><a href="#section-1.1-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-1.1-2.4">CMS-related (Cryptographic Message Syntax) documents: <span>[<a href="#RFC5652" class="xref">RFC5652</a>]</span> and <span>[<a href="#RFC6268" class="xref">RFC6268</a>]</span><a href="#section-1.1-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-1.1-2.5">CNSA-related documents: <span>[<a href="#RFC8603" class="xref">RFC8603</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC8755" class="xref">RFC8755</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC8756" class="xref">RFC8756</a>]</span>, and <span>[<a href="#RFC9151" class="xref">RFC9151</a>]</span><a href="#section-1.1-2.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        </ul>
<p id="section-1.1-3">
   The requirements from RFCs apply throughout this profile and are
   generally not repeated here.  This document is purposely written
   without using the requirements language described in <span>[<a href="#RFC2119" class="xref">RFC2119</a>]</span> and <span>[<a href="#RFC8174" class="xref">RFC8174</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-1.2">
<section id="section-1.2">
        <h3 id="name-document-organization">
<a href="#section-1.2" class="section-number selfRef">1.2. </a><a href="#name-document-organization" class="section-name selfRef">Document Organization</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-1.2-1"> The document is organized as follows:<a href="#section-1.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-1.2-2.1">The remainder of this section describes the operational
     environment used by clients to retrieve secure objects.<a href="#section-1.2-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-1.2-2.2">
            <a href="#sect-2" class="xref">Section 2</a> specifies the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) version used.<a href="#section-1.2-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-1.2-2.3">
            <a href="#sect-3" class="xref">Section 3</a> specifies SODP's EST interface.<a href="#section-1.2-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-1.2-2.4">
            <a href="#sect-4" class="xref">Section 4</a> specifies SODP's CMC interfaces.<a href="#section-1.2-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-1.2-2.5">Sections <a href="#sect-5" class="xref">5</a>-<a href="#sect-7" class="xref">7</a> specify Trust Anchor (TA), Certification Authority (CA), and End-Entity (EE) certificates, respectively.<a href="#section-1.2-2.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-1.2-2.6">Sections <a href="#sect-8" class="xref">8</a> and <a href="#sect-9" class="xref">9</a> specify Relying Party Applications and CRL Profile, respectively.<a href="#section-1.2-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        </ul>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-1.3">
<section id="section-1.3">
        <h3 id="name-environment">
<a href="#section-1.3" class="section-number selfRef">1.3. </a><a href="#name-environment" class="section-name selfRef">Environment</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-1.3-1">
   Clients obtain
   secure "objects" or "packages" from the client-server-based environment.  Objects/packages vary based on the
   Source of Authority (SOA), but all objects are "secured" minimally
   through the use of one or more digital signatures and zero or more
   layers of encryption, as profiled in this document.  An SOA is the
   authority for the creation of objects that the client will recognize
   as valid.  An SOA can delegate its authority to other actors;
   delegation occurs through the issuance of certificates.  An object or
   package is the generic term for certificates, certificate status
   information, and keys (both asymmetric and symmetric).  All of the
   objects except for the certificates and certificate status
   information are directly encapsulated in and protected by CMS content
   types.  CMS content types that provide security are referred to as
   "CMS-protecting content types".  All others are simply referred to as
   "CMS content types".  All secured objects are distributed either as CMS
   packages or as part of a CMS package.<a href="#section-1.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-1.3-2">
   In the example depicted in <a href="#ure-operating-environment-key-and-pki-sources-of-authority" class="xref">Figure 1</a>, there are two SOAs:
   one for symmetric keys, as depicted by the Key Trust Anchor (KTA),
   and one for public key certificates, as depicted by the PKI Trust
   Anchor (TA).  The KTA is responsible for the creation and distribution of
   symmetric keys.  The KTA delegates the creation and distribution
   responsibilities to separate entities through the issuance of
   certificates to a Key Source Authority (KSA) and a Key
   Distribution Authority (KDA).  The KSA generates the keys, digitally signs
   the keys, and encrypts the key for the end client using CMS content
   types for each step.  The KDA distributes the KSA-generated and KSA-protected key to the client; the key may also be signed by the KDA.
   The resulting CMS package is provided to the client through the EST
   extension's /symmetrickey service.  The PKI TA is responsible for the
   creation, distribution, and management of public key certificates.
   The PKI TA delegates these responsibilities to Certification
   Authorities (CAs), and CAs, in turn, are responsible for creating,
   distributing, and managing End-Entity (EE) certificates. CAs
   distribute PKI-related information through the /cacerts, /crls,
   /eecerts, /fullcmc, /simpleenroll, /simplereenroll, and /csrattrs EST
   and EST extension services.<a href="#section-1.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span id="name-operating-environment-key-a"></span><div id="ure-operating-environment-key-and-pki-sources-of-authority">
<figure id="figure-1">
          <div class="alignLeft art-text artwork" id="section-1.3-3.1">
<pre>
   +-----+                            +--------+
   | KTA |                            | PKI TA |
   +-----+                            +--------+
      |                                   |
      | Signs                             | Signs
      |                                   |
      +-------------+                     V
      |             |                   +----+
      V             V                   | CA |
   +-----+       +-----+                +----+
   | KSA |       | KDA |                   |
   +-----+       +-----+                   | Signs
      |           |                        |
      | Signs &amp;   | Optionally             +---------------+
      | Encrypts  | Signs                  |               |
      |           |                        V               V
      |           |                +-------------+ +-------------+
      |           V                | Certificate | | Certificate |
  +---|-------------+              +-------------+ | Revocation  |
  |   V             | CMS Content                  | List        |
  | +-------------+ | Types                        +-------------+
  | | Key Package | |
  | +-------------+ |
  +-----------------+
</pre>
</div>
<figcaption><a href="#figure-1" class="selfRef">Figure 1</a>:
<a href="#name-operating-environment-key-a" class="selfRef">Operating Environment (Key and PKI Sources of Authority)</a>
          </figcaption></figure>
</div>
<p id="section-1.3-4">
   For clients that support the CMC interface and not the EST interface,
   the environment includes only the PKI TAs.<a href="#section-1.3-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-2">
<section id="section-2">
      <h2 id="name-abstract-syntax-notation-on">
<a href="#section-2" class="section-number selfRef">2. </a><a href="#name-abstract-syntax-notation-on" class="section-name selfRef">Abstract Syntax Notation One</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-2-1">
   Implementations of this specification use the 2002/2008
   ASN.1 version; 2002/2008 ASN.1 modules can be found in
   <span>[<a href="#RFC5911" class="xref">RFC5911</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC5912" class="xref">RFC5912</a>]</span>, and <span>[<a href="#RFC6268" class="xref">RFC6268</a>]</span> (use <span>[<a href="#RFC6268" class="xref">RFC6268</a>]</span> for the CMS syntax), while other specifications already include the 2002/2008 ASN.1 along
   with the 1988 ASN.1.  See <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6268#section-1.1" class="relref">Section 1.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC6268" class="xref">RFC6268</a>]</span> for a discussion
   about the differences between the 2002 and 2008 ASN.1 versions.<a href="#section-2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3">
<section id="section-3">
      <h2 id="name-est-interface">
<a href="#section-3" class="section-number selfRef">3. </a><a href="#name-est-interface" class="section-name selfRef">EST Interface</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-3-1">
   Client options for EST <span>[<a href="#RFC7030" class="xref">RFC7030</a>]</span> and EST extensions <span>[<a href="#RFC8295" class="xref">RFC8295</a>]</span> are
   specified in this section.<a href="#section-3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<div id="sect-3.1">
<section id="section-3.1">
        <h3 id="name-hypertext-transfer-protocol">
<a href="#section-3.1" class="section-number selfRef">3.1. </a><a href="#name-hypertext-transfer-protocol" class="section-name selfRef">Hypertext Transfer Protocol Layer</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-3.1-1">
   Clients that receive redirection responses (3xx status codes) will
   terminate the connection (<span>[<a href="#RFC7030" class="xref">RFC7030</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030#section-3.2.1" class="relref">Section 3.2.1</a></span>).<a href="#section-3.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.1-2">
   Per <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8295#section-2.2" class="relref">Section 2.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC8295" class="xref">RFC8295</a>]</span>, clients indicate the format
   ("application/xml" or "application/json") of the PAL information
   (<span>[<a href="#RFC8295" class="xref">RFC8295</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8295#section-2.1.1" class="relref">Section 2.1.1</a></span>) via the HTTP Accept header.<a href="#section-3.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.2">
<section id="section-3.2">
        <h3 id="name-transport-layer-security">
<a href="#section-3.2" class="section-number selfRef">3.2. </a><a href="#name-transport-layer-security" class="section-name selfRef">Transport Layer Security</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-3.2-1">
   TLS implementations are configured as specified in
   <span>[<a href="#RFC9151" class="xref">RFC9151</a>]</span>; the notable exception is that only EC-based
   algorithms are used.<a href="#section-3.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.3">
<section id="section-3.3">
        <h3 id="name-eligibility">
<a href="#section-3.3" class="section-number selfRef">3.3. </a><a href="#name-eligibility" class="section-name selfRef">Eligibility</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-3.3-1">
 At the EST interface, servers only enroll clients that they have 
 established a prior relationship with independently of
 the EST service. To accomplish this, client owners/operators
   interact in person with the human acting as the Registration
   Authority (RA) to ensure the information included in the transmitted
   certificate request, which is sometimes called a Certificate
   Signing Request (CSR), is associated with a client.  The mechanism by
   which the owner/operator interacts with the RA as well as
   the information provided is beyond the scope of this document.  The
   information exchanged by the owner/operator might be something as
   simple as the subject name included in the CSR to be sent or a copy
   of the certificate that will be used to verify the certificate
   request, which is provided out of band.<a href="#section-3.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.4">
<section id="section-3.4">
        <h3 id="name-authentication">
<a href="#section-3.4" class="section-number selfRef">3.4. </a><a href="#name-authentication" class="section-name selfRef">Authentication</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-3.4-1">
   Mutual authentication occurs via "Certificate TLS Authentication"
   (<span>[<a href="#RFC7030" class="xref">RFC7030</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030#section-2.2.1" class="relref">Section 2.2.1</a></span>).  Clients provide their certificate to
   servers in the TLS Certificate message, which is sent in response to
   the server's TLS Certificate Request message.  Both servers and
   clients reject all attempts to authenticate based on certificates
   that cannot be validated back to an installed TA.<a href="#section-3.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.5">
<section id="section-3.5">
        <h3 id="name-authorization">
<a href="#section-3.5" class="section-number selfRef">3.5. </a><a href="#name-authorization" class="section-name selfRef">Authorization</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-3.5-1">
   Clients always use an explicit TA database (<span>[<a href="#RFC7030" class="xref">RFC7030</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030#section-3.6.1" class="relref">Section 3.6.1</a></span>).  At a minimum, clients support two TAs: one for the PKI and
   one for symmetric keys.<a href="#section-3.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.5-2">
   Clients check that the server's certificate includes the id-kp-cmcRA
   Extended Key Usage (EKU) value (<span>[<a href="#RFC6402" class="xref">RFC6402</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6402#section-2.10" class="relref">Section 2.10</a></span>).<a href="#section-3.5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.5-3">
   Clients that support processing of the CMS Content Constraints extension
   <span>[<a href="#RFC6010" class="xref">RFC6010</a>]</span> ensure returned CMS content is from an SOA or an
   entity authorized by an SOA for that CMS content; see <a href="#sect-7.1" class="xref">Section 7.1</a> for
   SOA certificates.<a href="#section-3.5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6">
<section id="section-3.6">
        <h3 id="name-est-and-est-extensions">
<a href="#section-3.6" class="section-number selfRef">3.6. </a><a href="#name-est-and-est-extensions" class="section-name selfRef">EST and EST Extensions</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-3.6-1">
   This section profiles SODP's interfaces for EST <span>[<a href="#RFC7030" class="xref">RFC7030</a>]</span> and EST extensions
   <span>[<a href="#RFC8295" class="xref">RFC8295</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3.6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<div id="sect-3.6.1">
<section id="section-3.6.1">
          <h4 id="name-pal">
<a href="#section-3.6.1" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.1. </a><a href="#name-pal" class="section-name selfRef">/pal</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.1-1">
   The Package Availability List (PAL) is limited to 32 entries, where
   the 32nd PAL entry links to an additional PAL (i.e., PAL Package
   Type 0001).<a href="#section-3.6.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.1-2">
   The PAL is XML <span>[<a href="#XML" class="xref">XML</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3.6.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6.2">
<section id="section-3.6.2">
          <h4 id="name-cacerts">
<a href="#section-3.6.2" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.2. </a><a href="#name-cacerts" class="section-name selfRef">/cacerts</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.2-1">
   The CA certificates located in the explicit TA database are
   distributed to the client when it is registered.  This TA
   distribution mechanism is out of scope.<a href="#section-3.6.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.2-2">
   CA certificates provided through this service are as specified in
   Sections <a href="#sect-5" class="xref">5</a> and <a href="#sect-6" class="xref">6</a> of this document.<a href="#section-3.6.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6.3">
<section id="section-3.6.3">
          <h4 id="name-simpleenroll">
<a href="#section-3.6.3" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.3. </a><a href="#name-simpleenroll" class="section-name selfRef">/simpleenroll</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.3-1">
   CSRs follow the specifications in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8756#section-4.2" class="relref">Section 4.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC8756" class="xref">RFC8756</a>]</span>,
   except that the CMC-specific ChangeSubjectName and
   the POP Link Witness V2 attributes do not apply.  Only
   EC-based algorithms are used.<a href="#section-3.6.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.3-2">
   Client certificates provided through this service are as specified in
   <a href="#sect-7" class="xref">Section 7</a> of this document.<a href="#section-3.6.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.3-3">
   The HTTP content type of "text/plain" (<span>[<a href="#RFC2046" class="xref">RFC2046</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046#section-4.1" class="relref">Section 4.1</a></span>) is
   used to return human-readable errors.<a href="#section-3.6.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6.4">
<section id="section-3.6.4">
          <h4 id="name-simplereenroll">
<a href="#section-3.6.4" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.4. </a><a href="#name-simplereenroll" class="section-name selfRef">/simplereenroll</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.4-1">
   There are no additional requirements for requests beyond those
   specified in Sections <a href="#sect-3.4" class="xref">3.4</a> and <a href="#sect-3.6.3" class="xref">3.6.3</a> of this document.<a href="#section-3.6.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.4-2">
   The HTTP content type of "text/plain" (<span>[<a href="#RFC2046" class="xref">RFC2046</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046#section-4.1" class="relref">Section 4.1</a></span>) is
   used to return human-readable errors.<a href="#section-3.6.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6.5">
<section id="section-3.6.5">
          <h4 id="name-fullcmc">
<a href="#section-3.6.5" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.5. </a><a href="#name-fullcmc" class="section-name selfRef">/fullcmc</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.5-1">
   Requests are as specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC8756" class="xref">RFC8756</a>]</span> with the notable
   exception that only EC-based algorithms are used.<a href="#section-3.6.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.5-2">
   Additional attributes for returned CMS packages can be found in
   <span>[<a href="#RFC7906" class="xref">RFC7906</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3.6.5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.5-3">
   Certificates provided through this service are as specified in
   <a href="#sect-7" class="xref">Section 7</a> of this document.<a href="#section-3.6.5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6.6">
<section id="section-3.6.6">
          <h4 id="name-serverkeygen">
<a href="#section-3.6.6" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.6. </a><a href="#name-serverkeygen" class="section-name selfRef">/serverkeygen</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.6-1">
   PKCS#12 <span>[<a href="#RFC7292" class="xref">RFC7292</a>]</span> -- sometimes referred to as "PFX" (Personal
   Information Exchange) or "P12" -- is used to
   provide server-generated asymmetric private keys and the associated
   certificate to clients.  This interface is a one-way interface as the
   RA requests these from the server.<a href="#section-3.6.6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.6-2">
   PFXs <span>[<a href="#RFC7292" class="xref">RFC7292</a>]</span> are exchanged using both password privacy mode and
   integrity password mode.  The PRF algorithm for PBKDF2 (the KDF for
   PBES2 and PBMAC1) is HMAC-SHA-384, and the PBES2 encryption scheme is
   AES-256.<a href="#section-3.6.6-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.6-3">
   The HTTP content type of "text/plain" (<span>[<a href="#RFC2046" class="xref">RFC2046</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046#section-4.1" class="relref">Section 4.1</a></span>) is
   used to return human-readable errors.<a href="#section-3.6.6-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-3.6.6-4">
   /serverkeygen/return is not supported at this time.<a href="#section-3.6.6-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6.7">
<section id="section-3.6.7">
          <h4 id="name-csrattrs">
<a href="#section-3.6.7" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.7. </a><a href="#name-csrattrs" class="section-name selfRef">/csrattrs</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.7-1">
 Clients use this service to retrieve partially filled PKIRequests
 with no public key or proof-of-possession signature,
 i.e., their values are set to zero length, either a zero length BIT
 STRING or OCTET STRING. The pKCS7PDU attribute, defined in
   <span>[<a href="#RFC2985" class="xref">RFC2985</a>]</span>, includes the partially filled PKIRequest as the only
   element in the CsrAttrs sequence.  Even though the CsrAttrs syntax is
   defined as a set, there is only ever exactly one instance of values
   present.<a href="#section-3.6.7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6.8">
<section id="section-3.6.8">
          <h4 id="name-crls">
<a href="#section-3.6.8" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.8. </a><a href="#name-crls" class="section-name selfRef">/crls</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.8-1">
   CRLs provided through this service are as specified in <a href="#sect-9" class="xref">Section 9</a> of
   this document.<a href="#section-3.6.8-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6.9">
<section id="section-3.6.9">
          <h4 id="name-symmetrickeys">
<a href="#section-3.6.9" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.9. </a><a href="#name-symmetrickeys" class="section-name selfRef">/symmetrickeys</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.9-1">
   Clients that claim to support SODP interoperation will be able to process
   the following messages from an SODP server:<a href="#section-3.6.9-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-3.6.9-2.1">additional encryption and origin
   authentication (<span>[<a href="#RFC8295" class="xref">RFC8295</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8295#section-5" class="relref">Section 5</a></span>); and<a href="#section-3.6.9-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
            <li class="normal" id="section-3.6.9-2.2">server-provided Symmetric Key
   Content Type <span>[<a href="#RFC6032" class="xref">RFC6032</a>]</span> encapsulated in an Encrypted Key Content Type using
   the EnvelopedData choice <span>[<a href="#RFC6033" class="xref">RFC6033</a>]</span> with an SOA certificate that includes the
   CMS Content Constraints extension (see <a href="#sect-7.1" class="xref">Section 7.1</a>).<a href="#section-3.6.9-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          </ul>
<p id="section-3.6.9-3">
   Client-supported algorithms to decrypt the server-returned symmetric
   key are as follows:<a href="#section-3.6.9-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-3.6.9-4.1">Message Digest: See <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8755#section-4" class="relref">Section 4</a> of [<a href="#RFC8755" class="xref">RFC8755</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3.6.9-4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
            <li class="normal" id="section-3.6.9-4.2">Digital Signature Algorithm: See <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8755#section-5" class="relref">Section 5</a> of [<a href="#RFC8755" class="xref">RFC8755</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3.6.9-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
            <li class="normal" id="section-3.6.9-4.3">Key Agreement: See <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8755#section-6.1" class="relref">Section 6.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC8755" class="xref">RFC8755</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3.6.9-4.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
            <li class="normal" id="section-3.6.9-4.4">Key Wrap: AES-256 Key Wrap with Padding <span>[<a href="#RFC6033" class="xref">RFC6033</a>]</span> is used. AES-128 Key Wrap with Padding is not
            used.<a href="#section-3.6.9-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
            <li class="normal" id="section-3.6.9-4.5">Content Encryption: AES-256 Key Wrap with Padding <span>[<a href="#RFC6033" class="xref">RFC6033</a>]</span> is used. AES-128 Key Wrap with
            Padding is not used.<a href="#section-3.6.9-4.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          </ul>
<p id="section-3.6.9-5">
   /symmetrickeys/return is not used at this time.<a href="#section-3.6.9-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-3.6.10">
<section id="section-3.6.10">
          <h4 id="name-eecerts-firmware-tamp">
<a href="#section-3.6.10" class="section-number selfRef">3.6.10. </a><a href="#name-eecerts-firmware-tamp" class="section-name selfRef">/eecerts, /firmware, /tamp</a>
          </h4>
<p id="section-3.6.10-1">
   /eecerts, /firmware, and /tamp are not used at this time.<a href="#section-3.6.10-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-4">
<section id="section-4">
      <h2 id="name-cmc-interface">
<a href="#section-4" class="section-number selfRef">4. </a><a href="#name-cmc-interface" class="section-name selfRef">CMC Interface</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-4-1">
   Client options for CMC <span>[<a href="#RFC5274" class="xref">RFC5274</a>]</span> <span>[<a href="#RFC6402" class="xref">RFC6402</a>]</span> are specified in this section.<a href="#section-4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<div id="sect-4.1">
<section id="section-4.1">
        <h3 id="name-rfc-5273-transport-protocol">
<a href="#section-4.1" class="section-number selfRef">4.1. </a><a href="#name-rfc-5273-transport-protocol" class="section-name selfRef">RFC 5273 Transport Protocols</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-4.1-1">
   Clients only use the HTTPS-based transport. The TLS implementation
   and configuration are as specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC9151" class="xref">RFC9151</a>]</span>, with the
   notable exception that only EC-based algorithms are used.<a href="#section-4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-4.1-2">
   Clients that receive HTTP redirection responses (3xx status codes)
   will terminate the connection (<span>[<a href="#RFC7030" class="xref">RFC7030</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030#section-3.2.1" class="relref">Section 3.2.1</a></span>).<a href="#section-4.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-4.2">
<section id="section-4.2">
        <h3 id="name-eligibility-2">
<a href="#section-4.2" class="section-number selfRef">4.2. </a><a href="#name-eligibility-2" class="section-name selfRef">Eligibility</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-4.2-1">
 At the CMC interface, servers only enroll clients that they have
 established a prior relationship with independently of
 the EST service. To accomplish this, client owners/operators
   interact in person with the human acting as the Registration
   Authority (RA) to ensure the information included in the transmitted
   certificate request, which is sometimes called a Certificate
   Signing Request (CSR), is associated with a client.  The mechanism by
   which the owner/operator interacts with the RA as well as the
   information provided is beyond the scope of this document.  The
   information exchanged by the owner/operator might be something as
   simple as the subject name included in the CSR to be sent or a copy
   of the certificate that will be used to verify the certificate
   request, which is provided out of band.<a href="#section-4.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-4.3">
<section id="section-4.3">
        <h3 id="name-authentication-2">
<a href="#section-4.3" class="section-number selfRef">4.3. </a><a href="#name-authentication-2" class="section-name selfRef">Authentication</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-4.3-1">
   Mutual authentication occurs via client and server signing of CMC
   protocol elements, as required by <span>[<a href="#RFC8756" class="xref">RFC8756</a>]</span>. All such
   signatures are validated against an installed TA; any that fail
   validation are rejected.<a href="#section-4.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-4.4">
<section id="section-4.4">
        <h3 id="name-authorization-2">
<a href="#section-4.4" class="section-number selfRef">4.4. </a><a href="#name-authorization-2" class="section-name selfRef">Authorization</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-4.4-1">
   Clients support the simultaneous presence of as many TAs as are
   required for all of the functions of the client, and only these TAs.<a href="#section-4.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-4.4-2">
   Clients check that the server's certificate includes the id-kp-cmcRA
   Extended Key Usage (EKU) value (<span>[<a href="#RFC6402" class="xref">RFC6402</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6402#section-2.10" class="relref">Section 2.10</a></span>).<a href="#section-4.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-4.4-3">
   Clients that support processing of the CMS Content Constraints extension
   <span>[<a href="#RFC6010" class="xref">RFC6010</a>]</span> ensure returned CMS content is from an SOA or an
   entity authorized by an SOA for that CMS content; see <a href="#sect-7.1" class="xref">Section 7.1</a> for
   SOA certificates.<a href="#section-4.4-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-4.5">
<section id="section-4.5">
        <h3 id="name-full-pki-requests-responses">
<a href="#section-4.5" class="section-number selfRef">4.5. </a><a href="#name-full-pki-requests-responses" class="section-name selfRef">Full PKI Requests/Responses</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-4.5-1">
   Requests are as specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC8756" class="xref">RFC8756</a>]</span> with the notable
   exception that only EC-based algorithms are used.<a href="#section-4.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-4.5-2">
   Additional attributes for returned CMS packages can be found in
   <span>[<a href="#RFC7906" class="xref">RFC7906</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-4.5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-4.5-3">
   Certificates provided through this service are as specified in <a href="#sect-7" class="xref">Section 7</a> of this document.<a href="#section-4.5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-5">
<section id="section-5">
      <h2 id="name-trust-anchor-profile">
<a href="#section-5" class="section-number selfRef">5. </a><a href="#name-trust-anchor-profile" class="section-name selfRef">Trust Anchor Profile</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-5-1">
   Clients are free to store the TA in the format of their choosing;
   however, servers provide TA information in the form of self-signed CA
   certificates.  This section documents requirements for self-signed
   certificates in addition to those specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC8603" class="xref">RFC8603</a>]</span>, which in
   turn specifies requirements in addition to those in <span>[<a href="#RFC5280" class="xref">RFC5280</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-5-2">
   Only EC-based algorithms are used.<a href="#section-5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-5-3">
   Issuer and subject names are composed of only the following naming
   attributes: country name, domain component, organization name,
   organizational unit name, common name, state or province name,
   distinguished name qualifier, and serial number.<a href="#section-5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-5-4">
   In the Subject Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier is the 64
   low-order bits of the subject's subjectPublicKey field.<a href="#section-5-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-5-5">
   In the Key Usage extension, the nonRepudiation bit is never set.<a href="#section-5-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-6">
<section id="section-6">
      <h2 id="name-non-self-signed-certificati">
<a href="#section-6" class="section-number selfRef">6. </a><a href="#name-non-self-signed-certificati" class="section-name selfRef">Non-Self-Signed Certification Authority Certificate Profile</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-6-1">
   This section documents requirements for non-self-signed CA
   certificates in addition to those specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC8603" class="xref">RFC8603</a>]</span>, which in
   turn specifies requirements in addition to those in <span>[<a href="#RFC5280" class="xref">RFC5280</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-2">
   Only EC-based algorithms are used.<a href="#section-6-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-3">
   Subject names are composed of only the following naming attributes:
   country name, domain component, organization name, organizational
   unit name, common name, state or province name, distinguished name
   qualifier, and serial number.<a href="#section-6-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-4">
   In the Authority Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier choice
   is always used.  The keyIdentifier is the 64 low-order bits of the
   issuer's subjectPublicKey field.<a href="#section-6-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-5">
   In the Subject Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier is the 64
   low-order bits of the subject's subjectPublicKey field.<a href="#section-6-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-6">
   In the Key Usage extension, the nonRepudiation bit is never set.<a href="#section-6-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-7">
   The Certificate Policies extension is always included, and
   policyQualifiers are never used.<a href="#section-6-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-8">Non-self-signed CA certificates can also include the following:<a href="#section-6-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6-9">
        <dt id="section-6-9.1">Name Constraints:</dt>
        <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6-9.2"> permittedSubtrees constraints are
   included, and excludedSubstree constraints are not.  Of the
   GeneralName choices, issuers support the following: rfc822Name,
   dNSName, uniformResourceIdentifier, and iPAddress (both IPv4 and
   IPv6) as well as hardwareModuleName, which is defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC4108" class="xref">RFC4108</a>]</span>.  Note that rfc822Name, dNSName, and
   uniformResourceIdentifier are defined as IA5 strings, and the
   character sets allowed are not uniform amongst these three name
   forms.<a href="#section-6-9.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
        <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-6-9.3">CRL Distribution Points:</dt>
        <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6-9.4"> A distributionPoint is
   always the fullName choice. The uniformResourceIdentifier
   GeneralName choice is always included, but others can also be used as
   long as the first element in the sequence of CRLDistributionPoints
   is the uniformResourceIdentifier choice. The reasons and cRLIssuer
   fields are never populated.  This extension is never marked as
   critical.<a href="#section-6-9.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
        <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-6-9.5">Authority Information Access:</dt>
        <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6-9.6"> Only one instance of
   AccessDescription is included.  accessMethod is id-caIssuers, and
   accessLocation's GeneralName is always the uniformResourceIdentifier
   choice.<a href="#section-6-9.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
        <dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="section-6-9.7">Extended Key Usage:</dt>
        <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6-9.8"> EST servers and RAs include the
   id-kp-cmcRA EKU, and the CAs include the id-kp-cmcCA, which are both
   specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC6402" class="xref">RFC6402</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6-9.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</dd>
      <dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
<p id="section-6-10">
   Issuers include the Authority Clearance Constraints extension <span>[<a href="#RFC5913" class="xref">RFC5913</a>]</span> in
   non-self-signed CA certificates that are issued to non-SOAs; values for the
   Certificate Policy (CP) Object Identifier (OID) and the supported classList
   values are found in the issuer's CP.  Criticality is determined by the
   issuer, and a securityCategories is never included.  Only one instance of
   Clearance is generated in the AuthorityClearanceConstraints sequence.<a href="#section-6-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-6-11">
   Issuers include a critical CMS Content Constraints extension
   <span>[<a href="#RFC6010" class="xref">RFC6010</a>]</span> in CA certificates used to issue SOA certificates;
   this is necessary to enable enforcement of scope of the SOA
   authority.  The content types included depend on the packages the
   SOA sources but include key packages (i.e., Encrypted Key Packages,
   Symmetric Key Packages, and Asymmetric Key Packages).<a href="#section-6-11" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-7">
<section id="section-7">
      <h2 id="name-end-entity-certificate-prof">
<a href="#section-7" class="section-number selfRef">7. </a><a href="#name-end-entity-certificate-prof" class="section-name selfRef">End-Entity Certificate Profile</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-7-1">
   This section documents requirements for EE signature and key
   establishment certificates in addition to those listed in <span>[<a href="#RFC8603" class="xref">RFC8603</a>]</span>,
   which in turn specifies requirements in addition to those in
   <span>[<a href="#RFC5280" class="xref">RFC5280</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7-2">
   Only EC-based algorithms are used.<a href="#section-7-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7-3">
   Subject names are composed of the following naming attributes:
   country name, domain component, organization name, organizational
   unit name, common name, state or province name, distinguished name
   qualifier, and serial number.<a href="#section-7-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7-4">
   In the Authority Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier choice
   is always used.  The keyIdentifier is the 64 low-order bits of the
   issuer's subjectPublicKey field.<a href="#section-7-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7-5">
   In the Subject Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier is the 64
   low-order bits of the subject's subjectPublicKey field.<a href="#section-7-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7-6">
   In the Key Usage extension, signature certificates only assert
   digitalSignature, and key establishment certificates only assert
   keyAgreement.<a href="#section-7-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7-7">
   The Certificate Policies extension is always included, and
   policyQualifiers are never used.<a href="#section-7-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7-8">
   When included, the non-critical CRL Distribution Point extension's
   distributionPoint is always identified by the fullName choice. The
   uniformResourceIdentifier GeneralName choice is always included, but
   others can also be used as long as the first element in the sequence
   of distribution points is the URI choice and it is an HTTP/HTTPS
   scheme. The reasons and cRLIssuer fields are never populated.<a href="#section-7-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7-9">
   The following subsections provide additional requirements for the
   different types of EE certificates.<a href="#section-7-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<div id="sect-7.1">
<section id="section-7.1">
        <h3 id="name-source-of-authority-certifi">
<a href="#section-7.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.1. </a><a href="#name-source-of-authority-certifi" class="section-name selfRef">Source of Authority Certificate Profile</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-7.1-1">
This section specifies the format for SOA certificates, i.e., certificates
issued to those entities that are authorized to create, digitally sign,
encrypt, and distribute packages; these certificates are issued by non-PKI
TAs.<a href="#section-7.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7.1-2">
   The Subject Alternative Name extension is always included.  The
   following choices are supported: rfc822Name, dNSName, ediPartyName,
   uniformResourceIdentifier, or iPAddress (both IPv4 and IPv6).  This
   extension is never critical.<a href="#section-7.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7.1-3">
   A critical CMS Content Constraints extension <span>[<a href="#RFC6010" class="xref">RFC6010</a>]</span> is included in
   SOA signature certificates.  The content types included depend on the
   packages the SOA sources (e.g., Encrypted Key Packages, Symmetric Key
   Packages, and Asymmetric Key Packages).<a href="#section-7.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-7.2">
<section id="section-7.2">
        <h3 id="name-client-certificate-profile">
<a href="#section-7.2" class="section-number selfRef">7.2. </a><a href="#name-client-certificate-profile" class="section-name selfRef">Client Certificate Profile</a>
        </h3>
<p id="section-7.2-1">
   This section specifies the format for certificates issued to clients.<a href="#section-7.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-7.2-2">
   A non-critical Subject Directory Attributes extension is always
   included with the following attributes:<a href="#section-7.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-7.2-3.1">Device Owner <span>[<a href="#RFC5916" class="xref">RFC5916</a>]</span><a href="#section-7.2-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-7.2-3.2">Clearance Sponsor <span>[<a href="#RFC5917" class="xref">RFC5917</a>]</span><a href="#section-7.2-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-7.2-3.3">Clearance <span>[<a href="#RFC5913" class="xref">RFC5913</a>]</span><a href="#section-7.2-3.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        </ul>
<p id="section-7.2-4">
   The following extensions are also included at the discretion of the
   CA:<a href="#section-7.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-7.2-5.1"> The Authority Information Access extension with only one instance of
AccessDescription included. accessMethod is id-caIssuers, and
accessLocation's GeneralName is always the uniformResourceIdentifier
choice.<a href="#section-7.2-5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-7.2-5.2">A non-critical Subject Alternative Name extension that includes
   the hardwareModuleName form <span>[<a href="#RFC4108" class="xref">RFC4108</a>]</span>, rfc822Name, or
   uniformResourceIdentifier.<a href="#section-7.2-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
          <li class="normal" id="section-7.2-5.3">A critical Subject Alternative Name extension that includes
   dNSName, rfc822Name, ediPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier, or
   iPAddress (both IPv4 and IPv6).<a href="#section-7.2-5.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        </ul>
</section>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-8">
<section id="section-8">
      <h2 id="name-relying-party-applications">
<a href="#section-8" class="section-number selfRef">8. </a><a href="#name-relying-party-applications" class="section-name selfRef">Relying Party Applications</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-8-1">
   This section documents requirements for Relying Parties (RPs) in
   addition to those listed in <span>[<a href="#RFC8603" class="xref">RFC8603</a>]</span>, which in turn specifies
   requirements in addition to those in <span>[<a href="#RFC5280" class="xref">RFC5280</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-8-2">
   Only EC-based algorithms are used.<a href="#section-8-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-8-3">
   RPs support the Authority Key Identifier and the Subject Key
   Identifier extensions.<a href="#section-8-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-8-4">
   RPs should support the following extensions: CRL Distribution Points,
   Authority Information Access, Subject Directory Attribute,  Authority
   Clearance Constraints, and CMS Content Constraints.<a href="#section-8-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-8-5">
   Within the Subject Directory Attribute extension, RPs should support
   the Clearance Sponsor, Clearance, and Device Owner attributes.<a href="#section-8-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-8-6">
   RPs support the id-kp-cmcRA and id-kp-cmcCA EKUs.<a href="#section-8-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-8-7">
   Failure to support extensions in this section might limit the
   suitability of a device for certain applications.<a href="#section-8-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-9">
<section id="section-9">
      <h2 id="name-crl-profile">
<a href="#section-9" class="section-number selfRef">9. </a><a href="#name-crl-profile" class="section-name selfRef">CRL Profile</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-9-1">
   This section documents requirements for CRLs in addition to those
   listed in <span>[<a href="#RFC8603" class="xref">RFC8603</a>]</span>, which in turn specifies requirements in addition
   to those in <span>[<a href="#RFC5280" class="xref">RFC5280</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-9-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-9-2">
   Only EC-based algorithms are used.<a href="#section-9-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-9-3">
   Two types of CRLs are produced: complete base CRLs and partitioned
   base CRLs.<a href="#section-9-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-9-4">
   crlEntryExtensions are never included, and the reasons and cRLIssuer
   fields are never populated.<a href="#section-9-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<p id="section-9-5">All CRLs include the following CRL extensions:<a href="#section-9-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
<ul class="normal">
<li class="normal" id="section-9-6.1">The Authority Key Identifier extension: The keyIdentifier is the
   64 low-order bits of the issuer's subjectPublicKey field.<a href="#section-9-6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
        <li class="normal" id="section-9-6.2">As per <span>[<a href="#RFC5280" class="xref">RFC5280</a>]</span>, the CRL Number extension.<a href="#section-9-6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
</li>
      </ul>
<p id="section-9-7">
   The only other extension included in partitioned base CRLs is the
   Issuing Distribution Point extension.  The distributionPoint is
   always identified by the fullName choice. The
   uniformResourceIdentifier GeneralName choice is always included, but
   others can also be used as long as the first element in the sequence
   of distribution points is the uniformResourceIdentifier choice and the
   scheme is an HTTP/HTTPS scheme. All other fields are omitted.<a href="#section-9-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-10">
<section id="section-10">
      <h2 id="name-iana-considerations">
<a href="#section-10" class="section-number selfRef">10. </a><a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">IANA Considerations</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-10-1">
   This document has no IANA actions.<a href="#section-10-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<div id="sect-11">
<section id="section-11">
      <h2 id="name-security-considerations">
<a href="#section-11" class="section-number selfRef">11. </a><a href="#name-security-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Security Considerations</a>
      </h2>
<p id="section-11-1">
   This entire document is about security.  This document profiles the
   use of many protocols and services: EST, CMC, and PKCS#10/#7/#12 as
   well as certificates, CRLs, and their extensions <span>[<a href="#RFC5280" class="xref">RFC5280</a>]</span>.  
 These have been cited throughout this document, and the
 specifications identified by those citations should be consulted
 for security considerations related to implemented protocols
 and services.<a href="#section-11-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
</section>
</div>
<section id="section-12">
      <h2 id="name-references">
<a href="#section-12" class="section-number selfRef">12. </a><a href="#name-references" class="section-name selfRef">References</a>
      </h2>
<section id="section-12.1">
        <h3 id="name-normative-references">
<a href="#section-12.1" class="section-number selfRef">12.1. </a><a href="#name-normative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Normative References</a>
        </h3>
<dl class="references">
<dt id="RFC2046">[RFC2046]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Freed, N.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">N. Borenstein</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2046</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2046</span>, <time datetime="1996-11" class="refDate">November 1996</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC2985">[RFC2985]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Nystrom, M.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">B. Kaliski</span>, <span class="refTitle">"PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2985</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2985</span>, <time datetime="2000-11" class="refDate">November 2000</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC2986">[RFC2986]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Nystrom, M.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">B. Kaliski</span>, <span class="refTitle">"PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2986</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2986</span>, <time datetime="2000-11" class="refDate">November 2000</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC3739">[RFC3739]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Santesson, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Nystrom, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">T. Polk</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3739</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3739</span>, <time datetime="2004-03" class="refDate">March 2004</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3739">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3739</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC4108">[RFC4108]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Housley, R.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to Protect Firmware Packages"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4108</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4108</span>, <time datetime="2005-08" class="refDate">August 2005</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4108">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4108</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5274">[RFC5274]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Schaad, J.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">M. Myers</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Certificate Management Messages over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5274</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5274</span>, <time datetime="2008-06" class="refDate">June 2008</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5274">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5274</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5280">[RFC5280]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Cooper, D.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Santesson, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Farrell, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Boeyen, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Housley, R.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">W. Polk</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5280</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5280</span>, <time datetime="2008-05" class="refDate">May 2008</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5652">[RFC5652]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Housley, R.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 70</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5652</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5652</span>, <time datetime="2009-09" class="refDate">September 2009</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5911">[RFC5911]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Hoffman, P.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">J. Schaad</span>, <span class="refTitle">"New ASN.1 Modules for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5911</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5911</span>, <time datetime="2010-06" class="refDate">June 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5911">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5911</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5912">[RFC5912]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Hoffman, P.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">J. Schaad</span>, <span class="refTitle">"New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5912</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5912</span>, <time datetime="2010-06" class="refDate">June 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5913">[RFC5913]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">S. Chokhani</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Clearance Attribute and Authority Clearance Constraints Certificate Extension"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5913</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5913</span>, <time datetime="2010-06" class="refDate">June 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5913">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5913</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5915">[RFC5915]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">D. Brown</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5915</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5915</span>, <time datetime="2010-06" class="refDate">June 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5916">[RFC5916]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Device Owner Attribute"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5916</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5916</span>, <time datetime="2010-06" class="refDate">June 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5916">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5916</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5917">[RFC5917]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Clearance Sponsor Attribute"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5917</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5917</span>, <time datetime="2010-06" class="refDate">June 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5917">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5917</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5958">[RFC5958]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Asymmetric Key Packages"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5958</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5958</span>, <time datetime="2010-08" class="refDate">August 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC5959">[RFC5959]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Algorithms for Asymmetric Key Package Content Type"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5959</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5959</span>, <time datetime="2010-08" class="refDate">August 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5959">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5959</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6010">[RFC6010]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Housley, R.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Ashmore, S.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">C. Wallace</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints Extension"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6010</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6010</span>, <time datetime="2010-09" class="refDate">September 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6010">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6010</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6031">[RFC6031]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">R. Housley</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6031</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6031</span>, <time datetime="2010-12" class="refDate">December 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6031">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6031</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6032">[RFC6032]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">R. Housley</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6032</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6032</span>, <time datetime="2010-12" class="refDate">December 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6032">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6032</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6033">[RFC6033]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6033</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6033</span>, <time datetime="2010-12" class="refDate">December 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6033">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6033</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6160">[RFC6160]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Protection of Symmetric Key Package Content Types"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6160</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6160</span>, <time datetime="2011-04" class="refDate">April 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6160">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6160</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6161">[RFC6161]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Elliptic Curve Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6161</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6161</span>, <time datetime="2011-04" class="refDate">April 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6161">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6161</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6162">[RFC6162]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Elliptic Curve Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Asymmetric Key Package Content Type"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6162</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6162</span>, <time datetime="2011-04" class="refDate">April 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6162">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6162</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6268">[RFC6268]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Schaad, J.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">S. Turner</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6268</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6268</span>, <time datetime="2011-07" class="refDate">July 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC6402">[RFC6402]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Schaad, J.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6402</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6402</span>, <time datetime="2011-11" class="refDate">November 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7030">[RFC7030]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Pritikin, M., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Yee, P., Ed.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">D. Harkins, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Enrollment over Secure Transport"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7030</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7030</span>, <time datetime="2013-10" class="refDate">October 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7191">[RFC7191]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Housley, R.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Key Package Receipt and Error Content Types"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7191</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7191</span>, <time datetime="2014-04" class="refDate">April 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7191">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7191</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7192">[RFC7192]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Key Package Receipt and Error Content Types"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7192</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7192</span>, <time datetime="2014-04" class="refDate">April 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7192">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7192</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7292">[RFC7292]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Moriarty, K., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Nystrom, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Parkinson, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Rusch, A.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">M. Scott</span>, <span class="refTitle">"PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7292</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7292</span>, <time datetime="2014-07" class="refDate">July 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7292">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7292</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC7906">[RFC7906]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Timmel, P.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Housley, R.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">S. Turner</span>, <span class="refTitle">"NSA's Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Key Management Attributes"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7906</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7906</span>, <time datetime="2016-06" class="refDate">June 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7906">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7906</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8295">[RFC8295]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Turner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) Extensions"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8295</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8295</span>, <time datetime="2018-01" class="refDate">January 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8295">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8295</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8603">[RFC8603]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Jenkins, M.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">L. Zieglar</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8603</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8603</span>, <time datetime="2019-05" class="refDate">May 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8603">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8603</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8755">[RFC8755]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Jenkins, M.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Using Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite Algorithms in Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8755</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8755</span>, <time datetime="2020-03" class="refDate">March 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8755">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8755</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8756">[RFC8756]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Jenkins, M.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">L. Zieglar</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Profile of Certificate Management over CMS"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8756</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8756</span>, <time datetime="2020-03" class="refDate">March 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8756">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8756</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC9151">[RFC9151]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Cooley, D.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Profile for TLS and DTLS 1.2 and 1.3"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 9151</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC9151</span>, <time datetime="2022-04" class="refDate">April 2022</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9151">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9151</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="SP-800-59">[SP-800-59]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">National Institute of Standards and Technology</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National Security System"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-59</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">NIST Special Publication 800-59</span>, <time datetime="2003-08" class="refDate">August 2003</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-59/final">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-59/final</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="XML">[XML]</dt>
      <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Bray, T.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Paoli, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Sperberg-McQueen, C.M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Maler, E.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">F. Yergeau</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC-xml-20081126</span>, <time datetime="2008-11" class="refDate">November 2008</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-20081126/">https://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-20081126/</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
</section>
<section id="section-12.2">
        <h3 id="name-informative-references">
<a href="#section-12.2" class="section-number selfRef">12.2. </a><a href="#name-informative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Informative References</a>
        </h3>
<dl class="references">
<dt id="RFC2119">[RFC2119]</dt>
        <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Bradner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2119</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2119</span>, <time datetime="1997-03" class="refDate">March 1997</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
<dt id="RFC8174">[RFC8174]</dt>
      <dd>
<span class="refAuthor">Leiba, B.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8174</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8174</span>, <time datetime="2017-05" class="refDate">May 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
<dd class="break"></dd>
</dl>
</section>
</section>
<div id="authors-addresses">
<section id="appendix-A">
      <h2 id="name-authors-addresses">
<a href="#name-authors-addresses" class="section-name selfRef">Authors' Addresses</a>
      </h2>
<address class="vcard">
        <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Michael Jenkins</span></div>
<div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">National Security Agency</span></div>
<div class="email">
<span>Email:</span>
<a href="mailto:mjjenki@cyber.nsa.gov" class="email">mjjenki@cyber.nsa.gov</a>
</div>
</address>
<address class="vcard">
        <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Sean Turner</span></div>
<div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">sn3rd</span></div>
<div class="email">
<span>Email:</span>
<a href="mailto:sean@sn3rd.com" class="email">sean@sn3rd.com</a>
</div>
</address>
</section>
</div>
<script>const toc = document.getElementById("toc");
toc.querySelector("h2").addEventListener("click", e => {
  toc.classList.toggle("active");
});
toc.querySelector("nav").addEventListener("click", e => {
  toc.classList.remove("active");
});
</script>
</body>
</html>