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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
* You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnUtil.h"
#include "hasht.h"
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
#include "mozpkix/pkixutil.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsHTMLDocument.h"
#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
#include "nsIEffectiveTLDService.h"
#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
namespace mozilla::dom {
bool IsValidAppId(const nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>& aPrincipal,
const nsCString& aAppId) {
// An AppID is a substitute for the RP ID that allows the caller to assert
// credentials that were created using the legacy U2F protocol. While an RP ID
// is the caller origin's effective domain, or a registrable suffix thereof,
// an AppID is a URL (with a scheme and a possibly non-empty path) that is
// same-site with the caller's origin.
//
// The U2F protocol nominally uses Algorithm 3.1.2 of [1] to validate AppIDs.
// However, the WebAuthn spec [2] notes that it is not necessary to "implement
// steps four and onward of" Algorithm 3.1.2. Instead, in step three, "the
// comparison on the host is relaxed to accept hosts on the same site." Step
// two is best seen as providing a default value for the AppId when one is not
// provided. That leaves step 1 and the same-site check, which is what we
// implement here.
//
// [1]
// https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-appid-and-facets-v2.0-id-20180227.html#determining-if-a-caller-s-facetid-is-authorized-for-an-appid
// [2] https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-appid-extension
auto* principal = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> callerUri;
nsresult rv = principal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(callerUri));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> appIdUri;
rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(appIdUri), aAppId);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
// Step 1 of Algorithm 3.1.2. "If the AppID is not an HTTPS URL, and matches
// the FacetID of the caller, no additional processing is necessary and the
// operation may proceed." In the web context, the "FacetID" is defined as
// "the Web Origin [RFC6454] of the web page triggering the FIDO operation,
// written as a URI with an empty path. Default ports are omitted and any path
// component is ignored."
if (!appIdUri->SchemeIs("https")) {
nsCString facetId;
rv = principal->GetWebExposedOriginSerialization(facetId);
return NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && facetId == aAppId;
}
// Same site check
nsCOMPtr<nsIEffectiveTLDService> tldService =
do_GetService(NS_EFFECTIVETLDSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
if (!tldService) {
return false;
}
nsAutoCString baseDomainCaller;
rv = tldService->GetBaseDomain(callerUri, 0, baseDomainCaller);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
nsAutoCString baseDomainAppId;
rv = tldService->GetBaseDomain(appIdUri, 0, baseDomainAppId);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
if (baseDomainCaller == baseDomainAppId) {
return true;
}
// Exceptions for Google Accounts from Bug 1436078. These were supposed to be
// temporary, but users reported breakage when we tried to remove them (Bug
// 1822703). We will need to keep them indefinitely.
if (baseDomainCaller.EqualsLiteral("google.com") &&
(aAppId.Equals("https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/origins.json"_ns) ||
aAppId.Equals(
"https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/a/google.com/origins.json"_ns))) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
nsresult DefaultRpId(const nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>& aPrincipal,
/* out */ nsACString& aRpId) {
// [https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#rp-id]
// "By default, the RP ID for a WebAuthn operation is set to the caller's
// origin's effective domain."
auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
if (NS_FAILED(basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return uri->GetAsciiHost(aRpId);
}
bool IsWebAuthnAllowedInDocument(const nsCOMPtr<Document>& aDoc) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aDoc);
return aDoc->IsHTMLOrXHTML();
}
bool IsWebAuthnAllowedForPrincipal(const nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>& aPrincipal) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal);
if (aPrincipal->GetIsNullPrincipal()) {
return false;
}
if (aPrincipal->GetIsIpAddress()) {
return false;
}
// This next test is not strictly necessary since CredentialsContainer is
// [SecureContext] in our webidl.
if (!aPrincipal->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy()) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool IsWebAuthnAllowedForTransportSecurityInfo(
nsITransportSecurityInfo* aSecurityInfo) {
nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory overridableErrorCategory;
if (!aSecurityInfo || NS_FAILED(aSecurityInfo->GetOverridableErrorCategory(
&overridableErrorCategory))) {
return false;
}
switch (overridableErrorCategory) {
case nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_UNSET:
return true;
case nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_TIME:
return true;
case nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_TRUST:
return false;
case nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_DOMAIN:
return false;
default:
return false;
}
}
bool IsValidRpId(const nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>& aPrincipal,
const nsACString& aRpId) {
// This checks two of the conditions defined in
// https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#rp-id, namely that the RP ID value is
// (1) "a valid domain string", and
// (2) "a registrable domain suffix of or is equal to the caller's origin's
// effective domain"
//
// We do not check that the condition that "origin's scheme is https [, or]
// the origin's host is localhost and its scheme is http". These are special
// cases of secure contexts (https://www.w3.org/TR/secure-contexts/). We
// expose WebAuthn in all secure contexts, which is slightly more lenient
// than the spec's condition.
// Condition (1)
nsCString normalizedRpId;
nsresult rv = NS_DomainToASCII(aRpId, normalizedRpId);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
if (normalizedRpId != aRpId) {
return false;
}
// Condition (2)
// The "is a registrable domain suffix of or is equal to" condition is defined
// in https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#dom-document-domain
// as a subroutine of the document.domain setter, and it is exposed in XUL as
// the Document::IsValidDomain function. This function takes URIs as inputs
// rather than domain strings, so we construct a target URI using the current
// document URI as a template.
auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentURI;
if (NS_FAILED(basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(currentURI)))) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> targetURI;
rv = NS_MutateURI(currentURI).SetHost(aRpId).Finalize(targetURI);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
return Document::IsValidDomain(currentURI, targetURI);
}
static nsresult HashCString(nsICryptoHash* aHashService, const nsACString& aIn,
/* out */ nsTArray<uint8_t>& aOut) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aHashService);
nsresult rv = aHashService->Init(nsICryptoHash::SHA256);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
rv = aHashService->Update(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(aIn.BeginReading()), aIn.Length());
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
nsAutoCString fullHash;
// Passing false below means we will get a binary result rather than a
// base64-encoded string.
rv = aHashService->Finish(false, fullHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
aOut.Clear();
aOut.AppendElements(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t const*>(fullHash.BeginReading()),
fullHash.Length());
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult HashCString(const nsACString& aIn, /* out */ nsTArray<uint8_t>& aOut) {
nsresult srv;
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hashService =
do_CreateInstance(NS_CRYPTO_HASH_CONTRACTID, &srv);
if (NS_FAILED(srv)) {
return srv;
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, aIn, aOut);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return NS_OK;
}
} // namespace mozilla::dom
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