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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "MultiLogCTVerifier.h"
#include "CTObjectsExtractor.h"
#include "CTSerialization.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
namespace mozilla {
namespace ct {
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
MultiLogCTVerifier::MultiLogCTVerifier()
: mSignatureCache(signature_cache_new(
StaticPrefs::security_pki_sct_signature_cache_size()),
signature_cache_free) {}
void MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLog(CTLogVerifier&& log) {
mLogs.push_back(std::move(log));
}
pkix::Result MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify(
Input cert, Input issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo, Input sctListFromCert,
Input sctListFromOCSPResponse, Input sctListFromTLSExtension, Time time,
Maybe<Time> distrustAfterTime, CTVerifyResult& result) {
assert(cert.GetLength() > 0);
result.Reset();
pkix::Result rv;
// Verify embedded SCTs
if (issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo.GetLength() > 0 &&
sctListFromCert.GetLength() > 0) {
LogEntry precertEntry;
rv = GetPrecertLogEntry(cert, issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo, precertEntry);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromCert, precertEntry, SCTOrigin::Embedded, time,
distrustAfterTime, result);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
LogEntry x509Entry;
GetX509LogEntry(cert, x509Entry);
// Verify SCTs from a stapled OCSP response
if (sctListFromOCSPResponse.GetLength() > 0) {
rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromOCSPResponse, x509Entry, SCTOrigin::OCSPResponse,
time, distrustAfterTime, result);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
// Verify SCTs from a TLS extension
if (sctListFromTLSExtension.GetLength() > 0) {
rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromTLSExtension, x509Entry, SCTOrigin::TLSExtension,
time, distrustAfterTime, result);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
return Success;
}
void DecodeSCTs(Input encodedSctList,
std::vector<SignedCertificateTimestamp>& decodedSCTs,
size_t& decodingErrors) {
decodedSCTs.clear();
Reader listReader;
pkix::Result rv = DecodeSCTList(encodedSctList, listReader);
if (rv != Success) {
decodingErrors++;
return;
}
while (!listReader.AtEnd()) {
Input encodedSct;
rv = ReadSCTListItem(listReader, encodedSct);
if (rv != Success) {
decodingErrors++;
return;
}
Reader encodedSctReader(encodedSct);
SignedCertificateTimestamp sct;
rv = DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(encodedSctReader, sct);
if (rv != Success) {
decodingErrors++;
continue;
}
decodedSCTs.push_back(std::move(sct));
}
}
pkix::Result MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs(Input encodedSctList,
const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
SCTOrigin origin, Time time,
Maybe<Time> distrustAfterTime,
CTVerifyResult& result) {
std::vector<SignedCertificateTimestamp> decodedSCTs;
DecodeSCTs(encodedSctList, decodedSCTs, result.decodingErrors);
for (auto sct : decodedSCTs) {
pkix::Result rv = VerifySingleSCT(std::move(sct), expectedEntry, origin,
time, distrustAfterTime, result);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
return Success;
}
pkix::Result MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(
SignedCertificateTimestamp&& sct, const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
SCTOrigin origin, Time time, Maybe<Time> distrustAfterTime,
CTVerifyResult& result) {
switch (origin) {
case SCTOrigin::Embedded:
result.embeddedSCTs++;
break;
case SCTOrigin::TLSExtension:
result.sctsFromTLSHandshake++;
break;
case SCTOrigin::OCSPResponse:
result.sctsFromOCSP++;
break;
}
CTLogVerifier* matchingLog = nullptr;
for (auto& log : mLogs) {
if (log.keyId() == sct.logId) {
matchingLog = &log;
break;
}
}
if (!matchingLog) {
// SCT does not match any known log.
result.sctsFromUnknownLogs++;
return Success;
}
if (!matchingLog->SignatureParametersMatch(sct.signature)) {
// SCT signature parameters do not match the log's.
result.sctsWithInvalidSignatures++;
return Success;
}
pkix::Result rv =
matchingLog->Verify(expectedEntry, sct, mSignatureCache.get());
if (rv != Success) {
if (rv == pkix::Result::ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) {
result.sctsWithInvalidSignatures++;
return Success;
}
return rv;
}
// Make sure the timestamp is legitimate (not in the future).
// SCT's |timestamp| is measured in milliseconds since the epoch,
// ignoring leap seconds. When converting it to a second-level precision
// pkix::Time, we round down.
Time sctTime = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(sct.timestamp / 1000u);
if (sctTime > time) {
result.sctsWithInvalidTimestamps++;
return Success;
}
// If the root has a distrustAfter time, ensure that the SCT's timestamp is
// not after that time.
if (distrustAfterTime.isSome() && sctTime > distrustAfterTime.value()) {
result.sctsWithDistrustedTimestamps++;
return Success;
}
VerifiedSCT verifiedSct(std::move(sct), origin, matchingLog->operatorId(),
matchingLog->state(), matchingLog->format(),
matchingLog->timestamp());
result.verifiedScts.push_back(std::move(verifiedSct));
return Success;
}
} // namespace ct
} // namespace mozilla
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