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>Gambit: Software Tools for Game Theory</TH
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><A
NAME="BIB"
></A
><H1
><A
NAME="BIB"
>Bibliography</A
></H1
><H1
CLASS="BIBLIODIV"
><A
NAME="BIB.CNE"
>Articles on computation of Nash equilibria</A
></H1
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="EAV71"
></A
><P
>[Eav71]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>B. C. Eaves</SPAN
>, "The linear complementarity problem", 612-634, <I
>Management Science</I
>, 17, 1971.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="KOLMEGSTE94"
></A
><P
>[KolMegSte94]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Daphne Koller, </SPAN
><SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Nimrod Megiddo, </SPAN
><SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>and Bernhard von Stengel</SPAN
>, "Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games", 247-259, <I
>Games and Economic Behavior</I
>, 14, 1996.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="LEMHOW64"
></A
><P
>[LemHow64]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>C. E. Lemke </SPAN
><SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>and J. T. Howson</SPAN
>, "Equilibrium points of bimatrix games", 413-423, <I
>Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics</I
>, 12, 1964.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="MAN64"
></A
><P
>[Man64]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>O. Mangasarian</SPAN
>, "Equilibrium points in bimatrix games", 778-780, <I
>Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics</I
>, 12, 1964.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="MCK91"
></A
><P
>[McK91]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Richard McKelvey</SPAN
>, <I
>A Liapunov function for Nash equilibria</I
>, 1991, California Institute of Technology.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="MCKMCL96"
></A
><P
>[McKMcL96]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Richard McKelvey </SPAN
><SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>and Andrew McLennan</SPAN
>, "Computation of equilibria in finite games", 87-142, <I
>Handbook of Computational Economics</I
>, <SPAN
CLASS="EDITOR"
>Edited by H. Amman</SPAN
>, <SPAN
CLASS="EDITOR"
>D. Kendrick</SPAN
>, <SPAN
CLASS="EDITOR"
>J. Rust</SPAN
>, Elsevier, 1996.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="ROS71"
></A
><P
>[Ros71]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>J. Rosenmuller</SPAN
>, "On a generalization of the Lemke-Howson Algorithm to 
noncooperative n-person games", 73-79, <I
>SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics</I
>, 21, 1971.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="SHA74"
></A
><P
>[Sha74]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Lloyd Shapley</SPAN
>, "A note on the Lemke-Houson algorithm", 175-189, <I
>Mathematical Programming Study</I
>, 1, 1974.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="TUR02"
></A
><P
>[Tur02]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Theodore Turocy</SPAN
>, "A computational approach to quantal response equilibrium properties", 2002.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="VTH87"
></A
><P
>[VTH87]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>G. van der Laan, </SPAN
><SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>A. J. J. Talman, </SPAN
><SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>and L. van Der Heyden</SPAN
>, "Simplicial variable dimension algorithms for solving the nonlinear
complementarity problem on a product of unit simplices using a general
labelling", 377-397, <I
>Mathematics of Operations Research</I
>, 1987.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="WIL71"
></A
><P
>[Wil71]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Robert Wilson</SPAN
>, "Computing equilibria of n-person games", 80-87, <I
>SIAM Applied Math</I
>, 21, 1971.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="YAM93"
></A
><P
>[Yam93]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Y. Yamamoto</SPAN
>, 1993, "A Path-Following Procedure to Find a 
  Proper Equilibrium of Finite Games
  ", <I
>International Journal of Game Theory</I
>.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><H1
CLASS="BIBLIODIV"
><A
NAME="BIB.THEORY"
>General game theory articles and texts</A
></H1
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="AEN8857"
></A
><P
>[Harsanyi1967a]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>John Harsanyi</SPAN
>, "Games of Incomplete Information Played By
	  Bayesian Players I", 159-182, <I
>Management Science</I
>, 14, 1967.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="AEN8869"
></A
><P
>[Harsanyi1967b]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>John Harsanyi</SPAN
>, "Games of Incomplete Information Played By
	  Bayesian Players II", 320-334, <I
>Management Science</I
>, 14, 1967.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="AEN8881"
></A
><P
>[Harsanyi1968]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>John Harsanyi</SPAN
>, "Games of Incomplete Information Played By
	  Bayesian Players III", 486-502, <I
>Management Science</I
>, 14, 1968.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="KREWIL82"
></A
><P
>[KreWil82]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>David Kreps </SPAN
><SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>and Robert Wilson</SPAN
>, "Sequential Equilibria", 863-894, <I
>Econometrica</I
>, 50, 1982.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="MCKPAL95"
></A
><P
>[McKPal95]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Richard McKelvey </SPAN
><SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>and Tom Palfrey</SPAN
>, "Quantal response equilibria for normal form games", 6-38, <I
>Games and Economic Behavior</I
>, 10, 1995.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="MCKPAL98"
></A
><P
>[McKPal98]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Richard McKelvey </SPAN
><SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>and Tom Palfrey</SPAN
>, "Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games", 9-41, <I
>Experimental Economics</I
>, 1, 1998.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="MYE78"
></A
><P
>[Mye78]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Roger Myerson</SPAN
>, "Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept", 73-80, <I
>International Journal of Game Theory</I
>, 7, 1978.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="NAS50"
></A
><P
>[Nas50]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>John Nash</SPAN
>, "Equilibrium points in n-person games", 48-49, <I
>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</I
>, 36, 1950.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="SEL75"
></A
><P
>[Sel75]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Reinhard Selten</SPAN
>, <I
>Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in
extensive games</I
>, 25-55, <I
>International Journal of Game Theory</I
>, 4, 1975.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="VAND83"
></A
><P
>[vanD83]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Eric van Damme</SPAN
>, 1983, <I
>Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria</I
>, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
><H1
CLASS="BIBLIODIV"
><A
NAME="BIB.GENERAL"
>Textbooks and general reference</A
></H1
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRY"
><A
NAME="MYE91"
></A
><P
>[Mye91]&nbsp;<SPAN
CLASS="AUTHOR"
>Roger Myerson</SPAN
>, 1991, <I
>Game Theory</I
><I
>: </I
><I
>Analysis of Conflict</I
>, Harvard University Press.</P
><DIV
CLASS="BIBLIOENTRYBLOCK"
STYLE="margin-left=0.5in"
></DIV
></DIV
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