File: cmd_rakp_message_1_2.go

package info (click to toggle)
golang-github-bougou-go-ipmi 0.7.8-1
  • links: PTS, VCS
  • area: main
  • in suites: forky, sid
  • size: 1,880 kB
  • sloc: makefile: 38
file content (216 lines) | stat: -rw-r--r-- 7,134 bytes parent folder | download | duplicates (2)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
package ipmi

import (
	"context"
	"fmt"
)

const IPMI_MAX_USER_NAME_LENGTH = 16
const IPMI_RAKP1_MESSAGE_SIZE = 44

// 13.20 RAKP Message 1
type RAKPMessage1 struct {
	MessageTag uint8

	// The Managed System's Session ID for this session, returned by the Managed System on the
	// previous RMCP+ Open Session Response message.
	ManagedSystemSessionID uint32

	// 16 bytes
	RemoteConsoleRandomNumber [16]byte

	// bit 4
	// 0b = Username/Privilege lookup.
	// 1b = Name-only lookup.
	NameOnlyLookup                 bool
	RequestedMaximumPrivilegeLevel PrivilegeLevel

	UsernameLength uint8
	Username       []byte
}

type RAKPMessage2 struct {
	// authAlg describes the authentication algorithm was agreed upon in
	// the open session request/response phase.
	// We need to know that here so that we know how many bytes (if any) to read from the packet for KeyExchangeAuthenticationCode
	authAlg AuthAlg

	MessageTag uint8

	// RMCP+ Status Code - Identifies the status of the previous message.
	//
	// If the previous message generated an error, then only the Completion Code, Reserved, and
	// Remote Console Session ID fields are returned.
	//
	// If the Remote Console Session ID  field is indeterminate
	// (as would be the case if the Managed System Session ID in RAKP Message 1 were invalid)
	// then the Remote Console Session ID field will be set to all zeros.
	//
	// On error, the remote console can attempt to correct the error and send a new RAKP Message 1.
	//
	// Note that the remote console must change the Message Tag value to ensure the BMC sees the message as a new message and not as a retry.
	//
	// See Table 13-15, RMCP+ and RAKP Message Status Codes for the status codes defined for this message.
	RmcpStatusCode RmcpStatusCode

	// The Remote Console Session ID specified by the RMCP+ Open Session Request message associated with this response.
	RemoteConsoleSessionID uint32

	// Random number generated/selected by the managed system.
	ManagedSystemRandomNumber [16]byte

	// The Globally Unique ID (GUID) of the Managed System.
	// This value is typically specified by the client system's SMBIOS implementation. See
	// 22.14, Get System GUID Command, for additional information
	ManagedSystemGUID [16]byte

	// An integrity check value over the relevant items specified by the RAKP algorithm for RAKP Message 2.
	// The size of this field depends on the specific Authentication Algorithm
	// This field may be 0-bytes (absent) for some algorithms (e.g. RAKP-none).
	//
	// see 13.31 for how the managed system generate this HMAC
	KeyExchangeAuthenticationCode []byte
}

func (req *RAKPMessage1) Command() Command {
	return CommandNone
}

func (r *RAKPMessage1) Pack() []byte {
	var msg = make([]byte, 28+len(r.Username))
	packUint8(r.MessageTag, msg, 0)
	packUint24L(0, msg, 1) // 3 bytes reserved
	packUint32L(r.ManagedSystemSessionID, msg, 4)
	packBytes((r.RemoteConsoleRandomNumber[:]), msg, 8)

	packUint8(r.Role(), msg, 24)
	packUint16L(0, msg, 25) // 2 bytes reserved

	packUint8(r.UsernameLength, msg, 27)
	packBytes(r.Username, msg, 28)
	return msg
}

// the combination of RequestedMaximumPrivilegeLevel and NameOnlyLookup field
// The whole byte should be stored to client session for computing auth code of rakp2
func (r *RAKPMessage1) Role() uint8 {
	privilegeLevel := uint8(r.RequestedMaximumPrivilegeLevel)
	if r.NameOnlyLookup {
		privilegeLevel = setBit4(privilegeLevel)
	}
	return privilegeLevel
}

func (res *RAKPMessage2) Unpack(msg []byte) error {
	// If RAKPMessage1 failed to be validated, the returned RAKPMessage2 only holds 8 bytes.
	if len(msg) < 8 {
		return ErrUnpackedDataTooShortWith(len(msg), 8)
	}

	res.MessageTag = msg[0]
	res.RmcpStatusCode = RmcpStatusCode(msg[1])
	// 2 bytes reserved
	res.RemoteConsoleSessionID, _, _ = unpackUint32L(msg, 4)

	// Now we can check whether RmcpStatusCode indicates error
	if res.RmcpStatusCode != RmcpStatusCodeNoErrors {
		return fmt.Errorf("the return status of rakp2 has error: %v", res.RmcpStatusCode)
	}

	if len(msg) < 40 {
		return ErrUnpackedDataTooShortWith(len(msg), 40)
	}

	res.ManagedSystemRandomNumber = array16(msg[8:24])
	res.ManagedSystemGUID = array16(msg[24:40])

	var authCodeLen int = 0
	switch res.authAlg {
	case AuthAlgRAKP_None:
		break
	case AuthAlgRAKP_HMAC_MD5:
		authCodeLen = 16
	case AuthAlgRAKP_HMAC_SHA1:
		authCodeLen = 20
	case AuthAlgRAKP_HMAC_SHA256:
		authCodeLen = 32
	}
	if len(msg) < 40+authCodeLen {
		return fmt.Errorf("the unpacked data does not contain enough auth code")
	}
	res.KeyExchangeAuthenticationCode = make([]byte, authCodeLen)
	copy(res.KeyExchangeAuthenticationCode, msg[40:40+authCodeLen])

	return nil
}

func (*RAKPMessage2) CompletionCodes() map[uint8]string {
	// no command-specific cc
	return map[uint8]string{}
}

func (res *RAKPMessage2) Format() string {
	return fmt.Sprintf("%v", res)
}

// ValidateRAKP2 validates RAKPMessage2 returned by BMC.
func (c *Client) ValidateRAKP2(ctx context.Context, rakp2 *RAKPMessage2) (bool, error) {
	if c.session.v20.consoleSessionID != rakp2.RemoteConsoleSessionID {
		return false, fmt.Errorf("session id not matched, cached console session id: %x, rakp2 returned session id: %x", c.session.v20.consoleSessionID, rakp2.RemoteConsoleSessionID)
	}

	// rakp2 authcode is valid
	authcode, err := c.generate_rakp2_authcode()
	if err != nil {
		return false, fmt.Errorf("generate rakp2 authcode failed, err: %w", err)
	}

	c.DebugBytes("rakp2 returned auth code", rakp2.KeyExchangeAuthenticationCode, 16)

	if !isByteSliceEqual(authcode, rakp2.KeyExchangeAuthenticationCode) {
		return false, fmt.Errorf("rakp2 authcode not equal, console: %x, bmc: %x", authcode, rakp2.KeyExchangeAuthenticationCode)
	}
	return true, nil
}

func (c *Client) RAKPMessage1(ctx context.Context) (response *RAKPMessage2, err error) {

	c.session.v20.consoleRand = array16(randomBytes(16))
	c.DebugBytes("console generate console random number", c.session.v20.consoleRand[:], 16)

	request := &RAKPMessage1{
		MessageTag:                     0,
		ManagedSystemSessionID:         c.session.v20.bmcSessionID, // set by previous RMCP+ Open Session Request
		RemoteConsoleRandomNumber:      c.session.v20.consoleRand,
		RequestedMaximumPrivilegeLevel: c.maxPrivilegeLevel,
		NameOnlyLookup:                 true,
		UsernameLength:                 uint8(len(c.Username)),
		Username:                       []byte(c.Username),
	}

	c.session.v20.role = request.Role()

	response = &RAKPMessage2{
		authAlg: c.session.v20.authAlg,
	}
	c.session.v20.state = SessionStateRakp1Sent

	err = c.Exchange(ctx, request, response)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// the following fields must be set before generate_sik/generate_k1/generate_k2
	c.session.v20.rakp2ReturnCode = uint8(response.RmcpStatusCode)
	c.session.v20.bmcGUID = response.ManagedSystemGUID
	c.session.v20.bmcRand = response.ManagedSystemRandomNumber // will be used in rakp3 to generate authCode

	if _, err = c.ValidateRAKP2(ctx, response); err != nil {
		err = fmt.Errorf("validate rakp2 message failed, err: %w", err)
		return
	}

	c.session.v20.state = SessionStateRakp2Received

	return
}