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|
package provisioner
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/crypto/sshutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
)
// awsIssuer is the string used as issuer in the generated tokens.
const awsIssuer = "ec2.amazonaws.com"
// awsIdentityURL is the url used to retrieve the instance identity document.
const awsIdentityURL = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document"
// awsSignatureURL is the url used to retrieve the instance identity signature.
const awsSignatureURL = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/signature"
// awsAPITokenURL is the url used to get the IMDSv2 API token
const awsAPITokenURL = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token"
// awsAPITokenTTL is the default TTL to use when requesting IMDSv2 API tokens
// -- we keep this short-lived since we get a new token with every call to readURL()
const awsAPITokenTTL = "30"
// awsMetadataTokenHeader is the header that must be passed with every IMDSv2 request
const awsMetadataTokenHeader = "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token"
// awsMetadataTokenTTLHeader is the header used to indicate the token TTL requested
const awsMetadataTokenTTLHeader = "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds"
// awsCertificate is the certificate used to validate the instance identity
// signature.
//
// The first certificate is used in:
// ap-northeast-2, ap-south-1, ap-southeast-1, ap-southeast-2
// eu-central-1, eu-north-1, eu-west-1, eu-west-2, eu-west-3
// us-east-1, us-east-2, us-west-1, us-west-2
// ca-central-1, sa-east-1
//
// The second certificate is used in:
// eu-south-1
//
// The third certificate is used in:
// ap-east-1
//
// The fourth certificate is used in:
// af-south-1
//
// The fifth certificate is used in:
// me-south-1
const awsCertificate = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----`
// awsSignatureAlgorithm is the signature algorithm used to verify the identity
// document signature.
const awsSignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
type awsConfig struct {
identityURL string
signatureURL string
tokenURL string
tokenTTL string
certificates []*x509.Certificate
signatureAlgorithm x509.SignatureAlgorithm
}
func newAWSConfig(certPath string) (*awsConfig, error) {
var certBytes []byte
if certPath == "" {
certBytes = []byte(awsCertificate)
} else {
if b, err := os.ReadFile(certPath); err == nil {
certBytes = b
} else {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "error reading %s", certPath)
}
}
// Read all the certificates.
var certs []*x509.Certificate
for len(certBytes) > 0 {
var block *pem.Block
block, certBytes = pem.Decode(certBytes)
if block == nil {
break
}
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" || len(block.Headers) != 0 {
continue
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error parsing AWS IID certificate")
}
certs = append(certs, cert)
}
if len(certs) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("error parsing AWS IID certificate: no certificates found")
}
return &awsConfig{
identityURL: awsIdentityURL,
signatureURL: awsSignatureURL,
tokenURL: awsAPITokenURL,
tokenTTL: awsAPITokenTTL,
certificates: certs,
signatureAlgorithm: awsSignatureAlgorithm,
}, nil
}
type awsPayload struct {
jose.Claims
Amazon awsAmazonPayload `json:"amazon"`
SANs []string `json:"sans"`
document awsInstanceIdentityDocument
}
type awsAmazonPayload struct {
Document []byte `json:"document"`
Signature []byte `json:"signature"`
}
type awsInstanceIdentityDocument struct {
AccountID string `json:"accountId"`
Architecture string `json:"architecture"`
AvailabilityZone string `json:"availabilityZone"`
BillingProducts []string `json:"billingProducts"`
DevpayProductCodes []string `json:"devpayProductCodes"`
ImageID string `json:"imageId"`
InstanceID string `json:"instanceId"`
InstanceType string `json:"instanceType"`
KernelID string `json:"kernelId"`
PendingTime time.Time `json:"pendingTime"`
PrivateIP string `json:"privateIp"`
RamdiskID string `json:"ramdiskId"`
Region string `json:"region"`
Version string `json:"version"`
}
// AWS is the provisioner that supports identity tokens created from the Amazon
// Web Services Instance Identity Documents.
//
// If DisableCustomSANs is true, only the internal DNS and IP will be added as a
// SAN. By default it will accept any SAN in the CSR.
//
// If DisableTrustOnFirstUse is true, multiple sign request for this provisioner
// with the same instance will be accepted. By default only the first request
// will be accepted.
//
// If InstanceAge is set, only the instances with a pendingTime within the given
// period will be accepted.
//
// IIDRoots can be used to specify a path to the certificates used to verify the
// identity certificate signature.
//
// Amazon Identity docs are available at
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html
type AWS struct {
*base
ID string `json:"-"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Accounts []string `json:"accounts"`
DisableCustomSANs bool `json:"disableCustomSANs"`
DisableTrustOnFirstUse bool `json:"disableTrustOnFirstUse"`
IMDSVersions []string `json:"imdsVersions"`
InstanceAge Duration `json:"instanceAge,omitempty"`
IIDRoots string `json:"iidRoots,omitempty"`
Claims *Claims `json:"claims,omitempty"`
Options *Options `json:"options,omitempty"`
config *awsConfig
ctl *Controller
}
// GetID returns the provisioner unique identifier.
func (p *AWS) GetID() string {
if p.ID != "" {
return p.ID
}
return p.GetIDForToken()
}
// GetIDForToken returns an identifier that will be used to load the provisioner
// from a token.
func (p *AWS) GetIDForToken() string {
return "aws/" + p.Name
}
// GetTokenID returns the identifier of the token.
func (p *AWS) GetTokenID(token string) (string, error) {
payload, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// If TOFU is disabled create an ID for the token, so it cannot be reused.
// The timestamps, document and signatures should be mostly unique.
if p.DisableTrustOnFirstUse {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
return strings.ToLower(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])), nil
}
// Use provisioner + instance-id as the identifier.
unique := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", p.GetIDForToken(), payload.document.InstanceID)
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(unique))
return strings.ToLower(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])), nil
}
// GetName returns the name of the provisioner.
func (p *AWS) GetName() string {
return p.Name
}
// GetType returns the type of provisioner.
func (p *AWS) GetType() Type {
return TypeAWS
}
// GetEncryptedKey is not available in an AWS provisioner.
func (p *AWS) GetEncryptedKey() (kid, key string, ok bool) {
return "", "", false
}
// GetIdentityToken retrieves the identity document and it's signature and
// generates a token with them.
func (p *AWS) GetIdentityToken(subject, caURL string) (string, error) {
// Initialize the config if this method is used from the cli.
if err := p.assertConfig(); err != nil {
return "", err
}
var idoc awsInstanceIdentityDocument
doc, err := p.readURL(p.config.identityURL)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error retrieving identity document:\n Are you in an AWS VM?\n Is the metadata service enabled?\n Are you using the proper metadata service version?")
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(doc, &idoc); err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error unmarshaling identity document")
}
sig, err := p.readURL(p.config.signatureURL)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error retrieving identity document:\n Are you in an AWS VM?\n Is the metadata service enabled?\n Are you using the proper metadata service version?")
}
signature, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(string(sig))
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error decoding identity document signature")
}
if err := p.checkSignature(doc, signature); err != nil {
return "", err
}
audience, err := generateSignAudience(caURL, p.GetIDForToken())
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Create unique ID for Trust On First Use (TOFU). Only the first instance
// per provisioner is allowed as we don't have a way to trust the given
// sans.
unique := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", p.GetIDForToken(), idoc.InstanceID)
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(unique))
// Create a JWT from the identity document
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.HS256, Key: signature},
new(jose.SignerOptions).WithType("JWT"),
)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error creating signer")
}
now := time.Now()
payload := awsPayload{
Claims: jose.Claims{
Issuer: awsIssuer,
Subject: subject,
Audience: []string{audience},
Expiry: jose.NewNumericDate(now.Add(5 * time.Minute)),
NotBefore: jose.NewNumericDate(now),
IssuedAt: jose.NewNumericDate(now),
ID: strings.ToLower(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])),
},
Amazon: awsAmazonPayload{
Document: doc,
Signature: signature,
},
}
tok, err := jose.Signed(signer).Claims(payload).CompactSerialize()
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error serializing token")
}
return tok, nil
}
// Init validates and initializes the AWS provisioner.
func (p *AWS) Init(config Config) (err error) {
switch {
case p.Type == "":
return errors.New("provisioner type cannot be empty")
case p.Name == "":
return errors.New("provisioner name cannot be empty")
case p.InstanceAge.Value() < 0:
return errors.New("provisioner instanceAge cannot be negative")
}
// Add default config
if p.config, err = newAWSConfig(p.IIDRoots); err != nil {
return err
}
// validate IMDS versions
if len(p.IMDSVersions) == 0 {
p.IMDSVersions = []string{"v2", "v1"}
}
for _, v := range p.IMDSVersions {
switch v {
case "v1":
// valid
case "v2":
// valid
default:
return errors.Errorf("%s: not a supported AWS Instance Metadata Service version", v)
}
}
config.Audiences = config.Audiences.WithFragment(p.GetIDForToken())
p.ctl, err = NewController(p, p.Claims, config, p.Options)
return
}
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token and returns the sign options that
// will be used on certificate creation.
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
payload, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "aws.AuthorizeSign")
}
doc := payload.document
// Template options
data := x509util.NewTemplateData()
data.SetCommonName(payload.Claims.Subject)
if v, err := unsafeParseSigned(token); err == nil {
data.SetToken(v)
}
// Enforce known CN and default DNS and IP if configured.
// By default we'll accept the CN and SANs in the CSR.
// There's no way to trust them other than TOFU.
var so []SignOption
if p.DisableCustomSANs {
dnsName := fmt.Sprintf("ip-%s.%s.compute.internal", strings.ReplaceAll(doc.PrivateIP, ".", "-"), doc.Region)
so = append(so,
dnsNamesValidator([]string{dnsName}),
ipAddressesValidator([]net.IP{
net.ParseIP(doc.PrivateIP),
}),
emailAddressesValidator(nil),
urisValidator(nil),
)
// Template options
data.SetSANs([]string{dnsName, doc.PrivateIP})
}
templateOptions, err := CustomTemplateOptions(p.Options, data, x509util.DefaultIIDLeafTemplate)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "aws.AuthorizeSign")
}
return append(so,
p,
templateOptions,
// modifiers / withOptions
newProvisionerExtensionOption(TypeAWS, p.Name, doc.AccountID, "InstanceID", doc.InstanceID),
profileDefaultDuration(p.ctl.Claimer.DefaultTLSCertDuration()),
// validators
defaultPublicKeyValidator{},
commonNameValidator(payload.Claims.Subject),
newValidityValidator(p.ctl.Claimer.MinTLSCertDuration(), p.ctl.Claimer.MaxTLSCertDuration()),
newX509NamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getX509()),
), nil
}
// AuthorizeRenew returns an error if the renewal is disabled.
// NOTE: This method does not actually validate the certificate or check it's
// revocation status. Just confirms that the provisioner that created the
// certificate was configured to allow renewals.
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) error {
return p.ctl.AuthorizeRenew(ctx, cert)
}
// assertConfig initializes the config if it has not been initialized
func (p *AWS) assertConfig() (err error) {
if p.config != nil {
return
}
p.config, err = newAWSConfig(p.IIDRoots)
return err
}
// checkSignature returns an error if the signature is not valid.
func (p *AWS) checkSignature(signed, signature []byte) error {
for _, crt := range p.config.certificates {
if err := crt.CheckSignature(p.config.signatureAlgorithm, signed, signature); err == nil {
return nil
}
}
return errors.New("error validating identity document signature")
}
// readURL does a GET request to the given url and returns the body. It's not
// using pkg/errors to avoid verbose errors, the caller should use it and write
// the appropriate error.
func (p *AWS) readURL(url string) ([]byte, error) {
var resp *http.Response
var err error
// Initialize IMDS versions when this is called from the cli.
if len(p.IMDSVersions) == 0 {
p.IMDSVersions = []string{"v2", "v1"}
}
for _, v := range p.IMDSVersions {
switch v {
case "v1":
resp, err = p.readURLv1(url)
if err == nil && resp.StatusCode < 400 {
return p.readResponseBody(resp)
}
case "v2":
resp, err = p.readURLv2(url)
if err == nil && resp.StatusCode < 400 {
return p.readResponseBody(resp)
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: not a supported AWS Instance Metadata Service version", v)
}
if resp != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
}
// all versions have been exhausted and we haven't returned successfully yet so pass
// the error on to the caller
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request for metadata returned non-successful status code %d",
resp.StatusCode)
}
func (p *AWS) readURLv1(url string) (*http.Response, error) {
client := http.Client{}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, url, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return resp, nil
}
func (p *AWS) readURLv2(url string) (*http.Response, error) {
client := http.Client{}
// first get the token
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, p.config.tokenURL, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set(awsMetadataTokenTTLHeader, p.config.tokenTTL)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request for API token returned non-successful status code %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
token, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// now make the request
req, err = http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, url, http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set(awsMetadataTokenHeader, string(token))
resp, err = client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return resp, nil
}
func (p *AWS) readResponseBody(resp *http.Response) ([]byte, error) {
defer resp.Body.Close()
b, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return b, nil
}
// authorizeToken performs common jwt authorization actions and returns the
// claims for case specific downstream parsing.
// e.g. a Sign request will auth/validate different fields than a Revoke request.
func (p *AWS) authorizeToken(token string) (*awsPayload, error) {
jwt, err := jose.ParseSigned(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrapf(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; error parsing aws token")
}
if len(jwt.Headers) == 0 {
return nil, errs.InternalServer("aws.authorizeToken; error parsing token, header is missing")
}
var unsafeClaims awsPayload
if err := jwt.UnsafeClaimsWithoutVerification(&unsafeClaims); err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; error unmarshaling claims")
}
var payload awsPayload
if err := jwt.Claims(unsafeClaims.Amazon.Signature, &payload); err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; error verifying claims")
}
// Validate identity document signature
if err := p.checkSignature(payload.Amazon.Document, payload.Amazon.Signature); err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; invalid aws token signature")
}
var doc awsInstanceIdentityDocument
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload.Amazon.Document, &doc); err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; error unmarshaling aws identity document")
}
switch {
case doc.AccountID == "":
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document accountId cannot be empty")
case doc.InstanceID == "":
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document instanceId cannot be empty")
case doc.PrivateIP == "":
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document privateIp cannot be empty")
case doc.Region == "":
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document region cannot be empty")
}
// According to "rfc7519 JSON Web Token" acceptable skew should be no
// more than a few minutes.
now := time.Now().UTC()
if err = payload.ValidateWithLeeway(jose.Expected{
Issuer: awsIssuer,
Time: now,
}, time.Minute); err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrapf(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "aws.authorizeToken; invalid aws token")
}
// validate audiences with the defaults
if !matchesAudience(payload.Audience, p.ctl.Audiences.Sign) {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; invalid token - invalid audience claim (aud)")
}
// Validate subject, it has to be known if disableCustomSANs is enabled
if p.DisableCustomSANs {
if payload.Subject != doc.InstanceID &&
payload.Subject != doc.PrivateIP &&
payload.Subject != fmt.Sprintf("ip-%s.%s.compute.internal", strings.ReplaceAll(doc.PrivateIP, ".", "-"), doc.Region) {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; invalid token - invalid subject claim (sub)")
}
}
// validate accounts
if len(p.Accounts) > 0 {
var found bool
for _, sa := range p.Accounts {
if sa == doc.AccountID {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; invalid aws identity document - accountId is not valid")
}
}
// validate instance age
if d := p.InstanceAge.Value(); d > 0 {
if now.Sub(doc.PendingTime) > d {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.authorizeToken; aws identity document pendingTime is too old")
}
}
payload.document = doc
return &payload, nil
}
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns the list of SignOption for a SignSSH request.
func (p *AWS) AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("aws.AuthorizeSSHSign; ssh ca is disabled for aws provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "aws.AuthorizeSSHSign")
}
doc := claims.document
signOptions := []SignOption{}
// Enforce host certificate.
defaults := SignSSHOptions{
CertType: SSHHostCert,
}
// Validated principals.
principals := []string{
doc.PrivateIP,
fmt.Sprintf("ip-%s.%s.compute.internal", strings.ReplaceAll(doc.PrivateIP, ".", "-"), doc.Region),
}
// Only enforce known principals if disable custom sans is true.
if p.DisableCustomSANs {
defaults.Principals = principals
} else {
// Check that at least one principal is sent in the request.
signOptions = append(signOptions, &sshCertOptionsRequireValidator{
Principals: true,
})
}
// Certificate templates.
data := sshutil.CreateTemplateData(sshutil.HostCert, doc.InstanceID, principals)
if v, err := unsafeParseSigned(token); err == nil {
data.SetToken(v)
}
templateOptions, err := CustomSSHTemplateOptions(p.Options, data, sshutil.DefaultIIDTemplate)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "aws.AuthorizeSSHSign")
}
signOptions = append(signOptions, templateOptions)
return append(signOptions,
p,
// Validate user SignSSHOptions.
sshCertOptionsValidator(defaults),
// Set the validity bounds if not set.
&sshDefaultDuration{p.ctl.Claimer},
// Validate public key
&sshDefaultPublicKeyValidator{},
// Validate the validity period.
&sshCertValidityValidator{p.ctl.Claimer},
// Require all the fields in the SSH certificate
&sshCertDefaultValidator{},
// Ensure that all principal names are allowed
newSSHNamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getSSHHost(), nil),
), nil
}
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