File: 07_infrastructure.po

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msgid ""
msgstr ""
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msgid "Debian Security Infrastructure"
msgstr ""

msgid "The Debian Security Team"
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian has a Security Team, that handles security in the <emphasis>stable</emphasis> distribution. Handling security means they keep track of vulnerabilities that arise in software (watching forums such as Bugtraq, or vuln-dev) and determine if the <emphasis>stable</emphasis> distribution is affected by it."
msgstr ""

msgid "Also, the Debian Security Team is the contact point for problems that are coordinated by upstream developers or organizations such as <ulink name=\"CERT\" url=\"http://www.cert.org\" /> which might affect multiple vendors. That is, when problems are not Debian-specific. The contact point of the Security Team is <ulink name=\"team@security.debian.org\" url=\"mailto:team@security.debian.org\" /> which only the members of the security team read."
msgstr ""

msgid "Sensitive information should be sent to the first address and, in some cases, should be encrypted with the Debian Security Contact key (as found in the Debian keyring)."
msgstr ""

msgid "Once a probable problem is received by the Security Team it will investigate if the <emphasis>stable</emphasis> distribution is affected and if it is, a fix is made for the source code base. This fix will sometimes include backporting the patch made upstream (which usually is some versions ahead of the one distributed by Debian). After testing of the fix is done, new packages are prepared and published in the <ulink url=\"http://security.debian.org\" /> site so they can be retrieved through <command>apt</command> (see <xref linkend=\"security-update\" />). At the same time a <emphasis>Debian Security Advisory</emphasis> (DSA) is published on the web site and sent to public mailing lists including <ulink name=\"debian-security-announce\" url=\"http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce\" /> and Bugtraq."
msgstr ""

msgid "Some other frequently asked questions on the Debian Security Team can be found at <xref linkend=\"debian-sec-team-faq\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian Security Advisories"
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian Security Advisories (DSAs) are made whenever a security vulnerability is discovered that affects a Debian package. These advisories, signed by one of the Security Team members, include information of the versions affected as well as the location of the updates. This information is:"
msgstr ""

msgid "version number for the fix."
msgstr ""

msgid "problem type."
msgstr ""

msgid "whether it is remote or locally exploitable."
msgstr ""

msgid "short description of the package."
msgstr ""

msgid "description of the problem."
msgstr ""

msgid "description of the exploit."
msgstr ""

msgid "description of the fix."
msgstr ""

msgid "DSAs are published both on <ulink name=\"Debian's frontpage\" url=\"http://www.debian.org/\" /> and in the <ulink name=\"Debian security pages\" url=\"http://www.debian.org/security/\" />. Usually this does not happen until the website is rebuilt (every four hours) so they might not be present immediately. The preferred channel is the debian-security-announce mailing list."
msgstr ""

msgid "Interested users can, however (and this is done in some Debian-related portals) use the RDF channel to download automatically the DSAs to their desktop. Some applications, such as <command>Evolution</command> (an email client and personal information assistant) and <command>Multiticker</command> (a GNOME applet), can be used to retrieve the advisories automatically. The RDF channel is available at <ulink url=\"http://www.debian.org/security/dsa.rdf\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "DSAs published on the website might be updated after being sent to the public-mailing lists. A common update is adding cross references to security vulnerability databases. Also, translations<footnote><para>Translations are available in up to ten different languages.</para></footnote> of DSAs are not sent to the security mailing lists but are directly included in the website."
msgstr ""

msgid "Vulnerability cross references"
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian provides a fully <ulink name=\"crossreferenced table\" url=\"http://www.debian.org/security/crossreferences\" /> including all the references available for all the advisories published since 1998. This table is provided to complement the <ulink name=\"reference map available at CVE\" url=\"http://cve.mitre.org/cve/refs/refmap/source-DEBIAN.html\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "You will notice that this table provides references to security databases such as <ulink name=\"Bugtraq\" url=\"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid\" />, <ulink name=\"CERT/CC Advisories\" url=\"http://www.cert.org/advisories/\" /> and <ulink name=\"US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database\" url=\"http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls\" /> as well as CVE names (see below). These references are provided for convenience use, but only CVE references are periodically reviewed and included."
msgstr ""

msgid "Advantages of adding cross references to these vulnerability databases are:"
msgstr ""

msgid "it makes it easier for Debian users to see and track which general (published) advisories have already been covered by Debian."
msgstr ""

msgid "system administrators can learn more about the vulnerability and its impact by following the cross references."
msgstr ""

msgid "this information can be used to cross-check output from vulnerability scanners that include references to CVE to remove false positives (see <xref linkend=\"vulnasses-false-positive\" />)."
msgstr ""

msgid "CVE compatibility"
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian Security Advisories were <ulink name=\"declared CVE-Compatible\" url=\"http://www.debian.org/security/CVE-certificate.jpg\" /><footnote><para>The full <ulink name=\"capability questionnaire\" url=\"http://cve.mitre.org/compatible/phase2/SPI_Debian.html\" /> is available at CVE</para></footnote> in February 24, 2004."
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian developers understand the need to provide accurate and up to date information of the security status of the Debian distribution, allowing users to manage the risk associated with new security vulnerabilities. CVE enables us to provide standardized references that allow users to develop a <ulink name=\"CVE-enabled security management process\" url=\"http://www.cve.mitre.org/compatible/enterprise.html\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "The <ulink name=\"Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)\" url=\"http://cve.mitre.org\" /> project is maintained by the MITRE Corporation and provides a list of standardized names for vulnerabilities and security exposures."
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian believes that providing users with additional information related to security issues that affect the Debian distribution is extremely important. The inclusion of CVE names in advisories help users associate generic vulnerabilities with specific Debian updates, which reduces the time spent handling vulnerabilities that affect our users. Also, it eases the management of security in an environment where CVE-enabled security tools -such as network or host intrusion detection systems, or vulnerability assessment tools- are already deployed regardless of whether or not they are based on the Debian distribution."
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian provides CVE names for all DSAs released since September 1998. All of the advisories can be retrieved on the Debian web site, and announcements related to new vulnerabilities include CVE names if available at the time of their release. Advisories associated with a given CVE name can be searched directly through the Debian Security Tracker (see below)."
msgstr ""

msgid "In some cases you might not find a given CVE name in published advisories, for example because:"
msgstr ""

msgid "No Debian products are affected by that vulnerability."
msgstr ""

msgid "There is not yet an advisory covering that vulnerability (the security issue might have been reported as a <ulink name=\"security bug\" url=\"http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?tag=security\" /> but a fix has not been tested and uploaded)."
msgstr ""

msgid "An advisory was published before a CVE name was assigned to a given vulnerability (look for an update at the web site)."
msgstr ""

msgid "Security Tracker"
msgstr ""

msgid "The central database of what the Debian security teams know about vulnerabilities is the <ulink name=\"Debian Security Tracker\" url=\"http://security-tracker.debian.net\" />. It cross references packages, vulnerable and fixed versions for different suites, CVE names, Debian bug numbers, DSA's and miscellaneous notes. It can be searched, e.g. by CVE name to see which Debian packages are affected or fixed, or by package to show unresolved security issues. The only information missing from the tracker is confidential information that the security team received under embargo."
msgstr ""

msgid "The package <command>debsecan</command> uses the information in the tracker to report to the administrator of a system which of the installed packages are vulnerable, and for which updates are available to fix security issues."
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian Security Build Infrastructure"
msgstr ""

msgid "Since Debian is currently supported in a large number of architectures, administrators sometimes wonder if a given architecture might take more time to receive security updates than another. As a matter of fact, except for rare circumstances, updates are available to all architectures at the same time."
msgstr ""

msgid "Packages in the security archive are autobuilt, just like the regular archive. However, security updates are a little more different than normal uploads sent by package maintainers since, in some cases, before being published they need to wait until they can be tested further, an advisory written, or need to wait for a week or more to avoid publicizing the flaw until all vendors have had a reasonable chance to fix it."
msgstr ""

msgid "Thus, the security upload archive works with the following procedure:"
msgstr ""

msgid "Someone finds a security problem."
msgstr ""

msgid "Someone fixes the problem, and makes an upload to security-master.debian.org's incoming (this <emphasis>someone</emphasis> is usually a Security Team member but can be also a package maintainer with an appropriate fix that has contacted the Security Team previously). The Changelog includes a <emphasis>testing-security</emphasis> or <emphasis>stable-security</emphasis> as target distribution."
msgstr ""

msgid "The upload gets checked and processed by a Debian system and moved into queue/accepted, and the buildds are notified. Files in here can be accessed by the security team and (somewhat indirectly) by the buildds."
msgstr ""

msgid "Security-enabled buildds pick up the source package (prioritized over normal builds), build it, and send the logs to the security team."
msgstr ""

msgid "The security team reply to the logs, and the newly built packages are uploaded to queue/unchecked, where they're processed by a Debian system, and moved into queue/accepted."
msgstr ""

msgid "When the security team find the source package acceptable (i.e., that it's been correctly built for all applicable architectures and that it fixes the security hole and doesn't introduce new problems of its own) they run a script which:"
msgstr ""

msgid "installs the package into the security archive."
msgstr ""

msgid "updates the <filename>Packages</filename>, <filename>Sources</filename> and <filename>Release</filename> files of security.debian.org in the usual way (<command>dpkg-scanpackages</command>, <command>dpkg-scansources</command>, ...)."
msgstr ""

msgid "sets up a template advisory that the security team can finish off."
msgstr ""

msgid "forwards the packages to the appropriate proposed-updates so that it can be included in the real archive as soon as possible."
msgstr ""

msgid "This procedure, previously done by hand, was tested and put through during the freezing stage of Debian 3.0 woody (July 2002). Thanks to this infrastructure the Security Team was able to have updated packages ready for the apache and OpenSSH issues for all the supported (almost twenty) architectures in less than a day."
msgstr ""

msgid "Developer's guide to security updates"
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian developers that need to coordinate with the security team on fixing in issue in their packages, can refer to the Developer's Reference section <ulink name=\"Handling security-related bugs\" url=\"http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/developers-reference/pkgs.html#bug-security\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "Package signing in Debian"
msgstr ""

msgid "This section could also be titled \"how to upgrade/update safely your Debian GNU/Linux system\" and it deserves its own section basically because it is an important part of the Security Infrastructure. Package signing is an important issue since it avoids tampering of packages distributed in mirrors and of downloads with man-in-the-middle attacks. Automatic software update is an important feature but it's also important to remove security threats that could help the distribution of trojans and the compromise of systems during updates <footnote><para>Some operating systems have already been plagued with automatic-updates problems such as the <ulink name=\"Mac OS X Software Update vulnerabity\" url=\"http://www.cunap.com/~hardingr/projects/osx/exploit.html\" />.</para></footnote>"
msgstr ""

msgid "FIXME: probably the Internet Explorer vulnerability handling. certificate chains has an impact on security updates on Microsoft Windows."
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian does not provide signed packages but provides a mechanism available since Debian 4.0 (codename <emphasis>etch</emphasis>) to check for downloaded package's integrity<footnote><para>Older releases, such as Debian 3.1 <emphasis>sarge</emphasis> can use this feature by using backported versions of this package management tool</para></footnote>. For more information, see <xref linkend=\"apt-0.6\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "This issue is better described in the <ulink name=\"Strong Distribution HOWTO\" url=\"http://www.cryptnet.net/fdp/crypto/strong_distro.html\" /> by V. Alex Brennen."
msgstr ""

msgid "The current scheme for package signature checks"
msgstr ""

msgid "The current scheme for package signature checking using <command>apt</command> is:"
msgstr ""

msgid "the <filename>Release</filename> file includes the MD5 sum of <filename>Packages.gz</filename> (which contains the MD5 sums of packages) and will be signed. The signature is one of a trusted source."
msgstr ""

msgid "This signed <filename>Release</filename> file is downloaded by 'apt-get update' and stored along with <filename>Packages.gz</filename>."
msgstr ""

msgid "When a package is going to be installed, it is first downloaded, then the MD5 sum is generated."
msgstr ""

msgid "The signed <filename>Release</filename> file is checked (signature ok) and it extracts from it the MD5 sum for the <filename>Packages.gz</filename> file, the <filename>Packages.gz</filename> checksum is generated and (if ok) the MD5 sum of the downloaded package is extracted from it."
msgstr ""

msgid "If the MD5 sum from the downloaded package is the same as the one in the <filename>Packages.gz</filename> file the package will be installed, otherwise the administrator will be alerted and the package will be left in the cache (so the administrator can decide whether to install it or not). If the package is not in the <filename>Packages.gz</filename> and the administrator has configured the system to only install checked packages it will not be installed either."
msgstr ""

msgid "By following the chain of MD5 sums <command>apt</command> is capable of verifying that a package originates from a a specific release. This is less flexible than signing each package one by one, but can be combined with that scheme too (see below)."
msgstr ""

msgid "This scheme is <ulink name=\"fully implemented\" url=\"http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2003/debian-devel-200312/msg01986.html \" /> in apt 0.6 and is available since the Debian 4.0 release. For more information see <xref linkend=\"apt-0.6\" />. Packages that provide a front-end to apt need to be modified to adapt to this new feature; this is the case of <command>aptitude</command> which was <ulink name=\"modified\" url=\"http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2005/03/msg02641.html\" /> to adapt to this scheme. Front-ends currently known to work properly with this feature include <command>aptitude</command> and <command>synaptic</command>."
msgstr ""

msgid "Package signing has been discussed in Debian for quite some time, for more information you can read: <ulink url=\"http://www.debian.org/News/weekly/2001/8/\" /> and <ulink url=\"http://www.debian.org/News/weekly/2000/11/\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "Secure apt"
msgstr ""

msgid "The apt 0.6 release, available since Debian 4.0 <emphasis>etch</emphasis> and later releases, includes <emphasis>apt-secure</emphasis> (also known as <emphasis>secure apt</emphasis>) which is a tool that will allow a system administrator to test the integrity of the packages downloaded through the above scheme. This release includes the tool <command>apt-key</command> for adding new keys to apt's keyring, which by default includes only the current Debian archive signing key."
msgstr ""

msgid "These changes are based on the patch for <command>apt</command> (available in <ulink name=\"Bug #203741\" url=\"http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=203741\" />) which provides this implementation."
msgstr ""

msgid "Secure apt works by checking the distribution through the <filename>Release</filename> file, as discussed in <xref linkend=\"check-releases\" />. Typically, this process will be transparent to the administrator although you will need to intervene every year<footnote><para>Until an automatic mechanism is developed.</para></footnote> to add the new archive key when it is rotated, for more information on the steps an administrator needs to take a look at <xref linkend=\"secure-apt-add-key\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "This feature is still under development, if you believe you find bugs in it, please, make first sure you are using the latest version (as this package might change quite a bit before it is finally released) and, if running the latest version, submit a bug against the <package>apt</package> package."
msgstr ""

msgid "You can find more information at <ulink name=\"the wiki pages\" url=\"http://wiki.debian.org/SecureApt\" /> and the official documentation: <ulink name=\"Migration to APT 0.6\" url=\"http://www.enyo.de/fw/software/apt-secure/\" /> and <ulink name=\"APT Signature Checking\" url=\"http://www.syntaxpolice.org/apt-secure/\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "Per distribution release check"
msgstr ""

msgid "This section describes how the distribution release check mechanism works, it was written by Joey Hess and is also available at the <ulink name=\"Debian Wiki\" url=\"http://wiki.debian.org/SecureApt\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid "Basic concepts"
msgstr ""

msgid "Here are a few basic concepts that you'll need to understand for the rest of this section."
msgstr ""

msgid "A checksum is a method of taking a file and boiling it down to a reasonably short number that uniquely identifies the content of the file. This is a lot harder to do well than it might seem, and the most commonly used type of checksum, the MD5 sum, is in the process of being broken."
msgstr ""

msgid "Public key cryptography is based on pairs of keys, a public key and a private key. The public key is given out to the world; the private key must be kept a secret. Anyone possessing the public key can encrypt a message so that it can only be read by someone possessing the private key. It's also possible to use a private key to sign a file, not encrypt it. If a private key is used to sign a file, then anyone who has the public key can check that the file was signed by that key. No one who doesn't have the private key can forge such a signature."
msgstr ""

msgid "These keys are quite long numbers (1024 to 2048 digits or longer), and to make them easier to work with they have a key id, which is a shorter, 8 or 16 digit number that can be used to refer to them."
msgstr ""

msgid "<command>gpg</command> is the tool used in secure apt to sign files and check their signatures."
msgstr ""

msgid "<command>apt-key</command> is a program that is used to manage a keyring of gpg keys for secure apt. The keyring is kept in the file <filename>/etc/apt/trusted.gpg</filename> (not to be confused with the related but not very interesting <filename>/etc/apt/trustdb.gpg</filename>). <command>apt-key</command> can be used to show the keys in the keyring, and to add or remove a key."
msgstr ""

msgid "<filename>Release</filename> checksums"
msgstr ""

msgid "A Debian archive contains a <filename>Release</filename> file, which is updated each time any of the packages in the archive change. Among other things, the <filename>Release</filename> file contains some MD5 sums of other files in the archive. An excerpt of an example <filename>Release</filename> file:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"MD5Sum:\n"
" 6b05b392f792ba5a436d590c129de21f            3453 Packages\n"
" 1356479a23edda7a69f24eb8d6f4a14b            1131 Packages.gz\n"
" 2a5167881adc9ad1a8864f281b1eb959            1715 Sources\n"
" 88de3533bf6e054d1799f8e49b6aed8b             658 Sources.gz"
msgstr ""

msgid "The <filename>Release</filename> files also include SHA-1 checksums, which will be useful once MD5 sums become fully broken, however apt doesn't use them yet."
msgstr ""

msgid "Now if we look inside a <filename>Packages</filename> file, we'll find more MD5 sums, one for each package listed in it. For example:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"    Package: uqm\n"
"    Priority: optional\n"
"    ...\n"
"    Filename: unstable/uqm_0.4.0-1_i386.deb\n"
"    Size: 580558\n"
"    MD5sum: 864ec6157c1eea88acfef44d0f34d219"
msgstr ""

msgid "These two checksums can be used to verify that you have downloaded a correct copy of the <filename>Packages</filename> file, with a md5sum that matches the one in the <filename>Release</filename> file. And when it downloads an individual package, it can also check its md5sum against the content of the <filename>Packages</filename> file. If apt fails at either of these steps, it will abort."
msgstr ""

msgid "None of this is new in secure apt, but it does provide the foundation. Notice that so far there is one file that apt doesn't have a way to check: The Release file. Secure apt is all about making apt verify the <filename>Release</filename> file before it does anything else with it, and plugging this hole, so that there is a chain of verification from the package that you are going to install all the way back to the provider of the package."
msgstr ""

msgid "Verification of the <filename>Release</filename> file"
msgstr ""

msgid "To verify the <filename>Release</filename> file, a gpg signature is added for the <filename>Release</filename> file. This is put in a file named <filename>Release.gpg</filename> that is shipped alongside the <filename>Release</filename> file. It looks something like this <footnote><para>Technically speaking, this is an ASCII-armored detached gpg signature.</para></footnote> , although only gpg actually looks at its contents normally:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n"
"Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux)\n"
"\n"
"iD8DBQBCqKO1nukh8wJbxY8RAsfHAJ9hu8oGNRAl2MSmP5+z2RZb6FJ8kACfWvEx\n"
"UBGPVc7jbHHsg78EhMBlV/U=\n"
"=x6og\n"
"-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----"
msgstr ""

msgid "Check of <filename>Release.gpg</filename> by <command>apt</command>"
msgstr ""

msgid "Secure apt always downloads <filename>Release.gpg</filename> files when it's downloading <filename>Release</filename> files, and if it cannot download the <filename>Release.gpg</filename>, or if the signature is bad, it will complain, and will make note that the <filename>Packages</filename> files that the <filename>Release</filename> file points to, and all the packages listed therein, are from an untrusted source. Here's how it looks during an <command>apt-get update</command>:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"W: GPG error: http://ftp.us.debian.org testing Release: The following signatures\n"
" couldn't be verified because the public key is not available: NO_PUBKEY 010908312D230C5F"
msgstr ""

msgid "Note that the second half of the long number is the key id of the key that apt doesn't know about, in this case that's 2D230C5F."
msgstr ""

msgid "If you ignore that warning and try to install a package later, apt will warn again:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"WARNING: The following packages cannot be authenticated!\n"
"  libglib-perl libgtk2-perl\n"
"Install these packages without verification [y/N]?"
msgstr ""

msgid "If you say Y here you have no way to know if the file you're getting is the package you're supposed to install, or if it's something else entirely that somebody that can intercept the communication against the server<footnote><para>Or has poisoned your DNS, or is spoofing the server, or has replaced the file in the mirror you are using, etc.</para></footnote> has arranged for you, containing a nasty suprise."
msgstr ""

msgid "Note that you can disable these checks by running apt with --allow-unauthenticated."
msgstr ""

msgid "It's also worth noting that newer versions of the Debian installer use the same signed <filename>Release</filename> file mechanism during their debootstrap of the Debian base system, before apt is available, and that the installer even uses this system to verify pieces of itself that it downloads from the net. Also, Debian does not currently sign the <filename>Release</filename> files on its CDs; apt can be configured to always trust packages from CDs so this is not a large problem."
msgstr ""

msgid "How to tell apt what to trust"
msgstr ""

msgid "So the security of the whole system depends on there being a <filename>Release.gpg</filename> file, which signs a <filename>Release</filename> file, and of <command>apt</command> checking that signature using gpg. To check the signature, it has to know the public key of the person who signed the file. These keys are kept in apt's own keyring (<filename>/etc/apt/trusted.gpg</filename>), and managing the keys is where secure apt comes in."
msgstr ""

msgid "By default, Debian systems come preconfigured with the Debian archive key in the keyring."
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"# apt-key list\n"
"/etc/apt/trusted.gpg\n"
"--------------------\n"
"pub   1024D/4F368D5D 2005-01-31 [expires: 2006-01-31]\n"
"uid                  Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (2005) &lt;ftpmaster@debian.org&gt;"
msgstr ""

msgid "Here 4F368D5D is the key id, and notice that this key was only valid for a one year period. Debian rotates these keys as a last line of defense against some sort of security breach breaking a key."
msgstr ""

msgid "That will make <command>apt</command> trust the official Debian archive, but if you add some other apt repository to <filename>/etc/apt/sources.list</filename>, you'll also have to give <command>apt</command> its key if you want apt to trust it. Once you have the key and have verified it, it's a simple matter of running <command>apt-key add</command> <replaceable>file</replaceable> to add it. Getting the key and verifying it are the trickier parts."
msgstr ""

msgid "Finding the key for a repository"
msgstr ""

msgid "The debian-archive-keyring package is used to distribute keys to <command>apt</command>. Upgrades to this package can add (or remove) gpg keys for the main Debian archive."
msgstr ""

msgid "For other archives, there is not yet a standard location where you can find the key for a given apt repository. There's a rough standard of putting the key up on the web page for the repository or as a file in the repository itself, but no real standard, so you might have to hunt for it."
msgstr ""

msgid "The Debian archive signing key is available at <ulink url=\"http://ftp-master.debian.org/ziyi_key_2006.asc\" /> (replace 2006 with current year).<footnote><para>\"ziyi\" is the name of the tool used for signing on the Debian servers, the name is based on the name of a <ulink name=\"Chinese actress\" url=\"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Ziyi\" />.</para> </footnote>"
msgstr ""

msgid "<command>gpg</command> itself has a standard way to distribute keys, using a keyserver that gpg can download a key from and add it to its keyring. For example:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"$ gpg --keyserver pgpkeys.mit.edu --recv-key 2D230C5F\n"
"gpg: requesting key 2D230C5F from hkp server pgpkeys.mit.edu\n"
"gpg: key 2D230C5F: public key \"Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (2006) &lt;ftpm\n"
"aster@debian.org&gt;\" imported\n"
"gpg: Total number processed: 1\n"
"gpg:               imported: 1"
msgstr ""

msgid "You can then export that key from your own keyring and feed it to <command>apt-key</command>:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"$ gpg -a --export 2D230C5F | sudo apt-key add -\n"
"gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found\n"
"OK"
msgstr ""

msgid "The \"gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found\" warning means that gpg was not configured to ultimately trust a specific key. Trust settings are part of OpenPGPs Web-of-Trust which does not apply here. So there is no problem with this warning. In typical setups the user's own key is ultimately trusted."
msgstr ""

msgid "Safely adding a key"
msgstr ""

msgid "By adding a key to apt's keyring, you're telling apt to trust everything signed by the key, and this lets you know for sure that apt won't install anything not signed by the person who possesses the private key. But if you're sufficiently paranoid, you can see that this just pushes things up a level, now instead of having to worry if a package, or a <filename>Release</filename> file is valid, you can worry about whether you've actually gotten the right key. Is the <ulink url=\"http://ftp-master.debian.org/ziyi_key_2006.asc\" /> file mentioned above really Debian's archive signing key, or has it been modified (or this document lies)."
msgstr ""

msgid "It's good to be paranoid in security, but verifying things from here is harder. <command>gpg</command> has the concept of a chain of trust, which can start at someone you're sure of, who signs someone's key, who signs some other key, etc., until you get to the archive key. If you're sufficiently paranoid you'll want to check that your archive key is signed by a key that you can trust, with a trust chain that goes back to someone you know personally. If you want to do this, visit a Debian conference or perhaps a local LUG for a key signing <footnote><para>Not all apt repository keys are signed at all by another key. Maybe the person setting up the repository doesn't have another key, or maybe they don't feel comfortable signing such a role key with their main key. For information on setting up a key for a repository see <xref linkend=\"check-non-debian-releases\" />. </para></footnote>."
msgstr ""

msgid "If you can't afford this level of paranoia, do whatever feels appropriate to you when adding a new apt source and a new key. Maybe you'll want to mail the person providing the key and verify it, or maybe you're willing to take your chances with downloading it and assuming you got the real thing. The important thing is that by reducing the problem to what archive keys to trust, secure apt lets you be as careful and secure as it suits you to be."
msgstr ""

msgid "Verifying key integrity"
msgstr ""

msgid "You can verify the fingerprint as well as the signatures on the key. Retrieving the fingerprint can be done for multiple sources, you can check <ulink name=\"The Debian System Book\" url=\"http://debiansystem.info/readers/changes/547-ziyi-key-2006\" />, talk to Debian Developers on IRC, read the mailing list where the key change will be announced or any other additional means to verify the fingerprint. For example you can do this:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"$ GET http://ftp-master.debian.org/ziyi_key_2006.asc | gpg --import\n"
"gpg: key 2D230C5F: public key \"Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (2006)\n"
"  &lt;ftpmaster&amp;debian.org&gt;\" imported\n"
"gpg: Total number processed: 1\n"
"gpg:               imported: 1\n"
"$ gpg --check-sigs --fingerprint 2D230C5F\n"
"pub   1024D/2D230C5F 2006-01-03 [expires: 2007-02-07]\n"
"      Key fingerprint = 0847 50FC 01A6 D388 A643  D869 0109 0831 2D23 0C5F\n"
"uid   Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (2006) &lt;ftpmaster@debian.org&gt;\n"
"sig!3        2D230C5F 2006-01-03  Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key\n"
"                                  (2006) &lt;ftpmaster@debian.org&gt;\n"
"sig!         2A4E3EAA 2006-01-03  Anthony Towns &lt;aj@azure.humbug.org.au&gt;\n"
"sig!         4F368D5D 2006-01-03  Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key\n"
"                                  (2005) &lt;ftpmaster@debian.org&gt;\n"
"sig!         29982E5A 2006-01-04  Steve Langasek &lt;vorlon@dodds.net&gt;\n"
"sig!         FD6645AB 2006-01-04  Ryan Murray &lt;rmurray@cyberhqz.com&gt;\n"
"sig!         AB2A91F5 2006-01-04  James Troup &lt;james@nocrew.org&gt;"
msgstr ""

msgid "and then <ulink name=\"check the trust path\" url=\"http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7.en.html#s-deb-pack-sign\" /> from your key (or a key you trust) to at least one of the keys used to sign the archive key. If you are sufficiently paranoid you will tell apt to trust the key only if you find an acceptable path:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"$ gpg --export -a 2D230C5F | sudo apt-key add -\n"
"Ok"
msgstr ""

msgid "Note that the key is signed with the previous archive key, so theoretically you can just build on your previous trust."
msgstr ""

msgid "Debian archive key yearly rotation"
msgstr ""

msgid "As mentioned above, the Debian archive signing key is changed each year, in January. Since secure apt is young, we don't have a great deal of experience with changing the key and there are still rough spots."
msgstr ""

msgid "In January 2006, a new key for 2006 was made and the <filename>Release</filename> file began to be signed by it, but to try to avoid breaking systems that had the old 2005 key, the <filename>Release</filename> file was signed by that as well. The intent was that apt would accept one signature or the other depending on the key it had, but apt turned out to be buggy and refused to trust the file unless it had both keys and was able to check both signatures. This was fixed in apt version 0.6.43.1. There was also confusion about how the key was distributed to users who already had systems using secure apt; initially it was uploaded to the web site with no announcement and no real way to verify it and users were forced to download it by hand."
msgstr ""

msgid "In January 2006, a new key for 2006 was made and the Release file began to be signed by it, but to try to avoid breaking systems that had the old 2005 key, the <filename>Release</filename> file was signed by that as well. In order to prevent confusion on the best distribution mechanism for users who already have systems using secure apt, the debian-archive-keyring package was introduced, which manages apt keyring updates."
msgstr ""

msgid "Known release checking problems"
msgstr ""

msgid "One not so obvious problem is that if your clock is very far off, secure apt will not work. If it's set to a date in the past, such as 1999, apt will fail with an unhelpful message such as this:"
msgstr ""

msgid "\n"
"W: GPG error: http://archive.progeny.com sid Release: Unknown error executing gpg"
msgstr ""

msgid "Although <command>apt-key</command> list will make the problem plain:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"gpg: key 2D230C5F was created 192324901 seconds in the future (time warp or clock problem)\n"
"gpg: key 2D230C5F was created 192324901 seconds in the future (time warp or clock problem)\n"
"pub   1024D/2D230C5F 2006-01-03\n"
"uid                  Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (2006) &lt;ftpmaster@debian.org&gt;"
msgstr ""

msgid "If it's set to a date too far in the future, apt will treat the keys as expired."
msgstr ""

msgid "Another problem you may encouter if using testing or unstable is that if you have not run <command>apt-get update</command> lately and <command>apt-get install</command> a package, apt might complain that it cannot be authenticated (why does it do this?). <command>apt-get update</command> will fix this."
msgstr ""

msgid "Manual per distribution release check"
msgstr ""

msgid "In case you want to add now the additional security checks and don't want or cannot run the latest apt version<footnote><para>Either because you are using the stable, <emphasis>sarge</emphasis>, release or an older release or because you don't want to use the latest apt version, although we would really appreciate testing of it.</para></footnote> you can use the script below, provided by Anthony Towns. This script can automatically do some new security checks to allow the user to be sure that the software s/he's downloading matches the software Debian's distributing. This stops Debian developers from hacking into someone's system without the accountability provided by uploading to the main archive, or mirrors mirroring something almost, but not quite like Debian, or mirrors providing out of date copies of unstable with known security problems."
msgstr ""

msgid "This sample code, renamed as <command>apt-check-sigs</command>, should be used in the following way:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"# apt-get update\n"
"# apt-check-sigs\n"
"(...results...)\n"
"# apt-get dist-upgrade"
msgstr ""

msgid "First you need to:"
msgstr ""

msgid "get the keys the archive software uses to sign <filename>Release</filename> files, <ulink url=\"http://ftp-master.debian.org/ziyi_key_2006.asc\" /> and add them to <filename>~/.gnupg/trustedkeys.gpg</filename> (which is what <command>gpgv</command> uses by default)."
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"  gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring trustedkeys.gpg --import ziyi_key_2006.asc\n"
"  "
msgstr ""

msgid "remove any <filename>/etc/apt/sources.list</filename> lines that don't use the normal \"dists\" structure, or change the script so that it works with them."
msgstr ""

msgid "be prepared to ignore the fact that Debian security updates don't have signed <filename>Release</filename> files, and that <filename>Sources</filename> files don't have appropriate checksums in the <filename>Release</filename> file (yet)."
msgstr ""

msgid "be prepared to check that the appropriate sources are signed by the appropriate keys."
msgstr ""

msgid "This is the example code for <command>apt-check-sigs</command>, the latest version can be retrieved from <ulink url=\"http://people.debian.org/~ajt/apt-check-sigs\" />. This code is currently in beta, for more information read <ulink url=\"http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2002/debian-devel-200207/msg00421.html\" />."
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"#!/bin/bash\n"
"\n"
"# Copyright (c) 2001 Anthony Towns &lt;ajt@debian.org&gt;\n"
"#\n"
"# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify\n"
"# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by\n"
"# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or\n"
"# (at your option) any later version.\n"
"#\n"
"# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,\n"
"# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of\n"
"# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the\n"
"# GNU General Public License for more details.\n"
"\n"
"rm -rf /tmp/apt-release-check\n"
"mkdir /tmp/apt-release-check || exit 1\n"
"cd /tmp/apt-release-check\n"
"\n"
"&gt;OK\n"
"&gt;MISSING\n"
"&gt;NOCHECK\n"
"&gt;BAD\n"
"\n"
"arch=`dpkg --print-installation-architecture`\n"
"\n"
"am_root () {\n"
"        [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]\n"
"}\n"
"\n"
"get_md5sumsize () {\n"
"        cat \"$1\" | awk '/^MD5Sum:/,/^SHA1:/' | \n"
"          MYARG=\"$2\" perl -ne '@f = split /\\s+/; if ($f[3] eq $ENV{\"MYARG\"}) {\n"
"print \"$f[1] $f[2]\\n\"; exit(0); }'\n"
"}\n"
"\n"
"checkit () {\n"
"        local FILE=\"$1\"\n"
"        local LOOKUP=\"$2\"\n"
"\n"
"        Y=\"`get_md5sumsize Release \"$LOOKUP\"`\"\n"
"        Y=\"`echo \"$Y\" | sed 's/^ *//;s/  */ /g'`\"\n"
"\n"
"        if [ ! -e \"/var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE\" ]; then\n"
"                if [ \"$Y\" = \"\" ]; then\n"
"                        # No file, but not needed anyway\n"
"                        echo \"OK\"\n"
"                        return\n"
"                fi\n"
"                echo \"$FILE\" &gt;&gt;MISSING\n"
"                echo \"MISSING $Y\"\n"
"                return\n"
"        fi\n"
"        if [ \"$Y\" = \"\" ]; then\n"
"                echo \"$FILE\" &gt;&gt;NOCHECK\n"
"                echo \"NOCHECK\"\n"
"                return\n"
"        fi\n"
"        X=\"`md5sum &lt; /var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE | cut -d\\  -f1` `wc -c &lt; /var/lib\n"
"/apt/lists/$FILE`\"\n"
"        X=\"`echo \"$X\" | sed 's/^ *//;s/  */ /g'`\"\n"
"        if [ \"$X\" != \"$Y\" ]; then\n"
"                echo \"$FILE\" &gt;&gt;BAD\n"
"                echo \"BAD\"\n"
"                return\n"
"        fi\n"
"        echo \"$FILE\" &gt;&gt;OK\n"
"        echo \"OK\"\n"
"}\n"
"\n"
"echo\n"
"echo \"Checking sources in /etc/apt/sources.list:\"\n"
"echo \"~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\"\n"
"echo\n"
"(echo \"You should take care to ensure that the distributions you're downloading\n"
"\"\n"
"echo \"are the ones you think you are downloading, and that they are as up to\"\n"
"echo \"date as you would expect (testing and unstable should be no more than\"\n"
"echo \"two or three days out of date, stable-updates no more than a few weeks\"\n"
"echo \"or a month).\"\n"
") | fmt\n"
"echo\n"
"\n"
"cat /etc/apt/sources.list | \n"
"  sed 's/^ *//' | grep '^[^#]' |\n"
"  while read ty url dist comps; do\n"
"        if [ \"${url%%:*}\" = \"http\" -o \"${url%%:*}\" = \"ftp\" ]; then\n"
"                baseurl=\"${url#*://}\"\n"
"        else\n"
"                continue\n"
"        fi\n"
"\n"
"        echo \"Source: ${ty} ${url} ${dist} ${comps}\"\n"
"\n"
"        rm -f Release Release.gpg\n"
"        lynx -reload -dump \"${url}/dists/${dist}/Release\" &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1\n"
"        wget -q -O Release \"${url}/dists/${dist}/Release\"\n"
"\n"
"        if ! grep -q '^' Release; then\n"
"                echo \"  * NO TOP-LEVEL Release FILE\"\n"
"                &gt;Release\n"
"        else\n"
"                origline=`sed -n 's/^Origin: *//p' Release | head -1`\n"
"                lablline=`sed -n 's/^Label: *//p' Release | head -1`\n"
"                suitline=`sed -n 's/^Suite: *//p' Release | head -1`\n"
"                codeline=`sed -n 's/^Codename: *//p' Release | head -1`\n"
"                dateline=`grep \"^Date:\" Release | head -1`\n"
"                dscrline=`grep \"^Description:\" Release | head -1`\n"
"                echo \"  o Origin: $origline/$lablline\"\n"
"                echo \"  o Suite: $suitline/$codeline\"\n"
"                echo \"  o $dateline\"\n"
"                echo \"  o $dscrline\"\n"
"\n"
"                if [ \"${dist%%/*}\" != \"$suitline\" -a \"${dist%%/*}\" != \"$codeline\" ]; then\n"
"                        echo \"  * WARNING: asked for $dist, got $suitline/$codeline\"\n"
"                fi\n"
"\n"
"                lynx -reload -dump \"${url}/dists/${dist}/Release.gpg\" &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1\n"
"                wget -q -O Release.gpg \"${url}/dists/${dist}/Release.gpg\"\n"
"\n"
"                gpgv --status-fd 3 Release.gpg Release 3&gt;&amp;1 &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 | sed -n \"s/^\\[GNUPG:\\] //p\" | (okay=0; err=\"\"; while read gpgcode rest; do\n"
"                        if [ \"$gpgcode\" = \"GOODSIG\" ]; then\n"
"                            if [ \"$err\" != \"\" ]; then\n"
"                                echo \"  * Signed by ${err# } key: ${rest#* }\"\n"
"                            else\n"
"                                echo \"  o Signed by: ${rest#* }\"\n"
"                                okay=1\n"
"                            fi\n"
"                            err=\"\"\n"
"                        elif [ \"$gpgcode\" = \"BADSIG\" ]; then\n"
"                            echo \"  * BAD SIGNATURE BY: ${rest#* }\"\n"
"                            err=\"\"\n"
"                        elif [ \"$gpgcode\" = \"ERRSIG\" ]; then\n"
"                            echo \"  * COULDN'T CHECK SIGNATURE BY KEYID: ${rest %% *}\"\n"
"                            err=\"\"\n"
"                        elif [ \"$gpgcode\" = \"SIGREVOKED\" ]; then\n"
"                            err=\"$err REVOKED\"\n"
"                        elif [ \"$gpgcode\" = \"SIGEXPIRED\" ]; then\n"
"                            err=\"$err EXPIRED\"\n"
"                        fi\n"
"                    done\n"
"                    if [ \"$okay\" != 1 ]; then\n"
"                        echo \"  * NO VALID SIGNATURE\"\n"
"                        &gt;Release\n"
"                    fi)\n"
"        fi\n"
"        okaycomps=\"\"\n"
"        for comp in $comps; do\n"
"                if [ \"$ty\" = \"deb\" ]; then\n"
"                        X=$(checkit \"`echo \"${baseurl}/dists/${dist}/${comp}/binary-${arch}/Release\" | sed 's,//*,_,g'`\" \"${comp}/binary-${arch}/Release\")\n"
"                        Y=$(checkit \"`echo \"${baseurl}/dists/${dist}/${comp}/binary-${arch}/Packages\" | sed 's,//*,_,g'`\" \"${comp}/binary-${arch}/Packages\")\n"
"                        if [ \"$X $Y\" = \"OK OK\" ]; then\n"
"                                okaycomps=\"$okaycomps $comp\"\n"
"                        else\n"
"                                echo \"  * PROBLEMS WITH $comp ($X, $Y)\"\n"
"                        fi\n"
"                elif [ \"$ty\" = \"deb-src\" ]; then\n"
"                        X=$(checkit \"`echo \"${baseurl}/dists/${dist}/${comp}/source/Release\" | sed 's,//*,_,g'`\" \"${comp}/source/Release\")\n"
"                        Y=$(checkit \"`echo \"${baseurl}/dists/${dist}/${comp}/source/Sources\" | sed 's,//*,_,g'`\" \"${comp}/source/Sources\")\n"
"                        if [ \"$X $Y\" = \"OK OK\" ]; then\n"
"                                okaycomps=\"$okaycomps $comp\"\n"
"                        else\n"
"                                echo \"  * PROBLEMS WITH component $comp ($X, $Y)\"\n"
"                        fi\n"
"                fi\n"
"        done\n"
"        [ \"$okaycomps\" = \"\" ] || echo \"  o Okay:$okaycomps\"\n"
"        echo\n"
"  done\n"
"\n"
"echo \"Results\"\n"
"echo \"~~~~~~~\"\n"
"echo\n"
"\n"
"allokay=true\n"
"\n"
"cd /tmp/apt-release-check\n"
"diff &lt;(cat BAD MISSING NOCHECK OK | sort) &lt;(cd /var/lib/apt/lists &amp;&amp; find . -type f -maxdepth 1 | sed 's,^\\./,,g' | grep '_' | sort) | sed -n 's/^&gt; //p' &gt;UNVALIDATED\n"
"\n"
"cd /tmp/apt-release-check\n"
"if grep -q ^ UNVALIDATED; then\n"
"    allokay=false\n"
"    (echo \"The following files in /var/lib/apt/lists have not been validated.\"\n"
"    echo \"This could turn out to be a harmless indication that this script\"\n"
"    echo \"is buggy or out of date, or it could let trojaned packages get onto\"\n"
"    echo \"your system.\"\n"
"    ) | fmt\n"
"    echo\n"
"    sed 's/^/    /' &lt; UNVALIDATED\n"
"    echo\n"
"fi\n"
"\n"
"if grep -q ^ BAD; then\n"
"    allokay=false\n"
"    (echo \"The contents of the following files in /var/lib/apt/lists does not\"\n"
"    echo \"match what was expected. This may mean these sources are out of date,\"\n"
"    echo \"that the archive is having problems, or that someone is actively\"\n"
"    echo \"using your mirror to distribute trojans.\"\n"
"    if am_root; then \n"
"        echo \"The files have been renamed to have the extension .FAILED and\"\n"
"        echo \"will be ignored by apt.\"\n"
"        cat BAD | while read a; do\n"
"            mv /var/lib/apt/lists/$a /var/lib/apt/lists/${a}.FAILED\n"
"        done\n"
"    fi) | fmt\n"
"    echo\n"
"    sed 's/^/    /' &lt; BAD\n"
"    echo\n"
"fi\n"
"\n"
"if grep -q ^ MISSING; then\n"
"    allokay=false\n"
"    (echo \"The following files from /var/lib/apt/lists were missing. This\"\n"
"    echo \"may cause you to miss out on updates to some vulnerable packages.\"\n"
"    ) | fmt\n"
"    echo\n"
"    sed 's/^/    /' &gt; MISSING\n"
"    echo\n"
"fi\n"
"\n"
"if grep -q ^ NOCHECK; then\n"
"    allokay=false\n"
"    (echo \"The contents of the following files in /var/lib/apt/lists could not\"\n"
"    echo \"be validated due to the lack of a signed Release file, or the lack\"\n"
"    echo \"of an appropriate entry in a signed Release file. This probably\"\n"
"    echo \"means that the maintainers of these sources are slack, but may mean\"\n"
"    echo \"these sources are being actively used to distribute trojans.\"\n"
"    if am_root; then \n"
"        echo \"The files have been renamed to have the extension .FAILED and\"\n"
"        echo \"will be ignored by apt.\"\n"
"        cat NOCHECK | while read a; do\n"
"            mv /var/lib/apt/lists/$a /var/lib/apt/lists/${a}.FAILED\n"
"        done\n"
"    fi) | fmt\n"
"    echo\n"
"    sed 's/^/    /' &gt; NOCHECK\n"
"    echo\n"
"fi\n"
"\n"
"if $allokay; then\n"
"    echo 'Everything seems okay!'\n"
"    echo\n"
"fi\n"
"\n"
"rm -rf /tmp/apt-release-check"
msgstr ""

msgid "You might need to apply the following patch for <emphasis>sid</emphasis> since <command>md5sum</command> adds an '-' after the sum when the input is stdin:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@\n"
"        local LOOKUP=\"$2\"\n"
"\n"
"        Y=\"`get_md5sumsize Release \"$LOOKUP\"`\"\n"
"-       Y=\"`echo \"$Y\" | sed 's/^ *//;s/  */ /g'`\"\n"
"+       Y=\"`echo \"$Y\" | sed 's/-//;s/^ *//;s/  */ /g'`\"\n"
"\n"
"        if [ ! -e \"/var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE\" ]; then\n"
"                if [ \"$Y\" = \"\" ]; then\n"
"@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@\n"
"                return\n"
"        fi\n"
"        X=\"`md5sum &lt; /var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE` `wc -c &lt; /var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE`\"\n"
"-       X=\"`echo \"$X\" | sed 's/^ *//;s/  */ /g'`\"\n"
"+       X=\"`echo \"$X\" | sed 's/-//;s/^ *//;s/  */ /g'`\"\n"
"        if [ \"$X\" != \"$Y\" ]; then\n"
"                echo \"$FILE\" &gt;&gt;BAD\n"
"                echo \"BAD\"\n"
"                "
msgstr ""

msgid "Release check of non Debian sources"
msgstr ""

msgid "Notice that, when using the latest apt version (with <emphasis>secure apt</emphasis>) no extra effort should be required on your part unless you use non-Debian sources, in which case an extra confirmation step will be required by apt-get. This is avoided by providing <filename>Release</filename> and <filename>Release.gpg</filename> files in the non-Debian sources. The <filename>Release</filename> file can be generated with <command>apt-ftparchive</command> (available in <package>apt-utils</package> 0.5.0 and later), the <filename>Release.gpg</filename> is just a detached signature. To generate both follow this simple procedure:"
msgstr ""

msgid ""
"\n"
"$ rm -f dists/unstable/Release\n"
"$ apt-ftparchive release dists/unstable &gt; dists/unstable/Release\n"
"$ gpg --sign -ba -o dists/unstable/Release.gpg dists/unstable/Release"
msgstr ""

msgid "Alternative per-package signing scheme"
msgstr ""

msgid "The additional scheme of signing each and every packages allows packages to be checked when they are no longer referenced by an existing <filename>Packages</filename> file, and also third-party packages where no <filename>Packages</filename> ever existed for them can be also used in Debian but will not be default scheme."
msgstr ""

msgid "This package signing scheme can be implemented using <package>debsig-verify</package> and <package>debsigs</package>. These two packages can sign and verify embedded signatures in the .deb itself. Debian already has the capability to do this now, but there is no feature plan to implement the policy or other tools since the archive signing scheme is prefered. These tools are available for users and archive administrators that would rather use this scheme instead."
msgstr ""

msgid "Latest <command>dpkg</command> versions (since 1.9.21) incorporate a <ulink name=\"patch\" url=\"http://lists.debian.org/debian-dpkg/2001/debian-dpkg-200103/msg00024.html\" /> that provides this functionality as soon as <package>debsig-verify</package> is installed."
msgstr ""

msgid "NOTE: Currently <filename>/etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg</filename> ships with \"no-debsig\" as per default."
msgstr ""

msgid "NOTE2: Signatures from developers are currently stripped when they enter off the package archive since the currently preferred method is release checks as described previously."
msgstr ""