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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
// (c) Hare authors <https://harelang.org>
use bytes;
use crypto::math::{xor,eqslice};
use endian::{beputu64, beputu32, begetu32};
use errors;
use io;
use types;
def GCMBLOCKSZ: size = 16;
export def GCMTAGSZ: size = 16;
export type gcmstream = struct {
stream: io::stream,
block: nullable *block,
handle: io::handle,
tagbuf: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
xorbuf: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
cipherbuf: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
y0: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
h: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
y: u32,
xorbufpos: size,
adlen: u64,
clen: u64,
};
const gcm_vtable: io::vtable = io::vtable {
writer = &gcm_writer,
reader = &gcm_reader,
closer = &gcm_closer,
...
};
// Creates a Galois Counter Mode (GCM) io::stream which can be used for
// encryption (by encrypting writes to the underlying handle) or decryption (or
// by decrypting reads from the underlying handle), but not both. [[gcm_init]]
// must be called to initialize the stream, before reading or writing. To
// authenticate the encrypted data an authentication tag must be created using
// [[gcm_seal]] after the encryption step. The authentication tag must be passed
// to [[gcm_verify]] after decryption to make sure that the encrypted and
// additional data were not modified. In case of a verification fail the
// decrypted data must not be trusted and hence discarded.
//
// A maximum of 2**36-32 bytes may be encrypted.
//
// The user must call [[io::close]] when they are done using the stream to
// securely erase secret information stored in the stream state. Close will
// also finish the 'block' provided by [[gcm_init]]. If the 'block' should
// not be finished, [[gcm_unlink_block]] must be called before close.
export fn gcm() gcmstream = {
return gcmstream {
stream = &gcm_vtable,
handle = 0,
...
};
};
// Initialises the gcmstream. The data will be encrypted to or encrypted from
// the given 'handle' The implementation only supports a block cipher 'b' with a
// block size of 16 bytes. The initialization vector (nonce) 'iv' may have any
// size up to 2**61 bytes. 12 bytes is the recommended size, if efficiency is
// critical. The additional data 'ad' will be authenticated but not encrypted
// and may have a maximum length of 2**61 - 1 bytes. 'ad' will not be written to
// the underlying handle.
export fn gcm_init(
s: *gcmstream,
handle: io::handle,
b: *block,
iv: const []u8,
ad: const []u8
) void = {
assert(blocksz(b) == GCMBLOCKSZ);
assert(len(iv): u64 <= (types::U64_MAX >> 3));
s.handle = handle;
s.block = b;
s.adlen = len(ad);
s.xorbufpos = GCMBLOCKSZ; // to force fill xorbuf at start
encrypt(b, s.h, s.h);
if (len(iv) == 12) {
s.y0[..12] = iv[..];
s.y0[15] |= 1;
} else {
let ivlen = s.tagbuf;
beputu64(ivlen[8..], len(iv) << 3);
ghash_ctmul64(s.y0, s.h, iv);
ghash_ctmul64(s.y0, s.h, ivlen);
bytes::zero(ivlen);
};
s.y = begetu32(s.y0[12..]) + 1;
let ad = ad[..];
for (len(ad) > 0) {
const max = if (len(ad) >= GCMBLOCKSZ) {
yield GCMBLOCKSZ;
} else {
yield len(ad);
};
ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, ad[..max]);
ad = ad[max..];
};
};
fn gcm_writer(s: *io::stream, buf: const []u8) (size | io::error) = {
let s = s: *gcmstream;
if (len(buf) == 0) {
return 0z;
};
if (s.xorbufpos == GCMBLOCKSZ) {
// current key block is depleted, prepare the next one
fillxorbuf(s);
};
let buf = buf[..];
let n: size = 0;
const max = if (s.xorbufpos + len(buf) > len(s.cipherbuf)) {
yield len(s.cipherbuf) - s.xorbufpos;
} else {
yield len(buf);
};
let cipher = s.cipherbuf[s.xorbufpos..s.xorbufpos + max];
let key = s.xorbuf[s.xorbufpos..s.xorbufpos + max];
xor(cipher, key, buf[..max]);
const n = io::write(s.handle, cipher)?;
s.xorbufpos += n;
s.clen += n;
if (s.xorbufpos == GCMBLOCKSZ) {
ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, s.cipherbuf);
};
return n;
};
fn fillxorbuf(s: *gcmstream) void = {
let y: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8 = [0...];
s.xorbuf[..] = s.y0[..];
beputu32(s.xorbuf[12..], s.y);
encrypt(s.block as *block, s.xorbuf, s.xorbuf);
s.y += 1;
s.xorbufpos = 0;
};
fn gcm_reader(s: *io::stream, buf: []u8) (size | io::EOF | io::error) = {
let s = s: *gcmstream;
const n = match (io::read(s.handle, buf)?) {
case io::EOF =>
return io::EOF;
case let s: size =>
yield s;
};
for (let i = n; i > 0) {
if (s.xorbufpos == GCMBLOCKSZ) {
fillxorbuf(s);
};
const max = if (s.xorbufpos + i > GCMBLOCKSZ) {
yield len(s.cipherbuf) - s.xorbufpos;
} else {
yield i;
};
let cipher = s.cipherbuf[s.xorbufpos..s.xorbufpos + max];
let key = s.xorbuf[s.xorbufpos..s.xorbufpos + max];
cipher[..] = buf[..max];
xor(buf[..max], buf[..max], key);
buf = buf[max..];
i -= max;
s.xorbufpos += max;
s.clen += max;
if (s.xorbufpos == len(s.cipherbuf)) {
ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, s.cipherbuf);
};
};
return n;
};
// Finishes encryption and returns the authentication tag. After calling seal,
// the user must not write any more data to the stream.
export fn gcm_seal(s: *gcmstream, tag: []u8) void = {
assert(len(tag) == GCMTAGSZ);
if (s.xorbufpos > 0 && s.xorbufpos < GCMBLOCKSZ) {
// last block was is not full, therefore the content was not
// hashed yet.
ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, s.cipherbuf[..s.xorbufpos]);
};
beputu64(tag, s.adlen << 3);
beputu64(tag[8..], s.clen << 3);
ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, tag);
// use tmp to store the resulting tag
encrypt(s.block as *block, tag, s.y0);
xor(tag, tag, s.tagbuf);
};
// Verifies the authentication tag against the decrypted data. Must be called
// after reading all data from the stream to ensure that the data was not
// modified. If the data was modified, [[errors::invalid]] will be returned and
// the data must not be trusted.
export fn gcm_verify(s: *gcmstream, tag: []u8) (void | errors::invalid) = {
assert(len(tag) == GCMTAGSZ);
if (s.xorbufpos > 0 && s.xorbufpos < GCMBLOCKSZ) {
ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, s.cipherbuf[..s.xorbufpos]);
};
let tmp: [16]u8 = [0...];
beputu64(tmp, s.adlen << 3);
beputu64(tmp[8..], s.clen << 3);
ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, tmp);
encrypt(s.block as *block, tmp, s.y0);
xor(tmp, tmp, s.tagbuf);
if (eqslice(tag, tmp) == 0) {
return errors::invalid;
};
};
// Unlinks the 'block' provided by [[gcm_init]] to avoid finishing it when
// calling [[io::close]] on the stream.
export fn gcm_unlink_block(s: *gcmstream) void = {
s.block = null;
};
fn gcm_closer(s: *io::stream) (void | io::error) = {
let s = s: *gcmstream;
bytes::zero(s.tagbuf);
bytes::zero(s.xorbuf);
bytes::zero(s.cipherbuf);
bytes::zero(s.y0);
bytes::zero(s.h);
if (s.block is *block) {
finish(s.block as *block);
};
};
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